JUANITO T. MERENCILLO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Decision Corona, J P

1
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 142369-70. April 13, 2007.]
JUANITO T. MERENCILLO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, * respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J p:
This petition for review 1 assails the June 18, 1999 decision 2 of the Sandiganbayan in A.R. Case Nos. 004-005 affirming 3 the omnibus
decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City, Branch 47, in Criminal Case Nos. 9482-83 finding petitioner Juanito T. Merencillo
guilty of violating Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 5 and Article 210 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
The information charging petitioner for violation of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 in Criminal Case No. 9482 read:
That, on or about the 28th day of September, 1995, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then a public official connected with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue as its Group Supervising Examiner, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent of
personal gain, directly demand and extort from a certain Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, in connection, in consideration and in exchange for the release of
the certification of her payment of the capital gains tax for the land purchased by the Ramasola [Superstudio] Inc. from
one Catherine Corpuz Enerio, a transaction wherein the aforesaid accused has to intervene in his official capacity, and to
which the said Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar reluctantly agreed but upon prior consultation with the military
authorities particularly the elements of the 702nd Criminal Investigation Command [CIC] who set up the accused for a
possible entrapment resulting to (sic) his being caught in the act of receiving an envelope supposedly containing the
amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) but consisting only of four (4) marked one hundred peso bills and
the rest all bogus (paper) monies, to the damage and prejudice of the said Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar in
particular and the public and the government in general in the amount to be proved during the trial of the case.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 3(b) of [RA] 3019. 7
On the other hand, the information for direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 9483 charged:
That, on or about the 28th day of September, 1995 in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then a public official connected with the performance of official duty
as its Group Supervising Examiner, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent of personal
gain, demand, extort and agree to perform an act constituting a crime, an act which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, that is — that the certification for payment of the capital gains tax relative to the land purchased
by the Ramasola Superstudio Incorporated from Catherine Corpus Enerio be released by him only upon payment of an
additional under the table transaction in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), Philippine Currency,
which Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar reluctantly agreed, but upon prior consultation with the military authorities
particularly the elements of the 702nd Criminal [Investigation] Command (CIC) who set up the accused for a possible
entrapment resulting to (sic) his being caught in the act of receiving an envelope supposedly containing the amount of
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) but, consisting only of four (4) marked one hundred pesos bills and the rest all
bogus (paper) monies, an act performed by the accused in his official capacity as Group Supervising Examiner of the BIR,
to the damage and prejudice of Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar in particular and the public and the government in
general in the amount to be proved during the trial of the case.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. 8
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges when arraigned. Thereafter trial ensued and the cases were tried jointly.
THE FACTS ESTABLISHED
BY THE PROSECUTION
In the morning of September 13, 1995, Lucit Estillore went to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) office in Tagbilaran City to ask for the
computation of taxes due on the sale of real property to Ramasola Superstudio, Inc. and to apply for a certificate authorizing registration
(CAR). 9 At the BIR office, she was entertained by revenue examiner Lourdes Fuentes who computed the documentary stamp tax (P37,500) and
capital gains tax (P125,000) due on the transaction. The computation was approved by petitioner in his capacity as group supervisor. Estillore
paid the taxes in the bank and returned to apply for a CAR. She submitted the application together with relevant documents to Fuentes for
processing. Fuentes prepared the revenue audit reports and submitted them together with the application for the CAR to petitioner for
preliminary approval. [The application was to be forwarded thereafter to the Revenue District Officer (RDO) for final approval.] Fuentes advised
Estillore that the CAR would be released after seven days.
At around 10:00 a.m. of the same day, private complainant Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar 10 (Cesar) received a call from Estillore. She was told
that petitioner wanted to see her "for some negotiation." She proceeded to petitioner's office where the latter demanded P20,000 in exchange
for the approval of the CAR. Cesar replied that she needed to confer with her two brothers who were her business associates.
The following day, on September 14, 1995, Cesar received a call from petitioner who was following up his demand. Later that day, Cesar
received another call from petitioner who told her that she could get the CAR after four or five days.
Cesar was able to return to the BIR only on September 20, 1995. When petitioner saw her, he repeated his demand for P20,000 although the
CAR had in fact been signed by RDO Galahad Balagon the day before, on September 19, 1995, and was therefore ready for release. On Cesar's
inquiry, the releasing clerk, Susan Cabangon, informed Cesar that she (Cabangon) was still waiting for petitioner's go signal to release the
document.
On September 22, 1995, Cesar visited RDO Balagon and complained about petitioner's refusal to release the CAR unless his demand was met.
RDO Balagon assured Cesar that he would look into her complaint. Subsequently, Cesar received a call from petitioner informing her that she
could get the CAR but reminded her of his demand. He told her that he was willing to accept a lesser amount. It was at this point that Cesar
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decided to report the matter to the authorities. She sought the help of the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Bohol,
Senior Superintendent Dionaid Baraguer.
The following day, Sr. Supt. Baraguer referred Cesar's complaint to the chief of police of Tagbilaran City who coordinated with Cesar for the
entrapment of petitioner. Cesar was instructed to prepare two bundles of bogus money by putting a one-hundred peso bill on each side of each
of the two bundles to make it appear that the two bundles amounted to P10,000 each or a total of P20,000. After the serial numbers of the
four one-hundred peso bills were recorded, the entrapment was set for September 28, 1995.
On the appointed day, Cesar called petitioner and pleaded for the release of the CAR as well as for the reduction of petitioner's demand.
Petitioner cautiously told Cesar not to talk about the matter on the phone and asked her to see him instead. Cesar went to petitioner's office
with the two bundles of bogus money inside a white envelope.
Petitioner was entertaining a lady visitor when Cesar arrived. The members of the PNP entrapment team were already in petitioner's office
posing as civilians. On seeing Cesar, petitioner handed the CAR to her and, as she was signing the acknowledgment for the release of the CAR,
he informed her that he was going down to the second floor. Cesar took this as a cue for her to follow. CAETcH
As petitioner left his office, he held the door open for Cesar to follow. On reaching the third floor lobby, petitioner uttered "Here only." Cesar
handed the envelope containing the two bundles of marked money to petitioner who, upon receiving it, asked "Why is this thick?" Before Cesar
could answer, a member of the PNP entrapment team photographed petitioner holding the envelope. Petitioner panicked, hid the envelope
behind his back and turned towards the window at the back of the BIR building. On seeing that the window was closed, he turned around
towards the open window facing the street. He threw the envelope towards the window but it hit the ceiling instead, bounced and fell to the
first floor of the BIR building. 11 The PNP entrapment team then introduced themselves to petitioner and invited him to go with them to their
headquarters.
Charges were filed against petitioner. During the trial, petitioner's evidence consisted of nothing more than a general denial of the charges
against him. He claimed that he never asked for money and that the allegations of demand for money existed only in Cesar's mind after she
was told that there was a misclassification of the asset and additional taxes had to be paid. He was surprised when policemen suddenly
arrested him as soon as Cesar handed him a white envelope the contents of which he suspected to be money.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Juanito T. Merencillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal by direct participation, defined and penalized by Section 3(b) of [RA] 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for eight (8) years and
one (1) month as minimum to fifteen (15) years as maximum, there being aggravating circumstances considered under
Section 3(e) and Section (f) of RA 3019 in relation to Article 14(1) and (11) of the [RPC] in the sense that the offender
have taken advantage of his public position, and that the crime was committed in consideration of a price or promise,
without any mitigating or extenuating circumstances to neutralize or offset any of the aggravating circumstances, with
perpetual disqualification from public office, and the Court further finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal by direct participation, for the crime of Direct Bribery defined and penalized by Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8)
years of prision mayor as maximum and a fine of Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) Pesos, all as mandated by law. The accused
Juanito T. Merencillo likewise is ordered to indemnify private complainant [Cesar] to pay moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos. Costs shall also be taxed against the
accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 12
Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan, however, denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision
with modification reducing the penalty of imprisonment for violation of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 to an indeterminate sentence of six years and
one month of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten years of prision mayor, as maximum. 13 Thus, this petition.
Petitioner basically raises two points: (1) the Sandiganbayan's refusal to believe his evidence over that of the prosecution's and (2) the
Sandiganbayan's failure to recognize that he was placed in double jeopardy.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for affirming the RTC decision and disregarding his evidence. He claims that, had the RTC and the
Sandiganbayan not ignored the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses, 14 he would have been acquitted. He also
asserts that he was placed twice in jeopardy when he was prosecuted for violation of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 and for direct bribery.
Petitioner is wrong.
TRIAL COURT'S EVALUATION OF
EVIDENCE WILL NOT BE DISTURBED
Both the RTC and the Sandiganbayan found the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses (that petitioner demanded and received money
from private complainant Cesar for the release of the CAR) sufficient and credible enough to sustain conviction.
This notwithstanding, petitioner now asks this Court to review the entire evidence anew, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses and make
another factual determination of the case — a course of action clearly improper given the nature of the instant petition. 15 Questions of fact
cannot generally be raised for the consideration of this Court.
The calibration of evidence and the relative weight thereof belongs to the appellate court. 16 Its findings and conclusions cannot be set aside
by this Court unless there is no evidence on record to support them.17 In this case, however, the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan,
affirming the factual findings of the RTC, were amply supported by evidence and the conclusions therein were not against the law and
jurisprudence. There is no reason to disturb the congruent findings of the trial and appellate courts. HTCaAD
Moreover, findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy the respect of appellate courts because trial courts
have the distinct advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. 18 In the absence of any arbitrariness in the trial court's
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findings and evaluation of evidence tending to show that it overlooked certain material facts and circumstances, its findings and evaluation of
evidence should be respected on review. 19 The presiding judge of the trial court had the opportunity to actually observe the conduct and
demeanor of the witnesses on the witness stand on direct examination by the prosecution, cross-examination by the defense as well as during
clarificatory questioning by the trial judge himself. 20 Between the trial judge and this Court, the former was concededly in a better position to
determine whether or not a witness was telling the truth. 21 Based on the records, we find no reason to disagree with the trial court's
assessment and to discredit the prosecution's witnesses.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the RTC and the Sandiganbayan considered the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Both courts, however, ruled that the inconsistencies referred only to minor details that did not detract from the truth of
the prosecution's testimonial evidence. We agree.
Witnesses testifying on the same event do not have to be consistent in each and every detail. Differences in the recollection of the event are
inevitable and inconsequential variances are commonly regarded as signs of truth instead of falsehood. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity
or the weight of their testimony. 22 In fact, such minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a testimony for they guard against memorized
falsities. 23
Minor discrepancies or inconsistencies do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution's evidence as a whole or reflect on the
witnesses' honesty. 24 The test is whether the testimonies agree on essential facts and whether the respective versions corroborate and
substantially coincide with each other so as to make a consistent and coherent whole. 25 Thus, inconsistencies and discrepancies in details
which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be successfully invoked as grounds for acquittal. 26
The RTC and the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner were neither material nor relevant to the
elements of the offenses for which he was charged. For instance, whether or not it was petitioner himself who handed the CAR to private
respondent was immaterial. The fact was that petitioner demanded and received money in consideration for the issuance of the CAR.
PETITIONER WAS NOT PLACED
IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Section 3 of RA 3019 begins with the following statement:
Sec. 3. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following [acts] shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony under the Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act,
that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being charged with a felony under the Revised Penal Code. 27 There is no double jeopardy if a
person is charged simultaneously or successively for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 and the Revised Penal Code.
The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. 28 The test is whether one
offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the other, as provided in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. 29 An offense charged necessarily includes that
which is proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter; and an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a
part of those constituting the latter. 30
A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct bribery defined and punished under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and those of
violation of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 shows that there is neither identity nor necessary inclusion between the two offenses.
Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for himself or for
any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any
other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of the crime penalized under Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 are:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) he requested or received a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit;
(3) he made the request or receipt on behalf of the offender or any other person;
(4) the request or receipt was made in connection with a contract or transaction with the government and
(5) he has the right to intervene, in an official capacity under the law, in connection with a contract or transaction has the
right to intervene. 31
On the other hand, direct bribery has the following essential elements:
(1) the offender is a public officer; TacESD
(2) the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another;
(3) such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing some
crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be
unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do and
(4) the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his official
duties. 32
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Clearly, the violation of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 is neither identical nor necessarily inclusive of direct bribery. While they have common
elements, not all the essential elements of one offense are included among or form part of those enumerated in the other. Whereas the mere
request or demand of a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit is enough to constitute a violation of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019, acceptance of
a promise or offer or receipt of a gift or present is required in direct bribery. Moreover, the ambit of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 is specific. It is
limited only to contracts or transactions involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority to intervene under the
law. Direct bribery, on the other hand, has a wider and more general scope: (a) performance of an act constituting a crime; (b) execution of an
unjust act which does not constitute a crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or refraining from doing an act which is his official duty to do.
Although the two charges against petitioner stemmed from the same transaction, the same act gave rise to two separate and distinct offenses.
No double jeopardy attached since there was a variance between the elements of the offenses charged. 33 The constitutional protection
against double jeopardy proceeds from a second prosecution for the same offense, not for a different one. 34
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The June 18, 1999 decision of the Sandiganbayan in A.R. Case Nos. 004-005 is AFFIRMED. ECcTaS
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
||| (Merencillo v. People, G.R. Nos. 142369-70, [April 13, 2007], 549 PHIL 544-560)
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FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 155574. November 20, 2006.]
TIMOTEO A. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to set aside and nullify the Decision 1 of the
Sandiganbayan dated 6 May 2002 which convicted petitioner Timoteo A. Garcia of 56 counts of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in Criminal Cases Nos. 24042 to 24098 (except 24078), and
its Resolution 2 dated 2 October 2002 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The instant case stemmed from the Complaint of Maria Lourdes Miranda against petitioner, then Regional Director, Land Transportation Office
(LTO), Region X, Gilbert G. Nabo and Nery Tagupa, employees of the same office, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for
their alleged frequent borrowing of motor vehicles from Oro Asian Automotive Center Corporation (Company). Finding probable cause for
violation thereof, Graft Investigation Officer II Gay Maggie F. Balajadia-Violan recommended that petitioner, Gilbert G. Nabo and Nery Tagupa
be indicted for violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.
On 14 August 1997, 57 Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner, Gilbert G. Nabo and Nery Tagupa for violation of
Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. The Information in Criminal Case No. 24042 reads:
That on or about the period covering January 9, 1993 to January 10, 1993 or sometime prior thereto, in Cagayan de Oro
City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, TIMOTEO A. GARCIA, GILBERT G. NABO
and NERY TAGUPA, being then public officers or employees of the Land Transportation Office (LTO), Cagayan de Oro City,
taking advantage of their respective official positions, and conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another
and with intent to gain personal use or benefit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously borrow One (1)
unit Asian Automotive Center's Service Vehicle — Fiera Blue KBK-732, in good running condition, spare tire, tools from
Oro Asian Automotive Corporation, which is engaged in the business of vehicle assembly and dealership in Cagayan de
Oro City, knowing that said corporation regularly transacts with the accused's LTO Office for the registration of its motor
vehicles, in the reporting of its engine and chassis numbers as well as the submission of its vehicle dealer's report and
other similar transactions which require the prior approval and/or intervention of the said accused Regional Director and
employees and/or their said LTO office in Cagayan de Oro City, to the damage and prejudice of and undue injury to said
Oro Asian Automotive Corporation, including complainant Maria Lourdes Miranda. 3
The fifty-six other Informations are similarly worded except for the alleged dates of commission of the offense, and the types/descriptions of
the vehicles allegedly borrowed by them. The pertinent data in the other informations are as follows:
CASE NUMBER DATE OF COMMISSION TYPE/DESCRIPTION OF
VEHICLE
24043 January 16, 1993 to One (1) unit FIERA BLUE
January 17, 1993
24044 January 23, 1993 to One (1) unit FIERA BLUE
January 24, 1993 KBK-732, service vehicle of
Asian Automotive Center, in
good running condition with
tools, spare tire
24045 February 6, 1993 to One (1) unit FIERA BLUE
February 7, 1993 KBK-732, in good running
condition with tools
24046 February 13, 1993 to One (1) unit FIERA BLUE
February 14, 1993 KBK-732, in good running
condition
24047 March 13, 1993 to One (1) unit TOYOTA
March 14, 1993 TAMARAW yellow, KBN-
156, in good running
condition, with tools and
spare tire
24048 Morning of March 20, One (1) unit TOYOTA
1993 to afternoon of HSPUR YELLOW KBN-156,
March 20, 1993 with spare tools, in good
condition
24049 Morning of March 27, One (1) unit TAMARAW
1993 to afternoon of HSPUR, yellow in color,
March 27, 1993 KBN-156, in good condition,
with spare tire, with jack and
tire wrench
24050 April 24, 1993 to One (1) unit TAMARAW
April 25, 1993 HSPUR, Yellow in color,
KBN-156, in good condition,
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with spare tire, jack and tire

wrench
24051 April 25, 1993 and have One (1) unit AERO D VAN
been returned after use KBN-865, maroon in color
Asian Automotive Center's
Vehicle, in good running
condition, with spare tire,
tools, jack and tire wrench
24052 May 15, 1993 to One (1) unit TOYOTA Fierra,
May 16, 1993 yellow in color, engine no.
4k-0907126, chassis no.
CMCI-109247-C, in good
condition, jack, spare tire, tire
wrench
24053 May 29, 1993 to One (1) unit TAMARAW
May 30, 1993 HSPUR, KBN-156, yellow in
color, in good running
condition, w/spare tire, jack
and tire wrench
24054 June 5, 1993 to One (1) unit TAMARAW
June 6, 1993 HSPUR, KBN-156, yellow in
and tire wrench
June 20, 1993 HSPUR, KBN-156, yellow in
and tire wrench
morning of June HSPUR, KBN-156, yellow in
26, 1993 color, in good running
and tire wrench
24057 July 17, 1993 to One (1) unit TAMARAW
July 18, 1993 HSPUR, KBN-156, yellow in
and tire wrench
August 1, 1993 HSPUR, KBN-156, yellow
in color, in good running
and tire wrench
July 25, 1993 HSPUR, KBN-156, yellow
and tire wrench
24060 August 7, 1993 to One (1) unit TAMARAW
and tire wrench
and tire wrench
7

and tire wrench
24063 September 4, 1993 to One (1) unit AERO D
September 5, 1993 HSPUR, KBP-375, white in
color, with engine no.
C190-484232, Chassis no.
SMM90-6787-C, in good
running condition upholstered
seats
24064 Morning of September 11, One (1) unit AERO D
1993 to evening of HSPUR, KBP-375, white in
September 11, 1993 color, in good running
condition, upholstered seats,
jack, tire wrench, spare tire
September 19, 1993 HSPUR, KBP-375, in good
running condition,
upholstered seats, side view
mirrors, rear view mirror,
jack w/handle, tire wrench,
seats
September 26, 1993 HSPUR, KBP-375, good
running condition,
seats
24067 October 23, 1993 to One (1) unit AERO D
October 24, 1993 HSPUR, KBP-375, good
running condition,
seats
24068 October 30, 1993 to One (1) unit ISUZU, NNJ-
October 31, 1993 917, white in color, in good
running condition, side view
mirror, jack w/tire wrench
24069 November 6, 1993 to One (1) unit AERO D
November 7, 1993 HSPUR, KBP-375, good
running condition,
seats
running condition,
seats
24071 November 27, 1993 to One (1) unit AERO D-II
running condition, jack
w/handle, tire wrench,
spare tire
24072 December 4, 1993 to One (1) unit AERO D-II
December 5, 1993 HSPUR, KBP-375, good
8
w/handle, tire wrench, spare

tire
24073 December 11, 1993 One (1) unit AERO D
to December 12, 1993 HSPUR, white in color,
KBP-375, full in dash
instrumentation, jack
w/handle, tire wrench in good
running condition
24074 December 18, 1993 to One (1) unit AERO D
December 19, 1993 HSPUR, white in color,
running condition
24075 January 8, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO
January 9, 1994 D HSPUR, white in color,
running condition
24076 Morning of January One (1) unit AERO D
15, 1994 to late afternoon HSPUR, white in color,
of January 15, 1994 KBP-375, full in dash
w/handle, tire wrench in
good running condition.
24077 January 29, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO D
January 30, 1994 HSPUR, KBP-375, white in
color, w/o plate number
24078 Withdrawn per Court Resolution dated July 3, 1998, p.
103 Crim. Case # 24042
24079 February 5, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO D
February 6, 1994 HSPUR, white in color,
good running condition
24080 February 12, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO D-II
February 13, 1994 HSPUR, KBP-375, in good
tire
24081 February 26, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO D
February 27, 1994 HSPUR, white in color,
24082 March 4, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO D
March 5, 1994 HSPUR, white in color,
9

instrumentation, in good
running condition, with jack,
tire wrench, spare tire.
24085 April 9, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO D

