Criminal Law II Session 1 Page |1

G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990 case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator
Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it
vs.
very simply-the information in Hernandezcharged murders and other common crimes committed as a
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br.
necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen.
103], et al, respondents.
Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,
complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to
vs.
in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND
the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less
EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.
concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.
NARVASA, J.:
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once more its Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty
takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of its conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for
doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number of similar Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued
cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners
season and circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the
impassioned debate, even among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 against granting bail to the Panlilios.
arguments that are now brought to bear on the same question.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition,
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan G.R. No. 92163.
Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:
of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of
Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an information signed
Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and
and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C.
that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed
Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr.,
with common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the Solicitor General in
charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime
oral argument although it is not offered in his written pleadings;
of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a
failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held
necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the
overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended
course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave
in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he
character;
was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses
Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula
committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance
Torres.3
thereof.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2)
corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he
Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling remains
was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially
that not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom
filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process;
Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which
(c) denied his right to bail; and
precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who
Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes
issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause. 4
penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6, upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious offense
1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in this in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."' 11 In thus acting, the President in effect by

legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less
than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should be,
limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion and
that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other common
crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the Court felt
that the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not
sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article
48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal
Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion,
and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the
following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of
rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years
of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. in other words,
in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be
imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted
out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said
provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would
be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the
culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper
if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the words of
Rodriguez Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace
referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente en
el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p.
2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the
Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then
in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un
solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio
necesario para cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave
en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represents la suma de las que
pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los
delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment,
restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period
to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts
charged were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal Code
Criminal Law II Session 1 Page |2
does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one
act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment
graver than that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that
the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period,
Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the
aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this
benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the
result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said
crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime
independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more
serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate
penalties for each offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is
that Hernandezremains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired into,
much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely provides
a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints about the
denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact
charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus,
in Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against
defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies
described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by
said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense of
rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is,
therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot
exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in
conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a
similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books,
while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other
offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric.
Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined
and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion. Was the petitioner charged without a complaint
having been initially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that
a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, and that on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by
the respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the questioned information. 14There is nothing
inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different
from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the
preliminary investigation.

It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without
first personally determining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the
complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has already
ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination, it
being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.16Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued
barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly
gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary
investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief
period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not
have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation
of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is
bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains:
Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate
vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right
to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested
with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition
to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against
him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have
been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was
also available there. Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the
information charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more
than one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis,
the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the
respondent Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the present
petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error
or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing with the charges
against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should have been
brought up there instead of directly to this Court. There was and is no reason to assume that the
resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability or competence of the respondent Judge-
indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to
hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this
Court, from deciding them; none, in short that would justify by passing established judicial processes
designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthetically, this is the reason
behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the
trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it
erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that the respondent
Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the
prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for the
judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged.19 It is, in any event,
Criminal Law II Session 1 Page |3
incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail
hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a
similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of
seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed
to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court. Not only
because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also because to wash
the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it has already gone
through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the Court cannot express too
strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of proceedings that
should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the relief appealed for was denied
by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift to,
pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the resolution of
issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts. What has thus far been stated is
equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually
Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles
already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against them
as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI
Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained without
bail on the strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany quixotic
quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day
rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no better than mere
terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their
ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings,
kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent
civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to
be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of
our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies
every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion,
either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as
absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity
undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law
as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will
perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before
final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional
in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the
amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the
petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 112235. November 29, 1995.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELIAS LOVEDIORO y
CASTRO, Defendant-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ESSENTIALLY A CRIME OF MASSES INVOLVING CROWD ACTION. — The
gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government. By its very nature,
rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined
a priori within predetermined bounds. One aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is that other
acts committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself because they acquire a political
character.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CRIMES COMMITTED IN FURTHERANCE OF POLITICAL END, ABSORBED. — Divested of
its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however grave, assumes a different color by being
absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of murder. In deciding
if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether
or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive of the act should be
conclusively demonstrated. It is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose
and overt acts are essential components of the crime. With either of these elements wanting, the crime
of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in cases where the act complained of were committed
simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing, robbing, or etc., were accomplished
for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it has been held that the crime would be
separately punishable as a common crime and would not be absorbed by the crime rebellion. If no political
motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of
rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization
dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF; BURDEN IN PROVING POLITICAL MOTIVE IN
CRIMES COMMITTED IN FURTHERANCE OF REBELLION LIES WITH THE ACCUSED. — The burden of
demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive, being a state of mind which the accused,
better than any individual knows. As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act committed was
impelled by a political motive lies on the accused. Political motive must be alleged in the information. It
must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; NOT ESTABLISHED WHERE KILLING WAS NOT POLITICALLY
MOTIVATED. — It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire extrajudicial confession did appellant ever
mention that he was a member of the New People’s Army. A thorough reading of the same reveals
nothing which would suggest that the killing in which he was a participant was motivated by a political
purpose. Moreover, the information filed against appellant, based on sworn statements, did not contain
any mention or allusion as to the involvement of the NPA in the death of SPO3 Lucilo. Even prosecution
eyewitness Nestor Armenta did not mention the NPA in his sworn statement of October 19, 1992. In any
case, appellant’s claim regarding the political color attending the commission of the crime being a matter
of defense, its viability depends on his sole and unsupported testimony. Against appellant’s attempts to
shade his participation in the killing with a political color, the evidence on record leaves the impression
that appellant’s bare allegations of membership in the NPA was conveniently infused to mitigate the
penalty imposable upon him. It is of judicial notice that in many NPA infested areas, crimes have been
all-too-quickly attributed to the furtherance of an ideology or under the cloak of political color for the
Criminal Law II Session 1 Page |4
purpose of mitigating the imposable penalty when in fact they are no more than ordinary crimes
perpetrated by common criminals. In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a political
motive for the killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, we are satisfied that the trial court correctly convicted appellant
of the crime of murder.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; TESTIMONY OF A SINGLE CREDIBLE WITNESS IS
SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT. — It is of no moment that a single eyewitness, Nestor Armenta, scaled his
fate, for it is settled that the testimony of one witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict.
