You are on page 1of 8

TEN LESSONS FROM

20 YEARS OF VALUE
CREATION INSIGHTS
By Gerry Hansell, Jeff Kotzen, Eric Olsen, Alexander Roos, Eric Wick, Ed Newman, and
Hady Farag

I n 1602, commerce evolved into capital-


ism when the Dutch East India Company
formally syndicated its ownership. The first
top corporations on the basis of the value
they’d created over the previous five years
and also attempted to draw out lessons
dispute between managers and shareholders from the winners. Since then, we have ex-
came shortly thereafter, in 1622, when a panded our databases, refined our method-
“complaining participant” sued for control ologies, and—continually developing our
rights, citing disagreements on transparency, thinking—shared our perspectives annual-
governance, and capital allocation. Through- ly. For our 20th report, we have now dili-
out the next four centuries, company owners gently reassessed our cumulative experi-
and managers have wrestled with how best ence and distilled our perspectives down
to handle the inherent tensions between to ten lessons—including the source of
long-term shareholder value creation and some of the most common managerial mis-
myriad other management objectives. takes—that we think really matter.

BCG has been advising companies on val- 1. Value creation is not the only goal, but it
ue creation since our founder, Bruce is essential. The concept of shareholder
Henderson, opened its doors more than value incites lots of debate. For some, it is
five decades ago. Indeed, many of the the singular company objective. For others,
firm’s innovations—such as the growth it is a misguided target. There are plenty of
share matrix, experience curves, and cash points of view in between.
trap—stem from our early work on the
ways that competitive advantage and capi- This debate sucks up a lot of air purpose-
tal allocation interact to create value for a lessly, for two reasons. First, companies
company’s owners. have shareholders, shareholders have rights,
and shareholders are increasingly sophisti-
In 1998, the firm published the first BCG cated, exercising their rights through activ-
Value Creators Report, which ranked the ism and other channels. More often than
not, a management team that loses the sup- just as important as getting the metrics
port of its investors also loses control of the right. (See Exhibit 1.) A comprehensive val-
company’s agenda, including the ability to ue creation agenda encompasses both the
pursue other, nonfinancial objectives. hard (performance) and soft (culture) sides
of the challenge. (See “VF Corporation’s
Second, the conflicts among the differing TSR-Led Transformation,” BCG article,
points of view are not as intense as many September 2013.)
believe them to be. There is a growing body
of evidence that purpose-driven, sustainable 3. Medium-term TSR must be the capstone
strategies are also beneficial to sharehold- metric. Two truths are critical to under-
ers. Our research on the impact of environ- standing many of the common mistakes
mental, social, and governance (ESG) met- made in the name of value creation: TSR is
rics shows that companies that perform well the only metric that represents the share-
in terms of nonfinancial ESG measures also holder’s bottom line, and the only metric
deliver better financial performance and that correlates 100% with TSR is TSR.
command measurably higher valuation. (See “Value Creation and Corporate
(See Total Societal Impact: A New Lens for Reinvention,” BCG article, December
Strategy, BCG report, October 2017.) 2017.) Medium-term TSR, measured over a
three- to five-year time frame, gives strate-
Put another way, building a great company gies the chance to be implemented and
is not at all inconsistent with being a great investments the opportunity to mature.
stock.
Substituting any proxy metric for TSR inev-
2. Metrics alone are not enough to achieve itably leads companies off course. When
this goal. Here are two points that they earnings per share (EPS) is the principle
don’t teach in business school. governing metric, for example, managers
can end up “buying” increased EPS by cut-
First, the theory that value creation comes ting important investments such as R&D or
solely from the act of making positive net making excessive capital expenditures,
present-value investments is of limited use ill-advised M&A moves, or poorly timed
in most modern public companies. Funda- buybacks. In contrast, TSR is balanced, and
mentally, investors price a company’s it takes into account all the critical factors
shares on the basis of their views of the un- that drive fundamental value: revenue
derlying business and the attractiveness of growth (from reinvestment in the busi-
the available reinvestment opportunities. ness), margin expansion (from cost control
Because such expectations are priced into and pricing), and cash flows (which can be
the stock today, the real value creation task reinvested in more growth or used for debt
confronting leaders of public companies is reduction, dividends, and buybacks). TSR
the need to make more and better invest- also takes into account how managerial ac-
ments than the ones already anticipated by tions that determine the valuation multi-
investors or to increase—beyond expecta- ple, such as investing in the future, opti-
tions—the profits being earned on existing mally deploying capital, or reducing risk
investments. Beating expectations as ex- exposures, affect investor expectations.
pectations evolve is what matters. It’s no
small task, and it’s nearly impossible to Medium-term TSR is the only performance
achieve using metrics alone. metric that appropriately scores the game.
This is why it is the only multiperiod met-
Second, strong and sustainable value cre- ric mandated by the US Securities and Ex-
ation is delivered in the trenches. Hardwir- change Commission and why it’s the prin-
ing value management principles into an ciple performance metric evaluated by
organization’s systems and processes—in- Institutional Shareholder Services. These
cluding target setting, planning, capital al- two bodies exert outsize influence on cor-
location and risk assessment performance porate reporting and governance around
reviews, and incentive compensation—is the world.

