Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v.
Phil-American might even be proven that working on a Saturday for
Forwarders
FACTS
Pineda recklessly drove a freight truck [owned by
Phil-American Forwarders] along the national
highway at Pampanga, and the truck bumped the
PRBL bus driven by Pangalangan. As a result,
Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was
damaged and could not be used for 79 days, thus
depriving PRBL of earnings amounting to P8,665.51.
Balingit was the manager of Phil-American
Forwarders.
PRBL and Pangalangan filed a complaint for damages
against Phil-American Forwarders, Balingit, and
Pineda. Defendants said Balingit was not Pineda’s
employer. Balingit moved that the complaint against him
be dismissed on the ground that PRBL and
Pangalangan had no cause of action against him. CFI
dismissed the complaint against Balingit, on the
ground that he is not the manager of an
establishment as contemplated in NCC 2180.
ISSUE AND HOLDING
WON the terms “employers” and “owners and
managers of an establishment or enterprise” embrace
the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the
reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the
vehicular accident from which the damage arose. NO.
RATIO
Those terms do not include the manager of a
corporation. It may be gathered from the context of
NCC 2180 that the term “manager” (“director” in the
Spanish version) is used in the sense of “employer”.
Hence, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be
imposed on Balingit as manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, in connection with the vehicular accident in
question, because he himself may be regarded as an
employee or dependiente of Phil-American
Forwarders.
CFI AFFIRMED
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Genson vs Adarle
FACTS
Arbatin was the successful bidder in a public auction
of junk and other unserviceable government property
in the Highway District Engineer’s Office of Roxas
City. Arbatin then employed Adarle to help him haul the
junk. On a non-working day, when Adarle and
Buensalido, the driver of the payloader, were at the site
continuing to gather the junk, a bucket from the
payloader fell and injured Adarle to the point of
paralyzing his lower extremities. Adarle instituted an
action against Arbatin, Buensalido, Marcelino (Civil
Engineer), and Genson (Highway District Engineer).
RTC ruled in favor of Adarle. IAC modified the
previous ruling, absolving Marcelino from liability,
and averring that the liability of Genson is based on
fault, by allowing Arbatin and his men to work on the
premises on a non-working day, in contravention of
his office’s policy. Petitioner Genson then appealed the
decision to the SC, stating that the facts upon which
the IAC declared that his liability is based on fault by
allowing the men to work on a non-working holiday is
without basis. Furthermore, he contends that by filing
a suit against him, Adarle is then filing a suit against
the Republic, which violates the non-suability of the
State.
ISSUE
Whether or not Genson should be held liable,
personally or officially?
HELD
NO. With regard to the non-suability contention,
Adarle filed a suit against Genson personally, in his
capacity as the Highway District Engineer, and not
the State or his office. As for the main issue, there
was no evidence to prove Genson’s presence when the
accident occurred, nor was there any basis for the lower
courts to hold that Genson was at fault by authorizing
Arbatin and his men to work on a non-working day. It
the specific purpose of hauling junk would be the time
when the most work can be done, as it has less traffic.
The Master-Servant doctrine in tort law cannot apply
either, since despite the fact that Buensalido,
Genson’s employee, was “moonlighting” on a non-
working holiday, Buensalido’s arrangement with Arbatin
was purely private in nature, and had nothing to do with
his being employed under Genson. Thus, absent the
showing of malice, bad faith or gross negligence on the
part of Genson, he cannot be held liable for the acts
committed by Buensalido and Arbatin.
Martin vs CA
FACTS:
Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car bearing
license plate No. NPA-930. At around 2 o’clock in the
morning of May 11, 1982, while being driven by Nestor
Martin, it crashed into a Meralco electric post on Valley
Golf Road, in Antipolo, Rizal. The car was wrecked and
the pole severely damaged. Meralco subsequently
demanded reparation from Ernesto Martin, but the
demand was rejected. It thereupon sued him for
damages in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, alleging
that he was liable to it as the employer of Nestor
Martin. The petitioner’s main defense was that Nestor
Martin was not his employee. Meralco did not present
any evidence to prove that Nestor Martin was the
employee of Ernesto Martin and Ernesto Martin did
not rebut such allegation.
ISSUE:
WON Ernesto Martin can be held liable.
HELD:
NO. Meralco had the burden of proof, or the duty “to
present evidence on the fact in issue necessary to
establish his claim” as required by Rule 131, Section 1 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Failure to do this was fatal
to its action. As the employment relationship between
Ernesto Martin and Nestor Martin could not be
presumed, it was necessary for the plaintiff to
establish it by evidence. It was enough for the
defendant to deny the alleged employment
relationship, without more, for he was not under
obligation to prove this negative averment. This Court
has consistently applied the rule that “if the plaintiff,
upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of
action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts
upon which he bases his claim, the defendant is under
no obligation to prove his exception or defense.”
Petition was granted.
Cuison vs Norton & Harrison Co.
This is an action brought by the father to recover
damages in the amount of P30,000 for the death of his
son, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of
the defendant. The answer pleaded the general issue.
The judgment in the Court of First Instance absolved
the defendant from the complaint, without
pronouncement as to costs.
A succinct statement of the facts will be first
undertaken as follows: On the afternoon of August 9,
1928, Moises Cuison, a boy 7 years of age, the son of
the plaintiff, was on his way to the Santa Mesa
School, in the City of Manila, in company with his
sister Marciana. As they came near to the fire station,
some large pieces of lumber on a truck which had
stopped fell from it pinning the boy beneath, and
causing his almost instant death. The truck in
question was owned by Antonio Ora. It was driven by
Felix Jose, with Telesforo Binoya as the washing and
Francisco Bautista as the helper, the two latter being
youths less than 18 years of age. Jose Binoya, and
Bautista were employees of Ora. The truck was rented
by Ora to Norton & Harrison Co. On the truck were
the letters "N-H," which where the first letters of the
firm name. Ora was in the employ of Norton &
Harrison Co. as a capataz. It was his duty as such
employee to direct the loading and transportation of
the lumber. When the accident occurred the lumber
had become loosened, and it was to rearrange it that
the truck halted, without, however, the
rearrangement having been before the pieces of
lumber had fallen and killed the boy.
Important details were not brought out in the
testimony, although it would have been easy to supply
those details. The most important question of fact to
determine was the relationship of Ora to Norton &
Harrison Co., whether he was a servant of the
company or an independent contractor. In view of the
debatable facts found in the record, and in view of the
propriety of obtaining as much enlightenment as
possible on the main issue, it is deemed advisable to
set forth a considerable portion of Ora’s testimony. He
testified:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. Do you know the truck T-101? — A. Yes, sir. "Q.
Whose is that truck? — A. Mine.
"Q. Showing you this document which I ask to be
marked Exhibit 1 (certificate of ownership of a truck)
state what is that document? — A. This is the
document of my truck.
"Q. On August 9, 1928, when, according to the
complaint the boy Moises Cuison was killed, was that
truck used? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. For whom? — A. For me.
"Q. For what kind of work? — A. For loading lumber.
"Q. Lumber of whom? — A. Of Norton & Harrison Co.
"Q. Where was the lumber to be taken? — A. To Santa
Mesa.
"Q. What was the agreement between you and Norton
& Harrison regarding the transportation of lumber to
Santa Mesa?
"A. The truck carried the lumber which I contracted
with Norton & Harrison for transportation to certain
places. I had an agreement with Norton & Harrison to
carry and transport lumber coming from its lumber
yard to the place of its destination.
"Q. Did you rent the truck to Norton & Harrison
monthly or annually? — A. By the cubic foot,
depending upon the distance travelled.
"Q. Do you know Telesforo Binoya y Alminanza and
Francisco Bautista y Cruz? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Had they anything to do with the loading of the
lumber of Norton & Harrison on the truck?
"A. The said Bautista and Binoya were not the ones
who did the loading on my truck. There were other
persons stronger than these two who did the loading.
"Q. What I mean to say is whether Binoya and
Bautista, on August 9, 1928, when the truck went to
the office of Norton & Harrison to carry lumber to
Santa Mesa, had anything to do with the loading of
the lumber on said truck? — A. No, sir.
"Q. In your agreement with Norton & Harrison for the
transportation of lumber, who was under the
obligation to load the lumber on my truck and take it
to its destination.
"Q. But who was to do the loading of the lumber, your
men or their men? — A. My men.
"Q. You said that you are an employee? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. here are you employed? — A. In the firm of Norton &
Harrison.
"Q. Since when? — A. Since 1911.
"Q. In what capacity? — A. As foreman.
"Q. What kind of work do you have? — A. Foreman.
"Q. Capataz? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And as foreman, are you in the charge of paying
the wages of the workers? — A. No, sir.
"Q. Therefore you are the capataz who directs the
loading and transportation of lumber? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Please see Exhibit I of the plaintiff and state if
truck T- 101 is what appears therein? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Do you admit that the condition of that truck on
August 9, 1928, is as it appears in this photograph? —
A. Yes, sir.
"Q. What explanation can you give the court
accounting for the sign ’N-H’ appearing there means
that the lumber belongs to Norton & Harrison.
"Q. And as foreman of Norton & Harrison, do you
receive any salary? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. How much? — A. P200.
"Q. You said that you entered into a contract with
Norton & Harrison, do you have a copy of that
contract? — A. No, sir, we had an agreement and not a
contract.
"Q. Verbal agreement? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. How do you collect the rent of the truck, monthly
or daily? — A. It depends upon the cargo and the
distance travelled.
"Q. Daily? — A. If I have loaded three times, then I have
three collections.
"Q. Do you issue receipts therefor? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Have you any with you? — A. I don’t have. "Q. Can
that truck of yours be rented by anybody? — A. No, sir.
"Q. Only by Norton & Harrison? — A. Only for my
work.
"Q. Do you have with you any books of account
pertaining to the business of your truck? — A. No, sir.
"Q. Not even a note? — A. I don’t have.
"Q. Not even the firm of Norton & Harrison? — A.
They may have because the number of the truck and the
total number of board feet appear on every receipt.
"Q. As owner of the truck, don’t you have any note? —
A. No, sir.
"Q. Is that truck No. T-101 the only one you have? —
A. I have some more.
"Q. Some more? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. For rent? — A. For my own use.
"Q. For the exclusive use of Norton & Harrison? — A. I
have a lime factory, and they are used for the
transportation of lime.
"Q. But this truck T-101 is exclusively intended to be
rented by Norton & Harrison? — A. It is not rented
exclusively to Norton & Harrison. I use it in my other
contracts to carry cargoes, and also to carry lime.
"Q. For the exclusive use of Norton & Harrison? — A.
No, sir, I use it also for the transportation of lime."
It is evident from the foregoing that Ora was a
contractor and an employee at the same time of
Norton & Harrison Co. Reverting now to the law,
counsel for neither party has considered it necessary
to assist the court in this regard. However, just as the
ascertainment of the facts is important, so is it
important to have before us the applicable law.
The Penal Code makes provision for the civil liability
of persons criminally liable, and establishes
subsidiary liability for persons and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies and
misdemeanors committed by their servants in the
discharge of their duties. (Penal Code, arts. 17-20). In
this instance, recurring to facts, it should have been
mentioned that the two youths, Binoya and Bautista,
pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through
reckless negligence, and were sentenced accordingly.