Against appellant’s claims that he acted merely as a look-out, the testimony of one witness, his blood
relative, free from any signs of impropriety or falsehood, was sufficient to convict the accused.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; MOTIVE; ABSENCE THEREOF DOES NOT PRECLUDE CONVICTION. — Neither may
lack of motive be availing to exculpate the appellant. Lack or absence of motive for committing a crime
does not preclude conviction, there being a reliable eyewitness who fully and satisfactorily identified
appellant as the perpetrator of the felony.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; BOLSTERED BY ABSENCE OF GRUDGE AGAINST ACCUSED.
— In the case at bench, the strength of the prosecution’s case was furthermore bolstered by accused-
appellant’s admission in open court that he and the eyewitness, his own uncle, bore no grudges against
each other.
8. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; MANIFEST BY THE SUDDEN AND
WITHOUT WARNING ATTACK ON THE VICTIM. — Treachery was adequately proved in the court below.
The attack delivered by appellant was sudden, and without warning of any kind.
9. ID.; MURDER; PENALTY. — The killing having been qualified by treachery, the crime committed is
murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with all
the accessories provided by law.
DECISION
Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., away from the Daraga, Albay Public
Market when a man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun
at the policeman’s right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three other companions with him,
one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After taking the latter’s gun,
the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled. 1
The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old welder
from Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed that he knew both the victim and the man who fired the fatal shot.
Armenta identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his nephew (appellant’s
father was his first cousin) and alleged that he knew the victim from the fact that the latter was a resident
of Bagumbayan. Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds on the
face, the chest, and other parts of the body. 2 On autopsy, the municipal health officer established the
cause of death as hypovolemic shock. As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor of
Albay, on November 6, 1992 filed an Information charging accused-appellant Elias Lovedioro y Castro of
the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30 o’clock in the afternoon, at Burgos
Street, Municipality of Daraga, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, together with Gilberto Longasa, who is already charged in Crim. Case

No. 5931 before RTC, Branch 1, and three (3) others whose true identities are at present unknown and
remain at large, conniving, conspiring, confederating and helping one another for a common purpose,
armed with firearms, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire and shoot one SPO3 JESUS LUCILO, a member of the Daraga
Police Station inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds causing his death, to the damage and
prejudice of his legal heirs.
After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder. The dispositive portion of said decision, dated September 24, 1993 states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, acting in conspiracy with his co-accused who are still at
large, of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessories provided by
law; to pay the heirs of the deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow, Mrs. Remeline Lucilo, the
amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos representing the civil indemnity for death; to pay the said
widow the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and to
pay the said widow the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00) Pesos,
representing actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment however, in case of insolvency on the part
of the said accused. With costs against the accused.
SO-ORDERED.
Hence, the instant appeal, in which the sole issue interposed is that portion of trial court decision finding
him guilty of the crime of murder and not rebellion.
Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness, Nestor Armenta, as supporting his
claim that he should have been charged with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his Brief, he
asseverates that Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the New People’s Army.
Additionally, he contends that because the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in furtherance of subversive
ends," 4 (said killing) should have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts. 134 and
135 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he did not fire the fatal shot but merely acted as
look-out in the liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he should have been charged merely as a participant
in the commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code
and should therefore have been meted only the penalty of prision mayor by the lower court.
Asserting that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder, the Solicitor General
avers that the crime committed by appellant may be considered as rebellion only if the defense itself had
conclusively proven that the motive or intent for the killing of the policeman was for "political and
subversive ends." 5 Moreover, the Solicitor General contends that even if appellant were to be convicted
of rebellion, and even if the trial court had found appellant guilty merely of being a participant in a
rebellion, the proper imposable penalty is not prision mayor as appellant contends, but reclusion temporal,
because Executive Order No. 187 as amended by Republic Act No. 6968, the Coup D’etat Law, prescribes
reclusion temporal as the penalty imposable for individuals found guilty as participants in a rebellion.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the crime committed was murder and not rebellion. Under Art.
134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act. No. 6968, rebellion is committed in the
following manner:
Criminal Law II Session 1 Page |5
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part
thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. 6
The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government. 7 By its very
nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be
confined a priori within predetermined bounds. 8 One aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion
is that other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself because they acquire
a political character. This peculiarity was underscored in the case of People v. Hernandez, 9 thus:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common
crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If
a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance to the Government the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, then it becomes
stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the
former acquires the political character of the latter. Divested of its common complexion therefore, any
ordinary act, however grave, assumes a different color by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which
carries a lighter penalty than the crime of murder. In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not
murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance
of a political end. The political motive of the act should be conclusively demonstrated.
In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive, being a state of
mind which the accused, better than any individual, knows. Thus, in People v. Gempes, 10 this court
stressed that:
Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accused’s) knowledge and since moreover this is an
affirmative defense, the burden is on them to prove, or at least to state, which they could easily do
personally or through witnesses, that they killed the deceased in furtherance of the resistance movement.
From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly
proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential components of the crimes. With either of these
elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in cases where the act
complained of were committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing, robbing,
or etc., were accomplished for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it has been
held that the crime would be separately punishable as a common crime and would not be absorbed by
the crime rebellion. 11
Clearly, political motive should be established before a person charged with a common crime-alleging
rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty-could benefit from the law’s relatively benign
attitude towards political crimes. Instructive in this regard is the case of Enrile v. Amin, 12 where the
prosecution sought to charge Senator Juan Ponce Enrile with violation of P.D. No. 1829, 13 for allegedly
harboring or concealing in his home Col. Gregorio Honasan in spite of the senator’s knowledge that
Honasan might have committed a crime. This Court held, against the prosecution’s contention, that
rebellion and violation of P.D. 1829 could be tried separately 14 (on the principle that rebellion is based
on the Revised Penal Code while P.D. 1829 is a special law), that the act for which the senator was being
charged, though punishable under a special law, was absorbed in the crime of rebellion being motivated
by, and related to the acts for which he was charged in Enrile v. Salazar (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164) a
case decided on June 5, 1990. Ruling in favor of Senator Enrile and holding that the prosecution for

violation of P.D. No. 1829 cannot prosper because a separate prosecution for rebellion had already been
filed and in fact decided, the Court said:
The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however constrain us to rule that the theory of
absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special
laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense. Noting the importance of purpose in
cases of rebellion the court in Enrile v. Amin further underscored that:
[I]intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he
harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former associate, the
motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is committed with political or social motives, that
is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of
being punished separately.
It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted
of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere
membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself,
suffice.
