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MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONER

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF BRAHMASTHAN
ORIGINAL WRIT JURISDICTION

PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION

UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF BRAHMASTHAN

WRIT PETITION NO: 333 OF 2019

The Brahmasthan Women's Rights Association
……...…PETITIONER(S)

Versus

The State of Rajputra and Ors. ..……RESPONDENT(S)

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND

HIS COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME
COURT OF BRAHMASTHAN

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 3
2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 4-6
3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 7
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 8,9
5. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 10
6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 11
7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED. 12-26
8. PRAYER 27

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

& And

AIR All India Reporter

Anr. Another

Art. Article

CEDAW The Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against

Women
CoB Constitution of Brahmasthan

Edn. Edition

HC High Court

Hon’ble Honourable

Ors. Others

P Paragraph

PIL Public Interest Litigation

S. Section

Sd/ Signed

Supp. Supplementary

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCR Supreme Court Reporter

V. Versus

Vol. Volume

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASE LAWS REFERRED

Sr. No. Case Laws Footnote
1. A.L.Kalara vs The Project & Equipment (1984) 3 SCR 646. 11

2. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981)1 SCC 722. 8

3. Anuj Garg & Ors vs Hotel Association Of India & Ors, (2008) 14
3 SCC 1.
4. B. Hasan Ali Khan v. Director of Higher Education, Andhra 9
Pradesh, (1987) 4 Reports 198 (AP).
5. Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors v. State Of Kerala & Ors, AIR 1987 SC 25
748.
6. Budhan Chowdhry v State of Bihar, (1955) 1 SCR 1045. 16
7. Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India & Ors., 1950 SCR 15
869.
8. Commissioner Of Police & Ors v. Acharya J. Avadhuta, (2004) 28
12 SCC 770.
9. Indian Young Lawyers Association vs The State Of Kerala, 12,19,26,29,
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 373 OF 2006. 30,34,35, 38
10. Janata Dal & Ors. v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors (1991) 3 SCR 752 4
11. K.K. Kochunni v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 725: 1959 Supp 1
(2) SCR 339.
12. Madhu Kishwar & Ors. Etc vs State Of Bihar, (1996) 5 SCC 13,18
125.
13. Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1. 36
14. N. Adithayan v. The Travancore Devaswom Board, (2002) 8 27
SCC 106.
15. Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India, Writ Petition (Criminal) 17, 23, 37
No. 76 of 2016.

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16. Rajiv Ranjan Singhlalan & Anr. v. Union Of India & Ors., 6
(2006) 205 CTR SC 512.
17. Ramesh Thaper v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124: 1950 2
SCR 594.
18. Riju Prasad Sarma Etc vs State Of Assam & Ors, (2015) 9 SCC 31
461.
19. S.P Gupta v. President of India, (1982) 2 SCR 365. 5
20. Sri Venkataramana Devaru & Ors.v. State of Mysore & Ors, 32
(1958) SCR 895.
21. State of Karnataka v Appa Balu Ingale, (1995) 4 SCC 469. 21
22. Sukhdev and Ors v. Bhagat Ram and Ors ., AIR 1975 SC 1331. 3
23. T.M.A.Pai Foundation & Ors vs State of Karnataka, (1995) 5 33
SCC 220.
24. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri 24,28
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954
SC 282.

STATUTES REFERRED
 The Constitution of India, 1950.
 The Travancore - Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950
 The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955.
 The Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act, 1965.
 The Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965.

CONVENTIONS REFERRED
 The Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW)

BOOKS REFERRED
 P.M. Bakshi, The Constitution of India, 15 (Universal Law Publishing, Haryana, 15th edn.,
2018).
 Women, Law and Free Legal Aid in India, Roma Mukherjee (1998).

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WEBSITES REFERRED
 Manupatra Online Resources, http://www.manupatra.com.
 Lexis Nexis Academica, http://www.lexisnexis.com/academica.
 Lexis Nexis Legal, http://www.lexisnexis.com/in/legal.
 SCC Online, http://www.scconline.co.in.
 Indian Kanoon, http://www.indiankanoon.com

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO: 333 OF 2019.

The petitioner has approached this Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution
of Brahmasthan.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

BACKGROUND
1. The State of Rajputra, situated in the south western part of Brahmasthan is a highly
populated state with diverse mix of culture, tradition and religion. A temple of great
antiquity, called 'The Satpura Kaliyugvardhan' is situated in the north eastern part of
Rajputra on the banks of river Satpura. The temple is also considered as 'religious
denomination' of its own and is renowned for lakhs and lakhs of pilgrims reaching
throughout the year to worship Lord Kalyugvardhan after undergoing 51 days strict
religious vows and penance while trying their maximum to help others, following celibacy,
teetotalism, controlling anger, and seeing everything around them as Lord Kaliyugvardhan.