Boston Consulting Group | Ten Lessons from 20 Years of Value Creation Insights 2
Exhibit 1 | BCG’s Integrated TSR Management Model

Business strategy
• Growth, margins, portfolio,
targets, and risk

Strong and
Align business, financial,
sustainable
and investor strategies
TSR
Investor strategy Financial strategy
Management processes

• Valuation multiple • Capital structure


• Messaging • Dividends and
• Migration buybacks

Metric design, selection, and use

Planning
Target Resource
and
setting allocation
budgeting Focus the company’s culture
specifically on TSR
Incentives
Enablers

Systems and reporting

Training and capability building

Source: BCG analysis.

4. Every company can find a path to value pany has the opportunity to outperform
creation. Managers often feel trapped, or at its peers. No matter how bad an industry’s
least typecast, by industry expectations average performance is relative to other
and macroeconomic factors. They overlook sectors and to the market as a whole, it is
the inevitability that in every industry and still possible for companies in that industry
for every cycle, there are winners—compa- to deliver superior shareholder returns.
nies that outperform the pack. (See “How Top Value Creators Outpace
the Market—for Decades,” BCG article,
Starting points matter, but for almost every July 2017.)
starting point, there is a value-creating road
forward. As always, in 2018, the leading com- 5. Growth is the most common path to TSR
panies in our sample of top value creators outperformance, but not the only path.
substantially outpaced their own industry as Profitable revenue growth is often the
well as the total market. The median TSR of primary driver of TSR outperformance
the top ten companies in each industry was over extended time horizons. For top
higher than the industry’s median by 9 per- performers during five- to ten-year periods,
centage points (in insurance) and 32 percent- revenue growth accounts for an average of
age points (in media and publishing as well 50% to 70% of value creation. For this
as metals). (See Exhibit 2.) reason, it’s easy to forgive managers for
concluding that growth is all that matters.
The lesson is this: being in a sector whose
market performance is below average is no Still, this view is misguided for two reasons.
excuse. TSR is a relative—as well as an ab- First, it overlooks that myopic pursuit of
solute—metric, so whether an industry is growth is one of the most common paths to
under pressure or accelerating, every com- value destruction. (See Threading the Needle:

Boston Consulting Group | Ten Lessons from 20 Years of Value Creation Insights 3
Exhibit 2 | How Industries Rank, by TSR
Five-year median TSR, 2013–2017 (%)

80

60

40
24.2 21.8 21.5 21.5 21.3 21.3
21.1 20.3 19.5 18.9 17.9 17.5
16.6 16.2 16.2 15.9 15.8 15.6 15.3 15.1 14.9 14.6 14.0 13.9
20 13.8 12.9 12.2 11.4 10.9
9.9 9.2
6.6

0
–3.3
–20

–40
Midcap pharma
Automotive components
Technology
Media and publishing
Medical technology
Consumer durables
Financial infrastructure providers
Travel and tourism
Forest products and packaging
Aerospace and defense
Services
Insurance
Health care services
Building materials
Machinery
Chemicals
Green energy and environment
Retail
Asset management and brokerage
Transportation and logistics
Automotive OEMs
Large-cap pharma
Consumer nondurables
Construction
Banking
Fashion and luxury
Real estate
Multibusiness
Power and gas utilities
Communication service providers
Metals
Oil
Mining
Minimum to maximum Median

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; company filings and disclosures; BCG ValueScience Center.
Note: Based on an analysis of 2,425 companies.