The similarity of some of the factual circumstances of People v. Ompad, Jr., 16 to the instant case is
striking. Two witnesses, both former NPA recruits identified the accused Ompad, alias "Commander
Brando," a known hitman of the NPA, as having led three other members of the NPA in the liquidation of
Dionilo Barlaan, a military informer, also in a rebel infested area. In spite of his notoriety as an NPA
hitman, Ompad was merely charged with and convicted of murder, not rebellion because political motive
was neither alleged nor proved.
As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act committed was impelled by a political motive lies
on the accused. Political motive must be alleged in the information. 17 It must be established by clear
and satisfactory evidence. In People v. Paz and Tica we held:
That the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter of mitigation or defense that the accused
has the burden of proving clearly and satisfactorily. The lone uncorroborated assertion of appellant that
his superiors told him of Dayrit being an informer, and his suspicion that he was one such, is neither
sufficient or adequate to established that the motivation for the killing was political, considering
appellant’s obvious interest in testifying to that effect.
Similarly, in People v. Buco, 19 the Court stressed that accused in that case failed to established that the
reason for the killing of their victim was to further or carry out rebellion. The evidence adduced by the
defense therein simply showed that appellant Francisco Buco was ordered by Tomas Calma, alias
"Commander Sol" to kill municipal mayor Conrado G. Dizon. However, the evidence likewise showed that
Calma was induced by an acquaintance, a civilian, to order the killing on account of private differences
over a ninety (90) hectare piece of land. The court attributed no political motive for the killing, though
committed by known members of the Hukbalahap movement.
People v. Dasig 21 has a factual milieu almost similar to the instant case. There, the Court held that "the
act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component
or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of a rebellion." In Dasig the Court however noted
that the accused, who was charged with murder, not only admitted his membership with the NPA but
also executed an extrajudicial confession to the effect that he was a member of an NPA "sparrow unit,"
Criminal Law II Session 1 Page |6
a fact to which even the Solicitor General, in his brief therein was in agreement. The Solicitor General’s
brief in Dasig which this Court favorably quoted, noted that:
[T]he sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People’s Army with the objective of overthrowing
the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad
was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA. 22
By contrast, the Solicitor General vigorously argues for a different result in the case at bench. He states
that accused-appellant’s belated claims to membership in the NPA were not only in substantial but also
self serving, 23 an averment to which, given a thorough review of the circumstances of the case, we fully
agree. He states:
[In the case cited] the appellants, admittedly members of the NPA clearly overcame the burden of
proving motive or intent. It was shown that the political motivation for the killing of the victim was the
fact that Ragaul was suspected as an informer for the PC. The perpetrators even left a letter card, a
drawing on the body of Ragaul as a warning to others not to follow his example. It is entirely different in
the case at bar where the evidence for the appellant merely contains self-serving assertions and denials
not substantial enough as an indicia of political motivation in the killing of victim SPO3 Jesus Lucilo. 24
In the case at bench, the appellant, assisted by counsel, admitted in his extrajudicial confession to having
participated in the killing of Lucilo as follows:
Q: What was that incident if any, please narrate?
A: July 27, 1992 at more or less 12:00 noon. I am at home, three male person a certain alias ALWIN,
ALIAS SAMUEL and the other one unknown to me, fetched me and told me to go with them, so I asked
them where, Alwin handed me a hand gun and same he stopped/call a passenger jeepney and told me
board on said jeepney. (sic)
Q: Please continue.
A.. Upon reaching Daraga, Albay fronting Petron Gasoline Station, we alighted on said jeep, so we walk
towards Daraga Bakery we stopped walking due to it is raining, when the rain stopped we continue
walking by using the road near the bakery. (sic)
Q: When you reached Daraga bakery, as you have said in Q.7 you used the road near the bakery where
did you proceed?
A: I am not familiar with that place, but I and my companion continue walking, at more less 4:30 P.M.
July 27, 1992 one of my companion told us as to quote in Bicol dialect to wit: ‘AMO NA YADI AN TINAMPO
PALUWAS’ (This is the place towards the poblacion), so, I placed myself just ahead of a small store, my
three (3) companion continue walking towards poblacion, later on a policeman sporting whit T-shirt a
khaki pant was walking towards me, while the said policeman is nearly approaching me, ALWIN shot the
said policeman infront of the small store, when the said policeman fell on the asphalted road, ALWIN
took the service firearm of the said policeman, then we ran towards the subdivision, then my two (2)
companions commanded a tricycle then we fled until we reached a hill wherein there is a small bridge,
thereafter Ka Samuel took the handgun that was handed to me by them at Pilar, Sorsogon. (sic)
Q: Do you know the policeman that was killed by your companion?
A: I just came to know his name when I reached home and heard it radio, that he is JESUS LUCILO.
Q: What is your participation in the ground?
A: Look-out sir
Q: I have nothing more to asked you what else, if there is any? (sic)
A: No more sir

It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire extrajudicial confession did appellant ever mention that he
was a member of the New People’s Army. A thorough reading of the same reveals nothing which would
suggest that the killing in which he was a participant was motivated by a political purpose. Moreover, the
information filed against appellant, based on sworn statements, did not contain any mention or allusion
as to the involvement of the NPA in the death of SPO3 Lucilo. 26 Even prosecution eyewitness Nestor
Armenta did not mention the NPA in his sworn statement of October 19, 1992. 27
As the record would show, allegations relating to appellant’s membership in the NPA surfaced almost
merely as an afterthought, something which the defense merely picked up and followed through upon
prosecution eyewitness Armenta’s testimony on cross-examination that he knew appellant to be a
member of the NPA. Interestingly, however, in the same testimony, Armenta admitted that he was
"forced" to pinpoint appellant as an NPA member. 28 The logical result, of course, was that the trial court
did not give any weight and credence to said testimony. The trial court, after all, had the prerogative of
rejecting only a part of a witness’ testimony while upholding the rest of it. 29 While disbelieving the
portion of Armenta’s testimony on appellant’s alleged membership in the NPA, the trial court correctly
gave credence to his unflawed narration about how the crime was committed. 30 Such narration is even
corroborated in its pertinent portions, except as to the identity of the gunwielder, by the testimony of the
appellant himself.