2. 'The Satpura Kaliyugvardhan' is usually considered to be a staunch celibate god. There are
18-sacred steps that lead to the sanctum sanctorum. Rajputra women aged between 10 and
50, which is those who are in menstruating age are barred from entering the temple in
accordance to the Hindu traditions and customs. The Hindu Community of Rajputra
believes that if women of menstruating age visit the temple then it will destroy the sanctity
of the diety. The temple’s security staff and policemen restrict the women from entering
the temple.

3. According to the priests of the temple, this custom had to be followed for the welfare of the
temple and on violation, a "purification ceremony" at the 18-sacred steps that lead to the
sanctum sanctorum, was performed. The last ceremony took place in January 2010, after a
34-year-old woman almost climbed 18 steps which led to the 'sanctum sanctorum'.

CONTENTIONS

4. 'The Brahmasthan Women's Rights Association' approached the Supreme Court of

Brahmasthan seeking a direction to allow entry of women into 'The Satpura
Kaliyugvardhan' temple without age restrictions. It has also been claiming that the present
restriction on women's entry is a discrimination on the basis of sex and is a clear cut
violation of their fundamental rights enshrined under The Brahmasthan Constitution and
thus right to worship diety of once choice is being violated here by the Board. They also
contended that the discrimination which is prevailing in matters of entry into the temple

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was neither a ritual nor a ceremony associated with Hindu religion, as nowhere else in
Brahmasthan other than 'The Satpura Kaliyugvardhan' one can see such restriction which
is totally anti-Hindu.

5. 'The Satpura Kaliyugvardhan' Temple's Management Board, which maintains the board has
contended that the right to restrict the entry of women folks is protected under the The
Brahmasthan Constitution. They also stated that it is not possible for women to put up with
the days of celibacy like men and that the restriction is in accordance with a usage from
time immemorial and not discriminatory under the CoB.

6. 'The Brahmasthan Women's Rights Association' pleaded before the court to uphold the right
to equality that is being guaranteed by the Constitution of Brahmasthan by allowing the
entry of women of all age groups into 'The Satpura Kaliyugvardhan' temple. They also
claimed that there are certain news feeds to prove that there were few instances where
woman have entered the sanctum sanctorum of the temple with the permission of 'The
Satpura Kaliyugvardhan Temple's Management Board'.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

The following issues are most humbly presented before this Hon’ble court for
adjudication with due respect:

ISSUE 1: Whether the present PIL filed in this Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 32
is maintainable or not?

ISSUE 2: Whether the restriction on women’s entry in the temple is violative of the
fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution of Brahmasthan?

ISSUE 3: Whether the restriction imposed on women’s entry is protected by Article 25

and 26 of the Constitution of Brahmasthan?

ISSUE 4: Whether Rule 3 (b) of The Rajputra Hindu Places of Public Worship
(Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 is valid?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1: Whether the present PIL filed in this Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 32
is maintainable or not?

The present writ petition of Public Interest Litigation is maintainable before this Hon’ble
Supreme Court of Brahmasthan and the present petition has been filed under Article 32 of the
CoB in the interest of justice, social equity and religious freedom from discrimination. The
temple comes under the ambit of ‘other authorities’ under Article 12 and is subject to
fundamental rights. Since the ban has continued from time immemorial and has acquired the
force of law, it shall be law within the meaning of article 13 of the constitution and is hence
subject to fundamental rights.
ISSUE 2: Whether the restriction on women’s entry in the temple is violative of the
fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution of Brahmasthan?

The restriction on the entry of women between the ages of 10 to 50 inside the Satpura Temple
is violative of their essential fundamental rights guaranteed under the CoB as this practice is in
violation of women’s right to equality, promotes discrimination on the basis of sex,
Untouchability and violates the right to privacy and dignity of women.

ISSUE 3: Whether the restriction on women’s entry is protected by Article 25 and 26 of

the Constitution of Brahmasthan?

It is submitted that the restriction on women’s entry is not protected by Article 25 of the
Constitution as it is not an essential practice of the said religion and further, takes away the
rights given to women under Article 25. Further, it is also submitted that the restriction is also
not protected by Article 26 as the said temple’s restriction goes against morality.

