Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUBMITTED TO
Dr.Subba Rao
(Associate professor in Political science)
By
A.K.SACHIDHAR
III year B.A.LL.B (Honrs)
(Reg no.BA0150037)
ACKNOWNLEDGMENT
A.K.Sachindhar
B.A., LL.B (Hons)
Research Methodology
The Constitution of India is federal in form but is more unitary in character. Strengthening the
federal system is necessary for meeting the aspirations of the people who are governed through
State Governments and for preserving the unity of India. Therefre, Centre-State relations, i.e. the
arrangements between the Union Government and the States in regard to their powers, functions
and responsibilities, have always been a crucial issue. The basic structure remains to be one where
legislative, administrative and financial powers are disproportionately concentrated in the Union
Government with the States having a large number of responsibilities without sufficient autonomy.
Alongwith significant socio-economic and political changes occurring in the post-independence
period, Centre-State relations have also undergone some changes. The period since 1991, which
witnessed a paradigm shift in the economic strategy from planned development to a market-
oriented one, has also thrown up new issues and challenges for the federal set-up. These have an
important bearing on the functioning of our democracy as well as the well being of our people.
The need for a thorough restructuring of Centre-State relations, in order to correct existing
imbalances and strengthen the federal system by empowering the States with genuine autonomy, is
therefore being felt strongly. This note is being put forward to initiate a discussion among political
parties and organisations that are genuinely committed to federalism and enable the emergence of a
common platform to bring about a restructuring of Centre-State relations.
India has a federal structure i.e. there is division of powers between the Centre and the State. These
division of powers can be classified into following types :
3. Financial Powers (enumerated in Articles 268 to 293 in Part XII of the constitution)
Judicial powers have not been divided among the Centre and the state. As the judicial powers are
exercised by an integrated system of judicial courts only with Supreme Court at its apex followed
by High Court & then the Subordinate courts.
The Constitution of India, being federal in structure, divides all power(legislative ,executive and
financial) between the center and the states. However, there is no division of judicial power as the
constitution has established an integrated judicial system to enforce both the central laws as well as
state law.
Article 245
Parliament : whole of the country[including sea border] (or)part of the territory, Extra
territorial legislation to make laws applicable to the Indian citizens and their property in
any part of the world.
Exceptions:
2. Governor: not to apply (or) modify parliamentary laws in scheduled and tribal areas.
Article 246,247,248,254,255.
1) 1
Breton, Albert (1987), “Towards the Theory of Competitive Federalism” European
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 3, No 1+2, pp 263 – 328.
42 nd Amendment: 5 subjects from state to concurrent list
1) Education
2) Forests
3) Weights and measures
4) Protection of wild animals and birds
5) Administration of justice(all courts)~except supreme and high courts.
Power of parliament (Article 247): To provide for establishment of additional courts for better
administration of parliamentary laws(Union list).
Residuary power (Article 248):Subjects not mentioned in any of the list in Seventh schedule-
parliament has the power to make law(includes new tax imposition).
1.In case of conflict between the central law and the state law on a subject enumerated in the
concurrent list,the Central law prevails over the state law.
2.Exception:If the state law has been reserved for the consideration of the president and has
received his assent,the the state law prevails in that state.(but::parliament can override it by making
a law by subsequently making a law on the same matter).
Articles 249,250,251,252,253.
National interest (Article 249):Rajya sabha must pass resolution(2/3 rd majority)~force for 1
year~can be renewed any no of time ~ ceases 6 m0nths after resolution ceases(with out renewing)
~ state can make law but union law prevails over it.
Article251: the law made by parliament in state list (under A249 and A250),whether passed
before or after the law made by state legislature of the state,prevails over the law made by state
legislature made under the same subject.
When states make request (Article 252):When 2 or more states request parliament to make law in
prescribed subject(surrender of power of states to union). Other states can pass resolution to enact
2
2) Breton, Albert (1996), Competitive Governments, Cambridge University Press, New York.
the law(same).
Examples:
International agreements (Article 2533):parliament has the power to enact laws in state list for
implementing international treaties,agreements,conventions.(to fulfill international obligations).
Examples:
President`s rule (Article 356):Parliament empowered to make laws in state list. ~law made is
operative even after the ceasure of president`s rule ~ But can be revealed or altered or re-enacted
by state legislature.