Value Creation in a Low-Growth Economy, the There are many paths to top-quartile TSR.
2010 BCG Value Creators Report, Septem-
ber 2010.) Aggressive growth can be a high- 6. Cash flow is underappreciated and often
risk, high-reward proposition, and “bad” misunderstood. While growth is the most
growth is a common cause of long-term TSR common route to top- and bottom-quartile
underperformance. There are many exam- performance, it is cash that accounts for
ples of companies that were able to sustain most of the shareholder return that a
10% or more top-line growth only to gener- company generates over time. Indeed,
ate below-average or even negative TSR. In since 1926, about 40% of the TSR of the
many cases, such disconnect is driven by S&P 500 has come from cash returned
M&A moves gone bad, prioritizing growth at through dividends—even more when
the expense of margins, betting on a cycle buybacks are factored in. Furthermore,
that collapses, or investing in adjacencies in cash generation is the main driver for
which the competitive advantages of the growth businesses, as it defines the magni-
core business do not apply. tude of a company’s organic or M&A
long-term reinvestment rate.
The second reason is that there are many
examples of top-quartile value creators gen- Beyond the simple truth that cash flow is
erating TSR from some combination of oth- king lies a less obvious point: investors do
er factors, including margin improvement, not value equally all dollars returned to
cash return, and multiple expansion. Our shareholders. In fact, the method of re-
2017 list of the top consistent value creators turn—share buybacks, dividends, or debt
over 20 years contained two tobacco compa- repayment—can have a powerful second-
nies, which, despite shrinking markets, ad- ary effect on valuation. For 15 years, we
verse regulation, and ample brand dispar- have been arguing in our publications that
agement, generated annual TSRs of 17% dividends are especially important: materi-
and 22% from 1997 through 2016. al increases in payout often lead to a signif-

Boston Consulting Group | Ten Lessons from 20 Years of Value Creation Insights 4
icant expansion of a company’s valuation disagree. While multiples move somewhat
multiple and therefore, in the right circum- randomly over short time periods as they in-
stances, can drive far greater TSR than buy- corporate a wide range of information
backs. (See “Thinking Differently about about future profits and risk, they are not
Dividends,” BCG Perspectives, May 2003.) random and certainly not uncontrollable.
We have invested more than 20 years in
7. M&A is a powerful tool—for those that building an analytical tool set that helps
commit to it. M&A has a bad rap, thanks to companies understand how their shares
the commonly cited assertion that most trade in public markets and which financial
deals destroy value. It is true that more KPIs investors take as signals of a healthy
than 50% of deals simply transfer wealth (or unhealthy) business outlook. Our tools
from buyer to seller. But there is an untold reveal the key drivers of valuation, which, in
other side to that story: many long-term, turn, can reveal strategic information about
top-quartile value creators engage in a business. (See Exhibit 3.)
significant numbers of M&A deals. (See
From Buying Growth to Building Value: One can point to countless examples. In
Increasing Returns with M&A, BCG report, many industries, investors look at gross
October 2015.) This should not be surpris- margin as a proxy for a business’s resis-
ing: M&A is one way (and there are not tance to commoditization (in, for example,
that many others) to reinvest large technology) or its brand power (apparel).
amounts of capital. Furthermore, well- Investors in financial services put a premi-
sourced and well-executed deals can serve um on return on tangible equity. Biotech
up substantial returns. (See “The Real Deal investors value forward-growth expecta-
on M&A, Synergies, and Value,” BCG tions—almost without regard to current
article, November 2016.) profitability. In other sectors, investors put
a premium on dividends, which they view
The factors that make successful acquirers as signals of a company’s confidence in fu-
successful are straightforward. These ac- ture earnings and its managers’ willingness
quirers commit to M&A and approach it as to put their money where their mouth is.
they would any other industrial process:
they climb an experience curve, become The drivers of valuation provide a rich and
proficient over time, and scale up their ca- refined tool for common managerial
pability. They also invest disproportionate- tradeoffs, such as driving growth at the ex-
ly in three key areas. (See “Lessons from pense of margins or reinvesting free cash
Successful Serial Acquirers,” BCG Perspec- flow instead of paying down debt. Indeed,
tives, October 2014.) First, they craft a pro- the success of companies such as Church &
prietary view of the ways that they create Dwight and VF has been achieved, in part,
value. This guides their M&A strategy. Sec- on a strong understanding of the way that
ond, senior leadership is deeply engaged in business fundamentals and valuation mul-
the M&A process, and managers at all lev- tiples interact to inform strategic decisions.
els of the organization are expected to (See Improving the Odds: Strategies for Supe-
source and cultivate relationships with po- rior Value Creation, the 2012 BCG Value
tential targets. Finally, the most successful Creators Report, September 2012.)
acquirers articulate a core set of operating
principles that define the way that the 9. The shape and asymmetry of investment
M&A process will be managed with no ad- opportunities are far more important than
ditional bureaucracy. the precision of the calculations behind
them. Too often, senior management
8. Valuation multiples are no longer a black wastes time and energy trying to get the
box. In many cases, managers think that a data inputs for their models precisely right.
company’s valuation multiple is a random The leading example of this phenomenon
and uncontrollable outcome and that fickle is the fruitless fretting over a company’s
investors don’t truly understand the busi- weighted average cost of capital. (Charlie
nesses in which they invest. We respectfully Munger, the vice chairman of Berkshire

