You are on page 1of 13

1

Chapter 1 – General Provisions

Article 774

1. Coronel, et. Al vs. CA

Facts:

On January 19, 1985, Coronel et.al executed a document entitled "Receipt of Down
Payment” in favor of plaintiff Ramona Patricia Alcaraz as an acknowledgement of their receipt of P50,000
as down payment of the purchase price of their inherited house and lot. They also bind themselves to
effect the transfer in their names from their deceased father the transfer certificate of title immediately
upon receipt of the down payment above-stated. Upon the transfer in their names of the subject property,
the Coronels will execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of Ramona and the latter will pay the former
the whole balance.

Concepcion, mother of Ramona, paid the down payment of P50,000.00. On February 6, 1985, the property
originally registered in the name of the Coronels' father was transferred in their names.

On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold the property to Catalina B. Mabanag P1,580,000.00 after the
latter has paid P300,000.00. For this reason, Coronels canceled and rescinded the contract with Ramona
by depositing the down payment paid by Concepcion in the bank in trust for Ramona Patricia Alcaraz.

On February 22, 1985, Concepcion, et al., filed a complaint for specific performance against the Coronels
and caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of TCT.

The RTC ruled in favor of Ramona ordering defendant to execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute
sale covering that parcel of land. On appeal, the CA rendered its decision fully agreeing with the trial court.

Hence this petition where the petitioners argue that there could been no perfected contract on January
19, 1985 because they were then not yet the absolute owners of the inherited property.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners can validly sell the inherited property?

Ruling: Yes.

Article 774 of the Civil Code defines Succession as a mode of transferring ownership as follows:

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to be extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death
to another or others by his will or by operation of law.

Petitioners-sellers in the case at bar being the sons and daughters of the decedent are compulsory heirs
who were called to succession by operation of law. Thus, at the point their father drew his last breath,
petitioners stepped into his shoes insofar as the subject property is concerned, such that any rights or
obligations pertaining thereto became binding and enforceable upon them. It is expressly provided that
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777).

Be it also noted that petitioners' claim that succession may not be declared unless the creditors have been
paid is rendered moot by the fact that they were able to effect the transfer of the title to the property
from the decedent's name to their names on February 6, 1985.

Succession Case Digest by GMJ Atty. Mera Grace A. Mejos


2

Aside from this, petitioners are precluded from raising their supposed lack of capacity to enter into an
agreement at that time and they cannot be allowed to now take a posture contrary to that which they
took when they entered into the agreement with private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz. The Civil Code
expressly states that:

Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon


the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.

Having represented themselves as the true owners of the subject property at the time of sale, petitioners
cannot claim now that they were not yet the absolute owners thereof at that time.

2. Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co.

Facts

The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty different indemnity
agreements, or counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased K. H. Hemady,
a surety solidary guarantor) in all of them, in consideration of the Luzon Surety Co.'s of having
guaranteed, the various principals in favor of different creditors.

It was stipulated that it shall not be necessary for the Company to bring suit against the principal
upon his default, or to exhaust the property of the principal, but the liability hereunder of the
undersigned indemnitor shall be jointly and severally, a primary one, the same as that of the
principal, and shall be exigible immediately upon the occurrence of such default.

The Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of the twenty
bonds it had executed in consideration of the counterbonds, and further asked for judgment for the
unpaid premiums and documentary stamps affixed to the bonds, with 12 per cent interest thereon

The Lower court dismissed the claims of Luzon on two grounds:

(1) that the premiums due and cost of documentary stamps were not contemplated under
the indemnity agreements to be a part of the undertaking of the guarantor (Hemady),
since they were not liabilities incurred after the execution of the counter-bonds; and

(2) that "whatever losses may occur after Hemady's death, are not chargeable to his estate,
because upon his death he ceased to be guarantor."

