Veterans Federation vs. COMELEC
GR No. 136781
Facts:
 May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list
representation was held simultaneously with the
national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-
three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions
participated. On June 26, 1998, the COMELEC en
banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list
representatives from twelve (12) parties and
organizations, which had obtained at least two
percent of the total number of votes cast for the
party-list system. Two of the proclaimed
representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which
obtained 5.5 percent of the votes.
 On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People's Progressive
Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards
Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed
with the COMELEC a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full
Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the
Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty
percent membership of party-list representatives in
the House of Representatives, as provided under the
Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that
the literal application of the two percent vote
requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941
would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25
nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52
party-list representatives who should actually sit in the
House.
 Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations filed their
respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the same
relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the
same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASA's Petition was
joined by other party-list organizations in a
Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These
organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP,
AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-
KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW,
Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP,
Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
 On October 15, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division
promulgated the present assailed Resolution granting
PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation
of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14
already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list
representatives. It held that "at all times, the total
number of congressional seats must be filled up by
eighty (80%) percent district representatives and
twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In
allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two
percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section
11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements
of the party-list system," which should supposedly
determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up”.
Issue: How to determine the winners of the subject
party-list election can be settled by addressing the
following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it
merely a ceiling? In other words, should the
twenty percent allocation for party-list solons
be filled up completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement
and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11
(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative,
how should the additional seats of a qualified
party be determined?
Held: WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED.
The assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC are SET ASIDE and
NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list
representatives — two for APEC and one each for the remaining
twelve (12) qualified parties — are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
In sum, we hold that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretionin ruling that the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent
parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-
list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA
7941: the two percent threshold and proportional
representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory
provisions, the COMELEC effectively arrogated unto itself what
the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the legislature:
the power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the
enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of
these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review. The COMELEC,
which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-
related laws, cannot simply disregard an act of Congress
exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere
implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or
rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to
the law find lobby for its approval and enactment by the
legislature.
In view of the party-list system elements per COMELEC.
First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized
sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House
of Representatives." Second, "the system should represent the
broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should
encourage [the] multi-party system." (Boldface in the original.)
Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent
threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-
list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 . . . should have at least one
representative."
In view of to whom the seats should be given
In the suits, made respondents together with the COMELEC were
the 38 parties, organizations and coalitions that had been
declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to party-list seats in
the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought
the proclamation of additional representatives from each of
their parties and organizations, all of which had obtained at least
two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo
Order directing the COMELEC "to CEASE and DESIST from
constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13
January 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as winners
the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions
enumerated in the dispositive portions at its 15 October 1998
Resolution or its 7 January 1999 Resolution, until further orders
from this Court."
In view of the 20% being mandatory
The COMELEC cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for
ultimately the voters themselves are the ones who, in the
exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how many
should represent them.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent
threshold may result in a "mathematical impossibility," suffice it to
say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust or
change this percentage requirement rests in Congress. Our task
now, as should have been the COMELEC's, is not to find fault in
the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical
extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that
can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context of the
actual election process.

In view of the 2% threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to
ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions
having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress.
In view of the 2.5% vote equivalent
"MR. MONSOD. . . . We are amenable to modifications in the
minimum percentage of votes. Our proposal is that anybody
who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat. There
are about 20 million who cast their votes in the last elections.
Two-and-a-half percent would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody
who has a constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a
seat in the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent, we
are talking about 400,000 votes. The average vote per family is
three. So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe
that there are many sectors who will be able to get seats in the
Assembly because many of them have memberships of over
10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our
proposal.
Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to
"the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of
a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local
representation.
In view of the Three-Seat-Per-Party limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is
to promote and encourage a multiparty system of
representation. Again, we quote Commissioner Monsod:
"MR. MONSOD: …but we also wanted to avoid the problems
of mechanics and operation in the implementation of a
concept that has very serious shortcomings of classification and
of double or triple votes. We are for opening up the system, and
we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why
one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of
representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50
allocated under the party list system. This way, we will open it up
and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn
their seats among the fifty. . . ."
In view of the method of allocating additional seat
Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is
merely a ceiling and having upheld the constitutionality of the
two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed
under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of determining
how many party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and
coalitions are entitled to.
In view of the Niemeyer Formula
Under this formula, the number of additional seats to which a
qualified party would be entitled is determined by multiplying
the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the total
number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the
product by the total number of votes garnered by all the
qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product will
be the number of additional seats that the party concerned is
entitled to.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany,
finds no application in the Philippine setting, because of our
three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty
percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag
have threshold requirements — two percent for us and five for
them.
One half of the German Parliament is filled up by party-list
members. More important, there are no seat limitations, because
German law discourages the proliferation of small parties. In
contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes a three-seat
limit to encourage the promotion of the multiparty system.
In view of the legal and logical formula for the Philippines
Step One. Rank all the participating parties, organizations
and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each
party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for
all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least
two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each.
Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of
additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes
shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats
the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that
for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on
proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted
to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first
party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of
votes.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales that
a fractional membership cannot be converted into a whole
membership of one when it would, in effect; deprive another
party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said
further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled to
..."
In view of the formula for determining additional seats for the first
party
The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least
two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat.
Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number
of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the
latter's number of seats and so on.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first
party is not always entitled to the maximum number of additional
seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the
total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case
wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus
entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of
seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the
maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of
Representatives.
However, if the first party received a significantly higher
amount of votes — say, twenty percent — to grant it the same
number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory
mandate of proportional representation, since a party getting
only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of
representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper
solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats;
and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in
proportion to those of the first party.
In view of the formula for additional seats of other qualified
parties
Step Three: The next step is to solve for the number of
additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to,
based on proportional representation.
In view of the 2% threshold rationale
The rationale for the 2% threshold can thus be synthesized as
follows:
1. To avoid a situation where the candidate will just use
the party-list system as a fallback position;
2. To discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who
are not ready and whose chances are very low, from
participating in the elections;
3. To avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the
system;
4. To encourage the marginalized sectors to organize,
work hard, and earn their seats within the system;
5. To enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same
majesty as that of the elected representatives in the
legislative body, rather than owing to some degree
 their seats in the legislative body either to an outright
constitutional gift or to an appointment by the
President of the Philippines;
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate
political party groups and those who have not really
been given by the people sufficient basis for them to
represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be
able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor
under the name of the party-list system; 16 and
7. To ensure that only those with a more or less
substantial following can be represented.
The framers of the Constitution knew that the
sectoral groups suffer from major disadvantages in
the competitive election arena. They sought to
remedy this inequality through an outright
constitutional gift of reserve seats for the first three
terms of the sectoral representatives and no further.
Thereafter, they have to earn their seats through
participation in the party-list system.
In view of the 3-seat limit rationale
The rationale for the 3-seat limit is to distribute party-
list representation to as many party groups as
possible. According to Senator Tolentino, if one party
will be allowed to dominate, then the idea of giving
as much as possible to the marginalized groups may
be defeated. The purpose is to allow as many as
possible of the marginalized groups that would be
entitled to representation to have a seat in Congress,
and to have enough seats left for those who are way
below the list.
The party-list system of proportional
representation is based on the Niemeyer formula,
embodied in Art. 6(2) of the German Federal
Electoral Law, which provides that, in determining
the number of seats a party is entitled to have in the
Bundestag, seats should be multiplied by the number
of votes obtained by each party and then the
product should be divided by the sum total of the
second votes obtained by all the parties that have
polled at least 5 percent of the votes. First, each
party receives one seat for each whole number
resulting from the calculation. The remaining seats
are then allocated in the descending sequence of
the decimal fractions. The Niemeyer formula was
adopted in R.A. No. 7941, §11.
Indeed, the goal should be to fill all seats allowed
for party-list representatives, which at present are 52.
The provision thus fixes a ratio of 80 percent district
representatives to 20 percent party-list
representatives. If in fact all seats reserved for party-
list representatives are not filled, that is due to the
fact that the law limits parties, organizations, and
coalitions to three (3) seats each. To maintain this
ratio, the entire number of seats for the party-list
system, after deducting the number of seats initially
distributed to the 2 percenters, must be allocated to
them.
I see no legal or logical basis for the majority's
fixation with designating the highest-ranking
participant as a "first" party. This procedure, as
admitted by the majority, assumes that the seats to
be allocated to the qualified parties depend on the
seats of the so-called first party.
In essence, the majority "formula" amounts simply
to the following prescription: (1) follow the "1 seat for
every 2%" rule in allocating seats to the first ranking
party only and (2) with respect to the rest of the 2
percenters, give each party one (1) seat, unless the
first ranking party gets at least six percent, in which
case all 2 percenters with at least one-half of the
votes of the first ranking party should get an extra
seat..
The scheme adopted by the majority will prevent
all 2 percenters, which are not the first ranking party,
from obtaining the maximum number of seats. This is
so because, with their votes being proportioned
against the votes of the first ranking party, there will
never be an instance where the additional seats of
these parties will be equivalent to 2. Again, this is
contrary to R.A. No. 7941, §11 which contemplates
the possibility of more than one (1) party obtaining
the maximum number of seats allowed by law
Bagong Bayani Labor Party vs. COMELEC
GR No. 147589
Facts:
 On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed
before the COMELEC a Petition praying that "the
names of [some of herein respondents] be
deleted from the 'Certified List of Political
Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions
Participating in the Party List System for the May 14,
2001 Elections' and that said certified list be
accordingly amended." It also asked, as an
alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents
not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's
nominees not be proclaimed. On April 11, 2001, Bayan
Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against
some of herein respondents.
 On April 18, 2001, the COMELEC required the
respondents in the two disqualification cases to file
Comments within three days from notice. It also set the
date for hearing on April 26, 2001, but subsequently
reset it to May 3, 2001. During the hearing, however,
Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.
 Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the COMELEC,
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition
before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition,
docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed COMELEC
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated
April 17, 2001, the Court directed respondents to
comment on the Petition within a non-extendible
 On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed
before this Court a Petition, docketed as GR No.
147613, also challenging COMELEC Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001,
the Court ordered the consolidation of the two
Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the
second Petition to file their respective Comments on or
before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to
an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the
COMELEC may proceed with the counting and
canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but
barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until
further orders of the Court.
Issues: During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court
directed the parties to address the following issues:
1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper
under the premises. More specifically, is there no
other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law?
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in
the party-list elections.
3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to
'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and
organizations.
 4. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785."
Held: WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the
COMELEC, which is hereby DIRECTED to
immediately conduct summary evidentiary
hearings on the qualifications of the party-list
participants in the light of the guidelines
enunciated in this Decision. Considering the
extreme urgency of determining the winners in the
last party-list elections, the COMELEC is directed to
begin its hearings for the parties and organizations
that appear to have garnered such number of
votes as to qualify for seats in the House of
Representatives. The COMELEC is further DIRECTED
to submit to this Court its compliance report within
30 days from notice hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the
COMELEC"to refrain from proclaiming any winner" during the last
party-list election, shall remain in force until after the COMELEC
itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the
foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on
Elections' receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to costs. SO,
ORDERED.
In view of standing on COMELEC OR 3785
Petitioners attack the validity of COMELEC Omnibus
Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the
party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution
and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before
this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated
by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion for
reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading
under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed
before the COMELEC a Petition for Cancellation of Registration
and Nomination against some of herein respondents. The
COMELEC, however, did not act on that Petition.
In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan
Muna sought succor from this Court, for there was no other
adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven
the urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the COMELEC has
not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution
may just be a formality because the COMELEC, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the
matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule
that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. It has been held that certiorari is
available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies,
"where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest
is involved, and in case of urgency." Indeed, the instant case is
indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme
urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent
of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional
issues on the party-list system, which this Court must urgently
resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rules."
Finally, when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or
when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the
only adequate and speedy remedy available."
In view of the participation of political parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends
that "the inclusion of political parties in the party-list system is
the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution."
For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation
of "major political parties."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, . . .." Section 3 expressly states
that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political
party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology
or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of
securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public
office."