April 10, 1994 HSPUR, white in color,
24086 April 30, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO D
May 1, 1994 HSPUR, white in color,
24087 May 7, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO D
24090 June 4, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO D-II
June 5, 1994 HSPUR, KBP-375, in good
tire
tire
tire
24093 July 2, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO D
July 3, 1994 HSPUR, white in color,
24094 July 23, 1994 to July 24, 1994 One (1) unit AERO D
HSPUR, white in color,
10
24095 August 25, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO D VAN

August 28, 1994 with engine no. C190-
542416, chassis no.
SMM90-8370-C, full in dash
instrumentation, maroon in
color with plate no.
KBN-865, in good condition
24096 Morning of September 3, One (1) unit AERO D
1994 to afternoon of HSPUR, white in color,
September 3, 1994 KBP-375, full in dash
instrumentation, jack, tire
wrench, in good running
condition
September 18, 1994 HSPUR, white in color,
instrumentation, in good
running condition
November 27, 1994 HSPUR, white in color,
good running condition 4
On 22 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued orders for the arrest of the three accused 5 and for the holding of their departure from the
country. 6 On 6 October 1997, petitioner posted a consolidated surety bond for his provisional liberty. 7
In a resolution dated 3 July 1998, the withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case No. 24078 was granted. 8
On 17 August 1998, when arraigned, petitioner and accused Tagupa, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded "not guilty" to the
charges. 9 Accused Nabo remains at large. aAIcEH
On 15 October 1998, pre-trial was concluded. 10 Thereafter, trial ensued.
The evidence of the prosecution, as summarized by the Sandiganbayan, are as follows:
ESTANISLAO BARRETE YUNGAO (hereinafter, "Yungao") declared that he was employed as the driver and liaison officer of
the Oro Asian Automotive Center Corporation (hereinafter, "the Company"), an establishment engaged in the assembly
of motor vehicles, during the period covering the years 1991 to 1995. As such, Yungao had to officially report to the Land
Transportation Office ("LTO") of Cagayan de Oro City all the engine and chassis numbers prior to the assembly of any
motor vehicle. In the process, the Company had to secure from the LTO a Conduct Permit after a motor vehicle has been
completely assembled, for purposes of carrying out the necessary road testing of the vehicle concerned. After the said
road testing and prior to its eventual sale/disposition, the vehicle has to be first properly registered with the LTO.
Accused Garcia, in his capacity as the Director of the LTO of Cagayan de Oro City, during all times relevant to the instant
cases, was the approving authority on the aforesaid reportorial requirements and the signatory of the said Conduct
Permits.
By reason thereof, Yungao knew accused Garcia since January of 1991. Yungao would always personally talk to accused
Garcia regarding the issuance of the required Conduct Permit for any newly assembled vehicle. Yungao would secure
from accused Garcia as many as 30 to 40 of such permits in a year.
In the process, accused Garcia would regularly summon Yungao to his office to tell him to inform either Aurora or Alonzo
Chiong, the owners of the Company, that he (accused Garcia) would borrow a motor vehicle for purposes of visiting his
farm. When Yungao could not be contacted, accused Garcia would personally call up the Company and talk to the owners
thereof to borrow the vehicle. Accused Garcia confided to Yungao that he could not utilize the assigned government
vehicle for his own personal use during Saturdays and Sundays. It was for this reason that he had to borrow vehicles from
the Chiongs to enable him to visit his farm.
Yungao maintained that accused Garcia had been regularly borrowing motor vehicles from the Chiongs during the period
covering January of 1993 up to and until November of 1994. Accused Garcia would always ask his representative to take
the Company's vehicle on a Saturday morning. However, Yungao never reported for work on Saturdays; thus, he was not
the one who actually released the borrowed motor vehicles to the representative of accused Garcia. Nonetheless,
Yungao would be aware of the fact that accused Garcia borrowed the vehicles requested because, for every such
instance, a corresponding delivery receipt is issued, which is placed on top of his table for him to place in the Company's
record files on the following working day. The numerous delivery receipts would show and indicate the actual number of
times accused Garcia had borrowed vehicles from the Company.
Finally, Yungao identified the affidavit which he executed in connection with the subject cases.
On cross-examination, Yungao testified that it was his duty to keep the permits relating to the road testing of the motor
vehicles assembled by the Company. These permits were secured by him from accused Garcia before the vehicles were
eventually put on display or presented to potential buyers. Although there was a Regulation Officer at the LTO before
11
whom the request for the issuance of a Conduct Permit is to be presented, Yungao was often told to go straight up to the
room of accused Garcia so that the latter could personally sign the said permit. It was only when accused Garcia is absent
or is not in office that the papers submitted to the LTO were attended to by his assistant.
Yungao testified that accused Garcia would always make his request to borrow the Company's motor vehicle verbally and
on a Friday. However, Yungao admitted that he was not very familiar with the signature of accused Garcia, and that the
latter's signature did not appear in any of the delivery receipts. CaDSHE
During all these years, Yungao could only recall one (1) instance when accused Garcia failed to approve the Company's
request, and this was a request for an extension of the usual "5-day road test" period granted to the Company.
Nonetheless, the Company found the said disapproval to be acceptable and proper.
On questions propounded by the Court, Yungao testified that the names and signatures of the persons who actually
received the Company's vehicles were reflected on the faces of the delivery receipts. However, Yungao does not
recognize the signatures appearing on the said delivery receipts, including those purportedly of accused Tagupa, because
Yungao was not present when the vehicles were taken.
The prosecution had intended to present another witness in the person of Ms. Ma. Lourdes V. Miranda (hereinafter,
"Miranda"), who was present at the time Yungao testified. Prior to her presentation, however, the parties agreed to
enter into stipulations and admissions. Thus, it was stipulated that Miranda was the mother of a child named Jane, who
was run over and killed in a vehicular accident; that the driver of the ill-fated motor vehicle was accused Nabo; that
Miranda, thereafter, successfully traced the said vehicle and eventually discovered the existence of numerous delivery
receipts in the files and possession of the Company; and that said discovery led to the institution of the subject criminal
cases against herein accused. As a result of such admissions and stipulations, the proposed testimony of Miranda was,
thereafter, dispensed with.
AURORA J. CHIONG (hereinafter, "Chiong") declared that she is the Vice-President and General Manager of the Company,
a business establishment engaged in the assembly of motor vehicles. In the process, the Company has to submit a
Dealer's Report to the LTO prior to the assembly of a motor vehicle. After the assembly is completed, the Company has to
secure a permit from the LTO for purposes of conducting the necessary road testing of the newly assembled motor
vehicle.
In 1993, accused Garcia was the Regional Director of the LTO in Cagayan de Oro City. He was the officer who approves
the needed Conduction Permit of newly assembled motor vehicles. He was also the LTO officer who approves and signs
the Company's annual LTO Accreditation Certificate.
Chiong recounted that accused Garcia has a farm, and that he would need a vehicle to transport water thereto. For this
purpose, he would, on a weekly basis, borrow from the Company a motor vehicle, either by asking from Chiong directly
through telephone calls or through Yungao, her Liaison Officer. Everytime accused Garcia would borrow a motor vehicle,
the Company would issue a delivery receipt for such purpose, which has to be signed by the person whom accused Garcia
would send to pick up the motor vehicle. Chiong was usually the company officer who signed the delivery receipt for the
release of the borrowed motor vehicle to the representative of accused Garcia. When she was not in office, she would
authorize her personnel to place [their] initials on top of her name. On several occasions, Chiong had seen accused Nabo
affixing his signature on the delivery receipt before taking out the borrowed motor vehicles. Chiong was very sure that
the driver who picked up the motor vehicle from the Company was the personnel of accused Garcia because the latter
would always call her up first before sending his representative to get a vehicle. Chiong was likewise very familiar with
the voice of accused Garcia because she had been dealing with him for a long period of time already, and all the while
she had always maintained a cordial relationship with him.
On questions propounded by the Court, Chiong testified that accused Garcia would ask his driver to get a vehicle on a
Saturday at around 6:30 o'clock in the morning. He would return it in the late afternoon of the same day. There was only
one instance when accused Garcia returned the motor vehicle on the day after, and this was the time when the said
vehicle had figured in a vehicular accident which resulted in the death of a certain Jane, the daughter of Miranda. Chiong
was not the complainant in the said vehicular accident case because she could not afford to offend or antagonize accused
Garcia, and she had always considered the lending of motor vehicles to accused Garcia as a public relation thing. CSDTac
Chiong clarified that the subject motor vehicles occasionally borrowed by accused Garcia were all company service cars
and not newly assembled vehicles. Finally, she testified that she gets irritated whenever accused Garcia would ask for a
vehicle at a time when she herself would also need it. However, under the circumstances, she had to give in to his
request. 11
For the defense, petitioner took the witness stand, while accused Tagupa did not present any evidence.
Petitioner testified that he was the Regional Director of the 10th Regional Office of the LTO from August, 1987 to December, 1994. He
downright denied borrowing any motor vehicle from the Company arguing that his signatures never appeared in the Delivery
Receipts 12 submitted by the prosecution. 13 He admitted, though, that the Company has been continually transacting business with his office
properly and officially, and has not, even for a single instance, violated any rules with respect to assembly of motor vehicles, and that there was
no reason for the owners of the Company to harbor any ill-feelings against him.14 He further admitted that he had known Atty. Aurora Chiong,
Vice-President and General Manager of the Company, even before he became Regional Director when he was still the Chief of the Operations
Division. 15 He added that employees of the LTO are used to borrowing vehicles from their friends and that this practice has been going on
prior to his being Regional Director. He claimed he repeatedly warned his subordinates about the illegality of the same but they merely turned
12
a deaf ear. 16 Lastly, he said his driver, accused Nabo, had, on several occasions, driven motor vehicles and visited him at his farm, and that he
rode with him in going home without allegedly knowing that the vehicles driven by Nabo were merely borrowed from his (Nabo) friends. 17
On 6 May 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed decision convicting petitioner of fifty-six counts of violation of Section 3(b)
of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. Accused Tagupa was acquitted, while the cases against accused Nabo, who remained at large, were
archived. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused TIMOTEO A GARCIA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of fifty-
six (56) counts of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as TheAnti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to: (i) in each case, suffer an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) month, as
maximum; (ii) suffer all accessory penalties consequent thereto; and (iii) pay the costs.
With respect to accused NERY TAGUPA, by reason of the total lack of any evidence against him, he is hereby ACQUITED.
As for accused Gilbert G. Nabo, considering that he remained at large and jurisdiction over his person had yet to be
acquired, let the case as against him be achieved. 18
Petitioner is now before us assigning as errors the following:
1. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF SECTION 3(B) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
3019 WERE PRESENT IN CRIM. CASES NOS. 24042 TO 24098 (EXCEPT 24078) AND IN FINDING THE HEREIN
PETITIONER GUILTY OF FIFTY SIX (56) COUNTS OF VIOLATION THEREOF;
2. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THE HEREIN PETITIONER GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF FIFTY SIX
(56) COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(B) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 ON THE BASIS OF FATALLY DEFECTIVE
INFORMATIONS WHEREIN THE FACTS CHARGED NEVER CONSTITUTED AN OFFENSE;
3. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THE HEREIN PETITIONER GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF FIFTY SIX
(56) COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(B) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 ON THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE WHICH IS
INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT (EVEN FOR A SINGLE COUNT);
4. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED AND IN THE PROCESS VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE
HEREIN PETITIONER WHEN IT SUPPLIED THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION WITH
ASSUMPTIONS WHICH WERE NOT AT ALL SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD;
5. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED WHEN IT OBSERVED DIFFERENT STANDARDS OF JUSTICE BY ACQUITTING THE
PETITIONER'S CO-ACCUSED TAGUPA AND CONVICTING THE HEREIN PETITIONER WHEN THE SAME REASONING
SHOULD HAVE LED ALSO TO THE ACQUITTAL OF THE PETITIONER. AIECSD
In any criminal prosecution, it is necessary that every essential ingredient of the crime charged must be proved beyond reasonable doubt in
order to overcome the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent. 19 To be convicted of violation of Section
3(b) 20 of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, the prosecution has the burden of proving the following elements: (1) the offender is a public
officer; (2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a share a percentage, or a benefit (3) on behalf of the offender or any other person; (4)
in connection with a contract or transaction with the government; (5) in which the public officer, in an official capacity under the law, has the
right to intervene. 21
Petitioner maintains that not all the elements of Section 3(b) have been established by the prosecution. Petitioner focuses primarily on the
fourth element. He argues that the prosecution failed to show the specific transactions of the Company with the LTO of Cagayan de Oro that
petitioner approved and/or intervened in so that he could borrow from, or be lent by, the Company a vehicle. Inasmuch as he was convicted by
the Sandiganbayan of fifty-six counts of violation of Section 3(b) for allegedly borrowing the Company's vehicle fifty-six times, the
Sandiganbayan, he stresses, should have at least pointed out what these transactions were. This, petitioner claims, the Sandiganbayan failed to
show with certainty in its decision. Petitioner adds that the prosecution did not even attempt to introduce evidence to show what contract or
transaction was pending before the LTO over which petitioner had the right to intervene being the Regional Director when, at the period stated
in all the fifty-six informations, he borrowed a vehicle.
We agree with petitioner that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the existence of the fourth element. It is very clear from Section 3(b)
that the requesting or receiving of any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit must be in connection with "a contract or
transaction" 22 wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. In the case at bar, the prosecution did not
specify what transactions the Company had with the LTO that petitioner intervened in when he allegedly borrowed the vehicles from the
Company. It is insufficient that petitioner admitted that the Company has continually transacted with his office. What is required is that the
transaction involved should at least be described with particularity and proven. To establish the existence of the fourth element, the relation of
the fact of requesting and/or receiving, and that of the transaction involved must be clearly shown. This, the prosecution failed to do. The
prosecution's allegation that the Company regularly transacts with petitioner's LTO Office for the registration of its motor vehicles, in the
reporting of its engine and chassis numbers, as well as the submission of its vehicle dealer's report, and other similar transactions, will not
suffice. This general statement failed to show the link between the 56 alleged borrowings with their corresponding transactions.
Failing to prove one of the other elements of the crime charged, we find no need to discuss the presence or absence of the elements.
The next question to be resolved is: Can petitioner be convicted of any other crime (i.e., Direct Bribery or Indirect Bribery) charged in the
informations?
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 23 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the following elements: (1) that the accused is a
public officer; (2) that he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has
been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which it is
his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer. 24 Thus, the acts constituting
direct bribery are: (1) by agreeing to perform, or by performing, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present an act constituting a
crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties; (2) by accepting a gift in consideration of the execution of an act which does
13
not constitute a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duty; or (3) by agreeing to refrain, or by refraining, from doing
something which is his official duty to do, in consideration of any gift or promise. 25
In the case under consideration, there is utter lack of evidence adduced by the prosecution showing that petitioner committed any of the three
acts constituting direct bribery. The two prosecution witnesses did not mention anything about petitioner asking for something in exchange for
his performance of, or abstaining to perform, an act in connection with his official duty. In fact, Atty. Aurora Chiong, Vice-President and General
Manager of the Company, testified that the Company complied with all the requirements of the LTO without asking for any intervention from
petitioner or from anybody else from said office. 26From the evidence on record, petitioner cannot likewise be convicted of Direct
Bribery. aTEHIC
Can petitioner be found guilty of Indirect Bribery?

