RIGHT TO ASSOCIATION

[ GR No. 95445, Aug 06, 1991 ]

MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION v. PERFECTO LAGUIO

NARVASA, J.:
The series of events that touched off these cases started with the so-called "mass action"
undertaken by some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the petitioning
associations in both cases, on September 17, 1990 to "dramatize and highlight"[1] the teachers'
plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had
time and again been brought to the latter's attention.
The petition in G.R. No. 95590 alleges in great detail the character and origins of those grievances
as perceived by the petitioners, and the attempts to negotiate their correction; [2] these are more
briefly, but quite adequately and with no sacrifice of relevant content, set forth in the petition
in G.R. No. 95445, portions of which are quoted hereunder without necessarily affirming their
objective truth or correctness:
"3. Together with other teachers embracing the Teachers and Employees Consultative Council
(TECC) and the Alliance of Concerned Teachers, the petitioners, in accordance with their
Constitution and By-Laws, resolved to engage in mass concerted actions, after peaceful dialogues
with the heads of the Department of the Budget and Management, Senate and House of
Representatives in public hearings as well as after exhausting all administrative remedies, to press
for, among other things, the immediate payment of due chalk, clothing allowances, 13th month
pay for 1989 arising from the implementation of the Salary of Standardization Law, the recall of
DECS Order 39 s. 1990 directing the oversizing of classes and overloading of teachers pursuant
to the cost-cutting measures of the government, the hiring of 47,000 new teachers to ease the
overload of existing teachers, the return of the additional 1% real property taxes collected by local
government units to education purposes to be administered by the Local School Boards, and
consequent recall of DBM Circulars Nos. 90-4 and 9011 and local budget circular No. 47
consistent with RA 5447 and the new Constitution mandating that education shall enjoy the highest
budgetary priority in the national budget, and other equally important demands; The dialogues and
conferences initiated by the petitioners and other teacher organizations were as early as March 14,
1989, March 14, 1990, April 23, 1990, May 28, 1990, June 5, 1990, September 3, 1990 and
September 14, 1990 with the Civil Service Commission, the Senate and House of Representatives,
Department of Budget and Management and the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, but
all these did not result in the granting of the demands of the petitioners, leaving them with no other
recourse but to take direct mass action such as the one they engage in three weeks ago.
4. On September 14, 1990, the petitioners and other teachers in other cities and municipalities in
Metro Manila, staged a protest rally at the DECS premises without disrupting classes as a last call
for the government to negotiate the granting of demands. No response was made by the respondent
Secretary of Education, despite the demonstration so the petitioners began the ongoing protest
mass actions on September 17, 1990. ***"[3]
September 17, 1990 fell on a Monday, which was also a regular school day. There is no question
that the some 800 teachers who joined the mass action did not conduct their classes on that day;
instead, as alleged in the petition in G.R. No. 95590,[4] they converged at
the Liwasang Bonifacio in the morning whence they proceeded to the National Office of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) for a whole-day assembly. At about 1:00
o'clock p.m., three representatives of the group were allowed to see the respondent Secretary of
Education who "*** brushed aside their grievances," warned them that they would lose their jobs
for going on illegal and unauthorized mass leave. Upon leaving said respondent's presence, they
were handed an order directing all participants in the mass action to return to work in 24 hours or
face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal
proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements.[5] Those directives
notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days
that followed. In its issue of September 19, 1990, the newspaper Manila Standard reported that
the day previous, the respondent Secretary of Education had relieved 292 teachers who did not
return to their classes. The next day, however, another daily, Newsday, reported that the Secretary
had revoked his dismissal order and instead placed 56 of the 292 teachers under preventive
suspension, despite which the protesters' numbers had swelled to 4,000.[6]
On the record, what did happen was that, based on reports submitted by the principals of the
various public schools in Metro-Manila, the respondent Secretary of Education had
filed motu proprio administrative complaints against the teachers who had taken part in the mass
actions and defied the return-to-work order on assorted charges like grave misconduct, gross
neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law, absence without official leave, etc., and
placed them under 90-day preventive suspension. The respondents were served copies of the
charge sheets and given five (5) days to submit answer or explanation. Later, on October 8,
1990, the respondent Secretary constituted an investigating committee of four (4) to determine and
take the appropriate course of action on the formal charges and designated the special prosecutors
on detail with the DECS to handle their prosecution during the formal hearings.[7]
On October 11, 1990, the respondent Secretary of Education rendered the first of his now-
questioned decisions on the administrative complaints. In Case No. DECS 90-002, he found
twenty (20) respondent teachers guilty of the charges preferred against them and dismissed them
from office, effective immediately.[8] In the other investigations that followed and as of December
3, 1990, 658 teachers were dismissed, 40 were suspended for one (1) year, 33 for nine (9) months,
and 122 for six (6) months; 398 were exonerated.[9]
Earlier, on September 19, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 95445 had filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 18, a petition[10] for prohibition, declaratory relief and preliminary
mandatory injunction to restrain the implementation of the return-to-work order of September 17,
1990 and the suspension or dismissal of any teacher pursuant thereto and to declare said order null
and void. Issuance ex parte of a temporary restraining order was sought, but seeing no compelling
reason therefor, the Regional Trial Court instead set the application for preliminary injunction for
hearing, and heard the same, on September 24, 1990. Thereafter and following the submission of
memorandums by the parties, said Court rendered judgment declaring the assailed return-to-work
order valid and binding, and dismissing the petition for lack of merit.[11]
Review of said judgment is sought in G.R. No. 95445.
G.R. No. 95590 is a parallel original proceeding for
prohibition, mandamus and certiorari grounded on the same state of facts and instituted for
substantially the same purpose, i.e., the invalidation of the return-to-work order of the respondent
Secretary of Education and all orders of suspension and/or dismissal thereafter issued by said
respondent against the teachers who had taken part in the mass actions of September 17, 1990 and
the days that followed.
Both cases were ordered consolidated by Resolution issued on October 25, 1990,[12] and separate
comments were filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the public respondents, in G.R. No.
95445 on October 31, 1990, and in G.R. No. 95590 on December 5, 1990.[13] On November 20,
1990 the parties were heard in oral argument on the petitioners' united pleas for a temporary
restraining order/mandatory injunction to restore the status quo ante and enjoin the public
respondents from continuing with the issuance of suspension orders and proceeding with the
administrative cases against the teachers involved in the mass actions.
Said pleas were denied by the Court in its Resolution of December 18, 1990,[14] and a motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners in G.R. No. 95590 was likewise denied.
In two separate but identically-worded motions filed on their behalf by
Atty. Froilan M. Bacungan,[15] the following persons, to
wit: Florita D. Guazon, Elisea G. Lazo, Gonzala G. Sioson, Esperanza Valero, Nenita Pangilinan,