The basis of civil law liability is not respondeat
superior but the relationship of paterfamilias. This
theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on
his own negligence and not on that of his servant.
(Bahia v. Litonjua and Levnes [1915], 30 Phil., 624;
Cango v. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768. As
to Porto Rico, see Acosta v. Porto Rico Gas Co. [1915],
7 Porto Rico Fed., 475; and Ortiz v. Ezquiaga [1918],
10 Porto Rico Fed., 350.) Article 1902 of the Civil Code
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Any person who by an act or omission causes damage
to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for
the damage so done." Article 1903, paragraphs 4 and 7
of the same Code provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Owners or directors of any establishment or business
are, in the same way, liable for any damages caused
by their employees while engaged in the branch of the
service in which employed, or on occasion of the
performance of their duties.
"The liability imposed by this article shall cease in
case the persons subject thereto prove that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is well to repeat that under the civil law an
employer is only liable for the negligence of his
employees in the discharge of their respective duties.
The defense of independent contractor would be a
valid one in the Philippines just as it would be in the
United States. Here Ora was a contractor, but it does
not necessarily follow that he was an independent
contractor. The reason for this distinction is that the
employer retained the power of directing and
controlling the work. The chauffeur and the two
persons on the truck were the employees of Ora, the
contractor, but Ora, the contractor, was an employee
of Norton & Harrison Co., charged with the duty of
directing the loading and transportation of the
lumber. And it was the negligence in loading the
lumber and the use of minors on the truck which
caused the death of the unfortunate boy. On the facts
and the law, Ora was not an independent contractor,
but was the servant of the defendant, and for his
negligence defendant was responsible.
Conceding that the record discloses a most unusual
state of facts, and conceding that the evidence is not
as ample as it should be, nevertheless on the record as
it is and on the law as it is, it is incumbent on the
court to rule that error was committed in the lower
court in not awarding the father of the dead boy
damages for the wrongful death of his son. It has been
practice of this court in cases of death through
negligence, in the absence of special proof, to allow the
sum of P1,000. (Manzanares v. Moreta [1918], 38
Phil., 821; Bernal and Enverso v. House and Tacloban
Electric & Ice Plant [1930], 54 Phil., 327.)
Judgment will be reversed, and in the court of origin
another judgment will issue in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant for the sum of P1,000. So
ordered, without special finding as to costs in either
instance.
Pilipinas Petroleum vs CA
Facts: Clarita T. Camacho, the operator of a gasoline
station in Baguio City wherein she sells Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corp.’s (Shell) petroleum products,
requested Shell to conduct a hydro-pressure test on the
underground storage tanks of the said station in order to
determine whether or not the sales losses she was
incurring for the past several months were due to
leakages therein. Shell acceded to the said request
and one Jesus “Jessie” Feliciano together with other
workers came to Clarita's station with a Job Order from
Shell to perform the hydro-pressure test. Jessie
conducted the necessary procedures to carry out the
said test.
At around 5:30 a.m. the next day, Clarita’s husband
opened the station and started selling gasoline. At about
6:00 a.m. however, the customers who had bought
gasoline returned to the station complaining that
their vehicles stalled because there was water in the
gasoline that they bought. On account of this, Clarita
was constrained to replace the gasoline sold to the
said customers. However, a certain Eduardo
Villanueva, one of the customers, filed a complaint
with the police against Camacho for selling the
adulterated gasoline. In addition, he caused the
incident to be published in two local newspapers.
Shell undertook to settle the criminal complaint filed
by Villanueva. Subsequently, Villanueva filed an
Affidavit of Desistance. Thereafter, Camacho filed
before the trial court a complaint for damages against
Shell due to the latter’s alleged negligence in the
conduct of the hydro-pressure test in her gasoline
station. For its part, Shell denied liability because,
according to it, the hydro-pressure test on the
underground storage tanks was conducted by an
independent contractor. The trial court dismissed the
complaint which ruling was reversed by the Court of
Appeals.
Issue: Whether Shell should be held accountable for
the damage to Camacho due to the hydro-pressure test
conducted by Feliciano
Decision: It is a well-entrenched rule that an
employer-employee relationship must exist before an
employer may be held liable for the negligence of his
employee. Respondent Court of Appeals coneluded
that Feliciano was not an independent contractor but
was under the control and supervision of petitioner in
the performance of the hydro-pressure test, hence, it
held petitioner liable for the former’s acts and
omissions. We are not in accord with the above finding
of respondent Court of Appeals. As aptly held by the trial
court, petitioner did not exercise control and supervision
over Feliciano with regard to the manner in which he
conducted the hydro-pressure test.
Feliciano is independently maintaining a business
under a duly registered business name “JFS Repair
and Maintenance Service,” and is duly registered with
the Bureau of Domestic Trade. He does not enjoy a
fixed salary but instead charges a lump sum
consideration for every piece of work he accomplishes.
If he is not able to finish his work, he does not get
paid, as what happened in this case. Further,
Feliciano utilizes his own tools and equipment and
has a complement of workers. Neither is he required
to work on a regular basis. Instead, he merely awaits
calls from clients such as petitioner whenever repairs
and maintenance services are requested. Moreover,
Feliciano does not exclusively service petitioner
because he can accept other business but not from
other oil companies. All these are the hallmarks of an
independent contractor. Being an independent
contractor, Feliciano is responsible for his own acts
and omissions. As he alone was in control over the
manner of how he was to undertake the
hydro-pressure test, he alone must bear the
consequences of his negligence, if any, in the conduct of
the same.
Anent the issue of damages, the same has been
rendered moot by the failure of private respondent to
establish an employer-employee relationship between
petitioner and Feliciano. Absent said relationship,
petitioner cannot be held liable for the acts and
omissions of the independent contractor, Feliciano.
De Leon Brokerage vs CA
Relevant Legal Doctrine: The fact of the driver’s
negligence gave rise to the presumption that the
employer had been negligent in the selection and
supervision of its employees. Exercise of the requisite
care and diligence is a matter of defense for the
employer.
Nature: Review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila
Facts: Respondent Angeline Steen, a pretty girl of
sixteen, suffered injuries as a result of the collision
between the passenger jeepney in which she was
riding, and petitioner's cargo truck recklessly driven
by its employee, Luna, and for which the latter had
been prosecuted and convicted of the crime of
homicide with physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. In the criminal action against Luna (and
the driver of the passenger jeepney, who was,
however, acquitted), respondent had reserved her
right to file a separate civil action.
After a judgment of conviction had been rendered,
respondent filed in the CFI Manila an action for
recovery of damages against Luna and petitioner De
Leon Brokerage. As proof of Luna's negligence, she
presented during the hearing the judgment of
conviction in the criminal case, Exh. B; and likewise
established her claim for actual, moral and exemplary
damages.
Defendants, that is, Luna and petitioner, sought to
prove by means of the former's testimony that he was
not engaged in the performance of his duties at the
time of the accident.
CFI and CA: held De Leon Brokerage and Luna
solidarily liable to respondent for the sums of
P1,183.70 for actual expenses; P3,000.00 for unpaid
medical fees; P7,000.00 as moral damages; and
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees; all amount to earn legal
interest from the filing of the complaint, plus costs.
De Leon Brokerage claims that:
(1) the allegations in respondent's complaint were so
ambiguous that it was not clear whether she was
suing for damages resulting from a quasi-delict or for
civil liability arising from crime, but since the
averments therein are more characteristic of an action
of the latter nature, the same, as against petitioner, is
premature for failure to allege the insolvency of its
employee;
(2) the judgment of conviction Exh. B, is not
admissible against it as evidence of a quasi-delict;
(3) the employee, Luna, was not in the discharge of his
duties at the time of the accident; and
(4) it cannot be held solidarily liable with Luna for
damages.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the complaint of respondent was
based on a quasi-delict. YES.
She alleged that she suffered injuries because of the
carelessness and imprudence of petitioner's chauffeur
who was driving the cargo truck belonging to
petitioner, which collided with the passenger jeepney
wherein she was riding. Since averment had been
made of the employer-employee relationship and of
the damages caused by the employee on occasion of
his function, there is a clear statement of a right of
action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The
complaint does not, and did not have to allege that
petitioner did not exercise due diligence in choosing
and supervising Luna, because this is a matter of
defense.
Respondent is holding De Leon Brokerage liable for
its own lack of care. Her allegation "that the acts of
the defendants above described consitutute gross
negligence and recklessness", plainly refers to
petitioner's act of employing Luna as driver of its
cargo truck, and to Luna's careless manner of driving
it.
Whatever doubts remain as to the nature of
respondent's action are resolved by her prayer that
petitioner and its employee be held solidarily liable
(2) Whether or not the action is for civil indemnity
under the criminal code. NO.
According to petitioner, what causes confusion as to
the nature of respondent's action are the allegations of
Luna's conviction (a copy of the judgment of conviction
was attached of her civil action — circumstances,
petitioner argues, which infallibly characterize an action
for civil indemnity under the criminal code.
But respondent clearly did not base her suit on the
criminal conviction. Mention of the criminal
conviction merely tended to support her claim that
Luna had been recklessly negligent in driving the
truck.
Respondent neither had to wait for the termination of
the criminal proceeding nor to reserve in the same her
right to file a separate civil action. She waited for the
results of the criminal action because she wanted to
be sure which driver and respective employer she
could rightly sue, since both Luna and the driver of
the passenger jeepney were prosecuted. An she
reserved because otherwise, the court in the criminal
proceeding would have awarded her indemnity, since
the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense is deemed instituted with the
criminal action. In such event, she would no longer be
able to file the separate civil action contemplated by
the civil code, not because of failure to reserve the
same but because she would have already received
indemnity for her injuries.
Plainly, the reservation made in the criminal action
does not preclude a subsequent action based on a
quasi-delict. It cannot be inferred therefrom that
respondent had chosen to file the very civil action she
had reserved. The only conclusion that can reasonably
be drawn is that she did not want the question of
damages threshed out in the criminal action, but
preferred to have this issue decided in a separate civil
action.
However, it seems that petitioner understood quite
well that it was being held liable under the civil code.
In its answer, it alleged as an affirmative defense that
in the selection and supervision of its employees and
drivers, it had exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family — a defense available only to an employer
being sued for a quasi-delict. Petitioner argues that, not
knowing the nature of respondent's action and deciding
to play it safe, it put up defense both against a suit for
quasi-delict and against an action for civil liability
arising from crime. Yet, it did not aver that the
complaint failed to alleged that its employee was
insolvent — the defense consistent with an action
against an employer for subsidiary liability under the
criminal code. What it alleged was that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action as against it, which could
not be sustained since the complaint sufficiently alleges
an action based on quasi-delict and the court could
validly have granted respondent's prayer for relief.
The fact of Luna’s negligence gave rise to the
presumption that petitioner had been negligent in the
selection and supervision of its employees. Petitioner
failed to prove that it had exercised such requisite
care and diligence as would relieve it from
responsibility.
(3) Whether or not Luna was in the performance of his
duties at the time of the collision. YES.
Luna testified that on the day of the accident he had
been instructed to go to Pampanga, from there to
proceed to Nueva Ecija, but that after unloading his
cargo in Pampanga, he at once returned to
Manila.However, his reason for immediately
returning to Manila is not clear. He could have
returned for purposes of repair. It does not appear
that he was on an errand of his own. In the absence of
determinative proof that the deviation was so
complete as would constitute a cessation or
suspension of his service, petitioner should be held
liable. Since both Luna and petitioner are responsible
for the quasi-delict, their liablity is solidary, although
the latter can recover from the former whatever sums
it pays to respondent.