The repeated misuse by the Centre of the provisions of Article 356 of the Constitution to dismiss
State Governments and dissolve State Assemblies has been subverting the federal principle and the
rights of the States. The demand to restrict the use of Article 356 only to cases where there is a
serious threat to national unity or the secular fabric of the country has been raised from various
quarters in successive meetings of the Inter-State Council. In view of the Supreme Court judgement
on the S. R. Bommai case, there is an urgent need to build in strong safeguards in Articles 356 and
365 through appropriate amendments of the Constitution. However, no decision has been taken by
the Union Government in this regard. There is also a new and alarming proposal for Central
deployment of paramilitary forces in the States unilaterally in a situation which the Centre would
consider as an ‘internal disturbance’. The provenance of Article 355 needs to be clarified. As has
been repeatedly stressed by several constituents of the Inter-State Council, the term ‘internal
disturbance’ in Article 355 is related to ‘public order’, which is the first entry in the State List. The
proposal for Central deployment of paramilitary forces in a State in a situation which the Centre
would consider as “internal disturbance” without the State’s concurrence is unacceptable. Article
355 should be amended on the lines suggested above for Article 356. Apart from external
aggression, only a serious threat to national unity or an assault on the secular principle can be
taken.
3
3) Breton, Albert (1996), Competitive Governments, Cambridge University Press, New York.
4.Centre`s control over state legislation:
Governor can reserve certain types of Bills passed by state legislature for the consideration
of President.(President enjoys ABSOLUTE VETO over them).Certain bills can be introduced in
state legislature with previous permission from President(matters relating to freedom of trade
and commerce).
ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONS4
Articles: 256-263
Article 256: The states are expected to comply with the laws of the parliament and not impede
the exercise of the executive powers of the union.
Article 257: Center can issue direction regarding the construction and maintenance
ofcommunications of national or military importance.It can also give instructions to state
forprotection of railways.Expenses incurred by the states on this account are reimbursed by the
Union.
Article 258: The president can entrust officers of the states (with [agreement]or without
[legislation under union list]the consent of state) certain functions of the Union,but the extra costs
have to be met by the Union.
Article 258A: Governor of the state may, with[agreement] the consent of the central
government,entrust to that government any of the executive functions of the state.(no legislative
delegation possible for state).
Article 260: Gov. of India can (by agreement) make law to territories outside India.
Article 261: Full faith and credit shall be given throughout the territory of India to public
acts,records and judicial proceedings of the Union and of every state.
Article 262: Parliament can provide for the adjudication of any dispute or complaint with respect
to the use, distribution and control of waters of any inter-state river and river valley.
4) 4
Government of India (1988), “Report of the Commission on CentreState Relations”,
(Chairman: Justice R. S. Sarkaria), Government of India, New Delhi.
Article 263: The President can Establish an Inter –State council to investigate and discuss subject
of common interest between the center and the states.
Parliment can appoint a body to regulate interstate free commerce and trade.(no body yet).
ICS---- IAS and IP----- IPS in 1947;1966- IFS was create Article 312:Parliament can create AIS on
the basis of resolution passed by Rajya sabha(2/3 rd majority)
UPSC: Members and chairman selected by center.can serve state needs on request
of governor (with president approval).
Integral judicial system: Judges of Supreme court and high court is appointed by President Of
India.Can be removed and transferred only by President of India. Parliment can constitute Common
High Court.
Article 355: Duties of Center:to protect every state against external aggression and
internal disturbances,to ensure gov carried out in accordance with constitution.
The state election commissioner ,though appointed by Governor of the state, can be
removed only by President.
5
5) Rao, M. Govinda and Nirvikar Singh (2005) Political Economy of Federalism in
India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
Planning commission and National development council
The National Development Council has to be developed as an effective instrument for Centre-
State co-ordination and should be given, through an appropriate amendment, a Constitutional
status as was suggested in the Srinagar Conclave. The meetings of the NDC should be more
frequent (at least once in every quarter), and its functioning should not be one of hastily
imposina pre-conceived view of the Centre as a consensus on the States, as is now often
practised. Instead, each issue should be discussed seriously with written notes from the Centre
and the States, and decisions should be taken democratically and implemented expeditiously.
The Planning Commission should act as an executive wing of the NDC. Unlike the present
10composition of the Planning Board where members and experts are all nominated by the
Centre, there should be adequate representation of the States – both for members as well as
experts – with at least one from each region with periodic rotation among the States in a region.
The restructured Planning Commission must not act primarily as a representative of the Centre
as it is now, but should also represent fairly the interests of the States.
Parliament enacted two laws : The river Boards Act(1956)~ request of state governments~
for regulation of river valley, The Inter-State Disputes Act (1956)~ ad-hoc tribunal ~decision will
be final and there will be no scope of judicial review.
o Article 131 (S.C to solve inter -state disputes) Vs Article 263 :: S.C (only legal
disputes,binding ), Council(legal/non-legal ,only advisory).