Ramon David, Aurora Bosi, Encarnita David, Socorro Sentin, Crispulo Santos,
Rodriguez Bagana, Rodolfo D. Bacsal, Ruben Bersamina, Rodolfo Arroyo, Irene Gadil,
Rebecca Roldan, Rosita Samson, Priscilla Avendia, Arturo Cabuhat, Rosalinda Caoili,
Angelina Corpuz, Purisima Leria, Elsie Somera, Dedaica Jusay,Teresita partoza, Gloria Salvador,
Catherine San Agustin, Nestor Aguirre, Lorenza Real, Celia Ronquillo, Vicente Carranza, Jessie
Villanueva, Yolanda Alura, Clara Alvarez, Danilo Llamas, Ladera Panita,
Myrna Sena, Zenaida Ligon, Daisy S. Conti, Danilo Caballes, Susan Maragat,
Roberto Manlangit and Elizabeth T. Aguirre, seek leave to withdraw as parties in G.R. No.
95590. These movants claim that they are such parties although not individually so named in the
petition in said case, being among those referred to in its title as "other similarly
situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded," who had been administratively
charged, then preventively suspended and/or dismissed in the wake of the mass actions of
September 1990. They assert that since this Court is not trier of facts, they have opted to appeal
the questioned decisions or actuations of the respondent Secretary of Education to the Civil Service
Commission where they believe they will have "* * all the opportunity to introduce evidence on
how (Secretary) Carino violated their constitutional rights to due process of law * * security of
tenure and * * peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances * *."
An opposition to the first motion was filed[16] which, briefly, contended that, as this Court had
already found that the petitioners had gone on an unlawful strike and that public
respondent Carino's acts were prima facie lawful, the motion was either an attempt at forum-
shopping or meant to avoid the "inevitable outcome" of issues already pending final determination
by the Court.
The Court's Resolution of December 18, 1990, supra, denying the petitioners' plea for
restoration of the status quo ante and to restrain/enjoin further suspensions of, and the initiation or
continuation of, administrative proceedings against the teachers involved, is based on the
following postulates:
(1) the undenied -- indeed, the pleaded and admitted -- fact that about 800 teachers, among them
the individual petitioners and other unnamed but "similarly situated" members of the petitioning
associations in both cases, unauthorizedly absented themselves from their classes on a
regular schoolday, September 17, 1990, in order to participate in a "mass action" to dramatize their
grievances concerning, in the main, the alleged failure of the public authorities, either to implement
at all or to implement in a just and correct manner, certain laws and measures intended to benefit
them materially;
(2) the fact, too, that in the days that followed, more mass actions for the same purpose
were undertaken, notwithstanding a return-to-work order issued by the respondent Secretary of
Education; more teachers joined the so-called "peaceful assemblies" on September 18, 1990 and
the number rising to 4,000 on September 19, 1990;[17]
(3) that from the pleaded and admitted facts, these "mass actions" were to all intents and purposes
a strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which
it was the teachers' duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons;
(4) that this Court had already definitively ruled that employees in the public (civil) service,
unlike those in the private sector, do not have the right to strike, although guaranteed the right to
self-organization, to petition Congress for the betterment of employment terms and conditions and
to negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the improvement of such
working conditions as are not fixed by law;[18]
(5) that upon the foregoing premises, it was prima facie lawful and within his statutory authority
for the respondent Secretary of Education to take the actions complained of, to wit: issue a return-
to-work order, prefer administrative charges against, and place under preventive suspension, those
who failed to comply with said order, and dismiss from the service those who failed to answer or
controvert the charges;[19]
The Court has not since been presented with any consideration of law or established fact that would
impair the validity of these postulates or preclude continued reliance thereon for the purpose of
resolving the present petitions on their merits.
The underlying issue here is due process; not whether the petitioners have a right to strike, which
it is clear they do not, however justifiable their reasons, nor whether or not there was in fact
such a strike, it being equally evident from the pleadings that there was, and there being no dispute
about this. What, therefore, is brought before the Court is the question of whether or not any rights
of the petitioners under the due process clause of the Constitution as it applies to administrative
proceedings were violated in the initiation, conduct, or disposition of the investigations
complained of.
Indeed, what the petitioners in G.R. No. 95590 proclaim about denial of due process being their
"paramount complaint" * * * "central to their prayer for interlocutory relief"[20] could as well be
said of the merits of their main cause as of their plea for a restraining order pendente lite or a
preliminary injunction.
There are, however, insuperable obstacles to the Court's taking up that issue and resolving it in
these cases. Said issue is not ripe for adjudication by this Court in the exercise of its review
jurisdiction; and this, for the obvious reason that it is one of fact. The petitions and subsequent
pleadings of the petitioners allege facts and circumstances which, it is claimed, show denial of due
process, citing as supposedly "representative samples"[21] among others: (a) that teachers were
dismissed on the sole basis of unsworn reports of their principals and without evidence of their
alleged failure to obey the return-to-work order; (b) that the charge sheets failed to specify the
particular charges or offenses allegedly committed; (c) that some teachers were not
furnished sworn complaints, and others were suspended without any formal charges; (d) that
teachers who attempted to return within a reasonable time after notice of the return-to-work order
were not accepted back; and similar allegations.
These are however denied and disputed by the public respondents, who set forth their own version,
initially in their separate Comments in both cases and, later and in greater detail, in their
Consolidated Memorandum of December 3, 1990, supra, from which the following passages are
quoted:
"Petitioners in G.R. No. 95545 and G.R. No. 95590 admit engaging in strike (referred by semantic
interplay as "concerted activity" or "mass action") directed against public
respondent Carino beginning September 17, 1990 (MPSTA Petition, pp. 3, 9; ACT Petition, pp.
15-16).
To avoid the disruption of classes, public respondent Carino, also on September 17, 1990, issued
a 'return to work order' reminding striking workers that in law, they cannot engage in strike and
warning them that dismissal proceedings will be instituted against them if they do not return to
work within 24 hours from their walkout (MPSTA Petition, p. 4; ACT Petition, p. 15) and a
memorandum to DECS officials instructing them to notify the striking teachers to return to work
within 24 hours from their walkout and to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who defy
the return to work order as well as to hire temporary replacements (MPSTA Petition, p. 4; ACT
Petition, pp. 15-16).
The striking teachers who did not heed the return-to-work order were administratively charged and
preventively suspended for ninety days for grave misconduct, gross neglect of
duty, insubordination, refusal to perform official duty, absence without leave beginning September
17, 1990 and other violations of Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. All the
striking teachers were served with the suspension orders and the charge sheets notifying them of
the charges and giving them five (5) days from receipt of the charge sheets within which to file
their respective answers.
With the filing of the administrative complaints and the receipt of the answers of some of the
teachers involved, public respondent Carino on October 8, 1990 issued a Memorandum
forming an Investigation Committee composed of Atty. Reno Capinpin of DECS Administrative
Services as Chairman; Dr. Alberto Mendoza, representing the Division Supervisors, Atty.
Evangeline de Castro, representing the City Superintendent of Schools of Manila, and
