PART ONE: OBLIGATIONS

General Provisions

1. Leung Ben vs.

O’Brien 8 Phil 102
2. Bautista vs. F.O.
Borromeo, Inc., 30
SCRA 119
3. Dela Cruz vs.
Northern
Theatrical, 50 O.G.
4225, August 1954
4. Pichel vs. Alonzo,
111 SCRA 341
5. Licudan vs. Court
of Appeals, Jan 24,
1991
6. Barredo vs.
Garcia, 73 Phil 607
7. Gutierrez vs.
Gutierrez, 56 Phil
177

Nature and Effect of Obligations

8. Bishop of Jaro vs.

De la Peña, 26 P
144
9. Sampaguita
Pictures vs.
Jalwindor
Manufacturers, 93 S
420
10. Picart vs. Smith,
37 P 809
11. Cangco vs.
Manila Railroad, 38
P 763
12. Rakes vs.
Atlantic Gulf, 7 P
359
13. Spouses Guanio
vs. Makati Shangrila
Hotel, February 7,
2011
14. Nakpil vs. CA,
144 SCRA 596
15. Sia vs. CA, 222
SCRA 24
16. RP vs. Luzon
Stevedoring 21
SCRA 279
17. NPC vs. Philipp
Brothers, 369 S 629
18. Medel vs. CA,
299 S 481

DIFFERENT KINDS OF OBLIGATIONS

Pure and Conditional Obligations

19. HSBC vs.

Spouses Broqueza,
November 17, 2010
20. Santiago vs.
Millar, 68 P 39
21. Patente vs.
Omega, 93 P 218

ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 1

 22. Gaite vs.
Fonacier, 2 SCRA
831
23. Coronel vs.
Court of Appeals,
Oct 7 1996
24. Javier vs. Court
of Appeals, 183 S
171
25. Heirs of Atienza
vs. Espidol, August
11, 2010
26. Parks vs.
Province of Tarlac,
49 P 142
27. Osmena vs.
Rama, 14 P 99
28. Trillana vs.
Quezon Colleges,
93 P 383
29. Hermosa vs.
Longara, 93 P 971
30. Smith Bell vs
Matti, 44 P 875
31. Lao Lim vs.
Court of Appeals,
191 S 150
32. Catungal vs.
Rodriguez, March
23, 2011
33. Luneta Motor
vs. Abad, 67 P 32
34. PLDT vs
Jeturian, 97 P 981
35. Valencia vs.
RFC, 103 P 444
36. Labayen vs.
Talisay, 52 P 440
37. Ang vs. Court of
Appeals, 170 S 286
38. Heirs of Gaite
vs. The Plaza Inc,
January 26, 2011
39. Lalicon vs. NHA,
July 13, 2011
40. Spouses
Fernando vs.
Continental
Airlines, January 16,
2012
41. F.F. Cruz vs. HR
Construction,
March 14, 2012
42. Tan vs. Court of
Appeals, 175 S 656
43. Heirs of JBL
Reyes vs. CA, 338 S
282
44. Song Fo vs.
Hawaiian Phil, 47 P
821
45. Filoil vs.
Mendoza, 150 S 632

Obligations with a Period

46. PNB vs. Lopez

Vito, 52 P 41

ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 2

 47. Victorias
Planters vs.
Victorias Milling, 97
P 318
48. Ponce de Leon
vs. Syjuco, 90 P 311
49. Barretto vs. City
of Manila, 7 P 416
50. People’s Bank
vs. Odom, 64 P 126
51. Gonzales vs.
Jose, 66 P 369
52. Eleizegui vs.
Manila Lawn Tennis
Club, 2 P 309
53. Araneta vs. Phil
Sugar, 20 SCRA 330
54. Gaite vs.
Fonacier, 2 SCRA
831
55. Abesamis vs.
Woodcraft, 166
SCRA 577
56. Song Fo vs.
Oria, 33 P 3

Alternative and Facultative Obligations

57. Reyes vs.

Martinez, 55 P 492
58. Ong Guan Can
vs. Century
Insurance, 46 P 592

ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 3

 Joint and Solidary Obligations

Dayadante and Rogero executed in a private writing a note

acknowledging indebtedness the first part of which says: “We
jointly and severally acknowledge our indebtedness in the sum IS ROGERO/QUEROL LIABLE AS A SURETY? OR AS A
of 13,332.33php Philippine currency (a balance made October SOLIDARY DEBTOR?
23, 1908) bearing interest at the rate of 10 percent.”
59. Rogero, though acting as surety for Dayadante, was bound
Jaucian vs. Querol Rogero signed the document in the capacity of surety for jointly and severally with Dayadante in the obligation because
38 P 707 Daydante. Jaucian, as answer to the action of Rogero for the when a surety bound himself jointly with the debtor he will be
(Comparative court to declare the private instrument void, asked for compelled to pay a creditor. The relationship is that of a joint
Jurisprudence) judgement against Rogero for the amount due from the solidary obligation by the very reason of the choice of words in
obligation. Jaucian continued instituting the demand for the the private instrument executed which has the force of law
obligation because Dayadante became insolvent but Querol between the parties. Joint and several = solidary.
(heir of Rogero) contends that their relationship is that of a
principal debtor-surety and that it should be the court’s action
to exhaust first all the property of Dayadante.
Villamor, being a friend and a former classmate of Borromeo
borrowed a LARGE SUM OF MONEY from the latter to settle
some pressing obligation from Mr. Millar. Villamor mortgaged
to Borromeo his land and house in Cebu City. Mr. Millar filed
civil action against Villamor and attached his properties
W/N the stipulation amounting to a waiver of a future
including the property mortgaged to Borromeo.
60. prescription is valid – YES
Borromeo vs.
Borromeo pressed Villamor for settlement of his debt but
Court of Appeals Borromeo was not renouncing any right for he was just being
instead the latter offered to execute a document promising to
47 S 65 considerate. Between two possible interpretations, that which
pay his indebtedness even after the lapse of 10 years.
(Comparative saves rather than destroys shall be preferred. In interpreting
Borromeo demanded orally that Villamor settle his debt to him
Jurisprudence) contracts, what matters is the ascertainment of the intent of
however, the latter failed to do so. So, Borromeo filed a
the parties. Decision of the CA is reversed.
complaint for collection.

The CFI-Cebu City rendered a decision in favour of Borromeo

but the CA reversed such stating that the agreement was not
valid for a waiver of future prescription is not allowed.
Siblings Sta. Maria executed Special Power of Attorney
authorizing brother Maximo to mortgage a land. In addition, W/N Valeriana is liable for the unpaid balances – YES, but only
Valeriana Sta. Maria alone executed another SPA authorizing JOINTLY
Maximo to borrow money and mortgage real estate owned by
her: Although the question has not been raised in appellants' brief,
we hold that Valeriana's liability for the loans secured by
“For me and in my name to borrow money and make, execute, Maximo is not joint and several or solidary as adjudged by the
sign and deliver mortgages of real estate now owned by me trial court, but only joint, pursuant to the provisions of Article
61.
standing in my name and to make, execute, sign and deliver any 1207 of the Civil Code that "the concurrence ... of two or more
PNB vs. Sta Maria
and all promissory notes necessary in the premises. (Exh. E-I)” debtors in one and the same obligation does not imply that ...
29 S 303
each one of the (debtors) is bound to render entire compliance
(Comparative
Maximo obtained two loans including in its security the land he with the prestation.
Jurisprudence)
jointly owned with his brothers and sisters. PNB then filed a
petition for collection against Maximo and his siblings. There is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly
so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation
The authority granted by defendants-appellants (except requires solidarity." It should be noted that in the additional
Valeriana) unto their brother, Maximo, was merely to special power of attorney, Exh. E-1, executed by Valeriana, she
mortgage the property jointly owned by them. They did not did not grant Maximo the authority to bind her solidarity with
grant Maximo any authority to contract for any loans in their him on any loans he might secure thereunder.
names and behalf.
Petitioner Ronquillo together with 3 others owed Antonio P. So
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE LIABILITY OF THE DEBTOR IN
of a certain amount. The compromise agreement entered into
THE CASE AT BAR? – SOLIDARY
by the parties are worded as follows:
By the express term of the compromise agreement and the
“Plaintiff agrees to reduce its claim of 117, 498.95 to only
62. decision based upon it, the defendants obligated themselves
110,000 and defendants agrees to acknowledge the validity of
Ronquillo vs. Court to pay their obligation "individually and jointly". The term
such claim and further bind themselves to initially pay out their
of Appeals "individually" has the same meaning as "collectively",
total indebtedness... defendants individually and jointly agree
132 S 274 "separately", "distinctively", “respectively” or "severally". An
to pay within a period of six months.”
(Comparative agreement to be "individually liable" undoubtedly creates a
Jurisprudence) several obligation, and a "several obligation” is one by which
Because of the failure of the 2 other debtors (aside from
one individual binds himself to perform the whole obligation.
Ronquillo) to pay their corresponding shares in the amount of
The obligation in the case at bar being described as
the debt, a Motion for Execution was issued. Certain furniture
"individually and jointly", the same is therefore enforceable
and appliances owned by Ronquillo were then sold at a public
against one of the numerous obligors.
sale to satisfy the full amount of the unpaid debt. Ronquillo

ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 4

 now questions the validity of the Motion for execution by
saying that since their liability is joint, each of them should only
be held liable for 1⁄4 of the total debt and that his properties
should not be made to answer for the full amount.
Marsman Drysdale and Gotesco Properties entered into a Joint
Venture agreement for the construction and development of
an office building on a land owned by Drysdale in Makati. In the
agreement, a 50-50 investment share was agreed upon in
63.
which Drysdale is to contribute the property and Gotesco is to
Marsman vs.
contribute the monetary investment of 420,000,000 in cash. A
Philippine
technical services contract was entered into by Marsman with
Geoanalytics
Philippine GeoAnalytics Inc. to provide subsurface soil
June 29, 2010
exploration. PGI was only able to drill 4 out of 5 holes due to
(Comparative
the failure on the part of the joint venture to clear the area
Jurisprudence)
where the drilling has to be made. PGI billed the JV and despite
repeated demands the JV failed to pay its obligations.
Marsman Drysdale passed the responsibility to Gotesco which,
under the JVA is solidarily liable for all money claims.
The heirs of Anastacio Cruz – Anastacio Alano, Jose Alano and
Florencio Alano, executed a document promising to pay
Marino on or before Feb. 27, 1905. In order to secure the
payment they will mortgage to Marino the house and lot
bequeathed to them by Anastacio Cruz AND in case of
64.
insolvency on their part, they will transfer ownership of said
Agoncillo vs. Javier
house to Marino – and if the appraisal of the property be lower
38 P 424
than the amount of indebtedness, it will be deducted from the
(Joint Divisible
amount and they will be liable to pay the difference. No part of
Obligations)
the sum due was paid, except the 200 paid by Anastacio Alano
who died intestate. A complaint was filed, alleging that, unless
defendants pay the debt for the recovery of which the action
was brought, they be required to convey to plaintiffs the house
and lot.
August 12, 1909 — Gregorio, for himself and in representation
of his brother Manuel, and in their own behalf Pedro,
Francisco, Carmen, and Concepcion, the latter being of age at
the time, executed the notarial instrument. They severally and
jointly acknowledged and admitted their indebtedness to
Inchausti for P253,445.42 First installment begins on June 30,
1910.
65.
Inchausti vs. Yulo
They also stipulated that the default in payment of any of the
34 P 978
installments or the noncompliance of any of the other
(Consequences of
obligations they have assumed will result in the maturity of all
Solidarity)
the said installments, and their debt will immediately be due
and demandable. All the obligations were contracted in
solidum by all of them.
The Yulos did not pay the first installment of the obligation.
1911—Inchausti brought an ordinary action against Gregorio
Yulo for the payment of the whole amount due plus interest
Which between joint venturers Marsman and Gotesco bears
the liability to pay PGI its unpaid claims? – BOTH
Court finds Marsman Drysdale and Gotesco jointly liable to
PGI. A technical services contract clearly listed Marsman
Drysdale and Gotesco as beneficial owners of the project.
Article 1208 – If from the law or the nature of the obligation to
which the preceding article refers the contrary does not
appear, the credit or debt shall be presumed to be divided into
as many equal shares as there are creditors and debtors. Thus
the obligation between Drysdale and Gotesco with respect to
PI is joint notwithstanding the JVA which is only binding
among them.
W/N the cause of action has been barred by the statute of
limitations – YES
The obligation involved here is an alternative one. The
principal undertaking is the payment of money. The
agreement to convey the house and lot at an appraised
valuation in the event of failure to pay the debt in money at its
maturity is simply an undertaking that if the debt is not paid in
money, it will be paid in another way. It is clear that the liability
of the respondents as to the conveyance of the house and lot is
subsidiary and conditional, being dependent upon their failure
to pay the debt in money. It must follow therefore that if the
action to recover the debt has prescribed, the action to compel
a conveyance of the house and lot is likewise barred.
The complaint was not filed within 10 years (Code of Civil
Procedure, Sec. 43), it is obvious that the plea of prescription is
well taken, unless the running of the statute was interrupted.
An extrajudicial demand is not sufficient, under the law, to stop
the running of the statute. There must be either (1) a partial
payment, (2) a written acknowledgement or (3) a written
promise to pay the debt.
It cannot be said that the payment made by Anastasio Alano
was for the benefit of Jose or Florencio or that it was
authorized by either of them, hence suspending the running of
the period of prescription. Article 1138 of the Civil Code – joint
obligations are, as regards to each of the debtors, to be
reputed as separate debts with respect to each of the debtors.
It follows that a payment or acknowledgement by one of such
joint debtors will not stop the running of the period or
prescription as to the others. The payment only suspended the
period of prescription as regards to him alone.
W/N the court may demand the whole amount of their debt to
Gregorio alone – YES
Gregorio answered in defense that, among others, the initial
instrument was novated by that which was executed by
Manuel, Francisco and Carmen, concluding that the action is
premature since the new due date would be on 1911. The court
however, replied that when the suit was brought on March 27,
1911, the first installment of the obligation had already
matured of June 30, 1910, and with the maturity of this
installment, the first not having been paid, the whole debt had
become due and demandable.
But as regards Francisco, Manuel, and Carmen, none of the
installments payable under their obligation, contracted later,
had as yet matured. The first payment was to mature on June
30, 1912. This exception or personal defense of Francisco,
Manuel, and Carmen Yulo "as to the part of the debt for which
ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 5
 (10% per annum)
Francisco, Manuel, and Carmen Yulo executed in favor of
Inchausti another notarial instrument in recognition of the debt
and obligation of payment with terms: reducing the debt and
pushing back the date of the first installment to June 30, 1911.
A Construction and Service Agreement was entered into by
Nicencio Tan Quiombing and Dante Biscocho, as the first
party, jointly and severally bound themselves to construct a
house for private respondents Francisco and Manuelita Saligo,
as the second party. Quiombing and Manuelita Saligo entered
into a second agreement under which the completion of the
house and payment of the balance of the contract price were
stipulated to be done.
66.
Quiombing vs.
M. Saligo signed a promissory note for 125,363.50 php
Court of Appeals
representing the amount still due from them payable to
189 S 325
Quiombing. Quiombing filed a complaint for the recovery of
(Consequences of
the said amount, and respondents contend that the complaint
Solidarity)
must be dismissed because Biscocho was an indispensable
party to the case and therefore should have been included as
co-plaintiff.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that as a solidary creditor
he could act by himself alone in the enforcement of his claim.
The amounts due were payable only to him under the second
agreement, where Biscocho was not mentioned at all.
Reyes and his wife (David) executed 3 indemnity agreements in
favor of Imperial Insurance Inc. jointly and severally to assure
indemnification of the latter for whatever liability it may incur
in connection with its posting the security bonds to lift the
attachments in civil cases, for the benefit of Felicisimo Reyes.
67.
While the case was pending, Reyes died. In the first two civil
Imperial Insurance
cases, judgment was rendered against the spouses Reyes and
vs. David
Emilia David. Appellee made demands on Emilia T. David to
133 S 317
pay the amounts of P60,000.00 and P40,000.00 under the
(Consequences of
surety bonds. When David failed to make payments, Imperial
Solidarity)
filed an action for collection of sums of money under three (3)
different causes of action. Judgment was rendered ordering
David to pay the amounts under the surety bonds. David
contended that the action has been barred because of
petitioner’s failure to file its claims against the estate of Reyes
in due time.
they were responsible" can be sent up by Gregorio Yulo as a
partial defense to the action.
The part of the debt for which these three are responsible is
P112,500, hence Gregorio may claim that, even acknowledging
that the debt for which he is liable is P225,000, nevertheless
not all of it can now be demanded of him, for that part of it
which pertained to his co-debtors is not yet due, a state of
affairs which not only prevents any action against the persons
who were granted the term which has not yet matured, but
also against the other solidary debtors who being ordered to
pay could not now sue for a contribution, and for this reason
the action will be only as to the P112,500.
The contract of May 12, 1911 has affected the action and the
suit to the extent that Gregorio Yulo has been able to make in
his favor the defense of remission of part of the debt (Art.1222
NCC) because it is a defense derived from the nature of the
obligation, so that although the said defendant was not party
to the contract in question, yet because of the principle of
solidarity he was benefited by it.
The remission of any part of the debt, made by the creditor in
favor of one or more of his solidary debtors, inures to the
benefit of the rest of them, and these latter may utilize in their
favor the defense of remission. (Art. 1222 NCC).
The solidary debtor unconditionally obligated (or whose period
for payment has expired) may not, with respect to the part of
the debt for which he is liable, plead the defense of
prematurity of the action, which is personal to his co-debtors.
W/N one of the two solidary creditors may sue by himself alone
for the recovery of amounts due to both of them without
joining the other creditor as a co-plaintiff – YES
Biscocho does not need to be included as a co-plaintiff in the
complaint. Quiombing as a solidary creditor can by himself
alone enforce payment of the construction costs by
respondents and as a solidary debtor may by himself alone be
held liable for any possible breach of contract that may be
proved by the private respondents. Biscocho is neither a
necessary nor an indispensable party.
Question of who should sue the private respondents was a
personal issue between Quiombing and Biscocho in which the
spouses Saligo had no right to interfere. If Quiombing
eventually collects the amount due from the solidary debtors,
Biscocho may later claim his share thereof, but that decision is
for him alone to make. Payment of the debt to the
complainant will be considered payment to the other solidary
creditor even if the latter was not a party to the suit.
W/N the creditor may file an action against the surviving
solidary debtors alone instead of instituting a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor (Reyes) –
YES
Under the law and well-settled jurisprudence, when the
obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may bring his action in
toto (as a whole) against any of the debtors obligated in
solidum (for the whole).
Thus, if husband and wife bound themselves jointly and
severally, in case of his death her liability is independent of and
separate from her husbands; she may be sued for the whole
debt and it would be error to hold that the claim against her as
well as the claim against her husband should be made in the
decedent's estate.
ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 6
 In the case at bar, appellant signed a joint and several
obligation with her husband in favor of herein appellee; as a
consequence, the latter may demand from either of them the
whole obligation. The Civil Code expressly allows the creditor
to proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or
all of them simultaneously. Hence, there is nothing improper in
the creditor's filing of an action against the surviving solidary
debtors alone, instead of instituting a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor wherein his
claim could be filed.