In any case, appellant’s claim regarding the political color attending the commission of the crime being a
matter of defense, its viability depends on his sole and unsupported testimony. He testified that, upon
the prodding of alias Alwin and alias Samuel, he joined the NPA because of the organization’s goals. 31
He claimed that his two companions shot Lucilo because he "had offended our organization," 32 without,
however, specifying what the "offense" was. Appellant claimed that he had been a member of the NPA
for five months before the shooting incident.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant’s contentions are couched in terms so general
and non-specific 34 that they offer no explanation as to what contribution the killing would have made
towards the achievement of the NPA’s subversive aims. SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a mere policeman, was never
alleged to be an informer. No acts of his were specifically shown to have offended the NPA.. Against
appellant’s attempts to shade his participation in the killing with a political color, the evidence on record
leaves the impression that appellant’s bare allegations of membership in the NPA was conveniently infused
to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him. It is of judicial notice that in many NPA infested areas, crimes
have been all-too-quickly attributed to the furtherance of an ideology or under the cloak of political color
for the purpose of mitigating the imposable penalty when in fact they are no more than ordinary crimes
perpetrated by common criminals. In Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr., Chief Justice Narvasa aptly observed:
The existence of rebellious groups in our society today, and of numerous bandits, or irresponsible or
deranged individuals, is a reality that cannot be ignored or belittled. Their activities, the killings and acts
of destruction and terrorism that they perpetrate, unfortunately continue unabated despite the best
efforts that the Government authorities are exerting, although it may be true that the insurrectionist
groups of the right or the left no longer pose a genuine threat to the security of the state. The need for
more stringent laws and more rigorous law-enforcement, cannot be gainsaid. 35
In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a political motive for the killing of SPO3
Jesus Lucilo, we are satisfied that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder. 36
It is of no moment that a single eyewitness, Nestor Armenta, sealed his fate, for it is settled that the
testimony of one witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict. 37 Against appellant’s claims
that he acted merely as a look-out, the testimony of one witness, his blood relative, free from any signs
Criminal Law II Session 1 Page |7
of impropriety or falsehood, was sufficient to convict the accused. 38 Moreover, neither may lack of
motive be availing to exculpate the appellant. Lack or absence of motive for committing a crime does not
preclude conviction, there being a reliable eyewitness who fully and satisfactorily identified appellant as
the perpetrator of the felony. 39 In the case at bench, the strength of the prosecution’s case was
furthermore bolstered by accused-appellant’s admission in open court that he and the eyewitness, his
own uncle, bore no grudges against each other.
Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The attack delivered by appellant was
sudden, and without warning of any kind. 41 The killing having been qualified by treachery, the crime
committed is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetuatogether with all the accessories provide by law
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court’s decision dated September 14, 1993, sentencing
the accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179080 November 26, 2014
EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE and GENEROSO MARFIL alias "TAPOL", Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated November 18, 2005 and Resolution2 dated June 19, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in G.R. CR No. 26418, which set aside the November 15, 2001 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Kidapawan City, Cotabato.
Petitioners Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde and Generoso Marfil alias "Tapol" were charged with the
crime of Violation of Domicile under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).4 The Information dated
May 3, 1990 reads:
The undersigned accuses EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE AND GENEROSO MARFIL Alias
"TAPOL" of the crime of Violation of Domicile, committed as follows:
That at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of May 14, 1989, at Sitio New Lantawan, Barangay
Greenhills, Municipality of President Roxas, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the above-named
accused EDIGARDO GEROCHE, being a Barangay Captain and the rest being CAFGUs, hence,
persons inauthority, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with
garand rifles, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without proper judicial
order, entered the house of ROBERTO MALLO by forcibly breaking the door of said house against
the will of the occupants thereof, search the effects of the house without the previous consent
of the owner and then mauled one of the occupant BARILIANO LIMBAG inflicting injuries to the
latter. CONTRARY TO LAW.5
During the arraignment on November5, 1990, all the petitioners pleaded not guilty. 6 Thereafter, trial
ensued.
Baleriano Limbag (Baleriano) testified that the crime happened around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of
May 14, 1989 inside the house which he already bought from Roberto Mallo. He roused from sleep when

petitioners, who were not armed with search warrant, suddenly entered the house by destroying the main
door. The petitioners mauled him, striking with a garand rifle, which caused his injuries. They looked for
firearms but instead found and took away his airgun. Roberto Limbag, Baleriano’s nephew who was living
with him, witnessed the whole incident and corroborated his testimony.
Aside from presenting SPO4 Felomino Calfoforo, the Subpoena and Warrant Officer of President Roxas
Police Station who testified on the police blotter, Dr. Antonio Cabrera also took the witness stand for the
prosecution. Essentially, he affirmed the medical certificate that he issued. His findings indicated that
Baleriano suffered hematoma on the left side of the nose, back portion of the body at the level of the hip
region, and back portion at the right side of the scapular region as well as abrasion on the right side of
the breast and left side of the body at the axilliary region. 7 Dr. Cabrera opined that the injuries inflicted
would heal from seven to ten days.8 For the defense, petitioners denied the crime charged, declaring in
unison that they were in their respective houses the entire evening of May 14, 1989. They alleged,
however, that the night before, on May 13, 1989, they conducted a roving footpatrol, together with other
barangay officials, due to the rampant cattle rustling in the area. At the time, they recovered a stolen
carabao owned by a certain Francisco Pongasi9 from three unidentified persons who managed to escape.
On November 15, 2001, the trial court found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Less Serious Physical Injuries under the Article 265 of the RPC. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of arresto mayor maximum, that is, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) months.
According to the RTC, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioners are public officers, which is an
essential element of Article 128 of the RPC. It held:
The prosecution who has that onus proband failed to prove one of the essential elements of the crime;
on the issue of whether or not all the accused were public officers; while it is true that accused were
named CVO’s and the other as a barangay captain and that even if the same were admitted by them
during their testimony in open court, such an admission is not enough to prove that they were public
officers; it is for the prosecution to prove by clear and convincing evidence other than that of the
testimony of witnesses that they werein fact public officers; there exist a doubt of whether or not all the
accused were in fact and in truth public officers; doubts should be ruled in favorof the accused; that on
this lone and essential element the crime charged as violation of domicile is ruled out; that degree of
moral certainty of the crime charged was not established and proved by convincing evidence of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt; x x x.10 Petitioners elevated the case to the CA, which, on November 18, 2005,
set aside the trial court’s judgment. While it agreed with both parties that petitioners should not be
convictedfor Less Serious Physical Injuries, the CA still ruled that they are guilty of Violation of Domicile
considering their judicial admissions that they were barangay captain (in the case of Geroche) and part
of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (in the case of Garde and Marfil). The dispositive portion
of the assailed Decision states:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and the evidence on hand, the
appealed decision is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered finding the accused-petitioners GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Domicile under Article 128 of the Revised Penal
Code and sentencing them to an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Months, One (1) Day of arresto mayor
maximum to Six (6) Months and One (1) Day of prision [correccional] minimum with the accessory penalty
of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a professionor calling pursuant to Article 43
of the Revised Penal Code. SO ORDERED.11
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition. They argue that there is double
jeopardy since the trial court already acquitted them of Violation of Domicile and such judgment, being
now final and executory, is res judicata. Petitioners insist that their appeal before the CA is limited to their
conviction for the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries, focusing their arguments and defense for
Criminal Law II Session 1 Page |8
acquittal from said crime, and that the CA violated their constitutional right to due process when it
convicted them for Violation of Domicile.