Atty. Isaias Melegrito, representing the National PPSTA Organization, as members. Copy of the
aforesaid Memorandum is hereto attached as Annex "1".
The committee was authorized to meet everyday, even as Special Prosecutors from the Department
of Justice on detail with the DECS were designated to handle the prosecution during the formal
hearings (Ibid.).
Petitioners in 'G.R. No. 95545' and 'G.R. No. 95590' admit having received the charge sheets and
notices of preventive suspensionwherein they were given five days from receipt of the charges
within which to file their answers (MPSTA Petition, p. 4; ACT Petition, p. 16, Annexes 'X' to
'AA').
* * *.
* * * Many striking teachers received their preventive suspension orders and the charge sheets
from their respective principals when they visited their schools. Many refused to receive and sign
receipt therefore; others tore up the preventive suspension orders and charge sheets in front of
their principals. Instead, they took the occasion to belittle and insult the substitute teachers who
took over their classrooms temporarily.
The striking teachers were given a period of five days to file their Answers in line with Sec. 8,
Rule III of Rules on Administrative Disciplinary Cases in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 46, S.
1989. The motion for extension of time to file Answer was denied by DECS Task Force because
it was dilatory -- the alleged reason being that Atty. Fabros is handling 2,000 cases of
teachers. The DECS was constrained by Sec. 38(d) of P.D. 807 and Sec. 8 of the Memorandum
Circular mentioned which mandate that administrative cases must be the decided within 30 days
from the filing of the charges. Another reason was that many refused to receive the notice of
charges. Also, to delay the resolution of the cases was to their disadvantage.
Moreover, another reason proferred was that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila still had
to act on the petition before it. However, the Motion
was filed AFTER the RTC Manila had already dismissed the Petition.
Nevertheless, answers to the administrative complaints started pouring in at the DECS, as prepared
personally by the striking teachers or by their lawyers.
After initial assessments of the reports coming in from the principals of the schools concerned and
the answers of the striking teachers, the DECS Special Task Force prepared on October 9, 1990
and submitted to respondent Secretary Carino the Guidelines and Criteria as to the nature of the
evidence to be assessed and the corresponding penalty to be imposed against the striking teachers,
which was approved by respondent Secretary Carino on the same day. A copy of the aforesaid
Guidelines and Criteria is hereto attached as Annex '2'. Thereafter, the DECS Special Task Force
proceeded with its task of investigating the cases against the striking teachers.
Those who refused to sign the DECS return-to-work order, the preventive suspension orders and
the charge sheets, some even tearing up the documents presented to them by their principals were
considered by the DECS Special Task Force as having waived their right to be heard; their cases
had to be resolved on the basis of the records. Nevertheless, the DECS Special Task Force
summoned the principals concerned, who then testified under oath confirming their reports on the
absences of the striking teachers. Some clarificatory questions were asked of them on the manner
of the service of the DECS orders and the situation obtaining in their schools.
For those who answered the charge sheets, the DECS Special Task Force set the administrative
cases for hearing. Many of the striking teachers refused to appear at the hearings but
preferred to submit their case on the basis of their answers.
With regard to those who attended the hearings, each of the absent or striking teachers was
investigated and asked questions under oath on their answers and the reasons for their absences
and/or joining the teachers' strike. Some teachers reiterated their answers to the charge sheets,
either giving justifiable reasons for their absences on the days mentioned or maintaining their
stubborn stand that they have all the right to absent themselves from classes in the exercise of their
constitutional right to join mass action to demand from the government what are supposedly due
them. Still the DECS Special Task Force was not satisfied with their written answers
and explanation during the hearings. The principals of the striking teachers were summoned and
they confirmed under oath their reports of absences and/or on teachers joining the strike.
After having conducted fully their investigations, the DECS Special Task Force submitted in
series their investigation reports and recommendation for each category of striking teachers to
respondent Secretary Carino. The investigation reports, together with their supporting documents,
submitted by the DECS Special Task Force indicated clearly the manner and conduct of the
administrative hearings, the nature and weight of the evidence adduced, and the corresponding
penalty or exoneration recommended.
On the bases of the investigation reports and recommendations of the DECS Special Task Force,
and after evaluating the reports and its documents attached, respondent
Secretary Carino promulgated the decisions either for exoneration, suspension or
dismissal. Copies of the DECS decisions of exoneration, suspension or dismissal were forwarded
to the principals of the striking teachers concerned. Those exonerated were allowed to resume
their duties and received their back salaries. Some of the teachers either suspended or dismissed
have already received the copies of the decisions, either personally or through mail.
* * *"[22]
This copious citation is made, not to suggest that the Court finds what is stated therein to be true
and the contrary averments of the petitions to be false, but precisely to stress that the facts upon
which the question of alleged denial of due process would turn are still in issue,
actively controverted, hence not yet established.
It is not for the Court, which is not a trier of facts, as the petitioners who would now withdraw
correctly put it, to make the crucial determination of what in truth transpired concerning the
disputed incidents. Even if that were within its competence, it would be at best a monumental
task. At any rate, the petitioners cannot -- as it seems they have done -- lump together into what
amounts to a class action hundreds of individual cases, each with its own peculiar set of facts, and
expect a ruling that would justly and correctly resolve each and everyone of those cases upon little
more than general allegations, frontally disputed as already pointed out, of incidents supposedly
"representative" of each case or group of cases.
This case illustrates the error of precipitate recourse to the Supreme Court, especially when
numerous parties disparately situated as far as the facts are concerned gather under the umbrella
of a common plea, and generalization of what should be alleged with particularity becomes
unavoidable. The petitioners' obvious remedy was NOT to halt the administrative proceedings
but, on the contrary, to take part, assert and vindicate their rights therein, see those proceedings
through to judgment and if adjudged guilty, appeal to the Civil Service Commission; or if, pending
said proceedings, immediate recourse to judicial authority was believed necessary because the
respondent Secretary or those acting under him or on his instructions were acting without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, to apply, not directly to the Supreme
Court, but to the Regional Trial Court, where there would be an opportunity to prove the relevant
facts warranting corrective relief.
Parties-litigant are duty bound to observe the proper order of recourse through the judicial
hierarchy; they by-pass the rungs of the judicial ladder at the peril of their own causes.[23] This
Court is a court of last resort. Its review jurisdiction is limited to resolving questions of law where
there is no dispute of the facts or the facts have already been determined by lower tribunals, except
only in criminal actions where capital penalties have been imposed.
WHEREFORE, both petitions are DISMISSED, without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely,
that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained
of. The motions to withdraw, supra, are merely NOTED, this disposition rendering any express
ruling thereon unnecessary. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[ GR No. L-22228, Feb 27, 1969 ]

