WILLIAMS V. ENRIQUEZ
CIOCO
Facts:
This is a petition for Disciplinary action against respondent for
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful acts.
The petitioners contend that respondent cited outdated material in his
complaint affidavit against Marissa and knowingly applied the same in
perverse fashion to argue that Marissa lost her Filipino citizenship
when she married David. However, according to, Article IV, Section 4
of the 1987 Constitution provides that she would not lose her
citizenship through marriage unless she renounces the same in a
specific act. Nonetheless Atty. Enriquez quotes the more outdated law,
declaring that her act of marrying was equivalent to renouncing her
citizenship. As a retired judge, respondent should know that the false
charge against petitioners will not prevail
Respondent contends that the complaint for disbarment was a mere
tactic to divert attention from the criminal charges against the
complainants. The charges against him have no factual basis and
Marissa was no longer a citizen of the Philippines as a result of her
marriage to David Williams.
Issue: Whether or not the Respondent is guilty of violating Canon 5
Held:
Yes. A Lawyers must keep themselves abreast of legal developments
Canon 5 requires that a lawyer be updated in the latest news and
jurisprudence.
As a retired judge, respondent should have known that it is his duty to
keep himself well-informed of the latest rulings of the Court on the
issues and legal problems confronting a client. In this case, the
respondent misconstrued no less than the Constitution, the basic law
of the land. The penalty of reprimand will suffice.
DINSAY V.
Facts:
Planters Machinery Corporation (PLAMACO) mortgaged to Traders
Royal Bank (the Bank) certain properties as security for the payment
of its loan. PLAMACO defaulted in the payment of the loan so the Bank
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. At a foreclosure sale
conducted by the sheriff, the property was sold to the bank, who was
the sole bidder. A certificate of Sheriff’s sale was executed by Atty.
Cioco, then clerk of Court and Ex-officio Sheriff.
Records disclose that page four of the said Certificate was
surreptitiously substituted. The new page lowered the bid price from
the original amount of P3, 263, 182.67 to only P730,000. Cioco and the
sheriff who conducted the sale had previously been administratively
charged and dismissed from service.
Now, Atty. Cioco is sought to be disbarred. He argues that there was
res adjudicata due to the administrative case, and that disbarment was
deemed adjudicated therein, thus he may now longer be charged.
Issue: W/N Cioco may be charged with disbarment (W/N res
adjudicata appplies)
Held:
Cioco’s contention has no merit. Res adjudicata applies only to judicial
or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the Court’s
administrative powers, as in this case.
Disbarment has not been adjudicated in the previous case. Therein,
Cioco was administratively proceeded against as an erring Court
personnel under the supervisory authority of the court. Herein, Cioco
is sought to be disciplined as a lawyer under the court’s plenary
authority over members of the legal profession.
The general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may
not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government official. The exception is , if
that misconduct affects his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral
delinquency.
SANTIAGO V. SAGUCIO
Facts:
Complainant charges respondent with the following violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant contends that
respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent,
being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat,
knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have
inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case
filed by Taggat employees. Furthermore, complainant claims that
respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and
threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to
support the complaint.
Issue:
whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with
respondent’s role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Held:
No. Canon 6 provides that the Code “shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official duties.” A
government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition “not [to]
represent conflicting interests.” However, this rule is subject to certain
limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not
apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all.
concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true
attorney-client relationship exists. Moreover, considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar,
clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of
the administrative penalty.
HUYSSEN V. GUTIERREZ
Facts:
Respondent Atty. Gutierrez, a Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
officer, received US$20,000 from complainant Huyssen. Accused of
falsely representing that it was needed in complainant’s application for
visa and failing to return the same, respondent denied
misappropriating the said amount, claiming that he gave it to a certain
Atty. Mendoza who assisted complainant and children in their
application for visa. He failed however to substantiate such denial.
Atty. Gutierrez had many alibis on why the money could not
immediately be returned to the complainant, and promised her several
times that he would repay her out of his personal funds. He even issued
personal post-dated checks on this, but which later bounced.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s conduct violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility and merits the penalty of disbarment?
