CASE DIGESTS IN CONFLICT OF LAWS

Submitted by: Camille Acabado

US vs. JARVISON

Nature of the case:

Criminal Case
Facts:
Esther and Ben Jarvison, both members of Navajo tribe, were married in Navajo rites in
1953. Subsequently, the government is compelling Esther to testify against Ben for the
sexual molestation case filed against Ben. Esther refused to testify and invoked spousal
testimonial privilege.
Issue:
Whether the Jarvison’s marriage in a traditional Navajo ceremony on June 25, 1953
was valid? Whether full faith and credit should be accorded said marriage?
Ruling:
Yes to both.
Navajo Nation retains sovereign authority to regulate domestic relations laws, including
marriage of its Indian subjects, Navajo law is dispositive as to the validity of the
marriage in question.
Under Navajo tradition, celebration of a traditional marriage ceremony and the
knowledge thereof by the community were sufficient to create a valid marriage. Current
Navajo law allows parties to contract marriage within the Navajo nation.
COOK vs. COOK

Nature of the case:

Civil Case
Facts:
Alan and Peggy Cook were first cousins and they were married in Virginia on April 7,
1984 where marriage between first cousins is valid. They then moved to Arizona in
1989. At that time, Arizona considered marriages between first cousins as void except
those that are valid by the laws of the place where it was contracted. In 1996, a
subsequent amendment was introduced where it stated that marriages valid by the laws
of the place where contracted are valid in Arizona, except marriages that are void and
prohibited by its laws
Issue:
Whether the marriage of Allan and Peggy Cook is valid under Arizona law?
Ruling:
Yes.
A spouse’s interest in the marital community includes a “vested property interest”.
Therefore the subsequent amendment with respect to the term “void” is applicable only
to marriages where rights in Arizona have not vested.
Further, Arizona law provides that “no statute is retroactive unless expressly declared
therein.”
OBERGEFELL V. HODGES

Nature of the case:

Civil rights case.
Facts:
Fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose same sex partners are deceased filed
suits against state officials responsible for enforcing state laws that define marriage as
union as a union between one man and one woman. They claimed that the respondent
state officials violated the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them their right to marry
or to have their marriages lawfully performed in another State, given full recognition.
Issue:
1. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage
between two people of the same sex?
2. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to recognize same sex
marriage licensed and performed in a state which grants such right?
Ruling:
1. Yes.
First, the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of
individual autonomy.
Second, the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person
union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals.
Third, the right to marry safeguards children and families and thus draws
meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.
Fourth and finally, marriage is a keystone of our social order.
The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and liberty.
2. Yes.
There is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex
marriage performed in another State on the Ground of its same-sex character.
TENCHAVEZ v. ESCANO

Nature of the case:

Civil Case for Legal Separation and Damages
Facts:
Plaintiff Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano were married on February 24, 1948 in
Cebu City. Their relationship grew cold which lead to Vicenta filing a complaint for
divorce on August 22, 1950 before a court in the State of Nevada. The complaint was
granted and an absolute decree of divorce was issued on October 21, 1950. She
subsequently married an American and later acquired American citizenship on August
8, 1958.
Tenchavez, on the other hand, filed a complaint for legal separation and damages
against Vicenta, her parents, and the Catholic Church but was denied by the CFI.
Issue:
Whether the divorce issued by a Nevada court can be recognized in our jurisdiction?
Ruling:
No.
At the time that the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escano, like her husband was
still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law. The Civil Code of the
Philippines does not admit absolute divorce, for the Philippine courts to recognize and
give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce between Filipino
citizens could be a patent violation of the declared policy of the state.
VAN DORN v. ROMILLO

Nature of the case:

Civil Case
Facts:
Petitioner Alice Van Dorn and private respondent Richard Upton were married in
Hongkong in 1972 and were divorced in Nevada, United States, 1982. Private
respondent filed a suit against petitioner before the RTC of Pasay City for accounting of
petitioner’s business, the Galleon Shop, alleging the same to be conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of bar by prior judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court, where private respondent acknowledge that they
had no conjugal property.
Issue:
Whether the divorce decree should be recognized in our jurisdiction?
Ruling:
Yes.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art.15 of the Civil
Code, only the Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces.
However, Aliens may obtain divorces in abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners
husband entitled to control over conjugal assets.
SAN LUIS v. SAN LUIS

Nature of the case:

Civil Case (Intestate Succession)
Facts:
Felicisimo T. San Luis died living as heirs the following:
1. Children from his first wife: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita, and Manuel;
2. Second Wife, Merry Lee Corwin (who obtained a divorce decree in Hawaii), and
son, Tobia
3. Third wife, Felicidad Sagalongos
Felicidad filed a petition for letters of administration with the Makati, RTC. Rodolfo and
Linda both file a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue and failure to state
a cause of action. They further alleged that Felicidad had no legal personality to file the
petition since she was only a mistress of the decedent, since the latter at the time of his
death was still legally married to Corwin.
Issue:
Whether the divorce obtained by Merry Lee in Hawaii could be recognized in our
jurisdiction?
Ruling:
Yes.
Applying the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. the divorce decree
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would
vest Felicidad with legal personality to file the present petition as the surviving spouse.
PILAPIL v. IBAY-SOMERA

Nature of the case:

Criminal Case
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German National were married in Germany in 1979. Private
respondent got a decree of divorce in 1986 from a German court.
On June 27, 1986 private respondent sued his wife for adultery before the City Fiscal of
Manila. Petitioner file a motion to quash the information but was denied.
Issue:
Whether the divorced husband may file a case of adultery against his divorced wife?
Ruling:
No.
Under Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted
except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse.

Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at
the time he file the suit.
ROEHR v. RODRIGUEZ

Nature of the case:

Civil Case (Custody and distribution of assets)
Facts:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, German citizen, married private respondent
Carmen Rodriguez, Filipino citizen, in Germany on Dec. 11, 1980.
On Aug. 1996, private respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage before RTC, Makati. Petitioner sought to dismiss the petition but was denied.
In the meantime, petitioner was able to obtain a decree of divorce from the Court of First
Instance of Hamburgblanknese on Dec. 16, 1997. The decree included the award of
custody of the children to the petitioner.
Petitioner filed a second motion to dismiss, and was granted. Private respondent
moved to reconsider, praying that the case proceed for the purpose of determining the
issues of custody and distribution of property.
RTC granted the partial motion for reconsideration of private respondent.
Issue:
Whether the RTC was correct in reopening the case to litigate the issues of
custody and distribution of assets despite the divorce between parties?
Ruling:
Yes.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are
cognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and
support of the children, must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can
give the effects of res judicata to a foreign judgment, it must be shown that the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given an ample opportunity to do so.
REPUBLIC v. ORBECIDO

Nature of the case:

Civil case (validity of a divorce decree)
Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the Unied Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City in 1981. Five years later, Lady Myros
migrated to United States where she later acquired American Citizenship and in addition
obtained a divorce decree from a US court. Cipriano then filed a petition for authority to
remarry with the RTC, Zamboanga City. No opposition was filed and petition was
allowed by the lower court. Office of the Solicitor General moved for reconsideration but
was denied.
Issue:
Whether Cipriano can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code?
Ruling:
Yes.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there
was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate
would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Par. 2, Art.
26 are both present in this case.
CORPUZ v. STO TOMAS

Nature of the case:

Civil Case (Judicial Recognition of Foreign Divorce)
Facts:
Former Filipino Citizen and now naturalized Canadian citizen Gerbert Corpuz married
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. After the wedding Gerbert went back to
Canada but upon his return to the Philippines he discovered that his wife was having an
affair with another man. Gerbert then returned to Canada and obtained a decree of
divorce from a court there.
When he met another Filipina whom he wanted to marry, he filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and/or a declaration of marriage as dissolved with the
RTC.
Issue:
Whether a foreigner may invoke the benefit of paragraph 2 of Art. 26 of the Family
Code?
Ruling:
No.
The RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of
the Filipino spouse, In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code.
However, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family
Code does not necessarily strip Gerber of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the rules of Court which provide for the effect
of foreign judgments.
FUJIKI v. MARINAY

Nature of the case:

Civil Case (Petition for Recognition of Foreign Judgment)
Facts:
Petitioner Fujiki, a Japanese National married respondent Marinay in the Philippines on
January 23,2004. In 2008, Marinay contracted another marriage with Maekara, also a
Japanese national, without her previous marriage having been dissolved.
Marinay suffered physical abuse from Maekara and got back with Fujiki. In 2010, the
couple was able to obtain a judgment in a Japanese court that declared Marinay’s
marriage with Maekara was void on the ground of bigamy.
Fujiki then filed a petition in the RTC for recognition of foreign judgment with respect to
the decree of absolute nullity of marriage but was dismissed. He then moved for a
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages is applicable to a foreign judgment of nullity.
2. Whether a husband or wife prior to marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his/her spouse and
a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy?
3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court?

Ruling:
1. No. For Philippine Courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of
a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country the petitioner
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court.

2. Yes. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay.

3. Yes. If there is neither inconsistency with the public policy nor adequate proof to
repel the judgment, Philippine courts, should by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of the nations.