UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

ISABEL SANTAMARIA

Plaintiff, Case No: 6:18-cv-1618-CEM-TBS

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA;
EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT,
IN AND FOR BREVARD COUNTY, FLORIDA;
HONORABLE JUDGE LISA DAVIDSON
(Individual and her Official Capacity);
HONORABLE JUDGE CHARLES HOLCOMB
(Individual and his Official Capacity);
CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICES, LLC;
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; AKERMAN LLP;
LIEBLER, GONZALEZ & PORTUONDO, P.A.;
MARINOSCI LAW GROUP, P.C., P.A.;
WILLIAM P. GRAY; PAUL W. ETTORI;
SCOTT R. STENGEL; SAHILY SERRADET;
MICHAEL P. GELETY;

Defendants,
________________________________/

PLAINTIFF’s AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT

AND JURY TRIAL DEMAND

COMES NOW Plaintiff ISABEL SANTAMARIA, pro se, who hereby files this
Amended Verified Complaint for remedies and violations of her Civil Rights by all parties
named herein and for injuries sustained and alleges as follows:

1
 I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Plaintiff ISABEL SANTAMARIA, hereby brings this claim for remedies and violations
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 1990, ADAAA 2008, ADAAA 2016, Title II,
and Title III: 42 U.S.C. 12182, Prohibition of Discrimination by Public Accommodations; 42
U.S.C. Chapter 126, Equal Opportunities For Individuals with Disabilities1, Subchapter II & III,
Public Accommodations and Services Operated by Private Entities §§ 12181 – 12189,
Subchapter IV §§ 12101 – 12213; 28 C.F.R. PART 36; USC 42 § 12203, Prohibition Against
Retaliation and Coercion (against all parties); Conspiracy to Violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
Deprivation of Rights in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution;
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress,
pursuant to 28 C.F.R. 36.501 and 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), giving such “aggrieved persons” as the
Plaintiff a separate right to bring a private civil action against the violators.
Plaintiff ISABEL SANTAMARIA is a natural person seeking to hold Defendants
collectively accountable for depriving Plaintiff of her civil rights and for Defendants’ failure,
neglect, and refusal to protect Plaintiff from said deprivations although it was in their power to
do so and for injuring Plaintiff.
Plaintiff asserts herein that Defendants were noticed2, at all material times and places,
that their conduct3 was unlawful and injurious to the secured civil rights of the Plaintiff and that
any defense raised on the basis of ignorance of the law or innocent intent is undeniably without
factual foundation.
The consequences of Defendants’ actions towards the Plaintiff are long-term and ongoing
as Defendants have caused Plaintiff emotional and physical harm and have burdened Plaintiff
with medical expenses, legal expenses and now bankruptcy. By their actions, Defendants have

1
See Exhibit B.
2
The Eleventh Circuit has clearly stated that "[a] person may file a suit seeking relief under the ADA without ever
notifying the defendant of his intent to do so, . . . We stress that pre-suit notice is not required to commence suit
under the ADA and that lack of pre-suit notice does not compel a reduction of the requested fee award." Association
of Disabled Ams. v. Neptune Designs, Inc., 469 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2006). Assuming the attorney’s fees sought are
reasonable, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205.
3
A party guilty of fraud or “misconduct” in the prosecution of a civil proceeding should not be permitted to
continue to employ the judiciary to achieve its ends. Andrews v. Palms De Majorca Condominium, 898 So. 2d 1066
(Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

2
 further corrupted and perverted the administration of justice in a court of law and obstructed
Plaintiff of her due process rights and ultimately the enjoyment of her real property as further
explained herein.
II. JURISDICTION

1. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132-12133, 12203(c); and 28

U.S.C. §1331, which gives district courts original jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States of America and 28 U.S.C. §1367, which gives
district courts supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.
2. This court has diversity jurisdiction over the lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(1)
because Defendants are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000, excluding interest and costs.
3. Plaintiff claims federal jurisdiction pursuant to Article III § 2 which extends the
jurisdiction to cases arising under the U.S. Constitution.
4. Plaintiff also brings this suit pursuant to Title 42 U.S. Code § 1983 for violations of
certain protections guaranteed to her by the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution,
by Defendant LISA DAVIDSON under color of law in her capacity as a judge in the Eighteenth
Judicial Circuit Court In and For Brevard County Florida.
5. Venue is appropriate in this jurisdictional district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because
the events that gave rise to this Complaint occurred in this district.

III. PARTIES

6. Plaintiff ISABEL SANTAMARIA (hereinafter “Plaintiff” or “Santamaria”), is a natural

person over the age of eighteen (18) and currently resides in the County of Brevard, State of
Florida, which is in this jurisdictional district.
7. Defendant STATE OF FLORIDA is a local government and is a “public entity”4 as
defined under the ADA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and has waived its immunity as time has expired to

4
A "public entity" is defined in title II to include "any department, agency ... or other instrumentality of a State ... or
local government." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B).

3
 investigate and respond to Plaintiff’s Notice of Claim for tort damages5 pursuant to F.S. 768.28.
The State of Florida may be served by process pursuant to Chapter 48 of the Florida Statutes.
F.S. §48.1216. Plaintiff has filed Notice pursuant to Florida Statutes 768.28(6)(a) and deadline
has expired on February 26, 2019 thereby giving the Plaintiff the right to sue for tort damages.
(See Service of Notice of Claim, Exhibit D).
8. Defendant LISA DAVIDSON, is a Circuit Court Judge for the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit
in and For Brevard County, Florida. Judge Davidson is a “person” within the meaning of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 1990, ADAAA 2008, ADAAA 2016, Title II; and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and acts under color of state law.
9. Defendant EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR BREAVRD
COUNTY FLORIDA (hereinafter “18th Circuit”) is a state court of original jurisdiction in
Brevard County, located at Moore Justice Center, 2825 Judge Fran Jamieson Way, Viera, Florida
32940. Defendant 18th Circuit is a “public entity” for the purposes of the ADA pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 12131 and provides programs and/or activities receiving federal financial assistance
acting under color of state and federal law. The Plaintiff named herein was a Co-
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff in this 18th Circuit Court in the matter of Carrington Mortgage vs
Echeverria, et al, Case No. 05-2015-CA-042159.
10. Defendant CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICES, LLC (hereinafter “CMS”) is a
“private entity” within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 1990,
ADAAA 2008, ADAAA 2016, Title III. CMS provides mortgage loan servicing support services
to borrowers and investors in the United States who’s headquarters are located in Anaheim,
California. Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC operates as a subsidiary of Carrington Holding
Company, LLC and may be served with process by serving its registered agent: CT Corporation,
1200 S. Pine Island Rd. Suite 250, Plantation, Florida 33324.
11. Defendant BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. (hereinafter “BANA”) is a “private entity”
within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 1990, ADAAA 2008,

5
There are no notice of claim requirements or forms for reporting a “federal civil rights claim” to Risk
Management. Claimants can outline their claim in a notice letter or can file a lawsuit with no waiting or
investigation period. https://www.myfloridacfo.com/Division/Risk/Liability/ClaimsProcess.htm
6
Service on the state.—When the state has consented to be sued, process against the state shall be served on the
state attorney or an assistant state attorney for the judicial circuit within which the action is brought and by sending
two copies of the process by registered or certified mail to the Attorney General. The state may serve motions or
pleadings within 40 days after service is made. This section is not intended to authorize the joinder of the Attorney
General or a state attorney as a party in such suit or prosecution.

4
 ADAAA 2016, Title III. BANA is a banking association that has its main office located in North
Carolina, United States of America. Bank of America, N.A. may be served with process by
serving its registered agent: CT Corporation, 1200 S. Pine Island Rd. Suite 250, Plantation,
Florida 33324.

12. Defendant AKERMAN LLP (hereinafter “Akerman”), is a “private entity” within the
meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 1990, ADAAA 2008, ADAAA 2016,
Title III. Akerman is a Florida professional service corporation law firm based in Miami, Florida
and with offices located at 420 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1200 in Orlando, Florida, 32801.
AKERMAN may be served with process by serving its registered agent: Corporate Creations
Network, Inc., 11380 Prosperity Farms Road, #221E, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida 33410.
13. Defendant WILLIAM P. GRAY (hereinafter “Gray”) is a licensed attorney that resides in
the State of Florida (Florida Bar ID no. 983993), a corporate officer of Defendant AKERMAN
LLP, an Officer of the Court, and a natural “person”.
14. Defendant PAUL W. ETTORI (herein after “Ettori”) is licensed attorney that resides in
the State of Florida (Florida Bar ID no. 84150), a corporate officer of Defendant AKERMAN
LLP, an Officer of the Court and a natural “person”.
15. Defendant SCOTT R. STENGEL (hereinafter “Stengel”) is a licensed attorney who
resides in the State of Florida (Florida Bar ID no. 79086), a corporate officer of Defendant
AKERMAN LLP7, an Officer of the Court, and a natural “person”.
16. Defendant LIEBLER, GONZALEZ & PORTUONDO (hereinafter “LGP”), is a “private
entity” within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 1990, ADAAA
2008, ADAAA 2016, Title III. LGP is a Florida professional service corporation law firm with
their main office located at 44 West Flagler Street, 25th Floor, Miami, Florida 33130. LGP may
be served with process by serving its registered agent: Liebler, J RMR., 44 West Flagler Street,
25th Floor, Miami, Florida 33130.
17. Defendant SAHILY SERRADET (herein after “Serradet”) is a licensed attorney who
resides in the State of Florida (Florida Bar ID no. 77620), a corporate officer of Defendant
LIEBLER, GONZALEZ & PORTUONDO, an Officer of the Court, and a natural “person”.

7
1. Defendant Scott R. Stengel is no longer employed by Defendant Akerman LLP. Defendant Stengel is currently a
partner at law firm Sokolof Remtulla Stengel, LLC, in Orlando, Florida.

5
18. Defendant MARINOSCI LAW GROUP, P.C., P.A., (hereinafter “Marinosci” or “MLG”),
is a is a “private entity” within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)
1990, ADAAA 2008, ADAAA 2016, Title III. MLG is a professional service corporation law
firm and foreign profit corporation with their office located at 100 West Cypress Creek Road,
Suite 1045, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33309. MLG may be served with process by serving its
registered agent: CT Corporation, 1200 S. Pine Island Rd. Suite 250, Plantation, Florida 33324.
19. Defendant MICHAEL T. GELETY (herein after “Gelety”) is a licensed attorney (Florida
Bar ID no. 52125), a corporate officer of MARINOSCI LAW GROUP, P.C., P.A., an Officer of
the Court, and a natural “person”.

IV. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

20. Plaintiff Isabel Santamaria is a disabled person as defined under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 1990, ADAAA 2008, and ADAAA 2016.
21. Under the ADA, “disability” is a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). A person is also considered
disabled for purposes of the ADA if she has a record of such an impairment, or is perceived as
having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B).
22. Plaintiff has numerous disabilities/impairments which include but are not limited to:
Diabetes (mellitus), Type 2 (Adult onset); Hypertension; Fibromyalgia/Chronic Fatigue
Syndrome; Multiple Sclerosis (suspect); Sciatic Neuropathy; Annular Fissures with bulges and
protrusions in her Cervical Spine; Carpal Tunnel Syndrome; Migraine unspecified; PTSD (with
PTSD related panic attack in response to stimuli associated with a nerve stressor); Major
Depressive Disorder; ADHD; Glaucoma (both eyes); Uveitis (Busacca’s Nodules, in both eyes);
Bilateral Ocular Hypertension8.
23. As described herein, Plaintiff suffers from both visible and invisible disabilities that are
both psychological and physical disabilities including vision impairments9.
24. Santamaria suffers from well-documented cognitive disabilities which often renders her
unable to function in stressful situations. She sought various accommodations under the ADA

8
If necessary, Plaintiff can provide these medical records to the Court to further substantiate her disabilities.
9
Plaintiff has medical and psychological documentation but due to costs, has only attached a portion of those
medical records to this amended complaint mainly relevant to her injuries.

