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William Viestenz
MLN, Volume 128, Number 2, March 2013 (Hispanic Issue), pp. 384-405 (Article)
William Viestenz
1
Rorty reasserts a claim made in the previous century by Friedrich Nietzsche, who
posits that humankind suffers from the illusion that truth exists outside of constructed
discourse; that universal prototypes emerge from the mind’s tendency to strip away dif-
ferentiating qualities from objects found in nature: “What then is truth? A mobile army
of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, in short, a sum of human relations
which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, decorated and which,
after lengthy use, seem firm, canonical and binding to a people” (“On Truth” 257).
MLN 128 (2013): 384–405 © 2013 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
M L N 385
2
Later in the essay, I will clarify the historical development of the signifiers ‘ethics’
and ‘morality’. For the time being, Williams explains that the two terms each relate to
words in Latin and Greek “meaning disposition or custom” (6).
3
Los enamoramientos was awarded the 2012 Premio Nacional de Literatura by the Ministro
de Cultura, Educación y Deporte. On a number of occassions, Marías stated emphatically
that he would never accept the award because his father, Julián, and several respected
novelists such as Juan Benet were never given the same honor. True to his word, Marías
hastily turned down the award and its 20,000 euro purse soon after it was announced.
386 William Viestenz
novel’s scope of moral duty. How does one delegate blame in a chain
of events that implicates various actors at varying distances from the
crime? By the same token, to whom does Dolz owe a moral obliga-
tion—her lover, the widow, or the deceased?4
In the third part, a different temporal unity emerges as Díaz-Varela
informs Dolz that the ‘murder’ was arranged at Desvern’s insistence.
Recently diagnosed with a terminal and disfiguring cancer of the eye,
Desvern, according to Díaz-Varela’s story, demanded that his friend
orchestrate his death. This narrative wrinkle obfuscates a philosophy
of moral duty still further—is the obligation to conform to the desires
of one’s kin and close acquaintances stronger than the prohibition to
kill, if the circumstances are sufficiently extreme? In response to an
insinuation that his involvement in the murder stains his hands with
blood, Díaz-Varela retorts, with the sang-froid of a clear conscience,
that “yo no me las he manchado [ . . . ] he llevado todo el cuidado.
Tú no sabes lo que es manchárselas de veras. No sabes lo que delegar
aleja de los hechos” (318). The novel’s plot convolutes a great deal the
seemingly clear-cut moral mandate that one ought not end another’s
life—in Rorty’s terms, Desvern’s death becomes an experimental
metaphor that both Dolz and the reader could decide to literalize
into a different conception of ethical truth. The novel’s picture of
ethics thus becomes increasingly aleatory, with contingent encounters
and accidental circumstances unsettling the straightforwardness of
causality and moral judgment. The unfolding of the plot also forces
the reader to reconsider the breadth of linguistic meaning, such as the
distinction between the intentionality of ‘murder’ and the potentially
involuntary nature of ‘homicide’.
Using Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar as a point of departure, a young
Marías constructs a theory of situational truth in El monarca del tiempo
(1978). Marías first extracts from his reading of the tragedy a series of
aperçus linked to two fundamental narrative conventions: “no hay más
que una verdad” at a single moment in a story, and at the conclusion
of a work “resplandece siempre la verdad” (“Fragmento” 438). Marías
argues that Julius Caesar puts forth two truths regarding the legality
of Caesar’s murder: one articulated by Marcus Brutus and another
4
In Marías’s novel Corazón tan blanco (1992) a similar drama is played out between
contingent encounter and the ethical obligation to the dead. The work’s protagonist,
Juan, runs across a family friend and the acquaintance lets it slip that his father’s second
wife—the narrator’s aunt—committed suicide soon after her wedding. He also reveals
unwittingly that Juan’s father had, in fact, been married to still another woman that
suspiciously died young.
388 William Viestenz
5
For Bergson, pure duration is “the form which the succession of our conscious states
assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state
from its former states” (100).