6
6) Rao, M. Govinda (2009), A Review of Indian Fiscal Federalism, Research Study
submitted to the Commission on Centre-State Relations; Inter-State Council, Ministry of
Home , Government of India.
o Special Counicls formed: (first 3 ~ president,other 2 ~ parliamentary act).Related
subjects.
PROVISIONS:
1. Article 301 – Declares that trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India
shall be free ~ No restrictions b/w states . Exceptions A 302-305.
2. Article 302 ~ Parliament can impose restrictions. should not discriminate. only in case of
scarcity of goods.
3. Article 303 ~ S.L can restrict (reasonable) ~ previous sanction from president ~ should not give
preference.
4. Article 304 ~ S.L can impose tax on goods (but no discrimination) ~ similar goods in state
affected.
5. Article 305 ~ freedom of trade ~ subject to nationalization laws
Zonal council
5 Zones
Advisory body
FINANCIAL RELATIONS
Fiscal federalism in India has always been deeply problematic, with vertical and horizontal
imbalances not only persisting till date but also getting aggravated in many cases. Resources
have always remained centralised in the hands of the Union Government with the States
suffering from gross inadequacy of resources in relation to their development needs. The already
limited financial and economic decision making powers of the States have got further
constrained in the post-liberalization period7.
provides independent sources of revenueto states(levy taxes on item nos 45-63of the statelist),these
are not adequeate.Therefore,the states have to depend on the center for subsidiesand contributions.
7
http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/india-2/the-financial-relation-between-the-union-and-the-states-in-india/5527
1. Distribution of taxes8
The 80 th Amendment of 2000 was enacted to give effect to the recommendations of the 10
th Finance Commission.The commission recommended that out of central taxes and duties
29% should go to the states.~~ALTERNATIVE SCHEME OF DEVOLUTION.----- came
into effect RETROSPECTIVELY from april1,1996.
The 88 th Amendment added new article 268-A dealing with service tax.Also inserted
new subject to union list Service tax(92-C).Levived by center but collected and
appropriated by both union and state.
BYSTATE(Article 268):The proceeds of these duties levied within any state do not form part of
the consolidated fund of India but are assigned to that state.(Stamp duties~bills of exchange,
cheques,promisory notes,policies of insurance,transfer of shares,Excise duties~containing alcohol
and narcotics).
THESTATES (Article 269): Taxes on sale of purchase of goods in course of inter-state trade and
commerce.Taxes on the consignment of goods in the course of inter-state trade or commerce.
Principles laid down by Parliament.
1) 8
Breton, Albert (1987), “Towards the Theory of Competitive Federalism” European
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 3, No 1+2, pp 263 – 328.
o TAXES LEVIED AND COLLECTED AND RETAINED BY THE STATES:
Enumerated in state list~20 in number. Tolls, capitation, fees, sales tax, land
revenue,excise duties, tax on agri income etc.
OTHER GRANTS:
For temporary period Export duties on jute and jute products Charged from consolidated fund
of India Recommended by Finance commission.
To protect the interest of states in the financial matters,the constitution lays down the
bills(varies state tax,agri income,surcharge,distribution of taxes) can be introduced in
the Parliament only on the recommendation of the President.
3. Decided by Parliament.
4. S.C ADVICE: central can impose custom duties for import/export of state.
1. Appointment/dismissal of Governor
2. Discriminatory role of governors
3. Imposition of presidents rule
4. Deployment of central forces
5. Reservation of state bill to president~ Absolute VET
6. Discrimination in financial allocation
7. P.C approving in state projects
8. All India service~ management
9. Use of electronic media~ political purpose
10. Sharing of finance
11. Encroachment of center on state list.
12. Enquiry/Disciplinary commissions.
9
) http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/india-2/the-financial-relation-between-the-union-and-the-
states-in-india/5527
Sarkaria commission(1983): 247 recommendations made
3 language formula.
CONCLUSION
The Centre-State divide needs a revisit. Both procedures and institutions need restructuring to meet the
new developmental challenges. Everyone knows that there is lack of adequate reforms in power,
education, health and agriculture, which lie in the purview of the States. We do not have the luxury of
time; our archaic approach and institutions are inconsistent with ambitious growth targets. Some things
are obvious. These need not await the recommendations of future commissions on Centre-State
relations. A wake up call is overdue.
References:
2) Breton, Albert (1996), Competitive Governments, Cambridge University Press, New York.
5) Rao, M. Govinda (2009), A Review of Indian Fiscal Federalism, Research Study submitted
to the Commission on Centre-State Relations; Inter-State Council, Ministry of Home ,
Government of India.
6) http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/india-2/the-financial-relation-between-the-union-and-
the-states-in-india/5527