In view of terms marginalized and underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections
does not mean, however, that any political party — or any
organization or group for that matter — may do so. The requisite
character of these parties or organizations must
be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid
down in the Constitution and RA 7941.
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the
number of people in a particular district, because the party-list
election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical
strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the
representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as
exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely,
"labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented,
because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-
list organization or party must factually and truly represent the
marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned
in Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-
list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituency" refers to the
absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters
of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather,
it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the
"marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only
those Filipinos who are "marginalized and underrepresented"
become members of Congress under the party-list system,
Filipino-style.
While the enumeration of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the
clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented
under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of
statutory construction that words employed in a statute are
interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained
by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are
associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute
may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate
association.

In view of OSG contention
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office
of the Solicitor General contends that any party or group that is
not disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941 may participate in
the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that
even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park
or Dasmariñas Village could participate in the party-list
elections.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar
disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be
appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests
of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, theOSG's
position to treat them similarly defies reason and common
sense.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and
underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in
poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-
list system was enacted — to give them not only genuine hope,
but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected
and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies;
and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the
larger affairs of the State.
In view of COMELEC’s grave abuse of discretion
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the
Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or
the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the function of all
judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as
they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.
In view of the Courts assistance
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to
the COMELEC for the latter to determine, after summary
evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations
allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the
requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate
to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the
Constitution, to assist the COMELEC in its work.
In view of the 2 systems of representation (Mendoza, J.)
Indeed, the two systems of representation are not
identical. Party list representation is a type of proportional
representation designed to give those who otherwise cannot win
a seat in the House of Representatives in district elections a
chance to win if they have sufficient strength on a nationwide
basis. (In this sense, these groups are considered "marginalized
and underrepresented.") Under the party-list system,
representatives are elected from multi-seat districts in proportion
to the number of votes received in contrast to the "winner-take-
all" single-seat district in which, even if a candidate garners 49.9%
of the votes, he gets no seat.
Thus, under the party-list system, a party or candidate need
not come in first in order to win seats in the legislature. On the
other hand, in the "winner-take-all" single-seat district, the votes
cast for a losing candidate are wasted as only those who vote
for the winner are represented.
What the advocates of sectoral representation wanted was
permanent reserved seats for "marginalized sectors" by which
they mean the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and youth sectors. Under Art. VI, §5(2),
these sectors were given only one-half of the seats in the House
of Representatives and only for three terms. On the other hand,
the "third or fourth placers" in district elections, for whom the
party-list system was intended, refer to those who may not win
seats in the districts but nationwide may be sufficiently strong to
enable them to be represented in the House. They may include
Villacorta's "marginalized" or "underprivileged" sectors, but they
are not limited to them. There would have been no need to give
the "marginalized sectors" one-half of the seats for the party-list
system for three terms if the two systems are identical.
In sum, a problem was placed before the Constitutional
Commission that the existing "winner-take-all" one-seat district
system of election leaves blocks of voters underrepresented. To
this problem of underrepresentation two solutions were
proposed: sectoral representation and party-list system or
proportional representation. The Constitutional Commission
chose the party-list system.
Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields support
for the view that the party-list system is designed exclusively for
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, and youth sectors.
For while the representation of "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors is a basic purpose of the law, it is not
its only purpose. As already explained, the aim of proportional
representation is to enable those who cannot win in the "winner-
take-all" district elections a chance of winning. These groups are
not necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in §5, i.e., labor,
peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, the elderly, the handicapped, women, the youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. These groups can
possibly include other sectors.
BANAT V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 179271
April 21, 2009
Facts:
 Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT)filed before the National Board
of Canvassers(NBC) a petition to proclaim the
fullnumber of party list representatives provided by
the Constitution. However, the recommendation of
the head of the legal group of COMELEC’s national
board of canvassers to declare the petition moot
and academic was approved by the COMELEC en
banc
 BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus
assailing the resolution of COMELEC to their petition to
proclaim the full number of party list representatives
provided by the Constitution.
 The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a
resolution proclaiming thirteen (13) parties as winners
in the party-list elections in May 2007. The COMELEC
announced that, upon completion of the canvass of
the party-list results, it would determine the total
number of seats of each winning party, organization,
or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation
Party v. COMELEC formula.
 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and
Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher)
asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its
decision to use the Veterans formula. COMELEC
denied the consideration.
 Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari
with mandamus and prohibition assailing the
resolution of the COMELEC in its decision to use the
Veterans formula.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for
party-list representatives in Section5(2), Article VI of
the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling
2. Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of
RA 7941 is constitutional
3. Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed
in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat is
constitutional
4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
 5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections? If
not, can the major political parties be barred from
participating in the party-list elections?
RULING:
The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling;
party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives.
Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the
number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may
occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party
from dominating the party-list elections.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 “
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes” is unconstitutional. The two percent threshold only in
relation to the distribution of the additional seats presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives."
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives
under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall
be observed:1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.2. The parties,
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to
one guaranteed seateach.3. Those garnering sufficient number
of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.4. Each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political
parties from participating in the party-list system. On the
contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the
major political parties to participate in party-list elections through
their sectoral wings. Also, in defining a "party" that participates in
party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party,"
R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will
participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the
major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against
the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission,
and R.A. No. 7941. However, by the vote of 8-7, the Court
decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections,
directly or indirectly
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
Facts:
 The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and
Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-
list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their
petitions for registration under the party-list system, or
cancellation of their registration and accreditation as
party-list organizations.
 Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941
(R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366
and 9531, approximately 280 groups and
organizations registered and manifested their desire
to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
 December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed
the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to grant
Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and
accreditation as a political party in the National
Capital Region. However, PBB was denied
participation in the elections because PBB does not
represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector.
 13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory
injunction from the Court. The COMELEC, on 7
January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and
excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the
printing of the official.
 Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the
COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary
hearings to determine whether the groups and
organizations that filed manifestations of intent to
participate in the elections have continually
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC
(Ang Bagong Bayani).
 39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory
injunction from the Court, directing the COMELEC to
include the names of these 39 petitioners in the
printing of the official ballot for the elections.
 Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all
petitions.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioners from participating in the elections.
Held:
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
following prevailing decisions in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the coming elections. However, since the Court
adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-list
system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied
by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the
COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to
determine who are qualified to register under the party-list
system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the
new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of
Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half
of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled,
as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again
that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for
two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-
list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list
system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the
"marginalized and underrepresented."
Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to
sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms
after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the
party-list system fully open after the end of the first three
congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will
be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies
under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure
ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for
sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional
parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat,
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list
system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections,
participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the
party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to
prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as
their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the
party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently
contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR. V. HOUSEOF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 189506, February 11, 2010..
FACTS:
 In the 2007 elections, Bantay party-list group received
the sufficient voting percentage entitling it to a seat
in the House of Representatives in which Petitioner
Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the firstnominee of the said
party-list group. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr. ,
Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes. Jr., Erlinda
Cadapan, Antonia Flores, and Joselito Ustarez are
members of the other party-list groups filed with
theHRET a petition for quo warranto against Bantay
and its nominee, Palaparan.
 They alleged that Palapran is not eligible to sit in the
House of Representative because he did not belong
to a marginalized and under reprsented sectors which
then are the victims of communist rebels, Civilian
Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), security guards
and former rebels.
 Palaparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee
and that HRET had no jurisdiction over his
person since it was actually the party-list that was
elected to assume membership in the House of
Representatives.
Furthermore, he said that such question should be
raised before the party-list group, not before the HRET.
On July 23, 2009 HRET issued an order upholding its
jurisdiction over the question of petitioner Palparan’s
qualifications. Palparan filed a motio for
reconsideration but the HRET denied it by a resolution
dated September 10, 2009.
ISSUE: Whether the HRET has the jurisdiction concerning the
eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats
in the lower house of Congress.
HELD:
YES. Under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, the members
of the House of
Representatives are of two kinds: “members who shall be
elected from legislative districts” and“those who shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations”. Thus, it is the part-list
representatives who are “elected” into office, not their parties or
organizations. Although it is the party-list organization that is
voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and
becomes member of the House of Representatives.
As contemplated in Section 17 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
the HRET shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and q
qualifications of the members of theHouse of Representatives.
Since the party-list representatives and districts representatives
are treated in like manner, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications. Once the party or organization of
the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee
has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House
of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins.
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other
things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since party-list nominees are “elected
members” of the House of Representatives no less than the
district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of
district representatives, once the party or organization of the
party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has
taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s
own jurisdiction begins
HARRY L. ROQUE, JR, et. al. vs COMELEC G.R. 188456
September 10, 2009
FACTS:
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
prayer for a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction,
petitioners H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al., suing as taxpayers and
concerned citizens, seek to nullify respondent Comelec’s award
of the 2010 Elections Automation Project (automation project) to
the joint venture of Total Information Management Corporation
(TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic)
and to permanently prohibit the Comelec, TIM and Smartmatic
from signing and/or implementing the corresponding contract-
award. They contend the mechanism of the PCOS machines
would infringe the constitutional right of the people to the
secrecy of the ballot which, according to the petitioners, is
provided in Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Is the Poll Automation Law unconstitutional for infringing the
constitutional right of the people to the secrecy of the ballot?
RULING:
No. Parenthetically, the contention that the PCOS would infringe
on the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot because, as petitioners
would put it, the voter would be confronted with a “three feet”
long ballot, does not commend itself for concurrence. Surely, the
Comelec can put up such infrastructure as to ensure that the
voter can write his preference in relative privacy. And as
demonstrated during the oral arguments, the voter himself will
personally feed the ballot into the machine. A voter, if so minded
preserving the secrecy of his ballot, will always devise a way to
do so. By the same token, one with least regard for secrecy will
likewise have a way to make his vote known.
Capalla vs. Comelec
GR No. 201112, June 13, 2012
Facts:
On July 10, 2009, the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM entered into
a Contract for the Provision of an Automated Election System for
the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections,
(AES Contract). The contract between the Comelec and
Smartmatic-TIM was one of “lease of the AES with option to
purchase (OTP) the goods listed in the contract.” In said
contract, the Comelec was given until December 31, 2010 within
which to exercise the option. In September 2010, the Comelec
partially exercised its OTP 920 units of PCOS machines with
corresponding canvassing/consolidation system (CCS) for the
special elections in certain areas in the provinces of Basilan,
Lanao del Sur and Bulacan. In a letter dated December 18, 2010,
Smartmatic-TIM, through its Chairman Flores, proposed a
temporary extension of the option period on the remaining
PCOS machines until March 31, 2011, waiving the storage costs
and covering the maintenance costs. The Comelec did not
exercise the option within the extended period. Several
extensions were given for the Comelec to exercise the OTP until
its final extension on March 31, 2012.
On March 29, 2012, the Comelec issued a Resolution resolving to
accept Smartmatic-TIM’s offer to extend the period to exercise
the OTP until March 31, 2012 and to authorize Chairman Brillantes
to sign for and on behalf of the Comelec the Agreement on the
Extension of the OTP Under the AES Contract (Extension
Agreement). Comelec again issued a Resolution resolving to
approve the Deed of Sale between the Comelec and
Smartmatic-TIM to purchase the latter’s PCOS machines to be
used in the upcoming May 2013 elections and to authorize
Chairman Brillantes to sign the Deed of Sale for and on behalf of
the Comelec. The Deed of Sale was forthwith executed.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Comelec Resolutions
on the grounds that the option period provided for in the AES
contract had already lapsed; that the extension of the option
period and the exercise of the option without competitive public
bidding contravene the provisions of RA 9184; and that the
Comelec purchased the machines in contravention of the
standards laid down in RA 9369. On the other hand, respondents
argue on the validity of the subject transaction based on the
grounds that there is no prohibition either in the contract or
provision of law for it to extend the option period; that the OTP is
not an independent contract in itself, but is a provision
contained in the valid and existing AES contract that had
already satisfied the public bidding requirements of RA 9184;
and that exercising the option was the most advantageous
option of the Comelec.
Issue: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
Comelec in issuing the assailed Resolutions and in executing the
assailed Extension Agreement and Deed.