ISSUE 4: Whether Rule 3 (b) of The Rajputra Hindu Places of Public Worship
(Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 is valid?

Rule 3 (b) of The Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965
is ultra vires The Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act, 1965
and violates Section 3 and Section 4 of this act. The rule also, violates fundamental rights’ of
women and therefore, is invalid.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1: Whether the present PIL filed in this Hon’ble Supreme Court
under Article 32 is maintainable or not?

The present PIL filed in this Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 32 is (1) maintainable, (2)
the temple is subject to fundamental rights as it comes under the purview of Article 12 and (3)
the ban being imposed by it is law, making it subject to fundamental rights as well.

1.1 PIL is maintainable under Article 32

1. It is being most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that this PIL filed is
most aptly maintainable under Article 32 of CoB. The PIL of writ jurisdiction under Article
32 has been filed by the petitioners for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus against the
respondents to ensure that female devotees between ages 10 to 50 are allowed entry in The
Satpura Kalyugvardhan Temple. The concept of PIL is in consonance with the principles
enshrined in Article 39A of the CoB to protect and deliver prompt social justice with the
help of law.
2. In K.K. Kochunni v. State of Madras 1 and in Ramesh Thaper v. State of Madras2, it was
held that the right to move to Supreme Court for enforcement of the fundamental right is
in itself a fundamental right. Herein the present filed PIL, there has been violation of
various fundamental rights such as Article 14, 15, 17, 21, 25 and 26 stating Equality before
Law, Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex, Untouchability, Right to privacy and
dignity, personal liberty, freedom to practice religion and to manage religious affairs
respectively. A PIL can be filed against the State for the violation of Fundamental rights 3
under Article 32 of the Constitution; therefore, the PIL is maintainable against the
respondents.
3. There stand some exceptions to the traditional rule of locus standi which limits the ambit
of litigation to only a person whose personal rights have been infringed or has suffered a

1
AIR 1959 SC 72.
2
AIR 1950 SC 124.
3
Sukhdev and Ors v. Bhagat Ram and Ors., AIR 1975 SC 1331.

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legal injury. Of those exceptions, one such is when challenging the constitutionality of the
legislation as it has been impugned.
4. In Janata Dal & Ors. v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors.4, the Court held that any public spirited
petitioner with sufficient interest can file a PIL. The Supreme Court in the case of S.P Gupta
v. President of India5 also observed that the individual or the group which moves to the
court for judicial redress in the case must have an act of bona fide nature with a view of
vindicating the cause of justice. The subject matter of a law suit is not a private dispute but
rather a grievance about certain public policies and laws which are themselves violative of
the basic fundamental and human rights.6 Herein, relief is not limited to compensation for
a past wrong, instead it is prospective, flexible and remedial having broad impact on many
people not party to the law suit.7
5. The restriction imposed on women in the present case is derogatory and discriminates on
the basis of sex alone. Since a long time, women between the ages of 10 to 50 haven’t been
allowed to enter a public place of worship while others belonging to the same religion are
permitted entry. Thus, the ban imposed applies to a large section of the society and is a
matter of public interest. This PIL is therefore, maintainable under Article 32 of the CoB.

1.2 Temple is subject to fundamental rights

6. Article 12 of the constitution says -that the state includes the Government and Parliament
of Brahmasthan and the government and the legislature of all the states. It also includes all
local authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the government. 8 The
judgement in B. Hasan Ali Khan v. Director of Higher Education, Andhra Pradesh9, says
that the essential tests to determine whether a particular institution is “other authority”
within the meaning of Article 12 are substantial financial aid, control by the Government,
and performance of public functions and entrustment of governmental activities. All of

4
(1991) 3 SCR 752.
5
(1982) 2 SCR 365.
6
Rajiv Ranjan Singhlalan & Anr. v. Union Of India & Ors., (2006) 205 CTR SC 512.
7
Roma Mukherjee, Women, Law and Free Legal Aid in India, 64 (Deep & Deep Publications Pvt. Ltd., New
Delhi).
8
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981)1 SCC 722.
9
(1987) 4 Reports 198 (AP).