6
Faber and Navajas have argued that Marías’s fiction constitutes a ‘post-postmodern’
intent to overcome the relativity of meaning and belief by “hacer construciones cohesivas
del sujeto” (Navajas 83). Faber puts forth that the Marían narrator, “asustado ante la
diferencia infinita [ . . . ] va en busca de lo idéntico y esencial. Se refugia en la postura
didáctica y pedante del que pontifica verdades inamovibles” (199). Los enamoramientos,
in this respect, steps backward, returning to a firmly postmodern stance where ethical
truth only remains cohesive within its proper temporal moment. In the novel, Dolz
maintains a didactic posture; however, the only universality that she identifies is the
human subject’s tendency to subsume moral rectitude to circumstantial utilitarianism.
390 William Viestenz
7
In the “Gorgias” dialogue, Socrates stresses again that judgment in the afterlife rests
on how well one has recollected the inner virtues within the soul. A “pious life,” in the
end, results from a life “devoted to truth” (868).
8
Aristotle notes that “virtues, however, we acquire by first exercising them. The same
is true with skills, since what we need to learn before doing, we learn by doing” (NE 23).
For an excellent comparison of Platonic and Aristotelian ethics, see Julián Marías 42–80.
392 William Viestenz
will is tasked with moving the soul toward “final and perfect happi-
ness”, which “can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine
Essence” (Aquinas 601). Aquinas thus co-opts Aristotle’s concept of
habituation and the progressive motion toward a supreme goal as
the basis of a life well lived. Ethics remains a system of dispositions
dictated by reason, with the qualifier that transcendental truth origi-
nates in God.
In the throes of the Enlightenment, Kant reduces the ethical system
of Antiquity and the Middle Ages to one fundamental question: “how
ought one live?” The subject learns what he or she must categorically
do by reaching within the self and recollecting the moral knowledge
elucidated by the precepts of practical reason. In a Platonic sense,
Kant’s moral principles are both universal and independent of all
subjectivity, yet are localized within an individual’s consciousness:
principles of morality function as the “formal supreme determining
ground of the will regardless of all subjective differences” (CPR 29).
Rather than thinking of morality as concordance with a supreme good,
Kant conceptualizes the precepts of practical reason as fully formed
within the self and, famously, obligatory (the categorical imperative).
As Kant continues, a “heteronomy of choice [ . . . ] not only does not
ground any obligation at all but instead is opposed to the principle
of obligation and to the morality of the will” (30).
One can glean a couple of commonalities in all of the aforemen-
tioned philosophies. First, ethical and moral knowledge never depend
on deliberation with a broader community—the self-sufficient indi-
vidual possesses an auto-didactic aptitude for reason. Practical reason,
a vision of the Divine Essence, a recollection of the Platonic Idea, and
gifts from God are either situated within the soul or acquired expe-
rientially by the sole individual. Secondly, moral precepts are never
arbitrary—living a life in accordance with virtue or moral obligation
presupposes that human actions cannot modify the immutable good.
All transcendental truth serves to provide an anchor against change,
granting to human affairs a stability that is absolutely invulnerable to
contingency. Virtuousness, as in Socrates’s thought, or the universal
knowledge of practical reason in Kant, functions as the objective givens
that contrast with the finitude, mutability, and weakness of the self.
Beyond the realm of philosophy and within the contingent practice
of everyday life, however, these philosophical premises crumble under
the weight of the exceptional situations wrought by reality—a phenom-
enon redolent of Marías’s novels and short stories. Everyday life, in
Marías’s texts, tends to present extreme situations unexpectedly, which
M L N 393
9
The protagonist of Tu rostro mañana, Jacobo Deza, also the narrator of Todas las almas
(1989) and a self-described “intérprete de vidas,” exploits the contingency of history
to his benefit (32). He possesses the ability to describe the shape of ‘tomorrow’s faces’
based on “sus inclinaciones y caracteres y sus capacidades de aguante; de su maleabili-
dad y su sumisión” (32). In a culture where the future’s uncertainty fuels high anxiety,
Deza fulfills a key function, especially to British spy operatives.