Indirect bribery is committed by a public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office. The essential ingredient of indirect
bribery as defined in Article 211 27 of the Revised Penal Code is that the public officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material
consideration. In the case at bar, was the prosecution able to show that petitioner indeed accepted a gift from the Company? The alleged
borrowing of a vehicle by petitioner from the Company can be considered as the gift in contemplation of the law. To prove that petitioner
borrowed a vehicle from the Company for 56 times, the prosecution adduced in evidence 56 delivery receipts 28 allegedly signed by
petitioner's representative whom the latter would send to pick up the vehicle.
The prosecution was not able to show with moral certainty that petitioner truly borrowed and received the vehicles subject matter of the 56
informations. The prosecution claims that petitioner received the vehicles via his representatives to whom the vehicles were released. The
prosecution relies heavily on the delivery receipts. We, however, find that the delivery receipts do not sufficiently prove that petitioner
received the vehicles considering that his signatures do not appear therein. In addition, the prosecution failed to establish that it was
petitioner's representatives who picked up the vehicles. The acquittal of one of the accused (Nery Tagupa) who allegedly received the vehicles
from the Company further strengthens this argument. If the identity of the person who allegedly picked up the vehicle on behalf of the
petitioner is uncertain, there can also be no certainty that it was petitioner who received the vehicles in the end.
Factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court except where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly an error or founded on a mistake; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact are premised on a want of evidence and are
contradicted by evidence on record. 29 In the case before us, we are constrained to apply the exception rather than the rule. We find that the
ruling of the Sandiganbayan that petitioners actually received the vehicles through his representatives is grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise, and conjectures, and not supported by evidence on record. The certainty of petitioner's receipt of the vehicle for his alleged personal
use was not substantiated.
WHEREFORE, all the above considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 24042 to 24077 and
24079 to 24098 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For insufficiency of evidence, the petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged in the
informations. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., is in the result.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
||| (Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 155574, [November 20, 2006], 537 PHIL 419-443)
14
EN BANC
[A.M. Nos. MTJ-99-1191. August 31, 2000.]
FEDERICO S. CALILUNG, complainant, vs. JUDGE WILFREDO S. SURIAGA, MTC, Angeles City, respondent.
[A.M. No. RTJ-99-1437. August 31, 2000.]
FEDERICO S. CALILUNG, complainant, vs. JUDGE PHILBERT I. ITURRALDE, RTC, Branch 58, Angeles City, respondent.
Marion B. Lauder for complainant.
SYNOPSIS
Complainant is the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer case filed with respondent Suriaga, MTC Judge in Angeles City. A favorable decision was
rendered, but it was appealed to the sala of respondent Iturralde. Claiming that Suriaga was demanding P250,000.00 for a favorable judgment
of the appealed case, complainant sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation. The entrapment was conducted on April 19,
1999 with NBI Supervising Agent Dapilos acting as the "yaya" of complainant's son. Suriaga, after talking with somebody over the phone about
the appealed case and assuring that complainant would be given a draft of the favorable decision, received the marked money in the amount
of P250,000.00. Thus, his arrest which was even published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer's April 22, 1999 edition. Suriaga was thereafter
charged with the crime of Corruption of a Public Official under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code before the Sandiganbayan and this
administrative complaint for serious misconduct was filed against him and Iturralde. However, the evidence presented against respondent
Iturralde was the alleged telephone conversation between him and Suriaga that transpired during the entrapment.
A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Improper conduct erodes public confidence in the
judiciary. Respondent Suriaga's culpability for serious misconduct has been established not just by substantial evidence but by an
overwhelming preponderance thereof. To demand and receive money from a party in a case before him constitutes serious misconduct for
which act he has no place in the judiciary. Suriaga was dismissed from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and
with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
However, there being no sufficient evidence to establish the culpability of respondent Iturralde, the case was referred back to the OCA for
further investigation. 2005jurcd
SYLLABUS
1. JUDICIAL ETHICS, JUDGES; SERIOUS MISCONDUCT; DEMANDING AND RECEIVING MONEY FROM A COMPLAINANT IN A CASE BEFORE
RESPONDENT IS NO LESS THAN A BRIBE AND CONSTITUTES SERIOUS MISCONDUCT. — As regards to respondent Suriaga, the Investigating
Justice observed that the testimonies of the Calilung spouses were replete with important details that could not be ignored. He pointed out
that mere denials and an unsatisfactory refutation on the part of Judge Suriaga to prove his innocence do not persuade to establish the falsity
of complainant's testimony and that of his wife. It was no less than a bribe for Judge Suriaga to demand and receive money from a party in a
case before him for which act he has no place in the judiciary. Neither is respondent judge's improper and illegal act, of asking from
complainant the amount of P250,000.00 to be given to Judge Iturralde, to be condoned. The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and
conclusion of Justice Ramirez. The culpability of respondent Judge Suriaga for serious misconduct has been established not just by substantial
evidence which suffices in an administrative investigation but by an overwhelming preponderance thereof. CHEDAc
2. ID.; ID.; DUTY TO AVOID ANY IMPRESSION OF IMPROPRIETY TO PROTECT THE IMAGE AND INTEGRITY OF THE JUDICIARY. — Case law
repeatedly teaches that "[j]udicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions thereon, which he
has to pay for accepting and occupying an exalted position in the administration of justice. The irresponsible or improper conduct of a judge
erodes public confidence in the judiciary. It is thus the duty of the members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the
image and integrity of the judiciary." As has been stated earlier, the Court has time and again "[a]dmonished judges to conduct themselves in a
manner that is free even from the appearance of impropriety. For judicial officers to enjoy the trust and respect of the people, it is necessary
that they live up to the exacting standards of conduct demanded by the profession and by the Code of Judicial Conduct. This is especially true in
the case of judges who, on a daily basis, interact with the public. Their official conduct, as well as personal behavior should always be beyond
reproach."
3. ID.; ID.; THEIR CONDUCT SHOULD MERIT THE RESPECT AND CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE. — A judge should conduct himself at all times in a
manner which would reasonably merit the respect and confidence of the people for he is the visible representation of the law. Rule 2.01 of
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct directs that a judge should behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
These consolidated administrative cases charge both respondent judges with irregular activities amounting to serious misconduct in office.
It appears from the record that on April 19, 1999, agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an entrapment operation
involving Judge Wilfredo S. Suriaga, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Angeles City. The operation stemmed from an Affidavit
Complaint dated April 16, 1999 1 filed by Federico Calilung y Surla with the NBI. The complaint alleged that:
1. Calilung was the complainant in a case against one Emiliano D. Joven in an ejectment case docketed as Civil Case No. 98-116 pending before
the MTC of Angeles City presided by Judge Suriaga. IaAHCE
2. While the case was still pending with him, Judge Suriaga approached Calilung soliciting the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision in Civil Case No. 98-116.
3. Calilung haggled with the judge and requested that the amount be lowered to Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) as that was all
he could afford, to which Judge Suriaga agreed.
4. Sometime thereafter in November 1998, Calilung delivered the money to Judge Suriaga at the latter's residence at Regina Street, Sta. Maria
Village II, Balibago, Angeles City.
5. On December 4, 1998, Judge Suriaga rendered a decision in favor of Calilung. 2
15
6. Emiliano Joven eventually appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) sometime in January 1999, which appeal, now docketed as
Civil Case No. 9314, was raffled to Branch 58 in Angeles City which was presided by respondent Judge Philbert Iturralde.
7. Thereafter, Judge Suriaga again approached Calilung and informed him that there will be no problem with the appeal, because Judge
Iturralde assured him of a favorable decision in consideration of the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos.
8. Calilung made it appear that he agreed to Judge Suriaga's proposal. The latter then directed Calilung to prepare and deliver the money to
him on Monday, April 9, 1999, at Judge Suriaga's residence.
9. Before the due date, Calilung approached the NBI requesting the Bureau to apprehend the two Judges "while in the act of receiving the
money . . . [to] cut short their illegal activities and to deter them from victimizing other litigants in the future."
10. Calilung was not able to talk to Judge Iturralde personally. It was his counsel, Atty. Marion Lauder, who talked to Judge Iturralde regarding
Calilung's case. According to Atty. Lauder, Judge Iturralde advised him to "talk to Judge Suriaga instead as they had already come to an
agreement regarding the matter."
Acting on the complaint, the NBI formed a team composed of several NBI agents. The Joint Affidavit of Arrest 3 outlined the plan and
procedure which the team adopted in the entrapment of Judge Suriaga, viz:
Upon the receipt of the complaint, the NBI agents immediately proceeded to Angeles City for the surveillance and casing
of the target area as well as to physically identify the subjects (Suriaga and Iturralde).
On April 18, 1999, the NBI agents prepared the money provided by Mr. Calilung to be used in the operation. It amounted
to two hundred fifty thousand pesos (P250,000.00) in two hundred fifty (250) one thousand peso (P1,000.00) bills. The
NBI agents took down the serial numbers of the money 4 and forwarded the same to the NBI-Forensic Chemistry Division
for fluorescent powder dusting together with a brown envelope with initials "JCG" and the date.
It was agreed that Supervising Agent Julma Dizon-Dapilos (SA Dapilos) of the NBI-ACADED would act as the baby-sitter of
Mr. Calilung's two-year old son, Marco. The NBI agents acted as back-up to SA Dapilos.
On the appointed date, the NBI agents stationed themselves along Katherine Street (near the house of Judge Suriaga).
They waited for the warning signal of SA Dapilos. The signal came at around 3:00 p.m. When the NBI agents moved in,
they found the envelope containing the marked money in Judge Suriaga's possession. Mr. Calilung also turned over to
them the recording machine containing his conversation with Judge Suriaga as well as the latter's phone conversation
with Judge Iturralde.
The NBI agents immediately proceeded to their Regional Office in San Fernando where they conducted a
forensic/laboratory examination of the dorsal palmar and dorsal portion of Judge Suriaga's hands to determine the
presence of fluorescent powder. The examination yielded a positive result. Consequently, they brought Judge Suriaga to
the NBI Office for further interrogation after which he was booked, photographed and fingerprinted. Judge Suriaga did
not however give any written testimony invoking his Constitutional rights.
In her affidavit dated 20th day of April 1999, 5 SA Dapilos also recounted what transpired on April 19, 1999. She stated that at about 8:30 a.m.,
Mrs. Joselin Calilung, accompanied by SA Dapilos and baby Marco, went to Judge Suriaga's residence to tell Mrs. Suriaga that they would
deliver the money at lunch time. Mrs. Calilung asked for the favorable decision of Judge Iturralde because the money would be given
simultaneously with the delivery of a copy of Judge Iturralde's decision. Sometime in the afternoon at about 12:30 p.m., Mrs. Joselin Calilung
talked to Judge Suriaga at the latter's house. SA Dapilos who was then nearby with the Calilung's two-year old son, Marco, heard their
conversation. Judge Suriaga said: "O, dalhin mo na ang asawa mo rito at ang pera. "Naka-usap ko na si Judge Iturralde na ngayon na daw niya
ire-release ang decision niya sa inyong kaso."
At around 1:35 p.m. of the same day, Mr. Calilung together with his wife Joselin, their son Marco and SA Dapilos entered Judge Suriaga's
residence to deliver the marked money. Judge Suriaga assured Mr. and Mrs. Calilung that Judge Iturralde would render a decision favorable to
them upon delivery of the money. The complainants however insisted that they would wait for Judge Iturralde who promised that he would
personally hand-carry the favorable decision to them. To convince the Calilung spouses that there was indeed an agreement between Judge
Suriaga and Judge Iturralde, the former dialed the phone and called Judge Iturralde. The taped conversation from the end of Judge Suriaga
went as follows:
"Hello, Branch 58? Nandiyan ba si Judge Iturralde? Puwede bang makausap? Si Judge Suriaga (Paused for a while.) Hello!
Tuloy tayo sa golf. Oo, mag-go-golf tayo ha? O papaano, anong oras ka pupunta rito? Mamayang hapon? O, sige, ikaw
na ang bahala dyan? Sa side mo ha? Tuloy na tuloy na tayo sa golf. May pambayad na ako sa caddie. Hindi na siguro.
Pagkatapos ng hearing, puntahan mo ako rito alas kuwatro, alas singko. Alas kuwatro. Oo, oo, ngayon na Ha, ha. Eh,
nandito eh Ha? Sige na, sige na. Sige na, ngayon na O sige, Ayos na? Kopya? Isang ano? O, dalhin mo na ang isang kopya,
para makuha na nila ang kopya. Oo. Hindi, hindi, hindi. O sige sige sige. Hindi, computer naman." At this point, Mr.
Calilung butted in and told Judge Suriaga: "Judge, kahit draft lang para masaya naman kami." Then, Judge Suriaga told
Judge Iturralde:"Huwag kang magalit pare, huwag kang magalit. Sige, sige, computer naman yan eh. Kahit na ipa-follow
up nila bukas. (Paused for a few seconds). O, sige, sige sige, o sige, sige, sige. Oo. Masyadong halata? Masyadong
halata? Pero siguradong, ano, pabor sa kanila. O sige, sige sige. Basta hihintaying kita rito ng four o'clock. Oo, sige. Mag-
go-golf tayo. Okay, okay." Then Judge Suriaga turned to complainants and said:"Ayos na ayos na. Kaya lang, huwag ninyo
lang ipa-follow up doon baka mahalata. Sabi niya sa akin, ibibigay niya daw sa inyo yung kopya mamaya, pero mababasa
ninyo lang hindi ninyo madadala." Mr. Calilung then said: "Oo, di bale, kahit punitin ang kopya okay lang sa akin." Then,
Mrs. Calilung said: "Lalabas kaya yon on time?" To which Judge Suriaga replied: "antayin na lang namin dito," Judge
Suriaga however said:"Hindi, huwag ninyong . . . kasi . . . maingat si Judge Iturralde. Andoon na, may date na i-me-mail sa
inyo. I-me-mail sa inyo. Hintayin ninyong matanggap ninyo na. Meron na kaming . . . pero sigurado ko na yon. Ang ayaw
niya lang, baka malaman na bakit alam ninyo kaagad na may desisyon na." Mr. Calilung then said: "Eh, syempre magfa-
16
follow up kunwari." Judge Suriaga then said: "O, ano ngayon, Monday? Mga Wednesday punta ka sa . . . (blurred). Pero
huwag mong ipa-follow up yung sa ano. Ang i-check mo sa Wednesday, sasabihin sa inyo, ah meron na ba kayong . . . ah,
meron na ho ba? Oo, patay malisya. Huwag na huwag kayong . . . (blurred). Kasi medyo maingat din yun sa reputasyon
niya eh, hi hi hi." Complainant then said: "Akala ko magkakainan tayo." Judge Suriaga said: "Eh, nagkainan na kami, wala
kayo eh. Pero sigurado na iyon. Nagagalit nga eh. Wala silang tiwala, huwag na lang. Sabi ko naman, hindi, hindi, hindi,
huwag."
The Calilung spouses then decided to give the marked money to Judge Suriaga and not to wait for Judge Iturralde anymore. SA Dapilos then
saw Mr. Calilung hand over the marked money to Judge Suriaga who was then standing by the main door. At that instance, SA Dapilos
announced the entrapment and informed Judge Suriaga that he was under arrest for receiving the marked money in violation of the provisions
ofR.A. 3019. She also informed him of his constitutional rights after which she gave the warning signal to her back-up NBI agents. Judge Suriaga
was thereafter placed under arrest and brought to the NBI Regional Office in San Fernando where an ultra-violet ray examination was
conducted on him by Chemist Edwin Purificacion. The examination showed that Judge Suriaga was positive for specks of fluorescent powder on
both his palmar and dorsal right and left hands. 6
On April 20, 1999, Director Santiago Y. Toledo of the NBI forwarded the findings of SRA Arnel B. Azul and company to the Inquest Prosecutor of
the Department of Justice in Padre Faura, Manila. 7 On the same day, two Informations were filed against Judge Suriaga by State Prosecutor
Rosalina P. Aquino for "Corruption of Public Officials (Art. 212, RPC) [Criminal Case No. OMB-1-99-0726]" and for "Violation of Sec. 3(a) of R.A.
No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." [Criminal Case No. OMB-1-00-0727]." 8 These were indorsed by Chief
State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano to the Ombudsman on the same date "requesting approval for the filing of the corresponding informations
and to direct the prosecutor of this Office to handle the prosecutions of the case." 9
Thereafter, in a Joint Review Action dated 21 April 1999, 10 Graft Investigating Officer II Germain G. Lim recommended "that the subject
Informations and the Resolutions dated 20 April 1999 rendered by the Department of Justice, National Prosecution Service, Manila be
AFFIRMED and APPROVED en toto, finding the existence of probable cause against" Judge Suriaga as charged. On even date, this Joint Review
Action was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman. 11 Likewise on the same day, an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 25244 12 was
filed before the Sandiganbayan accusing Judge Wilfredo Samson Suriaga of the crime of Corruption of a Public Official, defined and penalized
under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code.
"That on or about April 19, 1999, in Angeles City, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, WILFREDO SAMSON SURIAGA, a public officer, being then a Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Angeles City, Pampanga, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand and receive the
amount of PESOS: TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P250,000.00) from Spouses Federico and Joselin Calilung for the
purpose of mediating, inducing and influencing Judge Philbert Iturralde, Regional Trial Court Judge of Angeles City, into
rendering a favorable decision for said spouses in Civil Case No. 98-116."
The entrapment operation that led to the arrest of Judge Suriaga was published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer's April 22, 1999 edition. 13
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), to which the cases were subsequently referred for evaluation and report, found the evidence
sufficient to support the charges against respondent judges and recommended that: 1.] they be treated and docketed as a regular
administrative matter; 2.] Judge Suriaga be required to answer the complaint dated April 16, 1999 as well as the criminal charges against him
within ten (10) days from notice; 3.] Judge Iturralde be likewise required to answer the complaint dated April 16, 1999 within ten (10) days
from notice; 4.] thereafter, the case be referred to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals or a consultant of the OCA for immediate
investigation, report and recommendation; 5.] Judge Suriaga be placed immediately under suspension pending the resolution of the
investigation and criminal charges against him; 6.] Judge Iturralde be likewise placed under suspension and until final orders from the Court;
and 7.] the Court Administrator and/or the Spouses Calilung be authorized to institute criminal proceedings against Judge Iturralde.
The Court thereafter issued a Resolution dated May 4, 1999 adopting the foregoing recommendations of the OCA and referred the matter to
Justice Pedro A. Ramirez for immediate investigation, report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice. ADETca
On May 31, 2000, Justice Ramirez submitted his Report exhaustively synthesizing the evidence of complainant and respondent judges thus:
EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT
Complainant Federico S. Calilung's came to know respondent Judge Suriaga early in 1998 when he filed a case for
unlawful detainer against a tenant which was assigned to Judge Suriaga's branch. 14 Almost a year after the case was
filed he went to court to verify its status. It was there that he met respondent Judge Suriaga whom he asked if there was
already a decision in his case. Respondent Judge Suriaga answered there was "none yet" and told him, "your case has a
problem. If you want let us talk and you go to my house" in Sta. Maria Village, Balibago, Angeles City. 15 When he went
to see respondent Judge Suriaga at his house, the latter told him that expenses that had to be incurred amounting to
P500,000.00 "if you want to have a decision." 16 The amount was to be given to him, respondent Judge. 17 Told that he
could not afford that much, respondent Judge Suriaga reduced the amount to P300,000.00. 18 After raising the amount
of P300,000.00 in November 1998, he went to respondent Judge Suriaga's house and gave the money to him (respondent
Judge Suriaga). A few days thereafter the decision in his favor was released. 19 He then went to see again respondent
Judge Suriaga in his house to ask him about the writ of execution that he was supposed to issue in the
case. 20 Respondent Judge Suriaga told him, "Do not wait for the execution, anyway, they are going to appeal the case. I
would take care of it in the RTC." 21 The case was assigned in the Regional Trial Court to respondent Judge
Iturralde. 22 One day upon seeing him at the hallway of the RTC and MTC premises respondent Judge Suriaga told him
(witness) that his case was now with Judge Iturralde and advised him (witness) to see him (respondent Suriaga) at his
house to talk things over. 23 A few days thereafter the (witness) went to respondent Judge Suriaga's house to see
him. 24 There respondent Judge Suriaga told him (witness) that he has already talked with Judge Iturralde who was
asking P250,000.00 for a favorable decision. 25 He haggled with respondent Suriaga about the amount but the latter told
17
him that he had already done that for him and advised him not to haggle any further. 26 Respondent Judge Suriaga then
set a date for the delivery of the amount. Because of doubts he entertained about the matter he asked his lawyer, Atty.