(4) Whether or not the employer only becomes
solidarily liable with the driver for any accident when
the owner is riding in the car at the time of the
mishap. NO.
Petitioner invites attention to Art. 2184, of the Civil
Code, and insists that it is only in the instance
covered thereby — when the owner of the motor vehicle
is riding therein at the time of the mishap — that the
employer becomes solidarily liable with the driver for any
accident resulting from the latter's negligence. That
article refers to owners of vehicles who are not included
in the terms of Art. 2180 "as owners of an
establishment or enterprise."
(5) Whether or not the damages should be reduced.
NO.
The moral damages of P7,000.00 is amply justified by
the pain and disfigurement suffered by respondent, a
pretty girl whose left arm had been scraped bare of
flesh from shoulder to elbow because of the accident.
As a result, she had to undergo seven operations
which cost P3,000.00 — a reasonable enough sum.
Attorney's fees of P1,000.00 is not unconscionable
considering that the case was appealed to this Court.
Dispositive: Petition denied. The decision of the Court
of Appeals is affirmed.
Valenzuela vs CA
FACTS:
June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her
restaurant at Araneta avenue towards the direction of
Manila, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she had
a flat tire so she parked along the sidewalk about 1
1/2 feet away, place her emergency lights and seeked
help
She was with her companion Cecilia Ramon
While she was pointing her tools to the man who
will help her fixed the tires, she was suddenly hit by
another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li who
was intoxicated and she slammed accross his
windshield and fell to the ground
She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20
days and her leg was amputated and was replaced
with an artificial one.
Her expenses totalled 147, 000 [120,000 php
(confinement) + 27, 000 (aritificial leg)]
RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and
liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li’s employer,
jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to
Article 2180 P41,840 actual damages, P37,500
unrealized profits because of the stoppage of plaintiffs
Bistro La Conga restaurant 3 weeks after the accident
on June 24, 1990, P20,000 a month as unrealized
profits of Bistro La Conga restaurant, from August,
1990 until the date of this judgment, P30,000.00, a
month, for unrealized profits in 2 Beauty salons,
P1,000,000 in moral damages, P50,000, as exemplary
damages, P60,000, as reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs.
CA: there was ample evidence that the car was
parked at the side but absolved Li's employer
Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorraborated
Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an
establishment located just across the scene of the
accident: Valenzuela’s car parked parallel and very near
the sidewalk and Li was driving on a very fast speed and
there was only a drizzle (NOT heavy rain)
ISSUE:
1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO
2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory
negligence - NO
3. W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer
should be held liable - YES
4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES.
HELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision
1. NO
If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite
the wet and slippery road, he could have avoided
hitting the Valenzuela by the mere expedient or
applying his brakes at the proper time and distance
it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little
to the right in order to safely avoid a collision with the
on-coming car since there is plenty of space for both
cars, since Valenzuela car was running at the right
lane going towards Manila and the on-coming car was
also on its right lane going to Cubao
2. NO.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of
the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the
harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard
to which he is required to conform for his own
protection
emergency rule
an individual who suddenly finds himself in a
situation of danger and is required to act without
much time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty
of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a
better solution, unless the emergency was brought by
his own negligence
She is not expected to run the entire boulevard
in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark Street
or alley where she would likely find no one to help her
She stopped at a lighted place where there
were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and
to solicit help if needed
she parked along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet
away, behind a Toyota Corona Car
3. YES.
Not the principle of respondeat superior, which
holds the master liable for acts of the servant (must
be in the course of business), but that of pater
familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon
the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence
of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of his employees
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the
employer has exercised diligent supervision of its
employee during the performance of the latter‘s
assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the
liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article
2176 of the Civil Code.
situation is of a different character, involving a
practice utilized by large companies with either their
employees of managerial rank or their
representatives.
Moreover, Li’s claim that he happened to be on the
road on the night of the accident because he was
coming from a social visit with an officemate in
Parañaque was a bare allegation which was never
corroborated in the court below. It was obviously self-
serving. Assuming he really came from his
officemate’s place, the same could give rise to
speculation that he and his officemate had just been
from a work-related function, or they were together to
discuss sales and other work related strategies.
Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated,
to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting
its company car to Li
4. YES.
As the amount of moral damages are subject to this
Court’s discretion, we are of the opinion that the amount
of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater
accord with the extent and nature of the injury -. physical
and psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result
of Li’s grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer
in the early morning hours of the accident.
the damage done to her would not only be
permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently
changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes
which her body would normally undergo through the
years. The replacements, changes, and adjustments
will require corresponding adjustive physical and
occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it has
been documented, are painful.
Dulay vs CA
Facts: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between
Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred
at the “Big Bang Sa Alabang,” Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the
security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and
killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay. Petitioner Maria Benita
A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in
her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children,
filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela
and private respondents Safeguard and/or
Superguard, alleged employers of defendant Torzuela.
Respondent Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that the complaint does not state a valid
cause of action. Superguard claimed that Torzuela’s
act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his
duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was
committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil
liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code. Superguard further alleged that
a complaint for damages based on negligence under
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one
filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability
under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In
addition, the respondent argued that petitioners’ filing
of the complaint is premature considering that the
conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition
sine qua non for the employer’s subsidiary liability.
Respondent Safeguard also filed a motion praying that
it be excluded as defendant on the ground that
defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees.
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their
cause of action against the private respondents is
based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code. Respondent judge declared that the
complaint was one for damages founded on crimes
punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised
Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from,
quasi-delict.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Torzuela’ s act of shooting
Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable
under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code;
(2) Whether or not Article 33 of the New Civil Code
applies only to injuries intentionally committed; and
(3) Whether or not the liability or respondents is
subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
(1) Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides
that “whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.” Contrary to the theory of
private respondents, there is no justification for limiting
the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or
omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched
is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts
committed with negligence, but also acts which are
voluntary and intentional.
(2) No. The term “physical injuries” in Article 33 has
already been construed to include bodily injuries causing
death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in
the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical
injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and
attempted homicide. Although in the Marcia case, it
was held that no independent civil action may be filed
under Article 33 where the crime is the result of
criminal negligence, it must be noted, however, that
Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged
with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas
the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless
imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action
based on Article 33 lies.
(3) No. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code,
when an injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after selection or
both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180
is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee and a
prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private
respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee.
MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and
ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC., respondents.
Facts:
At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990,
plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue
Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant at Marcos
highway to her home. While travelling along Aurora
Blvd., she noticed something wrong with her tires; she
stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to
verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if
needed. Having been told by the people present that
her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach
her home in that car’s condition, she parked along the
sidewalk, about 1½ feet away, put on her emergency
lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to
open the trunk.
She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car
pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the
tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987
Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li
and registered in the name of defendant Alexander
Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was
thrown against the windshield of the car of
the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to
the ground. She was pulled out from
under defendant’s car. Plaintiff’s left leg was severed up
to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and
sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was
brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center
where she was found to have a “traumatic amputation,
leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee).” She was
confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was
eventually fitted with an artificial leg.
Issues:
1.) Whether or not Li was negligent.
2.) Whether or not Valenzuela was contributory
negligent.
3.) Whether or not Alexander Commercial, Inc. Li’s
employer is liable.
Held:
1.) Yes. A witness testified that Li’s car was being
driven at a “very fast” speed, racing towards the general
direction of Araneta Avenue. He also saw the car
hit Valenzuela, hurtling her against the windshield of
the defendant’s Mitsubishi Lancer, from where she
eventually fell under the defendant’s car. Moreover the
witness declared that he observed Valenzuela’s car
parked parallel and very near the sidewalk, contrary
to Li’s allegation that Valenzuela’s car was close to the
center of the right lane.
2.) No. The Court held that Valenzuela was not
negligent applying the emergency rule.
Under the “emergency rule,” an individual who suddenly
finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to
act without much time to consider the best means
that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is
not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a
better solution, unless the emergency was brought by
his own negligence.
Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably
dictated by the emergency and could not be considered
to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances
which eventually led to the amputation of one of her
lower extremities. The emergency which led her to
park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was
not of her own making, and it was evident that she
had taken all reasonable precautions. Obviously, the
only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on
the night of the accident.
3.) Yes. Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not
demonstrated, to the Court’s satisfaction, that it
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the
family in entrusting its company car to Li. No
allegations were made as to whether or not the
company took the steps necessary to determine or
ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to
whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car.
Not having been able to overcome the burden of
demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability
for entrusting its company car to Li, said company,
based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought
to be jointly and severally liable with the former for
the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela
during the accident.
Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander
Commercial, Inc. He admitted that his functions
as Assistant Manager did not require him to
scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was
required quite often to perform work outside the
office, visiting prospective buyers and contacting and
meeting with company clients. These meetings,
clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours
because, as a managerial employee tasked with the
job of representing his company with its clients,
meetings with clients were both social as well as
work-related functions. The service car assigned to Li
by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both
Li – as well as the corporation – to put up the front of a
highly successful entity, increasing the latter’s goodwill
before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting between
Li and its clients by providing the former with a
convenient mode of travel.
Dulay vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between
Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred
at the “Big Bang Sa Alabang,” Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the
security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and
killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay. Petitioner Maria Benita
A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in
her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children,
filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela
and private respondents Safeguard and/or
Superguard, alleged employers of defendant Torzuela.
Respondent Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that the complaint does not state a valid
cause of action. Superguard claimed that Torzuela’s
act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his
duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was
committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability
therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code. Superguard further alleged that a
complaint for damages based on negligence under
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one
filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability
under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In
addition, the respondent argued that petitioners’ filing
of the complaint is premature considering that the
conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a
condition sine qua non for the employer’s subsidiary
liability. Respondent Safeguard also filed a motion
praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground
that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees.
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their
cause of action against the private respondents is
based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code. Respondent judge declared that the
complaint was one for damages founded on crimes
punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised
Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from,
quasi-delict.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Torzuela’ s act of shooting
Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable
under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code;
(2) Whether or not Article 33 of the New Civil Code
applies only to injuries intentionally committed; and
(3) Whether or not the liability or respondents is
subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
(1) Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides
that “whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.” Contrary to the theory
of private respondents, there is no justification for
limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to
acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-
entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not
only acts committed with negligence, but also acts
which are voluntary and intentional.
(2) No. The term “physical injuries” in Article 33 has
already been construed to include bodily injuries causing
death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in
the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical
injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and
attempted homicide. Although in the Marcia case, it
was held that no independent civil action may be filed
under Article 33 where the crime is the result of
criminal negligence, it must be noted, however, that
Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged
with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas
the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless
imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action
based on Article 33 lies.
(3) No. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code,
when an injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after selection or
both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180
is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee and a
prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private
respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee.
TEODORO C. UMALI vs. HON. ANGEL BACANI
(Judge, CFI Pangasinan) and FIDEL H. SAYNES
Facts: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit
the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the
storm, the banana plants standing near the
transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant (AEP)
were blown down and fell on the electric wire. The live
electric wire was cut, one end of which was left
hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the
ground. The following morning, barrio captain saw
Cipriano Baldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him
to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain that he
could not do it but that he was going to look for the
lineman to fix it. Sometime thereafter, a small boy of
3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P.
Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the
road, went to the place where the broken line wire
was and got in contact with it. The boy was
electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only
after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.
Issues: (1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's
death is due to a fortuitous event- storm; (2) WON
boy’s parents’ negligence exempts petitioner from
liability.
Ruling: Decision affirmed.
(1) A careful examination of the records convinces the
SC that a series of negligence on the part of
defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the
death of the victim by electrocution. With ordinary
foresight, the employees of the petitioner could have
easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the
electric line would be endangered by banana plants
being blown down.
(2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the
plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case) was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of
the injury being the defendants' (petitioners’) lack of
due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This
law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not
exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for
injury caused by his employees negligence is well
defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
RAYMUNDO ODANI SECOSA v. HEIRS OF ERWIN
SUAREZ FRANCISCO
Facts:
Traveling behind the motorcycle driven by Francisco
was a sand and gravel truck, which in turn was being
tailed by the Isuzu truck driven by Secosa.
The three vehicles were traversing the southbound
lane at a fairly high speed. When Secosa overtook the
sand and gravel truck, he... bumped the motorcycle
causing Francisco to fall. The rear wheels of the Isuzu
truck then ran over Francisco, which resulted in his
instantaneous death. Fearing for his life, petitioner
Secosa left his truck and fled the scene of the collision.
Issues:
Hence the present petition, based on the following
arguments:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER DASSAD DID
NOT EXERCISE THE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD
FATHER OF A FAMILY IN THE SELECTION AND
SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES WHICH IS
NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 2180 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND RELATED
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
Ruling:
Based on the foregoing provisions, when an injury is
caused by the negligence of an employee, there
instantly arises a presumption that there was
negligence on the part of the employer either in the
selection of his employee or in the supervision over
him after such selection.
The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear
showing on the part of the employer that it exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of his employee. Hence,
to evade solidary liability for quasi-delict committed
by an... employee, the employer must adduce
sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of
care.[6]
In the selection of prospective employees, employers
are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records.[13]
On the other hand, with respect to the supervision of
employees, employers should formulate... standard
operating procedures, monitor their implementation,
and impose disciplinary measures for breaches
thereof. To establish these factors in a trial involving
the issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit
concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
Principles:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by...
the provisions of this Chapter.
On the other hand, Article 2180, in pertinent part,
states:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible x x x.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry x
x x.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.
Petitioner's attempt to prove its "deligentissimi patris
familias" in the selection and supervision of employees
through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to
buttress... the same with any other evidence, object or
documentary, which might obviate the apparent
biased nature of the testimony.[10]... employers must
submit concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.
Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Sebastian Baking
Facts:
Respondent Sebastian Baking went to the clinic of
Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. Subsequently,
after several tests, Dr. Sy prescribed two medical
prescriptions – Diamicron for his blood Sugar and
Benalize tablets for his triglyceride.
Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury
Drug Store (MDC) to buy the prescribed medicines.
However, the saleslady misread the prescription for
Diamicron for Dormicrum – a potent sleeping tablet.
Unaware of the mistake, Respondent took it for three
consecutive days. On the third day, he figured in a
vehicular accident. His car collided with another car
driven by one Josie Peralta. It turned out that
Respondent fell asleep while driving and has no idea
regarding the accident. Suspecting that the tablet he
took may have caused the accident, he returned to Dr.
Sy and the latter was shocked because of the wrong
medicine sold to his patient.
Respondent thereafter filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) complaint for damages against
petitioner.
The RTC ruled in favour of the plaintiff; decision of
which was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
Hence this present petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was negligent, if so,
whether such negligence was the proximate cause of
respondent’s accident?
Ruling:
YES.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that
“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no re-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict”.
The Court also enumerated the three (3) elements of
Quasi-delict, to wit:
Damage suffered by the plaintiff;
Fault or negligence of the defendant
Connection of the cause and effect between the fault
or negligence of the defendant and the damage
incurred by the plaintiff
The Court stressed that there is no dispute that
respondent suffered damages. It is generally
recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with
public interest. The health and safety of the people
will be put into jeopardy if the drugstore employees
will not exercise the highest degree of care and
diligence.
That petitioner’s employee was grossly negligent. The
care required must be commensurate with the danger
involved, and the skill employed must correspondent
with the superior knowledge of the business which the
law demands.
Hence, the Court sustained that the proximate cause
of the accident was the petitioner’s employee’s
negligence. The vehicular accident could have not
occurred had the employee been careful to his job.
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and AURMELA
GANZON vs.
RAUL DE LEON
Facts:
Respondent Raul T. De Leon, a judge, noticed that his
left eye was reddish. He also
had difficulty reading. On the same evening, he met a
friend who happened to be a doctor, Dr. Charles Milla.
The latter prescribed the drugs “CortisporinOpthalmic”
and “Ceftin” to relieve his eye problems. Before heading
to work the following morning, De Leon went to the
Betterliving, Parañaque, branch of Mercury Drug
StoreCorporation to buy the prescribed medicines. He
showed his prescription to petitioner AurmelaGanzon,
a pharmacist assistant. At his chambers, De Leon
requested his sheriff to assist him in using the eye
drops. As instructed, the sheriff applied 2-3 drops on
respondent’s left eye. Instead of relieving his irritation,
respondent felt searing pain. He immediately rinsed the
affected eye with water, but the pain did not
subside. Only then did he discover that he was given
the wrong medicine, “CortisporinOtic Solution.” De
Leon returned to the same Mercury Drug branch, with
his left eye still red and teary. When he confronted
Ganzon why he was given ear drops, instead of the
prescribed eye drops, she did not apologize and
instead brazenly replied that she was unable to fully
read the prescription and it was her supervisor who
apologized and informed De Leon that they do not
have stock of the needed CortisporinOpthalmic. De
Leon wrote Mercury Drug, through its president, Ms.
Vivian K. Askuna, about the day’s incident. Instead,
two sales persons went to his office and informed him
that their supervisor was busy with other matters. Having
been denied his simple desire for a written apology and
explanation, De Leon filed a complaint
for damagesagainst Mercury Drug.
Issue:
Whether or not the Mercury Drug and Ganzon are
liable.
Ruling:
Yes. Mercury Drug and Ganzoncannot exculpate
themselves from any liability. As active players in the
field of dispensing medicines to the public, the highest
degree of care and diligence is expected of
them. Likewise, numerous decisions, both here and
abroad, have laid salutary rules for the protection of
human life and human health. In the United States
case of Tombari v. Conners, it was ruled that the
profession of pharmacy demands care and skill, and
druggists must exercise care of a specially high
degree, the highest degree of care known to practical
men. In other words, druggists must exercise the
highest practicable degree of prudence and vigilance,
and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent
with the reasonable conduct of the business, so that
human life may not constantly be exposed to the
danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons
for harmless medicines.
In cases where an injury is caused by the negligence
of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption
of law that there has been negligence on the part of
the employer, either in the selection or supervision of
one’s employees. This presumption may be rebutted by
a clear showing that the employer has exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of the family.
Mercury Drug failed to overcome such presumption.
Petitioners Mercury Drug and Ganzon have similarly
failed to live up to high standard of diligence expected
of them as pharmacy professionals. They were grossly
negligent in dispensing ear drops instead of the
prescribed eye drops to De Leon.
As a buyer, De Leon relied on the expertise and
experience of Mercury Drug and its employees in
dispensing to him the right medicine. This Court has
ruled that in the purchase and sale of drugs, the
buyer and seller do not stand at arms length. There
exists an imperative duty on the seller or the druggist
to take precaution to prevent death or injury to any
person who relies on one’s absolute honesty and
peculiar learning.
Heirs of Redentor Completo, and Elpidio Abiad v. Sgt.
Amando Albayda, Jr.
Facts
Albayda is a Master Sergeant of the PH Air Force,
and Completo was the taxi driver of a Toyota Corolla
which was owned by Abiad. Albayda was riding a bike
on his way to the office, when Completo's taxi bumped
and sideswept him, causing serious physical injuries.
He [Albayda] was brought to the PH Air Force
General Hospital, but he was transferred to the AFP
Medical Center because he sustained a fracture and
there was no orthopedic doctor available in the first
hospital. He was confined from 27 Aug 1997 to 11 Feb
1998, and again in 23 Feb to 22 Mar 1998 [approx. 7
months].
Conciliation before the barangay failed, so Albayda
filed a complaint for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence against Completo before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Pasay. Completo filed a counter-
charge of damage to property through reckless
imprudence against Albayda. The Office of the City
Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information
for Albayda's complaint, and Completo's complaint
[against Albayda] was dismissed. Albayda manifested
his reservation to file a separate civil action for
damages against Completo and Abiad.
Albayda alleged that Completo's negligence is the
proximate cause of the incident. He demanded the
following damages and their respective
amounts: Actual damages - 276,550; Moral damages -
600,000; Exemplary damages - 200,000; Attorney's
fees - 25,000 + 1,000 per court appearance.
On the other hand, Completo alleged that he was
carefully driving the taxicab when he heard a strange
sound from the taxicab's rear right side. He found
Albayda lying on the road, holding his left leg, so he
brought Albayda to PH Air Force General Hospital.
Completo asserted that he was an experienced driver,
and that he already reduced his speed to 20km even
before reaching the intersection. In contrast, Albayda
rode his bicycle at high speed, causing him to lose
control of the bicycle. Completo said that Albayda had
no cause of action.
Several people testified for each side, but here are
some notes on the testimony of the owner of the taxi
driver, Abiad. Abiad said that aside from being a
soldier, he also held franchises of taxicabs and
passenger jeepneys, and being a taxicab operator, he
would wake up early to personally check the taxicabs.
When Completo applied as a taxicab driver, Abiad
required him to show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and
driver's license. Completo never figured in a vehicular
accident since he was employed, and according to
Abiad, he [Completo] was a good driver and good man.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Albayda, and
the defendants are ordered to pay actual [46k] and
moral [400k] damages, and attorney's fees [25k]. Upon
appeal at the CA, the court affirmed RTC's decision
with modifications [no more actual damages; awarded
temperate damages [40k]; moral damages only 200k;
Completo and Abiad are solidarily liable to pay
Albayda; added legal interest].
Issues and Holding
WON CA erred in finding that Completo was the one
who caused the collision. NO
WON Abiad failed to prove that he observed the
diligence of a good father of the family. YES
WON the award of moral and temperate damages and
attorney's fees for Albayda had no basis. NO / NO /
YES
Ratio
On Negligence
It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has
the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence
the motorist's breach in his duty of care owed to the
plaintiff, that the motorist was negligent in failing to
exercise the diligence required to avoid injury to the
plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury suffered. NCC 2176 quoted, and
said that the question of the motorist's negligence is a
question of fact. Usually, more will be required of a
motorist [25mi/hr = 37ft/sec] than a bicyclist [10mi/hr
= 15ft/sec] in discharging the duty of care because of
the physical advantages the former has over the
latter.
It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that
Completo failed to exercise reasonable diligence.