Held: No. A reading of the other provisions of the AES contract
would show that the parties are given the right to amend the
contract which may include the period within which to exercise
the option. There is, likewise, no prohibition on the extension of
the period, provided that the contract is still effective. The
Comelec still retains P50M of the amount due Smartmatic-TIM as
performance security, which indicates that the AES contract is
still effective and not yet terminated. Consequently, pursuant to
Article 19 of the contract, the provisions thereof may still be
amended by mutual agreement of the parties provided said
amendment is in writing and signed by the parties. Considering,
however, that the AES contract is not an ordinary contract as it
involves procurement by a government agency, the rights and
obligations of the parties are governed not only by the Civil
Code but also by RA 9184. A winning bidder is not precluded
from modifying or amending certain provisions of the contract
bidded upon. However, such changes must not constitute
substantial or material amendments that would alter the basic
parameters of the contract and would constitute a denial to the
other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the same terms.
The conclusions held by the Court in Power Sector Assets and
Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) v. Pozzolanic
Philippines Incorporated and Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International
Air Terminals Co., Inc., (PIATCO) cannot be applied in the present
case. First, Smartmatic-TIM was not granted additional right that
was not previously available to the other bidders. The bidders
were apprised that aside from the lease of goods and purchase
of services, their proposals should include an OTP the subject
goods. Second, the amendment of the AES contract is not
substantial. The approved budget for the contract was
P11,223,618,400.00 charged against the supplemental
appropriations for election modernization. Bids were, therefore,
accepted provided that they did not exceed said amount. The
competitive public bidding conducted for the AES contract was
sufficient. A new public bidding would be a superfluity. Lastly, the
amendment of the AES contract is more advantageous to the
Comelec and the public because the P7,191,484,739.48 rentals
paid for the lease of goods and purchase of services under the
AES contract was considered part of the purchase price. For the
Comelec to own the subject goods, it was required to pay only
P2,130,635,048.15. If the Comelec did not exercise the option,
the rentals already paid would just be one of the government
expenses for the past election and would be of no use to future
elections.
GARCIA ET AL. VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 111511
October 5, 1993
FACTS:
 Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in
the 1992 elections. Some mayors, vice-mayors and
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve
(12) municipalities of the province constituted
themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to
initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. They
issued Resolution No. 1 as formal initiation of the recall
proceedings. COMELEC scheduled the recall
election for the gubernatorial position of Bataan.
 Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to annul
the Resolution of the COMELEC because the PRAC
failed to comply with the "substantive and procedural
requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160
(Local Government Code 1991). They pointed out the
most fatal defect of the proceeding followed by the
PRAC in passing the Resolution: the deliberate failure
to send notices of the meeting to 65 members of the
assembly.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right
to initiate recall proceedings.
2) Whether or not the procedure for recall violated the right of
elected local public officials belonging to the political minority
to equal protection of the law.
RULING:
1) No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely
suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive right to
decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The
Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single
mode, of initiating recall elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is
for Congress to "enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum .
. ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the
power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its
discernment dictates.
What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of
recall, whether one or many, to be chosen by Congress should
be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion,
Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of
initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of
initiation by direct action of the people. The legislative records
reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative
mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was
adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru
the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its
expenses.
2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and
sangguniang members of the municipalities and component
cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at
the provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned to political
parties. No significance is given to the political affiliation of its
members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the
provincial level includes all the elected officials in the province
concerned. Considering their number, the greater probability is
that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69
of the Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally
elected public official is loss of confidence of the people. The
members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of
their political parties but as representatives of the people. By
necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised
on mere differences in political party affiliation. Indeed, our
Constitution encourages multi-party system for the existence of
opposition parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of
democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be
faulted for discriminating against local officials belonging to the
minority.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the
initiation of the recall process by a preparatory recall assembly
will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. We held that
notice to all the members of the recall assembly is a condition
sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also
requires a qualified majority of all the preparatory recall
assembly members to convene in session and in a public place.
Needless to state, compliance with these requirements is
necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid resolution of recall
which can be given due course by the COMELEC.
Claudio v. COMELEC
FACTS:
 Jovito O. Claudio (Claudio) was duly elected mayor
of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections. Sometime
in May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay
City gathered for the purpose of convening the
Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) and to file a
petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of
confidence.
 On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA
composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and
sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted
Resolution No. 01, S-1999 recalling Claudio as mayor
for loss of confidence. The petition for recall was filed
on July 2, 1999 and copies of the petition were in
public areas throughout the City.
 Claudio filed an opposition against the petition
alleging, among others, that the petition for recall was
filed within one year from his assumption into office
and therefore prohibited. He argued that the PRA was
convened within the 1 year prohibited period as
provided by Section 74 of the Local Government
Code. The COMELEC, however, granted the petition
for recall ruling that recall is a process which starts with
the filing of the petition for recall and since the
petition was filed exactly one year and a day after
Claudio's assumption of office, the petition was filed
on time. Thereafter, COMELEC set the date of the
recall elections on April 15, 2000. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the petition for recall was filed within the proper
period provided for by Section 74 of the Local Government
Code
HELD: Yes. SC Affirmed COMELEC
The limitations in Section 74 apply to the exercise of the power of
recall (i.e. the recall election itself) which is vested with the
registered voters of the LGU. It does not apply to the preparatory
processes to such exercise of recall such as the proceedings of
the PRA.
Recall as used in Section 74 refers to the election itself
We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the
convening of the preparatory, recall assembly or the gathering
of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local
government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall
resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such
resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election,
and the holding of the election on the scheduled date.
However, as used in paragraph (b) of § 74, "recall" refers to the
election itself by means of which voters decide whether they
should retain their local official or elect his replacement.
Section 69 of the Local Government Code provides that "the
power of recall ...shall be exercised by the registered voters of a
local government unit to which the local elective official
belongs." Since the power vested on the electorate is not the
power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an
official into office, the limitations in §74 cannot be deemed to
apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other words, the term
"recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election,
excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition
for recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures
of at least 25 % of the voters for a petition for recall.
Anything steps prior to recall election itself are merely preliminary
steps for the purpose of initiating a recall. The limitations in §74
apply only to the exercise of the power of recall which is vested
in the registered voters. It is this - and not merely, the preliminary
steps required to be taken to initiate a recall - which paragraph
(b) of §74 seeks to limit by providing that no recall shall take
place within one year from the date of assumption of office of
an elective local official.
The proceedings of the PRA do not constitute the exercise of
recall
It is the power to recall and not the power to initiate recall that
the Constitution gave to the people. A recall resolution "merely
sets the stage for the official concerned before the tribunal of
the people so he can justify why he should be allowed to
continue in office. [But until] the people render their sovereign
judgment, the official concerned remains in office. Thus, the
preliminary proceedings of the PRA do not produce a decision
by the electorate on whether the local official concerned
continues to enjoy the confidence of the people, then, the
prohibition in paragraph (b) against the holding of a recall,
except one year after the official's assumption of office, cannot
apply to such proceedings.
Purpose of the one year prohibitory period against the exercise
of recall
The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis
for judging the performance of an elective local official. Hence,
in this case, as long as the election is held outside the one-year
period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be
held even before the end of the first year in office of a local
official.
Including the convening of the PRA as part of recall restricts right
of speech and assembly
Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including
the convening of the PRA for the purpose of discussing the
performance in office of elective local officials would be to
unduly restrict the constitutional right of speech and of assembly
of its members. The people cannot just be asked on the day of
the election to decide on the performance of their officials. The
crystallization and formation of an informed public opinion takes
time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b)
includes the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and
opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of the most
cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume
that such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election.
To the contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence
in the incumbent.
The phrase regular local election does not include the
campaign period
Claudio contends that the date April 15, 2000 also falls within the
second prohibition under Section 74 of the Local Government
Code arguing that the phrase "regular local elections" in
paragraph (b) does not only mean "the day of the regular local
election" which, for the year 2001 is May 14, but the election
period as well. Hence, he contends that beginning March 30,
2000, no recall election may be held.
The contention is untenable. First there is nothing in the law that
shows the campaign period is included for purposes of
computing the prohibitory period. Moreover, petitioner's
interpretation would severely limit the period during which a
recall election may be held. Actually, because no recall election
may be held until one year after the assumption of office of an
elective local official, presumably on June 30 following his
election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the
following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding
year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days, more or
less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as
including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight
months. Such an interpretation must be rejected, because it
would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make
local government units" more responsive and accountable."
GOH vs. BAYRON
YES. IT CAN AUGMENT FROM SAVINGS ITS APPROPRIATIONS FOR
PERSONNEL SERVICES, MAINTENANCE AND OTHER OPERATING
EXPENSES. RECALL ELECTIONS ONLY NEED OPERATING EXEPENSES
BECAUSE THE EXISTING PERSONNEL ARE THE SAME PERSONNEL
WHO WILL EVALUATE THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE RECALL PETITIONS.
However, contrary to the COMELEC’s assertion, the
appropriations for personnel services and maintenance and
other operating expenses falling under “Conduct and
supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites”
constitute a line item which can be augmented from the
COMELEC’s savings to fund the conduct of recall elections in
2014. The conduct of recall elections requires only operating
expenses, not capital outlays. The COMELEC’s existing personnel
in Puerto Princesa are the same personnel who will evaluate the
sufficiency of the recall petitions. and conduct the recall
elections.
Joseph Peter Sison v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134096, March 3, 1999
Facts:
It appears that while the election returns were being canvassed
by the Quezon
CityBoard of Canvassers but before the winning candidates we
re proclaimed, petitionercommenced suit before the COMELEC
by filing a petition seeking to suspend the canvassing of votes
and/or proclamation in Quezon City and to declare a failure of
elections. The said petition was supposedly filed pursuant to
Section 63 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, as amended) on the ground of "massive and orchestrated
fraud and acts analogous thereto which occurred after the
voting and during the preparation of election returns and, in the
custody, or canvass thereof, which resulted in a
failure to elect."
While the petition was pending before the COMELEC, the City
Board of Canvassers proclaimed the winners of the elections in
Quezon City, including the winning candidate for the post
of vice mayor. On June 22, 1998, the COMELEC promulgated its
challenged resolution dismissing the petition before it on the
ground (1) that the allegations therein were not supported by
sufficient evidence, and (2) the grounds recited were not
among the pre-proclamation issues set forth in Section 17 of RA
No. 7166
Issue: WON the grounds are valid?
Ruling:
Under the pertinent codal provision of the Omnibus Election
Code, there are only three(3) instances where a failure of
elections may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any
polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud,
or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during the
preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof such election result in a failure
to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism ,
fraud, or other analogous causes. We have painstakingly
examined
petitioner'spetition before the COMELEC but found nothing ther
ein that could support an action for declaration of failure of
elections. He never alleged at all that elections were either not
held or suspended. Furthermore, petitioner's claim of failure to
elect stood as a bare conclusion bereft of any substantive
support to describe just exactly how the failure to elect came
about.
Soliva vs COMELEC
GR No. 141723 April 20, 2001
Facts:
 Petitioners and private respondents vied for local
posts in Remedios T. Romualdez (RTR), Agusan del
Norte during the 1998 elections. Petitioners belonged
to Lakas-NUCD party, while private respondents ran
under the Laban ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino
(LAMMP) banner.
 After election day, all the LAKAS candidates were
proclaimed as winning candidates. Six days after that,
p.respondent Bacquial filed a petitions to declare a
failure of elections due to “massive fraud, terrorism,
ballot switching, stuffing of ballot boxes, delivery of
ballot boxes by petitioner Soliva, his wife and men
from several precincts to the supposed canvassing
area, failure of the counting of votes in the precincts
or polling places, and other anomalies or irregularities.
Baludio, one of Soliva’s men, allegedly attempted to
assassinate Bacquial when he was about to case his
vote. This petition was amended to include the other
candidates under LAMMP.
 COMELEC granted the petition and declared a failure
of elections in RTR. COMELEC likewise declared the
proclamation of winners to be null and void.
COMELEC called for a special election.
 Petitioners filed this present petition for certiorari and
prohibition attributing grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of, or in excess of, jurisdiction to
COMELEC, when, without any formal proceedings
and absent any formal presentation of evidence and
witnesses, it declared a failure of elections. SolGen
maintains that the declaration is proper because of
the grounds stated by private respondents.