6
 throughout the proceedings due to her periods of incapacitation and inability to represent herself
in any meaningful way.
25. Defendant BANA was aware of Plaintiff’s disabilities as early as 2010.
26. Defendants AKERMAN, GRAY and ETTORI were aware of Plaintiff’s disabilities in the
year 2011.
27. Defendant LGP and SERRADET were aware of Plaintiff’s disabilities in 201410.
28. At all relevant times, all parties were aware of Plaintiff’s disabilities or perceived that
Plaintiff had disabilities before the acts described herein were committed11.
29. Plaintiff had provided documentation in May 2016 of her disabilities through the Court’s
administrative process when requesting accommodations under the ADA.
30. The 18th Circuit and the remaining Defendants named herein were all aware that Plaintiff
had an impairment communicating, understanding, and at times listening, when she had a panic
attack or other medical emergency which required her to have an ADA Advocate 12/Oral
Interpreter to assist her at all times during court proceedings.13
31. The instant record provides a concrete example: Santamaria faces significant barriers to
participate in legal proceedings due to her disabilities.
32. Plaintiff SANTAMARIA’s civil rights have been violated for many years by opposing
counsel (Akerman’s Paul Ettori and William P. Gray) and by their client Bank of America
(BANA) for a span of approximately eight (8) years when Plaintiff attended meetings,
depositions and expert witness evaluations that were not in compliance with the ADA and clearly
violated Plaintiff’s civil rights.
33. On or around August 1, 2014, Defendant Carrington Mortgage Services (“CMS”)
allegedly began servicing Plaintiff’s purported mortgage.
34. On or around September 11, 2015, Defendant Marinosci Law Group, P.C., P.A.
(“MLG”), filed a lis pendens of foreclosure against Plaintiff and her husband on behalf of

10
Defendants became aware of Plaintiff’s disabilities either through written notification and/or through previous
litigation.
11
As the Eleventh Circuit has recognized, the key principle is that the defendant “must have enough information to
know of both the disability and desire for an accommodation, or circumstances must at least be sufficient to cause a
reasonable [defendant] to make appropriate inquiries about the possible need for an accommodation.” United States
v. Hialeah Hous. Auth., 418 F. App’x 872, 876 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
12
Advocate: one who pleads the cause of another; specifically: one who pleads the cause of another before
a tribunal or judicial court. (Merriam-Webster Dictionary).
13
Plaintiff’s multiple impairments also substantially limit her in the major life activities of concentrating, thinking,
communicating, speaking, mobility, and work.

7
 Defendant CMS in The Eighteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Brevard County Florida (“18th
Circuit”), (Case No. 05-2015-CA-042159).
35. On or around January 4, 2016, Plaintiff Isabel Santamaria and her husband Mr.
Echeverria, pro se, filed their Answer, Affirmative Defenses and compulsory Counterclaim
against CMS, BANA, and MLG. (Case No. 05-2015-CA-042159, Doc. 16).
36. After Plaintiff tried to exercise her civil rights in March 2016 due to her disabilities
during foreclosure litigation, Defendants BANA, CMS, MLG, AKERMAN, LGP, SERRADET,
GRAY, ETTORI, STENGEL, and GELETY began on onslaught of discriminatory and
retaliatory antics against the Plaintiff. The egregious behavior intensified when Plaintiff advised
Defendants BANA, CMS, by and through their counsel and subordinates (Defendants LGP,
MLG, Marinosci, Seradet, Gelety, Stengel, Etorri and Gray), that she was in the process of
acquiring an ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter to assist her in all court related activities and
proceedings due to her disabilities.
37. Defendants Defendants BANA, CMS, by and through their counsel or subordinates
(Defendants LGP, MLG, Marinosci, Seradet, Gelety, Stengel, Etorri and Gray) began to chastise,
mock and ignore Plaintiff’s notices of the need for accommodations, especially the need for an
ADA Advocate with phone calls to Plaintiff’s husband and retaliatory written communications14.
(See April-May 2016 Emails, Exhibit E).
38. On or around May 17, 2016, Plaintiff submitted via fax an “ADA Title II
Accommodation Request” form to the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit Court in and for Brevard
County’s (“18th Circuit”) ADA Coordinator Ty Berdeaux requesting several accommodations.
Plaintiff listed some of her disabilities on this form. The most important and necessary
accommodation requested by the Plaintiff was the assistance of an ADA Advocate at all times
due to her disabilities and to protect her civil rights. Plaintiff did not burden the Circuit Court or
any Defendant named herein with any costs for the ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter. Plaintiff
also requested several other reasonable accommodations that did not constitute an administrative
or financial burden to the Court. The Plaintiff was notified by the ADA Coordinator within 72

14 Specific details of every violation committed by Defendants was filed with Plaintiff’s original complaint. Plaintiff
has simplified her amended complaint so the Court would not be burdened with repetitive or overwhelming facts.
(See Federal Rule 15. Amended and Supplemental Pleadings (c) RELATION BACK OF AMENDMENTS).

8
 hours that the presiding Judge, Lisa Davidson, approved her accommodations. (See “ADA Title
II Accommodation Request” dated May 17, 2016 attached hereto as Exhibit F).
39. A hearing for Plaintiff’s “Motion for Proof of Authority to Represent” was scheduled by
the Plaintiff for June 29, 2016 in the 18th Circuit in Brevard County, Viera Florida, where the
foreclosure was filed. Plaintiff attended the hearing with her ADA Advocate Dr. Rebecca Sharp
and her husband. Honorable Judge Lawrence V. Johnston was presiding. However, Plaintiff was
a having a panic attack before the hearing and the ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter had to read
Plaintiff’s argument. Defendant Stengel became agitated during the hearing and accused the
ADA Advocate of Unlicensed Practice of Law (“UPL”). At the end of the hearing, Plaintiff’s
ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter provided case law and legal authority to Judge Johnston. During
this hearing, Judge Johnston was compliant and very accommodating to Plaintiff’s disability
rights.
40. After the June 29, 2016 hearing, Plaintiff, her husband and ADA Advocate left the
courtroom and they all witnessed the three co-conspirator Defendants talking right outside the
courtroom as they walked by. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Rebecca Sharp (ADA Advocate/Oral
Interpreter) was ambushed outside the courtroom by Defendants Scott Stengel, Sahily Serradet
and Michael Gelety who started making threats and accusing the Dr. Sharp of UPL. Defendant
STENGEL, in a fit of rage, took the lead in the verbal attack and continuously threatened
Plaintiff’s ADA Advocate with her removal from the case. ADA Advocate Dr. Sharp was the
Plaintiff’s “approved” and necessary accommodation. Plaintiff’s ADA Advocate proceeded to
warn them several times that they were in violation of the ADA and violating Plaintiff’s
accommodations. Defendants SERRADET and GELETY were mutually in agreement and
supported and encouraged Defendant STENGEL’s verbal abuse15 and retaliatory tirade. The
Defendants did not care how their vicious behavior would affect their Oath as Officers of the
Court, the administration of justice or how it would affect the Plaintiff, especially after she had a
panic attack just a few minutes prior.
41. To berate and abuse the Plaintiff, her ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter, and Plaintiff’s
husband, is firmly against USC 42 § 12203 that prohibits intimidation, harassment, and
retaliation of a person seeking accommodations or anyone attempting to assist them in doing so.

15
A lawyer must avoid disparaging personal remarks or acrimony toward opposing parties, counsel, third parties or
the court. (Source: Professionalism Expectations: Expectation 2.3).

9
42. ADA Advocate Dr. Sharp called the Court’s ADA Coordinator Ty Berdeaux that same
afternoon and advised him of what had occurred outside the courtroom. Apparently, nothing was
documented by Mr. Berdeaux and/or forwarded to the presiding judge as was agreed.
43. ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter Dr. Sharp, advised Defendant SERRADET and fellow
Defendant counsel, who were copied on the emails regarding Plaintiff’s accommodations and the
need for “large print” filings as part of her approved accommodations. (See Exhibit I). Even
after several notifications, SERRADET and Defendant counsel repeatedly refused to comply
with Santamaria’s accommodations including larger print documents.
44. Due to Defendants’ continued violations of the ADA and retaliation, with no signs of
abatement after several warnings, Plaintiff’s ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter prepared and
allegedly submitted a Grievance against the Defendants to state officials (See Dr. Rebecca
Sharp’s “Statement of Grievance” dated September 11, 2016, page 6 attached hereto as Exhibit
C).
45. Mere days before a September 16, 2016 hearing, Plaintiff became aware that her ADA
Advocate/Oral Interpreter, Dr. Sharp, could not attend the hearing due to a hearing in Duval
County in which she was obligated to attend for a criminal domestic violence case that same day.
In addition to Plaintiff’s ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter Dr. Rebecca Sharp not being available
for the September 16, 2016 hearing, Santamaria and her husband also advised in their Motion to
Cancel Hearing (Case No. 05-2015-CA-042159, Doc. 57) and separately filed on the docket,
about opposing counsel’s malicious behavior via affidavits (See “ADA Advocate Affidavit of
Non-Availability for 9/16/2016 Hearing” attached hereto as Exhibit J) and how opposing
counsel were triggers to Santamaria’s condition for which they had to be replaced or
reprimanded to hold them accountable for ADA violations.
46. Judge Holcomb initially denies Santamaria and her husband’s Motion to Cancel Hearing
and Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On the morning of September 16, 2016, the
hearing was cancelled but an Order had not been issued yet.
46. After almost two (2) weeks waiting for the Circuit Court’s Order regarding Plaintiff’s
Motion for Reconsideration, Santamaria, her husband and her ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter
were served via email with Holcomb’s Order and Amended Order on Wednesday, September 28,
2016. (Case No. 05-2015-CA-042159, Doc. 61).

10
47. Judge Holcomb’s Order critiqued Santamaria’s accommodations16 and disabilities and
ignored Defendants SERRADET, STENGEL and GELETY’s belligerent behavior outside the
courtroom on June 29, 2016. In his Amended Order, Holcomb provided erroneous and
unsubstantiated claims regarding the ADA with no case law. Moreover, Holcomb chose to scold
Santamaria in his Amended Order for exercising her rights and justified opposing counsel’s
(Defendants) unscrupulous, discriminatory, retaliatory and unprofessional behavior.
48. In the Amended Order, Judge Holcomb scheduled a new hearing for November 30, 2016.
Santamaria, her husband nor her ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter were advised of their
availability for that date.
49. On October 21, 2016, Plaintiff Isabel Santamaria personally hand-delivered a
“supplemental authority” for Judge Holcomb (via ADA Coordinator) in response to Holcomb’s
recent Amended Order alleging that an ADA Advocate may not speak on behalf of a disabled
client17. As per the ADA Coordinator Ty Berdeaux, Judge Holcomb refused to accept the Amicus
Curiae and therefore did not vacate any erroneous ADA information on his Amended Order.
50. After hand-delivering the Amicus Curiae to ADA Coordinator Ty Beardeaux to deliver to
Judge Holcomb and asking via email for the date and time that Judge Holcomb refused service,
the ADA Coordinator would not respond to Santamaria’s emails.
51. On November 11, 2016, Plaintiff’s ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter, Dr. Sharp, became
aware that during a hearing in Duval County, Florida for one of her clients on November 10,
2016, opposing counsel at Defendant AKERMAN, LLP, Joseph Troendle, specifically asked the
Judge before the hearing concluded if he “received a copy of the Brevard County order on the
ADA issues involving Ms. Sharp?” Even though Mr. Troendle confirmed on the record that Dr.
Sharp received a copy of Holcomb’s Order being supplied to the Court, Dr. Sharp alleged that
nor her nor her client were never served said copy by Akerman’s Troendle or notified that the
“un-finalized” Amended Order by Judge Holcomb would be utilized as a “retaliatory” tactic
against Dr. Rebecca Sharp, her client in Duval County that day and against Santamaria and her
husband with the intent to cause further harm. (See “Duval County 11/10/2016 Hearing
Transcript” attached hereto as Exhibit K). Most importantly, counsel for Defendant

16
See Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3B (5)(6)(7).
17
Plaintiff hand-delivered an Amicus Curiae by Certified ADA Advocate Kenn Goldblatt confirming with case law
that under the ADA Amendment Act of 2008 intended that ADA Advocates of disabled litigants be allowed to speak
directly to the Court on behalf of the parties they are representing especially those who have issues communicating.