We deny.
An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not raised by
the parties.12 When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court,he or she waives the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the
appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate. 13 An appeal
confers upon the appellate court jurisdiction to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase (or reduce) the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. 14 The appellate court
may, and generally does,look into the entire records to ensure that no fact of weight or substance has
been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court.15
Thus, when petitioners appealed the trial court’s judgment of conviction for Less Serious Physical Injuries,
they are deemed to have abandoned their right to invoke the prohibition on doublejeopardy since it
becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the assailed judgment.
Petitioners could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC by
finding them guilty of Violation of Domicile as charged in the Information instead of Less Serious Physical
Injuries. The Court adopts the findings of factand conclusions of law of the CA. In their testimony before
the open court as well as in the pleadings they filed, neither Geroche denied that hewas a barangay
captain nor Garde and Marfil refuted that they were CAFGU members. In holding such positions, they are
considered as public officers/employees.16
As to the penalty imposed by the CA, however, We modify the same. Under Article 128 of the RPC, the
penalty shall be prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods (two [2] years, four [4] months
and one [1] day to six [6] years) if Violation of Domicile be committed at nighttime or if any papers or
effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the
offender. In this case, petitioners barged in the house of Baleriano while they were sleeping at night and,
in addition, they took away with them his airgun.
In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law17 requires courts to impose upon the accused an indeterminate sentence. The maximum term of the
prison sentence shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the said Code.1âwphi1 Yet the penalty prescribed by Article 128 of the RPC is composed
of only two, not three, periods. In which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division into three
equal portions the time included in the penalty, forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying
the provision, the minimum, medium and maximum periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 128 are:
Minimum – 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days
Medium – 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days
Maximum – 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years
Thus, applying in this case, the maximum term should be within the medium period or from 3 years, 6
months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days, in light of the provisions of Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code that if there are no other mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the
commission of the crime, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period.
On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the RPC for the crime. The penalty next lower to that prescribed by Article 128 is arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period (or 4 months and 1 day to 2
years and 4 months).

The foregoing considered, in view of the attending circumstances in this case, the Court hereby sentences
the petitioners to suffer the indeterminate penalty from two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to four ( 4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional,
as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision dated November 18, 2005 and Resolution dated June 19,
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 26418 finding petitioners Edigardo Geroche, Roberto
Garde and Generoso Marfil alias "Tapol" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Domicile, penalized
under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be
imposed is an indeterminate sentence from two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as maximum. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202692 November 12, 2014
EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 are the December 28, 2011
Decision1and July 18, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33567. The
assailed issuances affirmed the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 12, in
Criminal Case Nos. 09-270107-08 which, in turn, affirmed that of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in
Manila adjudging petitioner Edmund Sydeco (Sydeco) guilty of drunk driving and resisting arrest.4
The factual backdrop:
On July 20, 2006, separate Informations, one for Violation of Section 56(f) of Republic Act No.
(RA) 41365 and another, for Violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)6 were filed
against petitioner Sydeco with the MeTC in Manila and eventually raffled to Branch 14 of that
court. The accusatory portions of the interrelated informations, docketed as Crim. Case No.
052527-CN for the first offense and Crim. Case No. 052528-CN for the second, respectively read:
1. Crim. Case No. 052527-CN
That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then
the driver and owner of a car, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, drive, manage and
operate the same along Roxas Blvd. cor. Quirino Avenue, Malate, in said city, while under the
influence of liquor, in violation of Section 56(f) of Republic Act 4136. Contrary to law.
2. Crim. Case No. 052528-CN
That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then
and there willfully and unlawfully resist and disobey P/INSP Manuel Aguilar, SPO2 Virgilio
Paulino, SPO4 Efren Bodino and PO3 Benedict Cruz III, bonafide member of the Philippine
National Police, Malate Police Station-9, duly qualified and appointed, and while in the actual
performance of their official duties as such police officers, by then and there resisting, shoving
and pushing, the hands of said officers while the latter was placing him under arrest for violation
of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code. Contrary to law.
Criminal Law II Session 1 Page |9
By Order of September 19, 2006, the MeTC classified the cases as falling under, thus to be governed by,
the Rule on Summary Procedure.
When arraigned, petitioner, as accused, pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.
During the trial of the two consolidated cases, the prosecution presented in evidence the oral testimonies
of SPO4 Efren Bodino (Bodino),7 PO2 Emanuelle Parungao8 and Ms. Laura Delos Santos,9 plus the
documents each identified while in the witness box, among which was Exh. "A", with sub-markings, the
Joint Affidavit of Arrest10executed by SPO2 Bodino and two other police officers. The defense’s witnesses,
on the other hand, consisted of Sydeco himself, his wife, Mildred, and Joenilo Pano.
The prosecution’s version of the incident, as summarized in and/or as may be deduced from, the CA
decision now on appeal is as follows:
On or about June 11, 2006, P/Insp. Manuel Aguilar (Aguilar), SPO4 Bodino, PO3 Benedict Cruz III and
another officer were manning a checkpoint established along Roxas Boulevard corner Quirino Ave.,
Malate, Manila when, from about twenty (20) meters away, they spotted a swerving red Ford Ranger pick
up with plate number XAE-988. Petitioner was behind the wheel. The team members, all inuniform,
flagged the vehicle down and asked the petitioner to alightfrom the vehicle so he could take a rest at the
police station situated nearby,before he resumes driving.11 Petitioner, who the policemen claimed was
smelling of liquor, denied being drunk and insisted he could manage to drive. Then in a raised voice,
petitioner started talking rudely to the policemen and in fact yelled at P/Insp. Aguilar blurting: "P…g ina
mo, bakit mo ako hinuhuli." Atthat remark, P/Insp. Aguilar, who earlier pointed out to petitioner that his
team had seen him swerving and driving under the influence of liquor, proceeded to arrestpetitioner who
put up resistance. Despite petitioner’s efforts to parry the hold on him, the police eventually succeeded
in subduing him who was then brought to the Ospital ng Maynila where he was examined and found to
be positive of alcoholic breath per the Medical Certificate issuedby that hospital, marked as Exh. "F".