Obligations with a Penal Clause

68.
Manila Racing Club
vs. Manila Jockey
Club
69 P 55
(Purpose of Penal
Clause)
69.
SSS vs. Moonwalk
221 S 119
(Purpose of Penal
Clause)
70.
Caridad Estate vs.
Santero
71 P 114
(Purpose of Penal
Clause)
71.
Bachrach vs.
Espiritu
52 P 346
(Exception to the
Purpose of Penal
Clause)
72.
Cabarroguis vs.
Vicente
107 P 340
(Penalty plus
Fulfillment)
73.
Jison vs. Court of
Appeals
164 S 339
(Reduction of
Penalty)
74.
Umali vs. Miclat
105 P 1007
(Reduction of
Penalty)
75.
Lambert vs. Fox
26 P 558
(Proof of Actual
Damages)

EXTINGUISHMENT OF OBLIGATIONS
Payment or Performance

76. Defendants-appellants Ursula Torres Calasanz and Tomas W/N the contract was validly cancelled – NO
Angeles vs. Calasanz and plaintiffs-appellees Buenaventura Angeles and
Calasanz Teofila Juani entered into a contract to sell a piece of land Unilateral cancellation is unwarranted if there is only a slight or
135 S 323 located in Cainta, Rizal for the amount of P3,920 plus 7% casual breach on the fulfillment of the obligation. Apart from

ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 7

 interest per annum. Pursuant to the terms of the contract,
Angeles made a down payment of P392 and promised to pay
the balance in monthly installments of P 41.20 until fully paid.
On numerous occasions, Calasanz have received late payments
from Angeles. Due to the failure of Angeles to effect
subsequent installment payments, Calasanz cancelled the
contract by virtue of a stipulation which allows unilateral
cancellation in case of non-payment. But upon perusal of
Angeles together with the CFI of Rizal of all the subsequent
payments made, they found out that 4,533 pesos including
interests have already been paid. Thus, Angeles contend that
the rescission be held invalid.
Petitioner Pagsibigan obtained an agricultural loan from the
Planter’s Development Bank secured by a mortgage over a
parcel of land.
Pagsibigan issued a promissory note stipulating that for a first
payment to be made on May 3,
1977 and payments every six months at 1,018 pesos with 19%
interest for unpaid amortizations. This promissory note
77.
contained an acceleration clause.
Pagsibigan vs.
Court of Appeals
Initial payment was made followed by several payments in the
221 S 202
total amount of 11,900 pesos. However, only 4 payments were
made in time and those were the only payments that were
credited in his loan amount. The property was foreclosed extra
judicially on May 7, 1984 for failure to pay an outstanding
balance of 29,554 pesos. This resulted in the property being
sold
to the bank for 8,163 pesos and the bank thereafter claimed a
deficiency of 21,391 pesos.
Jm Tuason and Co. and Javier entered into a contract to sell a
parcel of land in Sta. Maria Heights for the total sum of
P3,691.20, with interest thereon at the rate of 10% a year,
payable as follows: P396.12 upon execution of the contract and
P43.92 every month thereafter, for a period of 10 years..
Paragraph 6 of said contract substantially stipulates that upon
failure of payment, a one month grace period will be given and
if no payment has been made on the defaulted month plus the
78.
grace period, a 10% interest per annum will be added and
JM Tuason vs.
further, if nothing has been paid within 90 days, the vendor
Javier
may have the right to rescind the contract.
31 S 829
Upon execution of contract and the payment of the first
installment, the respondent was placed in possession of the
land. Subsequently, however, she defaulted in the payment of
said installments, in view of which, petitioner informed her by
letter that their contract had been rescinded. Respondent sent
an answer, admitting that she had defaulted in the payment of
the stipulated monthly installments and that this fact was due
the initial down payment of 392 pesos, Calasanz received and
accepted the aggregate amount of 4,533 pesos. Angeles have
paid the monthly installments for 9 years and full payment will
be made in such a short time, thus not amounting to a
substantial breach thereof. Courts should only order the
payment of the few remaining installments but not uphold the
cancellation of the contract.
In addition, when the defendants-appellants, instead of
availing of their alleged right to rescind, have accepted and
received delayed payments of installments, though the
plaintiffs-appellees have been in arrears beyond the grace
period mentioned in paragraph 6 of the contract, the
defendants-appellants have waived and are now estopped
from exercising their alleged right of rescission. Calasanz is
ordered to execute the final deed of sale upon full payment of
the purchase price.
W/N the foreclosure and auction sale of the property were valid
and justified under the circumstances – NO
The respondent bank has the right to foreclose the mortgage
upon the first default of but the records show that it did not.
When it received payment which had been 2 months and 3
days delayed, it applied P154.80 to the principal, P210.00 to
interest, and only P25.20 to penalty. From this act of receiving
delayed payment, it is clear that the respondent bank had
waived its right under the acceleration clause.
Petitioner in this case has the right to move for the cancellation
of the mortgage and the release of the mortgaged property,
upon payment of the balance of the loan. Aside from the fact
that the respondent bank was estopped from enforcing its
right to foreclose by virtue of its acceptance of the delayed
payments for a period of more than six years, the application of
such payment to the interest and the principal during the first
three payments constitutes a virtual waiver of the acceleration
clause provided in the contract. We cannot sustain the legality
of the foreclosure under the peculiar facts of this case, because
there is substantial performance of the obligation on the part
of petitioner. Under Article 1235 of the Civil Code, when the
creditor accepts performance, knowing its incompleteness and
irregularity without protest or objection, the obligation is
deemed complied with.
The bank is bound by estoppel and has no right to rescind, and
further foreclose the property and claim an astronomical
amount of 29,554 pesos. In fact, it was the bank who acted in
bad faith, thereby being liable for: Moral damages, because of
the mental anguish caused to petitioners, and Exemplary
damages, to sufficiently deter similar acts in the future.
W/N JM Tuason and Co. can validly rescind the contract – YES
Apart from the initial installment paid upon the execution of
contract, the respondent religiously satisfied the monthly
installments accruing thereafter, for a period of 8 years.
Although the principal obligation under the contract was
P3,691, the total payments made by the respondent, including
the stipulated interest, aggregated to P4,134.08. The
respondent has offered to pay all of the installments overdue
including the stipulated interest, apart from reasonable
attorney’s fees and the costs.
The petitioner will be able to recover everything due thereto,
pursuant to its contract, including such damages as the former
may have suffered in the consequence of the latter’s default.
Under these circumstances, We feel that, in the interest of
justice and equity, the decision appealed from may be upheld
upon the authority of Art. 1234 of the Civil Code.
ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 8
 to unforeseen circumstances. She said that she is willing to pay
all overdue installments under the contract and had in fact
offered the same to the petitioner. Tuason refused and moved
for the rescission of the contract. CFI of Rizal rendered a
decision, declaring the contract to sell has not yet been
rescinded and ordering the respondent to pay the petitioner
within 60 days
De Guzman and Esguerra agreed to enter into a contract of
lease of the Esguerra – Gueco building in which de Guzman is
bound by a 10-year term of 300 pesos monthly and 400
thereafter. De Guzman failed to pay for 7 consecutive months,
thus, he executed a promissory note promising to pay. De
79.
Guzman failed to do so, and forcing Esguerra to file an action
Esguerra vs.
to recover. A writ of attachment was issued and the parties
Villanueva
entered into a compromise agreement wherein De Guzman is
21 S 1314
bound to pay Esguerra 2,260 pesos ON OR BEFORE November
26, 1962. De Guzman failed to pay, and thus a writ of execution
was issued. De Guzman contends that he delivered 800 and
subsequently 1400 pesos to Esguerra and that this constitutes
full satisfaction and compliance with the obligation.
Tanguilig entered into a proposal with Herce on the
construction of a wind-mill system for a consideration on
60,000Php. Herce was able to pay a downpayment of
30,000Php and a subsequent installment of 15,000Php leaving
a balance of 15,000Php. Tanguilig, due to the refusal of Herce
80.
to pay the remaining installment, filed an action for the
Tanguilig vs. Court
recovery of the sum of 15,000Php. Herce contends that he
of Appeals
already paid 15,000Php to San Pedro General Merchandising
Jan 2, 1997
Inc – the contractor who built the deep well to which the
windmill system was to be connected, and assuming he still
had to pay the balance, it should be offset because of the
defects of the windmill which caused it to collapse after a
strong wind hit the area.
Loreto Tan is the owner of a parcel of land in which
expropriation proceedings was instituted by the government.
Tan filed a motion to release him the expropriation price of
81.
32,480Php. Court, as a judgment rendered in favor of Tan,
PNB vs. Court of
ordered PNB to release to Tan 32,480. Branch manager issued
Appeals
the check to Sonia Gonzaga, whom, by SPA, they contend to
256 S 44
be an authorized representative of Tan. Tan denies as such but
PNB contends that an SPA was signed by Tan authorizing
Gonzaga to receive such payment.
Private respondent Asia Pacific Airways Inc., entered into an
agreement with petitioner Caltex (Philippines) Inc., whereby
petitioner agreed to supply private respondent's aviation fuel
82.
requirements for two (2) years. Private respondents had an
Caltex vs. IAC
outstanding obligation to petitioner in the total amount of
215 S 580
around 4 million pesos representing the unpaid price of the fuel
supplied. Asia Pacific assigned its receivables from National
Treasury to be applied as payment. The National Treasury then
W/N the "receipt" of said sums by the Esguerras constituted
"acceptance" of the incomplete and irregular performance of
respondents' obligation – NO
W/N the acceptance was deemed as full compliance of the
obligation – YES
Esguerra had neither acceded or assented to said payment, nor
taken the same as satisfactory or sufficient compliance with
the judgment aforementioned. The day immediately following
that of the first payment of P800, the Esguerras asked the
court to issue the corresponding writs of execution. Thus, the
Esguerras patently manifested their dissatisfaction with —
which necessarily implied an objection or protest to — said
partial payment.
The law does not require the protest or objection of the
creditor to be made in a particular manner or time. So long as
the acts of the creditor, at the time of the incomplete or
irregular payment by the debtor, or within a reasonable time
thereafter, evince that the former is not satisfied with or
agreeable to said payment or performance, the obligation shall
not be deemed fully extinguished.
Did the payment to SPGMI constituted a valid 3rd party
payment?
The word “deep well” or the construction thereof was not
actually included in the proposals.
It was not a stipulation included in the construction of the wind
mill system – it merely described the type of a deep well pump
suitable for the construction of the wind mill system.
SPGMI is not an authorized 3rd party in the case. Although
defendant contends that Tanguilig executed a letter
authorizing SPGMI to construct a deep well, the same has not
been proven with sufficient and convincing evidence. Thus no
debtor-creditor relationship exists between defendant and
SPGMI.
A one-year guaranty from the date of the completion of
windmill still binds petitioner to reconstruct it. When the
windmill failed to function properly it became his obligation to
make proper repairs in accordance with said guaranty agreed
by both parties. Strong wind is not unforeseen in the case of
windmills, because you put windmills where the strong winds
are!
Did an SPA ever exist? Is the payment to Gonzaga valid?
There is no question that no payment had ever been made to
Tan as the check was never delivered to him. When the court
ordered PNB to pay Tan the amount of 32,480, it had the
obligation to deliver the same to him. The burden of proof of
such payment lies with the debtor (PNB). In the case at bar,
neither SPA nor the check issued by the PNB was ever
presented to the court.
Did the deed of assignment satisfy the requisites of dation in
payment?
The obligation is totally extinguished only when the parties, by
agreement, express or implied, or by their silence, consider the
thing as equivalent to the obligation.
“.... in payment of ASSIGNOR's outstanding obligation plus
ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 9
 issued a Treasury warrant amounting to 5.4M which was issued