Held:
Yes, the respondent should be disbarred.
The defense of denial proffered by respondent is not convincing. It is
settled that denial, which is inherently a weak defense, to be believed
must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability.
Lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task
have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral
integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a
responsible public office.
PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered
financial difficulties. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to
recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution
declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with
safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering
its liquidation.
A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group
submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a
petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the
court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265.
After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover
the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and
cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution
against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al.
The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their
counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to
disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al.
with Sandiganbayan.
The motion to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from
accepting “engagement” or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to
disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an
inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as
SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group.
PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies
to respondent Mendoza
Held:
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule
6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest
problem when he acted as Sol-Gen and later as counsel of respondents
et.al. before the Sandiganbayan.
However there is still the issue of whether there exists a “congruent-
interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of
“matter” and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on
the matter.
Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as
SolGen involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how
to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition
for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given
by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not
the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that
“drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts
which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot
disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision
of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate
in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank.
Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot
apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while
SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter
involved in the Civil case of sequestration. Petition Denied.
SAMALA V. PALANA
Facts:
Complainant was looking for a company where he could invest his
dollar savings. He was introduced to Taino, a Trader-employee of the
First Imperial Resources, then to Palama, the company’s legal officer.
Respondent assured the complainant that FIRI would be directly
putting his investment with Eastern Forex ltd. Subsequently,
complainant decided to pull out his investments.
However, the checks issued were dishonored due to insufficient funds.
Respondent assured the complainant that the checks would be
replaced. When the complainant filed charges against Paul Desidero,
the President, it was revealed that his identity was fictitious.
Respondent’s acts of representing himself as the legal officer and
assuring the complainant that the checks would be delivered to him is
clearly fraudulent and violative of the Canons of Professional conduct.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating the code of
professional responsibility
Held:
Yes. The code of professional responsibility mandates that “a lawyer
shat at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
In this case, it is clear that the representations of respondent as legal
officer of FIRI caused material damage to complainant. In doing,
respondent failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and lessened the confidence of the public in the honesty
and integrity of the same.
LEDA V. TABANG
Facts:
Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar
Matter No. 78, claiming that Respondent had acted fraudulently in
filling out his application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's
Oath for lack of good moral character. Complainant also alleged that
after Respondent's law studies, he became aloof and "abandoned"
her.
In his answer, Tabang admitted that he was "legally married" to
Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the marriage "was not as...
yet made and declared public" so that he could proceed with his law
studies and until after he could take the Bar examinations "in order to
keep stable our future." He also admitted having indicated that he was
"single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason that to my...
honest belief, I have still to declare my status as single since my
marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and declared
public."
Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time praying for
Respondent's disbarment based on the following grounds:
a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid
marriage with me assuming that our marriage is not valid and making
a mockery of our marriage institution.
b. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification
he submitted to the Supreme Court;
c. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into
signing the affidavit of desistance, when in truth and in fact he is not
sincere, for he only befriended me to resume our marriage and
introduced me to his family, friends and relatives as his wife, for a bad
motive that is he wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him
with the Supreme Court."
Issues:
Whether or not respondent is guilt of violating the code of professional
responsibility (canon 10)
Ruling:
Upon the facts on record, even without testimonial evidence from
Complainant, we find Respondent's lack of good moral character
sufficiently established.
Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has
resorted to conflicting submissions before this Court to suit himself. He
has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant to serve his
purpose.
In so doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness
and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states
that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any
in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice." Therefore, tabang is suspended.
CAMACHO v PANGULAYAN
FACTS:
9 students of AMA were expelled for having apparently caused to be
published objectionable features or articles in the school paper. Denial
of the appeal to AMA President Aguiluz gave rise to Civil Case 97-30549
Camacho was the hired counsel of the expelled students in an action
for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in the
said civil case. While the civil case was still pending, letters of apology
and Re-admission Agreements were separately executed by the
expelled students without the knowledge of Camacho.