10
Macbeth’s phrase comes during a well-known soliloquy spoken just after learning
of the Queen’s death. The harangue’s first few lines: “She should have died hereafter;
/ There would have been a time for such a word.— / to-morrow, and to-morrow, and
to-morrow, / Creeps in this petty pace from day to day, / To the last syllable of recorded
time” (882). Purporting that someone ‘ought’ to die another day ascribes to fate the
power to fix events. Insisting on an ‘appropriate’ time and place for expiration proves
to be an inconsequential endeavor because each human life, until the end of recorded
history, will inevitably creep forward at a petty pace toward death.
M L N 395
11
Kant demonstrates a moral obligation’s implication of freedom by differentiating
between actions from duty and actions in accordance with duty. A decision only pos-
sesses moral import if the agent derives no simultaneous advantage from following a
mandate. In this respect, a suicidal man’s preservation of his life is a moral decision
from duty, whereas those who relish in living persevere according to duty (FMM 14).
396 William Viestenz
12
For an excellent survey of the relationship between masculine authority, violence,
and the fragmentation of the female body in Marías’s fiction, see Cuñado (“Una
historia familiar”).
M L N 401
rator notes that “la noté como un peso, como si me cayera encima
un enorme trozo de carne” (234).
As a product of the twenty-first century, however, the novel’s lifeworld
exists within a social construct where the ‘enorme trozo de carne’ of
a single individual cannot single-handedly set the community’s stan-
dard for moral comportment. To qualify this statement, I will briefly
outline the major points of two key thinkers. First, Richard Rorty,
having unleashed a theory of contingency that declares null and
void philosophical foundations, considers the possibility of a socially
binding moral code within liberal society. Rather than viewing moral-
ity as an extension of the divinized portion of the soul, Rorty argues
that “liberal society is one whose ideals can be fulfilled by persua-
sion rather than force, by reform rather than revolution, by the free
and open encounters of present linguistic and other practices with
suggestions for new practices” (60). A society, in full awareness that
its ‘present moment’ arrived via contingency, maintains its notion
of morality by balancing the good of the whole with each citizen’s
right to a private existence. The ethical ‘good’ thus becomes ‘that
which we, as a collective, condone’ rather than ‘that which is true,
independent of time and space’. Metaphorical shifts to codified ways
of speaking and thinking only become literalized at the point that
the majority of society accepts the change. Additionally, if a society
wishes to carry over a truth from one historical moment to the next,
the effort must be collective, voluntary, and willful, since truth is not a
naturally occurring species. Marías, in El monarca del tiempo, echoes this
point: “la verdad en cuestión habría más bien de estarse reafirmando
incansable e indefinidamente en cada momento presente en que se
la quisiera afirmar” (457).
Similar to Rorty, the philosopher Bernard Williams argues for the
abolishment of Kantian moral obligation in favor of viewing ethics as
the product of a community’s moral deliberation. It is illusory to think
of a consideration of moral obligation as an autonomous, self-sufficient
affair; “since ethical considerations are in question, the agent’s conclu-
sions will not usually be solitary or unsupported, because they are part
of an ethical life that is to an important degree shared with others”
(191). In this respect, one cannot choose to live outside of the moral-
ity system by ignoring the validity of a society’s ethical foundations.
At the point that one derives benefits from the social, and bears the
distinction of citizenship, he or she is committed to the binding ethical
articulations of the broader community. Dolz misses this point, which
perhaps explains her inability to escape her own inner equivocations.
402 William Viestenz
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13
I do not wish to insinuate that Marías has neglected such issues elsewhere, nor that
historical memory is not an essential theme of his texts. Faber (“La irresponsabilidad”),
Moreno-Nuno (“The ghosts of Javier Marías”), and Cuñado, El espectro de la herencia,
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404 William Viestenz
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