in favor or Caltex. Private respondent, having learned that the
amount remitted to petitioner exceeded the amount covered
by the Deed of Assignment, wrote a letter to petitioner,
requesting a refund in the amount of 900k pesos. However,
500k was not returned by Caltex as it represented interest and
service charges at the rate of 18% per annum on the unpaid
and overdue account of respondent. Thus, Asia Pacific filed a
complaint to collect the said amount, contending that the
Deed of Assignment was in fact dation in payment limiting
their debt to only 4.072M.
Luzon Development Bank is a bank that extends loans to
subdivision developers. Delta is a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of developing and selling real estate
properties. Spouses de Leon, owners of Delta, obtained a loan
from LDB amounting to 4 million pesos and as security for said
loans executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of the Bank on
several of their properties including the lot in question.
83.
Luzon
Years later, Delta executed a contract to sell with Enriquez over
Development Bank
the house and lot in Lot 4. On the other hand, Delta defaulted
vs. Enriquez
on its loan with the Bank and instead of foreclosing the
January 12, 2011
mortgage, the two agreed to a dation in payment wherein
Delta assigned/transferred to the bank several properties
including Lot 4. The BANK argues that, if title to Lot 4 is
ordered delivered to Enriquez, DELTA has the obligation to pay
the BANK the corresponding value of Lot 4. According to the
BANK, the dation in payment extinguished the loan only to the
extent of the value of the thing delivered.
Petitioner Tan Shuy, a man engaged in the business of buying
copra and corn in Quezon Province, extended a loan to
Guillermo Maulawin, a farmer-businessman engaged in buying
and selling of copra and corn, in the amount of P 420,000. In
consideration thereof, Guillermo obligated himself to pay the
loan and to sell lucad or copra to petitioner. Despite repeated
84.
demads, Guillermo failed to pay his outstanding balance and
Tan Shuy vs.
Tan Shuy filed a case before the Court.
Spouses Maulawin
February 8, 2012
According to respondent Guillermo, he had already paid the
subject loan in full. Allegedly, he continuously delivered and
sold copra to petitioner. Guillermo said they had an oral
arrangement that the net proceeds thereof shall be applied as
installment payments for the loan. He alleged that his
deliveries amounted to P 420,537.68 worth of copra.
any applicable interest charges on overdue account and other
avturbo fuel lifting and deliveries that ASSIGNOR may from
time to time receive from the ASSIGNEE, and ASSIGNEE does
hereby accepts such assignment in its favor.”
The Deed of Assignment speaks of three (3) obligations (1) the
outstanding obligation of P4,072,682.13 as of June 30, 1980; (2)
the applicable interest charges on overdue accounts; (3) the
other avturbo fuel lifting and deliveries that assignor (private
respondent) may from time to time receive from assignee.
If it were the intention of the parties to limit or fix respondent's
obligation to P4,072.682.13; they should have so stated and
there would have been no need for them to qualify the
statement of said amount with the clause "as of June 30, 1980
plus any applicable interest charges on overdue account" and
the clause "and other avturbo fuel lifting and deliveries that
ASSIGNOR may from time to time receive from the
ASSIGNEE".
After the execution of the Deed of Assignment, petitioner
continued to charge respondent with interest on its overdue
account. This was pursuant to the Deed of Assignment which
provides for respondent's obligation for "applicable interest
charges on overdue account." The charges for interest were
made every month and not once did respondent question or
take exception to the interest. The foregoing subsequent acts
of the parties clearly show that they did not intend the Deed of
Assignment to have the effect of totally extinguishing the
obligations. The Court rules in favor of Caltex and held that the
Deed of Assignment was not a dation in payment.
Did the dacion en pago extinguish the loan obligation, such
that DELTA has no more obligation to the BANK?
A dacion en pago is governed by the law of sales. Contracts of
sale come with warranties, either express (if explicitly
stipulated by the parties) or implied (under Article 1547 et seq.
of the Civil Code). In this case, however, the BANK does not
even point to any breach of warranty by DELTA in connection
with the Dation in Payment. To be sure, the Dation in Payment
has no express warranties relating to existing contracts to sell
over the assigned properties. As to the implied warranty in
case of eviction, it is waivable and cannot be invoked if the
buyer knew of the risks or danger of eviction and assumed its
consequences. As we have noted earlier, the BANK, in
accepting the assigned properties as full payment of DELTA’s
“total obligation,” has assumed the risk that some of the
assigned properties are covered by contracts to sell which must
be honored under PD 957.
Delta is NOT LIABLE TO PAY the Bank the value of the subject
lot; and respondent Enriquez is ordered to PAY the balance of
the purchase price and the interests accruing thereon, as
decreed by the Court of Appeals, to the Bank.
Did the delivery of copra amount to installment payments for
the loan obtained by Guillermo from Tan Shuy? YES
There was a dation in payment. In this case, the debtor delivers
and transmits to the creditor the former’s ownership over a
thing as an accepted equivalent of the payment or
performance of an outstanding debt. In such cases, Article
1245 provides that the law on sales shall apply, since the
undertaking really partakes – in one sense – of the nature of
sale.
Dation in payment extinguishes the obligation to the extent of
the value of the thing delivered, either as agreed upon by the
parties or as may be proved, unless the parties by agreement –
express or implied, or by their silence – consider the thing as
ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 10
 Furthermore, he pointed out that the pesadas (like a receipt) equivalent to the obligation, in which case the obligation is
did not contain the notation "pd," which meant that actual totally extinguished.
payment of the net proceeds from copra deliveries was not
given to him, but was instead applied as loan payment. Supported by petitioner’s statement that he only gets the
payments for trucking while the total amount which represent
the total purchase price for the copras that he delivered to the
plaintiff were all given to Elena Tan Shuy as installments for
the loan he owed to plaintiff, the arrangement between Tan
Shuy and Guillermo can thus be considered as one in the
nature of dation in payment. Pesadas show that other
deliveries were for corn and not copra, so Maulawin is still
indebted to the plaintiff in the amount of 41k pesos.
In the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Amadeo
Molave, a supplemental compromise agreement and project of
partition was executed among the heirs and interested parties.
The agreement provided for the payment of attorney’s fees to
Atty. Canlas in the aggregate amount of 600,000Php —
Did the clause “upon full payment of the corresponding liability
128,000Php in property and 472,000Php in cash. Stipulation:
of party the lien on his/her share is extinguished” in the
“Until after the full payment, there shall be established on all
agreement connote payment of fees in installments?
the properties of the Estate, a charging lien for attorney’s fees
to secure the payment of said fees and, by these present, all
The meaning of the proviso only connotes that the heirs will
the signatories to this Compromise Agreement expressly agree
pay at different times but does not connote that of a separate
to the establishment and creation of the aforesaid charging
payment in installments. The creditor cannot be compelled to
lien, provided that upon full payment of the corresponding
85. partially receive the prestations in which the obligations
liability of party the lien on his/her share is extinguished.”
Nasser vs. Cuevas consist unless there is an express stipulation to that effect.
188 S 812
The agreement was approved by the Court and shortly
Petition is hereby denied, and the Court holds that the Order
thereafter, Canlas moved for the execution of the agreement.
and Execution are validly and lawfully issued, and alias
The court assigned the corresponding shares to be paid by the
execution may issue to the extent that the judgment credit of
heirs and ordered Mariano Nasser to deliver payment within 10
Atty. Canlas remains unsatisfied, with the proviso that the
days from the receipt of the directive. The heirs contend that
sums still due to him shall bear interest until fully paid since it
the execution was improper due to the absence of a written
has already been 16 years and not a single centavo has been
agreement on the precise terms of payment, furthermore, the
paid by the heirs.
clause “Upon full payment of the corresponding liabilities of a
party, the lien on his/her share is extinguished” - to mean that
the agreement is that of an installment basis and the fact that
Nasser have complied with their undertaking, they are not
subject to their lien, and that the same was extinguished.
A judgment in favor of Fortunado was rendered by the court
whereby two parcels of land of Bautista were levied as
payment for the damages. The latter lot had already been
purchased by National Steel Corporation (NSC) but had not yet
been registered in its name. Was the check issued by NSC considered payment of
redemption price?
After due notice, these lots were sold at public auction to the
petitioners as the only bidder. They were issued a certificate of Redemption is not rendered invalid by the fact that the said
sale which was registered thereafter. NSC notified the sheriff officer accepted a check for the amount necessary to make the
of its intention to redeem one of the parcels of land. The sheriff redemption instead of requiring payment in money. It goes
suggested that as the two lots had been sold together for the without saying that if he had seen fit to do so, the officer could
lump sum, both of them should be redeemed by NSC. As the have required payment to be made in lawful money, and he
motion remained unresolved and the period of redemption undoubtedly, in accepting a check, placed himself in a position
86.
would soon expire, NSC issued to the sheriff a check as the where he could be liable to the purchaser at the public auction
Fortunado vs.
redemption price for the lot. The sheriff acknowledged receipt if any damage had been suffered by the latter as a result of the
Court of Appeals
of the check on the same date. medium in which payment was made. But this cannot affect
April 25, 1991
the validity of the payment.
The sheriff acknowledged receipt of the check as redemption
money for the two parcels of land; issued a certificate of The Court held that, while it is not sanctioning the use of a
redemption in favor of NSC and Bautista. check for the payment of obligations over the objection of the
creditor, a check may be used for the exercise of the right of
In a Motion, Bautista prayed that the sum covered by the check redemption, the same being a right and not an obligation. The
be delivered to and kept by the Clerk of Court of the RTC until tender of a check is sufficient to compel redemption but is not
such time as all incidents relative to the validity of the auction in itself a payment that relieves the redemptioner from his
sale conducted by the sheriff were finally resolved. The sheriff liability to pay the redemption price.
notified the petitioners’ counsel of the deposit of the check.
The said counsel replied that he was rejecting the check
because it was not legal tender and was not intended for
payment but merely for deposit.
87. In a civil case, Spouses Tibajia was ordered to pay Eden Tan a Is payment by means of a cashier’s check considered as
Tibajia vs. Court of total money judgment of 398,483.40php. They paid Tan in the payment in legal tender?

ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 11

 Appeals following form: 262,750.00php in cashier’s check and
Jun 4, 1993 135,733.70php in cash. Tan refused to accept the payment, and
insisted that the garnished funds deposited with the RTC
cashier be withdrawn to satisfy the judgment. Trial court and
CA favored Tan by saying that a payment in cashier’s check is
not payment in legal tender.
Petitioners cited that the cashier’s check was that of Bank of
the Philippine Islands, a bank of good standing, and it was
enough to fulfill the obligation.
Union Insurance Society of Canton, an insurance organization,
and General Insurance & Surety Corp (GISC for brevity) entered
into a First Surplus Reinsurance Agreement. Parties agreed on
reciprocal reinsurance expressed and payable in pounds
sterling or any equivalent Philippine currency valued at the
exchange rate existing at the time of payment.
88.
General Insurance
After termination of the reinsurance agreement, Union
vs. Union
Insurance claim that General Insurance is still indebted with a
Insurance
sum of 4,784.51 pounds and demands that it be paid according
179 S 530
to the terms stipulated in the contract. Union requested GISC
to pay the aforementioned sums in pounds sterling or in
Philippine Pesos at the exchange rate prevailing at such time.
GISC refused to pay in pounds and insisted to pay the said
amounts in Philippine Pesos at the old exchange rate. Hence,
this recourse to the Supreme Court.
Velasco bought 3 lots at Diliman, Quezon City. 2 of these lots
were sold to Meralco, who then proceeded to built a substation
which is a facility that reduces high voltage electricity to a
current suitable for commercial distribution. As this facility
emitted noise, Velasco filed a claim for damages due to
nuisance. The trial court dismissed it, but upon appeal to the
Supreme Court, the latter granted the petition granting
89. P20,000 in damages and P5,000 for attorney’s fee to Velasco.
Velasco vs. Hence, this motion for reconsideration contending that the
Meralco decision has incorrectly assessed appellant's damages and
42 S 556 unreasonably reduced their amount. It is first argued that the
decision erred in not taking into account, in computing
appellant's loss of income. Appelant also claimed that he lost
his chance in selling his house for P95,000 due to the noise
caused by Meralco’s substation. Appellant Velasco urges that
the damages awarded him are inadequate considering the
present high cost of living, and calls attention to Article 1250 of
the present Civil Code.
90. NAWASA entered into a contract with FilPipe and Foundry
Filipino Pipe Corp in which the latter is to supply cast iron pressure pipes
Foundry vs. amounting to 270k pesos. NAWASA paid in installments,
NAWASA leaving a balance of 135,507 pesos. FilPipe demanded payment
No, it is not considered payment in legal tender. Section 1 of
RA No. 529, as amended, which provides:
“Section 1. Every provision contained in, or made with respect
to, any obligation which purports to give the obligee the right
to require payment in gold or in any particular kind of coin or
currency other than Philippine currency... shall be as it is
declared against public policy null and void, and no effect... in
any obligation thereafter incurred.”
Section 63 of RA No. 265 (Central Bank Act), as amended,
which provides:
“Section 63. Legal Character – Checks representing deposit
money do not have legal tender power and their acceptance in
the payment of debts, both public and private, is at the option
of the creditor.” (There is a proviso in this section, but not
significant in this case.)
In Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs CA and Roman Catholic Bishop of
Malolos, Inc. vs IAC, the Court held that:
“A check, whether a manager’s check or ordinary check, is not
legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not
a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the
obligee or creditor.”
Was the agreement to pay in a foreign currency valid under
Philippine Law?
While the petitioners seek to evade its obligation to pay in
pounds sterling as being inconsistent to public policy, it
manifested its willingness to pay in another foreign currency,
U.S. dollars.
Whether GISC agreed to pay its obligations in pounds sterling
or in US dollars, it is settled that if there is any agreement to
pay the (instant) obligation in a currency other that the Phil
Currency, the same is null and void as contrary to public policy
(RA 529).
HOWEVER, RA 529 does not invalidate the whole contract
which gives the obligee the right to demand payment in gold
or in other foreign currencies. What it declares void is the
provision to such effect. Consequently, the transactions or
contract SUBSISTS! The most that could be demanded is to
pay the obligation in Philippine Currency.
Is Article 1250 of the Civil Code applicable to this case?
No, it is not applicable. It can be seen from the employment of
the words "extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency
stipulated" that the legal rule envisages contractual obligations
where a specific currency is selected by the parties as the
medium of payment; hence it is inapplicable to obligations
arising from tort and not from contract, as in the case at bar,
besides there being no showing that the factual assumption of
the article has come into existence. Hence, his motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Was there an extraordinary inflation as to warrant the
adjustment for the unpaid balance?
While appellant FPFC’s voluminous records and statistics
ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 12
 161 S 32 for the unpaid balance and NAWASA failed to pay, thus,
FilPipe instituted a complaint for recovery of a sum of money.
Subsequently, FilPipe demanded that an adjustment for the
unpaid balance in accordance with the value of the Phil peso at
the time of the decision, due to the alleged supervening
extraordinary inflation.
Filpipe presented voluminous records and statistics showing
that the price index of commodities, which is the usual
evidence of the value of the currency, has been rising.
proved that there has been a decline in the purchasing power
of the Philippine peso, this downward fall of the currency
cannot be considered "extraordinary." It is simply a universal
trend that has not spared our country.
Extraordinary inflation exists "when there is a decrease or
increase in the purchasing power of the Philippine currency
which is unusual or beyond the common fluctuation in the
value said currency, and such decrease or increase could not
have reasonably foreseen or was manifestly beyond the
contemplation of the parties at the time of the establishment
of the obligation.