CAMACHO filed a complaint against lawyers comprising the
PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES Law Firm (lawyers of AMA) because
without his knowledge they procured and effected on separate
occasions compromise agreements (letters of apology and Re-
admission Agreements) with 4 of his clients which in effect required
them to waive all kinds of claims they may have with AMA.
CAMACHO averred that such an act was unbecoming of any member
of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension.
PANGULAYAN in his defense claimed that the agreements were
executed for the sole purpose of effecting the settlement of an
administrative case
ISSUE:
Whether or not pangulayan and associates should be suspended
(violated canon 8)
Held: bobo", referring to "the manner complainant was trying to inject
wholly irrelevant and highly offensive matters into the record" while in
YES. It would appear that when individual letters of apology and Re-
the process of making an offer of evidence.
admission Agreement swere formalized, CAMACHO was already the
retained counsel of the expelled AMA students. PANGULAYAN and
associates having full knowledge of this fact still proceeded to
HELD:
negotiate with the expelled AMA students and their parents without
at least communicating the matter to their lawyer. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such cutting
remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he
This failure of PANGULAYAN and associates, whether by design or
exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also to the
oversight, is an excusable violation of the canons of profession ethics
court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to
and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. The excuse that
measure up to the norm of conduct required of a member ofthe legal
agreements were executed for settling the administrative case was
profession, which all the more deserves reproach because this is not
belied by the Manifestation which states “ 9 signatories agreed among
the first time that respondent has employed offensive language in the
others to terminate ALL civil, criminal and administrative proceedings
course of judicial proceedings. He has previously been admonished to
they may have against AMA arising from their previous dismissal”
refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and warned to be
Hence, PANGULAYAN should be suspended for 3 months.
more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. (CA-G.R. No.
09753-SP, Court of Appeals; Civil Case No. C-7790 CFI of Caloocan.)

The Court, however, notes that in the case at bar, respondent's

actuation was triggered by complainant's own manifest hostility and
CASTILLO V. PADILLA
provocative remarks. Complainant is therefore not entirely free from
blame when respondent unleashed his irritation through the use of
improper words.
FACTS:
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior.
Respondent was counsel for the plaintiff. At the hearing of the case on He is directed to observe proper decorum and restraint and warned
November 19, 1981, while complainant was formally offering his that a repetition of the offense will be dealt with more severely.
evidence, he heard respondent say "bobo". When complainant turned
toward respondent, he saw the latter looking at him (complainant)
menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in the presence of many
people, complainant was unable to proceed with his offer of evidence.
The court proceedings had to be suspended.

While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having directed the

same at the complainant, claiming that what he said was "Ay, que
NOBLE V AILES
FACTS:
Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer, filed a
complaint2 for damages against his own brother, Marcelo O. Ailes, Jr.
(Marcelo), whom Maximino represented, together with other
defendants, therein. In the said complaint, Orlando stated the
following data: "IBP-774058-12/07/09-QC x x x MCLE Compliance No.
II-00086893/Issued on March 10, 2008."4 Maximino claimed that at
the time of the filing of the said complaint, Orlando's IBP O.R. number
should have already reflected payment of his IBP annual dues for the
year 2010, not 2009, and that he should have finished his third
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance, not just
the second. Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from
Marcelo that the latter had filed a separate case for grave threats and
estafa5 against OrlandoIn his defense,11 Orlando denied the charges
against him and claimed that his late submission of the third MCLE
compliance is not a ground for disbarment and that the Notice to
Terminate Services of Counsel and Compromise Agreement were all
made upon the request of Marcelo when the latter was declared in
default in the aforementioned civil case. Moreover, he insisted that the
allegedly offensive language in his text messages sent to Marcelo was
used in a "brother-to-brother communication" and were uttered in
good faith.12
In a Report and Recommendation15 dated April 30, 2013, the IBP
Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the case against
Orlando, finding that a transgression of the MCLE compliance
requirement is not a ground for disbarment as in fact, failure to
disclose the required information would merely cause the dismissal of
the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records
Issue:
whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against
Orlando.