He was overspeeding at the time he hit Albayda's
bicycle; he did not slow down even when he
approached the intersection
Such negligence was the sole and proximate cause of
the injuries sustained by Albayda
It was proven that Albayda had the right of way since
he reached the intersection ahead of Completo
NCC 2180 cited - obligation imposed by NCC 2176 is
demandable also for those persons for whom one is
responsible. Employers are liable for damage caused
by employees, but the responsibility ceases upon proof
that employers observed the diligence of the good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of
employees. The burden of proof is on the
employer. The responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for QD is solidary. The employer's civil
liability for his employee's negligent acts is also
primary and direct, owing to his own negligence in
selecting and supervising them, and this liability
attaches even if the employer is not in the vehicle at
the time of collision.
In the selection of employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience, and service records. With respect
to supervision, employers should formulate SOPs and
monitor their implementation, and impose
disciplinary measures for breaches. To establish these
factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious
[secondary] liability, employers must submit concrete
proof, including documentary evidence.
ABIAD'S EVIDENCE CONSISTED ENTIRELY OF
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE, AND THIS IS
INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE LEGAL
PRESUMPTION THAT HE WAS NEGLIGENT IN
THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF
COMPLETO.
On Damages
CA rightfully deleted the award of actual damages
because Albayda failed to present documentary
evidence to establish the amount incurred. Temperate
damages may be recovered when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot be proved with certainty. Moral damages are
awarded in QDs causing physical injuries, so the
award is proper. The award of attorney's fees is
deleted for failure to prove that petitioners acted in
bad faith in refusing to satisfy respondent's just and
valid claim.
JOSE A. ORTALIZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CORADO ECHARRI, defendant-appelee.
Parreno and Tonogbanua for appellant.
Hilado and Hilado for appellees.
Plaintiff-appellant seeks the reversal of the order of
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
dismissing the case on the ground that the complaint
does not state a cause of action.
On February 19, 1953, plaintiff filed in the court
below a complaint wherein, after stating the legal
personalities of the parties, he averred the following:
2. That the plaintiff is the lawful father of the child,
Winston Ortaliz, had in legitimate wedlock with
Elena Lucasan;
3. That on or about December 18, 1953, at the corner
of Washington and Justicia Streets, Bacolod City,
Philippines, the Studebaker Sedan Car with Plate No.
35-1138 of the defendant struck the plaintiff's son,
Winston Ortaliz, causing upon him physical injuries
as a result of which he was taken to the Occidental
Negros Provincial Hospital as evidenced by the
medical certificate herewith attached and marked as
Annex "A" of this complaint;
4. That the said Studebaker Sedan Car with Plate No.
35-1138 was at the time of the accident, driven and
controlled by Segundino Estanda, a driver under the
employ of the defendant, without due care and
diligence and with negligence and recklessness and
violation of traffic rules and regulations;
5. That an information was filed in the Municipal
Court of the City of Bacolod which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2607 against the said Segundino
Estanda for the crime of Slight Physical Inuries
Through Reckless Imprudence, a copy of said
information is hereto attached marked as Annex "B"
and made an integral part of this complaint;
6. That the said Segundino Estanda pleaded guilty to
the crime charge in the Information and he was
finally sentenced to suffer the penalty of five (5) days
of Arresto Menor and to pay the costs in a Decision
rendered in said case, copy of which Decision is hereto
attached marked as Annex "C" and made an integral
part of this complaint;
7. That the said Decision, Annex "C" has long become
final and said Segundino Estanda has already served
the penalty metted to him by virtue thereof; .
8. That the plaintiff has suffered damages in the form
of expenses paid for the hospitalization, medicines,
physicians' fees and incidental expense of his son,
Winston Ortaliz, in the amount of P446.58;
9. That the plaintiff, by reason of the accident met by
his said son, Winston Ortaliz, as above-stated,
through the fault, negligence and recklessness of
Segundino Estanda for whose acts the defendant is
responsible because he was at the time employed by
him (defendant) as his driver, has also suffered,
because of the mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and moral shock, moral damages in
the amount of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000),
Philippine Currency;
10. That the boy, Winston Ortaliz, was strong, robust
and happy before the accident that caused on him
physical Injuries which necessitated his
hospitalization and medical attention, and was not
suffering nor had he ever suffered from any illness;
11. That demands have been made on the defendant
to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,446.55 for actual,
consequential and moral damages, but the defendants
refused and still refuses to pay the same and that by
reason of the refusal of the defendant, the plaintiff
was forced to secure the services of an attorney paying
the latter the sum of P500.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a
decision be rendered;
1. Sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P2,446.55 for the actual, consequential and
moral damages plus an additional sum of P500 for
attorney's fees;
2. To pay the costs of this suit, and
3. Plaintiff be granted any other remedy that is just
and equitable and proper in law.
On March 18, 1953, the defendant-appellee filed a
motion to dismiss wherein, after admitting the
ownership of the Studebaker Sedan car with plate No.
35-1138, he alleged the following:
(a) That the case at bar is one for recovery of damages
arising from the crime of Slight Physical Injuries as
borne out by the allegations of the complaint itself.
(b) That defendant is being sued in his capacity as the
employer of the perpetrator of the said crime,
Segundino Estanda, and, as deducible from the
allegations of the complaint, for defendant's supposed
subsidiary civil liability arising therefrom under the
Revised Penal Code.
(d) That the complaint does not allege that defendant
was nor is engaged in any business or industry in
conjunction with which he has at any time used the
said car, much less on the occasion of the alleged
accident, nor the defendant had at any time put out
the said car for hire.
(e) That the obligation or liability of defendant, if any,
for the damages alleged in the complaint, being an
obligation arising from a criminal offense, is governed
by Article 1161 of the Civil Code, which, in turn,
makes the penal laws applicable thereto.
(f) That, under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
it is essential, in order for an employer to be liable
subsidiarily for felonies committed by his employee,
that the former be engaged in some kind of industry,
and that the employer had committed the crime in the
discharge of his duties in connection with such
industry.
(g) That, therefore, defendant cannot be held
subsidiarily liable for the crime committed by his
driver as alleged in plaintiff's complaint.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, defendant respectfully
prays this Hon. Court to dismiss the complaint, the
same having failed to state a cause of action, with
costs.
Thereafter the parties submitted their respective
memoranda on whether the complaint failed to state a
cause of action and the Court, after taking into
consideration the arguments advanced by the parties,
dismissed the complaint.
Plaintiff now contends that under paragraph 2 of
Article 2884 of the Civil Code and paragraph 1 and 5
of Article 2180, a sufficient cause of action has been
clearly alleged in the disputed complaint and
therefore the same should not have been dismissed.
Article 2180 in part provides:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omission
but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
and Article 2184 in its last paragraph provides:
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the
provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.
Having in view the aforequoted provisions of law and
those of Article 2176 to the effect that "Whoever by act
or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done", there seems to be good reason to support
plaintiff's contention that the complaint in question
states sufficient cause of action. Defendant-appellee,
however, claims that there is no allegation in the
complaint that "the defendant was engaged in some
kind of industry and that the employee had committed
the crime in the discharge of his duties in connection
with such industry," hence the defendant cannot be
held subsidiarily liable for the crime committed by his
driver and therefore the complaint failed to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. But
paragraph 5 of Article 2180 refutes this contention for
it clearly provides that "Employers shall be liable for
the damages caused by their employees acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry."
Defendant-appellee also contends that when the
judgment in Criminal Case No. 2607 of the Municipal
Court of Bacolod was rendered against the driver
Segundino Estanda, plaintiff did not reserve the civil
action and thus he lost his right thereto and
consequently the present action against the
defendant-appellee would not lie. This contention,
however, is untenable, for Article 33 of the Civil Code
clearly provides:
ART. 33. In cases of physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal entered by the
lower court is hereby revoked and the case remanded
to said court for further proceedings. Without costs.
Torts And Damages Case Digest: Mr. And Mrs.
Amador C. Ong V. Metropolitan Water District (1958)
G.R. No. L-7664 August 29, 1958
FACTS:
July 5, 1952 1:45 p.m.: For the 4th or 5th time,
Dominador Ong, a 14-year old high school student and
boy scout, and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio, went
to Metropolitan Water District's recreational
swimming pools charging a nominal fee (P0.50 for
adults; P0.20 for children)
4:35 p.m.: Dominador Ong told his brothers that he
was going to the locker room in an adjoining building
to drink a bottle of coke
Upon hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio went to the
bigger pool leaving Dominador in the small pool and
so they did not see the latter when he left the pool to
get a bottle of coke.
Lifeguards Manuel Abaño (8 am - 12 nn;2 pm - 6
pm) and Mario Villanueva (7:30-11:30 am;2:30 to 4:30
pm) were on duty
4-5 pm: there were about 20 bathers inside the pool
area and Manuel Abaño was going around the pools to
observe the bathers in compliance with the
instructions of his chief
4:40-4:45 p.m: some boys who were in the pool area
informed a bather by the name of Andres Hagad, Jr.,
that somebody was swimming under water for quite a
long time
Another boy informed lifeguard Manuel Abaño of the
same happening so he immediately jumped into the big
swimming pool and retrieved the apparently lifeless body
of Dominador Ong from the bottom
The body was placed at the edge of the pool and Abaño
immediately applied manual artificial respiration
Soon after, male nurse Armando Rule came to render
assistance, followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado
Vicente who, after being called by phone from the
clinic by one of the security guards, boarded a jeep
carrying with him the resuscitator and a medicine kit,
and upon arriving he injected the boy with
camphorated oil
After the injection, Vicente left on a jeep in order to
fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the
Philippines
Meanwhile, Abaño continued the artificial manual
respiration, and when this failed to revive him, they
applied the resuscitator until the two oxygen tanks
were exhausted
Not long thereafter, Dr. Ayuyao arrived with another
resuscitator, but the same became of no use because
he found the boy already dead. The doctor ordered
that the body be taken to the clinic.
The autopsy of Dr. Enrique V. de los Santos, Chief,
Medico Legal Division of the NBI found that the death
was due to asphyxia by submersion in water.
lower court: dismissed the complaint
Mr. and Mrs. Amador C. Ong: failure of the lifeguard
Abaño to immediately respond to their call may
and even if it be assumed that the deceased is partly
to be blamed for the unfortunate incident, defendants
may still be held liable under the doctrine of "last
clear chance" for the reason that, having the last
opportunity to save the victim, it failed to do so
ISSUE: W/N the death of minor Dominador Ong can
be attributed to the negligence of Metropolitan Water
District and/or its employees
HELD: NO. decision appealed from is affirmed
Since the present action is one for damages founded
on culpable negligence, the principle to be observed is
that the person claiming damages has the burden of
proving that the damage is caused by the fault or
negligence of the person from whom the damage is
claimed, or of one of his employees
The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where
the party charged is required to act instantaneously,
and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application
of all means at hand after the peril is or should have
been discovered; at least in cases in which any
previous negligence of the party charged cannot be
said to have contributed to the injury
Before closing, we wish to quote the following
observation of the trial court, which we find supported
by the evidence: "There is (also) a strong suggestion
coming from the expert evidence presented by both
parties that Dominador Ong might have dived where
the water was only 5.5 feet deep, and in so doing he
might have hit or bumped his forehead against the
bottom of the pool, as a consequence of which he was
stunned, and which to his drowning. As a boy scout he
must have received instructions in swimming. He
knew, or have known that it was dangerous for him to
dive in that part of the pool."
PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L.
RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and
ANDRES BONIFACIO, respondents.
FACTS:
The car driven by Augusto Ramos (son of co-plaintiff
Placido Ramos) collided with the truck of PEPSI,
driven by the driver and co-defendant Andres
Bonifacio. As a result, the Ramoses sued Bonifacio
and Pepsi.
The trial court found Bonifacio negligent and declared
that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently proved that it
exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage. PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio,
solidarily, were ordered to pay the plaintiffs damages.
The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court, but absolved
PEPSI-COLA from liability, finding that it sufficiently
proved due diligence in the selection of its driver
Bonifacio. In its decision, CA stated the basis for its
decision:
“The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco,
personnel manager of defendant company, was to the
effect that defendant driver was first hired as a
member of the bottle crop in the production
department; that when he was hired as a driver, ' we
had size [sic] him by looking into his background,
asking him to submit clearances, previous experience,
physical examination and later on, he was sent to the
pool house to take the usual driver's examination ,
consisting of: first, theoretical examination and
second, the practical driving examination, all of which
he had undergone, and that the defendant company
was a member of the Safety Council. Our Supreme
Court had put it down as a rule that ‘In order that the
defendant may be considered as having exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family, he should
not have been satisfied with the mere possession of a
professional driver's license; he should have carefully
examined the applicant for employment as to his
qualifications, his experiences and record of service.’
Defendant Company has taken all these steps.”
ISSUE: Whether PEPSI-COLA exercised due
diligence in the selection of its employee.
HELD:
The appellants contended that Añasco, being PEPSI-
COLA's employee, is a biased and an interested
witness. This is a question of fact, and the SC would
not disturb the findings of CA.
It should perhaps be stated that in the instant case no
question is raised as to due diligence in the
supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its driver. Article 2180
points out that the owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service
of the branches in which the latter are employed or on
the occasion of their functions. This responsibility
shall cease when the employers prove that they
observed the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage; hence, PEPSI-COLA shall be
relieved from liability (rebuttable presumption of
negligence).
The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed.
RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Petitioners impute to PEPSI-COLA the violation of
subpars M.V.O. Administrative Order No. 1 in that at
the time of the collision, the trailer-truck, which had a
total weight of 30,000 kgms., was (a) being driven at a
speed of about 30 k.p.h. or beyond the 15 k.p.h. limit
set and (b) was not equipped with a rear-vision mirror
nor provided with a helper for the driver. There is no
finding that the tractor-truck did not have a rear-
vision mirror.
Petitioners also charge PEPSI-COLA with having
violated par. (b) of Sec. 8-A of the Rev. Motor Vehicle
Law, alleging that the truck exceeded the dimensions
allowed. It is not enough that the width of the tractor-
truck exceed the limit in Sec. 8-A; in addition, it must
also appear that there was no special permit granted
under Sec. 9. Unfortunately for petitioners, that vital
factual link is missing. There was no proof much less
any finding to that effect.
We are urged to apply the Anglo-American doctrine
of respondent superior. We cannot however, abandon
the Bahia ruling without going against the explicit
mandate of the law. A motor vehicle owner is not an
absolute insurer against all damages caused by its
driver. Article 2180 of our Civil Code is very explicit
that the owner's responsibility shall cease once it
proves that it has observed the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. The Bahia case
merely clarified what that diligence consists of,
namely, diligence in the selection and supervision of
the driver-employee.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the basis of an
employer's liability is his own negligence, not that of
his employees. The former is made responsible for
failing to properly and diligently select and supervise
his erring employees. We do not — and have never —
followed the respondent superior rule.8 So, the
American rulings cited by petitioners, based as they
are on said doctrine, are not authoritative here.
In view of the foregoing, the motion for
reconsideration is hereby denied.
Filamer v. IAC
Facts: Funtecha was a working student of Filamer
Christian Institute. Being a part-time janitor and a
scholar of petitioner Filamer, he was considered an
employee even if he was assigned to clean the
premises for just 2 hours every day.
Allan Masa, the son of Filamer’s president Mr. Agustin
Masa, was the official driver of the school’s vehicle.
Since Funtecha and Allan lived in the same house,
Funtecha, holder of a student driver’s license,
requested Allan to take over the vehicle and drive it
home. Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha
only after driving down a road, negotiating a sharp
dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear. A
fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them
so they swerved to the right to avoid collision. Upon
swerving, they heard a sound as if something had
bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop to
check. Unfortunately, their jeep swerved towards the
pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in
his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic, and
hit him.
The heirs of Kapunan filed an action against Filamer
for damages. In its defense, Filamer alleged that
Funtecha acted outside of his scope of his authority.
Therefore, it was only Funtecha who was liable and
not Filamer.
Issue: Whether or not Filamer Christian Institute is
liable for the acts of Funtecha
Held: Yes, Filamer is liable for the acts of Funtecha.
Ratio: In learning how to drive while taking the
vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house,
Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride.
Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his
enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately,
for the service for which the jeep was intended by the
petitioner school. Therefore, the Court is constrained
to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the
steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his
employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot
deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done
beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. He need not
have an official appointment for a driver's position in
order that the petitioner may be held responsible for
his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the
act of driving at the time of the incident was for the
benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that
Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting
within the scope of his janitorial duties does not
relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the
presumption that there was negligence on its part
either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in
the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to
show proof of its having exercised the required
diligence of a good father of a family over its
employees Funtecha and Allan.
What does supervision of employee include?
It includes the formulation of suitable rules
and regulations for the guidance of its employees and
the issuance of proper instructions intended for the
protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his employees.
Was there any showing that Filamer provided rules
and regulations?
None.
Therefore:
Petitioner Filamer has an obligation to pay
damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner
by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. The liability of
Filamer is primary and solidary. It has, however,
recourse against the negligent employee for whatever
damages it has paid.
FULL TEXT
FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON.
ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his capacity as Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Roxas City and
POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, SR., respondents.
The private respondents assert that the circumstances
obtaining in the present case call for the application of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code since Funtecha is no
doubt an employee of the petitioner. The private
respondents maintain that under Article 2180 an
injured party shall have recourse against the servant
as well as the petitioner for whom, at the time of the
incident, the servant was performing an act in
furtherance of the interest and for the benefit of the
petitioner. Funtecha allegedly did not steal the school
jeep nor use it for a joy ride without the knowledge of
the school authorities.
After a re-examination of the laws relevant to the
facts found by the trial court and the appellate court,
the Court reconsiders its decision. We reinstate the
Court of Appeals' decision penned by the late Justice
Desiderio Jurado and concurred in by Justices Jose C.
Campos, Jr. and Serafin E. Camilon. Applying Civil
Code provisions, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court decision which ordered the payment of the
P20,000.00 liability in the Zenith Insurance
Corporation policy, P10,000.00 moral damages,
P4,000.00 litigation and actual expenses, and
P3,000.00 attorney's fees.
It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working
student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of
petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school,
an employee even if he was assigned to clean the
school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning
of each school day.
Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested
the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take over
the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one
late afternoon. It is significant to note that the place
where Allan lives is also the house of his father, the
school president, Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is also
the house where Funtecha was allowed free board
while he was a student of Filamer Christian Institute.
Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only
after driving down a road, negotiating a sharp
dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear.
(TSN, April 4, 1983, pp. 78-79) According to Allan's
testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights
nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the right
to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a
sound as if something had bumped against the
vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the
Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian,
Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in
the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him.
Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his advise to
swerve to the right. (Ibid., p. 79) At the time of the
incident (6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had only
one functioning headlight.
Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same
time a security guard of the petitioner-school. He
further said that there was no specific time for him to
be off-duty and that after driving the students home
at 5:00 in the afternoon, he still had to go back to
school and then drive home using the same vehicle.
Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school
president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an
act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-
school. Allan's job demands that he drive home the
school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the
morning of the next school day.
It is indubitable under the circumstances that the
school president had knowledge that the jeep was
routinely driven home for the said purpose. Moreover,
it is not improbable that the school president also had
knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student
driver's license and his desire to undergo driving
lessons during the time that he was not in his
classrooms.
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle
home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha
definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not
driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic
of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which
the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. (See L.
Battistoni v. Thomas, Can SC 144, 1 D.L.R. 577, 80
ALR 722 [1932]; See also Association of Baptists for
World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen's Insurance Co.,
Inc. 124 SCRA 618 [1983]). Therefore, the Court is
constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in
taking over the steering wheel was one done for and
in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-
school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that
it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties.
The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks"
for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of
an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the
account of the employer at the time of the infliction of
the injury or damage. (Manuel Casada, 190 Va 906, 59
SE 2d 47 [1950]) Even if somehow, the employee
driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act,
the existence of a presumptive liability of the
employer is determined by answering the question of
whether or not the servant was at the time of the
accident performing any act in furtherance of his
master's business. (Kohlman v. Hyland, 210 NW 643,
50 ALR 1437 [1926]; Jameson v. Gavett, 71 P 2d 937
[1937])
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules
implementing the Labor Code, on which the petitioner
anchors its defense, was promulgated by the Secretary
of Labor and Employment only for the purpose of
administering and enforcing the provisions of the
Labor Code on conditions of employment. Particularly,
Rule X of Book III provides guidelines on the manner
by which the powers of the Labor Secretary shall be
exercised; on what records should be kept; maintained
and preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion of
working scholars from, and inclusion of resident
physicians in the employment coverage as far as
compliance with the substantive labor provisions on
working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is
concerned.
In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the
enforcement of the substantive law on labor. The
Court, thus, makes the distinction and so holds that
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the
decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by
an injured person during a vehicular accident against
a working student of a school and against the school
itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on
conditions of employment between an alleged
employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim
brought by one for damages for injury caused by the
patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-
employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the
implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary
liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor
cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid
liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil
Code.
There is evidence to show that there exists in the
present case an extra-contractual obligation arising
from the negligence or reckless imprudence of a
person "whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a
legal fiction, to other(s) who are in a position to
exercise an absolute or limited control over (him)."
(Bahia v. Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624 [1915])
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He
need not have an official appointment for a driver's
position in order that the petitioner may be held
responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being
sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the
incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence,
the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or
was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties
does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of
rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there
was negligence on its part either in the selection of a
servant or employee, or in the supervision over him.
The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having
exercised the required diligence of a good father of a
family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.
The Court reiterates that supervision includes the
formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the
guidance of its employees and the issuance of proper
instructions intended for the protection of the public
and persons with whom the employer has relations
through his employees. (Bahia v. Litonjua and
Leynes, supra, at p. 628; Phoenix Construction, v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353 [1987])
An employer is expected to impose upon its employees
the necessary discipline called for in the performance
of any act indispensable to the business and beneficial
to their employer.
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that
it has set forth such rules and guidelines as would
prohibit any one of its employees from taking control
over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or
prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer
president from authorizing another employee to drive
the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has
failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or
warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by
persons other than the driver.
The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages
for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which
Funtecha drove the vehicle. (Cangco v. Manila
Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768, 772 [1918]). In the absence
of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it
the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its
employees. (Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263 [1976];
Poblete v. Fabros, 93 SCRA 200 [1979]; Kapalaran
Bus Liner v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]; Franco
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 331
[1989]; Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa, 179
SCRA 384 [1989]) The liability of the employer is,
under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However,
the employer shall have recourse against the
negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to
the heirs of the plaintiff.