That new requirement has been added for a person to qualify as a guarantor, that is: integrity. As
correctly pointed out by the Administratrix, integrity is something purely personal and is not
transmissible. Upon the death of Hemady, his integrity was not transmitted to his estate or
successors.

Issue: WON the solidary guarantor's liability is not extinguished by his death

Succession Case Digest by GMJ Atty. Mera Grace A. Mejos


3

Ruling: Yes

While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot
exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs
succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. Articles 774 and 776 of
the New Civil Code expressly so provide, thereby confirming Article 1311 already quoted.

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted
through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.

Art. 776, The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are
not extinguished by his death.

Under the Civil Code the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession are subrogated to all the
rights and obligations of the deceased (Article 661) and can not be regarded as third parties with
respect to a contract to which the deceased was a party, touching the estate of the deceased.

The contracts of suretyship entered into by K. H. Hemady in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being rendered
untransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by the stipulations of the contracts
themselves, nor by provision of law, his eventual liability thereunder necessarily passed upon his
death to his heirs. The contracts, therefore, give rise to contingent claims provable against his
estate.

For defendant administratrix it is averred that the above doctrine refers to a case where the surety files
claims against the estate of the principal debtor; and it is urged that .the rule does not apply to the case
before us, where the late Hemady was a surety, not principal debtor.

The conclusion is that the solidary guarantor's liability is not extinguished by his death, and that in such
event, the Luzon Surety Co., had the right to file against the estate a contingent claim for
reimbursement. It becomes unnecessary now to discuss the estate's liability for premiums and stamp
taxes, because irrespective of the solution to this question, the Luzon Surety's claim did state a cause of
action, and its dismissal was erroneous.

3. De Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et. Al

Facts

Juan Melgar died and the judicial administration of his estate was commenced in 1915 and came to a
close on December 2, 1924, only. During the pendency of the said administration, Susana Melgar,
daughter of the deceased Juan Melgar, sold the land with the right of repurchase to Pedro Cui,
subject to the stipulation that during the period for the repurchase she would continue in possession
of the land as lessee of the purchaser.

On December 12, 1920, the partition of the estate left by the deceased Juan Melgar was made, and the
land in question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar.

Succession Case Digest by GMJ Atty. Mera Grace A. Mejos


4

In 1921, she conveyed, one-half of the land in favor of Nicolasa Rafols, who, entered upon the portion
thus conveyed and has been in possession thereof up to the present.

On July 23, 1921, Pedro Cui brought an action to recover said half of the land from Nicolas Rafols
and the other half from the other defendants, and while that case was pending, or about August 4, 1925,
Pedro Cui donated the whole land in question to Generosa Teves, the herein plaintiff-appellant.

After trial, the lower court rendered a decision absolving Nicolas Rafols as to the one-half of the land
conveyed to him by Susana Melgar, and declaring the plaintiff owner of the other half but express
acknowledgment of the other defendants. The plaintiff appealed from that part of the judgment which is
favorable to Nicolas Rafols.

The lower court absolved Nicolas Rafols upon the theory that Susana Melgar could not have
anything to Pedro Cui because the a land was then in custodia legis, that is, under judicial
administration.

Issue: WON the conveyance of the subject land by Susana in favor of Pedro Cui was valid

Ruling: Yes

Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that "the possession of hereditary property is deemed to be
transmitted to the heir without interruption from the instant of the death of the decedent, in case the
inheritance be accepted." Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs "becomes the undivided owner
of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a
community of ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate while it remains
undivided”.

And according to article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assign or mortgage his part in the
common property, and the effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted him in the partition upon the dissolution of the community.

The court held that where some of the heirs, without the concurrence of the others, sold a property left
by their deceased father, said sale is valid, but that effect thereof was limited to the share which
may be allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate.

Hence the sale made by Susana Melgar in favor of Pedro Cui was valid, but it would be effective only as
to the portion to be adjudicated to the vendor upon the partition of the property left by her deceased
father Juan Melgar. And as on December 12, 1920, upon the partition of said property, the land in
question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar, the sale of the whole land which the latter made in favor
of Pedro Cui was entirely confirmed.