Petitioner was then turned over to the Malate Police Station for disposition.
Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed tobe a victim in the incident in question, adding in this regard that
he has in fact filed criminal charges for physical injuries, robbery and arbitrary detention against P/Insp.
Aguilar et al. In his Counter-Affidavit13 and his Complaint-Affidavit14 appended thereto, petitioner averred
that, in the early morning of June 12, 2006, he together with Joenilo Pano and Josie Villanueva, cook and
waitress, respectively, in his restaurant located along Macapagal Ave., Pasay City, were on the way home
from on board his pick-up when signaled to stop by police officers at the area immediately referred to
above. Their flashlights trained on the inside of the vehicle and its occupants, the policemen then asked
the petitioner to open the vehicle’s door and alight for a body and vehicle search, a directive he refused
to heed owing to a previous extortion experience. Instead, he opened the vehicle window, uttering, "plain
view lang boss, plain view lang." Obviously irked by this remark, one of the policemen, P/Insp. Aguilar,
as it turnedout, then told the petitioner that he was drunk, pointing to three cases of empty beer bottles
in the trunk of the vehicle. Petitioner’s explanation about being sober and that the empty bottles adverted
to came from his restaurant was ignored as P/Insp. Aguilar suddenly boxed him (petitioner) on the mouth
and poked a gun at his head, at the same time blurting, "P…g ina mo gusto mo tapusin na kita dito
marami ka pang sinasabi." The officers then pulled the petitioner out of the driver’s seat and pushed him
into the police mobile car, whereupon he, petitioner, asked his companions to call up his wife. The
policemen then brought petitioner to the Ospital ng Maynila where they succeeded in securing a medical
certificate under the signature of one Dr. Harvey Balucating depicting petitioner as positive of alcoholic
breath, although he refused to be examined and no alcohol breath examination was conducted. He was
thereafter detained from 3:00 a.m.of June 12, 2006 and released in the afternoon of June 13, 2006.
Before his release, however, he was allowed to undergo actual medical examination where the resulting
medical certificate indicated that he has sustained physical injuries but negative for alcohol breath. Ten

days later, petitioner filed his Complaint-Affidavit against Dr. Balucating, P/Insp. Aguilar and the other
police officers.
Petitioner also stated in his counter-affidavit that, under Sec. 29 of R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code, the procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not to place the erring driver under
arrest, but to confiscate his driver’s license.
On June 26, 2009, the MeTC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty as charged, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, his conviction of the offenses charges is hereby pronounced. Accordingly, he is
sentenced to:
1. Pay a fine of two hundred fifty pesos (₱250.00) for Criminal Case No. 052527-CN; and
2. Suffer imprisonment of straight penalty of three (3) months and pay a fine of two hundred
fifty pesos (₱250.00) for Criminal Case No. 052528-CN.
For lack of basis, no civil liability is adjudged.
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to certify to the Land Transportation Office the result of this case,
stating further the data required under Section 5815 of Republic Act 4136.
Therefrom, petitioner appealed to the RTC on the main submissions that the MeTC erred in: 1) according
credit to the medical certificate issued by Dr. Balucating, although the records custodian of Ospital ng
Maynila was presented to testify thereon instead of the issuing physician, and 2) upholding the veracity
of the joint affidavit of arrest of P/INSP Manuel Aguilar, SPO4 Efren Bodino, and PO3
Benedict Cruz III, considering that only SPO4 Bodino appeared in court to testify.
By Decision16 dated February 22, 2010, the RTC affirmed the conviction of the petitioner, addressing the
first issue thus raised in the appeal in the following wise: Dr. Balucating’s failure to testify relative to
petitioner’s alcoholic breath, as indicatedin the medical certificate, is not fatal as such testimony would
only serve to corroborate the testimony on the matter of SPO4 Bodino, noting thatunder the Rules of
Court,17 observations of the police officers regarding the petitioner’s behavior would suffice to support
the conclusion of the latter’s drunken state on the day he was apprehended.18
Apropos the second issue, the RTC pointed out that the prosecution has the discretion as to how many
witnesses it needs to present before the trial court, the positive testimony of a single credible witness as
to the guilt of the accused being reasonable enough to warrant a conviction. The RTC cited established
jurisprudence19 enunciating the rule that preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number as
"[W]itnesses are to be weighed, not numbered." Following the denial by the RTC of his motion for
reconsideration, petitioner went to the CA on a petition for review, the recourse docketed as CA-G.R. CR
No. 33567. By a Decision dated December 28, 2011, as would be reiterated in a Resolution of July 18,
2012, the appellatecourt affirmed that of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 22, 2010 of the RTC, Manila,
Branch 12, is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition on the following stated issues:
I. The CA erred in upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties by the
police officers; and
II. The CA erred in giving weight to the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Harvey Balucating, in
the absence of his testimony before the Court.
The petition is meritorious.
C r i m i n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 10
Prefatory, the rule according great weight, even finality at times, to the trial court’s findings of fact does
hold sway when, as here, it appears in the record that facts and circumstancesof weight and substance
have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a case under appeal. 20 Corollary, it is basic that
an appeal in criminal prosecutions throws the whole case wide open for review, inclusive of the matter
of credibility and appreciation of evidence.21` Peace officers and traffic enforcers,like other public officials
and employees are bound to discharge their duties with prudence, caution and attention, which careful
men usually exercise in the management of their own affairs.22
In the case at bar, the men manning the checkpoint in the subject area and during the period material
appeared not to have performed their duties as required by law, or at least fell short of the norm expected
of peace officers. They spotted the petitioner’s purported swerving vehicle. They then signaled him to
stop which he obeyed. But they did not demand the presentation of the driver’s license orissue any ticket
or similar citation paper for traffic violation as required under the particular premises by Sec. 29 of RA
4136, which specifically provides:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver’s License. – Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies
duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any
regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations x x x confiscate the license of
the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall
authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the
time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall
become invalid thereafter.x x x (Emphasis added.) Instead of requiring the vehicle’s occupants to answer
one or two routinary questions out of respect to what the Court has, in Abenes v. Court of
Appeals,23 adverted to as the motorists’ right of "free passage without [intrusive] interruption," P/Insp.