Marion Lauder, to check the record of the case at Judge Iturralde's Court and find out if Judge Suriaga and Judge Iturralde
had really talked with each other. 27 And (witness) himself went to Judge Iturralde's Court and asked one of the clerks
for the record of the case. 28 The clerk told him that it was atop judge Iturralde's table, that Judge Suriaga has already
talked to Judge Iturralde about the case and suggested that he inquire from Judge Suriaga himself about the matter,
whereupon he and Atty. Lauder left, 29 witness (Federico Calilung) believing that really Judges Suriaga and Iturralde had
talked with each other about his case. 30 So he prepared the money that Judges Suriaga and Iturralde were expecting
from him, the date for its delivery set for April 19, 1999. 31 Before that, on April 16, 1999 he went to the NBI Office in
Manila to complain against Judges Suriaga and Iturralde for extortion. 32 Atty. Roel Lazala advised him to prepare the
money that was to be dusted with fluorescent powder to be used to entrap the two judges. 33 At 8:30 o'clock in the
morning of April 1999, he and his wife Jocelin, their two-year-old son Marco and Julma Dizon-Dapilos of the NBI went to
Judge Suriaga's house. They asked Mrs. Evelyn Suriaga, the Judge's wife, "if the luncheon with Judge Suriaga and Judge
Iturralde will go through" 34 Mrs. Suriaga answered it "will go through," whereupon they left, went home and told his
wife to fetch him at the bank. 35 After he was fetched by his wife from the bank, at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon,
he, his wife, their son Marco and Agent Dapilos went to Judge Suriaga's house, Agent Dapilos pretending to be his son
Marco's "yaya." 36 There they waited for Judge Iturralde to whom the money he had was to be given. 37 Judge Suriaga
told him he himself would give the money to Judge Iturralde. 38 Tired already of waiting for Judge Iturralde, he asked
Judge Suriaga if Judge Iturralde would really come and suggested it was better that the money be entrusted to Judge
Suriaga. 39 Judge Suriaga then went to dial the telephone. He heard respondent Judge Suriaga say, "Is this Branch 58, this
is Judge Suriaga. I want to talk to Judge Iturralde." After that Judge Suriaga said, "Okay na." 40 "We can already play golf
by and by, I have already something to pay the caddie." After that he told Judge Suriaga who was still on the telephone to
get a copy of the decision. Judge Suriaga told the person he was talking [with] over the telephone, "They need the
decision," followed by "If it is a draft only, let us give them," and "Do not get angry anymore, okay na naman, you just
bring a computer copy this afternoon at 4:00 o'clock. I would let them read it and tear it afterwards." Thus, he was
satisfied and convinced that Judge Iturralde knew about the whole thing. 41 In the presence of his wife, his son Marco
and Agent Dapilos he gave to Judge Suriaga the envelope with the amount of P250,000.00 inside. 42 It was then that
Agent Dapilos shouted "entrapment ito" and frisked Judge Suriaga. He (witness) then picked up his son and hurriedly
called the NBI agents who were outside. 43 The NBI agents apprehended Judge Suriaga and brought him first to their
regional office in San Fernando where his hands were tested for powder dusting. That done he (witness) was brought to
the NBI office in Manila. 44There he (witness) executed the affidavit, Exhibit A. 45
Jocelin Marcial Calilung, Federico's wife, testified in the following manner: Sometime in November 1998, her husband,
upon arriving home told her that there was a problem in their case for ejectment. 46 It was because respondent Judge
Suriaga told her husband when he visited the Judge at his residence that "their case has many problems" 47 and that
Judge Suriaga was aking P500,000.00 from him for a favorable decision. 48 The amount was too much, she remarked and
asked why. 49 She suggested that her husband bring her to Judge Suriaga's house so she could haggle with him about the
amount being asked. 50 She and her husband then went to see Judge Suriaga at his house where she told the Judge the
amount he was asking was too much. 51 Judge Suriaga answered her it was in exchange for a favorable decision and a
writ of execution. 52 Told that she had to borrow money for that purpose and asked that it be reduced, respondent
Judge Suriaga said, "O, sigue," meaning that he was agreeable to P300,000.00, and if she had the money already it be
brought to his house. 53 In the latter part of November 1998, she and her husband gave the amount of P300,000.00 to
respondent Judge Suriaga at his house in Regina Street, Sta. Maria Village. 54 After a while the decision in their favor was
rendered by respondent Judge Suriaga. 55 She and her husband then went to see Judge Suriaga again at his house to ask
him why no writ of execution was issued in the case.56 Judge Suriaga explained that the decision would be appealed just
the same but assured them he would take care of it in the Regional Trial Court. 57 After coming home they went to see
their lawyer who told them that an appeal from the decision had been taken to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58,
Angeles City, Judge Iturralde, presiding. 58 They then went to see Judge Suriaga at his house, told him of the appeal
taken and reminded him to take care of the matter. Judge Suriaga answered that he knew Judge Iturralde and would take
care of it, "he is ours," and "wala namang problema iyan, kilala naman niya si Judge Iturralde siya na ang bahala, sa atin
iyan, magbibigay ng favorable decision." 59 Asked how much was the amount needed, respondent Judge Suriaga
answered, "P250,000.00 but do not bargain anymore because I have already bargained with him." 60 The amount was
for a favorable decision and the writ of execution to be issued, to which she grudgingly agreed, said amount to be
delivered on April 19, 1999 at Judge Suriaga's house at Regina Street, Sta. Maria Village, Balibago. 61 On the night of April
14, 1999, her husband broached to her the idea of complaining to the NBI about the matter. She told him not to do that
because "they were judges and were very powerful." 62 Finally, she agreed to her husband's idea. On April 15, 1999,
about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, they went to see Atty. Roel Lazala of the NBI who told them to return at 2:00 o'clock
in the afternoon, which they did. 63 When they returned to his office Atty. Lazala called for Agent Arnel Azul whom she
saw taking notes of their conversation. 64 Before leaving the NBI office after talking with Atty. Lasala and Agent Azul, the
latter told her and her husband, that they would go to Angeles City at 8:30 in the morning next day April 16, 1999 and
told them to meet them at Kentucky Fried Chicken in Mabalacat. 65 As they were leaving, Atty. Lasala told them to
confirm with Judge Suriaga "kung tuloy iyong 19th kay Judge Iturralde." 66 on April 16, 1999, at 7:00 o'clock in the
18
morning, she and her husband went to Judge Suriaga's house. 67 There Judge Suriaga told them, "O Tuloy na iyon ha?
Ang tagal tagal ninyo, kung bumalik kayo agad tapos na iyan." 68 After talking with Judge Suriaga at about 9:00 or 10:00
o'clock in the morning she and her husband went to Kentucky Fried Chicken to meet with Atty. Lazala, 69 who upon
seeing them introduced them to the agents who would go with them to Judge Suriaga's house to familiarize themselves
with the inside portion of his house. 70 After her husband and the agents had left Atty. Lazala introduced her to Agents
Edmund Arugai and Dapilos. 71 It was agreed upon that Agent Dapilos would pose as her two-year old son
Marco's "yaya" when they go to Judge Iturralde's house. 72 While she was talking with Agent Dapilos, her husband
returned with the NBI agents from Judge Suriaga's house. 73 After lunch at Kentucky Fried Chicken in Mabalacat, they
left to return to the NBI office at Taft Avenue, Manila where they arrived at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. 74 There she
and her husband gave their sworn statements marked Exhibits A and B, 75 which were finished at about 7:00 o'clock in
the evening. 76 On April 17, 1999, between 9:00 and 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Agent Azul called up her house to tell
her husband about the money to be used in the entrapment. 77 He agreed to bring next day "real money" to be
used. 78 The next day, April 18, 1999, he brought the money which was received by Atty. Lazala who issued the receipt
for it and turned it over to Joey Guillen for dusting with fluorescent powder. 79 Early in the morning of April 19, 1999,
Agent Dapilos was brought to her house. 80 After she was introduced to her son, her husband (Federico) told them to go
to respondent Judge Suriaga's house "to confirm if our lunch with Judge Iturralde will push through." 81 Together with
her two-year old son and Agent Dapilos, she went to respondent Judge Suriaga's house 82 where upon arrival the Judge's
wife told her that her husband brought their children to "Mimosa para magpraktis ng golf then "to proceed to
MTC" 83 and confirmed the lunch date with respondents Judges Iturralde and Suriaga. 84 Afterwards she and her
husband went to Kentucky Fried Chicken where they met with the two groups of Atty. Arugai and Atty. Lazala, consisting
of ten to twelve persons each group. 85 Together with Agent Dapilos and her son she went to Judge Suriaga's house at
Regina Street, Sta. Maria Village, Balibago. 86 After being allowed by the houseboy to get inside she asked Mrs. Suriaga if
respondent Judge Suriaga was "there already and she said yes, I would call him." 87 Upon meeting her, respondent Judge
Suriaga asked where her husband was and said, "dalhin mo siya rito." She answered he was "in Equitable Bank," 88 to
which respondent Judge Suriaga replied, "O, dalhin mo na siya rito pati iyong pera," 89 whereupon she and Agent Dapilos
left and went to the gasoline station where her husband and the rest of the agents were. 90 She told her husband that
respondent Suriaga told her, "dalhin mo na rito ang asawa mo pati na ang pera." 91 Together with her husband and son
and Agent Dapilos she returned to respondent Judge Suriaga's house between 1:00 and 1:30 o'clock in the
afternoon. 92 Upon reaching his house, she asked Mrs. Suriaga if her husband was there. Mrs. Suriaga answered, "Sige
tawagin ko lang sandali, just a while and she said sit down." 93 It took respondent Judge Suriaga about thirty minutes to
come out of his bedroom. 94 Asked about their case, respondent Judge Suriaga blurted out, "Wala ata kayong tiwala sa
akin," to which she answered, "hindi naman." 95 Her husband asked respondent Judge, "talaga bang ilalabas nila ang
decision, iyong favorable decision with writ of execution this time." He stood up and answered "Okay, sige tatawagan
ko si Judge Iturralde." 96 Thereupon respondent Judge stood up and went to the telephone between the dining room
and the sala. After dialing the telephone he said, "Hello, Branch 58, si Judge Iturralde," followed by, "Si Judge Suriaga ito,
o, tuloy na tuloy na tayo, maggogolf na tayo mamaya tuloy na tuloy na tayo, mayroon na tayong pambayad sa caddie." It
was then that her husband butt[ed] in. "Judge iyong Decision." Respondent Judge continued, "O, iyong desisyon daw, o
ano lalabas ba ngayon ay hindi hindi, o ano alas kwatro, alas singko, alas kwatro, o sige hihintayin na lang kita dito." She
(witness) butt[ed] in and said, "Judge lalabas kaya iyon on time o ano, sabi niya ho eh, huwag kang
magalit, computerized naman iyan eh, draft de puede a, hindi, o sige sige huwag kang magalit," respondent Judge said as
he put down the phone. 97 Respondent Judge then said to them, "Hayan nagalit si Judge Iturralde, kasi para atang wala
kayong tiwala sa kanya eh," to which she replied, "Judge gusto lang naman naming makasiguro." 98 Respondent Judge
said, "Maingat iyang si Butz, huwag kayong pupunta doon ng basta basta sabi niya kasi baka mahalata, basta magtiwala
na lang kayo sa akin." 99 Complainant Federico Calilung replied, "Judge, sana huwag nang mangyari ang nangyari
katulad before na walang execution," 100 to which respondent Judge Suriaga replied, "akong bahala diyan sabi niya
malapit ako diyan kay Butz" (referring to respondent Judge Iturralde). 101 Complainant Federico Calilung then left to get
the money from the car. Upon returning, complainant Federico Calilung said to respondent Judge Suriaga, ". . . Judge eto
na iyong pera kunin mo na kasi aalis pa kami, dahil susunduin ko iyong nanay ni Joy sa airport," which was in the amount
of P250,000.00 in P1,000.00 denomination, in a brown envelope, 102 which respondent Judge Suriaga received saying,
"thank you, thank you," after seeing what was inside the envelope, his favorite expression everytime she gave him
money. 103 Present on that occasion were she (witness Jocelin Calilung), her son, Agent Dapilos and Mrs.
Suriaga. 104 Agent Dapilos then announced, "Entrapment ito Judge," to which respondent Judge Suriaga answered, "Ha?
Ha? Dick (referring to complainant Federico Calilung) bakit mo ginawa sa akin ito." 105 Witness Jocelin Calilung went out
of the house waving her hands at NBI agents Guillen, Gayas, Lazala, Arugai, Uson and others who went inside respondent
Judge Suriaga's house. 106 Together with respondent Judge Suriaga, she and the NBI agents went to the NBI Regional
Office in San Fernando, Pampanga aboard different cars. 107 Tested for fluorescent powder specks, respondent Judge
was found positive for it. 108 From there they went to the NBI office in Manila where she and her husband Federico
Calilung jointly swore to an affidavit that they executed before DOJ Prosecutor Aquino. 109
Sr. Forensic Chemist Edwin C. Purificando testified that in the evening of April 18, 1999, a Sunday, he reported for work
at the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division. He received a letter-request from Special Investigator Joselito Guillen of the
Special Investigation Division of the NBI, noted by the Chief, SID Roel Lazala, requesting that 250 pieces of P1,000.00 bills
19
(original) be dusted and marked with fluorescent powder. 110 That he did. The money bills were used for
entrapment. 111
Supervising Agent Julma Dizon-Dapilos, who acted as yaya of complainant's two year old son, testified that she executed
the affidavit, Exhibit C, 112 the authenticity of which was stipulated upon by the parties. 113She corroborated the
testimony of the Calilung spouses about respondent Judge Suriaga's conversation with respondent Judge Iturralde over
the telephone.
NBI Special Investigator Joselito C. Guillen testified that respondent Judge Suriaga was photographed, fingerprinted and
booked at the NBI office in Manila. 114 The P250,000.00 in bills were turned over to the evidence custodian by Agent
Arnel Azul, now dead. It was Agent Azul who prepared the request for turnover notice dated April 22, 1999. 115 It was he
(witness) who prepared the list of money bills and turned over the money bills to the forensic chemist after receipt. 116
Evidence for respondents Judges
Respondent Judge Suriaga
Complainant Federico Calilung's testimony that in 1998 or on an unspecified date he met the complainant at his court's
hallway and that he (respondent Judge Suriaga) demanded from him P500,000.00, reduced to P300,000.00, which
amount was handed to him, is not true. 117 The Calilungs are lying when they testified that after the case was appealed
to Judge Iturralde's court they (Calilungs) sought his (Suriaga's) help. 118Likewise it is false and not true that prior to April
19, 1999 he met the Calilungs several times, at least six times, and that he arranged to meet with them in his house on
April 19, 1999. 119 Early in the morning of that day he left his house to bring his two sons to their swimming lesson at
Flow and Arrow near his place of work. 120 From there he went to his office to conduct trial until 11:30 or 11:45 in the
morning. 121 He never had occasion to meet the Calilung spouses in the morning of April 19, 1999. 122 After trial he
fetched his two sons and went home. He reached home between 12:00 and 12:15. 123 He rested in his bedroom at
home after lunch with his wife and children. 124 While resting his wife told him Mrs. Calilung was in his house. 125 At
first he did not like to see her but his wife prevailed upon him to know what she wanted from him. 126So he went out of
his bedroom and saw Mrs. Calilung standing at the sala. 127 It is not true that upon seeing Mrs. Calilung he asked her
where her husband and the money were. He never said those words. 128 But after greeting him Mrs. Calilung asked if
Judge Iturralde had already arrived. Her question surprised him because there was no party to be held its his house and
in fact their food for lunch was but good for his family only. 129 After Mrs. Calilung left, he returned to his
bedroom. 130 After about thirty minutes his wife called him from his bedroom telling that again there were visitors at
home, this time Mr. and Mrs. Calilung.131 Asked what they wanted, his wife told him she did not know. 132 Finally, after
thirty minutes he went out of his bedroom to meet the Calilung spouses. 133 Again he was asked if Judge Iturralde had
arrived already. 134 He answered them there was no party in his house and asked why they were looking for Judge
Iturralde, in whose branch their (Calilungs) case was on appeal. They were asking his help because Judge Iturralde was his
friend. 135 He answered he could not do that because Judge Iturralde was but his co-judge and not a friend, their
relation with each other being "purely professional," whereupon he excused himself and returned to his bedroom,
leaving the Calilungs behind. 136 After five minutes his wife told him that the Calilungs would like to see him again. Asked
what for, his wife answered she did not know. Upon emerging from his bedroom he saw Federico Calilung standing near
his bedroom door. Asked what was it they wanted from him, he heard Mr. Calilung tell Mrs. Calilung, "Ibigay mo na kay
Judge." 137 From the porch of his house, Mrs. Calilung rushed inside and thrust at him an envelope. 138 As he asked,
"Ano iyan," a woman who turned out to be an NBI agent emerged pointing, then poking a gun at him. 139 He believes
the envelope was thrown on the floor and thinks he was not able to hold it. 140 The NBI agent was Julma Dizon Dapilos
who pointed a gun at him. 141 So was his alleged reaction to the NBI agents, "Anong pera?What money are you looking
for? If he had the money why would he react to that statement in that way?" 142 Fifteen to twenty people entered his
house, some of them from TV Channel 5. A big NBI agent wearing shorts with a gun tucked to his waist was among
them. 143 He never dialed the telephone to call anybody (p. 24, t.s.n., supra). On April 19, 1999, he did not know the
status of the ejectment case that was with Judge Iturralde. In fact the case was not pending before his court anymore,
having decided it in December 1994. 144 Presumably the Calilung's motive in filing the false charges against him was the
fact that their notice of appeal and later their motions for execution were denied. Besides, he found that the property
subject of the case had already been auctioned for sale. 145
Respondent Judge Suriaga's wife, Evelyn Torres Suriaga, testifying as a witness for him, sought to corroborate his
testimony. 146
Respondent Judge Iturralde
What complainant Federico Calilung said in his sworn statement (Exhibit A) that respondent Judge Suriaga assured him
(Calilung) there would be no problem in the case on appeal because Judge Iturralde himself assured him (Suriaga) of a
favorable decision in consideration of the amount of P250,000.00, to which he (Iturralde) agreed, is "totally hearsay and
not true." 147 Federico Calilung's testimony that although he was not able to talk to Judge Iturralde himself, it was his
lawyer, Atty. Marlon Lauder, who did regarding the case on appeal and Judge Iturralde said he should talk to Judge
Suriaga instead because they had already come to an agreement regarding the matter, is again "totally hearsay and not
true." 148 What the Calilungs swore in their affidavit dated April 20, 1999, 149 that Judge Suriaga instructed them to
prepare the money and told them there was no problem in the appeal as Judge Iturralde has assured them of a favorable
decision and about the scheduled pay-off on April 19, 1999 at his rented house where Judge Iturralde would receive the
money, is likewise "totally hearsay and not true." 150 So is the alleged telephone call by Judge Suriaga insinuating that he
(respondent Judge Iturralde) was at the other end of the line, is "totally hearsay and not true." 151 At 1:35 in the
20
afternoon of April 19, he was in his sala conducting a hearing as scheduled in the calendar for that day starting from
about 1:30 o'clock in afternoon and ending at about 4:00 o'clock p.m. 152 He was supposed to hear twelve cases for that
day starting from 1:30 o'clock. 153 He arrived at his sala about 12:30 o'clock noon, took his lunch and went over the
record of the cases involved. 154 He received no telephone call from anybody that afternoon of April 12, 1999 while in
Court in Angeles City. 155 He inquired from the members of his staff if they received any for him and they told him there
was none.156 The joint affidavit of his staff members to that effect is marked Exhibit 6. 157 The calendar of cases set for
hearing on April 19, 1999 is marked Exhibits 7, 7-A and 7-B. 158 He then left to fetch his wife at the Veterans Memorial
hospital near Shoemart at EDSA in Quezon City. 159 He reported for work next day, April 20, and until Friday of that
week. 160 He went on leave of absence beginning April 27, 1999, the application therefor he filed on March 25, duplicate
copy of which is marked Exhibit 8. 161 He tried once at the driving range but his back ached. He has a set of golf clubs
which he bought "hulugan." 162 The medical certificate attesting to his health is marked Exhibit 10. 163 It is not true he
was supposed to go to Judge Suriaga's house in Angeles City on April 19, 1999. That is totally hearsay and not true. 164
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the Investigator recommended the dismissal of both respondents with the forfeiture of benefits except
accrued leaves.
As regards to respondent Suriaga, the Investigating Justice observed that the testimonies of the Calilung spouses were replete with important
details that could not be ignored. He pointed out that mere denials and an unsatisfactory refutation on the part of Judge Suriaga to prove his
innocence do not persuade to establish the falsity of complainant's testimony and that of his wife. 165 It was no less than a bribe for Judge
Suriaga to demand and receive money from a party in a case before him for which act he has no place in the judiciary. 166 Neither is
respondent judge's improper and illegal act, of asking from complainant the amount of P250,000.00 to be given to Judge Iturralde, to be
condoned. TCAScE
The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and conclusion of Justice Ramirez. The culpability of respondent Judge Suriaga for serious
misconduct has been established not just by substantial evidence which suffices in an administrative investigation 167 but by an overwhelming
preponderance thereof. The testimony of Supervising Agent Julma Dizon-Dapilos who posed as yaya of complainant's two-year old son during
the entrapment operation demolishes whatever credibility respondent's proffered defense has. Dizon-Dapilos, a disinterested observer in
addition to being a law enforcement officer corroborated the testimony of the complainant and his wife. She was a direct witness to the
entrapment operation and, equally important, respondent judge failed to present any reason why her testimony should be disbelieved.
The Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