Upon the confirmation of the sale of December 12, 1920 in favor of Pedro Cui, the conveyance by Susana
Melgar in favor of Nicolasa Rafols in 1921 could no longer be done. And even in the case of a double
sale, where neither of the purchasers has registered the sale, the first in possession namely, Pedro
Cui, should be referred. When the sale made in the latter's favor was confirmed on December 12, 1920,
Susana Melgar was in possession of the land as lessee, and this possession should be considered
as that of Pedro Cui. The possession of Nicolas Rafols commenced in 1921 only, wherefore, it is
subsequent to that of Pedro Cui.

Succession Case Digest by GMJ Atty. Mera Grace A. Mejos


5

4. Vitug vs. CA

Facts

On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to sell
certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the
estate in the sum of P667,731.66, plus interests, which he claimed were personal funds.

According to Mr. Vitug, he withdrew the sums of P518,834.27 and P90,749.99 from savings account No.
35342-038 of the Bank of America.

On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds
withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal partnership properties and part of the
estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for failure
to include the sums in question for inventory and for "concealment of funds belonging to the estate."

Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through a survivorship
agreement executed with his late wife and the bank on June 19, 1970. The agreement provides:

We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF AMERICAN NATIONAL TRUST AND
SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred to as the BANK), that all money now or hereafter
deposited by us or any or either of us with the BANK in our joint savings current account shall be
the property of all or both of us and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either
or any of us during our lifetime, and after the death of either or any of us shall belong to and be
the sole property of the survivor or survivors, and shall be payable to and collectible or
withdrawable by such survivor or survivors.

We further agree with each other and the BANK that the receipt or check of either, any or all of
us during our lifetime, or the receipt or check of the survivor or survivors, for any payment or
withdrawal made for our above-mentioned account shall be valid and sufficient release and
discharge of the BANK for such payment or withdrawal.

The trial courts upheld the validity of this agreement and granted "the motion to sell some of the estate
of Dolores L. Vitug, the proceeds of which shall be used to pay the personal funds of Romarico Vitug in
the total sum of P667,731.66.

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in the petition for certiorari filed by the herein private
respondent, held that the above-quoted survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa
which "did not comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code,"
and secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under the
provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code.

Issue: WON the survivorship agreement executed by his wife

Ruling: Yes

The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be embodied in a will. A
will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person
disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death." In
other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator.

Succession Case Digest by GMJ Atty. Mera Grace A. Mejos


6

In this case, the monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds. In
the case relied on, Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co., we rejected claims that a survivorship agreement
purports to deliver one party's separate properties in favor of the other, but simply, their joint holdings.

There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be presumed to
be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marital relations.

Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was to take
effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses because it involved
no conveyance of a spouse's own properties to the other.

It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal partnership, as
held by the Court of Appeals, by "mere stipulation" and that it is no "cloak" to circumvent the law on
conjugal property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to invest conjugal property,
say, by way of a joint and several bank accounts, more commonly denominated in banking parlance as an
"and/or" account.

In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened savings account No. 35342-038, they merely put what
rightfully belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other,
which would have arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited donation. And since the funds were
conjugal, it cannot be said that one spouse could have pressured the other in placing his or her deposits
in the money pool.

The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its "survivor-take-all" feature, but in reality, that
contract imposed a mere obligation with a term, the term being death. Such agreements are permitted
by the Civil Code.

There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been executed for such unlawful
purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in order to frustrate our laws on wills, donations, and
conjugal partnership.

The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the latter has
acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No. 35342-038 of the
Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets left by
Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate property of petitioner, it forms no
more part of the estate of the deceased.

5. Heirs of Natividad vs. Natividad

Facts

An action for specific performance and/or recovery of sum of money was filed against herein respondents
by the spouses Leandro Natividad (Leandro) and Juliana Natividad (Juliana), who are the predecessors of
herein petitioners.