Issue:
Whether COMELEC erred in declaring a failure of election in the
entire municipality of RTR
Held:
The COMELEC did not err, did not commit grave abuse of
discretion; the petition was dismissed.
The 1987 Constitution vested upon the COMELEC the broad
power to enforce all the laws and regulations of the conduct of
elections as well as the plenary authority to decide all questions
affecting elections, except the question as to the right to vote.
(plenary – full, entire, complete)
Section 4 of RA 7166 provide that the postponement,
declaration of failure of elections and the calling of special
elections shall be decided by COMELEC sitting en banc by a
majority vote.
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code contemplates 3
instances when the COMELEC may declare a failure of election
and call for the holding of a special election:
 when the election in any polling place has not been
held on the date fixed due to force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous cases
 when the election in any polling place had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing
of voting
 when after the voting and during the preparation and
the transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a
failure to elect
The SC agrees with the findings of COMELEC that there was a
failure of election. The counting of the votes and the canvassing
of election returns were clearly attended by fraud, intimidation,
terrorism and harassment. Findings of fact of administrative
bodies charged with a specific field of expertise are afforded
great weight and respect by the courts.
Petitioners did not assail the claim that the counting of votes was
transferred from the polling place to the multi-purpose
gymnasium without the knowledge of private respondents. They
were done without the accredited watchers or duly authorized
representatives of private respondents. They likewise did not
deny that the transfer of the counting was without the authority
of COMELEC as required by law. The provisions in COMELEC
resolution no. 2971 state that the counting of votes should be in
the polling place and conducting without interruption, and that
if the counting of votes were to be transferred to a safer place,
it should be effected through an unanimous approval of the
Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) and concurred by the majority
of watchers present. These sections were violated. These
provisions emphasize the need to safeguard the popular will.
Petitioners did not submit any counter affidavits to rebut the
sworn statements submitted by the witnesses for the private
respondents. The elections cannot be accorded regularity and
validity. The circumstances constitute a failure of election, and
thus, COMELEC is empowered to annul the election and call for
a special election.
AMPATUAN VS COMELEC
Facts:
 Ampatuan and Candao were candidates for the
position of Governor of Maguindanao during the 2001
elections
 May 2001: respondents filed a petition with the
COMELEC for the annulment of election results and/or
declaration of failure of elections in several
municipalities. They claimed that the elections were
―completely sham and farcical‖. The ballots were
filled-up en masse by a few persons the night before
the election day, and in some precincts, the ballot
boxes, official ballots and other election
paraphernalia were not delivered at all.
 Comelec suspended proclamation of winning
candidates
 Petitioners filed a motion to lift suspension of
proclamation. Comelec granted and proclaimed the
petitioners s winners.
 June 2001: Respondents filed with SC a petition to set
aside Comelec order and prelim injunction to
suspend effects of the proclamation of petitioners.
 July 2001: Comelec ordered the consolidation of the
respondents ‘petition for declaration of failure of
elections.
 Sept 2001: Petitioners filed the present petition and
claimed that by virtue of the proclamation, the
proper remedy available to the respondents was not
petition for declaration of failure of elections but an
election protest. The former is heard summarily while
the latter involves a full-blown trial.
 Oct 2001: Comelec ordered the suspension of the 2
assailed orders (with regard to respondents ‘petition
for failure of elections and directing the continuation
of hearing and disposition of the consolidated SPAs
on the failure of elections and other incidents related
thereto)
The main issue to be resolved is whether the
Commission on Elections was divested of its jurisdiction
to hear and decide respondents ‘petition for
declaration of failure of elections after petitioners had
been proclaimed.
We deny the petition. Petitioners submit that by virtue
of their proclamation as winners, the only remedy left
for private respondents is to file an election protest, in
which case, original jurisdiction lies with the regular
courts. Petitioners cited several rulings that an election
protest is the proper remedy for a losing candidate
after the proclamation of the winning candidate.[25]
However, the authorities petitioners relied upon
involved pre-proclamation controversies. In Loong v.
Commission on Elections,[26] we ruled that ―a pre-
proclamation controversy is not the same as an
action for annulment of election results, or failure of
elections.‖ These two remedies were more specifically
distinguished in this wise: ―While, however, the
Comelec is restricted, in pre-proclamation cases, to
an examination of the election returns on their face
and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind
them and investigate election irregularities, the
Comelec is duty b discretion in dismissing a petition for
declaration of failure of elections. However, we made
a pronouncement that the dismissal was proper since
the allegations in the petition did not justify a
declaration of failure of elections. ―Typoco‘s relief
was for Comelec to order a recount of the votes cast,
on account of the falsified election returns, which is
properly the subject of an election contest.”[31]
Respondents‘ petition for declaration of failure of
elections, from which the present case arose,
exhaustively alleged massive fraud and terrorism that,
if proven, could warrant a declaration of failure of
elections. Thus: ―4.1. The ‘elections’ in at least eight
(8) other municipalities xxx were completely sham
and farcical. There was a total failure of elections in
these municipalities, in that in most of these
municipalities, no actual voting was done by the real,
legitimate voters on election day itself but ‘voting’
was made only by few persons who prepared in
advance, and en masse, the ballots the day or the
night before election and, in many precincts, there
was completely no voting because of the non-
delivery of ballot boxes, official ballots and other
election paraphernalia; and in certain municipalities,
while some semblance of ‗voting‘ was conducted on
election day, there was widespread fraudulent
counting and/or counting under very irregular
circumstances and/or tampering and manufacture
of election returns which completely bastardized the
sovereign will of the people. These illegal and
fraudulent acts of desecration of the electoral
process were perpetrated to favor and benefit
respondents. These acts were, by and large,
committed with the aid and/or direct participation of
military elements who were deployed to harass,
intimidate or coerce voters and the supporters or
constituents of herein petitioners, principally, of re-
electionist Governor Datu Zacaria Candao. Military
units and personnel visibly, openly and flagrantly
violated election laws and regulations by escorting
people or elements engaged in the illegal, advanced
preparation of ballots and election returns and, at
times, manning the polling places or precincts
themselves and/or staying within the prohibited
 radius. Ballot boxes and other election paraphernalia
were brought not to the precincts or voting centers
concerned but somewhere else where massive
manufacture of ballots and election documents were
perpetrated.‖[32] The Comelec en banc has the
authority to annul election results and/or declare a
failure of elections.[33] Section 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code further provides that: ―Section 6.
Failure of election.- If, on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes
the election in any polling place has not been held
on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the
hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after
the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the
election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a
verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than
thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election of failure
to elect.‖ Elucidating on the concept of failure of
election, we held that: ―xxx before Comelec can act
on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of
election, two (2) conditions must concur: first, no
voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on
the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the
election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and
second, the votes cast would affect the result of the
election. In Loong vs. Commission on Elections, this
Court added that the cause of such failure of election
should have been any of the following: force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
cases.‖ [34] In another case, we ruled that ―while it
may be true that election did take place, the
irregularities that marred the counting of votes and
the canvassing of the election returns resulted in a
failure to elect.
PEOPLE VS. FERRER
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, the dispositive part of which states:
Five (5) days after receipt of a copy of this Order by the
prosecution, the information in this case shall be deemed
cancelled and released, unless in the meantime the prosecution
amends the information so as to allege sufficient facts
constituting an offense under section 51 of our Revised Election
Code.
The information held defective by the trial court reads as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan and the
Provincial Fiscals of Nueva Ecija and Batanes, on special detail
in Pangasinan by Administrative Orders Nos. 6 and 13, dated
January 12 and 27, 1954, respectively, of the Secretary of Justice,
accuse Andres G. Ferrer of the offense violation of Sections 51
and 54 in the relation to Sections 51 and 54 in relation to Section
183, 184 and 185 of the revised Election Code, committed as
follows:
That on or about 10th day of November, 1953,
(Election Day), and for sometime prior thereto in the municipality
of Binmaley, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Andres G. Ferrer, being then and there a Foreign Affairs Officer,
Class III, Department of Foreign Affairs, and classified civil service
officer, duly qualified and appointed as such, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly, in utter disregard
and defiance of the specific and several legal prohibition on the
subject, and in disregard of the civil service rules and regulations,
induce, influence, sway and make the electors vote in favor of
the candidates of the Liberal Party in the following manner, to
wit: (1) that sometime before the elections on November 10,
1958, the said accused, Andres G. Ferrer, delivered a speech
during a political rally of the Liberal Party in Barrio Caloocan
Norte, of the said municipality of Binmaley, Pangasinan, inducing
the electors to vote for the candidates of the Liberal Party but
more particularly for President Quirino and Speaker Perez; that
during said political meeting the said accused caused to be
distributed to the people who attended said meeting cigarettes
and pamphlets concerning the Liberal Party; and (2) that the
said accused, Andres G. Ferrer, sometime prior to the last
elections campaigned in the Barrio of Caloocan Norte, of the
said municipality of Binmaley, going from house to house and
induced the electors to whom he distributed sample, ballots of
the Liberal Party.
Contrary to sections 51 and 54 in relation to Sections 183, 184 and
185 of Republic Act No. 180, as amended.
The defendant moved to quash the information on the ground
that it charges more than one offense and that the facts alleged
in the information do not constitute a violation of either section
51 or section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The trial court is of the opinion that causing cigarettes or
pamphlets concerning the Liberal Party to be distributed to the
people who attended a political meeting, charged against the
defendant, does not constitute a violation of section 51 of the
Revised Election Code, because it is not giving "food" for
tobacco is not food; nor does it constitute a violation of that part
of section 51 which makes unlawfully the contributing or giving,
directly or indirectly, of money or things of value, because the
information merely charges the defendant with-having caused
cigarettes, etc. to be distributed, and it does not state that the
cigarette belonged to the defendant and were being given
away by him as his contribution for electioneering purposes. True,
cigarettes are not food, but they have and are of value and the
charge that the defendant caused cigarettes and pamphlets
concerning the Liberal Party to be distributed to the people who
attended a political meeting mentioned in the information is a
sufficient allegation that he gave or contributed things of value
for electioneering purposes. If the cigarettes did not belong to
him, that is a matter of defense. The trial court is also of the
opinion that the defendant is not a classified civil service officer
or employee, because to be such it is necessary that he be
assigned in the Department of Foreign Affairs under section 6,
Republic Act. No. 708 and if and when thus assigned he will for
purposes of civil service law and regulations, be considered as
first grade civil service eligible," and that even if the prosecution
could establish that the defendant at the time of the commission
of the violation charged was assigned in the Department of
Foreign Affairs under the section just mentioned, still such
assignment would not make him a classified civil service officer
embraced within the provisions of section 54 of the Revised
Election Code, for, according to the trial court, section 670 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides that the classified civil
service embraces all persons not expressly declared to be the
unclassified civil service and section 671 enumerates the persons
embraced in the unclassified civil service; and concludes; that
the defendant is in the unclassified civil service under section
671, paragraph b, of the Revised Administrative Code, because
the defendant was appointed by the President first as Foreign
Affairs Officer Class III, Department of Foreign Affairs, and later
on as Vice Consul the last appointment having been duly
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, and that the,
assignment or detail in the Department of Foreign Affairs would
make him by mere legal fiction a first grade civil service eligible
under section 6, Republic Act No. 708.
The reason advanced by the trial court are defense matters. The
allegation in the information that the defendant is "a classified
civil service officer, duly qualified and appointed as such," for
purposes the motion to quash, is deemed admitted. The trial
court cannot go beyond the allegations of the information.
Nevertheless, the information is defective, because it charges
two violations of the Revised Election Code, to wit: section 51 to
which a heavier penalty is attached, and section 54 for which a
lighter penalty is provided. And the prosecuting attorneys had
that in mind when at the end of the information filed by them
they stated: "Contrary to Sections 51 and 54 in relation to
Sections 183, 184 and 185 of Republic Act No. 180, as amended."