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these are not essential, and, in a particular case, one or combination of more than one may
suffice.10
In the present case, The Travancore - Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 (pari
material to the State of Rajputra) has created The Satpura Kalyugvardhan Temple Board
for the maintenance of The Satpura temple. Article 290- A of the Constitution states that
funds are provided to The Satpura Temple’s Management Board by the Consolidated Fund
of Rajputra. Thus, The Satpura Temple is maintained by a Board which is state-funded.
As stated in the facts of the case, it is the State of Rajputra which provides the governing
rules and regulations. The opposing counsel appeals that the restriction itself is a law given
by the state fund to protect the interest of the nature of the deity and the temple. If the state
is involved in the governance and has direct control on the restriction and entry of women
then it can be established that there exists deep and pervasive state control.
Therefore, as the temple is maintained by a board which receives financial aid and is
controlled by the government, it comes under the ambit of ‘other authorities’ under Article
12 of the Constitution and thus, is subject to fundamental rights.

1.3 Ban is “law” according to Article 13

7. It has been held that if a law violates any of the fundamental rights including Art. 14, the
same is void to the extent as provided in Art. 13.11 In the present case, it is humbly
submitted that the imposed ban is “law” according to Article 13 of the CoB.
8. Article 13 of the CoB provides that there shall be no law inconsistent with the fundamental
rights provided for in Part III of the Constitution and in case of inconsistency, shall be void
to that extend.
9. It is clearly recognised in article 13(3)(a) that “law” includes customs and usages which
have the force of law and to immunize them from constitutional scrutiny, is to deny the
primacy of the Constitution.12 Further, even if a custom is elevated to the status of a law,
yet it is essential that the customs inconsistent with or repugnant to constitutional scheme
must always yield place to fundamental rights.13

10
P.M. Bakshi, The Constitution of India, 15 (Universal Law Publishing, Haryana, 15th edn., 2018).
11
A.L.Kalara v. The Project & Equipment (1984) 3 SCR 646.
12
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. The State Of Kerala, WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 373 OF 2006.
13
Madhu Kishwar & Ors. Etc v. State Of Bihar, (1996) 5 SCC 125.

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10. In the present case, there is a ban imposed on the women of menstruating ages to enter the
temple of Satpura Kaliyugvardhan. This ban is as per centuries old tradition and custom of
the State of Rajputra and is in accordance with a usage that has continued from time
immemorial and continues to persist till date. Further, the usage has such a stronghold and
force in the area that there is there is a police station on the way to the temple where women
devotees are restricted from proceeding further and going into the temple in case women
manage to slip by, 'The Satpura Kaliyugvardhan temple's security staff do not allow them
to enter into the temple.
11. The century’s old usage or custom restricting women’s entry has also been crystallised in
the form of a Rule 3(b) under Rajputra Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of
Entry) Rules, 1965 which clearly states that any custom or usage which restricts women
from entering temples during a certain period is to be valid.
12. Hence, the custom or usage restricting women’s right to enter temples has the force of law
in the state of Rajputra and is followed by police authorities and others, and is hence subject
to Part III of the Constitution.
13. In the present case, since the usage has continued from time immemorial and has acquired
the force of law, it shall be law within the meaning of article 13 of the constitution and is
hence subject to fundamental rights.

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ISSUE 2: Whether the restriction on women’s entry in the temple is violative

of the fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution of
Brahmasthan?

The restriction on the entry of women between the ages of 10 to 50 inside the Satpura Temple
is violative of their essential fundamental rights guaranteed under the CoB. This practice is in
(1) Violation of women’s right to equality, promotes (2) Discrimination on the basis of sex, (3)
Untouchability and (4) Violates the right to privacy and dignity of women.

2.1 Violation of women’s right to equality

14. The Constitution through its Article 14 provides for ‘equality before the law’ to everyone.
The SC has noted that “The difference between human beings, whether perceived or real,
and whether biologically or socially based, should not be permitted to make a difference in
the lived-out equality of those persons.”14
15. Arbitrariness has been accepted as a test under Article 14. An act or law be held arbitrary
if the classification it makes is unreasonable. If a law discriminates between one person and
another even if as regards the subject-matter of the legislation their position is the same15,
then the law would be held to be violative of Article 14. Thus, to attract the operation of
the equal protection clause, it is necessary to show that the classification is not based on an
intelligible differentia, and that the differentia does not have a rational relation to the object
sought to be achieved.16
16. In the present case, there is a classification which has been made in respect of men and
women of menstruating ages, on the basis of the natural and biological process of
menstruation that women go through. Further, on the basis of this classification, women
are restricted from proceeding inside the temple since the deity ‘Satpura Kaliyugvardhan'
is usually considered a staunch celibate god and it is not possible for women to put up with
the days of celibacy like men.
17. It is submitted that the differentia on the basis of the biological process of menstruation has
no nexus to the aim of preserving the celibate status of the deity, since the oath of celibacy

14
Anuj Garg & Ors v. Hotel Association Of India & Ors, (2008) 3 SCC 1.
15
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India & Ors., 1950 SCR 869.
16
Budhan Chowdhry v. State of Bihar, (1955) 1 SCR 1045.