In their Complaint, Leandro and Juliana alleged that sometime in 1974, Sergio Natividad (Sergio), husband
of respondent Juana Mauricio-Natividad (Juana) and father of respondent Jean Natividad-Cruz (Jean),

Succession Case Digest by GMJ Atty. Mera Grace A. Mejos


7

obtained a loan from DBP. As security for the loan, Sergio mortgaged two parcels of land, one of which is
co-owned and registered in his name and that of his siblings namely, Leandro, Domingo and Adoracion.

Subsequently, Sergio died without being able to pay his obligations with DBP. Leandro paid Sergio's loan
obligations. Since respondents were unable to reimburse Leandro, respondents agreed that Sergio's share
in the lot which he co-owned with his siblings and the other parcel of land in the name of Sergio and Juana,
shall be assigned in favor of Leandro and Juliana. Leandro's and Sergio's brother, Domingo, was tasked to
facilitate the transfer of ownership of the subject properties in favor of Leandro ·and Juliana. However,
Domingo died without being able to cause such transfer. Subsequently, despite demands and several
follow-ups made by petitioners, respondents failed and refused to honor their undertaking.

Respondents filed their Answer denying the allegations in the complaint and raising the following
defenses: (1) respondents are not parties to the contract between Sergio and DBP; (2) there is neither
verbal nor written agreement between petitioners and respondents that the latter shall reimburse
whatever payment was made by the former or their predecessor-in-interest; (3) Jean was only a minor
during the execution of the alleged agreement and is not a party thereto; (4) that whatever liability or
obligation of respondents is already barred by prescription, laches and estoppel; (5) that the complaint
states no cause of action as respondents are not duty-bound to reimburse whatever alleged payments
were made by petitioners; and (6) there is no contract between the parties to the effect that respondents
are under obligation to transfer ownership in petitioners' favor as reimbursement for the alleged
payments made by petitioners to DBP.

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, it was partly granted.

Issue: WON the heirs of Sergio is liable to reimburse the amount paid by Leandro

Ruling: Yes

The Court finds it proper to reiterate the CA ruling that, in any case, since respondents had already
acknowledged that Sergio had, in fact, incurred loan obligations with the DBP, they are liable to reimburse
the amount paid by Leandro for the payment of the said obligation even if such payment was made
without their knowledge or consent.

Article 1236 of the Civil Code clearly provides that:

The creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance by a third person who has no interest
in the fulfillment of the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.

Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without
the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been
beneficial to the debtor. (Emphasis supplied)

Neither can respondents evade liability by arguing that they were not parties to the contract between
Sergio and the DBP. As earlier stated, the fact remains that, in the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs,
respondents clearly acknowledged Sergio's loan obligations with the DBP. Being Sergio's heirs, they
succeed not only to the rights of Sergio but also to his obligations.

The following provisions of the Civil Code are clear on this matter, to wit:

Succession Case Digest by GMJ Atty. Mera Grace A. Mejos


8

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others
either by will or by operation of law.

Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death.

Art. 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only the property and the transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of his death, but also those which have accrued thereto since the opening
of the succession.

In the present case, respondents, being heirs of Sergio, are now liable to settle his transmissible
obligations, which include the amount due to petitioners, prior to the distribution of the remainder of
Sergio's estate to them, in accordance with Section 1, 10 Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.

6. Genato vs Bayhon

Facts

1st Case

On October 18, 1990, Respondents filed an action before the RTC for the declaration of nullity of a dacion
en pago allegedly executed by respondent Benjamin Bayhon in favor of petitioner William Ong Genato.

Respondent Benjamin Bayhon alleged that on July 3, 1989, he obtained from the petitioner a loan
amounting to PhP 1,000,000.00; that to cover the loan, he executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over
the property; that, however, the execution of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was conditioned upon
the personal assurance of the petitioner that the said instrument is only a private memorandum of
indebtedness and that it would neither be notarized nor enforced according to its tenor.