CANON 2 — A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01 — A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
It is evident from the aforesaid provisions that both the reality and the appearance must concur. Case law repeatedly teaches that "[j]udicial
office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions thereon, which he has to pay for accepting and
occupying an exalted position in the administration of justice. 168 The irresponsible or improper conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in
the judiciary. 169 It is thus the duty of the members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of
the judiciary." 170
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein
respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties.171 They are the
intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the people's sense of justice. 172 Thus, their
official conduct should remain "free from any appearance of impropriety" and should be beyond reproach. 173
Given the factual circumstances prevailing in this case, the Court does not hesitate to conclude that "[r]espondent Judge tainted the image of
the judiciary to which he owes fealty and the obligation to keep it all times unsullied and worthy of the people's trust." 174 A judge should
conduct himself at all times in a manner which would reasonably merit the respect and confidence of the people for he is the visible
representation of the law. 175 Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct directs that a judge should behave at all times to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the Judiciary." 176In National Bureau of Investigation v. Judge Ramon B. Reyes, 177 whose
factual milieu is similar to this case, the Court said:
Bribery is a serious charge punishable by, inter alia, dismissal from service with forfeiture of benefits and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled corporations. 178 In
the case at bench, we find sufficient bases in the charge of malfeasance in office against respondent. On past occasions
where we had the disagreeable task of disciplining mulcting magistrates, 179 we did not hesitate to impose the penalty
of dismissal. Conformably, as he has demonstrated his unsuitability to remain a member of the bench, respondent is
deservingly dismissed from service with all its attendant consequences. For as we held in Haw Tay v. Singayao. 180
. . . The acts of respondent Judge in demanding and receiving money from a party-litigant before his court
constitutes serious misconduct in office. This court condemns in the strongest possible terms the misconduct of
respondent Judge. It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct on the part of those who are charged with
the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice that so quickly and surely corrodes the respect
for the law and the courts without which government cannot continue and that tears apart the very bonds of
our polity.
In Saphia M. Magarang v. Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr, 181 the Court in dismissing respondent judge said in scathing terms that —
Judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They must be the embodiment of competence, integrity
and independence. 182 A judge's conduct must be above reproach. 183 Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure
21
but above suspicion. 184 A judge's private as well as official conduct must at all times be free from appearances of
impropriety, and be beyond reproach. 185
In Vedana vs. Valencia, 186 the Court held:
The code of judicial ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only
with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code
dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,
must behave with propriety at all times. As we recently explained, a judge's official life cannot simply be
detached or separated from his personal experience. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior
of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.
Respondent judge miserably failed to measure up to stringent judicial standards. 187 Complainant has sufficiently
established the corrupt acts of respondent judge . . . He received a bribe . . . He has no place in the Judiciary. 188 He
dishonored the judicial robe he wore. His acts could even be criminal in nature. 189 We have unhesitatingly removed
from office judges and court employees for less serious transgressions. 190 We removed a deputy sheriff from office for
asking a bribe of only P1,500.00. 191 We have no reason to depart from this ruling. Respondent judge's acts of
corruption clearly show his unfitness to remain any minute longer in his judicial robe.
Perforce, the penalty of dismissal from the service is the most appropriate penalty under the circumstances for respondent Judge Suriaga's
malfeasance in office. SCcHIE
As has been stated earlier, the Court has time and again "[a]dmonished judges to conduct themselves in a manner that is free even from the
appearance of impropriety. 192 For judicial officers to enjoy the trust and respect of the people, it is necessary that they live up to the exacting
standards of conduct demanded by the profession and by the Code of Judicial Conduct. This is especially true in the case of judges who, on a
daily basis, interact with the public. Their official conduct, as well as personal behavior should always be beyond reproach." 193
As regards the case against Judge Iturralde, complainants capitalized on a telephone conversation that allegedly transpired in the house of
Judge Suriaga on April 19, 1999, the date the latter was entrapped and arrested. There being no sufficient showing at this time to establish the
culpability of Judge Iturralde, the case against him should be referred back to the Office of the Court Administrator for further investigation as
to his participation in the anomalous transactions complained of. In the meantime, in order to enable Judge Iturralde to perform his functions,
this Court lifts his suspension pending the proceedings against him.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.] Respondent Wilfredo S. Suriaga is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice
to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations;
2.] The administrative complaint against respondent Philbert I. Iturralde is REFERRED back to the Office of the Court Administrator for further
investigation. In the meantime, his preventive suspension is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
||| (Calilung v. Suriaga, A.M. Nos. MTJ-99-1191, RTJ-99-1437, [August 31, 2000], 393 PHIL 739-769)
22
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 61776 to 61861. March 23, 1984.]
REYNALDO R. BAYOT, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Renato J. Bihasa for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; EX POST FACTO LAW; LAWS PROVIDING FOR SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
PENDING TRIAL, NOT IN VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTION. — There is no merit in petitioner's contention that Section 13 of Republic Act 3019, as
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which includes the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document as among the crimes subjecting
the public officer charged therewith with suspension from office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional
prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS; SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE PENDING TRIAL; APPLICABILITY THEREOF TO ANY
OFFICE WHICH THE OFFICER CHARGED MAY BE HOLDING CASE AT BAR. — The claim of petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is
presently occupying a position different from that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that any
incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense involving
fraud upon the government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Thus, by the use of the word "office" the same applies to any office
which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he was charged.
DECISION
RELOVA, J p:
Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several persons accused in more than one hundred (100) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Documents before theSandiganbayan. The said charges stemmed from his alleged involvement, as a government auditor of the Commission on
Audit assigned to the Ministry of Education and Culture, together with some officers/employees of the said Ministry, the Bureau of Treasury
and the Teacher's Camp in Baguio City, in the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for non-existent obligations of the
Teacher's Camp resulting in damage to the government of several million pesos. The first thirty-two (32) cases were filed on July 25, 1978.
In the meantime, petitioner ran for the post of municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite in the local elections held in January 1980. He was elected.
On May 30, 1980, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting herein petitioner and some of his co-accused in all but one of the
thirty-two (32) cases filed against them. Whereupon, appeals were taken to this Court and the cases are now pending review in G.R. Nos. L-
54645-76.
However, on March 16, 1982, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 was passed amending, among others, Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019. The said
section, as amended, reads —
"Sec. 13. Suspension of and Loss of Benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted
by final judgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if acquitted,
he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings had been filed against
him."
Thereafter, in other cases pending before the respondent court in which herein petitioner is one of the accused, the prosecution filed a motion
to suspend all the accused-public officers pendente lite from their respective offices or any other public office which they may be occupying
pending trial of their cases. prLL
On July 22, 1982, respondent court issued an order directing the suspension of all the accused including herein petitioner "from their public
positions or from any other public office that they may be holding . . ." (p. 26, Rollo).
Herein petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that "to apply the provision of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 to the herein accused
would be violative of the constitutional guarantee of protection against an ex post facto law" (p. 28, Rollo). The motion was denied by
respondent court in a resolution dated September 6, 1982. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
It is the submission of petitioner that respondent court acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in suspending petitioner from office as Mayor of Amadeo, Cavite, pendente lite because —
1. Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, is a penal statute
in which case the provision of said Act must be strictly construed in favor of the accused and against the State;
2. A close perusal of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, as well as the proceedings therein of the Batas Pambansa is absent of the legislative intent to
have said Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 applied retroactively;
3. In the supposition that Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 is to be applied retroactively, its application would violate the Constitutional provision
against enactment of ex post facto law; and,
4. Petitioner cannot be suspended to the position of which he was duly elected by the people of Amadeo, Cavite, based on an act which has
nothing to do with his present position.
We find no merit in petitioner's contention that Section 13 of Republic Act 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which includes the
crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document as among the crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from
office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law.
23
Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that suspension from the employment or public office during the trial or in
order to institute proceedings shall not be considered as penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings.
In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension. Those mentioned in paragraph Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of said Article 24 are merely preventive measures before final judgment. Not being a
penal provision, therefore, the suspension from office, pending trial, of the public officer charged with crimes mentioned in the amendatory
provision committed before its effectivity does not violate the constitutional provision on ex post facto law. Further, the claim of petitioner that
he cannot be suspended because he is presently occupying a position different from that under which he is charged is untenable. The
amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Thus, by the
use of the word "office" the same applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which
he was charged.
ACCORDINGLY, instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Fernando, C .J . and Teehankee, J ., are on leave.
||| (Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 61776 to 61861, [March 23, 1984], 213 PHIL 344-348)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001.]
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,vs.SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Agarin Verzola Hermoso & Layasen Law Offices, Saguisag Carao & Associates, Jose B. Flaminiano and Fortun Narvasa & Salazar for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
The Court affirmed the constitutionality of RA 7080, otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659. The Plunder Law contained
ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Indeed, it can be
understood that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000 through a
series or combination of acts enumerated in the Plunder Law. Petitioner bewailed the failure of the law to provide statutory definitions of the
terms used. The Court, however, ruled that the same will not render the law void and the words of the statute will be interpreted in their ordinary
acceptation. Hence, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is misplaced. That the Plunder Law requires only proof of pattern
of the criminal acts showing unlawful scheme, the Court ruled that the same does not do away with the requirement of proving guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. However, what the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000. There is no need to prove each and
every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy
to amass ill-gotten wealth.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATION; PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. — The whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of
legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution. Courts invariably
train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional
adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to
encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch
accords to its coordinate branch — the legislature. If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must
assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the
facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every
intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing
therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of
constitutionality. CADHcI
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF WHEN LAW IS CHALLENGED. — The onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party
challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution,
for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by
Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."
3. ID.; ID.; PLUNDER LAW; CONTAINS WELL-DEFINED PARAMETERS. — As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-
defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of
the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. As
long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable
to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its
violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty
that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00
24
through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law. In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks
the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; TERMS USED; ABSENCE OF STATUTORY DEFINITION THEREOF DOES NOT RENDER LAW VOID; POPULAR MEANING GENERALLY
APPLIED. — Petitioner bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key
phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions,
according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process. A statute is not rendered
uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do
we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each
and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed
in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered
from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of
a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
technical or special legal meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers — who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers
— to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Further, that Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to
be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA
7080 or the Plunder Law.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WORDS "COMBINATION," "SERIES" AND "PATTERN"; ELUCIDATED. — When the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is
referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in
Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3). On the
other hand, to constitute a "series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found
in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily,
had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically
providing for it in the law. As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4,
in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 of the Plunder Law.
6. ID.;ID.;ID.;"VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS" DOCTRINE; NOT APPLICABLE. — Petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly
misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal
offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by
the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by
a saving clause or by construction. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in
two (2) respects — it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid;
and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But
the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard
though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved"
by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities. With more reason,
the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a
criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility,
rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held
invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of
the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by
dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of
the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-
entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder
Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by
the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications
and sound constitutional anchorage.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROVISION IN SEC. 4 THAT ONLY PROOF OF PATTERN OF CRIMINAL ACTS SHOWING UNLAWFUL SCHEME IS REQUIRED; DOES
NOT DO AWAY WITH PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. — Petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder
Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of
plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. In a criminal prosecution for
plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and
unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The
use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the application of
criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether
innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence
that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.
This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause
which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
25
which he is charged. The legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still
remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.
8. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;ELUCIDATED. — The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal
misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient
to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove
each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder
with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove
by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00. A reading of Sec.
2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the
prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d).Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof
of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth."
The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the
establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
9. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;"PATTERN," NOT AN ELEMENT OF CRIME AND DOES NOT AFFECT SEC. 4 PROVIDING FOR RULE OF EVIDENCE. — Relative to
petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of
plunder";and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the
accused cannot be convicted of plunder — We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled
and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d),and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening
clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal: SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. — For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder . . . It purports to do no
more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not
define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid
to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to
present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be
severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant
Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause. And implicit in that section is that to avoid the whole act
from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the
provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be
achieved. DCcIaE
10. ID.;ID.;ID.;A CRIME MALUM IN SE.— We agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent.
Thus, he says . . . "The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se.For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law,
especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as
though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard
to the inherent wrongness of the acts."
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PLUNDER LAW, UPHELD. — Petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA
7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same
having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA
7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an
integral part of it. Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its
very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly
contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly
sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially
designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately
consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately
eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office. These are times that try men's souls. In
the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's
ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge
of dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism
and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty,unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the
State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State
cannot tread — asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference — he veritably
acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against
those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says —
26
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of
their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and
cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and
inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a new
formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the
web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and
broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members
to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience
is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime
of Plunder),1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder
Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code,all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4
which are reproduced hereunder:
SECTION 1. ....(d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person
within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of
pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by
reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any
of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines.
SECTION 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties.— Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section
1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the
crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In
the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances
as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth
and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or
investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
SECTION 4. Rule of Evidence.— For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each
and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of
the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No.
26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par.
(a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par.
(d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees);(d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183
of The Revised Penal Code);and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, forIllegal Use of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to
specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under
specifications "a","b",and "c" to give the accused the opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of
probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and
27
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged
were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense
of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not
constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for
Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash,and five (5) days later
or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition
for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate
crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is
a malumprohibitum,and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative
measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution. 3 Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative
act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its
bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been
said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch — the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the
borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right
and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts
should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor
of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain
whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon 4 we held that as long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of
the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient
to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palpably transgresses
the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate
beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain." 5 And petitioner
has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine
the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and
prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus —
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity
or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or
criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of
pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of
the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to
the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity
or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage
of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense
and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least
P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them
liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged
with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little
difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least
P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the
offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a.'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. JOSE
VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro,
JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does,
28
of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed
as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself
AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused,WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY
OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE
OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17),more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS,
described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000.000.00),MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION
OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR
THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
(P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000.000.00)
tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No 7171, by himself
and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or
Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (emphasis supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security
System (SSS),329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF
MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00) RESPECTIVELY,
OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY
EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS,
FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER
THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY
FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR
LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS
ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous — as there is obviously none — that will confuse petitioner in his defense.
Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate
contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations
against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense. aCSEcA
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key
phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions,
according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein,
or because of the employment of terms without defining them;6 much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive
constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the
form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity
of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. 8 The
intention of the lawmakers — who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers — to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is
always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination"
and "series":
29
Combination — the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series — a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative
deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 orthe Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO:
I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR
CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to
say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something
else are included, how about a series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion,
misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA:
Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO:
Series.
REP. GARCIA:
Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO:
But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA:
Yes.
REP. ISIDRO:
When we say combination, it seems that —
REP. GARCIA:
Two.
REP. ISIDRO:
Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA:
No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO:
Not twice?
REP. GARCIA:
Yes. Combination is not twice — but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO:
So in other words, that's it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the
same act.
REP. GARCIA:
That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO:
No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA:
A series.
REP. ISIDRO:
That's not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, di
ba?
REP. GARCIA:
Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is only
one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So
...
REP. GARCIA:
Series. One after the other eh di ...
SEN. TAÑADA:
So that would fall under the term "series?"
REP. GARCIA:
Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO:
Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations ...
REP. GARCIA:
Its not ...Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO:
30
So, it is not a combination?