Causing cigarettes which are things of value to be distributed,
made unlawful by section 51 and punished by section 183,
cannot be deemed a necessary means to commit the lesser
violation of section 54 were the penalty attached to it taken into
consideration. The rule in the case of People vs. Buenviaje, 47
Phil., 536, cited and invoked by the State, has no application to
the case, because there the defendant, who was not a duly
licensed physician, gave medical assistance and treatment to a
certain person and advertised himself and offered services as a
physician by means of cards or letterheads and advertisement
in the newspapers, latter being a means to commit the former,
and both violations are punishable with the same penalty,
whereas in the present case causing cigarettes or things of value
to be distributed by the defendant to the people who attended
a political meeting is a violation distinct from that of
electioneering committed by a classified civil service officer or
employee. The former has no connection with the latter.
If the penalty provided for violation of section 51 and 54 were
the same as in the case of the violation of the Medical Law, the
rule in the case of People vs. Buenviaje supra, might be invoked
and applied.
That a violation of section 51 is distinct from that of section 54 is
further shown by the fact that a violation of the former may be
committed by any candidate, political committee, voter or any
other person, whereas a violation of the latter may only be
committed by a justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer or assessor of any
province, officer or employee of the Army, member of the
national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force, and
classified civil service officer or employee.
Under the information in question, if the charges be proved, the
defendant may be convicted and sentenced under either
section or both. The rule enjoining the charging of two or more
offenses in an information has for aim to give the defendant the
necessary knowledge of the charge to enable, him to prepare
his defense. The State should not heap upon the defendant two
or more charges which might confuse him in his defense.
The order appealed from is affirmed, not upon the grounds relied
upon by the trial court, but on the ground that the information
charges two different violations, without pronouncement as to
costs.
MAPPALA vs. NUÑEZ
240 SCRA 600
Facts: This is an administrative complaint filed by Jacinto
Mappala against Judge Crispulo A. Nuñez, the presiding judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabangan, Isabela for
gross inefficiency, serious misconduct and violation of the Code
of Judicial Ethics. In his decision, respondent found that
Alejandro shot complainant inside Precinct No. 2, located at the
elementary school building in Sto. Tomas, Isabela, during the
barangay elections. Respondent also found that Alejandro was
the one who surrendered the gun. To respondent, the surrender
of the weapon was an implied admission that it was the one
used by Alejandro in shooting complainant. Inspite of all these
findings, respondent acquitted Alejandro of illegally carrying a
deadly weapon inside a precinct on the theory that the gun was
not seized from him while he was inside the precinct.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge erred in ruling that
Alejandro was not in violation of illegal possession of firearms.
Held: To support a conviction under Sec. 261 (p) of the Omnibus
Election Code, is not necessary that the deadly weapon should
have been seized from the accused while he was in the precinct
or within a radius of 100 meters therefrom, as it is enough that he
carried the deadly weapon “in the polling place or within 100
meters thereof” during any of the specified days and hours.
PEOPLE vs. BAYONA
FACTS:
 This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Braulio
Bejasa in the Court of First Instance of Capiz, finding
the defendant guilty of a violation of section 416 of
the Election Law and sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment for thirty days and to pay a fine of P50,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.
 The defendant, who was a special agent of the
Philippine Constabulary, contends that he stopped his
automobile in front of the municipal building of Pilar
for the purpose of delivering to Major Agdamag a
revolver that the defendant had taken that day from
one Tomas de Martin, who had no license therefor;
that he did not know there was a polling place near
where he parked his motor car; that he was called by
his friend, Jose D. Benliro and aligned his automobile,
he did not leave the revolver because there were
many people in the road and he might lose it; that he
was sixty-three meters from the electoral college
when the revolver was taken from him by Jose E.
Desiderio, a representative of the Secretary of the
Interior.
ISSUE: W/N the defendant is liable even without criminal intent.
HELD: Yes. The law which the defendant violated is a statutory
provision, and the intent with which he violated it is immaterial. It
may be conceded that the defendant did not intend to
intimidate any elector or to violate the law in any other way. The
act prohibited by the Election Law was complete.
The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent,
but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was
intentionally done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing the
difference between the intent to commit the crime and the
intent to perpetrate the act. ..." (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128.)
LOZANO vs. YORAC
in dismissing the petition for the disqualification of respondent
Binay. No clear and convincing proof exists to show that
respondent Binay was indeed engaged in vote buying. The
traditional gift-giving of the Municipality of Makati during the
Christmas season is not refuted. That it was implemented by
respondent Binay as OIC Mayor of Makati at that time does not
sufficiently establish that respondent was trying to influence and
induce his constituents to vote for him. The charge against
respondent Binay for alleged malversation of public funds should
be threshed out and adjudicated in the appropriate proceeding
and forum having jurisdiction over the same. Consequently, it
was properly dismissed by the Commission on Elections
Ong v. Martinez, G.R. No. 87743, 21 August 1990
The permanent vacancy for councilor exists and its filling up is
governed by the Local Government Code while the appointment
referred to in the election ban provision is covered by the Civil
Service Law.
For having satisfied the formal requisites and procedure for
appointment as Councilor, which is an official position outside
the contemplation of the election ban, respondent's
appointment is declared valid.
The issue on the alleged discrepancy between the dates of
petitioner's oath and his residence certificate need not be
tackled now because it will not anymore affect the recalled
appointment of petitioner. If ever, the matter casts a doubt on
petitioner's credibility and honesty.
Regalado v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 115962, 15 February 2000
First. The two elements of the offense prescribed under 261(h)
of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, are:
(1) a public officer or employee is transferred or
detailed within the election period as fixed by the
COMELEC, and
(2) the transfer or detail was affected without prior
approval of the COMELEC in accordance with its
implementing rules and regulations.
The transfer may be from one department or agency to
another or from one organizational unit to another in the same
department or agency: Provided, however, that any
movement from the non-career service to the career service
shall not be considered a transfer.
Thus, contrary to petitioners claim, a transfer under 24(c) of P.D.
No. 807 in fact includes personnel movement from one
organizational unit to another in the same department or
agency.
DR. REY B. AQUINO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Facts:
 On January 8, 2010, Aquino, as President and Chief
Executive Officer of the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (PHIC),issued PhilHealth Special Order
No. 16, Series of 2010 (reassignment order)5 directing
the reassignment of several PHIC officers and
employees.
 On the same date, Aquino released the reassignment
order, via the PHIC’s intranet service, to all PHIC
officers and employees, including the following: (1)
Dennis Adre, PHIC Regional Vice-President (VP); (2)
Masiding Alonto, PHIC Regional VP; and (3)
Khaliquzzaman M. Macabato, PHIC Assistant
Regional VP.
 On January 11, 2010, Aquino issued an Advisory
implementing the reassignment order.
 In view of the reassignment order and its directive,
Dean Rudyard A. Avila III, consultant to the Chairman
of the Board of PHIC and former Secretary of the PHIC
Board of Directors, filed before the COMELEC on
January 18, 2010, a complaint against Aquino and
Melinda C. Mercado, PHIC Officer-in-Charge,
Executive VPand Chief Operating Officer, for violation
of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737in relation to Section
261(h) of BP 881. The case was docketed as E.O. Case
No. 10-003.
 On March 29, 2010, Aquino filed a petition10 before
the COMELEC reiterating his request and maintaining
that PhilHealth SO No. 16-2010 is beyond the
coverage of Resolution No. 8737. The COMELEC
directed its Law Department to file the appropriate
information against Aquino for violation of Resolution
No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881; it
dismissed, for lack of merit, the complaint against
Mercado, Mendiola, and Basa.
 The COMELEC declared that Aquino violated Section
261(h) of BP 881 when he directed the
transfer/reassignment of the PHIC officers and
employees within the declared election period
without its prior approval. It pointed out that Section
261(h) considers an election offense for "any public
official who makes or causes the transfer or detail
whatever of any public officer or employee in the civil
service x x x within the election period except upon
prior approval of the Commission."
 On December 7, 2012, Aquino sought
reconsideration15 of the COMELEC’s October 19,
2012 resolution.
 The COMELEC agreed with the complainants’
position and ruled that the word "whatever" in Section
261(h) of BP 881 expanded the coverage of the
prohibition so as to include any movement of
personnel, including reassignment, among others. In
fact, to dispel any ambiguity as regards Section
261(h)’s prohibition, Resolution No. 8737 defined the
word "transfer" as including any personnel action.
 The COMELEC affirmed in toto the October 19, 2012
resolution.
ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC validly found prima facie case against
Aquino for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section
261(h).
HELD: COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 is valid
A common and clear conclusion that we can gather from these
provisions is the obvious and unequivocal intent of the framers of
the Constitution and of the law to grant the COMELEC with
powers, necessary and incidental to achieve the objective of
ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
In Resolution No. 8737, the COMELEC defined the phrase
"transfer or detail whatever" found in Section 261(h) of BP 881 as
including any personnel action, i.e., "reassignment." Aquino
questions this COMELEC interpretation as an unwarranted
expansion of the legal prohibition which he argues renders the
COMELEC liable for grave abuse of discretion.
the Court already clarified the interpretation of the term
whatever as used in Section 261(h) of BP 881 in relation to the
terms transfer and detail. In agreeing with the Solicitor General’s
position, this Court declared that the terms transfer and detail
are modified by the term whatever such that "any movement of
personnel from one station to another, whether or not in the
same office or agency, during the election period is covered by
the prohibition.
Read in the light of this ruling, we affirm the COMELEC’s
interpretation of the phrase "transfer or detail whatever" as we
find the Regalado interpretation consistent with the legislative
intent
Thus, to reiterate and emphasize – the election law’s prohibition
on transfer or detail covers any movement of personnel from one
station to another, whether or not in the same office or agency
when made or caused during the election period.
As a general rule, the period of election starts at ninety (90) days
before and ends thirty (30) days after the election date pursuant
to Section 9, Article IX-C of the Constitution and Section 3 of BP
881. This rule, however, is not without exception. Under these
same provisions, the COMELEC is not precluded from setting a
period different from that provided thereunder.
In this case, the COMELEC fixed the election period for the May
10, 2010 Elections at 120 days before and 30 days after the day
of the election. We find this period proper as we find no
arbitrariness in the COMELEC’s act of fixing an election period
longer than the period fixed in the Constitution and BP 881
Under Section 261(h) of BP 881, a person commits the election
offense of violation of the election transfer ban when he makes
or causes the transfer or detail whatever of any official or
employee of the government during the election period absent
prior approval of the COMELEC.
By its terms, Section 261(h) provides at once the elements of the
offense and its exceptions. The elements are: (1) the making or
causing of a government official or employee’s transfer or detail
whatever; (2) the making or causing of the transfer or detail
whatever was made during the election period; and (3) these
acts were made without the required prior COMELEC approval

By its terms, Section 261(h) provides at once the elements of the
offense and its exceptions. The elements are: (1) the making or
causing of a government official or employee’s transfer or detail
whatever; (2) the making or causing of the transfer or detail
whatever was made during the election period; and (3) these
acts were made without the required prior COMELEC approval
Make is defined as "to cause to exist. To do, perform, or execute;
as to make an issue, to make oath, to make a presentment. To
do in form of law; to perform with due formalities; to execute in
legal form; as to make answer, to make a return or report. To
execute as one’s act or obligation; to prepare and sign; to issue;
to sign, execute, and deliver."44
Cause, on the other hand, is defined as "each separate
antecedent of an event. Something that precedes and brings
about an effect or result. A reason for an action or condition x x
x x an agent that brings about something. That which in some
manner is accountable for condition that brings about an effect
or that produces a cause for the resultant action or state.
Significantly, the terms make and cause indicate one and the
same thing – the beginning, the start of something, a precursor;
it pertains to an act that brings about a desired result. If we read
these definitions within the context of Section 261(h) of BP 881,
the legal prohibition on transfer or detail undoubtedly affects
only those acts that go into the making or causing or to the
antecedent acts.
In short, during the making or causing phase of the entire transfer
or reassignment process – from drafting the order, to its signing,
up to its release – the issuing official plays a very real and active
role. Once the transfer or reassignment order is issued, the active
role is shifted to the addressee of the order who should now carry
out the purpose of the order. At this level – the implementation
phase – the issuing official’s only role is to see to it that the
concerned officer or employee complies with the order. The
issuing official may only exert discipline upon the addressee who
refuses to comply with the order.