Respondent further alleged that he filed a separate proceeding for the reconstitution of the TCT before
the RTC. Petitioner William Ong Genato filed an Answer in Intervention in the said proceeding and
attached a copy of an alleged dacion en pago covering said lot. Respondent assailed the dacion en pago
as a forgery alleging that neither he nor his wife, who had died 3 years earlier, had executed it.

In his Answer, petitioner Genato denied the claim of the respondent regarding the death of the latter’s
wife. He alleged that on the date that the real estate mortgage was to be signed, respondent introduced
to him a woman as his wife. He alleged that the respondent signed the dacion en pago and that the
execution of the instrument was above-board.

2nd Case

On December 20, 1990, petitioner William Ong Genato filed an action for specific performance with the
RTC. Petitioner alleged that respondent obtained a loan from him in the amount of PhP 1,000,000.00.
Petitioner alleged further that respondent failed to pay the loan and executed on October 21, 1989 a
dacion en pago in favor of the petitioner. The dacion en pago was inscribed and recorded with the Registry
of Deeds.

Succession Case Digest by GMJ Atty. Mera Grace A. Mejos


9

Petitioner further averred that despite demands, respondent refused to execute the requisite documents
to transfer to him the ownership of the lot subject of the dacion en pago. Petitioner prayed, inter alia, for
the court to order the respondent to execute the final deed of sale and transfer of possession of the said
lot.

RTC found that respondent obtained a loan in the amount of PhP 1,000,000.00 from the petitioner on July
3, 1989 and that the dacion en pago was novated.

The trial court likewise found that at the time of the execution of the real estate mortgage, the wife of
respondent, Amparo Mercado, was already dead. It held that the property was owned in common by the
respondents and not by respondent Benjamin Bayhon alone. It concluded that the said lot could not have
been validly mortgaged by the respondent alone; the deed of mortgage was not enforceable and only
served as evidence of the obligation of the respondent.

On appeal, respondent Benjamin Bayhon died while the case was still pending decision. CA held that the
real estate mortgage and the dacion en pago were both void. It ruled that at the time the real estate
mortgage and the dacion en pago were executed, the wife of respondent Benjamin Bayhon was already
dead. The appellate court struck down both the dacion en pago and the real estate mortgage as being
simulated or fictitious contracts pursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code.

The Court of Appeals held further that while the principal obligation is valid, the death of respondent
Benjamin Bayhon extinguished it. The heirs could not be ordered to pay the debts left by the deceased.
Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated January 6, 2006.

Issue: WON the obligation of Benjamin Bayhon was extinguished upon his death

Ruling: No

As a general rule, obligations derived from a contract are transmissible. Article 1311, par.1 of the Civil
Code provides:

Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he
received from the decedent.

In Estate of Hemady v. Luzon Surety Co., Inc.,26 the Court, through Justice JBL Reyes, held:

While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot
exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs
succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. Articles 774 and 776 of the New
Civil Code (and Articles 659 and 661 of the preceding one) expressly so provide, thereby confirming Article
1311 already quoted.

"ART. 774. — Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations
to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation of law."

Succession Case Digest by GMJ Atty. Mera Grace A. Mejos


10

"ART. 776. — The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death." (Emphasis supplied)

Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of
patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco, has characterized the history of these
institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into
a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying only a representative position,
barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in
consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other. The transition is marked by the
disappearance of the imprisonment for debt. (Emphasis supplied)

The loan in this case was contracted by respondent. He died while the case was pending before the
Court of Appeals. While he may no longer be compelled to pay the loan, the debt subsists against his
estate. No property or portion of the inheritance may be transmitted to his heirs unless the debt has
first been satisfied. Notably, throughout the appellate stage of this case, the estate has been amply
represented by the heirs of the deceased, who are also his co-parties in Civil Case No. Q-90-7012.