Aguilar, et al. engaged petitioner in what appears to be an unnecessary conversation and when utterances
were made doubtless not to their liking, they ordered the latter to step out of the vehicle, concluding
after seeing three (3) empty cases of beer at the trunk of the vehicle that petitioner was driving under
the influence of alcohol. Then petitioner went on with his "plain view search" line. The remark apparently
pissed the police officers off no end as one of them immediately lashed at petitioner and his companions
as "mga lasing" (drunk) and to get out of the vehicle, an incongruous response to an otherwise reasonable
plea. Defense witness, Joenilo Pano, graphically described this particular event in his sinumpaang
salaysay, as follows:
x x x matapos kami huminto ay naglapitan sa amin ang mga pulis, nag flash light sa loob ng sasakyan at
sa aming mga mukha.
x x x isang pulis ang nag-utos sa aminna kami ay magsi-baba at buksan ang pintuan ng nasabing
sasakyan.
x x x dahil doon sinabi ni Kuya sa mga pulis, na hindi pwede iyon at pinigilan niya ako at ang aking
kasama kong waitress na bumaba.
x x x iginiit ni Kuya sa mga pulisang salitang "PLAIN VIEW LANG BOSS, PLAIN VIEW LANG" pero iyon
ayhindi nila pinansin. Sa halip as isang pulis ang nagsabi na "MGA LASING KAYO HETO MAY CASE PA
KAYO NG BEER".
x x x habang nagpapaliwanag si Kuya, isang pulis ang biglang kumuha ng susi ng sasakyan habang ang
isang pulis ang biglang sumuntok sa bibig ni Kuya, nagbunot ng baril at tinutukan sa ulo si Kuya.
x x x dahil doon ay nagmakaawa ako na wag barilin si Kuya subalit ako rin ay tinutukan ng baril. x x x na
matapos suntukin si Kuya aypinagtulungan siya ng mga pulis na ilabas sa sasakyan at nang mailabas
siyaay pinagtulakan siya ng mga pulis sa gilid ng kalsada habang hawak ang kanilang baril.24

Pano’s above account ironicallyfinds in a way collaboration from the arresting officers themselves who
admitted that they originally had no intention to search the vehicle in question nor subject its occupants
to a body search. The officers wrote in their aforementioned joint affidavit:
xxxx
That we arrested the suspect, Edmund Sydeco y Siozon x x x for violation of RA 4136 (Driving under the
influence of liquor), and violation of Article 151 of the RPC (Resisting Arrest) x x x committed on or about
3:30A.M., June 11, 2006 along x x x Malate, Manila. x x x He began to raise his voice and converse with
us rudely without considering that we are in uniform, on duty and performing our job. P/INSP Manuel
Aguilar pointed out that we saw him swerving and driving under the influence of liquor that was why we
are inviting him to our police station in which our intention was to make him rest for a moment before
he continue to drive. x x x (Emphasis added.)
In fine, at the time of his apprehension, or when he was signaled to stop, to be precise, petitioner has
not committed any crime or suspected of having committed one. "Swerving," as ordinarily
understood,refers to a movement wherein a vehicle shifts from a lane to another or to turn aside from a
direct course of action or movement.25 The act may become punishable when there is a sign indicating
that swerving is prohibited or where swerving partakes the nature ofreckless driving, a concept defined
under RA 4136, as:
SECTION 48. Reckless Driving. – Noperson shall operate a motor vehicle on any highway recklessly or
without reasonable caution considering the width, traffic, grades, crossing, curvatures, visibility and other
conditions of the highway and the conditions of the atmosphere and weather, or so as to endanger the
property or the safetyor rights of any person or so as to cause excessive or unreasonable damage to the
highway.
Swerving is not necessarily indicative of imprudent behavior let alone constitutive of reckless driving. To
constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the
operation of a motor vehicle, and a willful and wantondisregard of the consequences is
required.26 Nothing in the records indicate that the area was a "no swerving or overtaking zone."
Moreover, the swerving incident, if this be the case, occurred at around 3:00 a.m. when the streets are
usually clear of moving vehicles and human traffic, and the danger to life, limb and property to third
persons is minimal. When the police officers stopped the petitioner’s car, they did not issue any ticket for
swerving as required under Section 29 of RA 4136. Instead, they inspected the vehicle, ordered the
petitioner and his companions to step down of their pick up and concluded that the petitioner was then
drunk mainly because of the cases of beer found at the trunk of the vehicle. On re-direct examination,
SPO4 Bodino testified:
Q: On that particular date, time and place … what exactly prompted you to arrest the accused (sic) the
charged in for Viol. of Section 56(f) of R.A. 4136?
A: Noong mag check-up kami, naamoynamin na amoy alak siya at yung sasakyan ay hindi maganda ang
takbo.
Q: Now you stated in your affidavit of arrest Mr. Witness that you spotted the vehicle of the accused
swerving, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q. Is that also the reason why you apprehended him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened after Mr. Witness, when you approached the vehicle of the accused?
A: The accused was in a loud voice. He was asking, "Bakit daw siya pinahihinto?"
Q: How do you describe the resistance Mr. Witness?
A: He refused to ride with usgoing to the hospital, Your Honor.