Following these considerations, we find that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in this case based on the following
facts:
First, Aquino made or caused the reassignment of the
concerned PHIC officers and employees before the election
period.
Second, Aquino sent out, via the PHIC’s intranet service, the
reassignment order to all affected PHIC officers and employees
before the election period.
Third, the reassignment order was complete in its terms, as it
enumerated clearly the affected PHIC officers and employees
as well as their respective places of reassignments, and was
made effective immediately or on the day of its issue, which was
likewise before the election period.
Fourth, the subsequent orders that Aquino issued were not
reassignment orders per se contrary to the COMELEC’s
assessment.
Based on these clear facts, Aquino completed the act of making
or causing the reassignment of the affected PHIC officers and
employees before the start of the election period. In this sense,
the evils sought to be addressed by Section 261 (h) of BP 881 is
kept intact by the timely exercise of his management
prerogative in rearranging or reassigning PHIC personnel within
its various offices necessary for the PHIC's efficient and smooth
operation. As Aquino's acts of issuing the order fell outside the
coverage of the transfer prohibition, he cannot be held liable for
violation of Section 261(h).
In sum, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when, firstly,
it used wrong or irrelevant considerations when it sought to hold
Aquino liable for violation of Section 261 (h) for issuing orders that
were clearly not for reassignment, but which were simply orders
for retention of position or orders for temporary discharge of
additional duties.
COMELEC VS. TAGLE, ET AL.
GR No.s 148948 & 148951, February 17, 2003
Facts:
In connection with the May 11, 1998 elections, candidate for
Mayor Florentino A. Bautista filed a complaint against Mayor
Federico Poblete et al. for vote –buying in violation of Sec 261
(a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The Information was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99 of the RTC of Imus,
Cavite. Subsequently, a complaint for vote-selling in violation of
Sec 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code was filed with the
Prosecutor’s Office as witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 and
the Provincial Prosecutor in Imus, Cavite filed separate
Informations for vote-selling against said witnesses. On appeal,
the COMELEC en banc declared that the witnesses in Criminal
Case No. 7034-99 were exempt from criminal prosecution
pursuant to 4th paragraph of Sec 28, RA No. 6646, otherwise
known as “The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987” which grants
immunity from criminal prosecution to persons who voluntarily
give information and willingly testify against those liable for vote-
buying or vote-selling. The Law Department of the COMELEC
moved to dismiss the Informations against the said witnesses but
the RTC in Imus, Cavite denied the motion to dismiss.
Held:
1. One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of
vote-buying and of prosecuting those committing it is the grant
of immunity from criminal liability in favor of the party whose vote
was bought. Sec 28 of RA No. 6646 concludes with the following
paragraph:
The giver, offeror, the promissory as well as the
solicitor, acceptor, recipient and conspirator referred to in
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881 shall be liable as principals: Provided, that any person,
otherwise guilty under said paragraphs who voluntarily gives
information and willingly testifies on any violation thereof in any
official investigation or proceeding shall be exempt from
prosecution and punishment for the offenses with reference to
which his information and testimony were given: Provided,
further, that nothing herein shall exempt such person from
criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony.
2. To avoid possible fabrication of evidence against the vote-
buyers, especially by the latter’s opponents, Congress saw it fit
to warn “vote-sellers” who denounce the vote-buying that they
could be liable for perjury or false testimony should they not tell
the truth.
3. The prosecution witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 are
exempt from criminal prosecution for vote-selling by virtue of the
proviso in the last paragraph of Section 28, RA 6646. At the time
when the complaint for vote-selling was filed with the office of
the Provincial Prosecutor, the respondents had already
executed sworn statements attesting to the corrupt practice of
vote-buying. It cannot then be denied that they had already
voluntarily given information in the vote-buying case. In fact,
they willingly testified in Crim. Case No. 7034-99.
4. The COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the
election laws and to prosecute the same. The Chief State
Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Prosecutors, or their respective
assistants are, however, given continuing authority, as deputies
of the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigation of
complaints involving election offenses and to prosecute the
same. This authority may be revoked or withdrawn by the
COMELEC anytime whenever, in its judgment, such revocation
or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the
COMELEC and to promote the common good, or when it
believes that the successful prosecution of the case can be
done by the COMELEC. When the COMELEC nullified the
resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor, it in effect withdrew the
deputation granted by the COMELEC.
ELSIE S. CAUSING v . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HERNAN
D. BIRON, SR.
G.R. No. 199139, 09 September 2014
The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC
Resolution No. 8737 are transfer and detail. Transfer is defined in
the Resolution as “any personnel movement from one
government agency to another or from one department,
division, geographical unit or subdivision of a government
agency to another with or without the issuance of an
appointment”; while detail as defined in the Administrative
Code of 1987 is the movement of an employee from one
agency to another without the issuance of an appointment. Elsie
Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. Mayor Biron issued Memorandum No. 12,
Series of 2010 (Office Order No. 12), commanding for the
detailing of Causing at the Office of the Municipal Mayor.
Causing filed the complaint claiming that issuance made by
Mayor Biron ordering her detail to the Office of the Municipal
Mayor, being made within the election period and without prior
authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and it violated of
Section 1, Paragraph A, No. 1, in connection with Section 6 (B) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8737. Mayor Biron countered that the
purpose of transferring the office of Causing was to closely
supervise the performance of her functions after complaints
regarding her negative behavior in dealing with her co-
employees and with the public transacting business in her office.
The Provincial Election Supervisor recommended the dismissal of
the complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause. COMELEC En
Banc affirmed the findings and recommendation.
ISSUE: Is the relocation of Causing by Mayor Biron during the
election period from her office as the Municipal Civil Registrar to
the Office of the Mayor constitute a prohibited act under the
Omnibus Election Code and the relevant Resolution of the
COMELEC?
RULING:
No. Reassignment was not prohibited by the Omnibus Election
Code there was no probable cause to criminally charge Mayor
Biron with the violation of the Omnibus Election Code. UST Law
Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015 The movement involving
Causing did not equate to either a transfer or a detail within the
contemplation of the law if Mayor Biron only physically
transferred her office area from its old location to the Office of
the Mayor. Causing is not stripped of her functions as Municipal
Civil Registrar. She was merely required to physically report to the
Mayor’s Office and perform her functions as Municipal Civil
Registrar therein. Definitely, she is still the MCR, albeit doing her
work physically outside of her usual work station. She is also not
deprived of her supervisory function over the staff as she
continues to review their work and signs documents they
prepared. While she may encounter difficulty in performing her
duties as a supervisor as she is not physically near her staff, that
by itself, however, does not mean that she has lost supervision
over them. Moreover, Causing’s too literal understanding of
transfer should not hold sway because the provisions involved
here were criminal in nature. Mayor Biron was sought to be
charged with an election offense punishable under Section 264
of the Omnibus Election Code. It is a basic rule of statutory
construction that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in
favor of the accused. Every reasonable doubt must then be
resolved in favor of the accused
JALOSJOS vs COMELEC
GR. Nos. 192474, 192704, 193566, June 26, 2012
Doctrine: The proclamation of a congressional candidate
following the election divests Comelec of jurisdiction over
disputes relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
proclaimed Representative, At this point, the HRET assumes
jurisdiction
Facts:
 In May 2007, Romeo Jalosjos, Jr., ran for Mayor of
Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and won. While
serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he bought a residential
house and lot in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay and renovated and furnished
the same. In September 2008, he began occupying
the house.
 After 8 months or on May 6, 2009, Jalosjos applied with
the Election Registration Board (ERB) of Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay, for the transfer of his voter's
registration record to Precinct 0051F of Barangay
Veterans Village. Dan Erasmo, Sr., opposed the
application. The ERB approved Jalosjos' application
and denied Erasmo's opposition.
 Erasmo filed a petition to exclude Jalosjos from the list
of registered voters of Precinct 0051F before the
MCTC. The MCTC rendered judgment excluding
Jalosjos from the list of registered voters in question.
The MCTC found that Jalosjos did not abandon his
domicile in Tampilisan since he continued even then
to serve as its Mayor. Jalosjos appealed to the RTC
which affirmed the MCTC decision.
 The CA granted the application of Jalojos and
enjoined MCTC and RTC from enforcing their
decisions. His name was reinstated in the Barangay
Veterans Village's voters list pending the resolution of
the petition.
 On Nov. 28, 2009, Jalosjos filed his COC for the position
of Representative of the Second District of
Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 National
Elections. Erasmo filed a petition to deny due course
to cancel his COC before the Comelec claiming that
Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in that
COC when he indicated in it that he resided in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. But the Second Division of the
COMELEC dismissed Erasmo’s petitions.
 While Erasmo’s MR was pending before the Comelec
En Banc, the May 10, 2010 elections took place,
resulting in Jalosjos' winning the elections. He was
proclaimed winner on May 13, 2010.
 On June 3, 2010, the Comelec En Banc granted
Erasmo’s MR and declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek
election as Representative. It held that Jalosjos did
not satisfy the residency requirement since, by
continuing to hold the position of Mayor of Tampilisan,
Zamboanga Del Norte, he should be deemed not to
have transferred his residence from that place to
Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.
Issue: Whether or not the Comelec En Banc exceeded its
jurisdiction in declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the position of
Representative for the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay?
Ruling:
Yes. While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to
decide all questions affecting elections, such power is not
without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the
resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral
Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives.
The Court has already settled the question of when the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET
begins. The proclamation of a congressional candidate
following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over
disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET.
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3,
2010, Jalosjos had already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as
winner in the election. Thus, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his qualification
and declared him ineligible for the office of Representative of
the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
LOKIN v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 179431-321, 22 June 2010
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in
which the party- list organization can substitute another person
in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the
COMELEC, namely:
(a) when the nominee dies;
(b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and
(c) when the nominee becomes incapacitated.
The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule
applies to all cases not falling under any of the three exceptions.
AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC SITTING AS THE
NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, THE SPECIAL PROVINCIAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR MAGUINDANAO CHAIRED BY ATTY.
EMILIO S. SANTOS, and JUAN MIGUEL F. ZUBIRI
Facts:
 The Petition stemmed from the 14 May 2007 national
elections for 12 senatorial posts. At the time of filing of
the Petition, around two months after the said
elections, the 11 candidates with the highest number
of votes had already been officially proclaimed and
had taken their oaths of office as Senators. With other
candidates conceding, the only remaining
contenders for the twelfth and final senatorial post
were Pimentel and private respondent Juan Miguel F.
Zubiri (Zubiri). Public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc, acting as the National
Board of Canvassers (NBC), continued to conduct
canvass proceedings so as to determine the twelfth
and last Senator-elect in the 14 May 2007 elections.
 Pimentel assailed the proceedings before the NBC
and its constituted Special Provincial Board of
Canvassers for Maguindanao (SPBOC-
Maguindanao) in which the Provincial and Municipal
Certificates of Canvass (PCOC and MCOCs) from the
province of Maguindanao were respectively
canvassed. The SPBOC-Maguindanao was created
because the canvass proceedings held before the
original Provincial Board of Canvassers for
Maguindanao (PBOC-Maguindanao)
 Task Force Maguindanao, headed by COMELEC
Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. and Commissioner
Nicodemo T. Ferrer, retrieved and collected 21
MCOCs from the municipalities of Maguindanao,
mostly copy 2, or the copy intended to be posted on
the wall. Due to the consistent denial by the SPBOC-
Maguindanao of the repeated and persistent
motions made by Pimentel’s counsel to propound
questions to PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the
MBOCs-Maguindanao regarding the due execution
and authenticity of the Maguindanao MCOCs,
Pimentel’s counsel manifested her continuing
objection to the canvassing of the said MCOCs.
 On 29 June 2007, the SPBOC-Maguindanao
submitted to the NBC the second PCOC for
Maguindanao. In the proceedings before the NBC,
Pimentel’s counsel reiterated her request to
propound questions to PES Bedol and the
Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and the
SPBOC-Maguindanao. The NBC, however, refused to
grant her request. Pimentel’s counsel thereafter
moved for the exclusion of the second Maguindanao
PCOC from the canvass
 Pimentel averred that said canvass proceedings were
conducted by the NBC and SPBOC-Maguindanao in
violation of his constitutional rights to substantive and
procedural due process and equal protection of the
laws, and in obvious partiality to Zubiri
 In the meantime, without any TRO and/or Status Quo
Ante Order from the Court, the canvass proceedings
before the NBC continued, and by 14 July 2007, Zubiri
(with 11,004,099 votes) and Pimentel (with 10,984,807
votes) were respectively ranked as the twelfth and
thirteenth Senatorial candidates with the highest
number of votes in the 14 May 2007 elections.