11
 AKERMAN in Jacksonville, Joseph Troendle, who was supplied with Judge Holcomb’s Order
by Defendant Akerman, LLP’s opposing counsel Defendants in this case, were all maliciously
spreading18 this “un-finalized” Amended Order by Senior Judge Charles Holcomb as if it were
case law in direct retaliation against Santamaria, her husband and their ADA Advocate/Oral
Interpreter.
52. These actions by the Defendant parties involved further injured Santamaria, her husband
and further jeopardized their foreclosure case in addition to Defendants’ malicious intent of
shutting-down ADA Advocates through-out the State of Florida in direct violation of ADA Title
II and III and USC 42 § 12203 that prohibits intimidation, harassment, and retaliation of a person
seeking accommodations or anyone attempting to assist them in doing so19.
53. Due to the widespread damage and retaliation by the attorney Defendants in utilizing
Judge Charles Holcomb’s Amended Order to advance their discriminatory agenda, Santamaria
and her husband filed a “Motion to Disqualify Judge Holcomb” on November 15, 2016 (See
Case No. 05-2015-CA-042159, Doc. 62).
54. A hearing was scheduled by Defendants for November 30, 2016. The only motions or
issues scheduled to discuss on the docket for this hearing was Santamaria’s Answer and
Counterclaim.
55. Days before the hearing, Sharp advised Santamaria that she would not be attending the
November 30th hearing but was going to try to cancel the hearing that the Court in Duvall County
scheduled for that same day.
56. Due to the uncertainty of a pending cancellation, Santamaria and her husband then filed
an “Emergency Motion to Cancel Hearing” on November 29, 2016 and served all Defendants
electronically. (See “Emergency Motion To Cancel Hearing For 11/30/2016” attached hereto as

18
A lawyer must not criticize or denigrate opposing parties, witnesses, or the court to clients, media, or members of
the public. (Source: Professionalism Expectations: Expectation 4.20).
19
42 U.S. Code § 12203 - Prohibition against retaliation and coercion – (a) RETALIATION - No person shall
discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this
chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter. (b) INTERFERENCE, COERCION, OR INTIMIDATION - It shall be
unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on
account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other
individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chapter. (c) REMEDIES AND
PROCEDURES - The remedies and procedures available under sections 12117, 12133, and 12188 of this title shall be
available to aggrieved persons for violations of subsections (a) and (b), with respect to subchapter I, subchapter II
and subchapter III, respectively. (Pub. L. 101–336, title V, § 503, July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 370.).

12
 Exhibit L), The Defendants were now aware beforehand that Santamaria would be attending the
hearing alone and more vulnerable to discrimination and exploitation without her ADA
Advocate/Oral Interpreter present. Furthermore, Santamaria’s husband was also being
represented at this time by the ADA Advocate due to a neurological disability20.
57. On the morning of November 30, 2016, Plaintiff and her ADA Advocate received an
email from Judge Lisa Davidson’s Judicial Assistant Jennie Young stating that Santamaria had to
attend the hearing. Santamria was shocked. Santamaria’s husband was already at work and he
was also shocked that Santamaria21 was being forced to go all alone without an ADA Advocate,
her court-approved and most necessary ADA accommodation.
58. The Defendants present at the November 30, 2016 hearing were Defendants Scott R.
Stengel and William P. Gray of Akerman LLP, agent for Defendant Carrington; Defendant
Sahily Serradet of Liebler, Gonzalez & Portuondo, agent for Defendant Bank of America, N.A.;
and Michael Gelety of Marinosci Law Group, P.C., P.A. agent for Defendant Marinosci and
initially agent for Defendant Carrington Mortgage (CMS). Defendant Serradet took the lead in
arguing the case and her colleagues adopted her argument on the record.
59. At the hearing, Judge Lisa Davidson denied Plaintiff’s “Emergency Motion to Cancel
Hearing” which was filed the previous afternoon, and forced the hearing to proceed without the
presence of Santamaria’s ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter, which was one of Santamaria’s most
required and necessary accommodation. Defendant Judge Davidson told Santamaria to try to say
something on the record. Santamaria was forced to defend herself during a “panic attack” and
while being unprepared. However, Santamaria read a written statement she prepared beforehand
at the beginning of the hearing advising the Court that she was in duress and that she was present
out of respect for the Court.
60. Several times during this hearing, Santamaria mentioned, while having difficulty
speaking, that she was in duress, distress, not prepared, was not feeling well and had shortness of
breath22. Defendant SERRADET accused Santamaria’s husband for not attending but Santamaria

20
Santamaria’s husband and Co-Defendant in the foreclosure case, Abdiel Echeverria, had already completed final
requirement and approval for an ADA Advocate on October 3, 2016, almost two (2) weeks prior to this hearing
taking place.
21
Santamaria is unemployed due to her disabilities and was at home.

22
Because access to the courts is a fundamental right, the United States Supreme Court has held that Title II of the
ADA is constitutionally valid. In Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S.Ct. 1978 (2004), the Court held that “Title II
unquestionably is valid…as it applies to the class of cases implicating the accessibility of judicial services [.]” Id. at

13
 stated on the record that her husband was also disabled and now being represented by the ADA
Advocate. (See “November 30, 2016 Transcript of Hearing” attached hereto as Exhibit M).
61. Defendant Judge Lisa Davidson stated several times on the record, with the support of the
other Defendants, that Santamaria’s ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter “chose” not to be present at
the hearing even though by law, the hearing should not have taken place. Judge Davidson would
smirk at the attorney Defendants when she critiqued Santamaria’s ADA Advocate as if it were
planned. This was “retaliation” against Santamaria and Santamaria’s ADA Advocate in violation
of the ADA, 42 U.S. Code § 12203.
62. On the record and in further retaliation against Santamaria and her ADA Advocate/Oral
Interpreter, Defendant STENGEL of Akerman LLP, asked Judge Davidson if she had read Judge
Holcomb’s Amended Order. Defendant Judge Davidson confirmed that she did read Judge
Holcomb’s Order, (further prejudicing Santamaria), and that she would address those issues after
the other matters regarding Santamaria and her husband’s motions were addressed. Judge
Davidson had time to read Holcomb’s Order before the hearing but did not have time to read
Santamaria and her husband’s “Emergency” Motion. Nonetheless, Santamaria was being
“ambushed” by the Court and the other Defendants with ADA issues without her ADA Advocate
present, issues Santamaria was not yet familiar with at the time or prepared to argue. The ADA
issues that Judge Davidson and Defendant counsel agreed to discuss at this hearing were not
reserved for the hearing or on the docket for that day all. Santamaria was being ambushed by the
Defendants while being incapacitated and unprepared in violation of her due process Fourteenth
Amendment rights. (See November 30, 2016 Transcript of Hearing, 7:17 – 25, Exhibit M).
63. Santamaria also stated on the record23 that this was all a “violation of her civil rights” and
that Defendant counsel and their clients have violated her rights repeatedly. Defendants did not
publicly deny Santamaria’s public allegations.
64. During the course of this hearing, Santamaria was having a “panic attack” and also felt
her blood pressure rising due to the severe distress she was being forced to endure. During most
of the time that Santamaria was in the courtroom and during the hearing, she was

1993. The Court observed that the “duty to accommodate is perfectly consistent with the well-established due
process principle that ‘within the limits of practicability, a State must afford to all individuals a meaningful
opportunity to be heard’ in its courts.” Id. at 1994 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
23
See “November 30, 2016 Transcript of Hearing” attached hereto as Exhibit M).

14
 hyperventilating while she sat next to the bailiff and just feet away facing the judge. Judge
Davidson24 and the other Defendants chose not to care, chose to ignore it and not once even
bothered to ask Santamaria if she was okay, needed a break or needed medical attention after it
was obvious that Santamaria was in severe medical distress. Attorney Defendants25 also
purposely ignored Santamaria and continued speaking their argument like if what Santamaria
was experiencing or said was of no consequence.
65. Defendant Judge Davidson and the other Defendants and co-conspirators did not show
any intention of letting Santamaria defend herself during this hearing and knew Santamaria was
“incapacitated” in attempting to do so in violation of Santamaria’s due process rights.
66. Defendant Judge Davidson was dismissing all of Santamaria’s counterclaim causes of
action with prejudice alleging res judicata. Judge Davidson did not ask for proof or
corroboration of Defendants’ res judicata defense or allegations. Defendant Judge Davidson also
denied Santamaria the chance to amend her counterclaim complaint even though Judge Davidson
also knew that Santamaria was not only not prepared, Santamaria and her husband had never
amended the complaint before and that in her condition Santamaria could not properly argue her
case involving her real property in violation of Santamaria’s due process rights.
67. While Defendant SERRADET was giving her argument on the 2nd or 3rd cause of action,
Santamaria had to get out of her chair, walk over to her purse next to the bailiff and retrieved her
medication and took her medication with the bottled water that she had in her purse. Everyone
saw this and ignored it. No one even suggested a break or a recess for Santamaria after it was
obvious that she needed one. Santamaria felt that she had to take her medication because not
only was she having a panic attack the whole time she was there, she also felt her heart racing for
a long period of time and also felt very lightheaded. Shortly before Santamaria “publicly” took
her medication in the courtroom, she had said again on the record that she was not feeling well.
By this time, Santamaria had endured a panic attack for over forty-five (45) minutes. Defendant
Judge Davidson and the counsel Defendants ignored it as they did everything else Santamaria

24
See Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1, Canon 2A, Canon 3A, Canon 3B(4)(5)(6)(7), Canon 3C (2), Canon 3D
(2)).
25
It is noteworthy that the scope of the ADA covers not only intentional discrimination, but also the discriminatory
effects of ―benign neglect, apathy, and indifference. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 335 (3rd Cir. 1995) (internal
quotations omitted).

15
 said. Defendant Serradet would continue her argument like if Santamaria was of no consequence
and invisible even though Santamaria was just a few feet away.
68. By the time Defendant SERRADET and her Co-Defendant cohorts argued Count Four
(4) of Santamaria and her husband’s Counterclaim, Santamaria just didn’t care anymore as she
was not feeling well and the Court was clearly prejudiced against her anyway. It was obvious, as
the records shows, that Defendant Judge Davidson, under color of law, co-conspired with
counsel Defendants and their Defendant clients beforehand or at the very least, during the
proceeding.
69. According to the transcript, Santamaria did not speak at all after Ms. Serradet argued
against counts five (5) through seven (7) of her counterclaim and she has no recollection of what
transpired during that time. It is obvious that Santamaria had already passed out in her chair
sometime after she opposed Defendant Serradet’s argument to dismiss count four (4) of
Santamaria’s Counterclaim. However, Santamaria does recall that she was still short of breath
while speaking after Ms. Serradet argues against count four (4), feeling very lightheaded and
having palpitations. If video or audio would have been available26, it will not only show exactly
when Santamaria passed-out but also show just how egregious Judge Davidson and the
Defendant attorneys’ actions and violations were. By the time Santamaria stopped speaking, she
had already endured a panic attack for over one (1) hour and elevated blood pressure and glucose
for a prolonged period of time.
70. While opposing counsel was still presenting their argument for count seven (7) of
Santamaria’s counterclaim, Plaintiff Santamaria collapsed27 on the floor and the transcript
confirms it. Defendant Judge Lisa Davidson immediately called for recess according to the
transcript (See November 30, 2016 Transcript, 32:7, Exhibit M).
71. Shortly after Santamaria collapsed to the floor, Santamaria remembers waking up
embarrassed as she was sprawled-out on the floor, shaking, crying, sobbing, hyperventilating,
with pressure in her chest, her heart was racing and she was disoriented. Santamaria had no idea
if the hearing was finished or what had occurred and she asked the bailiff what had happened.

26
Plaintiff Santamaria called the Court’s Administration office to request the video and audio for this hearing and
spoke to Brittany who told the Plaintiff that only DR cases are recorded and not civil cases. According to
administration, there is no audio or video of this hearing.
27
For many days after Plaintiff collapsed, Plaintiff not only had to endure the psychological trauma and
embarrassment of this event but also experienced pain due to the collapse on the floor and had to increase her intake
of pain medication further hindering her ability to function.