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS v. SECRETARY OF LABOR

CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Petitioners pray for writs of certiorari and prohibition to restrain respondents, the Secretary of
Labor, the Director of Labor Relations and the Registrar of Labor Organizations, from enforcing
an order of cancellation of the registration certificate of the Social Security System Employees
Association - hereinafter referred to as the SSSEA which is affiliated to the Philippine Association
of Free Labor Unions - hereinafter referred to as PAFLU - as well as to annul all proceedings in
connection with said cancellation and to prohibit respondents from enforcing Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 875. Petitioners, likewise, pray for a writ of preliminary injunction pending the
final determination of this case. In their answer, respondents traversed some allegations of fact
and the legal conclusions made in the petition. No writ of preliminary injunction pendente lite has
been issued.
It appears that on September 25, 1963, the Registrar of Labor Organizations -
hereinafter referred to as the Registrar - issued a notice of hearing, on October 17, 1963, of the
matter of cancellation of the registration of the SSSEA, because of:
"1. Failure to furnish the Bureau of Labor Relations with copies of the reports on the finances of
that union duly verified by affidavits which its treasurer or treasurers rendered to said union and
its members covering the periods from September 24, 1960 to September 23, 1961 and September
24, 1961 to September 23, 1962, inclusive, within sixty days of the 2 respective latter dates, which
are the end of its fiscal year; and
"2. Failure to submit to this office the names, postal addresses and non-subversive affidavits of
the officers of that union within sixty days of their election in October (1st Sunday), 1961 and
1963, in conformity with Article IV(1) of its constitution and by-laws."
in violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875. Counsel for the SSSEA moved to postpone
the hearing to October 21, 1963, and to submit then a memorandum, as well as the documents
specified in the notice. The motion was granted, but, nobody appeared for the SSSEA on the date
last mentioned. The next day, October 22, 1963, Manuel Villagracia, Assistant Secretary of the
SSSEA, filed, with the Office of the Registrar, a letter dated October 21, 1963, enclosing the
following:
1. Joint non-subversive affidavit of the officers of the SSS Employees' Association - PAFLU;
2. List of newly elected officers of the Association in its general elections held on April 29,
1963; and
3. Copy of the amended constitution and by-laws of the Association.
Holding
"1. That the joint non-subversive affidavit and the list of officers mentioned in the letter of Mr.
Manuel Villagracia were not the documents referred to in the notice of hearing and made the
subject matter of the present proceeding; and
"2. That there is no iota of evidence on records to show and/or warrant the dismissal of the present
proceeding."
on October 23, 1963, the Registrar rendered a decision cancelling the SSSEA's Registration
Certificate No. 1-1P-169, issued on September 30, 1960. Soon later, or on October 28, 1963,
Alfredo Fajardo, president of the SSSEA moved for a reconsideration of said decision and prayed
for time, up to November 15, within which to submit the requisite papers and data. An opposition
thereto having been filed by one Paulino Escueta, a member of the SSSEA, upon the ground that
the latter had never submitted any financial statement to its members, said motion was heard on
November 27, 1963. Subsequently, or on December 4, 1963, the Registrar issued an order
declaring that the SSSEA had "failed to submit the following requirements to wit:
"1. Non-subversive affidavits of Messrs. Teodoro Sison, Alfonso Atienza,
Rodolfo Zalameda, Raymundo Sabino and Napoleon Pefianco who were elected along with
others on January 30, 1962.
"2. Names, postal addresses and non-subversive affidavits of all the officers who were supposedly
elected on October (1st Sunday), of its constitution and by-laws."
and granting the SSSEA 15 days from notice to comply with said requirements, as well as
meanwhile holding in abeyance the resolution of its motion for reconsideration.
Pending such resolution, or on December 16, the PAFLU, the SSSEA, Alfredo Fajardo "and all
the officers and members" of the SSSEA commenced the present action, for the purpose stated at
the beginning of this decision, upon the ground that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 violates
their freedom of assembly and association, and is inconsistent with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; that it unduly delegates judicial power to an administrative agency; that said
Section 23 should be deemed repealed by ILO-Convention No. 87; that respondents have acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating, on
November 19, 1963, its decision dated October 22, 1963, beyond the 30-day period provided in
Section 23(c) of Republic Act No. 875; that "there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law"; that the decision complained of had not been
approved by the Secretary of Labor; and that the cancellation of the SSSEA's certificate of
registration would cause irreparable injury.
The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 unduly curtails the freedom of
assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of factual basis. The
registration prescribed in paragraph (b) of said section[1] is not a limitation to the right of assembly
or association, which may be exercised with or without said registration.[2] The latter is merely a
condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by labor organizations, associations
or unions and the possession of the "rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations." The Constitution does not guarantee these rights and privileges, much less said
personality, which are mere statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of which
registration is required to protect both labor and the public against abuses, fraud, or impostors who
pose as organizers, although not truly accredited agents of the union they purport to
represent. Such requirement is a valid exercise of the police power, because the activities in which
labor organizations, associations and union of workers are engaged affect public interest, which
should be protected.[3] Furthermore, the obligation to submit financial statements, as a condition
for the non-cancellation of a certificate of registration, is a reasonable regulation for the benefit of
the members of the organization, considering that the same generally solicits funds or membership,
as well as oftentimes collects, on behalf of its members, huge amounts of money due to them or to
the organization.[4]
For the same reasons, said Section 23 does not impinge upon the right of organization guaranteed
in the Declaration of Human Rights, or run counter to Articles 2, 4, 7 and Section 2 of Article 8 of
the ILO-Convention No. 87, which provide that "workers and employers, x xshall have the right
to establish and x x join organizations of their own choosing, without previous authorization;" that
"workers and employers organizations shall not be liable to be dissolved or suspended by