It is an admitted fact that the actual driver of the
school jeep, Allan Masa, was not made a party
defendant in the civil case for damages. This is quite
understandable considering that as far as the injured
pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan, was
concerned, it was Funtecha who was the one driving
the vehicle and presumably was one authorized by the
school to drive. The plaintiff and his heirs should not
now be left to suffer without simultaneous recourse
against the petitioner for the consequent injury
caused by a janitor doing a driving chore for the
petitioner even for a short while. For the purpose of
recovering damages under the prevailing
circumstances, it is enough that the plaintiff and the
private respondent heirs were able to establish the
existence of employer-employee relationship between
Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and the fact that
Funtecha was engaged in an act not for an
independent purpose of his own but in furtherance of
the business of his employer. A position of
responsibility on the part of the petitioner has thus
been satisfactorily demonstrated.

CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC. and
SPOUSES EDGARDO L. LIMON and SYLVIA S.
LIMON, vs.
TIMOTHY TAGARIO, assisted by his parents
BASILIO TAGORIO and HERMINIA TAGORIO
FACTS:
Timothy Tagoria was a grade IV student at
Marymount School, an academic institution operated
and maintained by Child Learning Center, Inc. (CLC).
One afternoon, he found himself locked inside the
boy’s comfort room in Marymount. He started to panic
so he banged and kicked the door and yelled for help.
No help arrived. He then decided to open the window
to call for help. As he opened the window, Timothy
went right through and fell down three stories.
Timothy was hospitalized and given medical
treatment for serious multiple physical injuries. He,
assisted by his parents, filed a civil action against the
CLC, the members of its Board of Directors which
includes the Spouses Limon. They claim that the
school was negligent for not installing iron grills at
the window of the boy’s comfort room. CLC, in its
defense, maintained that there was nothing defective
about the locking mechanism of the door and that the fall
of Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence. CLC
further maintained that it had exercised the due care
and diligence of a good father of a family to ensure the
safety, well-being and convenience of its students. The
trial court ruled in favor of the respondents. The
respondents proceeded their appeal to the Court of
Appeals who affirmed the trial court’s ruling in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the school was negligent for the boy’s
accidental fall.
RULING:
YES. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered
by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the
defendant or some other person for whose act he must
respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence and the damages
incurred.
In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC failed
to provide precautionary measures to avoid harm and
injury to its students in two instances: (1) failure to
fix a defective door knob despite having been notified
of the problem; and (2) failure to install safety grills
on the window where Timothy fell from. During trial,
it was found that the lock was defective. The architect
witness testified that he did not verify if the doorknob
at the comfort room was actually put in place.
Further, the fact that Timothy fell out through the
window shows that the door could not be opened from
the inside. That sufficiently points to the fact that
something was wrong with the door, if not the door
knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor. The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the
accident was of such character as to warrant an
inference that it would not have happened except for
the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have
been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive management or control of the person
charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the
accident must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person
injured. Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure
to see to it that the doors of their school toilets are at
all times in working condition. The fact that a student
had to go through the window, instead of the door,
shows that something was wrong with the door. As to
the absence of grills on the window, petitioners
contend that there was no such requirement under
the Building Code. Nevertheless, the fact is that such
window, as petitioners themselves point out, was
approximately 1.5 meters from the floor, so that it was
within reach of a student who finds the regular exit,
the door, not functioning.
Petitioners, with the due diligence of a good father of
the family, should have anticipated that a student,
locked in the toilet by a non-working door, would
attempt to use the window to call for help or even to
get out. Considering all the circumstances, therefore,
there is sufficient basis to sustain a finding of liability
on petitioners’ part.
Petitioners’ argument that CLC exercised the due
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees is not decisive. Due
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees
is applicable where the employer is being held
responsible for the acts or omissions of others under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In this case, CLC’s
liability is under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised
on the fact of its own negligence in not ensuring that
all its doors are properly maintained. The Court’s
pronouncement that Timothy climbed out of the window
because he could not get out using the door, negates
petitioners’ other contention that the proximate cause of
the accident was Timothy’s own negligence. The injuries
he sustained from the fall were the product of a natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening
cause, that originated from CLC’s own negligence

MERCURY DRUG VS HUANG
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury Drug)
is the registered owner of a six-wheeler 1990
Mitsubishi Truck with plate number PRE 641
(truck). It has in its employ petitioner Rolando J. del
Rosario as driver. Respondent spouses Richard and
Carmen Huang are the parents of respondent Stephen
Huang and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI
Sedan with plate number PTT 775 (car).
These two vehicles figured in a road accident on
December 20, 1996 at around 10:30 p.m. within the
municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila. Respondent
Stephen Huang was driving the car, weighing 1,450
kg., while petitioner Del Rosario was driving the
truck, weighing 14,058 kg. Both were traversing the
C-5 Highway, north bound, coming from the general
direction of Alabang going to Pasig City. The car was
on the left innermost lane while the truck was on the
next lane to its right, when the truck suddenly
swerved to its left and slammed into the front right
side of the car. The collision hurled the car over the
island where it hit a lamppost, spun around and
landed on the opposite lane. The truck also hit a
lamppost, ran over the car and zigzagged towards,
and finally stopped in front of Buellah Land Church.
At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario
only had a Traffic Violation Receipt (TVR). His drivers
license had been confiscated because he had been
previously apprehended for reckless driving.
The car, valued at P300,000.00, was a total
wreck. Respondent Stephen Huang sustained massive
injuries to his spinal cord, head, face, and
lung. Despite a series of operations, respondent
Stephen Huang is paralyzed for life from his chest
down and requires continuous medical and
rehabilitation treatment.
Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for
committing gross negligence and reckless imprudence
while driving, and petitioner Mercury Drug for failing
to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of its driver.
In contrast, petitioners allege that the immediate and
proximate cause of the accident was respondent
Stephen Huangs recklessness. According to petitioner
Del Rosario, he was driving on the left innermost lane
when the car bumped the trucks front right tire. The
truck then swerved to the left, smashed into an
electric post, crossed the center island, and stopped on
the other side of the highway. The car likewise
crossed over the center island and landed on the same
portion of C-5. Further, petitioner Mercury Drug
claims that it exercised due diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of all its
employees.
The trial court, in its Decision dated September 29,
2004, found petitioners Mercury Drug and Del Rosario
jointly and severally liable to pay respondents actual,
compensatory, moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
1. WON DEL ROSARIO IS NEGLIGENT?
2. WON MERCURY DRUG IS LIABLE?
RULING
1. YES! The evidence does not support petitioners
claim that at the time of the accident, the truck was at
the left inner lane and that it was respondent Stephen
Huangs car, at its right, which bumped the right front
side of the truck. Firstly, petitioner Del Rosario could
not precisely tell which part of the truck was hit by
the car,[6] despite the fact that the truck was snub-
nosed and a lot higher than the car. Petitioner Del
Rosario could not also explain why the car landed on
the opposite lane of C-5 which was on its left side. He
said that the car did not pass in front of him after it
hit him or under him or over him or behind him.[7] If
the truck were really at the left lane and the car were
at its right, and the car hit the truck at its front right
side, the car would not have landed on the opposite
side, but would have been thrown to the right side of
the C-5 Highway. Noteworthy on this issue is the
testimony of Dr. Marlon Rosendo H. Daza, an expert
in the field of physics. He conducted a study based on
the following assumptions provided by respondents:
1. Two vehicles collided;
2. One vehicle is ten times heavier, more massive
than the other;
3. Both vehicles were moving in the same direction
and at the same speed of about 85 to 90 kilometers
per hour;
4. The heavier vehicle was driving at the innermost
left lane, while the lighter vehicle was at its right.
Dr. Daza testified that given the foregoing
assumptions, if the lighter vehicle hits the right front
portion of the heavier vehicle, the general direction of
the light vehicle after the impact would be to the right
side of the heavy vehicle, not the other way
around. The truck, he opined, is more difficult to move
as it is heavier. It is the car, the lighter vehicle, which
would move to the right of, and away from the
truck. Thus, there is very little chance that the car
will move towards the opposite side, i.e., to the left of
the truck.
Dr. Daza also gave a further study on the basis of the
same assumptions except that the car is on the left
side of the truck, in accordance with the testimony of
respondent Stephen Huang. Dr. Daza concluded that
the general direction of the car after impact would be
to the left of the truck. In this situation, the middle
island against which the car was pinned would slow
down the car, and enable the truck to catch up and hit
the car again, before running over it.[8]
To support their thesis, petitioners tried to show the
damages that the truck sustained at its front right
side. The attempt does not impress. The photographs
presented were taken a month after the accident, and
Rogelio Pantua, the automechanic who repaired the
truck and authenticated the photographs, admitted
that there were damages also on the left side of the
truck.[9]
Worse still, petitioner Del Rosario further admitted
that after the impact, he lost control of the truck and
failed to apply his brakes. Considering that the car
was smaller and lighter than the six-wheeler truck,
the impact allegedly caused by the car when it hit the
truck could not possibly be so great to cause petitioner
to lose all control that he failed to even step on the
brakes.
We therefore find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The
evidence proves petitioner Del Rosarios negligence as
the direct and proximate cause of the injuries suffered
by respondent Stephen Huang. Petitioner Del Rosario
failed to do what a reasonable and prudent man would
have done under the circumstances.
2. YES
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
xxx
The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned
on a prior recourse against the negligent employee, or
a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. It is
also joint and solidary with the employee.[11]
To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug
should show that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family, both in the selection of the
employee and in the supervision of the performance of
his duties. Thus, in the selection of its prospective
employees, the employer is required to examine them
as to their qualifications, experience, and service
records.[12] With respect to the supervision of its
employees, the employer should formulate standard
operating procedures, monitor their implementation,
and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To
establish compliance with these requirements,
employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.[13]
In the instant case, petitioner Mercury Drug
presented testimonial evidence on its hiring
procedure. According to Mrs. Merlie Caamic, the
Recruitment and Training Manager of petitioner
Mercury Drug, applicants are required to take
theoretical and actual driving tests, and psychological
examination. In the case of petitioner Del Rosario,
however, Mrs. Caamicadmitted that he took the
driving tests and psychological examination when he
applied for the position of Delivery Man, but not when
he applied for the position
of Truck Man. Mrs. Caamic also admitted that
petitioner Del Rosario used a Galant which is a light
vehicle, instead of a truck during the driving
tests. Further, no tests were conducted on the motor
skills development, perceptual speed, visual attention,
depth visualization, eye and hand coordination and
steadiness of petitioner Del Rosario. No NBI and
police clearances were also presented. Lastly,
petitioner Del Rosario attended only three driving
seminars on June 30, 2001, February 5, 2000 and July
7, 1984. In effect, the only seminar he attended before
the accident which occurred in 1996 was held twelve
years ago in 1984.