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taken by the deity cannot be said to be broken by just the entry of women into the temple,
and that too by only women of menstruating ages.
18. Hence, it is humbly submitted by the petitioners that the while the differential between men
and women may be valid in some other instance, it is not so in the present case since it has
no rational nexus to object being sought. The consequence of a ban emerging from such
classification is depriving women of the right to equality for arbitrary reasons and hence
should be uplifted.

2.2 Discrimination on the basis of sex

19. The restriction of women’s entry violates Article 15(1) of the CoB which amounts to
discrimination on the basis of sex. “If any ground of discrimination, whether direct or
indirect is founded on a stereotypical understanding of the role of the sex, it would not be
distinguishable from the discrimination which is prohibited by Article 15 on the grounds
only of sex.”17 Thus, the discrimination on the basis of menstruation is a classification on
the basis of sex.
20. The exclusion is based only on the physiological feature of females and has created a stigma
around menstruation which is nothing more than a biological process. Women are
considered to be impure during such a period and are forbidden to participate in any
religious activities. Denying access on the basis of such an argument cannot be considered
as a rational basis as it is derogatory and has a dehumanizing effect. Such an unjust practice
thus promotes in legitimising stereotypical taboos and limits women’s rights.
21. The contention of the respondents that women cannot put up with the days of celibacy and
austerity like men, stigmatizes women and places them in a position of subordination. It
also stereotypes women as overly sexual beings with no control over themselves and
regards them as the weaker sex in comparison to men.
22. The Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
is an international treaty which was ratified by Brahmasthan in 1993. The state, being a
party to the convention has to fulfil its obligation by eliminating gender stereotypical
practices.
“The Preamble of CEDAW reiterates that discrimination against women, violates the
principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity; is an obstacle to the
participation on equal terms with men in the political, social, economic and cultural life of

17
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 76 of 2016.

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their country; hampers the growth of the personality from society and family and makes it
more difficult for the full development of potentialities of women in the service of their
countries and of humanity.” 18
CEDAW’s Article 5 (a) requires States Parties to take “all appropriate measures” to
“modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women” in an effort to
eliminate practices that “are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either
of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.”
Article 2(f) reinforces article 5 by requiring States Parties to take “all appropriate
measures”, to “modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which
constitute discrimination against women.”
23. The exclusionary practice is violative of the basic tenets of the CoB as well as CEDAW
and thus, the state must take appropriate measures to ensure that exclusive, unjust and
stereotypical practices such as the restriction on women’s entry in this case must be
eradicated.

2.3 Untouchability

24. Article 17 states that Untouchability is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden.
This article was created to ensure that an equal societal order was maintained. “The
constitutional intent in keeping the understanding of untouchability in Article 17 open-
textured was to abolish all practices based on the notion of purity and pollution.”19

The Board has pointed out in front of the Supreme court that there are few rituals where
The Satpura Kaliyugvardhan 'Temple poojari would perform a "purification ceremony" at
the 18-sacred steps that lead to the sanctum sanctorum, whenever the rules are violated. 20
This ceremony being carried out in the temple following their entry is proof that the entry
of women is considered to be “polluting”. Thus, menstrual discrimination against women
which is considered to be impure and polluting is included under untouchability in any
form.

25. “The thrust of Article 17 and The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 is to liberate the
society from blind and ritualistic adherence and traditional beliefs which has lost all legal

18
Supra note 13 at 42.
19
Supra note 12 at 45.
20
P7, Moot Proposition, Centre for Legal Studies, GIBS, 1 st National Moot, 2019.

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or moral base.”21 The practice being followed by the temple is prohibited under The
Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955.
 Section 3 provides punishment for preventing any person on the grounds of
untouchability from entering a place of public worship and from worshipping or
offering prayers in such a place, which is permissible to other people professing the
same religion.

The ban on entry is applicable to Hindu women of menstruating age only. Thus, it
prevents them on grounds of untouchability from entering a public place of worship
while others belonging to the Hindu religion are permitted entry.