C r i m i n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 11
Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational stand-off between the
police team, on one hand, and petitioner on the other, was the latter’s refusal to get off of the vehicle
for a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his insistence on a plain view search only. Petitioner’s twin
gestures cannot plausibly be considered as resisting a lawful order. 28 He may have sounded boorish or
spoken crudely at that time, but none of this would make him a criminal. It remains to stress that the
petitioner has not, when flagged down, committed a crime or performed an overt act warranting a
reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not try to avoid the road block established. He came to
a full stop when so required to stop. The two key elements of resistance and serious disobedience
punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the
performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or
seriously disobeys such person or his agent.29
There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are persons in authority or
agents of a person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But surely petitioner’s act of exercising one’s
right against unreasonable searches30 to be conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in context, be
equated to disobedience let alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC. As has
often been said, albeit expressed differently and under dissimilar circumstances, the vitality of democracy
lies not in the rights it guarantees, but in the courage of the people to assert and use them whenever
they are ignored or worse infringed.31 Moreover, there is, to stress, nothing in RA 4136 that authorized
the checkpoint-manning policemen to order petitioner and his companions to get out of the vehicle for a
vehicle and body search. And it bears to emphasize that there was no reasonable suspicion of the
occurrence of a crime that would allow what jurisprudence refers to as a "stop and frisk" action. As SPO4
Bodino no less testified, the only reason why they asked petitioner to get out of the vehicle was not
because he has committed a crime, but because of their intention toinvite him to Station 9 so he could
rest before he resumes driving. But instead of a tactful invitation, the apprehending officers, in an act
indicative of overstepping of their duties, dragged the petitioner out of the vehicle and, in the process of
subduing him, pointed a gun and punched him on the face. None of the police officers, to note,
categorically denied the petitioner’s allegation aboutbeing physically hurt before being brought to the
Ospital ng Maynila to be tested for intoxication. What the policemen claimed was that it took the three
(3) of them to subdue the fifty-five year old petitioner. Both actions were done in excess of their authority
granted under RA 4136. They relied on the medical certificate issued by Dr. Balucating attesting that
petitioner showed no physical injuries. The medical certificate was in fact challenged not only because
the petitioner insisted at every turn that he was not examined, but also because Dr. Balucating failed to
testify as to its content. Ms. Delos Santos, the medical record custodian ofthe Ospital ng Maynila, testified,
but only to attest that the hospital has a record of the certificate. The trial court, in its decision, merely
stated:
At the outset, the records of the case show that the same were not testified upon by the doctor who
issued it.1âwphi1Instead, the Records Custodian of the Ospital ng Maynila was presented by the
Prosecution to testify on the said documents.
However, although the doctor who examined the accused was unable to testify to affirm the contents of
the Medical Certificate he issued (re: that he was found to have an alcoholic breath), this court finds that
the observation of herein private complainants as to the accused’s behavior and condition after the
incident was sufficient.
Under Section 50 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of evidence:
The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding x x x x
 C r i m i n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 12

The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. And to be sure,
person Under Section 15 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, "at the trial, the affidavits this presumption alone cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not
submitted by the parties shall constitute the direct testimonies of the witnesses who executed the overcome by proof that obliterates all doubts as to the offender’s culpability. In the present case, the
same."32 absence of conclusive proof being under the influence of liquor while driving coupled with the forceful
manner the police yanked petitioner out of his vehicle argues against or at least cast doubt on the finding
In sum, the MeTC, as echoed by RTC and CA later, did not rely on the medical certificate Dr. Balucating
of guilt for drunken driving and resisting arrest.
issued on June 12, 2006 as to petitioner’s intoxicated state, as the former was not able to testify as to its
contents, but on the testimony of SPO4Bodino, on the assumption that he and his fellow police officers
In case of doubt as to the moral certainty of culpability, the balance tips in favor of innocence or at least
were acting in the regular performance of their duties. It cannot be emphasized enough that smelling of
infavor of the milderform of criminal liability. This is as it should be. For, it is basic, almost elementary,
liquor/alcohol and be under the influence of liquor are differing concepts. Corollarily, it is difficult to
that the burden of proving the guiltof an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength
determine with legally acceptable certainty whether a person is drunk in contemplation of Sec. 56(f) of
of its evidence and noton the weakness of the defense.
RA 4136 penalizing the act of driving under the influence of alcohol. The legal situation has of course
changed with the approval in May 2013 of the Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of 2013 (RA 10586)
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
which also penalizes driving under the influence of alcohol (DUIA), 33 a term defined under its Sec. 3(e)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 33567 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASI:OE. Petitioner is hereby acquitted of the
as the "act of operating a motor vehicle while the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level has, after
crimes charged in Criminal Case No. 052527-CN and Criminal Case No. 052528-CN. No pronouncement
being subjected to a breath analyzer test reached the level of intoxication as established jointly by the
as to costs.
[DOH], the NAPOLCOM] and the [DOTC]. And under Sec. 3(g) of the IRR of RA 10586, a driver of a
private motor vehicle with gross vehicle weight not exceeding 4,500 kilograms who has BAC [blood alcohol
concentration] of 0.05% or higher shall be conclusive proof that said driver isdriving under the influence
of alcohol. Viewed from the prism of RA 10586, petitioner cannot plausibly be convicted of driving under
the influence of alcohol for this obvious reason: he had not been tested beyond reasonable doubt, let
alone conclusively, for reaching during the period material the threshold level of intoxication set under
the law for DUIA, i.e., a BAC of 0.05% or over.
Under Art. 22 of the RPC,34penal laws shall be given retroactive insofar asthey are favorable to the
accused. Section 19 of RA 10586 expressly modified Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136. Verily, even by force of Art.
22 ofthe RPC in relation to Sec. 3(e) of RA 10586 alone, petitioner could very well be acquitted for the
charge of driving under the influence of alcohol, even if the supposed inculpatory act occurred in 2006.
Parenthetically, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, per its Resolution 35 of November 21, 2006
found, on the strength of another physical examination from the same Ospital ng Maynila conducted by
Dr. Devega on the petitioner on the same day,June 12, but later hour, probable cause for slight physical
injuries against P/Insp. Aguilar et al. That finding to be sure tends to indicate that the police indeed man
handled the petitioner and belied, or at least cancelled out, the purported Dr. Balucating’s finding as to
petitioner’s true state.
The Court must underscore at this juncture that the petitioner, after the unfortunate incident, lost no
time incommencing the appropriate criminal charges against the police officers and Dr. Balucating,
whomhe accused of issuing Exh. "F" even without examining him. The element of immediacy in the filing
lends credence to petitioner’s profession of innocence, particularly of the charge of disobeying lawful
order or resisting arrest. Certainly not to be overlooked is the fact that petitioner,in so filing his complaint,
could not have possibly been inspired by improper motive, the police officers being complete strangers
to him and vice versa. Withal, unless he had a legitimate grievance, it is difficult to accept the notion that
petitioner would expose himself to harm’s way by filing a harassment criminal suit against policemen.
Conviction must come only after it survives the test of reason.36 It is thus required that every circumstance
favoring one’s innocence be duly taken into account.37 Given the deviation of the police officers from the
standard and usual procedure in dealing with traffic violation by perceived drivers under the influence of
alcoholand executing an arrest, the blind reliance and simplistic invocation by the trial court and the CA
on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is clearly misplaced. As stressed in People
v. Ambrosio,38 the presumption of regularity is merely just that, a presumption disputable by contrary