16
 The bailiff assisted Santamaria and sat on the floor with her making sure she was okay.
Defendant Judge Davidson was no longer in the courtroom. The bailiff proceeded to call for
medical attention and an ambulance was dispatched.
72. When the paramedics arrived minutes later, they asked Plaintiff Santamaria about her
symptoms, requested to see bottles of medication she took (the bailiff handed them the bottles)
and took Santamaria’s blood pressure. The paramedic told Santamaria at that time that her blood
pressure was 230/165. The medic also told Santamaria to breathe properly through her nose
because she was breathing too heavily and that her pulse was too high. They gave Santamaria
oxygen as she sat on the floor and did an EKG on her to make sure that she was not having a
heart attack. The paramedics placed Santamaria on a gurney and transported her in the
ambulance at approximately 3:15 pm to the nearest hospital. In the ambulance Santamaria was
given two (2) nitroglycerin pills and three (3) aspirin as they continued to monitor her blood
pressure.
73. Meanwhile inside the courtroom after Santamaria was taken to the nearest hospital, the
hearing resumed. When the hearing resumed, Defendant Judge Davidson stated that the hearing
will have to be rescheduled. The heartless, discriminatory and confrontational Defendant Scott
Stengel of Akerman LLP (opposing counsel for CMS) then began complaining and retaliating on
the record about how difficult it is to schedule anything with Santamaria and her husband “as
you can see, I think from today”, referring to Santamaria’s unnecessary medical episode and
collapse in the courtroom. (See November 30, 2016 Transcript of Hearing, 32:20 – 25 and 33:1 –
4, Exhibit M).
74. Meanwhile at the hospital, Plaintiff Santamaria was given more than one blood pressure
medication because the medical staff was having difficulty bringing down her blood pressure in
the hospital. Due to the distress, Santamaria’s blood glucose was also high. Santamaria was
released hours later after her blood pressure was no longer dangerously high and she was able to
breathe normally and the pressure/pain in her chest diminished. Santamaria’s blood pressure was
so elevated it could have caused a stroke in the courtroom. (See “E.R. Medical Records and E.R.
Medical Bills” attached hereto as Exhibit N).
75. No human being should be treated the way Santamaria was treated. Nonetheless,
Defendant Judge Lisa Davidson forced the hearing to proceed, with the full cooperation of
opposing counsel, knowing that Santamaria was in severe distress and then became fully

17
 incapacitated, no longer able to speak for herself or participate in the Court’s activity, thereby
further denying her due process and civil rights. Judge Davidson and the counsel Defendants’
behavior was with “malicious intent” and conspired to violate Santamaria’s rights given the
opportunity that they were aware that Santamaria would be alone in the courtroom without her
ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter.
76. At all material times, Defendants were all aware of Santamaria’s disabilities.
77. Plaintiff Isabel Santamaria incurred numerous medical bills28 and expenses that day and
during the course of litigation that Plaintiff cannot pay due to limited financial resources which
have further burdened her and her husband and also further harmed her credit29. (See 11/30/2016
E.R. “Medical Records and E.R. Medical Bills” as Exhibit N).
78. Plaintiff Santamaria sustained further emotional distress30 and injury due to the actions of
the Defendants and the Court.
79. Plaintiff Santamaria was DENIED full or equal participation in the proceeding by the
Court and Defendants in violation of her ADA and due process rights.
80. Defendants could have easily rescheduled the hearing to a date and time that Plaintiff’s
ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter would be able to attend but chose to violate Plaintiff’s rights
instead and conspired to do so.
81. On or around January 20, 2017, Defendant STENGEL retaliates against Plaintiff
Santamaria and her husband in an email. All Defendant counsel were copied in this email and
were complicit in the retaliatory acts.
82. On or around January 25, 2017, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the Florida Judicial
Qualifications Committee (hereinafter “JQC”) against Judge Lisa Davidson. Plaintiff Santamaria
then proceeded to file the JQC and the transcript of the November 30, 2016 hearing on the
docket (See Case No. 05-2015-CA-042159, Doc. 66 & 67). The JQC complaint was assigned
Docket No. 17-053; Davidson.

28
Medical Bills attached hereto as “Exhibit N” do not reflect all medical expenses incurred on November 30, 2016
and do not reflect follow-up visits and expenses or all medical expenses incurred as a result of litigation.
29
Plaintiff and her husband were forced to file for Bankruptcy, for the first time in their lives, on December 3, 2018
to stop the sale of their home and due to the substantial debt incurred due to Plaintiff’s lack of income from her
disabilities and hospital debt and medical bills. (Case No. 6:18-bk-07478-KSJ).
30
Under Florida law, to state a cause of action for “intentional infliction of emotional distress”, a complaint must
allege four elements: (1) deliberate or reckless infliction of mental suffering; (2) outrageous conduct; (3) the conduct
caused the emotional distress; and (4) the distress was severe.

18
83. By early February 2017, Plaintiff Santamaria could no longer contact her ADA
Advocate/Oral Interpreter, Dr. Rebecca Sharp. Dr. Sharp no longer responded to Plaintiff’s
emails, texts or phone calls and other clients were also not able to reach her according to group
texts. Plaintiff can only assume that the threats by opposing counsel and the Court became so
intense that Dr. Sharp completely cut ties with Plaintiff or was coerced by Defendants to the
detriment of the Plaintiff.
84. On or around February 7, 2017, Plaintiff submitted emails to the Clerk of Court Scott
Ellis which were forwarded to Trial Court Administrator Mark Van Bever. The Court’s
administration refused to assist SANTAMARIA in finding another ADA Advocate or Oral
Interpreter. (See Exhibit S).
85. On or around February 9, 2017, Plaintiff filed a “Notice of ADA Violations” on the
Docket. (See “Notice of ADA Violations” attached hereto as Exhibit T).
86. On or around February 26, 2017, Plaintiff Santamaria filed Florida BAR grievances against
Defendant Scott Stengel, Esq., attorney for client Carrington Mortgage Services (“CMS”) with
law firm Akerman LLP.
87. On or around February 27, 2017, Plaintiff Santamaria filed Florida BAR grievances31
against Defendant Sahily Serradet, Esq., attorney for client Bank of America, N.A. (“BANA”)
with law firm Liebler, Gonzalez & Portuondo.
88. On or around March 13, 2017, Plaintiff received via U.S. Mail a response letters, RFA
No. 17-11814 and RFA No. 17-11815, from The Florida Bar’s Heidi Brewer regarding the
complaint filed by Plaintiff against Defendant STENGEL and Defendant SERRADET, stating
that the matters that Plaintiff has alleged in her complaint involve a “civil dispute” and present
questions of law that would have to be left to a “tribunal”. (See “Florida BAR response”
attached hereto as Exhibit U). Plaintiff is hereby exercising that right to a tribunal by filing this
complaint.
89. On or around April 5, 2017, Plaintiff received a response from the DOJ alleging that the
DOJ has decided not to take Plaintiff’s claim because it does not have the “resources” to resolve

31
Before Plaintiff Santamaria was able to finish writing Florida BAR grievances against Defendants GELETY,
GRAY and ETTORI, Plaintiff fell ill.

19
 Plaintiff’s claim or all the other ADA claims it receives. (See “DOJ Letters” attached hereto as
Exhibit V).
90. Because Plaintiff’s life would likely be in peril during court proceedings without any
representation or judicial support during the remainder of the litigation, Plaintiff and her husband
were forced to hire an attorney in April 2017 which caused further financial hardship to the
Plaintiff and her household.
91. In several instances during court appearances after Plaintiff and her husband hired an
attorney, Defendant Davidson was defiant and retaliatory against Plaintiff’s attorney and at times
stared-down the Plaintiff likely because of the JQC Complaint the Plaintiff filed on the record.
92. Plaintiff Santamaria’s counsel of record for the foreclosure case, filed an Amended
Counterclaim on October 11, 2017 which included “criminal” causes of action against
Defendants CMS, BANA, AKERMAN, LGP and MLG.
93. Plaintiff submitted a grievance via email on July 2, 2018 to Florida ADA Coordinator
Debbie Howells and demonstrated good cause for the delay.
94. As per the state’s grievance procedure, Ms. Howells submitted Plaintiff’s grievance to the
18th Circuit’s ADA Coordinator, Ty Berdeaux for review. However, Santamaria had expressed
that at first Mr. Berdeaux was helpful and accommodating but after Judge Holcomb’s Order and
Plaintiff’s attempt to serve Defendant Holcomb with an amicus curiae, Mr. Berdeaux would no
longer answer Plaintiff’s emails and his demeanor changed towards the Plaintiff.
95. Plaintiff received a response letter from ADA Coordinator Ty Berdeaux dated July 10,
2018, in the mail (See Exhibit X). The letter states that the matter will not be considered by the
Court because the 180 day grievance deadline expired thereby not allowing Plaintiff’s grievance
to be advanced for a judicial review. Mr. Berdeaux did not take into consideration Plaintiff’s
good cause for delay.
96. On July 20, 2018, Plaintiff Santamaria sent an email to Debbie Howells alleging that the
initial review should not be handled by the ADA Coordinator when the process could be
compromised due to a “conflict of interest” in regards to Mr. Berdeaux, who was named in
Plaintiff’s grievance, and that the ADA violations were ongoing. (See Exhibit W).
97. Ms. Howells responds to the Plaintiff that the “State’s Court System’s ADA Grievance
Procedure does not provide for review by the Office of the State Courts Administrator of the
outcome of a circuit grievance proceeding”.

20
98. The State of Florida’s ADA Grievance Procedure is severely flawed when a disabled
litigant shows good cause for delay of a grievance for which violations are still on-going and also
in the likelihood that the court’s ADA Coordinator is prejudiced against the complainant, will
not advance the complaint. The State of Florida’s ADA Grievance Procedure does not have an
option for the complainant to appeal or for an impartial review as in the case of the Plaintiff.
99. On July 27, 2018, Plaintiff Santamaria filed an “updated” ADA Title II Accommodations
Request Form for upcoming trial (August 16, 2018) via email to the Court’s ADA Coordinator
Ty Berdeaux which included more medical records to further substantiate Santamaria’s
disabilities and in addition, a request for access to her blood pressure machine and glucometer.
(See Exhibit Y).
100. After awaiting a response and trial quickly approaching, Plaintiff Santamaria sent an
email to Mr. Berdeaux on August 6, 2018 for an update regarding her accommodations request.
101. On or around August 13, 2018, Mr. Berdeaux responds to Santamaria’s request via email
and reiterates what Judge Holcomb said on his Order that an ADA Advocate may be present but
may not speak on Santamaria’s behalf. Plaintiff Santamaria already had an attorney who would
speak for her at trial and Plaintiff was not able to retain another ADA Advocate to help protect
her rights during trial.
102. After years of abuse, discrimination and retaliation by the Defendants named herein, on
August 16, 2018, Plaintiff Santamaria and her husband illegally lost their home to foreclosure at
a bench trial with Judge David Dugan presiding. Judge Dugan set sale date for Plaintiff and her
husband’s home for October 17, 2018. Plaintiff Santamaria has suffered extensive damages as a
result. Santamaria’s foreclosure defense attorney filed an appeal with the District Court of
Appeal State of Florida Fifth District, Case No. 5D18-2934.
103. Plaintiff Santamaria and her husband were forced to file for bankruptcy on December 3,
2018 to stop the sale of their home pending appeal and due to the debt incurred during years of
litigation and for medical expenses incurred on November 30, 2018.
104. The record shows that the Court continued to allow retaliatory behavior by Defendants
CMS, BANA, MLG, AKERMAN, LGP, SERRADET, GRAY, ETTORI, STENGEL and
GELETY, named herein.

21
105. The State of Florida’s ADA Grievance Procedure is severely flawed and does not
allow for complainants to appeal and fully exercise their rights in the grievance procedure
especially when the review process may be contaminated or biased beforehand.
106. The State of Florida32 has failed to hold its officials accountable after Plaintiff’s many
requests.
107. The State of Florida deprived Plaintiff of due process, deprivations caused by the
government’s failure to train, supervise or adequately hire its employees.
108. The Eighteenth Judicial Circuit (“18th Circuit”) receives federal funding to, among other
things, appropriately train its staff and judges regarding the ADA but has apparently failed to do
so.
109. The Eighteenth Judicial Circuit is complicit with the continuous and systemic pattern of
ADA violations and discrimination against disabled persons by Judges of the 18th Circuit
Court33.
110. The Eighteenth Judicial Circuit Court (“18th Circuit”) failed to provide Plaintiff with
“larger print” documents as requested by Plaintiff Santamaria in her ADA Title II
Accommodations Request on May 7, 2016 and again on July 27, 2018.
111. The Eighteenth Judicial Circuit Court is also liable for the injuries sustained by the
Plaintiff on November 30, 2016.
112. Defendants CMS and BANA’s34 connivance as client-principals, or at the very least their
indifference, to their agents/subordinates’ deliberate acts against the Plaintiff during court related
activities in a place of public accommodations, is in violation of ADA Title II, III and the
miscellaneous provisions of Title V.

32
STATE IMMUNITY SEC. 12202. [Section 502] A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to
the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a
violation of this chapter. In any action against a State for a violation of the requirements of this chapter, remedies
(including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such
remedies are available for such a violation in an action against any public or private entity other than a State.

33
Another disabled litigant who was abused by this 18th Circuit Court and by Defendant Judge Davidson is willing
to testify in Plaintiff’s case as to her terrifying experience during her probate case.
34
“Generally, an attorney serves as agent for his client; the attorney's acts are the acts of the principal, the client.”
Andrew H. Boros, P.A. v. Arnold P. Carter, M.D., P.A., 537 So.2d 1134, 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).

22
113. Defendants AKERMAN, MLG and LGP, law firms who oversee their employee’s
performance and their clients’ best interest, were complicit and at the very least indifferent to the
deliberate acts against the Plaintiff and did nothing to cease the behavior.
114. Defendants DAVIDSON, SERRADET, GRAY, STENGEL, ETORRI, GELETY, CMS,
BANA, MLG and LGP, agreed to conspire against Plaintiff in violation of her due process and
civil rights.
115. Defendants mutually failed to provide Plaintiff with “larger print” documents as
requested by Plaintiff in her ADA Title II Accommodations Request on May 7, 2016 and on July
27, 2018 and via email by her ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter.
116. Plaintiff exhausted the processes available to her for violation of her civil rights.
117. Defendants disregarded their own policies and violated Plaintiff’s civil and constitutional
rights.
118. No undue financial or administrative burden was ever placed on the Defendants named
herein to accommodate the Plaintiff or to respect her civil rights so that she can enjoy equal or
fair treatment during litigation. Instead, the Defendants named herein “exploited” the Plaintiff’s
disabilities to their advantage and benefited from their reckless and illegal behavior35.