Example of extraordinary inflation: More recently, in the 1920's

Germany experienced a case of hyperinflation. In early 1921,
the value of the German mark was 4.2 to the U.S. dollar. By
May of the same year, it had stumbled to 62 to the U.S. dollar.
And as prices went up rapidly, so that by October 1923, it had
reached 4.2 trillion to the U.S. dollar!
Par value vs. Exchange Rate
Par value
 Sometimes called legal exchange rate or par of
exchange.
 It signifies "the amount it takes of one currency
(also based on gold) to buy a unit another
currency(also based on gold) that is, how many
The Central Bank issued a circular which limited the sales of
pieces of the one unit (or their gold content) are
exchange at 2 pesos to 1 dollar to certain specified
necessary to equal the gold content of the other
transactions. Subsequently, the Monetary Board passed two
unit.
resolutions, the first one adjusting the exchange rate of dollars
Exchange Rate
in the free market at 3.20 pesos to 1 dollar and the second
 The price, or the indication of the price, at which
reducing the said amount to 3 pesos is to 1 dollar, with a 15%
one can sell or buy with one's own domestic
margin levy.
currency a foreign currency unit.
 Normally determined by the law of supply and
Gonzalo L. Manuel & Co., Inc., purchased US dollars from
91. demand for a particular currency.
Central Bank through its duly authorized agent bank, the
Gonzalo Maluel Co.
Philippine Bank of Communications, at the rate of P3.00 to  “The price of one currency in terms of another”
vs. Central Bank
$1.00.
38 S 533 Thus, there is a difference between par value and rate of
After some time, petitioner filed a formal claim with CB for the exchange: the first is defined by law, and (as in the case of the
refund of around P20,000 pesos, allegedly paid in excess of the peso) is based upon its gold content. The second is conditioned
amount which the law allowed, based on the statutory par by prevailing economic factors which bear upon the demand
value of P2.00 to $1.00. Central Bank turned down the claim for a particular currency and its availability in the market.
explaining that there was no devaluation of the peso or change
in its par value, and only that the exchange rate changed. The par value of the peso is defined in the Central Bank Act,
Company then filed a petition at the CFI but was likewise which is seven and thirteen-twenty first (7-13/21) grains of gold,
dismissed for the same reason. nineteenth (0.900) fine. If the resolutions were meant to
change the par value of the peso, they were null and void for
not having complied with the requisites under the said act,
which provides that any modification in the gold or dollar value
of the peso shall be made only by the President upon the
proposal of the Monetary Board and with the approval of
Congress and the proposal of the Monetary Board shall require
the concurrence of at least five of the members.
92.
Magdalena Estates
vs. Rodriguez
18 S 967
93. Baltazar Vs.
Lingayen Gulf Inc.,
14 S 522
94. Lopez vs. Court
of Appeals, 114 S
671
95. Adelfa
Properties vs. Court
of Appeals, 240 S
565
96. Soco vs.
Militante, 123 S 160

ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 13

 97. Federation of
United NAMARCO
Distributors vs.
National Marketing,
4 S 867
98. PNCC vs. Court
of Appeals, May 5,
1997
99. Naga Telephone
vs. Court of
Appeals, 73 S 637
100. Yu Tek Co. vs.
Gonzales, 29 P 384
101. Soria vs. COA,
February 8, 2011
102. Sochayseng vs.
Trujillo, 31 P 153
103. Yek Ton Lin vs.
Court of Appeals,
46 S 473
104. Chittick vs.
Court of Appeals,
166 S 219
105. Insular
Investment vs.
Capital One, April
25, 2012
106. Garcia vs. Lim
Chu Sing, 59 P 562
107. Domingo vs.
Garlitos, 8 S 443
108. Soriano vs.
Compañia General,
18 S 999
109. Republic vs.
Mambulao, 4 S 622
110. Gullas vs. PNB,
62 P 519
111. Ong vs. Court
of Appeals, 177 S
402
112. Perez vs. Court
of Appeals, 127 S
636
113. Mialhe vs.
Manalili, 6 S 453
114. Dalton vs. FGR
Realty, January 19,
2011
115. Pioneer
Insurance vs. Court
of Appeals, 180 S
156
116. Sesbreño vs.
Court of Appeals,
222 S 466
117. Ajax Marketing
vs. Court of
Appeals, 248 S 222
118. Cochingyan vs.
R & B Surety, 151 S
339
119. Guerrero vs.
Court of Appeals,
29 S 791
120. Banate vs.
Philippine
Countryside Rural

ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 14

Bank, July 13, 2010
121. Hernandez-
Nieverra vs.
Hernandez,
February 14, 2011
122. Padilla vs. Levy
Hermanos, 69 P 681
123. Ramos vs.
Gibbon, 67 P 371
124. Garcia vs.
Court of Appeals,
191 S 493
125. Heirs of
Servando Franco vs.
Spouses Gonzales,
June 27, 2012
126. Gaw vs. IAC,
220 S 405
127. Asia Bank vs.
Elser, 54 P 994
128. Chemphil vs.
Court of Appeals,
251 S 257

129. Jardine Davies

vs. CA, 333 SCRA
684
130. Azcuna, Jr. vs.
CA, 255 S 215
131. Manila Bay
Club vs. CA, 245 S
715
132. De Leon vs.
CA, 186 S 345
133. Batarra vs.
Marcos, 7 P 156
134. Cui vs. Arellano
University, 2 S 205
135. Ferrazzini vs.
GSell, 34 P 697
136. Omico Mining
and Industrial Corp
vs. Vallejos, 63 S
301
137. Perez vs.
Pomar, 2 P 682
138. Asian
Construction vs.
Cathay Pacific
Steel, June 29, 2010
139. UCPB vs.
Beluso, 530 S 567
140. Joaquin vs.
Mitsumine, 34 P 858
141. Garcia vs.
Legarda, 21 S 555
142. Integrated
Packing vs. CA, 333
S 170
143. DKC Holdings
vs. CA, 329 S 666
144. Marmont Hotel
vs. CA, 168 S 373
145. Coquia vs.
Fieldmen’s
Insurance, 26 S 178
146. Mandarin Villa

ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 15

 vs. CA, 257 S 538
147. Everett
Steamship vs. CA,
297 S 496
148. Kauffman vs.
PNB, 42 P 182
149. Associated
Bank vs. CA, 291 S
511
150. Gilchrist vs.
Cuddy 29 Phil 542
151. So Ping Bun vs.
CA 314 S 751
152. Lagon vs. CA,
453 S 616
153. Luxuria Homes
vs. CA, 302 S 315
154. Rallos vs. Felix
Go Chan, 81 S 251
155. United
Namarco
Distributors vs.
NAMARCO, 114 P
802 *** (see
Number 97)
156. Clarin vs.
Rulona, 127 S 512
157. Korean Air vs.
Yuson, June 26,
2010
158. Rosenstock vs.
Burke, 46 P 217
159. Batañgan v.
Cojuangco, 78 P 481
160. Zayco vs. Serra
44 P 326
161. Laudico vs.
Arias, 43 P 270
162. Sanchez vs.
Rigos, 45 S 368
163. Bambalan vs.
Maramba, 51 P 417
164. Mercado, et al.
vs. Espiritu, 37 P 215
165. Braganza vs.
de Ville Abrille, 105
P 456
166. Hernandez vs.
Hernandez, March
9, 2011
167. Gomez vs.
Linton, 45 P 653
168. Atilano vs.
Atilano, 28 P 231
169. Teran vs.
Villanueva, 56 P 677
170. Tan vs Mandap
429 S 712
171. Dela Cruz vs.
Dela Cruz 419 S 648
172. Calilap-
Asmeron vs. DBP,
November 23, 2011
173. Martinez vs.
HSBC, 15 P 252
174. Bañez vs. CA,
59 S 15

ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 16

 175. Vales vs. Villa,
35 P 769
176. Strong vs.
Gutierrez, 6 P 680
177. Woodhouse vs.
Halili 93 P 526
178. Cacho vs.
Bonifacio 476 S 869
179. Araneta vs. De
Paterno 91 P 786
180. Tuason vs.
Marquez, 45 P 381
181. Songco vs.
Sellner, 37 P 254
182. Azarraga vs.
Gay 52 P 599
183. Hill vs. Veloso,
31 P 160
184. Asiasin vs.
Jalandoni, 45 P 296
185. Rodriguez vs.
Rodriguez, 127 P
294
186. Gonzalez vs.
Trinidad, 67 P 682
187. Borromeo vs.
Borromeo, 98 P 432
188. Bravo Guerrero
vs. Bravo, 465 S 244
189. Blas vs. Santos,
1 S 899
190. Uson vs. Del
Rosario, 92 P 530
191. Castro vs.
Longa, 89 P 581
192. Raet vs. CA,
295 S 677
193. PBC vs. Lui
She, 21 S 52
194. Saguid vs.
Security Finance
Inc., 477 S 256
195. Liguez vs. CA,
102 P 577
196. Velez vs.
Ramas, 40 P 787
197. Liam Law vs.
Olympic Sawmill,
129 S 449
198. Tan vs. Lim,
296 S 455
199. San Lorenzo
Dev’t Corp. vs. CA,
449 S 99
200. Vda de Espiritu
vs. CFI of Cavite, 47
S 354
201. Shaffer vs.
Palma, 131 P 22
202. Hawaiian Phil.
Co. vs. Hernaez, 45
P 746
203. Dauden vs. de
los Angeles, 137 P
900
204. San Miguel
Brewery vs. Law
Union and Rock, 40

ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 17

 P 674
205. Sarming vs.
Dy, 383 S 131
206. Dizon vs.
Gaborro, 83 S 688
207. City of
Cabanatuan vs.
Lazaro, 39 S 653
208. Emilio vs.
Rapal, March 30,
2010
209. Jayme vs.
Alampay, 62 S 131
210. Ong Chua vs.
Carr, 53 P 975
211. Heirs of
Amparo del Rosario
vs. Santos, 108 S 43
212. Labasan vs.
Lacuesta, 86 S 16
213. Prisma
Construction vs.
Menchavez, March
9, 2010
214. Martin vs. DBS
Bank, June 16, 2010
215. Ramos vs.
Heirs of Ramos Sr.,
381 S 594
216. Carceller vs.
CA, 302 S 719
217. Almeda vs.
Bathala Marketing,
542 S 470
218. Bundalian vs.
CA, 129 S 645
219. Andreas vs.
BPI, 47 P 795
220. Ildefonso vs.
Sibal, 106 P 287
221. Ong Yong vs.
Tiu, 375 S 614
222. Gov’t of the
Phil vs. Derham
Bros, 36 P 960
223. Cannu vs. CA,
459 S 80
224. CBC vs. CA,
327 S 378
225. Oria vs.
McMicking 21 P 243
226. Contreras vs.
CBC, 76 P 709
227. Rosencor Dev’t
Corp. vs. Inquing,
354 S 119
228. Suria vs. IAC,
151 S 661
229. Regalado vs.
Luchsinger, 5 P 625
230. Goquiolay vs.
Sycip, 9 S 663
231. Goldenrod vs.
CA, 299 S 141
232. Cabaliw vs.
Sadorra, 64 S 310
233. Alpuerto vs.

ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 18

 Perez Pastor, 38 P
785
234. Ayles vs.
Reyes, 18 P 243
235. Lee vs
Bangkok Bank, Feb
9, 2011
236. Uy Soo Lim vs.
Tan Unchuan, 38 P
552
237. De Luna vs
Linatoc, 74 P 15
238. Rosales vs.
Reyes, 25 P 495
239. Philippine
Trust Co. vs.
Roldan, 99 P 393
240. Bumanlag vs.
Alzate, 144 S 480
241. Almirol vs.
Monserrat, 48 P 67
242. Hernandez vs.
Andal, 78 P 196
243. Robles vs.
Lizarraga, 42 P 584
244. Reiss vs.
Memije, 15 P 350
245. Syquia vs. CA,
151 S 507
246. Averia vs.
Averia, 436 S 459
247. Abrenica vs.
Gonda, 34 P 739
248. Ayson vs. CA,
97 P 965
249. Ariaga vda. de
Gurrea vs. Suplico,
488 S 332
250. Tongoy vs. CA,
123 S 99
251. Rongavilla vs.
CA, 294 S 289
252. Calimlim –
Canullas vs. Fortun
129 S 675
253. Mapalo vs.
Mapalo, 123 P 979
254. Manzano vs.
Garcia, Nov. 28,
2011
255. Ras vs. Sua,
134 P 131
256. Angeles vs. CA,
102 P 1006
257. Terre vs. Terre,
211 S 7
258. Atienza vs.
Brillantes, 243 S 32
259. MWSS vs. CA,
297 S 287
260. Batarra vs.
Marcos, 7 P 156
261. Santos vs.
Roman Catholic
Church, 94 P 405
262. Pio Barretto
Realty vs. CA, 360 S
127

ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 19

263. Kalalo vs. Luz,
34 S 337
264. Cristobal vs.
Gomez, 50 P 810
265. Marques vs.
FEBTC, Jan 10, 2011
266. Fat Kee
Computer vs.
Online Networks,
Feb 2, 2011
267. Terminal
Services vs. PPA,
378 S 82
268. Francel Realty
vs. Sycip, 469 S 431
269. Metromedia
Times vs. Pastorin,
465 S 335
270. Magtira vs. CA,
96 S 680
271. De Ynchausti
vs. MERALCO, 36 P
908
272. Rep vs. Go Bon
Lee, 111 P 805
273. Republic vs.
CA, 354 S 148
274. Republic vs.
“G” Holdings, 475 S
608
275. Favis vs.
Municipality of
Subangan, 136 P
366
276. Eugenio vs.
Perdido, 97 P 41
277. Cristobal vs.
Gomez, 50 P 810
278. Bachrach
Motors vs. Unson,
50 P 981
279. Nilo vs.
Romero, 111 P 540
280. Leca Realty vs.
Republic, 503 S 563
281. Sotto vs.
Teves, 86 S 154
282. Ramos vs.
Ramos, 61 S 284
283. Cuayacong vs.
Cuayacong, 129 P
439
284. Lorenzo vs.
Posadas 64 P 353
285. Juan vs. Yap,
Mar 30, 2011
286. Kiel vs. Estate
of Sabert, 46 P 193
287. Thomson vs.
CA, 298 S 280
288. Uy Aloc vs.
Cho Jan Ling, 19 P
202
289. Muller vs.
Muller, 500 S 65
290. Amerol vs.
Bagumbaran, 154 S
397

ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 20

 291. Marquez vs.
CA, 300 S 655

292. Morales vs.

CFI, 97 S 872
293. Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, 32 S
29
294. Catholic
Bishop vs. Court of
Appeals, Nov 14,
1996
295. Insurance of
Phil Islands vs.
Sponses Gregorio,
Feb 14, 2011
296. Vda. De
Alberto vs. Court of
Appeals, 173 S 436
297. Marcelino vs.
Court of Appeals,
210 S 444
298. Republic vs.
PNB, 13 S 42
299. Director of
Forest Admin vs.
Fernandez, 192 S
121
300. Republic vs.
Court of Appeals,
131 S 532
301. DBP vs. Adil,
161 S 307
302. DBP vs.
Ozarraga,
September 20, 1965
303. Alvero vs.
Reas, 35 S 210
304. Godinez vs.
Court of Appeals,
135 S 351
305. Heirs of
Amarante vs. Court
of Appeals, 185 S
585
306. Republic vs.
Court of Appeals,
146 S 15
307. Ramos vs.
Court of Appeals,
112 S 542
308. Coronado vs.
Court of Appeals,
191 S 814
309. Corpus vs.
Padilla, 5 S 814
310. Reyes vs. Court
of Appeals, 258 S
651
311. Negrete vs. CFI
of Marinduque, 48 S
113
312. Doliendo vs.
Biarnesa, 7 P 232
313. Solis vs. Court
of Appeals, 176 S
678

ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 21

 314. Tan vs. Court
of Appeals, 195 S
355
315. South City
Homes vs. Republic,
185 S 693
316. Dira vs.
Tañega, 33 S 479
317. Español vs.
Philippine Veterans
Administration, 137
S 314
318. Kramer Jr. vs.
Court of Appeals,
178 S 518
319. Vda. De
Borromeo vs.
Pogoy, 126 S 217
320. Callanta vs.
Carnation Phils.,
145 S 268
321. Tolentino vs.
Court of Appeals,
162 S 66
322. Provident vs.
Court of Appeals,
222 S 125
323. Ledesma vs.
Court of Appeals,
224 S 175
324. Cabrera vs.
Tinio, 8 S 542
325. Olympia
International vs.
Court of Appeals,
180 S 353
326. Ramos vs.
Condez, 20 S 1146

ANDREA OBLICON CASE MATRIX (◕ ‿◕ ✿) | 22