 Section 4 contains a punishment for enforcing social disabilities against persons on the
ground of untouchability with regard to the use of, or access to, any place used for a
public purpose maintained out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general
public or [any section thereof]; or the observance of any social or religious custom,
usage or ceremony or [taking part in, or taking out, any religious, social or cultural
procession].

The Board has contended that the restriction is done with accordance to centuries old
traditions and custom.22 Thus, it enforces social disabilities against Hindu women on
grounds of untouchability for observance of religious custom.

26. It has been proved above that the restriction on women’s entry violates Article 17 which is
enforceable by the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955.

2.4 Violates the right to dignity of women

27. The basic framework of the constitution promotes principles of equality, justice and
personal liberty. The fundamental rights of the citizens are to be protected and every
individual is to be treated with equal respect and dignity.
28. Right to life and personal liberty in Article 21 includes Right to live with human dignity as
an integral part guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.23 The restriction on women
on the basis of menstruation is not justified and is unjust. Article 51A (e) renounces

21
State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale, (1995) 4 SCC 469.
22
P6, Moot Proposition, Centre for Legal Studies, GIBS, 1 st National Moot, 2019.
23
Supra note 17 at 158.

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practices derogatory to the dignity of women. Therefore, such a ban on women of

menstruating age violates their intrinsic right to dignity.

ISSUE 3: Whether the restriction imposed on women’s entry is protected by

Article 25 and 26 of the Constitution of Brahmasthan?

It is submitted that the restriction on women’s entry is not protected by Article 25 of the
Constitution as it is not an essential practice of the said religion (1) and further, takes away the
rights given to women under Article 25 (2). Further, it is also submitted that the restriction is
also not protected by Article 26 as the said temple’s restriction also goes against morality (3).

3.1 Restriction is not an essential practice

29. Article 25 of the Constitution grants freedom to all persons not just of religious opinion to
but it protects also acts done in pursuance of a religion. 24 If the belief is genuinely and
conscientiously held it attracts the protection of Art. 25 but subject, of course, to the
inhibitions contained therein.25
30. It has also been recognised that what constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily
to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself26 and further that it is
required to be carefully examined and considered to decide whether it is a matter of religion
or a secular management by the State.27 The test of determining an essential religious
practice, as laid down by the Apex Court, is to find out whether the nature of religion will
be changed without that part or practice. If the taking away of that part or practice could
result in a fundamental change in the character of that religion or in its belief, then such
part could be treated as an essential or integral part.28
31. In the present case, the devotees of “Satpura Kalyugvardhan” temple are considered a
religious denomination within Hinduism itself. The practice followed by the “Satpura
Kalyugvardhan” temple in restricting entry of women of menstruating ages is one that is
specific to the particular temple, and is not followed in any of the other Hindu temples

24
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shri Shirur
Mutt, 1954 AIR 282.
25
Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors v. State Of Kerala & Ors, 1987 AIR 748.
26
Supra note 12.
27
N. Adithayan v. The Travancore Devaswom Board, (2002) 8 SCC 106.
28
Commissioner Of Police & Ors v. Acharya J. Avadhuta, (2004) 12 SCC 770.

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throughout the length and breadth of the country. The exclusionary practice finds no basis
in the tenants and doctrine of Hinduism, which accords a high status to women. Thus,
considering that the Satpura Kaliyugvardhan is a temple in isolation which practices the
said restriction, it cannot be said that the restriction is essential or fundamental to the
religion of Hinduism.
32. Further, the restricting of women cannot be said to be an essential practice of the said
denomination itself. Merely establishing a usage will not afford it constitutional protection
as an essential religious practice. It must be proved that the practice is ‘essential’ to religion
and inextricably connected with its fundamental character29, which has not been done in
this case as no scriptures or doctrines of the religious denomination have been averred to
by the respondents to establish the religious sanction behind the usage. Additionally, it has
not been shown how the ban on entry of women is relevant to preserving the special
“celibate” status of the God “Satpura Kalyugvardhan”.
33. Applying the test laid down by the Apex itself Court itself, it is submitted that restricting
entry of women is not an essential religious practice of Hinduism or even the religious
denomination of devotees of “Satpura Kalyugvardhan” since it does not find support in
traditional texts or even in popular practice. It is further submitted that since the restriction
is not an essential feature of the religious denomination, it is not protected by Article 25 as
an expression of one’s religious belief and is in fact a matter of secular management by the
State.
3.2 Restriction violates women’s right under Article 25
34. Article 25 safeguards the right of all people the freedom to practice a religion of their
choice. Women of any age group have as much a right as men to visit and enter a temple
30
in order to freely worship as guaranteed under Article 25(1). Further, since the
Constitution makers were aware of the nature of religious practices existing in India, article
25(2)(b) made the freedom of religion subject to the provision for providing social welfare
and reform or for throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all
classes and sections of Hindus. It has been established right to every religious denomination
to manage its own affairs in matters of religion are subject to and can be controlled by a