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)

119. Under the ADA, “disability” is a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). A person is also considered disabled for
purposes of the ADA if she has a record of such an impairment, or is perceived as having such an
impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B).
120. The ADA rule defines “mental impairment” to include “any mental or psychological
disorder, such as . . . emotional or mental illness.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (1996).
121. Access to the courts is a “fundamental right” under the state and federal constitutions.
State and federal statutes require that people with disabilities be afforded equal access 36 to

35
It is noteworthy that the scope of the ADA covers not only intentional discrimination, but also the discriminatory
effects of ―benign neglect, apathy, and indifference. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 335 (3rd Cir. 1995) (internal
quotations omitted).
36
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), prohibiting discrimination by a public entity, validly
abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity through enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to cases
implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 11, 14, §5; Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, §§ 201, 502, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131, 12202.

23
 courthouses, courtrooms, and court services. Their access must be just as effective as the access
provided to other members of the public37. (See Exhibit A).
122. Title II of the ADA prohibits exclusion or unequal treatment of qualified individuals in
any program, service, or activity of state or local government. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A qualified
individual is anyone who, with or without reasonable regulatory modifications, removal of
barriers or auxiliary aids and services, is eligible for public services. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
123. The regulations enforcing Title II of the “Americans with Disabilities Act” (ADA) can be
enforced through a private right of action38. There is no doubt that there is a private right of
action to enforce Title II itself and, as the United States Supreme Court has held, a private right
of action to enforce a statute includes the right to enforce all authoritative regulations that
reasonably interpret the statute. Title II’s integration regulation directly implements the statute’s
prohibition on “discrimination,” including “isolation” and “segregation.” 42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(2),
(a)(5).
124. In Title II39, the ADA prohibits discrimination in public services, including courts, and
mandates that persons eligible for receipt of services not, because of disability, be excluded from
participation or from the benefits, services or activities of a public entity. Administrators of
public programs must take steps to accommodate persons with disabilities, unless the
accommodation fundamentally alters the nature of an activity or program or constitutes an undue
administrative or financial burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A). This obligation may be
enforceable by a suit for declaratory or injunctive relief, or money damages. 42 U.S.C. § 12133
(incorporating Rehabilitation Act remedies, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)); 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.150(a)(3), 164.

37
The American Bar Association and the United States Department of Justice in their Webinar, Grant No. 2004-
WT-AX-K078 2009, urge supportive and “safe” judicial environments. Courts are asked to, without special
accommodations requested, assure that the most basic of human rights are provided: security, respect, dignity, the
opportunity to pursue rights in a forum with a “fair” process, and the freedom from any type of degrading or
disrespectful treatment.
38
The Eleventh Circuit has clearly stated that "[a] person may file a suit seeking relief under the ADA without ever
notifying the defendant of his intent to do so, . . . We stress that pre-suit notice is not required to commence suit
under the ADA and that lack of pre-suit notice does not compel a reduction of the requested fee award." Association
of Disabled Ams. v. Neptune Designs, Inc., 469 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2006).

39
“Because we find that Title II unquestionably is valid legislation as it applies to the class of cases implicating the
accessibility of judicial services, we need go no further”. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 26, 80 S.Ct. 519,
4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960).

24
 Section 202 of the ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled by public entities; § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against the disabled by recipients of federal
funding, including “private organizations”, 29 U. S. C. § 794(b)(3). Both provisions are
enforceable through private causes of action. Section 203 of the ADA declares that the
"remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in [§ 505(a)(2) of the Rehabilitation Act] shall be the
remedies, procedures, and rights this subchapter provides" for violations of § 202. 42 U. S. C. §
1213340.
125. Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 2001) held that “A trial undoubtedly is a
service, program, or activity within the meaning of [42 U.S.C.] §12132.” Although Cates
involved architectural accessibility, neither Title II nor its implementing regulations are licensing
laws so as to obliterate this Court’s previous express ADA federal preemption of conflicting
Florida laws decision in Burdines, and the ADA guarantees of ‘full participation, equality of
opportunity, independent living, and economic self -sufficiency,” 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(8), such
enforcement is illegal, in violation of the ADA, and contrary to Burdines and Lane. Significantly,
the final clause of Title II is a “catch-all phrase that prohibits all discrimination by a public
entity.” Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 822
(11th Cir. 1998).
126. States have historically denied persons with disabilities an equal opportunity to use the
State courts as litigants by not providing interpreters or other necessities for effective
communication, or by imposing architectural barriers that exclude persons with mobility or
sensory impairments from using the court system. Such inaccessibility violates due process
principles when people with disabilities are unable effectively to access the judicial system,
either in the criminal or civil context.
127. And, to be sure that there is no doubt about the applicability of the ADA (specifically,
Title II), the term ― “public entity” is defined:

The term ―public entity41 means – (A) any State or local government;

40
Our conclusion is consistent with the "well settled" rule that "where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal
statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make
good the wrong done." Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 684 (1946); see also Franklin, supra, at 66.

41
Significantly, the final clause of Title II is a “catch-all phrase that prohibits all discrimination by a public entity.”
Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 822 (11th Cir. 1998).

25
 (B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or
States or local government; and

(C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority (as defined
in section 24102(4) of Title 49).

128. Title III of the ADA provides that “no individual shall be discriminated against on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation.” (42 U.S.C. §
12182(a)).
129. “Public entity” means a private entity that owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place
of public accommodation.
130. ADA accommodations violations generally involve a failure to provide access and
amenities in public places for persons with disabilities. Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA), businesses and governments are required to make accommodations for
persons who are legally disabled. A failure to follow ADA accommodation requirements can
lead to various penalties for businesses and can subject them to costly private lawsuits
(especially if the violation has caused injury to a disabled person).
131. Title V includes information regarding the ADA’s relationship with other federal and
state laws, including the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, requirements relating to the provision of
insurance, construction and design regulations by the U.S. Access Board, prohibition of state
immunity, inclusion of Congress as a covered entity under the law, promotion of alternative
means of dispute resolution, and establishment of technical assistance.
132. Title V (miscellaneous) of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) sets forth
miscellaneous provisions:
 Requires the U.S. Access Board to issue accessibility standards.
 Allows for attorney’s fees to be awarded to prevailing parities in suits filed under the
ADA
 Requires federal agencies to provide technical assistance.
 State specifically that illegal use of drugs is not a covered disability.
 Provides that state and local laws that mandate equal or greater protection to individuals
with disabilities are not superseded or limited by the ADA.

133. Since the outset, Defendants collectively have violated clearly established statutory laws
and/or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known and/or palpably in

26
 excess of the jurisdiction of the Defendants, and the judicial and court officials of State
Defendants.
134. Plaintiff contends that BANA and CMS’s subordinates or agents, violated Plaintiff’s
federal rights, and that BANA and CMS should also be liable for subordinate’s conduct. BANA
and CMS, with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a
contractual policy, practice or custom which directly caused the violation. BANA and CMS had
actual knowledge of subordinate’s violation of Plaintiff’s rights and that BANA and CMS
acquiesced in that violation. Even though BANA and CMS were aware of their agents’
violations, they not only did nothing to stop the furtherance of the violations, they continued to
contractually employ its agents to represent them in depriving Plaintiff not only of her home, but
of her constitutional and civil rights.
135. As explained throughout this amended complaint, Plaintiff was discriminated due to her
disabilities, excluded from equally participating in court activities, was deprived of reasonable
her accommodations which included larger print documents, breaks during proceedings
(especially when having a medical episode) with hearings no longer than one (1) hour, deprived
of timely medical care, and deprived of a necessary accommodation, ADA Advocate/Oral
Interpreter, clearly all in violation of the ADA.

Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitations Act42

136. Section 504 similarly provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability
…..shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
137. The State of Florida and The Eighteenth Judicial Circuit Court are recipients of federal
assistance which includes federal funding for ADA compliance and education. The state actors
named herein benefit from this federal funding.

42
Under the Rehabilitation Act, the term program or activity includes all of the operations of a department, agency,
special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local government. 29 U.S.C. 794(b)(1)(A). Title II
implementing regulations explain that they shall not be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards
applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 791) or the regulations issued by Federal
agencies pursuant to that title. 28 C.F.R. § 35.103(a). Thus, Title II applies to all of the operations of the Court.

27
138. Courts have expressly confirmed the availability of emotional distress damages in such
cases. See, e.g., Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 505 F.3d 1173, 1198 (11th Cir. 2007)
(“The open question before us today is narrower still: whether a subset of compensatory
damages—non-economic compensatory damages—is available under § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act for intentional discrimination. We hold that it is”); Stamm v. New York City Transit Auth.,
No. 04-CV-2163 SLT JMA, 2013 WL 244793, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2013) (“this Court holds
that damages for emotional distress are available under Title II”); Prakel v. Indiana, 100 F. Supp.
3d 661, 673 (S.D. Ind. 2015) (confirming the availability of a compensatory damage remedy in
Title II and Section 504 case, including for emotional distress).

Deliberate Indifference

139. Deliberate indifference requires both knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right
is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood. City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1988); see also id. at 395, 109 S.Ct. 1197
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (deliberate indifference requires both "some form of notice ... and the
opportunity to conform to[statutory] dictates"). In Memmer, the Court required the plaintiff to
identify "specific reasonable" and "necessary" accommodations that the defendant failed to
provide. 169 F.3d at 633.
140. When a plaintiff has alerted the public entity to her need for accommodation (or where
the need for accommodation is obvious, or required by statute or regulation), the public entity is
on notice that an accommodation is required, and the plaintiff has satisfied the first element of
the “deliberate indifference” test.
141. In order to meet the second element of the “deliberate indifference” test, a failure to act
must be a result of conduct that is more than negligent, and involves an element of
deliberateness. See Bartlett, 156 F.3d at 331; Matthews v. Jefferson, 29 F.Supp.2d 525, 535-536
(W.D.Ark. 1998) (notice combined with failure to provide appropriate facilities may violate Title
II).
142. On June 29, 2016, Plaintiff exercised her rights in a hearing after her approved court
accommodation (ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter) who was assisting her during a medical
episode and beforehand, when she appropriately requested accommodations on May 17, 2016

28
 through the Court’s ADA Coordinator putting Defendants on “notice” that Plaintiff was
exercising her civil rights as a disabled person and alerting all parties of the need for her
accommodations.
143. Plaintiff and her ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter communicated to Defendants via
emails43 and court filings that she was exercising her rights and that her civil rights and required
ADA accommodations were being intentionally deprived and violated.
144. On November 30, 2016, Plaintiff was not only denied a continuance after she filed an
“Emergency Motion to Cancel Hearing” the previous day, Plaintiff repeatedly stated on the
record that her rights were being violated after her accommodation was intentionally denied and
excluded from the proceeding and during a medical episode where she clearly needed a break 44,
and/or medical attention.

USC 42 § 12203, Prohibition Against Retaliation and Coercion

145. Section 12133 affords the Plaintiff her right to enforce any violation of this federal law.
Moreover, under 42 U.S.C. § 12203, federal law bars any and all retaliation, coercion,
interference or intimidation whatsoever against “any individual because such individual has
opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter, or because such individual made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in the investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this chapter.” Giving such “aggrieved persons” as the Plaintiff a separate right to
bring civil action against the violators.
146. Defendants deliberately subjected the Plaintiff to numerous instances of intentional and
irrational discrimination and/or retaliation in violation of the ADA, by refusing to reasonably
accommodate her known disabilities in a Florida State court, agency, programs, activities, and
services. Mangin v. Westco Security Systems, Inc., 922 F.Supp. 563, 567 (Fla. M.D. 1996);
Harding v. Winn -Dixie Stores, Inc., 907 F.Supp. 386 (M.D.Fla. 1995); DOJ Title II Technical
Assistance Manual, §§II -2.1000 & II -1.4200.

43
See Exhibits E, I, O, R and S.
44
Breaks were one of many requested accommodations by the Plaintiff through the Court’s ADA Coordinator and
Judge Davidson was fully aware of such accommodation because she allegedly approved it in May 2016.