 After a close scrutiny of the allegations, arguments,
and evidence presented by all the parties before this
Court, this Court rules to dismiss the present Petition
Held: A pre-proclamation controversy has been defined by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines, as follows:
SEC. 241. Definition. – A pre-proclamation controversy is any
question pertaining to or affecting the proceeding of the board
of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any
registered political party or coalition of political parties before
the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised
under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appearance of
the election returns.
Under Republic Act No. 7166, providing for synchronized national
and local elections, pre-proclamation controversies refer to
matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appearance of election returns and certificates of
canvass
Similarly, the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC for the
election for Senators, did not violate Section 30 of Republic Act
No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, when it denied
Pimentel’s request to question PES Bedol and the Chairpersons
of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOC-Maguindanao, and his
subsequent motion to exclude the second Maguindanao
PCOC.
The SPBOC-Maguindanao, in the conduct of its canvass
proceedings, properly refused to allow Pimentel to contest the
Maguindanao MCOCs at that stage by questioning PES Bedol
and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and
presenting evidence to prove the alleged manufactured nature
of the said MCOCs, for such would be tantamount to a pre-
proclamation case still prohibited by Section 15 of Republic Act
No. 7166, even after its amendment by Republic Act No. 9369.
According to Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended
by Republic Act No. 9369, Congress and the COMELEC en banc,
acting as the NBC, shall determine the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass for President, Vice-
President and Senators, respectively, as accomplished and
transmitted to them by the local boards of canvassers. For the
province of Maguindanao, it is the PBOC which transmits the
PCOC to the NBC.
Given the foregoing, there is indeed no merit in Pimentel’s
request before the NBC to still question PES Bedol and the
Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOC-
Maguindanao regarding the Maguindanao MCOCs. There is
also no reason to exclude the second Maguindanao PCOC from
the national canvass of votes for Senators after its authenticity
and due execution had been determined by the NBC in
accordance with the criteria provided by the law.
This Court finds Pimentel’s argument of deprivation of due
process problematic since he has not established what he is
being deprived of: life, liberty, or property. He was a candidate
in the senatorial elections. At the time he filed the instant Petition,
he might have been leading in the canvassing of votes, yet the
canvass proceedings were still ongoing, and no winner for the
twelfth and last senatorial post had been proclaimed. May he
already claim a right to the elective post prior to the termination
of the canvass proceedings and his proclamation as winner, and
may such a right be considered a property right which he
cannot be deprived of without due process? These were clearly
substantial and weighty issues which Pimentel did not address.
Unfortunately, this Court cannot argue and settle them for him.
Finally, while Section 15, in relation to Section 30, of Republic Act
No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, did introduce
an additional exception to the prohibition against pre-
proclamation controversies in elections for President, Vice-
President, and Senators, this Court has already established in the
preceding discussion that Pimentel cannot invoke the same in
his Petition. The provisions in question did not materially change
the nature of canvass proceedings before the boards of
canvassers, which still remain summary and administrative in
nature for the purpose of canvassing the votes and determining
the elected official with as little delay as possible and in time for
the commencement of the new term of office
Tan v. COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 166143-47, 166891, 20 November 2006
The COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petitions for Declaration of
Failure of Election since the electoral anomalies alleged in the
petitions should have been raised in an election protest, not in a
petition to declare a failure of election. Under Republic Act No.
7166, otherwise known as The Synchronized Elections Law of
1991,[68] the COMELEC en banc is empowered to declare a
failure of election under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code.
From the above-cited proviso, three (3) instances justify the
declaration of failure of election, to wit:
A. the election in any polling place has not been held on the
date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes;
B. the election in any polling place had been suspended
before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes; or
C. after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes.
Reyes vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013
Facts:
 Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
the position of Representative of the lone district of
Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and
resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque,
filed before the COMELEC a petition for the
cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October 31,
2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on
the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained
material misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s
marital status, residency, date of birth and citizenship.
Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an
American citizen and filed in February 8, 2013 a
manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered
evidence and amended last exhibit.
 On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued
a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s COC on the
basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines
because of her failure to comply with the
requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.
 The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on
April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the COMELEC en
banc promulgated a Resolution denying the
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit.
 On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of
the May 13, 2013 elections and on June 5, 2013 took
her oath of office before the Speaker of House of
Representatives. She has yet to assume office at noon
of June 30, 2013.
 On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a
Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14, 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and
executory.
 Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for
Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Status Quo Ante Order.
Issues:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the
petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already
taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House
of Representative.
Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner
is illegible to run for office
Held: The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the
House of Representative Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive
jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election returns and qualification of the members of House of
Representative.
In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and
become eligible for public office, the law requires that she must
have accomplished the following 1) take the oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines before the consul-general of
the Philippine Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and
sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath. In the case at
bar, there is no showing that petitioner complied with the
requirements. Petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial
Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in
compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of residency, the court
approved the ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen who
becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his
domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he
must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the
Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his residency
shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice.
In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired
her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that
the petitioner renounced her American citizenship, it follows that
she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
Petitioner claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the
province of Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is
not sufficient to prove her one-year residency for she has never
recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an
American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can
substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of
choice in the USA.
LLOREN vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 196355 September 18, 2012
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent Rogelio Pua, Jr. (Pua) were the
candidates for Vice Mayor of the Municipality of Inopacan,
Leyte in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Pua as
the winning candidate with a plurality of 752 votes for garnering
5,682 votes as against petitioner’s 4,930 votes. Alleging massive
vote-buying, intimidation, defective PCOS machines in all the
clustered precincts, election fraud, and other election-related
manipulations, petitioner commenced Election Protest Case
(EPC) No. H-026 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Hilongos,
Leyte. In his answer with special and affirmative defenses and
counterclaim, Pua alleged that the election protest stated no
cause of action, was insufficient in form and content, and should
be dismissed for failure of petitioner to pay the required cash
deposit.
Issues:
Whether or not appeal was perfected.
Whether or not there was a valid election contest.
Held: Yes. The rules on the timely perfection of an appeal in an
election case requires two different appeal fees, one to be paid
in the trial court together with the filing of the notice of
appeal within five days from notice of the decision, and the
other to be paid in the COMELEC Cash Division within the 15-day
period from the filing of the notice of appeal.
In A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, the Court promulgated the Rules of
Procedure In Election Contests Before The Courts Involving
Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials (hereafter, the Rules in
A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC), effective on May 15, 2007, to set down the
procedure for election contests and quo warranto cases
involving municipal and barangay officials that are
commenced in the trial courts. The Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC
superseded Rule 35 (“Election Contests Before Courts of General
Jurisdiction”) and Rule 36 (“Quo Warranto Case Before Courts of
General Jurisdiction”) of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Under Section 8, of Rule 14 of the Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, an
aggrieved party may appeal the decision of the trial court to the
COMELEC within five days after promulgation by filing a notice
of appeal in the trial court that rendered the decision, serving a
copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse counsel or on the
adverse party if the party is not represented by counsel. Section
9, of Rule 14 of the Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC prescribes for that
purpose an appeal fee of P 1,000.00 to be paid to the trial court
rendering the decision simultaneously with the filing of the notice
of appeal.
It should be stressed, however, that the Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-15-
SC did not supersede the appeal fee prescribed by the
COMELEC under its own rules of procedure. As a result, “the
requirement of two appeal fees by two different jurisdictions
caused a confusion in the implementation by the COMELEC of
its procedural rules on the payment of appeal fees necessary for
the perfection of appeals.” To remove the confusion, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8486, effective on July 24, 2008,
whereby the COMELEC clarified the rules on the payment of the
two appeal fees by allowing the appellant to pay the
COMELEC’s appeal fee of P 3,200.00 at the COMELEC’s Cash
Division through the ECAD or by postal money order payable to
the COMELEC within a period of 15 days from the time of the
filing of the notice of appeal in the trial court.
The non-payment of the motion fee of P 300.00 at the time of the
filing of the motion for reconsideration did not warrant the
outright denial of the motion for reconsideration, but might only
justify the COMELEC to refuse to take action on the motion for
reconsideration until the fees were paid, or to dismiss the action
or proceeding when no full payment of the fees is ultimately
made. The authority to dismiss is discretionary and permissive, not
mandatory and exclusive, as expressly provided in Section 18,
Rule 40 of the 1993 Rules of Procedure.
Yes. Section 10(c), Rule 2 of the Rules in A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC
pertinently provides as follows: Section 10. Contents of the
protest or petition. —
xxx
c. An election protest shall also state: (i) that the protestant was
a candidate who had duly filed a certificate of candidacy and
had been voted for the same office; (ii) the total number of
precincts in the municipality; (iii) the protested precincts and
votes of the parties in the protested precincts per the Statement
of Votes by Precinct or, if the votes of the parties are not
specified, an explanation why the votes are not specified; and
(iv) a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained
of showing the electoral frauds, anomalies or irregularities in the
protested precincts.
As the findings of the RTC show, petitioner did not indicate the
total number of precincts in the municipality in his election
protest. The omission rendered the election protest insufficient in
form and content, and warranted its summary dismissal, in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 2 of the Rules in A.M. No. 10-4-
1-SC.
Relampagos vs. Cumba
243 SCRA 690, April 27, 1995
Facts:
 In the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, the
petitioner and private respondent were candidates
for the position of Mayor in the municipality of
Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was
proclaimed the winning candidate. Unwilling to
accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest
with the RTC of Agusan del Norte. On June 29, 1994,
the trial court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found
the petitioner to have won with a margin of six votes
over the private respondent and rendered
judgement in favor of the petitioner.
 The private respondent appealed the decision to the
COMELEC which was later on given a due course by
the trial court. The petitioner then filed with the trial
court a motion for execution pending appeal. The
trial court granted the petitioner's motion for
execution pending appeal despite the opposition of
the private respondent. The corresponding writ of
execution was forthwith issued. Thereafter, the private
respondent filed a motion for a reconsideration which
was later on denied. The private respondent then filed
with the respondent COMELEC a petition
for certiorari to annul the aforesaid order of the trial
court granting the motion for execution pending
appeal and the writ of execution. The COMELEC
granted the petition on February 9, 1995, ordering the
petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered restored to her
position as Municipality Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan
del Norte, upholding its exclusive authority to decide
petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus where the COMELEC maintains that
there is a special law granting it such jurisdiction
Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full force
as it was not expressly repealed by the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).
Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction
Held: Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 remains in full force and effect
but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue
the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Guevara v. COMELEC, 104 Phil. 269
Cawasa v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 150469, 3 July 2002
Dumarpa v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 192249, 2 April 2013
DUMAYAS vs. COMELEC

Facts:
 Petitioner Dumayas and respondent Bernal were rival
candidates for the position in Mayor of Carles, Iloilo in
the May 1998 synchronized elections. During the
canvassing by the MBC, petitioner sought the
exclusion of election returns for 3 precincts of
Barangay Pantalan owing to alleged acts of terrorism,
intimidation and coercion committed in said
precincts during the casting and counting of votes.
The MBC denied petitioner’s objections and
proceeded with the canvass which showed
respondent Bernal garnering more votes than the
petitioner.
 Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC Second Division
which excluded election returns from 3 precincts and
directed the MBC to reconvene and finish the
canvass of the remaining or uncontested returns and
then, to proclaim the winning mayoralty candidate.
Private respondent Bernal moved for reconsideration
of the decision of the Second Division with the
COMELEC en banc.
 The MBC proclaim petitioner winner of the election.
Private respondent Bernal filed an urgent motion to
declare void petitioner’s proclamation. The duly
proclaimed Vice-Mayor Betita, and private
respondent Bernal filed n action for quo warranto
against petitioner before the RTC of Iloilo. Petitioner
filed with COMELEC en banc a motion to cancel
Bernal’s motion for reconsideration and motion
declare void petitioner’s proclamation on the ground
that respondent Bernal should be deemed to have
abandoned said motion when he filed quo warranto
action.