Boston Consulting Group | Ten Lessons from 20 Years of Value Creation Insights 5
Exhibit 3 | Analysis of Multiples Can Reveal the Drivers of Company Valuations over Time

Approach: Insight: Application:


Regression analysis Equations identify key drivers The model tracks valuations
of a specific peer set over time of differences in valuation multiples and can inform strategic decisions

100 100 100


Value per share ($)
Actual multiple 13
17 15
100
8 9 9
9 7 10
12 5 80
9
10
15 12
24 60
12
35 40
26
28
7 8 20
Asset-based Earnings-based Growth-based
variables variables variables 0
(for example, (for example, (for example,
materials) consumer) software) 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

Unexplained ROI Trading range Year-end price


Predicted multiple
Industry Margin BCG Smart Multiple1
Financial policy Growth
Balance sheet

Source: BCG analysis.


Note: Because of rounding, not all percentages add up to 100.
1
BCG Smart Multiple uses regression analysis to empirically derive the linkage between business fundamentals and relative valuation within
an industry or peer set over time, typically a ten-year period.

Hathaway, once said, “I’ve never heard an companies put anywhere near the level of
intelligent discussion about the cost of time, effort, and intensity into learning
capital.” He’s right.) What managers should why investors own their stock that they put
be evaluating is how a proposed investment into figuring out why customers buy their
compares with the next-best use of capital. products. This is a mistake.
If the difference in the cost of capital
assumptions (within reasonable bounds) Some customers are more valuable than
reduces the attractiveness of an investment, others, so it makes no sense to try to serve
it has likely already failed the test. every customer equally. Similarly, there are
investors that a company wants and those
Even more important, excessive focus on that it would just as soon not have. Each
technical precision takes time and effort investor has its own investment process,
away from the more meaningful determi- capital allocation preferences, KPIs, and
nants of investment decisions, such as the buy-sell triggers. Investors differ in their
reliability and asymmetry of the forecast willingness to support a company’s mid-to-
and whether there are any accounting prin- long-term strategy—especially when re-
ciples at play that decouple reported earn- sults are likely to take time to materialize.
ings from cash flow. Management time The smart play for management teams is
and attention are much better spent on to identify the “right” investors and go af-
pressure-testing key assumptions, contrast- ter them, just as they would pursue high-
ing different approaches for evaluation value customers.
(such as cash versus accounting metrics),
and considering the different competitive Doing so takes more than the typical
scenarios in which the investment could approach to investor relations. Value-
unfold. (See Risky Business: Value Creation in oriented leadership teams seek to engage
a Volatile Economy, the 2011 BCG Value in a genuine dialogue with sophisticated
Creators Report, September 2011.) investors about the ways value will be
created. They use such opportunities to
10. Treating your investors like customers benefit from the experience of portfolio
pays dividends over time. Relatively few managers and analysts, whose insights can