29
147. Defendants SERRADET, STENGEL, GELETY, ETTORI, BANA, CMS, MLG,
AKERMAN and LGP deliberately subjected the Plaintiff to numerous instances of intentional
and irrational discrimination and/or retaliation in violation of the ADA, by threatening Plaintiff
and her ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter with her removal on June 29, 2016 in a Florida State
court, agency, programs, activities, and services.
148. Defendants SERRADET, STENGEL, GRAY, ETTORI, GELETY, BANA, CMS, MLG,
AKERMAN and LGP deliberately subjected the Plaintiff to numerous instances of intentional
and irrational discrimination and/or retaliation in violation of the ADA, through email and verbal
communications while in litigation in a Florida State court, agency, programs, activities, and
services.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Deprivation of Rights45

149. Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides that "[e]very person" who acts under color of state law
to deprive another of a constitutional right shall be answerable to that person in a suit for
damages. Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983, originally passed as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17
Stat. 13, reads in full: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
150. “Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides every person with the right to sue those acting under
color of state law for violations of federal constitutional” provisions46. Williams v. Bd. of Regents
of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007).
151. "A government official's conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the
alleged conduct, the contours of the right are sufficiently clear that every 'reasonable official
would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.'" Mikko v. City of
Atlanta, Ga., 857 F.3d 1136, 1146 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 735).

45
Its purpose is plain from the title of the legislation, "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes." 17 Stat. 13. Allegation of facts
constituting a deprivation under color of state authority of a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment satisfies
the requirement of R. S. § 1979. See Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 161-162.
46
In 1990 in Howlett By and Through Howlett v. Rose the United States Supreme Court held unanimously that
Florida, and all states, cannot apply sovereign immunity rules to bar Section 1983 claims against local government
in state courts.

30
152. A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more people to do something illegal. A
person who is not a state official acts under color of state law when he/she enters into a
conspiracy, involving one or more state officials, to do an act that deprives a person of federal
constitutional statutory rights.
153. “[C]onduct satisfying the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment satisfies
[Section 1983’s] requirement of action under color of state law.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
31 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 (1982)47.
154. The Supreme Court has recognized that “although the conduct of private parties lies
beyond the Constitution’s scope in most instances, governmental authority may dominate an
activity to such an extent that its participants must be deemed to act with the authority of the
government and, as a result, be subject to constitutional restraints.” Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 610 (1991).
155. Private parties conspiring with a state actor acting under color of law may be liable for
damages even if the state actor involved is determined to be absolutely immune. (Tower v.
Glover, 467 U.S. 914; Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105).
156. In Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Company, the Court found that a private attorney
using peremptory challenges in a jury trial in a racially biased manner was a “state actor”
because his act—use of peremptory challenges—could exist only in the judicial context and with
the approval of a state judge.
157. Joint activity by a private party and a government agent can also transform the private
party into a state actor, where the purpose of the collusion is to violate the federal rights of the
plaintiff. Similarly, in Dennis v. Sparks, the Court held that private parties who conspired with a
judge to fix a case acted under color of law48. A nominally private entity controlled by the state
is also a state actor49.
158. In addition to seeking a private remedy for the parties’ disability-based discrimination,
Plaintiff also brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce her statutory rights protected by
the ADA. In relevant part, § 1983 creates a cause of action to redress the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

47
See also Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 n.2 (2001) (“If a
defendant's conduct satisfies the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the conduct also constitutes
action ‘under color of state law’ for § 1983 purposes.”).
48
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1980).
49
Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230, 231 (1957)

31
 Accordingly, a plaintiff can bring a cause of action under § 1983 to enforce rights protected by
Title II of the ADA.

Due Process

159. “The essential elements of Due Process of Law are notice, an opportunity to be heard,
and the right to defend in an orderly proceeding”. Fiehe vs R.E. Householder Co., 125 So. 2, 7
(Fla. 1929).
160. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state from depriving “any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
161. The Due Process Clause imposes an affirmative obligation upon States to take such
measures as are necessary to ensure that individuals, including those with disabilities50, are not
deprived of their life, liberty, or property without procedures affording “fundamental fairness”.
Lassiter v. Department Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).
162. The case often used to express the civil model of due process is Mathews v. Eldridge51. In
Mathews, which concerned an agency proceeding to terminate disability benefits, the Supreme
Court affirmed that the "right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any
kind" is a basic constitutional principle52. In so holding, the Court applied a principle reflected in
numerous prior and subsequent Supreme Court decisions53.
163. At heart, the notice-and-hearing approach to due process reflected in such decisions is
simply an expression of basic values of the American adversary system of justice54. The notion is

50
The United States Supreme Court, Justice Stevens, held that Title II of the ADA, as applied to cases implicating
the fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of Congress' enforcement power under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
51
424 U.S. 319 (1976); see 32 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 9, § 8129 (noting that the
Mathews analysis has "guided due process analysis ever since" it was issued).
52
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting McGrath, 341 U.S. at 168 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
53
A classic formulation of this notice-and-hearing principle is found in the Supreme Court's decision in Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). There, the Court emphasized that "for more than a century the central meaning of
procedural due process has been clear: 'Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order
that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified."' Id. at 80 (quoting Baldwin, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) at 233
(1864)); see also Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602,
617 (1993); Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965);
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).

54
See, e.g., Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) (emphasizing that "our adversarial system of justice" is
"premised on the well-tested principle that truth-as well as fairness-is best discovered by powerful statements on
both sides of the question" (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984)

32
 simple. If each person is allowed to argue his own side and to respond to the views of the other,
and if a decision is then rendered by someone partial to neither, it will best air the issues and lead
to a just result. Cases like Mathews simply implement the same due process values developed
within the court system in other settings, whether administrative agency proceedings or judicial
settings outside of trial55. The basic premise of the civil due process model, in this respect, is
both longstanding and uncontroversial56.
164. Due process requires hearing procedures with respect to temporary or preliminary
deprivations, as well as for those that are final and permanent57.
165. Defendants, mutually and in agreement, conspired to violate Plaintiff’s Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights by forcing a hearing to proceed when Plaintiff was incapacitated,
depriving her of fundamental fairness, of the right to be heard and of the right to defend her real
property58 in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Plaintiff was initially not able
to properly speak and was then silent for a period of time after passing out in her chair thereby
providing no argument and no voice, for which Defendants were mutually aware, and thereby
deprived Plaintiff of her Due Process Rights to their advantage.

Immunity

166. While Defendants’ may “seem” to have immunity, this immunity disappears when a
fundamental right is claimed, as Plaintiff has pleaded in her amended complaint that she was
deprived of due process and equal protection rights to a fair hearing and/or a trial.

("The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will
best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free." (quoting Herring v. New
York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975))).
55
See, e.g., Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) ("Our system assumes that adversarial testing will
ultimately advance the public interest in truth and fairness."); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977)
("[D]ebate between adversaries is often essential to the truth-seeking function...."); McGrath, 341 U.S. at 171-72
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in
jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.").
56
See, e.g., Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 336, 350 (1850) ("No principle is more vital to the
administration of justice, than that no man shall be condemned in his person or property without notice, and an
opportunity to make his defence."); Oakley v. Aspinwall, 4 N.Y. 513, 518 (1851) ("It is a first principle in the
administration of justice, that no one shall be condemned, nor be made to suffer, either in his person, fame, or estate,
before he has had an opportunity to be heard in his defence."). More controversial is Mathews' three-part test, which
might reasonably be critiqued for its lack of guidance and undue flexibility.
57
See, e.g., Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 85 (noting that it is "now well settled that a temporary, non-final deprivation of
property" falls within due process protection).
58
In Board of Regents v. Roth, the Supreme Court defined the property interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment as a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to the item or benefit in question. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972).

33
167. In Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), the Supreme Court ruled that Congress did
have enough evidence that the disabled were being denied those fundamental rights that are
protected by the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, among those rights being the
right to access a court. Further, the remedy Congress enacted was congruent and proportional,
because the "reasonable accommodations" mandated by the ADA were not unduly burdensome
and disproportionate to the harm.
168. Plaintiff has properly pleaded a violation of due process under the 14th Amendment. (See
Johnson v Southern Connecticut State University, 2004 WL 2377225 (D. Conn. Sep. 30, 2004 –
“In the wake of Lane, it appears that a private suit for money damages under Title II of the ADA
may be maintained against a state only if the plaintiff can establish that the Title II violation
involved a fundamental right.”)
169. The reasonable accommodations she requested – ADA Advocate59, breaks, large print
documents, etc. – is not unduly burdensome for the court. Additionally, in Haas v Quest
Recovery Services Inc., 338 F. Supp. 2d 797 (N.DS. Ohio Sep 20, 2004) quoting Popovich V.
Cuyahoga County Court Pleas, 276 F. 3d 808 (6th Circuit 2002), the court outlined a list of what
would be considered a fundamental right: the right to be present at trial, the right to a meaningful
opportunity to be heard, the right to a trial by jury or the public’s right of access to criminal
proceedings.
170. Here, Plaintiff was denied the right to fully participate at an important hearing, and was
precluded from having a meaningful opportunity to be heard. That Defendant Counsel and the
Judge “discussed” the issues denying Plaintiff the right to speak while incapacitated, including
Plaintiff’s alleged and predicted arguments, cannot substitute for this right.
171. In Phiffer v Columbia River Correctional Institute, 384 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. Sep 21, 2004),
the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration a case in which an inmate with
osteoporosis and osteoarthritis was unable to sit for the three hour periods required for
participation in his assigned prison program, requested return to a previous program or
reasonable accommodation, and suffered physical pain as a result of the denial of the requested
accommodation. The court rejected the state’s 11th Amendment immunity, finding it consistent
with its precedent (that Title II as a whole validly abrogates states’ immunity), and declined to
further review that settled principle.

59
At no cost to the Court.

34
172. In Association for Disabled Americans Inc. v Florida International University, No. 02-
10360 F. 3d (April 6, 2005), the Court ruled that the University failed to provide qualified sign
language interpreters, effective note takers, and other aids, and stated that Title II is valid 14th
Amendment legislation and properly abrogates states’ sovereign immunity.

V. CAUSES OF ACTION

Count I – Violations of the Americans Disabilities Act (“ADA”),

ADAAA 2008, ADAAA 2016, Title II
(All Defendants)

173. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the preceding paragraphs as
though fully rewritten herein.

174. Plaintiff has averred that she has impairments; she requested accommodations so she
could participate in court activities and those accommodations were either ignored or not
provided altogether.
175. Under the ADA, “disability” is a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). A person is also considered disabled for
purposes of the ADA if she has a record of such an impairment, or is perceived as having such an
impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B).
176. In Title II, the ADA prohibits discrimination in public services, including courts60, and
mandates that persons eligible for receipt of services not, because of disability, be excluded from
participation or from the benefits, services or activities of a public entity. Administrators of
public programs must take steps to accommodate persons with disabilities, unless the
accommodation fundamentally alters the nature of an activity or program or constitutes an undue
administrative or financial burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A). This obligation may be
enforceable by a suit for declaratory or injunctive relief, or money damages. 42 U.S.C. § 12133.

60
The Title II regulations state that “[a] public entity may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements,
utilize criteria or methods of administration...that have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing
accomplishment of the objectives of the public entity’s program with respect to persons with disabilities.”

35
177. Plaintiff hereby alleges that she was discriminated against not once or twice, but
numerous times by different Defendants which further implies a meeting-of-the-minds; and that
she was ultimately punished for trying to protect her civil rights and after she filed numerous
complaints with the Florida Judicial Qualifications Committee against Judge Davidson and
Holcomb and against Defendant attorneys with the Florida BAR.
178. Here, the 18th Circuit Court, its Judges, Florida BAR Card Members, their law firms and
their clients BANA61 and CMS, discriminated against a person known to be disabled; knew that
she was disabled; were repeatedly cognizant of requests for accommodations; acted deliberately
indifferent, at best, or as alleged, intentionally discriminated and retaliated against the Plaintiff
precisely or proximately because of her disabilities.
179. Defendant 18th Circuit Court has failed to properly train administrative personnel such as
ADA Coordinator Ty Berdeaux and Trial Court Administrator Mark Van Bever in regards to
amendments of the ADA (ADAAA) and the compliance thereof. An ADA Coordinator’s job is
to appropriately assist in accommodating qualified disabled litigants, jurors and attendees
through the court system, not take sides against those trying to enforce or protecting their civil
rights.
180. Defendant 18th Circuit Court has failed to properly evaluate Senior Judge Charles
Holcomb or to train Senior Judge Charles Holcomb on how to properly address disabled litigants
without violating their civil rights and thereby have failed to properly train Senior Judge Charles
Holcomb to comply with the ADA. Defendant Judge Charles Holcomb violated Plaintiff’s
disability rights in his Amended Order and offered no case law to support his discriminatory rant
against the Plaintiff, her husband and her ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter.
181. Defendants mutually conspired to retaliate and decimate disabled pro se Plaintiff’s civil
rights and accommodations through Judge Charles Holcomb’s Amended Order in hearings in
Duval County on November 11, 2016 and in the November 30, 2016 hearing further violating
Plaintiff’s ADA rights.
182. Defendant 18th Circuit Court failed to assist Plaintiff in much-needed reasonable
accommodations. Defendant 18th Circuit Court receives federal funding and has failed to be

61
Joint activity by a private party and a government agent can also transform the private party into a state actor,
where the purpose of the collusion is to violate the federal rights of the plaintiff.