administrative authority;" that "the acquisition of legal personality by workers' and employers'
organizations, x x shall not be made subject to conditions of such a character as to restrict the
application of the provisions" above mentioned; and that "the guarantees provided for in" said
Convention shall not be impaired by the law of the land.
In B.S.P. v. Araos[5], we held that there is no incompatibility between Republic Act No. 875 and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Upon the other hand, the cancellation of
the SSSEA's registration certificate would not entail a dissolution of said association
orits suspension. The existence of the SSSEA would not be affected by said cancellation,
although its juridical personality and its statutory rights and privileges - as distinguished from
those conferred by the Constitution - would be suspended thereby.
To be registered, pursuant to Section 23 (b) of Republic Act No. 875, a labor organization,
association or union of workers must file with the Department of Labor the following documents:
"(1) A copy of the constitution and by-laws of the organization together with a list of all officers
of the association, their addresses and the address of the principal office of the organization;
'"(2) A sworn statement of all the officers of the said organization, association or union to the
effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and that they are not members of any
organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or
unconstitutional method; and
"(3) If the applicant organization has been in existence for one or more years, a copy of its last
annual financial report."
Moreover, paragraph (d) of said Section ordains that:
"The registration and permit of a legitimate labor organization shall be cancelled by the Depart-
ment of Labor, if the Department has reason to believe that the labor organization no longer meets
one or more of the requirements of paragraph (b) above; or fails to filewith the Department of
Labor either its financial report within the sixty days of the end of its fiscal year or the names of
its new officers along with their non-subversive affidavits as outlined in paragraph; (b) above
within sixty days of their election; however, the Department of Labor shall not order the
cancellation of the registration and permit without due notice and hearing, as provided under
paragraph (c) above, and the affected labor organization shall have the same right of appeal to the
courts as previously provided."[6]
The determination of the question whether the requirements of paragraph (b) have been met, or,
whether or not the requisite financial report or non-subversive affidavits have been filed within the
period above stated, is not judicial power. Indeed, all officers of the government, including those
in the executive department, are supposed to act on the basis of facts, as they see the same. This
is specially true as regards administrative agencies given by law the power to investigate and
render decisions concerning details related to the execution of laws the enforcement of which is
entrusted thereto. Hence, speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Reyes (J.B.L.) had occasion to say:
"The objections of the appellees to the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056, not only as an
undue delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works but also for being
unreasonable and arbitrary, are not tenable. It will be noted that the Act (R.A. 2056) merely
empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon public
streams, constructions that no private person was anyway entitled to make, because the bed of
navigable streams is public property, and ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse
possession (Palanca vs. Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 449).
"It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily involves
the determination of some questions of fact, such as the existence of the stream and its previous
navigable character; but these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental
to the exercise of the power granted by law to clear navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions
or encroachments, and authorities are clear that they are validly conferable upon executive
officials provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required by
Republic Act No. 2056, section 2."[7]
It should be noted, also, that, admittedly, the SSSEA had not filed the non-subversive affidavits of
some of its officers - "Messrs. Sison, Tolentino, Atienza, Zalameda, Sabino and Pefianca" -
although said organization avers that these persons "were either resigned or out on leave as
directors or officers of the union," without specifying who had resigned and who were on
leave. This averment is, moreover,controverted by respondents herein.
Again, the 30-day period invoked by the petitioners is inapplicable to the decision complained
of. Said period is prescribed in paragraph (c)[8] of Section 23, which refers to the proceedings for
the "registration" of labor organizations, associations or unions not to the "cancellation" of said
registration, which is governed by the above-quoted paragraph (d) of the same section.
Independently of the foregoing, we have repeatedly held that legal provisions prescribing the
period within which a decision should be rendered are directory, not mandatory in nature - in the
sense that, a judgment promulgated after the expiration of said period is not null and void, although
the officer who failed to comply with law may be dealt with administratively, in consequence of
his delays[9] - unless the intention to the contrary is manifest. Such, however, is not the import of
said paragraph (c). In the language of Black:
"When a statute specifies the time at or within which an act is to be done by a public officer or
body, it is generally held to be directory only as to the time, and not mandatory, unless time is of
the essence of the thing to be done, or the language of the statute contains negative words, or shows
that the designation of the time was intended as a limitation of power, authority or right."[10]
Then, again, there is no law requiring the approval, by the Secretary of Labor, of the decision of
the Registrar decreeing the cancellation of a registration certificate. In fact, the language of para-
graph (d) of Section 23 suggests that, once the conditions therein specified are present, the office
concerned "shall" have no choice but to issue the order of cancellation. Moreover, in the case at
bar, there is nothing, as yet, for the Secretary of Labor to approve or disapprove, since petitioners'
motion for reconsideration of the Registrar's decision of October 23, 1963, is still pending
resolution. In fact, this circumstance shows, not only that the present action is premature[11], but,
also, that petitioners have failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to
them.[12] Indeed, they could ask the Secretary of Labor to disapprove the Registrar's decision or
object to its execution or enforcement, in the absence of approval of the former, if the same were
necessary, on which we need not and do not express any opinion.
In view of the foregoing, the petition herein should be, as it is hereby dismissed, and the writs
prayed for denied, with costs against the petitioners.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH EXPRESSION OR PRESS