Held:
The petition is partly meritorious.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high
standards of legal proficiency and morality. It is a special privilege
burdened with conditions before the legal profession, the courts, their
clients and the society such that a lawyer has the duty to comport
himself in a manner as to uphold integrity and promote the public's
faith in the profession.21 Consequently, a lawyer must at all times,
whether in public or private life, act in a manner beyond reproach
especially when dealing with fellow lawyers.
In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR
Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial
proceedings, as in this case, constitutes unprofessional conduct which
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. While a lawyer is entitled to
present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language.
ANDRES V CABRERA
FACTS:
respondent Stanley R. Cabrera, a successful Bar examinee in 1977
against whom petition had been filed for denial of his admission as
member of the Bar for lack of good moral character and for his
proclivity to filing baseless, malicious, and unfounded cases, was found
guilty of contempt of this Court for "(b)y his improper conduct in the
use of highly disrespectful, insolent language.
HELD:
respondent having paid the fine imposed upon him for direct contempt
against the integrity and dignity of this Court, having apologized in
repeated motions filed before this Court for his disrespectful language
and personally reiterated at the hearing conducted herein, and has
furthermore complied with the Court's directives contained in Our
Resolution dated August 23, 1983 by submitting his letters of apology
to the Chief Justice and to the members of this Court, to Atty. Victor
Sevilla, Legal Investigator of the Court, to complainant Atty. Emilia E.
Andres, to Fiscal Leonardo Arguelles, and Certifications of Good Moral
Character from his parish priest, Rev. Fr. Eduardo A. Cruz, and his
Barangay Captain, Emiliano C. Masilungan of Barangay 604, Zone 60,
Sta. Mesa, Manila where respondent resides, We are convinced by
these actions that he has become respectful, sincere and honest,
thereby evincing that good moral character required of a person who
may be admitted to the practice of law.
We hold that respondent has expiated enough for his misdeed and
may now be allowed to take the lawyer's oath and thus become a more
useful member of society and of the law profession.
TOLENTINO VS. BAYLOSIS
FACTS:
Baylosis was counsel for defendants. 5 of the plaintiffs died, defendant
had nothing to do; cause of death was due to will of God or heavy
expenses they may have suffered from their leader or counsel.
On basis of TOLENTINO, deceased plaintiff is claiming from defendant
P29,000 and giving allowance of another 2 who may die which made
him ask for P200,000.
When TOLENTINO made this allegation, he is not in usual mind, in old
age. Court should not entertain unreasonable demand. Baylosis’
statements were libelous and derogatory to his reputation as known
lawyer, former high government official and employee and good
citizen.
i. Sought to recover P100,000 for actual and moral damages.
BAYLOSIS ALSO FILED FOR DAMAGES. Both were dismissed by the trial
court, only plaintiff appealed.
Issue: Whether or not Baylosis can be held for damages?
HELD
BAYLOSIS REMARKS CANNOT BE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES.
Concentrated on the propriety of recovering damages caused by
appellee (Baylosis) to plaintiffs (Tolentino) herein appellant’s claim for
attorney’s fees.
i. Thus, Tolentino also laid open not only amound of damages
supposedly due to his clients but also his standing as a lawyer by
reason of claiming attorney’s fees of P10,000.
ii. Baylosis’ remarks concerning Tolentino’s standing and ability as
counsel was relevant and pertinent. Hence, remarks are deemed
privileged.
Comment on “not his usual mind… otherwise, with his old age and long
practice of law, he would not have dared to make such fictitious and
malicious claim”, are not relevant whether true or untrue.
i. Damages Tolentino asked was made by his clients, not by him,
hence counsel’s state of mind could not be a subject of inquiry.