36
 compliant with the ADA in providing services to the Plaintiff which included but was not limited
to, an ADA Advocate, breaks during proceedings and large print documents.
183. Defendant 18th Circuit Court failed to provide or assist Plaintiff in acquiring another
ADA Advocate after her own ADA Advocate/Interpreter was coerced and threatened by
Defendants BANA, CMS, MLG, AKERMAN, LGP, SERRADET, GRAY, ETTORI, STENGEL
and GELETY to abandon the Plaintiff. ADA Advocate abandoned Plaintiff in February 2017.
184. Defendants BANA, CMS, MLG, AKERMAN, LGP, SERRADET, GRAY, ETTORI,
STENGEL and GELETY interfered in Plaintiff’s enjoyment and constitutional right to
participate as a disabled litigant in the activities of a “public entity” and intervened and
attempted to supersede the administrative process of the Court’s administration in order to
remove Plaintiff’s necessary ADA accommodations in violation of the Americans Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), ADAAA 2008, ADAAA 2016, Title II.
185. Defendants 18th CIRCUIT, DAVIDSON, BANA, CMS, MLG, AKERMAN, LGP,
SERRADET, GRAY, ETTORI, STENGEL and GELETY discriminated, retaliated and
ultimately injured Plaintiff in a place of public services thereby denying Plaintiff her right to the
Court’s services and to due process in violation of the Americans Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
ADAAA 2008, ADAAA 2016, Title II.
186. The case at Bar describes that Plaintiff was “excluded from participation in or denied the
benefits of” Defendants’ activities and was injured by the Defendants’ reckless behavior. Thus,
prima facie case has been pled.
187. The case at bar describes that the Plaintiff was “excluded from participation in or denied
the benefits of” Defendants’ and the Court’s activities.
188. Plaintiff was denied the enjoyment of a public facility, service and accommodations
by the Defendants in violation of Plaintiff’s civil and disability rights.
189. Plaintiff Isabel Santamaria has been harassed, exploited, mocked, ridiculed, injured and
was denied her rights to fair hearings and/or litigation by the Officers of the Court, law firms and
their clients named herein during the course of litigation.
190. In order to reach their objective, Defendants displayed complete and utter disregard not
only for Plaintiff’s civil rights inside and outside the courtroom, but for Plaintiff’s well-being
thereby endangering her life after being aware of her disabilities and that a medical emergency
was likely to occur.

37
191. As a result of Defendants’ malicious discrimination through written and verbal
communications and during proceedings in a Court of Equity, Plaintiff suffered injury.
192. Due to Defendants’ abuse towards the Plaintiff, Plaintiff was forced to spend money
she could not afford and hire an attorney to speak for her and in an effort to protect her
rights.
193. Defendants named herein are the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.
194. The Plaintiff hereby requests injunctive relief as permitted by this Act and that the
Defendants be estopped from causing further injury to the Plaintiff.
195. Plaintiff has suffered emotional distress and related medical expenses.
196. Plaintiff seeks actual and compensatory damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Isabel Santamaria demands all available relief under this Act
and for the damages incurred by the Plaintiff for her losses and injuries, together with interest,
costs, expenses and attorney’s fees.

Count II – Violations of the Americans Disabilities Act (“ADA”),

ADAAA 2008, ADAAA 2016, Title III

(BANA, CMS, AKERMAN, LGP and MLG)

197. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the preceding paragraphs as
though fully rewritten herein.
198. Defendants BANA, CMS, AKERMAN, LGP, and MLG are private entities under Part
III, § 12181(6).
199. Title III of the ADA provides that “no individual shall be discriminated against on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation.” (42 U.S.C. §
12182(a)).
200. Plaintiff was denied the enjoyment of a public facility, service and accommodations
by the Defendants named herein in violation of Plaintiff’s civil and disability rights.
201. Defendants knew or should have known that these discriminatory acts were illegal
and would cause harm to the Plaintiff.

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202. Defendants AKERMAN, LGP and MLG, law firms, fail to properly train their
employees and officers to comply with the ADA, federal law, or to respect a litigant’s civil
rights through verbal communications, during court proceedings and litigation.
203. Defendants BANA and CMS, failed to properly evaluate or supervise their
subordinates or contractual agent’s egregious conduct or knew and failed to cease the
discriminatory conduct of their subordinates or contractual agents during litigation against
the disabled Plaintiff in violation of ADA, Title III.
204. In an effort to deter Defendants’ abuse towards the Plaintiff after her ADA
Advocate was coerced by Defendants to abandon her, Plaintiff was forced to spend money
she could not afford and hire an attorney to speak and to protect her rights causing further
economic injury to the Plaintiff.
205. As a result of Defendants’ malicious discrimination, Plaintiff suffered injury.
206. Title III Defendants named herein are the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.
207. The Plaintiff hereby requests “injunctive relief” against Title III Defendants BANA,
CMS, MLG, AKERMAN, LGP, SERRADET, GRAY, STENGEL, ETTORI and GELETY
as permitted by this Act and that these Defendants be estopped from causing further injury
to the Plaintiff.
208. Plaintiff has suffered emotional distress, physical injuries and related medical expenses.
209. Plaintiff seeks actual and compensatory damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Isabel Santamaria demands all available relief under this Act
and for the damages incurred by the Plaintiff for her losses and injuries together with interest,
costs, expenses and attorney’s fees.

Count III - USC 42 § 12203, Prohibition Against Retaliation and Coercion

(All Defendants)

210. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the preceding paragraphs as
though fully rewritten herein.
211. Section 12133 affords the Plaintiffs their right to enforce any violation of this federal law.
Moreover, under 42 U.S.C. § 12203, federal law bars any and all retaliation, coercion,
interference or intimidation whatsoever against “any individual because such individual has
opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter, or because such individual made a

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 charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in the investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this chapter.” Giving such “aggrieved persons” as the Plaintiff a separate right to
bring civil action against the violators.
212. Defendants STENGEL, ETTORI, GRAY, SERRADET & GELETY, with the full
knowledge of their employers AKERMAN, MLG and LGP, their clients BANA and CMS and of
the 18th Circuit Court and its Judges DAVIDSON and HOLCOMB, intimidated, threatened and
interfered with Plaintiff Isabel Santamaria in the exercise or enjoyment of or on account of
Plaintiff having exercised her rights granted or protected by this Chapter in violation of §
12203(b).
213. Defendants retaliated against the Plaintiff and her ADA Advocate during hearings in
Brevard County, Florida on June 29, 2016 and in a hearing not related to the Plaintiff which
included retaliatory acts against the Plaintiff to her detriment and against her ADA Advocate Dr.
Sharp in Duval County, Florida on November 10, 2016 in violation of U.S.C. 42 § 12203.
214. Defendants persistently retaliated against the Plaintiff, on the record, during the
November 30, 2016 hearing and after Plaintiff was transported to the hospital. (See Exhibit M).
215. Defendants and their agents retaliated against Plaintiff Isabel Santamaria through written
and verbal communications.
216. Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff during and after Court proceedings.
217. The 18th Circuit Court knew of the violations as notified by the Plaintiff but failed to take
any action to cease the retaliation.
218. Defendant 18th Circuit has failed to properly train administrative personnel such as
Brevard County ADA Coordinator Ty Berdeaux and Trial Court Administrator Mark Van Bever
in regards to amendments of the ADA (ADAAA) and the compliance thereof. An ADA
Coordinator’s job is to appropriately assist in accommodating qualified disabled litigants, jurors
and attendees through the court system, not to retaliate or take sides against those trying to
enforce or protect their own civil rights. Defendant 18th Circuit Court receives federal funding
and therefore is bound to Section 504 of the Rehabilitations Act.
219. The State of Florida knew of the violations as notified by the Plaintiff but failed to take
any action to cease the retaliation.
220. Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff’s ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter, who is a person
“assisting” a disabled person as defined under the ADA.

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221. As a result of Defendants’ discrimination, retaliation and threats, Plaintiff was abandoned
by her most needed accommodation, her ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter, on or around February
2017. Plaintiff was forced to incur attorney fees as a result causing further injury and damages.
222. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful discrimination and
retaliation, Plaintiff has sustained long-term injuries and damages.
223. Defendants are the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.
224. Plaintiff has suffered emotional distress and related medical expenses.
225. Plaintiff seeks actual and compensatory damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Isabel Santamaria demands all available relief under this section
of the Act and for the damages and injuries incurred by the Plaintiff for her losses, together with
interest, costs, expenses and attorney’s fees.

Count IV - Conspiracy To Violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983

226. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the preceding paragraphs as
though fully rewritten herein.
227. To establish a conspiracy claim under § 1983, plaintiffs "must show among other things,
that defendants 'reached an understanding to violate [their] rights.'" Rowe v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d 421,
425 (11th Cir. 1988)).

228. Plaintiff must prove both of the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:

 First: Defendant acted under color of state law.

 Second: While acting under color of state law, defendant deprived plaintiff of a
federal constitutional statutory right.
229. “A jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the
defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves
reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
230. Plaintiff’s amended complaint with the attached exhibits has met this burden.

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231. The Plaintiff has adequately asserted violations of her civil rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
232. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Judge Lisa Davidson, Judge Charles Holcomb, Bank of
America, N.A., and their subordinates Sahily Serradet of Liebler, Gonzalez & Portuondo,
Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC and their subordinates Scott Stengel, William P. Gray, and
Paul W. Etorri of Akerman LP, Michael Gelety of Marinosci Law Group, mutually conspired to
commit an act to deprive Plaintiff of her constitutional and statutory rights in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983.

233. Defendants were all aware of Plaintiff’s disabilities and medical condition.
234. Defendants were aware ahead of time that Plaintiff would be alone without the assistance
of her ADA Advocate/Oral Interpreter at the hearing.
235. On or before November 30, 2016, Defendants mutually conspired to violate Plaintiff’s
Eleventh Amendment rights by providing no Notice of discussing ADA-related issues regarding
Judge Holcomb’s Order in this hearing for which Plaintiff was not only in severe distress but was
also unaware of and unprepared to litigate. Defendant Stengel specifically asked Judge Davidson
if he had read Judge Holcomb’s Order and Judge Davidson assured Defendant Stengel that they
would discuss those ADA “matters” after addressing Plaintiff’s counterclaim62.
236. During the November 30, 2016 hearing, Plaintiff clearly displayed symptoms to
necessitate medical care but was ignored instead during the proceeding by Defendants.
Defendant Judge Davidson and the other Defendants continued to conspire to deprive Santamaria
of not only her right to fully participate in a hearing involving her property but to delay any
medical care or attention until Santamaria ultimately collapsed to the floor after passing-out in
her chair several minutes prior.
237. As a state court judge, Defendant DAVIDSON was using power that she possessed by
virtue of state law.
238. Defendant 18th Circuit Court, by and through Defendant State of Florida, provided a
mantle of authority that enhanced the power of the harm-causing individual actor.
239. Defendant 18th Circuit has failed to properly train administrative personnel and its judges
to abide by federal law.

The November 16, 2016 hearing was scheduled on the docket for a Motion to Dismiss Santamaria’s Counterclaim
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& Answer and for no other matters.

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240. Defendant BANA, CMS, MLG, AKERMAN, LGP, SERRADET, GRAY, STENGEL,
ETTORI, are not state officials. However, Plaintiff hereby alleges that Defendants acted under
color of state law by conspiring with one or more state officials to deprive Plaintiff of a federal
and constitutional right.
241. As a result of the conspiracy by the Defendants, Plaintiff suffered injury.
242. Defendants are the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injury.
243. Plaintiff has suffered emotional distress and related medical expenses.
244. Plaintiff seeks actual and compensatory damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands all available relief under this statute and for damages
for her loss against Defendants, together with interest, costs, expenses, and attorney fees.