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EN BANC

[ GR No. 69899, Jul 15, 1985 ]

ROMMEL CORRO v. ESTEBAN LISING +

DECISION

222 Phil. 77
RELOVA, J.:
On September 29, 1983, respondent Regional Trial Court Judge Esteban Lising of Quezon City,
upon application filed by Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal
Investigation Service, issued Search Warrant No. Q-00002 authorizing the search and seizure of

"1. Printed copies of Philippine Times;

2. Manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine Times;

3. Newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times;

4. Subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners;

Typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines, video

5.
machines and tapes
which have been used and are being used as instrument and means of committing the crime
of inciting to sedition defined and penalized under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by PD 1835 x x x" (p. 24, Rollo)

On November 6, 1984, petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to return
documents/personal properties alleging among others that:

"2. x x x the properties seized are typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape
recording machines, video machines and tapes which are not in any way, inanimate or mute things
as they are, connected with the offense of inciting to sedition.

"3. More so, documents or papers seized purporting to do the body of the crime has been rendered
moot and academic due to the findings of the Agrava Board that a military conspiracy was
responsible for the slaying of the late Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 at the
Manila International Airport. The Agrava Board which has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine
the facts and circumstances behind the killing had virtually affirmed by evidence testamentary and
documentary the fact that soldiers killed Benigno Aquino, Jr.

"4. More so, the grave offense of libel, RTC, Q.C. Branch XCV has dismissed said case against
the accused on all documents pertinent and more so as we repeat, rendered moot and academic by
the recent Agrava Report." (p. 27, Rollo)
On January 28, 1985, respondent Judge Lising denied the motion in a resolution, pertinent portions
of which state:

"x x x The said articles presently form part of the evidence of the prosecution and they are not
under the control of the prosecuting arm of the government. Under these circumstances, the proper
forum from which the petition to withdraw the articles should be addressed, is the Office of the
City Fiscal, Quezon City and not with this Branch of the Court. It is to be further noted that it is
not even with this Branch of the Court that the offense of inciting to sedition is pending." (p.
29 Rollo)
Hence, this petition for certiorariand mandamus, with application for preliminary injunction and
restraining order to enjoin respondent Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 98
from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 83-Q-29243, praying: (a) that Search Warrant
No. Q-00002 issued by respondent Judge Esteban M. Lising be declared null and void ab initio and
that a mandatory injunction be issued directing respondents City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City
and Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo and 1st Lt. Godofredo Ignacio jointly and severally to return
immediately the documents/properties illegally seized from herein petitioner and that final
injunction be issued enjoining respondents City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, Lt. Col. Castillo
and 1st Lt. Ignacio from utilizing said documents/properties as evidence in Criminal Case No.
29243; and (b) that respondent PC-CIS officers Lt. Col. Berlin A. Castillo and 1st Lt. Godofredo
Ignacio be directed to reopen the padlocked office premises of the Philippine Times at 610
Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Building, T. M. Kalaw, Ermita, Manila

In Our Resolution of February 19, 1985, respondents were required to file their comment. The plea
for temporary restraining order was granted and respondents City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City,
Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo and 1st Lt. Godofredo Ignacio were enjoined from introducing as evidence
for the state the documents/properties seized under Search Warrant No. Q-00002 in Criminal Case
No. Q-29243 (Sedition case against petitioner), pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 98, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from the Court.

Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that (1) the present action
is premature because petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration of respondent Judge
Lising's order of January 28, 1985; (2) probable cause exists justifying the issuance of a search
warrant; (3) the articles seized were adequately described in the search warrant; (4) a search was
conducted in an orderly manner; (5) the padlocking of the searched premises was with the consent
of petitioner's wife; (6) the findings of the Agrava Board is irrelevant to the issue of the validity of
the search warrant; (7) press freedom is not an issue; and, (8) the petition is barred by laches.

There is merit in the petition.