REP. GARCIA:
Yes.
REP. ISIDRO:
When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA:
Yes.
SEN. TAÑADA:
Two different.
REP. ISIDRO:
Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA:
For example, ha ...
REP. ISIDRO:
Now a series, meaning, repetition ...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA:
In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may already result in such a big amount,
on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of overt or," to read, therefore: "or
conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as." Remove the idea of necessitating "a series." Anyway, the
criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TAÑADA:
That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT:
Probably two or more would be ....
SENATOR MACEDA:
Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TAÑADA:
Accepted, Mr. President ....
THE PRESIDENT:
If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say "acts of plunder" there
should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO:
In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration
provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g.,raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d),subpar. (1),and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the
National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d),subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a "series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration
found in Sec. 1, par. (d),say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d),subpar.
(1).Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in
specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par.
(d),and Sec. 2 —
....under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d).Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed
towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass,accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth.And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As
commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the
principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him, follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the
alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt
or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the
circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various
ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness
that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of
legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e.,that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects — it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. 10 But the doctrine does not apply as against
legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that
31
are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge
may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities. 11 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where
the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to
the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. 12 It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner
seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly
delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially
where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes. ESCacI
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the
allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity —
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law." 13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.'' 14
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling
effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute
drawn with narrow specificity." 15The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished
is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to
fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws
against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing
the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not
recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." 16 In Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 17 the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which,
by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason,
it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." 18 As for the vagueness
doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A
plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to
the conduct of others.'' 19
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their
faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made
to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to
whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might
also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." 20 As has
been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce
facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a
particular defendant.'' 21 Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder
Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied
to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. 22 It constitutes a departure from the case
and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and
in sterile abstract contexts. 23 But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris 24
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these
deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief
sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes, ...ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions,
whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort," 25 and is generally disfavored. 26 In determining the constitutionality of a statute,
therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct
with which the defendant is charged. 27
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length
by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish
32
support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with
reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and
validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted
for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason
of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan 28 must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are loathed to
declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable
construction that will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par.
(e),of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly
imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness,
Sec. 3, par. (e),violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued
that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b)
giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while
in the discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated
because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e),of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional
defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different
modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e),of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information
does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster,
Third International Dictionary, p. 2514);or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US
Dept. of Justice,C.D. Pa.,405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative
Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act
of the public officer in:
. . . or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence, . . . (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in
the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or
preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e),of The Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection
thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of
overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy —
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence.— For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and
every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused
always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating
by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. 29 The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is
indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of
criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important
in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal
offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted
stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. 30The following exchanges between
Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating —
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO:
Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the
information, does that not work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by
falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is P100 million since there is
malversation, bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA:
Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.What is required to
be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is
33
an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information — three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry.
These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which
he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two.Now, what
is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO:
I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very important,
I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery,he was able
to accumulate only P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when
we add the totality of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence,
it is just one single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA:
With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove that
element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved
is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount
would be P110 or P120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the
amounts involved in those transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions,
proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder (emphasis supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder.
The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that
provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series
which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged
in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids
on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids
beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00. 31
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern
arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d).Pattern is merely a by-
product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation
for a combination or series of overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill gotten wealth. The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily
follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts. DaHISE
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the crime
of plunder";and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the
accused cannot be convicted of plunder —
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:
In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of
Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN:
In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:
In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you
not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN:
Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:
Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN:
Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law ....
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:
What I said i — do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged
constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN:
Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive element
of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:
But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do not have
to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN:
Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be
avoided by the prosecution. 32
34
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec.
2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d),and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence — For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder ....
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure,
Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means
to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the
prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner,
it may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on
evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause —
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. — If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is
held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances
shall not be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its provisions,
assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other,
especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he
says, in his Concurring Opinion —
...Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for
plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully,
unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the
statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAÑADA
...And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual criminal act
but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder. 33
However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO:
And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view,
would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAÑADA:
Yes, Mr. President ... 34
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal
act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must
be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown. IaECcH
Indeed, §2 provides that —
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the
crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal
Code, shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-
Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender
is determined by his criminal intent. It is true that §2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in
the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does
not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities
about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing
laws as saying what they obviously mean." 35
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the
affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of
heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:36
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either
because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely
disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being ....Seen in this light, the capital crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped,
tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving
minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide,
infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or
serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor,
robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver
35
or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are
clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject
criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be
struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses.Reeling from decades of corrupt
tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government
must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality
that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the
government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of
government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous
are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug
offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to
cause further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the
acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se 37 and it does not matter that such acts are
punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it
would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing
Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however
that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray 38 to
the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the
State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its very foundation.
The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentless]y contrive more and
more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated,
extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to
disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume
the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate
this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the amount of interest
and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute.
This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call
for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL.
Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Buena and De Leon, Jr.,JJ.,concur.
Mendoza, J., files separate concurring opinion.
Davide, Jr.,C.J.,Melo, Puno, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ.,concur with the opinion of Justice Mendoza.
Panganiban, J.,files separate concurring opinion.
Kapunan, Pardo, Ynares-Santiago and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., file separate dissenting opinions.
Carpio, J.,took no part as he was one of complainants before Ombudsman.
||| (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, [November 19, 2001], 421 PHIL 290-515)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148965. February 26, 2002.]
JOSE "JINGGOY" E. ESTRADA, petitioner,vs.SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION),PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
Saguisag Carao & Associates and Jose B. Flaminiano for petitioner.
The Sandiganbayan for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
As an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against former President Estrada, five criminal complaints against him and
members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman. One of the
informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner, then Mayor of
San Juan, Metro Manila. The case was assigned to respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash or
Suspend" the amended information on the ground that the Anti-Plunder Lawwas unconstitutional and that it charged more than one
offense. The Ombudsman opposed the motion. The petitioner filed several other motions. Thereafter, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash and very urgent omnibus motion, as well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration. In this
petition, the petitioner questioned the decision of the Sandiganbayan for not declaring unconstitutional the Anti-Plunder Law. Petitioner
36
also claimed that he was denied substantive due process when the charge against him was sustained. He also faulted the Sandiganbayan for
not fixing bail for his release from confinement. CaDATc
The Supreme Court ruled that the constitutionality of the Anti-Plunder Law has been settled in the case of Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan.It also ruled that the time to assail the finding of probable cause by the Ombudsman had long passed and the issue cannot
be resurrected in this petition. According to the Supreme Court, the allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with
the adequacy of evidence that may be required proving it. In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the amended information alleged in
general terms how the accused committed the crime of plunder. The use of the words "in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused" in
the said information was sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused with the former President in committing the crime of plunder. As
to the question of bail, the Supreme Court ruled that it is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter required evidentiary
hearing that should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The records did not show that evidence on petitioner's guilt was presented before
the lower court. Upon proper motion of the petitioner, the Sandiganbayan should conduct hearing to determine if the evidence of
petitioner's guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to petitioner. The petition was dismissed for failure to show that respondent
Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; ANTI-PLUNDER LAW (R.A. No. 7080); "ON SEVERAL INSTANCES"; TERM SYNONYMOUS WITH "SERIES" OR
"COMBINATION" AS USED UNDER THE LAW; RATIONALE. — Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of
the Amended Information which is of "receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances,money in the aggregate amount of
P545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit ...." In this sub-
paragraph (a),petitioner,in conspiracy with former President Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving or collecting money from illegal
gambling amounting to P545 million. Contrary to petitioner's posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal
gambling "on several instances." The phrase "on several instances" means the petitioner committed the predicate act in series. To insist that
the Amended Information charged the petitioner with the commission of only one act or offense despite the phrase "several instances" is
to indulge in a twisted, nay, "pretzel" interpretation. It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words "combination" or
"series" as they appear in R.A. No. 7080. For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,we held that where these two terms are to be taken in their
popular, not technical, meaning, the word "series" is synonymous with the clause "on several instances." "Series" refers to a repetition of
the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1 (d) of the law. The word "combination" contemplates the commission of at least any
two different predicate acts in any of said items. Plainly, sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information charges petitioner with plunder
committed by a series of the same predicate act under Section 1 (d) (2) of the law.
2. ID.; ID.; PURPOSE FOR ENACTMENT THEREOF. — A study of the history of RA. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to
avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regime where
charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government prosecutors found no
appropriate law to deal with the multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the former President to acquire illegal
wealth.They also found that under the then existing laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other
special laws, the acts involved different transactions, different time and different personalities. Every transaction constituted a separate
crime and required a separate case and the over-all conspiracy had to be broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The
preparation of multiple Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent cases were filed
against practically the same accused before the Sandiganbayan. R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law was enacted precisely to address this
procedural problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 733, viz:"Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt
terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of
acts done not in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and
which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation
of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national
economy.The above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a
safeguard against the possible recurrence of the depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to
succumb to the corrupting influence of power."
3. ID.;ID.;NATURE THEREOF. — There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to
the national economy" is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be
united by a common purpose.In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality — to help the
former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different
participation of each accused in the conspiracy. Thegravamen of the conspiracy charge,therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive
protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS
and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from
commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.
4. ID.;ID.;CONSPIRACY; CONSTRUED. — Under Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. As a general rule,
conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy
to commit treason, rebellion and sedition. In contrast, under American criminal law, the agreement or conspiracy itself is the gravamen of
the offense.The essence of conspiracy is the combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful
purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means. Its elements are: agreement to accomplish an
illegal objective, coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose; and requisite intent necessary to commit the
underlying substantive offense. When conspiracy is alleged as a crime in itself, the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging
the offense is governed by Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
37
5. ID.;ID.;ID.;AS A MODE OF COMMITTING THE OFFENSE; ALLEGATIONS IN THE INFORMATION NEED NOT BE IN DETAIL;
RATIONALE. — The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the
mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar.There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy
is not the gravamen of the offense charged.The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the
conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime. The liability of the
conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others, for the act of one is the act of all. In People
v. Quitlong,we ruled on how conspiracy as the mode of committing the offense should be alleged in the Information. Again, following the
stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in either of the following
manner:(1) by use of the word "conspire," or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of
basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended, and with such
precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. The allegation of
conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it.A conspiracy is proved
by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of
sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it. A statement of this evidence is not necessary in the information.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION; ALLEGATIONS THEREIN MUST STATE THE ELEMENTS
OF OFFENSE CHARGED AND SPECIFY QUALIFYING AND AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES. — The complaint or information to be sufficient
must state the name of the accused, designate the offense given by statute, state the acts or omissions constituting the offense,the name
of the offended party, the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense was committed. Our rulings
have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense should be made in order to meet the standard of sufficiency.
Thus, the offense must be designated by its name given by statute or by reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
The information must also state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. The
acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it
does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information.
What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the
specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. ECSHAD
7. ID.; ID.; BAIL HEARINGS; WHEN REQUIRED; CASE AT BAR. — The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by
Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is strong. Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure is based on Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads: "Sec. 13.All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusis
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required." The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on
the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong.This requires that the trial court conduct bail hearings wherein both
the prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient opportunity to present their respective evidence. The burden of proof lies with the
prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt.
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
A law may not be constitutionally infirm but its application to a particular party may be unconstitutional. This is the submission of
the petitioner who invokes the equal protection clause of theConstitution in his bid to be excluded from the charge of plunder filed against
him by the respondent Ombudsman.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President of the Republic
of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President and members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators
were filed with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution 1 finding probable cause warranting the filing with the
Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former President and the other respondents therein. One of the Informations
was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, then
mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, the case was assigned to
respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The arraignment of the accused was set on July 10, 2001 and no bail for petitioner's
provisional liberty was fixed.
On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash or Suspend" the Amended Information on the ground that the Anti-Plunder
Law, R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense. Respondent Ombudsman opposed the motion.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-accused. On its basis, petitioner and
his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.
On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion" 2 alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put him on trial
and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a "series or combination of
overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded
38
from the Amended Information and be discharged from custody. In the alternative, petitioner also prayed that he be allowed to post bail in
an amount to be fixed by respondent court. 3
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada's Motion To Fix Bail On Grounds That An
Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable
Offense As To Him." 4
On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Strike Out So-Called 'Entry of Appearance,' To Direct Ombudsman To Explain Why
He Attributes Impropriety To The Defense And To Resolve Pending Incidents." 5
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner's "Motion to Quash and Suspend" and "Very
Urgent Omnibus Motion." 6 Petitioner's alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing after arraignment of all accused. The court held:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES for lack of merit the following: (1) MOTION
TO QUASH AND SUSPEND dated April 24, 2001 filed by accused Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada; (2) MOTION TO QUASH dated
June 7, 2001 filed by accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada; and (3) MOTION TO QUASH (Re: Amended Information dated 18
April 2001) dated June 26, 2001 filed by accused Edward S. Serapio.
Considering the denial of the MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND of accused Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, his VERY
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION, praying that he be: (1) dropped from the information for plunder for want of probable
cause and (2) discharged from custody immediately which is based on the same grounds mentioned in this MOTION TO
QUASH AND SUSPEND is hereby DENIED. Let his alternative prayer in said OMNIBUS MOTION that he be allowed to post
bail be SET for hearing together with the petition for bail of accused Edward S. Serapio scheduled for July 10, 2001, at
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon after the arraignment of all the accused." 7
The following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. Respondent court denied the motion
and proceeded to arraign petitioner. Petitioner refused to make his plea prompting respondent court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for
him. 8
Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in: ISCaTE
"1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and, as applied to petitioner, and denying
him the equal protection of the laws;
2) not holding that the Plunder Law does not provide complete and sufficient standards;
3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with which and
with whom he is not even remotely connected — contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious
— results in the denial of substantive due process;
4) not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in one count of the information which
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment totally in defiance of the principle of proportionality." 9
We shall resolve the arguments of petitioner in seriatim.
I.
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him and denies him the equal protection
of the laws. 10
The contention deserves our scant attention. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law, has been settled in the
case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.11 We take off from the Amended Information which charged petitioner, together with former President
Joseph E. Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Yolanda T. Ricaforte and others, with the crime of plunder as follows:
"AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC- Director, EPIB Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses
former PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' AND a.k.a. 'JOSE
VELARDE',together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES &
Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under RA. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659,
committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING
THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY,
RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER
PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE,did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate
and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL
VALUE ofFOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17],more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO
PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,through ANY OR A combination OR A series of
overt ORcriminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS,described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00),MORE OR LESS,
FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY
39
FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE

'ATONG' ANG,Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AN (sic) JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES,in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING,RECEIVING,misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,for HIS
OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00],more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED
MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur
under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie 'Atong'
Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane
Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT,the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS,and the
Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE
CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION
NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESO [P744,612,450.00],RESPECTIVELY, OR A
TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,847,578,057.50];AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES
BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00],MORE OR LESS,
FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI
BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,in the
amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME
"JOSE VELARDE" AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001" 12
Petitioner's contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is principally perched on the premise that the
Amended Information charged him with only one act or one offense which cannot constitute plunder. He then assails the denial of his right
to bail.
Petitioner's premise is patently false. A careful examination of the Amended Information will show that it is divided into three (3)
parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former President Joseph E. Estrada with the crime of plunder together with petitioner Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte and others; (2) the second paragraph spells out in general terms how the
accused conspired in committing the crime of plunder; and (3) the following four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate
acts constitutive of the crime of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) ofR.A. No. 7080, and state the names of the accused who committed
each act.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which is of "receiving or
collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances,money in the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of
gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit ...." In this sub-paragraph (a), petitioner,in conspiracy with former
President Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling amounting to P545 million. Contrary to
petitioner's posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal gambling "on several instances." The phrase "on several
instances" means the petitioner committed the predicate act in series.To insist that the Amended Information charged the petitioner with
the commission of only one act or offense despite the phrase "several instances" is to indulge in a twisted, nay, "pretzel" interpretation.
It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words "combination" or "series" as they appear in R.A. No. 7080.
For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,13 we held that where these two terms are to be taken in their popular, not technical, meaning, the word
"series" is synonymous with the clause "on several instances." "Series" refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in
Section 1 (d) of the law. The word "combination" contemplates the commission of at least any two different predicate acts in any of said
items. Plainly, sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information charges petitioner with plunder committed by a series of the same predicate
act under Section 1 (d) (2) of the law.
Similarly misleading is petitioner's stand that in the Ombudsman Resolution of April 4, 2001 finding probable cause to charge him
with plunder together with the other accused, he was alleged to have received only the sum of P2 million, which amount is way below the
minimum of P50 million required under R.A. No. 7080. The submission is not borne out by the April 4, 2001 Resolution of the Ombudsman,
recommending the filing of charges against petitioner and his co-accused, which in pertinent part reads:
"xxx xxx xxx
Respondent Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, the present Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, appears to have also
surreptitious collection of protection money from jueteng operations in Bulacan. This is gleaned from the statements of
40
Gov. Singson himself and the fact that Mayor Estrada, on at least two occasions,turned over to a certain Emma Lim, an
emissary of the respondent governor, jueteng haul totalling P2 million,i.e.,P1 million in January, 2000 and another P1
million in February, 2000. An alleged "listahan" of jueteng recipients listed him as one "Jingle Bell," as affirmed by
Singson [TSN 8 & Dec. 2000 SICt/17 Oct. 2000 SBRC/SCI]." 14
Hence, contrary to the representations of the petitioner, the Ombudsman made the finding that P2 million was delivered to
petitioner as "jueteng haul" on "at least two occasions." The P2 million is, therefore, not the entire sum with which petitioner is specifically
charged. This is further confirmed by the conclusion of the Ombudsman that:
"xxx xxx xxx
It is clear that Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in confabulation with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio and
Yolanda Ricaforte, demanded and received, as bribe money, the aggregate sum of P545 million from jueteng collections
of the operators thereof, channeled thru Gov. Luis 'Chavit' Singson, in exchange for protection from arrest or
interference by law enforcers; ...." 15
To be sure, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to argue that the Ombudsman failed to establish any probable cause against
him for plunder. The respondent Sandiganbayan itself has found probable cause against the petitioner for which reason it issued a warrant
of arrest against him. Petitioner then underwent arraignment and is now on trial. The time to assail the finding of probable cause by the
Ombudsman has long passed. The issue cannot be resurrected in this petition.
II.
Next, petitioner contends that "the plunder law does not provide sufficient and complete standards to guide the courts in dealing
with accused alleged to have contributed to the offense." 16 Thus, he posits the following questions:
"For example, in an Information for plunder which cites at least ten criminal acts, what penalty do we impose
on one who is clearly involved in only one such criminal act? Is it reclusion perpetua? Or should it be a lesser penalty?
What if another accused is shown to have participated in three of the ten specifications, what would be the penalty
imposable, compared to one who may have been involved in five or seven of the specifications? The law does not provide
the standard or specify the penalties and the courts are left to guess. In other words, the courts are called to say what
the law is rather than to apply what the lawmaker is supposed to have intended." 17
Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he labors hard under the impression that: (1) he is charged with only one act or
offense and (2) he has not conspired with the other accused named in sub-paragraphs (b) to (d) of the Amended Information, ergo,the
penalty imposable on him ought to be different from reclusion perpetua to death. R.A. No. 7080, he bewails, is cloudy on the imposable
penalty on an accused similarly situated as he is. Petitioner, however, overlooks that the second paragraph of the Amended Information
charges him to have conspired with former President Estrada in committing the crime of plunder. His alleged participation consists in the
commission of the predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information. If these allegations are proven, the penalty of
petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be no different from that of the former President for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the
other. The imposable penalty is provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, viz:
"Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death.Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of
an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties,
the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised
Penal Code, shall be considered by the court."
III.
Petitioner also faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for "sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses and with
alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected — contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is
personal, not vicarious — results in the denial of substantive due process." 18
The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand, that petitioner is charged not only with the predicate act in sub-paragraph (a) but
also with the other predicate acts in sub-paragraphs (b),(c) & (d) because he is indicted as a principal and as co-conspirator of the former
President. This is purportedly clear from the first and second paragraphs of the Amended Information. 19
For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended Information vis-a-vis the provisions of R.A. No.
7080.
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other co-accused with the crime of plunder. The
first paragraph names all the accused, while the second paragraph describes in general how plunder was committed and lays down most of
the elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts that constitute the crime and name in
particular the co-conspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs
correspond to the items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several
instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as
one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense
described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving
or misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense described in
item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead names other conspirators
of the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts — that of ordering the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
and the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions from such
41
purchase from the Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the "Jose Velarde" account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two
predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the former President in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act that the former President unjustly enriched
himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his account name
"Jose Velarde" at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No.
7080. CEDHTa
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d),thru
their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information is worded,however, it is not certain whether the accused in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of
clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as related in the
second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d).We hold that petitioner can be held
accountableonly for the predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were
allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including the predicate acts alleged in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in one, and not in four, separate Informations. A study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will
show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the
aftermath of the Marcos regime where charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President Marcos and his alleged
cronies. Government prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the
former President to acquire illegal wealth.20 They also found that under the then existing laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved different transactions, different time and different personalities. Every
transaction constituted a separate crime and required a separate case and the over-all conspiracy had to be broken down into several criminal
and graft charges.The preparation of multiple Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent
cases were filed against practically the same accused before the Sandiganbayan. 21 R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law 22 was enacted
precisely to address this procedural problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 733, viz:
"Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes
the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the public eye but in stealth
and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many states
and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of
public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage
to the national economy.The above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to
come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the possible recurrence of the depravities of the previous regime and
as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting influence of power."
There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy" is made
up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose.In
the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality — to help the former President amass, accumulate
or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the
conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge,therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal
gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of
Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and
kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation
and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.
In the American jurisdiction,the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves two structures: (1) the
so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the "hub") dealing individually with two or more other
persons or groups (the "spokes");and (2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which
there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer
and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. 23
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a "wheel" conspiracy. The hub is former President
Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the spokes is the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e.,the
amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
IV.
Some of our distinguished colleagues would dismiss the charge against the petitioner on the ground that the allegation of
conspiracy in the Amended Information is too general. The fear is even expressed that it could serve as a net to ensnare the innocent. Their
dissents appear to be inspired by American law and jurisprudence.
We should not confuse our law on conspiracy with conspiracy in American criminal law and in common law. Under Philippine law,
conspiracy should be understood on two levels. As a general rule, conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only
when the law fixes a penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and sedition. In contrast, under American
criminal law, the agreement or conspiracy itself is the gravamen of the offense.24 The essence of conspiracy is the combination of two or
more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by
criminal or unlawful means. 25 Its elements are: agreement to accomplish an illegal objective, coupled with one or more overt acts in
furtherance of the illegal purpose; and requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying substantive offense. 26
42
A study of the United States Code ought to be instructive. It principally punishes two (2) crimes of conspiracy 27 — conspiracy to
commit any offense or to defraud the United States, and conspiracy to impede or injure officer. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud
the United States is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371,28 as follows:
"Sec. 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States.If two or more persons conspire either
to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner
or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons to any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the
punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor."
Conspiracy to impede or injure officer is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 372, viz:
"Sec. 372. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer.— If two or more persons in any State, Territory, Possession,
or District conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust
or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof, or to induce by like means any
officer of the United States to leave the place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to injure
him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful
discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his
official duties, each of such persons shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than six years, or both."
Section 371 of 18 U.S.C.punishes two acts: (1) conspiracy to commit any offense against the United States; and (2) conspiracy to
defraud the United States or any agency thereof. The conspiracy to "commit any offense against the United States" refers to an act made a
crime by federal laws. 29 It refers to an act punished by statute.30 Undoubtedly, Section 371 runs the whole gamut of U.S. Federal laws,
whether criminal or regulatory.31 These laws cover criminal offenses such as perjury, white slave traffic, racketeering, gambling, arson,
murder, theft, bank robbery, etc.and also include customs violations, counterfeiting of currency, copyright violations, mail fraud, lotteries,
violations of antitrust laws and laws governing interstate commerce and other areas of federal regulation. 32 Section 371 penalizes the
conspiracy to commit any of these substantive offenses. The offense of conspiracy is generally separate and distinct from the substantive
offense,33 hence, the court rulings that acquittal on the substantive count does not foreclose prosecution and conviction for related
conspiracy. 34
The conspiracy to "defraud the government" refers primarily to cheating the United States out of property or money. It also covers
interference with or obstruction of its lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest. 35 It
comprehends defrauding the United States in any manner whatever, whether the fraud be declared criminal or not. 36
The basic difference in the concept of conspiracy notwithstanding,a study of the American case law on how conspiracy should be
alleged will reveal that it is not necessary for the indictment to include particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes, in stating the
manner and means of effecting the object of the conspiracy.Such specificity of detail falls within the scope of a bill of particulars. 37 An
indictment for conspiracy is sufficient where it alleges: (1) the agreement; (2) the offense-object toward which the agreement was directed;
and (3) the overt acts performed in furtherance of the agreement. 38To allege that the defendants conspired is, at least, to state that they
agreed to do the matters which are set forth as the substance of their conspiracy. To allege a conspiracy is to allege an agreement. 39 The
gist of the crime of conspiracy is unlawful agreement, and where conspiracy is charged, it is not necessary to set out the criminal object with
as great a certainty as is required in cases where such object is charged as a substantive offense.40
In sum, therefore, there is hardly a substantial difference on how Philippine courts and American courts deal with cases challenging
Informations alleging conspiracy on the ground that they lack particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes. In our jurisdiction, as
aforestated, conspiracy can be alleged in the Information as a mode of committing a crime or it may be alleged as constitutive of the crime
itself. When conspiracy is alleged as a crime in itself, the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging the offense is governed by
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It requires that the information for this crime must contain the following
averments: DAEIHT
"Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.— A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name
of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense;the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information."
The complaint or information to be sufficient must state the name of the accused, designate the offense given by statute, state
the acts or omissions constituting the offense,the name of the offended party, the approximate date of the commission of the offense and
the place where the offense was committed.
Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense should be made in order to meet the
standard of sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be designated by its name given by statute or by reference to the section or subsection of
the statute punishing it. 41 The information must also state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. 42 The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. 43 No
information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. 44 Every element of
the offense must be stated in the information. 45 What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined
by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. 46The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the
information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. 47
43
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be set forth in the
complaint or information.For example, the crime of "conspiracy to commit treason" is committed when, in time of war, two or more persons
come to an agreement to levy war against the Government or to adhere to the enemies and to give them aid or comfort, and decide to
commit it. 48 The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender owes allegiance to the Government of the Philippines; (2) that there is a
war in which the Philippines is involved; (3) that the offender and other person or persons come to an agreement to: (a) levy war against
the government, or (b) adhere to the enemies, to give them aid and comfort; and (4) that the offender and other person or persons decide
to carry out the agreement. These elements must be alleged in the information.
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode
of committing the crime as in the case at bar.There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not
the gravamen of the offense charged.The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the
conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime. 49 The liability of the
conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others, 50 for the act of one is the act of
all. 51 In People v. Quitlong,52 we ruled on how conspiracy as the mode of committing the offense should be alleged in the Information, viz:
"....In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and
circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare
for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that
of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to during
trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute
criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless
of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of the
crime.Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes
of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others (People v.Ilano,313 SCRA 442).Verily, an
accused must know from the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the
acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the details
thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common design or the
facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe
conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the
indictment contains a statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language,
with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction
to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient "if it
follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the offense he is charged with
conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect
the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the respective
statutes defining them (15A C.J.S. 842-844).
xxx xxx xxx
....Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit
the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it. Verily, the information must state that the accused have confederated to
commit the crime or that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony
among the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words "conspired" or "confederated" or
the phrase "acting in conspiracy," must aptly appear in the information in the form of definitive acts constituting
conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of design among the
accused must be conveyed such as either by the use of the term "conspire" or its derivatives and synonyms or by
allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on
which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of
evidence that may be required to prove it.In establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it
need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.
xxx xxx xxx."
Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense
in either of the following manner:(1) by use of the word "conspire," or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive,
collude, etc;53 or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would
know what is intended, and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based
on the same facts. 54
The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove
it.A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted
action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it. 55 A statement of this evidence is not necessary in the
information.
In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in general terms how the accused committed the
crime of plunder.It used the words "in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused." Following the ruling in Quitlong,these words are
sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused with the former President in committing the crime of plunder.
44
V.
We now come to petitioner's plea for bail. On August 14, 2002, during the pendency of the instant petition before this Court,
petitioner filed with respondent Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons." Petitioner prayed that he be
allowed to post bail due to his serious medical condition which is life-threatening to him if he goes back to his place of detention. The motion
was opposed by respondent Ombudsman to which petitioner replied.
For three days, i.e.,on September 4, 20 and 27, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion for bail. Dr.
Roberto V. Anastacio, a cardiologist of the Makati Medical Center, testified as sole witness for petitioner.
On December 18, 2001, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court an "Urgent Motion for Early/Immediate Resolution of Jose
'Jinggoy' Estrada's Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations." Petitioner reiterated the motion for bail he earlier filed with
respondent Sandiganbayan. 56
On the same day, we issued a Resolution referring the motion to respondent Sandiganbayan for resolution and requiring said court
to make a report, not later than 8:30 in the morning of December 21, 2001.
On December 21, 2001, respondent court submitted its Report. Attached to the Report was its Resolution dated December 20,
2001 denying petitioner's motion for bail for "lack of factual basis." 57Basing its finding on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio, the
Sandiganbayan found that petitioner "failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince the court that the medical condition of the accused
requires that he be confined at home and for that purpose that he be allowed to post bail." 58
The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659, with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are non-bailable when the
evidence of guilt is strong, to wit:
"Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.— No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution." 59
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
reads:
"Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required."
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue of whether or not the evidence
of guilt of the accused is strong.This requires that the trial court conduct bail hearings wherein both the prosecution and the defense are
afforded sufficient opportunity to present their respective evidence. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong evidence
of guilt. 60
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter requires evidentiary hearing that should be conducted
by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent court based its Resolution of December 20, 2001 involved the reception of medical
evidence only and which evidence was given in September 2001, five months ago. The records do not show that evidence on petitioner's
guilt was presented before the lower court.
Upon proper motion of the petitioner, respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to determine if the evidence of
petitioner's guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,C.J.,Bellosillo, Melo, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr.,JJ., concur.
Vitug, J.,please see Separate Opinion.
Kapunan and Buena, JJ.,join Justices Santiago and Gutierrez in their separate dissenting opinions.
Ynares-Santiago, J.,pls. see separate Dissenting Opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez J.,please see my Dissent.
Carpio, J.,took no part as before.