It also appears that petitioner Mercury Drug does not
provide for a back-up driver for long trips. At the time
of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario has been out on
the road for more than thirteen hours, without any
alternate. Mrs. Caamic testified that she does not
know of any company policy requiring back-up drivers
for long trips.[14]
Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that
it exercised due diligence on the supervision and
discipline over its employees. In fact, on the day of the
accident, petitioner Del Rosario was driving without a
license. He was holding a TVR for reckless driving. He
testified that he reported the incident to his superior,
but nothing was done about it. He was not suspended
or reprimanded.[15] No disciplinary action whatsoever
was taken against petitioner Del Rosario. We
therefore affirm the finding that petitioner Mercury
Drug has failed to discharge its burden of proving that
it exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employee, petitioner Del Rosario.
Africa vs. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448
Facts: In the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke
out at the Caltex service station at the corner of
Antipolo St. and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started
while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into
the underground storage, right at the opening of the
receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was
inserted. The fire spread to and burned several
houses. The owners, among them petitioner spouses
Africa and heirs of Ong, sued respondents Caltex
Phil., Inc., the alleged owner of the station, and Mateo
Boquiren, the agent in charge of its operation, for
damages. The CFI and CA found that the petitioners
failed to prove negligence of the respondents, and that
there was due care in the premises and with respect
to the supervision of their employees.
Issue: Whether or not, without proof as to the cause
and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on
the part of the respondents.
Held: Yes. Res ipsa loquitur literally means “the thing
or transaction speaks for itself.” For the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur to apply, the following requisites should
be present: (a) the accident is of a kind which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s
negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality within
the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and
(c) the possibility of contributing conduct which would
make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. In the case
at bar, the gasoline station, with all its appliances,
equipment and employees, was under the control of
respondents. A fire occurred therein and spread to
and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who
knew or could have known how the fire started were
respondents and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and
reasonable inference that the incident happened
because of want of care. The negligence of the
employees was the proximate cause of the fire, which
in the ordinary course of things does not happen.
Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to the award for
damages.
VICENTE LAMIS and SANDIGAN PROTECTIVE &
INVESTIGATION AGENCY, INC., petitioners, vs.
DAVID Y. ONG, respondent.
FACTS:
Sandigan Protective and Investigation Agency, Inc.
(Sandigan), petitioner, was the security agency
providing security services at the Manila Chinese
Cemetery. The visiting hours were at 6:00 a.m. to 6:00
p.m. Sandigan instructed the security guards not to
allow any one to enter the cemetery from 6:00 p.m. to
6:00 a.m.
On September 20, 1994, Vicente Lamis, also a
petitioner, was the guard assigned at the south gate of
the cemetery for the 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. slot.
Around 3:00 in the morning, a Mitsubishi Lancer,
with a PSM 679 plate, driven by David Y. Ong, herein
respondent, arrived at the south gate of the cemetery.
He beeped his car and continued doing so, but Lamis
did not open the gate. Eventually, he went outside the
gate and informed respondent that being beyond
visiting hours, he cannot enter the cemetery.
Suddenly, respondent accelerated the speed of his car,
trying to enter the cemetery. This irked Lamis. He
closed the gate and took a shot gun entrusted to him
by one of the roving guards.
About thirty minutes thereafter, respondents car
returned at full speed toward the closed gate where
Lamis was standing. He fired a warning shot but
respondent did not stop his car. Lamis fired another
warning shot. Respondent then alighted from his car.
Seeing it was closed, he got inside the car, but before
he could do so, Lamis shot him, hitting his right arm,
left hip, and right waist. He managed to drive to the
Chinese General Hospital where he was examined
and treated. Thereafter, the hospital guard reported
the incident to the police who immediately conducted
an investigation.
Petitioner Sandigan conducted its own investigation
but did not turn over to the police the firearm used by
Lamis.
Subsequently, Sandigan paid Lamis mother the
amount spent for his medical expenses. Meanwhile,
he was given another job but he absented from work
without leave. Thus, he was suspended and
eventually dismissed from the service.
On March 16, 1994, respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Manila a complaint
for frustrated homicide against Lamis, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 94-J-27836.
ISSUES: 1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
CORRECTLY HELD PETITIONER SANDIGAN
LIABLE DESPITE THE FACT THAT SANDIGAN
EXERCISED DUE DILIGENCE IN THE
SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS
SECURITY GUARDS.
2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS, DESPITE
LACK OF BASIS TO SUPPORT ANY FINDING OF
LIABILITY AGAINST PETITIONERS, CORRECTLY
AWARDED DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT.
RULING:
Anent the first and second issues, petitioners contend
that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that: (a)
petitioner Lamis did not act in self-defense, and (b)
petitioner Sandigan failed to prove that it exercised
due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
security guards.
The first two issues are obviously questions of fact.
Certainly, such matters mainly require a calibration
of the evidence or a determination of the credibility of
the witnesses presented by the parties and the
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances, their relation to each other and to the
whole, and the probabilities of the situation.[3]
The well-entrenched rule is that questions of fact may
not be the subject of an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, as this recourse is generally confined
to questions of law.[4] Under the said Rule, the
jurisdiction of this Court over cases brought to it is
limited to the review and rectification of errors of law
committed by the lower court.
Moreover, it is doctrinally settled that where the trial
courts factual findings are adopted and affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, as in this case, the same are
final and conclusive and may not be reviewed by this
Court.[5] It bears emphasis that in the appreciation of
evidence, the Appellate Court accords due deference to
the trial courts factual findings because the latter had
the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses when they testified during the trial and,
therefore, is in a better position to determine their
credibility.[6] Thus, we find no compelling reason to
overturn the factual findings and conclusion of law by
the Court of Appeals relative to the first and second
issues.
With respect to the third issue, petitioners maintain
that there is no legal basis for the trial courts award
of damages.
As earlier stated, the trial court found that Lamis act
of shooting the respondent was deliberate and
intentional, hence, both petitioners are jointly and
solidarily liable to respondent for damages.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that Whoever
by an act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. x x x. The obligation imposed by this
Article is demandable not only for ones own wrongful
acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom
one is responsible.[7] Thus, petitioner Sandigan, being
the employer of petitioner Lamis, is likewise liable for
damages caused by the latter.[8]
As stated earlier, petitioner Sandigan already paid
the medical expenses (or actual damages) incurred by
respondent.
We find, however, that the trial court erred in
awarding to respondent moral damages in the sum
of P500,000.00, exemplary damages of P300,000.00
and attorneys fee in the amount of P50,000.00. These
amounts are quite excessive. We have held that
although the trial court is given the discretion to
determine the amount of such damages, the appellate
court may modify or change the amount awarded
when it is inordinate,[9] as in this case.
It bears stressing that the award of moral damages is
meant to compensate the claimant for any physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly
caused by the defendants wrongful acts.[10] Although
incapable of pecuniary estimation, the amount must
somehow be proportional to and in approximation of
the suffering inflicted.[11] Moral damages are not
intended to impose a penalty to the
wrongdoer,[12] neither to enrich the claimant at the
expense of the defendant.[13] There is no hard-and-fast
rule in determining what would be a fair and
reasonable amount of moral damages, since each case
must be governed by its own peculiar facts. Trial
courts are given discretion in determining the
amount, with the limitation that it should not be
palpably and scandalously excessive.[14] We hold that
an award to respondent of P30,000.00, instead
of P500,000.00, as moral damages is reasonable.
Likewise, we are convinced that the award of
exemplary damages should be reduced
from P300,000.00 to P25,000.00. Such damages are
imposed not to enrich the claimant and impoverish
the defendant but to serve as a deterrent against, or
as a negative incentive to curb, socially deleterious
actions.[15]
Finally, an award of P20,000.00 as attorneys fee is
deemed sufficient considering that the suit involved is
merely for damages. Attorneys fee may be awarded
when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses
to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act
of the other party,[16] as in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated March 13, 2001 and Resolution dated
June 28, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 61034 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
the sense that petitioners are ordered to pay
respondent (a) P30,000.00 as moral damages,
(b) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
(c) P20,000.00 as attorneys fee. Costs against
petitioners.
Cerezo vs Tuazon
FACTS:
Noontime, June 26, 1993 -- A Country Bus Lines
passenger bus collided with a tricycle in Pampanga.
The driver of the tricycle Tuazon filed a complaint for
damages against Mrs. Cerezo, the owner of the bus
lines, her husband, Atty. Cerezo, and bus driver
Foronda.
According to the facts alleged in the complaint,
Tuazon was driving on the proper lane. There was a
"Slow Down" sign which Foronda ignored. After the
complaint was filed, alias summons was served upon
the person of Atty. Cerezo, the Tarlac Provincial
Prosecutor.
In their reply, Mrs. Cerezo contended that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction because there was
no service of summons on Foronda. Moreover, Tuazon
failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil
action for damages in the criminal action.
ISSUE:
Art. 2180 originates from the negligent act of the
employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer
directly. When an employee causes damage, the law
presumes that the employer has himself committed an
act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the
damage. This is the fault that the law condemns.
While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary
capacity for the employee's criminal negligence, the
employer is also civilly liable directly and separate for
his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due
diligence in selecting and supervising his employee.
The idea that the employer's liability is wholly
subsidiary is wrong.
The action can be brought directly against the person
responsible (for another) without including the author
of the act. The action against the principal is
accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of
a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but is
not subsidiary in the sense that it cannot be instituted
till after the judgment against he author of the act or
at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action;
action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a
principal action.

Whether or not Mrs. Cerezo is liable for damages
HELD:
Mrs. Cerezo's contention is wrong. Tuazon's case is
not based on criminal law but on quasi-delict under
the Civil Code.
The same negligent act may produce civil liability
arising from a delict under Art. 103, RPC, or may give
rise to an action for quasi-delict under Art. 2180, C.C.
An aggrieved party may choose between the two
remedies. An action based on quasi-delict may proceed
independently from the criminal action. There is,
however, a distinction between civil liability arising
from a delict and civil liability arising from a quasi-
delict. The choice of remedy whether to sue for a delict
or a quasi-delict, affects the procedural and
jurisdictional issues of the action.
In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to
enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer for the
criminal negligence of the employee as provided in
Art. 103, RPC. To hold the employer liable in a
subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party
must initiate a criminal action where the employee's
delict and corresponding primary liability are
established. If the present action proceeds from a
delict, then the trial court's jurisdiction over Foronda
is necessary.
However, the action filed by Tuazon was based on a
quasi-delict, which is separate and independent from
an action based on a delict. Hence, there was no need
to reserve the filing of a separate civil action. The
purpose of allowing the filing the of an independent
action based on quasi-delict against the employer is to
facilitate the remedy for civil wrongs.

Tuazon's action is based on quasi-delict under Art.

2180: Employer's liability.

Foronda is not an indispensable party, contrary to

Mrs. Cerezo's contention. An indispensable party is
one whose interest is affected by the court's action in
the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of
the case is possible. However, Mrs. Cerezo's liability
as an employer in action for quasi-delict is not only
solidary, it is also primary and direct.

The responsibility of two or more persons who are

liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a
solidary liability on the part of the debtors, as in this
case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation.
Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire
obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation
of rights, but only mutual representation. Where the
obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the
parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a
necessary party because complete relief is available
from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is
not even necessary as Tuazon may collect from Mrs.
Cerezo alone.

Moreover, an employer's liability based on a quasi-

delict is primary and direct, while the employer's
liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. The
words "primary and direct," as contrasted with
"subsidiary," refers to the remedy provided by law for
enforcing the obligation rather than to the character
and limits of the obligation. Although liability under