Respondents contend that petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the order in
question before coming to Us. This is not always so. When the questions raised before the Supreme
Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in and passed upon by the lower court, the
filing of the motion for reconsideration in said court before certiorarican be instituted in the
Supreme Court is no longer a prerequisite. As held in Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA
823, "[t]he rule requiring the filing of a motion for reconsideration before an application for a writ
of certiorarican be entertained was never intended to be applied without considering the
circumstances. The rule does not apply where, the deprivation of petitioners' fundamental right to
due process taints the proceeding against them in the court below not only with irregularity but
also with nullity." Likewise, in Pajo, et al. vs. Ago, et al., 108 Phil. 905 and in Gonzales vs. Court
of Appeals, 3 SCRA 465, this Court ruled that "it is only when questions are raised for the first
time before the high court in a certioraricase that the writ shall not issue, unless the lower court
had first been given an opportunity to pass upon the same." Further, in the case of Matute vs. Court
of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768, We held that "while as a matter of policy a motion for reconsideration
in the lower court has often been considered a condition sine qua non for the granting of a writ of
certiorari, this rule does not apply 'where the proceeding in which the error occurred is a patent
nullity' or where 'the deprivation of petitioner's fundamental right to due process x x x taints the
proceeding against him in the court below not only with irregularity but with nullity' (Luzon Surety
Co. v. Marbella, et al., L-16038, Sept. 30, 1960), or when special circumstances warrant immediate
and more direct action. x x x." The records of this petition clearly disclose that the issues herein
raised have already been presented to and passed upon by the court a quo.

Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides:

"SEC. 3. x x x no search warrant or warrant of arrest issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
and, Section 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court, states that:

"SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
Probable cause may be defined as "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, as will
warrant a cautious man in the belief that his actions, and the means taken in prosecuting it, are
legally just and proper (Burton vs. St. Paul, M & M. Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 189, cited in U.S. vs.
Addison, 28 Phil. 566)." Thus, an application for search warrant must state with particularity the
alleged subversive materials published or intended to be published by the publisher and editor of
the Philippine Times, Rommel Corro. As We have stated in Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, 133 SCRA 800, "mere generalization will not suffice." A search
warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. "The
evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only
those, particularly described in the searched warrant to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and
seizures may not be committed, that abuses may not be committed (Bache & Co. (Phil), Inc. vs.
Ruiz, supra)." The affidavit of Col. Castillo states that in several issues of the Philippine Times:

"x x x we found that the said publication in fact foments distrust and hatred against the government
of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities, defined and penalized by Article 142 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1835;" (p. 22, Rollo)
and, the affidavit of Lt. Ignacio reads, among others

"x x x the said periodical published by Rommel Corro, contains articles tending to incite distrust
and hatred for the Government of the Philippines or any of its duly constituted authorities." (p.
23, Rollo)
The above statements are mere conclusions of law and will not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. They can not serve as basis for the issuance of search warrant, absent of the existence of
probable cause. In fact, as a consequence of the search warrant issued, the items confiscated from
the premises of the office of the Philippine Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Bldg., T.
M. Kalaw, Ermita, Manila were the following:

1. One bundle of assorted negative;

2. One bundle of assorted lay out;
Three folders of assorted articles/writings used by Philippine Times news and other
3.
paraphernalias;
Four tape alleged speech of Mayor Climaco, two alleged speeches of Aquino and a speech
4.
of one various artist;
5. One bundle Dummies;
Ten bundles of assorted copies of Philippine Times issued on different dates (Nos. 6, 7,
6.
8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15);
7. One Typewriter Remington Brand Long Carriage with No. J 2479373;
8. One Typewriter Adler-short with No. 9003011;
9. Three (3) bundles of Philippine Times latest issue for Baguio City (p. 26, Rollo)
In Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, this Court held that search warrants authorizing the seizure
of books of accounts and records "showing all the business transactions" of certain persons,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal, contravene the explicit comment of the
Bill of Rights that the things to be seized should be particularly described and defeat its major
objective of eliminating general warrants. In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by
respondent judge allowed seizure of printed copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of
articles for publication, newspaper dummies, subversive documents, articles, etc., and even
typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines. Thus, the
language used is so all embracing as to include all conceivable records and equipment of petitioner
regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the
nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally objectionable.

Respondents do not deny the fact that the business office of the "Philippine Times" of which
petitioner was the publisher-editor was padlocked and sealed. The consequence is, the printing and
publication of said newspaper were discontinued. In Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, supra, We held that "[s]uch closure is in the nature of previous restraint
or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and
constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of
being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press
is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry."

Finally, respondents argue that while the search warrant was issued on September 29, 1983 and
was executed on the very same day, it was only on November 6, 1984, or one (1) year, one (1)
month and six (6) days when petitioner filed his motion for the recall of the warrant and the return
of the documents/personal properties. Having failed to act seasonably, respondents claim that
petitioner is guilty of laches.

Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April
15, 1968, 23 SCRA 35).
In his petition, Corro alleged that on October 1, 1983, less than forty-two (42) hours after the
military operatives shut down his newspaper on September 29, 1983, he was invited by the
Director/General PC/INP, and subsequently detained. Thereafter, he was charged with the crime
of inciting to sedition before the City Fiscal's Office in Quezon City, and on October 7, 1983, a
preventive detention action was served upon him. Consequently, he had to file a petition for habeas
corpus. It was only on November 8, 1984 when this Court issued its Resolution in G. R. No. 68976,
entitled: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rommel Corro; Angie Corro vs.
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., releasing Rommel Corro on recognizance of his lawyers, Attys.
Humberto B. Basco, Reynaldo Bagatsing and Edilberto Balce. In the same month, November
1984, petitioner filed his motion to recall warrant and to return the seized documents. When
respondent judge denied the motion, he came to Us.

Considering the above circumstances, the claim that petitioner had abandoned his right to the
possession of the seized properties is incorrect.

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. Q-00002 issued by the respondent judge on September 29,
1983 is declared null and void and, accordingly, SET ASIDE.