29
Supra note 12 at 244.
30
Id. at 64.

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law contemplated under Article 25(2)(b) as both the articles are required to be read
harmoniously.31
35. In the present case, admittedly the restriction on entry of women in temples has been
imposed in accordance with religious beliefs of the devotees. However, anything done in
pursuance of one’s religion cannot take away the same fundamental right given to another
– in this case, women – to worship the deity of their choice. Further, Article 25 itself
envisaged and provided for such a situation in Clause 2 by stating that temples of a public
nature are to be thrown open to all classes and sections of Hindus, notwithstanding the
freedom of religion and thought and actions done in pursuance of it.
36. It is humbly submitted that the restriction imposed on women is restricting the Fundamental
Right of freedom of religion given to women, and the removal of such a restriction is
validated by virtue of Article 25(2)(b) which expressly states that regardless of freedom to
practice religion, public places of worship can be thrown to all Hindus for social reform
and “denominational institutions are within Article 25 (2) (b).”32
3.3 Restriction is not protected by Article 26
37. Article 26 gives the freedom to manage religious affairs to religious denominations.
However, Article 26 has to be exercised in a manner that is in conformity with public order,
morality and health. 33
38. It is established that in case of violation of the fundamental rights, the term “morality”
cannot be viewed with a narrow lens so as to confine the sphere of definition of morality to
what an individual, a section or religious sect may perceive the term to mean 34 and that it
naturally implies constitutional morality35 and the traditions and conventions have to grow
to sustain the value of such a morality.36 Constitutional morality implies that it is not
confined to the provisions and literal text which a Constitution contains but rather it
embraces within itself virtues of a wide magnitude such as that of ushering a pluralistic and
inclusive society.37

31
Riju Prasad Sarma Etc v. State Of Assam & Ors, (2015) 9 SCC 461.
32
Sri Venkataramana Devaru & Ors.v. State of Mysore & Ors, (1958) SCR 895.
33
T.M.A.Pai Foundation & Ors v. State of Karnataka, (1995) 5 SCC 220.
34
Supra note 12 at 68.
35
Ibid.
36
Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1.
37
Supra note 17 at 30.

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39. It was further elucidated by the Court in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India that “the
society as a whole or even a minuscule part of the society may aspire and prefer different
things for themselves. They are perfectly competent to have such a freedom to be different,
like different things, so on and so forth, provided that their different tastes and liking remain
within their legal framework and neither violates any statute nor results in the abridgement
of fundamental rights of any other citizen.”
40. The restriction practiced by the Satpura Kalyugvardhan temple is not permissible under
Article 26 as it is opposed to morality. It is submitted that the restriction is not in
consonance with the morality of the large masses of women who believe that their rights
are being abridged and secondly, in any case, public morality must yield to constitutional
morality38 and the restriction is not in consonance with the spirit and morals of the
Constitution itself. Hence the restriction is sought to be removed.

38
Supra note 12 at 71.

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ISSUE 4: Whether Rule 3 (b) of The Rajputra Hindu Places of Public

Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 is valid?

41. It is humbly submitted that the impugned Rule 3(b) is invalid as well as outside the
Constitutional limits itself. Rule 3(b) of The Rajputra Hindu Places of Public Worship
(Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965 is a rule which has been made by virtue of the
Rajputra Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act, 1965, a law which
seeks to throw open Hindu temples to all, in consonance with Art. 25(2)(b) of the
Constitution of Brahmasthan.
42. Section 2 of this Act defines ‘person’, ‘place of public worship’ and ‘section or class.’
Person includes both men and women, and hence Hindu women too are covered under the
ambit of this Act. Further, the Satpura temple is also covered in this Act as a place of public
worship since it is clearly mentioned in the Act itself in Section (2)(b) that “"place of public
worship" means a place, by whatever name known or to whomsoever belonging, which is
dedicated to, or for the benefit of, or is used generally by, Hindus or any section or class
thereof, for the performance of any religious service…” and further in Section 2(c) that
“"section or class" includes any division, sub-division, caste, sub-caste, sect or
denomination whatsoever.” 39Thus, the temple being open to a denominational group under
Hinduism open for public worship comes under this Act.
43. Further, Section 3 of The Rajputra Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of
Entry) Act, 1965 provides that “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
any other law for the time being in force or any custom or usage or any instrument
having effect by virtue of any such law or any decree or order of court, every place of public
worship which is open to Hindus generally or to any section or class thereof, shall be open
to all sections and classes of Hindus; and no Hindu of whatsoever section or class shall,
in any manner, be prevented, obstructed or discouraged from entering such place of
public worship, or from worshipping or offering prayers thereat, or performing any
religious service therein, in the like manner and to the like extent as any other Hindu of
whatsoever section or class may so enter, worship, pray or perform:”
44. According to Section 3, no custom, law or any other such provision can stand in the way
of throwing open of public Hindu temples to all classes of Hindus. The provisions of this
section thus also impliedly express that Hindu women whether of menstruating age or not,