||| (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, [February 26, 2002], 427 PHIL 820-912)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 169251. December 20, 2006.]
DEMIE L. URIARTE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Sandiganbayan in A.R. No. 058 and its Resolution 2 denying the motion for
partial reconsideration thereof. The assailed decision affirmed with modification the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cantilan,
Surigao del Sur, Branch 41, convicting petitioner Demie L. Uriarte for violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019.
Petitioner was the Municipal Assessor of the Municipality of Carrascal, Surigao del Sur. In 1948, Joventino Correos declared for taxation
purposes a .9434-hectare parcel of land under Tax Declaration (TD) No. 3352. 4 The pertinent entries read:
Location: Batong, Carrascal, Surigao
Area: .9434 hectares
45
Boundaries:
North: Carrascal River;
South: Maximo Leva and Botong Rill;
East: Botong Creek;
West: Carrascal River
In 1974, TD No. 3352 was cancelled by TD No. 5249. 5 In 1980, the previous tax declaration was "revised" by TD No. 116, 6 where the entry
pertaining to the location of the property was changed from "Batong, Carrascal, Surigao del Sur" to "(S) Botong, (B) Doyos, Carrascal, Surigao
del Sur." In 1985, TD No. 116 was cancelled by TD No. 121, 7 where the boundaries of the property were also changed, as follows:
Boundaries:
North: Carrascal River
South: Botong Rill
East: Botong Creek
West: Antioco Uriarte
TD No. 121 thus contained significant "revisions." The subsequent tax declarations, however, no longer contained alterations: TD No.
132 8 which canceled T.D. No. 121; ARP No. 93-08-00344 9 in 1994; and ARP No. 96-08-00349 10 in 1997. However, in ARP No. 96-08-
00328 11 filed in 2000, the entries in the original tax declaration — TD No. 3352 — were restored.
Meantime, in 1954, Antioco Uriarte, petitioner's father, declared a two-hectare lot for taxation purposes under TD No. 4642. 12 The pertinent
entries are the following:
Area: 2 hectares
Location: Doot, Poblacion, Carrascal, Surigao
Boundaries:
South: Maximo Leva;
East: Botong Rill;
West: Maximo Leva and Carrascal River
In 1974, TD No. 4642 was canceled by TD No. 1534, 13 and the entries regarding the boundaries of the property were also altered. 14 In 1980,
TD No. 1534 was cancelled by TD No. 243, 15 where "Embarcadero" was inserted on the entry pertaining to the location of the property. In
1985 TD No. 243 was canceled by TD No. 247. 16 This time, the area of the property was changed from two (2) to three (3) hectares, and the
boundary in the east became "Joventino Correos." The subsequent tax declarations, TD No. 270 17 which canceled TD No. 247 and ARP No. 96-
09-00290 18 effective 1997, did not contain any further alterations. Thus, the "boundaries" of the lot became aSAHCE
South: Pantaleon Cervantes;
East: Joventino Correos;
West: Maximo Leva
The above alterations were allegedly committed by petitioner when she was the Municipal Assessor and Deputy Provincial Assessor of
Carrascal, Surigao del Sur. On May 21, 1999, Evelyn Arpilleda, through counsel, sent a letter 19 informing petitioner of the alterations that had
been made on the tax declarations of her predecessor, Joventino Correos. She requested that the "erroneous and prejudicial entries" be
rectified.
Petitioner complied with the request. Thus, in ARP No. 96-08-00328, the original entries were restored.
On July 5, 1999, Arpilleda, through counsel, sent a letter 20 to the Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) stating the alleged unlawful acts of
petitioner in altering the tax declarations of Joventino Correos and Antioco Uriarte. It was alleged that the alterations prejudiced her since they
became the basis of petitioner's "forceful and unlawful possession" of the subject property.
The Office of the Ombudsman requested Arpilleda to formalize the charges. 21 She later complied by filing a Sworn Complaint 22 dated August
19, 1999. Petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit, 23 to which Arpilleda filed her Reply-Affidavit 24 on October 28, 1999.
The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao later filed an Information 25 dated November 24, 1999 before the RTC 26 of Tandag, Surigao del Sur
against petitioner for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. 3019.
On December 15, 1999, the Administrative Officer of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tandag, Surigao del Sur forwarded 27 the entire
case record to the RTC of Cantilan, Surigao del Sur, Branch 41.
On March 13, 2000, private complainant, through counsel, filed a Motion to Suspend Pendente Lite, 28 alleging that the immediate suspension
of petitioner is proper in view of the provisions of R.A. 3019 and existing jurisprudence. 29
Petitioner was arraigned on March 14, 2000, and pleaded not guilty. On even date, the trial court ordered 30 his preventive suspension.
The case was then set for pre-trial and the parties submitted their respective pre-trial briefs. On June 15, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift
Order of Preventive Suspension, 31 pointing out that he had already served three months' suspension. The trial court granted the motion on
June 16, 2000. 32
On October 2, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. 33 He claimed that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case because in the first place, the special prosecution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao had no authority to file the
information. To support his claim, petitioner cited Uy v. Sandiganbayan, 34 where it was held that the authority to file the corresponding
information before the RTC rests in the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, and that the latter exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The trial court provisionally dismissed35 the case and ordered the cancellation of petitioner's bail bond.
On July 12, 2001, the private prosecutor moved to reinstate the case, 36 claiming that the Supreme Court likewise declared in a Resolution
in Uy v. Sandiganbayan 37 that the Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation, and to prosecute all criminal
46
cases involving public employees — not only those involving public officers within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those within
the jurisdiction of the regular courts. DcTaEH
On November 6, 2001, the trial court ordered the case reinstated. Since the bail bond of petitioner had been cancelled, the trial court further
ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner posted bail.
Private complainant filed a Reservation to File Civil Action 38 which the trial court granted in an Order 39 dated March 15, 2002. She likewise
filed a Manifestation and/or Motion for Inhibition, 40 which was however denied in an Order 41 dated July 3, 2002.
Trial on the merits ensued, and the prosecution presented the following witnesses: private complainant Arpilleda, who testified that petitioner,
as Municipal Assessor, took advantage of his position and caused changes in the location and boundaries of various tax declarations of
Joventino Correos and Antioco Uriarte, and that these changes were designed to promote petitioner's own interest, thus causing damage and
prejudice to her and her co-heirs; 42 Tremy Correos who corroborated private complainant's testimony, specifically on the damage they
sustained when petitioner evicted them from the land they had been occupying; 43 Richard Paniamogan who, as barangay captain of
Embarcadero, issued a certification that Botong is located in that barangay and testified thereon; 44 Charmelinda A. Yañez, then the provincial
assessor who testified on the limitations of the powers of the municipal assessor; 45 SPO2 Saturnino Cubero, whose testimony was, however,
dispensed with in view of the parties' admission of the copy of the police blotter on the alleged eviction of private complainant and her co-heirs
from the lot; 46 and Carlito A. Ladroma who likewise testified that Botong is part of barangay Embarcadero. 47
On the other hand, the defense presented four (4) witnesses, namely: Leovino Constantino, an employee of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources who testified that the land covered by the subject tax declarations had not been surveyed and no title had been issued
by the City Environment and Natural Resources Office; 48 Florida Coma who was once the barangay captain of Barangay Embarcadero and
testified that Sitio or Purok Doot, Pelong belongs to Barangay Embarcadero, while Botong belongs to Barangay Doyos; 49 and Gaudiosa
Tolentino who testified on the creation of barangays Embarcadero and Doyos as well as the existing sitios. 50
Petitioner, for his part, admitted that he had made changes on the tax declarations. He however justified the changes, stating that they were
the result of the general revision made in 1978. He also claimed that as municipal assessor, he has absolute authority to determine
the barangay to which a particular property belongs. He further asserted that the prosecution failed to cite any law that prohibits a municipal
assessor from making revisions on (a) the location of the property according to barangay; (b) the names of the adjoining owner; or (c) the
boundaries of the property. Petitioner likewise insisted that the case is civil and not criminal in nature. 51
Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to file Demurrer to Evidence 52 dated June 25, 2003. However, the trial court denied the motion in its
Order 53 dated August 1, 2003.
After the parties rested their respective cases, the RTC, on April 29, 2004, rendered a decision 54 convicting petitioner of violating Section 3(e)
of R.A. 3019. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds DEMIE URIARTE Y LIMGUANGCO, Municipal Assessor of Carrascal,
Surigao del Sur, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principal for violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act
3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, this Court imposes upon the accused the penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1)
MONTH to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY; perpetual disqualification from holding public office and forfeiture of all
retirement benefits or gratuity benefits under any law and in the event that such convicted officer, who may have
already been separated from the service, has already received such benefits shall be liable to restitute the same to the
government.
The bail bond put up by the accused for his temporary liberty is ordered cancelled. Accused shall serve his sentence at
the Davao Prison and Penal Farm, Panabo City, Davao del Norte pursuant to Circular No. 63-97 of the Supreme Court
dated October 6, 1997.
To pay the cost.
SO ORDERED. 55
On April 29, 2004, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal 56 to the Court of Appeals (CA), which was later withdrawn. 57 On May 6, 2004, petitioner
filed a Notice of Appeal 58 before the Sandiganbayan on the following grounds:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING DEMIE L. URIARTE FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 3(E) OF R.A. 3019 UNDER THE
INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT CHARGED (SIC) SUCH AN OFFENSE. SEDICa
II.
EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT (THAT) THE INFORMATION CHARGES THE OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF
SEC. 3 (E) OF R.A. 3019, STILL, THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED BASED ON FACTS NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AND NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
III.
ASSUMING FURTHER THAT THE INFORMATION CHARGED VIOLATION OF SEC. 3 (E) OF R.A. 3019, AGAIN, THE TRIAL
COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO SPECIFY,
QUANTIFY AND PROVE THE ELEMENT OF "UNDUE INJURY" PURSUANT TO THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT
IN LLORENTE V. SANDIGANAYAN (SIC) [G.R. NO. 122166. MARCH 11, 1998].
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PRESENT CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO OVERCOME THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS
OFFICIAL DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS AS MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR. 59
47
Petitioner averred that the prosecution failed to allege in the information any prohibited act which he had committed in the performance of his
official duties or in relation to his public position. He further averred that no mention was made of the injury caused to any party, which is
essential in a charge under Section 3(e), R.A. 3019; this violated his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against
him.60 Petitioner also claimed that the RTC erred in concluding that he had intended to dispossess private complainant of their property, since
this was not alleged in the information. 61 He pointed out that private complainant could not prove, much less impute, any undue injury
because the original entries in the tax declarations had already been restored. He also invoked the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official function as an additional ground.
On April 15, 2005, the Sandiganbayan affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC. 62 The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, this Court hereby finds no cogent reason to disturb or reverse, and
therefore AFFIRMS, the findings and conclusion of the trial court, with modification of the imposable penalty, such that
the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH
to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY and perpetual disqualification from holding public office. The clause "and forfeiture
of all retirement benefits or gratuity benefits under any law and in the event that such convicted officer, who may have
already been separated from the service, has already received such benefits shall be liable to restitute the same to the
government" is hereby ordered deleted.
SO ORDERED. 63
The anti-graft court held that all the elements of violation of the offense had been alleged in the information; the allegation that the appellant
willfully changed the location and boundaries of the subject properties was the prohibited act, while the element of undue injury was alleged in
the phrase "to the damage and prejudice of the said heirs." The facts that had not been alleged in the information were evidentiary matters.
As to the prosecution's alleged failure to specify the element of undue injury, the anti-graft court held that the injury caused by petitioner was
not in terms of money but, on the part of private complainant, the deprivation of three-fourths of her property. Lastly, the court held that
under the General Instructions Governing the Conduct and Procedures in the General Revision of Real Property Assessment, 64 the municipal
assessor had no discretion to change the entries in tax declarations. Moreover, the failure of petitioner to notify Joventino Correos of the
changes in the entries defies the provision therein that owners should participate in the revision. Lastly, the presumption of regularity has been
overcome by petitioner's unilateral act of restoring the original boundaries and location of the property owned by Joventino Correos. cAaETS
Petitioner comes before this Court on the following issues:
I. CAN AN ACCUSED BE CONVICTED UNDER AN INFORMATION THAT CHARGES AN OFFENSE WHICH THE COURT
ADMITTED THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE AS A VIOLATION OF ANY LAW?
II. CAN AN ACCUSED BE CONVICTED OF VIOLATION OF SEC. 3 (E) OF R.A. 3019 BASED ON CONCLUSION OF FACTS MADE
BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT HE COMMITTED LANDGRABBING AND/OR DISPOSSESSING THE COMPLAINANT OF HER
PROPERTY, WHICH OFFENSES WERE NOT CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION? 65
The resolution of the issues raised by petitioner hinges on the interpretation of the elements of the crime of violation of Section 3(e), R.A. 3019,
in relation to the facts alleged in the information and those proven during trial. The provision reads:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices
or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
The essential elements of this crime have been enumerated in several cases 66 decided by this Court, as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
A perusal of the Information filed against petitioner shows that all these elements were sufficiently alleged, as correctly ruled upon by both the
RTC and Sandiganbayan. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That in 1993, and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Carrascal, Surigao del Sur, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused DEMIE L. URIARTE, a public officer being
the Municipal Assessor of Carrascal, Surigao del Sur, while in the performance of his official functions, committing the
offense in relation to office, taking advantage of his position, acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause the change of the location and boundaries of the property of
one Joventino Correos as indicated in Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 121 and 132 despite knowing fully well that in the
previously issued TD Nos. 3352 and 5249, of the same property state different location and boundaries and also, cause
the change of the location and boundaries of the property of his own father, Antioco Uriarte, particularly, to make it
appear that the property is adjacent to the property of Joventino Correos, in order to favor his own interest being an heir
of Antioco Uriarte and occupant of the land subject of the application of the heirs of Joventino Correos, to the damage
and prejudice of the said heirs. aDACcH
CONTRARY TO LAW. 67
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or
by culpa as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious or plain
inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. 68 "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also
48
palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill
will. 69 It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior
purposes. 70 "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act
in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar
as other persons may be affected. 71
From the evidence adduced by the parties, petitioner indeed acted with evident bad faith in making the alteration on the entries in the tax
declarations of both Joventino Correos and Antioco Uriarte. The fact of alteration is shown not only in the tax declarations presented in
evidence; petitioner also admitted that he made the alterations himself. Petitioner even attempted to justify his act by stating that such
changes were made pursuant to the General Instructions issued in 1978 for the general revision of tax declarations, and that he was authorized
to make the alterations because municipal assessors were mandated to identify the properties according to the barangay where the property is
located. Petitioner likewise justified his act of changing the boundaries of the property covered by the tax declarations of Joventino and
Antioco because of the alleged instruction that the boundaries should be designated using the name of the landowner.
Paragraph 28 of the General Instructions Governing the Conduct and Procedures in the General Revision of Real Property
Assessments 72 provides:
28) The boundaries which will appear in the field sheets shall be the name of persons, streets, rivers or natural
boundaries adjoining the property subject of revision. The technical descriptions of the land to be revised should not be
written down on the field sheets, not only to follow the prescribed form but also to avoid additional or unnecessary
typing costs. Tax declarations are issued for taxation purposes and they are not titles to lands. In case boundary conflict
arises, the parties can refer to the titles. 73
Thus, contrary to petitioner's contention that the boundaries should be designated only according to the names of persons, the provision
clearly allows the streets, rivers, and natural boundaries of the property to be placed on the tax declarations. Petitioner was aware of the
consequences of altering the entries in the tax declarations, particularly in the untitled properties. Petitioner's bad faith is further strengthened
by the fact that he did not inform Joventino Correos or the private complainant of the alterations, including his act of restoring the original
entries in the tax declarations. Assuming for the sake of argument that he was not motivated by ill will but merely committed a mistake in the
interpretation of the wording of the Instructions, petitioner's act is nevertheless unjustified. We cannot fathom why a municipal assessor would
think that the boundaries of a particular property should only be designated by persons' names. Even one of ordinary intelligence would know
that a property may be bounded by a street, a river, or a mountain. In any event, therefore, petitioner may still be considered guilty of
inexcusable negligence.
Petitioner contends that due to the prosecution's failure to cite any law that prohibits the municipal assessor from altering tax declarations, the
presumption is that he regularly performed his official duties. However, the very Instructions petitioner relies upon to justify his acts outlines
the limitations on the authority of municipal assessors to revise tax declarations. Paragraph 27 provides:
27) Utmost care should be taken that the full christian and surname appearing in the existing 1978 tax declaration must
exactly be the same christian and surname which has to be carried forward to the field sheets. For obvious reasons, no
transfer or change of ownership of real property be made by assessors or appraisers in the process of general revision.
The primary purpose of general revision is not to transfer or change ownership of property from one person to another
during the period of revision but to update or upgrade property values for real property taxation purposes. However, real
property declared for the first time shall be appraised and assessed for taxation purposes. Lands declared for the first
time shall be accepted provided the declaration is supported by corresponding certification of the Bureau of Forest
Development and the Bureau of Lands that the land so declared is in the alienable or disposable area (emphasis
supplied). aEHADT
The third element provides for the modalities in which the crime may be committed, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including
the Government; or (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. 74 The use of the disjunctive term "or"
connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), or as aptly held in Santiago v. Garchitorena, 75 as two (2) different modes of
committing the offense. This does not, however, indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, rather, that an accused may be charged
under either mode or under both.
We affirm the Sandiganbayan's finding that there was substantial compliance with the requirement. The wording of the information shows that
petitioner, in willfully changing the boundaries of the tax declarations of Joventino Correos and Antioco Uriarte, both caused undue injury to
private complainant and gave himself and his father unwarranted benefit. In jurisprudence, 76 "undue injury" is consistently interpreted as
"actual damage." Undue has been defined as more than necessary, not proper, or illegal; and injury as any wrong or damage done to another,
either in his person, rights, reputation or property, that is, the invasion of any legally protected interest of another. On the other hand,
in Gallego v. Sandiganbayan, 77 the Court ruled that unwarranted means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized; or
without justification or adequate reasons. Advantage means a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit or gain of any kind;
benefit from course of action. Preference signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another. 78
From the foregoing definitions, petitioner's act of altering the boundaries of the property in question as stated in the tax declaration clearly
falls under the very act punishable by Section 3(e), R.A. 3019.
It bears stressing that it is beyond the power of this Court to settle the issue of who, between petitioner and private complainant, has the
better right to own and possess the subject property. This Court has no jurisdiction over the issue, and the evidence presented is not sufficient
to make a definite determination of ownership. Suffice it to state that the alteration of the entries in the subject tax declarations, especially on
the boundaries of the property, caused undue injury to private complainant as an heir of Joventino Correos. The alteration substantially
changed the identity of the property. Considering that the property in question was not titled and no survey had yet been conducted to settle
49
the actual areas and boundaries of the properties, the tax declarations constitute important evidence of the declarant's possession and
ownership, though not conclusive.
Indeed, the alterations made by petitioner are too substantial to ignore. It was made to appear that petitioner's property is between the
Carrascal River and that of the private complainant. In the original tax declaration, no such property existed. The new entries in effect
"lessened" the area of private complainant's property, which would have been evident had the lot been surveyed. Moreover, the deletion of
the entry "Maximo Leva" in the south boundary of Joventino Correos' property was also prejudicial, since this alteration had the effect of
deleting the property entirely.
Petitioner in fact admitted that while he declared that the subject property was in the name of Joventino Correos, he was in possession
thereof; he later stated that the property in his possession was declared for taxation in the name of his father. 79 From this testimony, it can be
inferred that the identities of the properties in his possession, the lot in his father's name and that declared under Joventino Correos' name, are
not certain. DcaCSE
While tax declarations are indicia of a valid claim of ownership, they do not constitute conclusive evidence thereof. They are prima facie proofs
of ownership or possession of the property for which such taxes have been paid. Coupled with proof of actual possession of the property,
however, they may become the basis of a claim for ownership. 80 Moreover, a person who claims ownership of real property is duty bound to
clearly identify the land being claimed in accordance with the document on which he anchors his right of ownership. Proof of ownership
together with identity of the land is the basic rule. 81
It must be stressed that the alterations made by petitioner compromised the identity of the private complainant's property. The fact that
petitioner restored the original entries in the tax declarations is of no moment; restoration of the entries in the tax declaration is not one of
those enumerated under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code 82 as one of the ways by which to extinguish criminal liability. Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code applies in a suppletory character as provided for under Article 10 83 of the same Code. 84
Lastly, petitioner avers that he cannot be convicted on the basis of the court's conclusion of land-grabbing and dispossession as no such facts
have been alleged in the information.
We do not agree. It is evident from the decisions of both the RTC and the Sandiganbayan that petitioner was charged and convicted of violating
Section 3(e), R.A. 3019; he was not civilly held liable for dispossession of property or eviction. The anti-graft court correctly held that the finding
of the RTC — "that there was hidden intention on the part of the petitioner to grab and dispossess private complainant from their property" —
was merely descriptive of how petitioner acted with evident bad faith. There was thus no need for this matter to be alleged in the information.
It bears stressing that an information needs only to allege the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. 85 It must state only
the relevant facts, since the reason therefor could be proved during the trial. 86 Thus, an allegation of evident bad faith on the part of
petitioner is sufficient. The trial court correctly found that petitioner's hidden intention to grab the land of private complainant is a
manifestation of evident bad faith, which need not be further alleged in the information.
The penalty for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 is provided for in Section 9 of the law:
SECTION 9. Penalties for violations — (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or
omission enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than six years
and one month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in
favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and
other lawful income.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by special law, as in the present case, an indeterminate penalty shall be
imposed on the accused, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the law, and the minimum not less than the
minimum prescribed therein.
In view of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed the indeterminate prison term of six (6) years
and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated March 21, 2005 is
AFFIRMED. TCcSDE
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, C.J., retired as of December 7, 2006.
||| (Uriarte v. People, G.R. No. 169251, [December 20, 2006], 540 PHIL 477-502)

JUANITO T. MERENCILLO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Decision Corona, J P

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with spare tire, jack and tire

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24085 April 9, 1994 to One (1) unit AERO D

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Can petitioner be found guilty of Indirect Bribery?

The Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

So, it is not a combination?

FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE

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