The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is GRANTED
and all properties seized thereunder are hereby ordered RELEASED to petitioner. Further,
respondents Lt. Col. Berlin A. Castillo and 1st Lt. Godofredo M. Ignacio are ordered to RE-OPEN
the padlocked office premises of the Philippine Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Bldg.,
T. M. Kalaw, Ermita, Manila.

SO ORDERED.

[ GR No. L-62992, Sep 28, 1984 ]

ARLENE BABST v. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD

217 Phil. 302

PLANA, J.:
This was originally a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction which was superseded
by the amended and supplemental petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by
petitioners on March 3, 1983, seeking to prohibit the respondents (a) from issuing subpoenas or
letters of invitation to petitioners and interrogating them, and (b) from filing libel suits on matters
that have been the subject of inquiry by respondent National Intelligence Board (NIB).
Petitioners are columnists, feature article writers and reporters of various local publications. At
different dates since July, 1980, some of them have allegedly been summoned by military
authorities who have subjected them to sustained interrogation on various aspects of their works,
feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives. Typical of the letters
received by the petitioners from respondent NIB is that addressed to petitioner Arlene Babst, dated
December 20, 1982, which reads:
"Madam:
"Pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, you are hereby requested to appear before this
Special Committee at Philippine Army Officer's Clubhouse, Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila (sketch
attached), 9:00 A.M., December 22, 1982, to shed light on confidential matters being looked into
by this Committee.
"Your failure to appear on the specified date and place shall be considered as a waiver on your part
and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO C. ESTRADA
Brig. General, AFP (Ret.)
Chairman"
Aside from the interrogations, a criminal complaint for libel was filed by Brig. Gen. Artemio
Tadiar, Jr. on February 9, 1983 with the Office of the City Fiscal, Manila, against petitioners
Domini Torrevillas-Suarez, editor of the Panorama, and Ma. Ceres Doyo based on an article
written by Doyo and published in the March 28, 1982 issue of the Panorama, on which the author
had been interrogated by respondents. The complaint included a staggering P10 million claim for
damages. (An information for libel has since been filed with the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region against Suarez and Doyo.)
Petitioners maintain that the respondents have no jurisdiction over the proceedings which are
violative of the constitutional guarantee on free expression since they have the effect of imposing
restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media; that they are a punitive ordeal or subsequent
punishment of petitioners for lawful publications; that they amount to a system of censorship,
curtailing the "free flow of information and opinion," indispensable to the right of the people to
know matters of public concern guaranteed in Section 6 of Article IV of the Constitution; and that
they constitute intrusions into spheres of individual liberty. Regarding the libel charge against
Suarez and Doyo, petitioners denounce the filing as instituted with intent to intimidate and based
on illegally obtained evidence, referring to the matters inquired into by respondents in previously
conducted, allegedly illegal interrogations.
In their comment, respondents counter that no issue of jurisdiction exists since they do not pretend
to exercise jurisdiction over the petitioners; that what respondents have sent to petitioners were
neither subpoenas nor summonses, but mere invitations to dialogues which were completely
voluntary, without any compulsion employed on petitioners; that the dialogues themselves were
designed simply to elicit information and exchange ideas; and that the expression of personal
preferences and opinions by members of the respondent Board is not equivalent to the imposition
of norms and guidelines to be followed by petitioners. Relative to the libel case, respondents
contend that petitioners have no cause of action against respondent Board since respondent General
Tadiar is not a member of respondent Board and has filed the libel case in his personal capacity;
and the libel case is not pending before any of the respondents. Furthermore, respondents aver that
this case has been rendered moot and academic because the proceedings before NIB Special
Committee No. 2 (which conducted the interrogations) have already been ordered terminated by
General Fabian C. Ver in his capacity as Director General and Chairman of the NIB, and said
proceedings have in fact been terminated.
The petition is premised upon the alleged illegality and unconstitutionality of the issuance by
respondent NIB to petitioners of letters of invitation, their subsequent interrogation, and the filing
of the aforementioned libel suit.
Under the circumstances of the case, the petition cannot be granted.
The assailed proceedings have come to an end. The acts sought to be prohibited (i.e., the issuance
of letters of invitation and subsequent interrogations) have therefore been abated, thereby
rendering the petition moot and academic as regards the aforesaid matters.
Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer
some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or
constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily
assume a different appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed
predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the country has just emerged from
martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely
been lifted, and the designated interrogation site is a military camp, the same can easily be taken,
not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as an authoritative command which
one can only defy at his peril, especially where, as in the instant case, the invitation carries the
ominous warning that "failure to appear...shall be considered as a waiver...and this Committee will
be constrained to proceed in accordance with law." Fortunately, the NIB director general and
chairman saw the wisdom of terminating the proceedings and the unwelcome interrogation.
Similarly, prohibition will not issue in respect of the libel charges now pending in court against
two of the petitioners and similar suits that might be filed.
Firstly, the writ of prohibition is directed against a tribunal, board or person acting without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion vis-a-vis certain proceedings pending
before it. The libel cases adverted to are not pending before respondent NIB or any other
respondent.
Secondly, the issue of validity of the libel charges by reason of their alleged collision with freedom
of expression, is a matter that should be raised in the proper forum, i.e., before the court where the
libel cases are pending or where they may be filed. The same rule applies to the issue of
admissibility as evidence of matters that have been elicited in the course of an inquiry or
interrogation conducted by respondent NIB, which petitioners claim to have been illegally
obtained.
Finally, the right to seek redress when libeled is a personal and individual privilege of the
aggrieved party, and no one among the respondent officials has the authority to restrain any of his
subordinates who has been libeled from vindicating his right by instituting a libel suit. Brig. Gen.
Tadiar has filed the libel case against petitioners Suarez and Doyo in his personal capacity.
Moreover, he is not even a member of respondent NIB. And the NIB does not appear to have
anything to do with Gen. Tadiar's private right to complain of libel.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.