 The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the
Second Division, annulled the petitioner Dumayas’
proclamation; and constituted a new MBC.
Respondent Bernal was proclaimed by the newly-
constituted MBC as the duly-elected Mayor of the
Municipality.
 Petitioner Dumayas asked the Supreme Court to set
aside the COMELEC en banc resolution.
Issue:
1. Should respondent Bernal, who was named as
petitioner in the quo warranto proceedings
commenced before the regular court, be deemed to
have abandoned the motions he had filed with
respondent Commission?
2. Did the COMELEC err in ordering the inclusion of the
contested election returns in the canvassing of ballots
Held:
The filing of an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation
controversy or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed,
thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and
pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his
proclamation. The reason for this rule is that once the competent
tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have
to be decided in the case itself and not in another proceeding,
so as to prevent confusion and conflict of authority.
Nevertheless, the general rule is not absolute. It admits of certain
exceptions, as where: (a) the board of canvassers was
improperly constituted; (b) quo warranto was not the proper
remedy; (c) what was filed was not really a petition for quo
warranto or an election protest but a petition to annul a
proclamation; (d) the filing of a quo warranto petition or an
election protest was expressly made without prejudice to the
pre-proclamation controversy or was made ad cautelam; and
(e) the proclamation was null and void
An examination of the petition filed primarily by Vice-Mayor
Betita with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City reveals that it is
neither a quo warranto petition under the Omnibus Election
Code nor an election protest.
Petition for quo warranto under the Omnibus Election Code
raises in issue the disloyalty or ineligibility of the winning
candidate. It is a proceeding to unseat the respondent from
office but not necessarily to install the petitioner in his place. An
election protest is a contest between the defeated and winning
candidates on the ground of frauds or irregularities in the casting
and counting of the ballots, or in the preparation of the returns.
It raises the question of who actually obtained the plurality of the
legal votes and therefore is entitled to hold the office
The allegations contained in Betita's petition before the regular
court do not present any proper issue for either an election
protest or a quo warranto case under the Omnibus Election
Code. Spl. Civil Action No. 98-141 appears to be in the nature of
an action for usurpation of public office brought by Betita to
assert his right to the position of Mayor pursuant to the rules on
succession of local government officials contained in the Local
Government Code. Although said petition is also denominated
as a quo warranto petition under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, it
is different in nature from the quo warranto provided for in the
Omnibus Election Code where the only issue proper for
determination is either disloyalty or ineligibility of respondent
therein. Neither can it be considered as an election protest since
what was put forth as an issue in said petition was petitioner's
alleged unlawful assumption of the office of Mayor by virtue of
his alleged illegal proclamation as the winning candidate in the
election
The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. The only evidence
presented by the petitioner to prove the alleged irregularities
were the self-serving contracts of his watchers and inspectors.
Returns cannot be excluded on mere allegations that the returns
are manufactured or fictitious when the returns on their face
appear to be regular and without any physical signs of
tampering. The election irregularities cited by the petitioner
would require the presentation of evidence which cannot be
done in a pre-proclamation controversy which is summary in
nature.
Miranda v. Abaya
G.R. No. 136351, 28 July 1999
There was a valid substitution. The COMELEC may not, by itself,
without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. In Sanchez v. Del
Rosario, the Court ruled that the question of eligibility or
ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and
proper cognizance of the COMELEC.
CERAFICA, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; COMELEC; DUTY TO RECEIVE AND
ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF COCs; MINISTERIAL. In declaring
that Kimberly, being under age, could not be considered to
have filed a valid COC and, thus, could not be validly substituted
by Olivia, we find that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion.
Firstly, subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its
power to deny due course to or cancel COCs under Sec. 78,
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881, the Comelec has the ministerial
duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs.
In Cipriano v. Comelec, we ruled that the Comelec has no
discretion to give or not to give due course to COCs. We
emphasized that the duty of the Comelec to give due course to
COCs filed in due form is ministerial in character, and that while
the Comelec may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may
not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of
eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual mayor of Baybay with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte
and proper cognizance of the Comelec. sufficed to effectively withdraw such candidacy.

The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring that Hans Roger,
being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid
certificate of candidacy and, thus, could not be validly
substituted by Luna. The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the
proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy filed in due form. In Sanchez vs. Del Rosario, the
Court ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility of a
candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper
cognizance of the COMELEC.
Yes. Sec. 3, Rule 23 of COMELEC Rules of procedure provides that
a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificates of
candidacy shall be heard summarily after due notice. In the
case, the COMELEC Law department conducted an ex-parte
study of the cases without giving petitioner an opportunity to be
heard or requiring her to submit a comment or opposition to the
petitions or setting the case for hearing. Hence, the COMELEC
en banc deprived the petitioner of due process of law in
approving the report and recommendation of the Law
Department.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; COMELEC; QUESTION OF ELIGIBILITY OF

CANDIDATE; MINUTE RESOLUTION; NOT VALID. The determination
of whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking
involves a determination of fact where parties must be allowed
to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. We thus
caution the Comelec against its practice of impetuous
cancellation of COCs via minute resolutions adopting the
recommendations of its Law Department when the situation
properly calls for the case's referral to a Division for summary
hearing.

Rep. Ma. Catalina Loreto – Go v. COMELEC

GR No. 147741, May 10, 2001
Pardo, J.

Facts:
 Petitioner Loreto-Go filed Certificates of Candidacy
for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte and for Governor of the
province of Leyte.
 She filed an affidavit of withdrawal for the position of
Mayor with the provincial election officer, which the
latter refused to receive stating that she should file the
same with the municipal election officer of Baybay,
hence, she filed the same with the proper office by
fax.
 However, she filed the withdrawal 28 minutes after the
deadline.
 Respondents Felipe Montejo and Arvin Antoni filed
separate petitions to deny due course and/or to
cancel the certificates of candidacy of petitioner.
 The case was referred to the Law Department of
COMELEC which gave due course to respondents’
petitions without affording petitioner an opportunity
to be heard or to submit responsive pleadings.
 Based on the report of the COMELEC’s Law
Department, the COMELEC en banc disqualified
petitioner to run for both positions; hence, this petition.

Issues:
1. WON petitioner is disqualified to be a candidate for
governor.
2. Was there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of
candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte?
3. Was there denial to petitioner of procedural due
process of Law?
Held:
No. Petitioner’s withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for
mayor of Baybay, Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and
left in full force her certificate of candidacy for governor.
Yes. Section 73, BP Blg. 881, does not mandate that the affidavit
of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the
certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. While it may
be true that Sec. 12 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A
requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer
where the certificate of candidacy was filed, such requirement
is merely directory, and is intended for the convenience. Hence,
the filing of petitioner’s affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for
Divinagracia v. COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 186007 & 186016, 27 July 2009
The appeal to the COMELEC of the trial court’s
decision in election contests involving municipal and barangay
officials is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal and
the payment of the P1,000.00 appeal fee to the court that
rendered the decision within the five-day reglementary period.
The non-payment or the insufficient payment of the additional
appeal fee of P3,200.00 to the COMELEC Cash Division, in
accordance with Rule 40, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, as amended, does not affect the perfection of the
appeal and does not result in outright or ipso facto dismissal of
the appeal.
Santos v. COMELEC, et al.
G.R. No. 155618 March 26, 2003
FACTS:
 Petitioner Edgar Santos and respondent Pedro
Panulaya were both candidates for Mayor of the
Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental in the May
14, 2001 elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers
proclaimed respondent Panulaya as the duly elected
Mayor.
 Petitioner filed an election protest before the lower
court. After trial and revision of the ballots, the trial
court found that petitioner garnered 2,181 votes while
respondent received only 2,105. Hence, it rendered
judgment declaring and proclaiming petitioner as the
duly elected Municipal Mayor and setting aside as
null and void the proclamation of respondent made
by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
 Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for execution
pending appeal. Meanwhile, before the trial court
could act on petitioner’s motion, respondent filed
with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari, assailing
the decision of the trial court. Likewise, respondent
appealed the trial court’s decision to
the COMELEC. The COMELEC issued a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, which effectively enjoined the
trial court from acting on petitioner’s motion for
execution pending appeal.
 Subsequently, the COMELEC dismissed petitioner’s
petition for certiorari after finding that the trial court
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in rendering
the assailed judgment. Moreover, the COMELEC held
that the remedy from the decision of the court a quo
was to file a notice of appeal. Hence, it directed the
trial court to dispose of all pending incidents in the
election protest with dispatch.
 The trial court issued an Order approving the Motion
for Execution Pending Appeal and installing petitioner
as the duly elected Mayor.
 Meanwhile, respondent filed with the COMELEC
a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his
petition in SPR No. 20-2002. After five days, or on
August 26, 2002, he filed a supplemental petition in
SPR No. 20-2002. Barely two days later, on August 28,
2002, and while his motion for reconsideration and
supplemental petition in SPR No. 20-2002 were
pending, respondent filed another petition with the
COMELEC, docketed as SPR No. 37-2002. The petition
contained the same prayer as that in the
supplemental petition filed in SPR 20-2002. Acting on
respondent’s motion, the COMELEC issued the
assailed Order directing the parties to maintain the
status quo ante and enjoining petitioner from
assuming the functions of Mayor.
ISSUE:
whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in giving due course, instead of dismissing outright, the
petition in SPR No. 37-2002 despite the clear showing that
respondent was guilty of forum-shopping, and in setting aside
the trial court’s order granting execution pending appeal
HELD:
Yes. It is at once apparent from the records, as shown above,
that respondent was guilty of forum-shopping when he instituted
SPR No. 37-2002 with the COMELEC. Forum-shopping is an act
of a party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been
rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a
favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or
special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of
two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same
cause on the supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition. For it to exist,
there should be (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as
would represent the same interest in both actions; (b)identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and (c) identity of the two preceding particulars
such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in
the action under consideration. Considering that respondent
was indubitably guilty of forum-shopping when he filed SPR No.
37-2002, his petition should have been dismissed outright by the
COMELEC. Willful and deliberate forum-shopping is a ground for
summary dismissal of the case, and constitutes direct contempt
of court. COMELEC’s act of setting aside the trial court’s order
granting execution pending appeal is premised on the
argument that shortness of the remaining term of office and
posting a bond are not good reasons. This is untenable. A valid
exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal
requires that it should be based upon good reasons to be stated
in a special order. The following constitute good reasons and a
combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant
execution pending appeal: (1) public interest involved or will of
the electorate; (2) the shortness of the remaining portion of the
term of the contested office; and (3) the length of time that the
election contest has been pending. The decision of the trial
court in election protest was rendered on April 2, 2002, or after
almost one year of trial and revision of the questioned ballots.
It found petitioner as
thecandidate with the plurality of votes. Respondent appealed
the said decision to theCOMELEC. In the meantime, the three-
year term of the Office of the Mayor continued to run. The will of
the electorate, as determined by the trial court in the election
protest, had to be respected and given meaning. The
Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, needed of a mayor
even while the election protest was pending, and it had to be
the candidate judicially determined to have been chosen
by the people.
Navarosa v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 157957, 18 September 2003
A supersedeas bond secures the performance of the judgment
or order appealed from in case of its affirmation. Section 3 finds
application in ordinary civil actions where the interest of the
prevailing party is capable of pecuniary estimation, and
consequently, of protection, through the filing of a supersedeas
bond. Thus, the penultimate sentence of Section 3 states: The
bond thus given may be proceeded against on motion with
notice to the surety. Consequently, it finds no application in
election protest cases where judgments invariably include orders
which are not capable of pecuniary estimation such as the right
to hold office and perform its functions.
As applied to the present case, the supersedeas bond petitioner
Navarosa filed can only answer for that portion of the trial courts
ruling ordering her to pay to respondent Esto actual damages,
attorneys fees and the cost of the suit. It cannot secure
execution of that portion proclaiming respondent Esto duly
elected mayor of Libacao, Aklan by popular will of the
electorate and authorizing him to assume the office. This
anomalous situation defeats the very purpose for the filing of the
supersedeas bond in the first place.