Count V – Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Rights
(State Actors: Judge Davidson, Judge Holcomb, 18th Judicial Circuit and State of Florida)

245. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the preceding paragraphs as
though fully rewritten herein.
246. Fourteenth Amendment, Section. 1. “… nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”
247. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
248. Defendants’ wrongful acts constitute a violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 in that the
Defendants, acting “under color of law” as a municipal corporation and officials empowered by
that municipality, willfully and intentionally violated Santamaria’s civil rights as guaranteed by
the Constitution of the United States, for which this suit seeks redress.
249. At all relevant times herein, Defendants DAVIDSON, HOLCOMB, 18th Circuit Court
and the STATE OF FLORIDA, with deliberate indifference, intentionally, willfully, and

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 wantonly and/or with reckless disregard deprived SANTAMARIA of rights and/or privileges
secured by the Constitution.
250. Defendants, state actors, with deliberate indifference, failed to implement established
procedures and policies that are necessary to provide a proper investigation to disabled
complainants.
251. Defendants, under color of law and with deliberate indifference, willful and wanton
conduct created a danger of an increased risk of harm to the Plaintiff.
252. As a governmental and public entity charged with ensuring compliance with state and
federal law, Defendants knew or should have known their duties and obligations under Title II of
the ADA and the U.S. Constitution.
253. Despite this knowledge and based on the facts alleged herein, Defendants intentionally
refused adequate compliance with Title II of the ADA and failed to afford Plaintiff with
reasonable disability accommodations in a setting appropriate to her needs, in violation of 42
U.S.C. §12182.
254. Defendants subjected Santamaria to discrimination by denying her full access to the
courts, including the enjoyment of benefits of a service, program or activity conducted by the
court which ultimately caused injury to Plaintiff Santamaria.
255. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ actions, omissions, policies, practices and
customs, all committed or adopted with deliberate indifference, Plaintiff was denied the rights
afforded to her and further injured on the premises of the 18th Judicial Circuit Court, all in
violation of her rights afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
256. As a result of the complicit conduct by the Defendants, Plaintiff suffered physical and
long-term emotional injury.
257. Defendants are the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injury.
258. Plaintiff has suffered emotional distress and related medical expenses.
259. Plaintiff seeks actual and compensatory damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands all available relief under this statute and for damages
for her loss against Defendants, together with interest, costs, expenses, and attorney fees.

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 Count VI – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

260. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the preceding paragraphs as
though fully rewritten herein.
261. Under Florida law, to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, a complaint must allege four elements: (1) deliberate or reckless infliction of mental
suffering; (2) outrageous conduct; (3) the conduct caused the emotional distress; and (4) the
distress was severe63.
262. This Circuit has expressly confirmed the availability of emotional distress damages in
such cases as the Plaintiffs’. See, e.g., Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 505 F.3d 1173,
1198 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The open question before us today is narrower still: whether a subset of
compensatory damages—non-economic compensatory damages—is available under § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act for intentional discrimination. We hold that it is”); Stamm v. New York City
Transit Auth., No. 04-CV-2163 SLT JMA, 2013 WL 244793, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2013)
(“this Court holds that damages for emotional distress are available under Title II”); Prakel v.
Indiana, 100 F. Supp. 3d 661, 673 (S.D. Ind. 2015) (confirming the availability of a
compensatory damage remedy in Title II and Section 504 case, including for emotional distress).
263. When reviewing the conduct by the Defendants, which is substantiated herein with Court
transcripts, emails, affidavits, grievances, medical records, medical bills and Court documents,
there is no doubt that Defendants’ conduct against the Plaintiff was in fact outrageous, deliberate
and reckless.

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Under Florida law, a court should allow a lawsuit for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress to proceed
where the defendant’s shocking and scandalous acts should cause an average member of the community to exclaim
“Outrageous!” The Florida appellate courts have held that, as a matter of law, the following three situations
generally provide the “Outrageous!” conduct to support a lawsuit for intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress: IIED upon children; IIED where a company abuses its power, position of trust, or fiduciary duty for
financial gain; and IIED upon families.

Florida law provides an intentional infliction of severe emotional distress cause of action where a company abuses
its power, position of trust, or fiduciary duty for financial gain by causing fear and emotional distress in others. For
example, in Miller v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 235 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970), the First District Court of
Appeal reversed a trial court’s dismissal of an IIED claim and remanded for entry of judgment for the plaintiff
where an insurance company attempted to dissuade an insured’s claim on a policy by insinuating that the insured
was trying to defraud the insurer for coverage. Miller v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 235 So. 2d 33, 35 (Fla. 1st DCA
1970).

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264. Defendants knew that Plaintiff had a history of emotional distress and medical issues that
could severely jeopardize the Plaintiff both psychologically and physically.
265. Defendants STENGEL, SERRADET and GELETY verbally attacked Plaintiff, her ADA
Advocate/Oral Interpreter and husband outside the Courtroom on June 29, 2016 without remorse
and without any signs of abatement to the detriment of the Plaintiff. (See Exhibit J).
266. Defendants encouraged and forced Plaintiff to endure a medical episode for a prolonged
period of time in the Courtroom on November 30, 2018. (See Exhibit M).
267. Defendants BANA, CMS, MLG, AKERMAN, LGP, SERRADET, GRAY, STENGEL
and GELETY co-conspired with Defendant DAVIDSON on November 30, 2016 to deny
Plaintiff a continuance and thereby forced Plaintiff to endure a medical episode, without any
recess (breaks) and without the assistance of her reasonable accommodation, her ADA Advocate,
for a prolonged period of time in open Courtroom thereby denying her timely medical care.
268. Defendants intentionally ignored Plaintiff’s requests and warnings of her symptoms
which included shortness of breath throughout the hearing. Plaintiff warned several times that it
was a violation of her rights, that she was medicated and not feeling well.
269. Defendants lacked all sense of humanity as they made no attempt to assist Plaintiff,
request a recess during the prolonged hearing, or even suggest that Plaintiff be tended to after she
passed-out in her chair during the November 30, 2016 hearing. Instead, Defendants exploited
Plaintiff’s medical condition and willfully and callously proceeded with their argument for
several minutes, knowing that Plaintiff was no longer able to speak or defend herself.
270. Plaintiff’s “collapse” on the floor when she fell forward from her chair, caused further
physical injury to Plaintiff, who already suffers from chronic pain, as she experienced increased
pain from the fall after recovering at home.
271. Plaintiff’s dangerously elevated vital signs64 taken by paramedics minutes after she
collapsed were a clear indication of the severity of the distress she endured and that she was
prone to a stroke in the Courtroom.
272. Defendants BANA and CMS abused its power for financial gain.
273. Defendant “law” firms AKERMAN, LGP and MLG, knew or should have known that
their attorneys (Defendants Stengel, Gray, Serradet and Gelety) had a history of discrimination

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There are four primary vital signs: body temperature, blood pressure, pulse (heart rate), and breathing rate
(respiratory rate), often notated as BT, BP, HR, and RR.

46
 and retaliation against the Plaintiff and that this scenario was likely to occur. Nonetheless,
Defendant law firms negligence and lack of due diligence allowed these attorneys to continue to
participate in proceedings with the Plaintiff to the Plaintiff’s detriment.
274. Defendants law firms AKERMAN, LGP and MLG, abused its power and position of trust
for financial gain and caused injury to the Plaintiff.
275. Defendant attorneys STENGEL, ETTORI, GRAY, SERRADET and GELETY, abused
their position of trust for financial gain and caused injury to the Plaintiff.
276. Defendants’ complete disregard for Plaintiff’s physical and psychological well-being and
the exploitation of her disabilities in a judicial fora was intentional, extreme, and to the detriment
of the Plaintiff.
277. Defendants’ tortious acts were committed in bad faith.
278. Plaintiff suffered further psychological trauma and physical injury as a result of the Court
and Defendants’ reckless behavior.
279. Plaintiff suffered monetary losses and medical expenses and will continue to suffer these
losses and expenses as a result of Defendants’ reckless behavior.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Isabel Santamaria demands all available punitive relief under
this cause of action and for the damages incurred by the Plaintiff for her losses, together with
interest, costs, expenses and attorney’s fees.

Count VII – Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

280. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the preceding paragraphs as
though fully rewritten herein.

281. The elements of negligent infliction of emotional distress are: "(1) the plaintiff must
suffer a discernable physical injury; (2) the physical injury must be caused by the psychological
trauma; (3) the plaintiff must be involved in the event causing the negligent injury to another;
and (4) the plaintiff must have a close personal relationship to the directly injured person."
LeGrande v. Emmanuel, 889 So. 2d 991, 995 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (citing Zell v. Meek, 665 So.
2d 1048, 1052 (Fla. 1995)).

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282. Defendants were aware that Plaintiff had a history of emotional distress and medical
issues that could severely jeopardize the Plaintiff psychologically and physically.
283. Defendants were at the very least negligent by ignoring Plaintiff’s requests and warnings
of her symptoms in the courtroom which included shortness of breath throughout the November
30, 2016 hearing. Plaintiff warned several times that it was a violation of her rights, that she was
medicated and not feeling well. (See Exhibit M).
284. Defendants were at the very least negligent as they made no attempt to assist Plaintiff,
request a break, or even suggest that Plaintiff be tended to after she passed-out in her chair
during the November 30, 2016 hearing. Instead, Defendants exploited Plaintiff’s medical
condition and willfully and callously continued with their argument for several minutes, knowing
that Plaintiff was no longer able to speak or defend herself. (See Exhibit M).
285. Plaintiff’s “collapse” on the floor when she fell forward from her chair, caused further
physical injury to Plaintiff, who already suffers from chronic pain, as she experienced increased
pain from the fall after recovering at home. This physical injury could have been avoided.
286. Plaintiff’s elevated vital signs taken by paramedics minutes after she collapsed were a
clear indication of the severity of her distress and that she was prone to a stroke in the
Courtroom.
287. Defendants BANA and CMS abused their power for financial gain.
288. Defendant “law” firms AKERMAN, LGP and MLG, knew or should have known that
their attorneys (Defendants Stengel, Gray, Ettori, Serradet and Gelety) had a history of
discrimination and retaliation against the Plaintiff and that this scenario was likely to occur.
Nonetheless, Defendant law firms willfully, or at the very least were negligent, in allowing these
attorneys named herein to continue to participate in proceedings with the Plaintiff to the
Plaintiff’s detriment.
289. Defendants law firms AKERMAN, LGP and MLG, abused its power and position of trust
for financial gain.
290. Defendant attorneys STENGEL, ETTORI, GRAY, SERRADET and GELETY, abused
their position of trust for financial gain.
291. Defendants’ negligent, callous, discriminatory, heartless, inhumane and willful conduct
towards the Plaintiff was a violation of her human rights and “surpasses all bounds of decency”.

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292. Defendants’ complete disregard for Plaintiff’s physical and psychological well-being and
the exploitation of her disabilities in a judicial fora was intentional, extreme, and to the detriment
of the Plaintiff.
293. Plaintiff suffered psychological trauma and physical injury as a result of Defendants’
reckless behavior.
294. Plaintiff suffered monetary losses and medical expenses and will continue to suffer these
losses and expenses as a result of Defendants’ reckless behavior.
295. Plaintiff’s damages are ongoing.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Isabel Santamaria demands all available punitive relief under
this cause of action and for the damages incurred by the Plaintiff for her losses, together with
interest, costs, expenses and attorney’s fees.

VI – PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that this Court enter judgment against the
Defendants providing the following relief:

a. Compensatory damages in whatever amount in excess of $5,000,000.00, exclusive of

costs and interest, that Plaintiff is found to be entitled;
b. Punitive/exemplary damages against Defendants in whatever amount, exclusive of costs
and interest, that Plaintiff is entitled;
c. Punitive/exemplary damages pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 768.72 and § 772.11;
d. An Order placing Plaintiff in the position that she would have been in had there been no
violation of her rights;
e. An Order enjoining/restraining Defendants from further acts of discrimination, retaliation
or harm against the Plaintiff and other disabled persons;
f. An award of interest, costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees;
g. Any and all remedies provided pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act Title II
and Title III, USC 42 § 12203 and for Infliction of Emotional Distress;
h. Any and all remedies provided pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of Plaintiff’s
Fourteenth Amendment and disability rights.
i. Take other appropriate nondiscriminatory measures to overcome the above described
discrimination and retaliation; and
j. Such other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate.
k. A trial by jury.

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 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
The Plaintiffs hereby demands a jury trial by her peers on all issues so triable against the
Defendants.

Respectfully submitted,

___________________________
Isabel Santamaria – Pro Se
499 Cellini Ave NE
Palm Bay, FL 32907
(321) 614-6441
Email: Isabel-1229@hotmail.com

VERIFICATION

I, ISABEL SANTAMARIA, am over the age of 18 and the Plaintiff in this action. The
statements and allegations about me or which I make in this AMENDED VERIFIED
COMPLAINT are true and correct, based upon my personal knowledge (unless otherwise
indicated), and if called upon to testify as to their truthfulness, I would and could do so
competently with the assistance of an ADA Advocate or an attorney. I declare under penalties of
perjury, under the laws of the United States, that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

Executed this 26th day of February, 2019

_____________________________
Isabel Santamaria - pro se

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