Boston Consulting Group | Ten Lessons from 20 Years of Value Creation Insights 6
help challenge conventional wisdom within and second decades of this century, and
the company. the great financial crisis. One of the biggest
changes has been to the nature of business
Company executives also need to appreciate itself.
that the support of patient and long-term-
oriented investors comes at a price—in the Value management grew up in an economy
form sometimes of inconvenient transpar- that was dominated by capital-intensive
ency. During both good and not-so-good companies, for which value creation was
times, investors want a candid assessment largely about squeezing out incremental re-
of key market forces, the company’s strate- turns on physical capital (accounted for on
gies to win, and the upsides for sticking balance sheets). Recent decades have seen
around, as well as the roadmap for getting the rapid rise of “discovery” businesses—
to the payoff and how they can track prog- including IT, pharma, professional services,
ress. And when mistakes are made, investors and medical technology—for which value
want to know what lessons have been creation is much more about driving top-
learned. They increasingly also want reas- line growth and generating returns from
surance that a solid governance system— investments that flow through the income
one that includes a proven board of direc- statement. (See “Value Patterns: The Con-
tors and executive compensation that cept,” BCG Perspectives, May 2012.)
emphasizes the right metrics—is in place.
(See Winning Moves in the Age of Shareholder This proliferation of new business models
Activism, BCG Focus, August 2015.) is, in many cases, interpreted as making
value management less relevant when, of
All this takes time and sophistication on course, the opposite is true. The 2019 Value
the part of management, but the effort is Creators report will examine some of the
worthwhile. Over and over, we see that new challenges we expect managers to face
well-aligned investors are critical to ensur- as advancing technology causes the econo-
ing the success of well-designed strategies. my—and the managerial principles that
govern value creation within it—to evolve.
But the use of TSR as a North Star that

T he shape of the playing field has


changed many times since the early
17th century and, indeed, over the 20 years
guides value-creating agendas and the ap-
plication of the hard-won, timeless princi-
ples of value creation are more important
of our Value Creators series, which have than ever. The game may be changing once
seen the dot-com bubble expand and burst, again, but the rules—and the ways of win-
the surges in the middle years of the first ning—remain the same.

Boston Consulting Group | Ten Lessons from 20 Years of Value Creation Insights 7
About the Authors
Gerry Hansell is a senior partner and managing director in the Chicago office of Boston Consulting
Group. You may contact him by email at hansell.gerry@bcg.com.

Jeff Kotzen is a senior partner and managing director in the firm’s New Jersey office. You may contact
him by email at kotzen.jeffrey@bcg.com.

Eric Olsen is a senior advisor in BCG’s Chicago office. You may contact him by email at
olsen.eric@advisor.bcg.com.

Alexander Roos is a senior partner and managing director in the firm’s Berlin office. You may contact
him by email at roos.alexander@bcg.com.

Eric Wick is a senior partner and managing director in BCG’s Chicago office. You may contact him by
email at wick.eric@bcg.com.

Ed Newman is a principal in the firm’s Chicago office. You may contact him by email at
newman.ed@bcg.com.

Hady Farag is an associate director in BCG’s New York office. You may contact him by email at
farag.hady@bcg.com.

Boston Consulting Group (BCG) is a global management consulting firm and the world’s leading advisor
on business strategy. We partner with clients from the private, public, and not-for-profit sectors in all re-
gions to identify their highest-value opportunities, address their most critical challenges, and transform
their enterprises. Our customized approach combines deep insight into the dynamics of companies and
markets with close collaboration at all levels of the client organization. This ensures that our clients
achieve sustainable competitive advantage, build more capable organizations, and secure lasting results.
Founded in 1963, BCG is a private company with offices in more than 90 cities in 50 countries. For more
information, please visit bcg.com.

© Boston Consulting Group 2018. All rights reserved.

For information or permission to reprint, please contact BCG at permissions@bcg.com. To find the latest
BCG content and register to receive e-alerts on this topic or others, please visit bcg.com. Follow Boston
Consulting Group on Facebook and Twitter.

11/18

Boston Consulting Group | Ten Lessons from 20 Years of Value Creation Insights 8

You might also like