Peeters, Bert (2000). "Setting the scene. Recent milestones in the lexicon-encyclopedia debate".

The lexicon - encyclopedia interface. (Current research in the semantics / pragmatics interface, 5; Bert
Peeters, ed.). Oxford

“(…)an important difference between linguistic and encyclopedic knowledge (the latter
term is used quite sparingly) is that “linguistic knowledge is essentially shared between all
the speakers of a language, whereas real-world knowledge is not” (Goddard 1998:14). This
leaves of course a lot of uncertainty regarding so-called “common knowledge”, e.g. “that
dogs have four legs, bark, and wag their tails” (ibid.). What sort of knowledge is this?
Wierzbicka’s answer is that the meaning of the word dog (to take but one example)
coincides with the folk knowledge surrounding dogs. This folk knowledge includes among
other things the features quoted by Goddard. “The linguistic concept of dog, for instance,
includes barking, tail-wagging, and much more besides” (Goddard 1998:15).Wierzbicka’s
position is perhaps more clearly stated in her 1995 paper (revised reprint in Wierzbicka
1996), where terms such as encyclopedia and encyclopedicknowledge are no longer rare
occurrences:I am using the words “dictionary” and “encyclopaedia” in a metaphorical
sense, referring to language-related “folk knowledge” (everyday knowledge) and to language-
independent scientific knowledge (and certainly not to any concrete reference works such as the
Oxford English Dictionary or the Encyclopaedia Britannica). (Wierzbicka 1996:337)
According to Wierzbicka, there is linguistic evidence that the human mind itself
draws a distinction between a “mental dictionary” and a “mental encyclopedia”. The nature
of the available linguistic evidence is neatly summarised in Taylor (forthcoming).
He argues that “acquisition is not a process of building up a concept
from its constituent parts”, but that it consists in the “gradual elaboration of a
knowledge network”. He then goes on as follows: Wierzbicka’s definition of mouse is
instructive in this respect. The definition, as mentioned, extends over almost two pages, and
includes such information as the characteristic size, shape, and colour of mice, their
habitat, their manner of moving, and the sounds they make. Also included is the fact that mice are
(or are thought of as being) timid, quiet, and inconspicuous; that cats chase them; that they are fond
of eating cheese; that they live near humans; that they are regarded as pests; and that people try to
get rid of them. (Surprisingly, the fact that some people – stereotypically women – have a phobic
terror of mice, is not included in the definition.) Wierzbicka motivates the contents of her definition
largely on linguistic grounds. A cat can be ‘a good mouser’; poor quality Cheddar cheese can be
called (or used to be called) ‘mousetrap cheese’; a shy, timid, and inconspicuous person (usually
female) can be called ‘a mouse’ (or ‘a grey mouse’); and so on. Idioms (‘as poor as a church
mouse’) and nursery rhymes (‘Three blind mice’) are also called in evidence. Excluded from the
definition are ‘encyclopedic’ facts about mice that are not reflected in everyday linguistic usage,
such as their geographical distribution, the length of the gestation period of the female mouse, the
size of the mouse litter, and such like.
Wierzbicka’s linguistic definition of mice, first attempted in Wierzbicka (1985:175-
176), later revised in Wierzbicka (1995, 1996:340-341), “sums over a range of
conventionalised uses of the word mouse; these include idioms, fixed expressions,
typical collocations, standard metaphorical uses, and so on” (Taylor forthcoming).
The differences between the 1985 and 1995/1996 definitions are quite remarkable,
and would in themselves be worthy of detailed study. Why, for instance, does the
1985 version (which Taylor clearly did not consult) refer to the fact that “people say
that women are often frightened of contact with them” (Wierzbicka 1985:176),
whereas no mention is made of this in the later definition?
Both (1)and (2) are taken from Raskin (1985a:93).
(1) I did not like the spoon. The bowl was too small.
(2) I did not like the spoon because of the ornament.
How do we know that native speakers use linguistic knowledge to attribute
coherence to (1), and encyclopedic knowledge to do the same in the case of (2)?
Raskin’s answer is based on what one typically finds in a lexicographical definition.
Since dictionary entries are intended by lexicographers to represent the meaning of
words, and since a typical dictionary entry for the word spoon refers to an ‘eating or
cooking implement consisting of a small shallow bowl with a handle’, without
adding anything on the ornaments that one sometimes finds on spoons, the
attribution of coherence to (1) involves linguistic knowledge, whereas the attribution
of coherence to (2) involves encyclopedic knowledge. Linguistic knowledge is
defined as knowledge “internalized by the native speaker of a language by virtue of
his/her knowing the language in question”; it includes “familiarity with the
meanings of the words and of the ways the words can be combined together”.
Encyclopedic knowledge, on the other hand, is defined as “what the native speaker
knows about the world he/she lives in and what is not included in his/her linguistic
knowledge” (Raskin 1985a:92).