39
The Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act, 1965, Section 2.

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shall be allowed entry into public places of worship and will not be restricted on the basis
of any customs.
45. Admittedly, the proviso to Section 3 states that “in case of a place of public worship which
is a temple founded for the benefit of any religious denomination or section thereof, the
provisions of this section shall be subject to the right of that religious denomination or
section, as the case may be, to manage its own affairs in matters of religion”; however the
right of the denomination to manage its own affairs granted under Art. 26(b) is not superior
to throwing open public places to all.
46. In the case of Sri Venkatramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, it was clearly recognised by
the Apex Court that “Art. 25(2) is much wider in its contents and has reference to the rights
of communities, and controls both Article 25(1) and Article 26(b).” The Act has been
created to give effect to the provisions of clause (b) of Art. 25(2), and the central idea
behind the Act remains to open public places of worship to all. Since Art. 25(2) overrides
the right of religious denominations to manage its own affairs, the proviso cannot be
interpreted in such a way so as to defeat the very purpose of the Act and Art. 25(2)(b).
47. Further, Section 4 of The Rajputra Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act,
1965, gives power to make rules for the proper maintenance and order in public places of
worship and says that “the trustee or any other person in charge of any place of public
worship shall have power, subject to the control of the competent authority and any rules
which may be made by that authority, to make regulations for the maintenance of order and
decorum in the place of public worship and the due observance of the religious rites and
ceremonies performed therein. It further provides “that no regulation made under this
sub-section shall discriminate in any manner whatsoever, against any Hindu on the
ground that he belongs to a particular section or class.”40
48. Rule 3(b) of The Rajputra Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules,
1965 is a rule which has been made by virtue of Section 4 of the said Act, and states that
“(b)Women at such time during which they are not by custom and usage allowed to
enter a place of public worship” shall not be entitled to offer worship in any place of
public worship.”41
49. It is submitted before the Honourable Court that Rule 3(b) of The Rajputra Hindu Places
of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965, prevents women from entering

40
The Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act, 1965, Section 3.
41
The Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965, Rule 3(b).

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public places of worship on basis of custom or usage based on menstruation. This Rule is
ultra vires the The Rajputra Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act,
1965 and completely defeats its overall object and purpose.
50. It is submitted that the proviso to Section 3 is valid but not to the extent that the present
restriction may be justified under its garb. Further, the impugned rule 3(b) goes against
Section 4 of the Act in that Section 4 prohibits discriminatory rules and this rule is clearly
discriminating between Hindu men and women.
51. Further, it is submitted that Rule 3 (b) also violates the fundamental rights enshrined in our
constitution. The rule allows the restriction on the entry of women of menstruating age and
violates the principles of equality and equals to untouchability. It also discriminates on the
basis of sex and prevents women from exercising their freedom to practice their religion.
Therefore, this rule is sought to be struck down as being erroneous and constitutionally
invalid.

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PRAYER

In light of the facts stated, issues raised, authorities cited and arguments advanced, the counsel
for the appellants humbly prays to the Hon'ble bench of Supreme Court to declare:

1. That the PIL filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of Brahmasthan is maintainable,
2. That the restriction is violative of Article 14, 15, 17, 21, of the Constitution of Brahmasthan,
3. That the restriction is not an essential religious practice and is not protected by morality,
4. That Rule 3(b) of The Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry)
Rules, 1965 is invalid.

AND/OR
Pass any order that this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the interest of equity, justice and good
conscience.
And for this act of kindness, the counsels for the petitioners shall duty bound forever pray.

Place – BRAHMASTHAN Respectfully Submitted

Sd/-________________
(Counsel for the petitioner)

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