The procedure in vindicating monetary claims involving a defendant who dies before final judgment is
governed by Rule 3, Section 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit:

When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the
defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the
time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry
of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the
manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased
person.

Pursuant to this provision, petitioner’s remedy lies in filing a claim against the estate of the deceased
respondent.

Article 777

1. Uson vs. Del Rosario

Facts

This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels located in pangasinan
filed by Maria Uson against the respondents with the RTC.

Respondent alleged that Maria Uson and her husband Faustino executed a public document whereby they
agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given
a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property
that may be left by her husband upon his death.

There is no dispute that Maria is the lawful wife of Faustino. That Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-
appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four

Succession Case Digest by GMJ Atty. Mera Grace A. Mejos


11

illegitimate children. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity
of the new Civil Code.

The court rendered decision ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and
possession of the lands in dispute without special pronouncement as to costs.

On appeal, Respondents contends that

1. Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she expressly renounced
to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed
of separation they had entered on February 21, 1931
2. That, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the late Faustino
Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under
the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status and rights of
natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter
(article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared
for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event
which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil
Code).

Issue: WON the property belongs to Maria Uson

Ruling: Yes

As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as
completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death".
From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became
vested.

As to the 1st contention: The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the
lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may
acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931,
cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract
nor can it be renounced.

As to the 2nd contention: There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed
that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which
gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights
do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. As already stated in the early part of this
decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon
the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which
commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil
Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased
cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in
dispute.

Succession Case Digest by GMJ Atty. Mera Grace A. Mejos


12

2. Ibarlie vs PO

Facts

This action commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to annul a deed of sale conveying to the
defendant, in consideration of P1,700, one undivided half of a parcel of land which previously had been
sold, along with the other half, by the same vendor to the plaintiff's grantors. judgment was against the
plaintiff. Undisputed facts:

1st. —That Leonard j. Winstanley and Catalina Navarro were husband and wife, the former having died
on June 6, 1946 leaving heir the surviving spouse and some minor children;
2nd. — hat upon the death of L.J. Winstanley, he left a parcel of land described under Transfer
Certificate of title No. 2391 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cebu;
3rd. — That the above mentioned property was a conjugal property;
4th. — That on April 15, 1946, the surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire
parcel of land to the spouses Maria Canoy, alleging among other things, that she needed money for the
support of her children;
5th. — That on May 24, 1947, the spouses Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy sold the same parcel of land
to the plaintiff in this case named Bienvenido A. Ebarle;
6th. — That the two deeds of sale referred to above were not registered and have never been registered
up to the date;
7th. — That on January 17, 1948 surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley, after her
appointment as guardian of her children by this court (Special proceeding no. 212-R) sold one-half of the
land mentioned above to Esperanza M. Po, defendant in the instant case, which portion belongs to the
children of the above named spouses.

Issue: 1. WON the 1st sale in favor of Spouses Canoy was valid

2. WON the 2nd sale in favor to Respondent Po was valid

Ruling:

1. No. Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death." in a slightly different language, this article is incorporated in
the new Civil Code as article 777.

Manresa, commending on article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain, says:

The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the
inheritance, whether such right be pure or contingent. It is immaterial whether a short or long
period of time lapses between the death of the predecessor and the entry into possession of the
property of the inheritance because the right is always deemed to be retroactive from the
moment of death. (5 Manresa, 317.)

The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the
entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the seller's children. No formal or
judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it follows that the first sale was null and
void in so far as it included the children's share.

Succession Case Digest by GMJ Atty. Mera Grace A. Mejos


13

2. Yes. On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent
court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no consequence. If
registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to
no other cause than his own opposition.

3. TESTATE ESTATE OF TANGCO VS DE BORJA

Facts

Succession Case Digest by GMJ Atty. Mera Grace A. Mejos

You might also like