IN RE: WENCESLAO LAURETA (1987)
Facts:
Incriminating acts of Eva Maravilla Ilustre: wrote threatening letters to
the Justices of the Supreme Court; filed an Affidavit-Complaint
before the Tanod-bayan that completely disregarded facts,
circumstances, and legal considerations; instigated the circulation of a
false headline implying graft and corruption charges against Justices •
Involvement of Atty. Wenceslao Laureta: likely wrote the threatening
letters sent to the Justices in Ilustre’s name; likely encouraged
Ilustre’s pursuit of her Affidavit-Complaint with the Tanodbayan and
her disparaging remarks regarding the Justices in her letters and
comments to the media; was responsible for all the acts of his clients
Issue:
WoN the Justices of the First Division acted in bad faith
Held:
NO. (Ratio: Ilustre has lost three times in court, and by virtue of res
judicata, the Escolin Decision and the Javellana Resolution, which
bar her from acquiring Maravilla’s properties, serve as final judgment
of the case.) o SC gave ample time and consideration to her petitions,
but ultimately held that they had no merit (as stated in their Banc
Decision) o Justice Yap clarified that he was not aware that his former
partner Atty. Sedfrey Ordoñez was the counsel for the respondents,
and inhibited himself immediately upon finding out o Court is not
duty bound to issue signed Decisions all the time, if it deems it
unnecessary
LINSANGAN V TOLENTINO
Facts:
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe
Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation.
Respondent promised them financial assistance and expeditious
collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he
persistently called them and sent them text messages.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by
respondent into complainants professional practice in violation of Rule
8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in
furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct
violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to,
including the manner by which a lawyers services are to be made
known.
HELD:
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is
the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor
induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good
result or reduced fees for his services. Again the Court notes that
respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor
eiving benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied
Labianos connection to his office. Respondent committed an unethical,
predatory overstep into s legal practice. He cannot escape liability
under Rule 8.02 of the CPR., by engaging in a money-lending venture
with his clients as borrowers, respondent Rule 16.04The rule is
intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the
free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks
to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as
his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends
money to the client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer in
effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an
additional stake in its outcome. Either of these circumstances may lead
the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client,
or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the
verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of
undivided fidelity to the clients cause.
CAMBALIZA V. CRISTAL-TENORIO
FACTS:
Complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of respondent
Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the latter
with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office. Case on deceit and grossly immoral conduct did
not pursue lacking clear and convincing evidence. On malpractice or
other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the
respondent cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband,
who is not a member of the Philippine Bar and two other allegations.
The respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was filed by
the complainant just to get even with her. The complainant later filed
a Motion to Withdraw Complaint as she is no longer interested in
pursuing the case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP and the
case was pursued. The IBP found the respondent guilty of assisting in
unauthorized practice of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Cristal-Tenorio violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months.
A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself
as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule
9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:
Canon 9 – A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and
policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to
those individuals found duly qualified in education and character.
REPUBLIC V. KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORP.
FACTS:
Kenrick built a concrete fence around some parts of the land behind
the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air Transportation Office (ATO)
claiming ownership over those lands. Its encroachment resulted to the
dispossession of ATO of some 30,228 square meters of prime land.
Kenrick justified its action by presenting TCTs issued in its name and
which allegedly originated from a TCT registered in the name of
Alfonso Concepcion.
When ATO verified the TCTs, the Registrar of Deeds reported that it
has no record of them and that their ascendant title, allegedly in the
name of Concepcion, was non-existent in their office. Thus, the OSG
filed a complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation of
certificates of title in behalf of the Republic against Concepcion and
Kenrick. Kenrick filed an answer which was allegedly signed by its
counsel Atty. Onofre Garlitos Jr. When Concepcion could not be
located and be served with summons, the trial court ordered the
issuance of an alias summons by publication against him.
While the case was pending, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and
Committee on Justice and Human Rights investigated Kenrick’s
acquisition of fake titles. During the hearing, Atty. Garlitos was
summoned and testified that he prepared Kenrick’s answer and
transmitted an unsigned draft to Kenrick’s president, Victor Ong.
Apparently, the signature appearing above Garlitos’ name was not his,
he did not authorized anyone to sign it in his behalf, and he did not
know who finally signed it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Kenrick failed to file a valid answer on the ground that
its pleading was unsigned by its counsel Atty. Garlitos.
HELD:
Yes. Pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 7, a pleading must be “signed by the party
or counsel representing him.” The law is clear, and the counsel’s duty
and authority to sign a pleading is personal to him and may not be
delegated to just any person.
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has
read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
for delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his
signature, who can certify to these matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work
involving practice of law which is reserved exclusively for the members
of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading
to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one who is not.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 9.01 ― A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by
unqualified persons, something the law strongly proscribes.
Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos
entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act taken pursuant to that
authority was likewise void. There was no way it could have been cured
or ratified by Atty. Garlitos’ subsequent acts.
FIVE J V. NLRC (1994)
Facts:
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were
hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers and, as such, they worked for 4
days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily
boundary of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-
conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car
washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any
deficiency in their boundary, for every actual working day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by
the petitioners, he already failed to report for work for unknown
reasons. Petitioners learned that he was working for Mine of Gold Taxi
Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of
petitioners on September 1983, he was held up by his armed
passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was Ruling:
hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to this home province to
The Court declares that the deposits made amounts to the prohibition
recuperate.
provided by law. The deposits made were illegal and the respondents
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi must be refunded.
driver under the same terms and conditions as when he was first
It can be deduced that the said article 114 of the labor code provides
employed, but his working schedule was made on an alternative basis
the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or
where he drove only every other day. However, on several occasions,
equipment supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same does not apply
he failed to report for work during his schedule. On September 22,
to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may
1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his boundary of P700.00 for the previous
incur in the remittance of his boundary.
day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth
P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners for him to report for On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to
work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that he was say in his decision: "Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is no
driving a taxi for Bulaklak Company. dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of
duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has given
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the
to the same clean condition when he took it out, and as claimed by the
reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein
respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private
petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits
respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for washing,
as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the
the amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the
repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice
unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to
adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair
consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the
of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his
context of the law."
deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part,
claimed that his termination from employment was effected when he Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of
refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers. the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be noted that there
was nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the
units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the
manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission
Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a
charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions.
practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.
Issue:

Whether or not the deductions made were illegal and if illegal,

considered a prohibition regarding wages.
GARCIA V. LOPEZ (2007) scheduled hearing, he had to immediately file an entry of appearance
with motion for postponement. He asserted that it was an honest
FACTS:
mistake not to have listed the names of his clients. He claimed it was
Complainant was the counsel of the late Angelina Sarmiento. not deliberate and did not prejudice anyone. He insisted that he had
Sarmiento sought the registration and confirmation of her title over a no intention of misrepresenting himself to the court.
376,397 sq. m. tract of land which was granted by the court.
ISSUES:
The decision became final and executory and the RTC directed the Land
Whether or not respondent is guilty of misrepresentation and violation
Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the decree of registration and
of Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
certificate of title. The LRA failed to comply, prompting the
complainant to file an urgent motion to cite the LRA administrator or
his representative in contempt of court.
RULINGS:
On September 19, 2002, respondent, claiming to be the counsel of the
Yes. Respondent is guilty of misrepresentation and violation of Rule
heirs of Sarmiento, filed his entry of appearance and motion for
8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) when he failed to
postponement.
specify in his entry of appearance the individuals he was representing.
Complainant alleged that he was surprised by this, considering that he
Lawyers are officers of the court who are empowered to appear,
had not withdrawn from the case. He contended that respondent
prosecute and defend the causes of their clients. The law imposes on
should be sanctioned for misrepresenting to the court that he was the
them peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities. Membership in the
counsel of all the heirs of Sarmiento and omitting to mention that
bar imposes on them certain obligations. They are duty bound to
complainant was the counsel of record. According to him, his
uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably,
attorney's fee was arranged on a contingent basis and therefore, the
fairly and candidly towards each other and otherwise conduct
attempt of respondent to enter his appearance at the final stage of the
themselves beyond reproach at all times.
proceedings was tantamount to "unfair harvesting" of the fruit of
complainant's labors since 1996. Complainant was the counsel of Sarmiento, the original applicant.
Upon her death, the attorney-client relationship was terminated.
Complainant presented an affidavit executed by Gina Jarviña and
However, complainant was retained as counsel by Gina Jarviña and
Alfredo Ku wherein they stated that they did not engage the services
Alfredo Ku. In filing an entry of appearance with motion of
of respondent and that they recognized complainant as their only
postponement in behalf of the "compulsory heirs of the late Angelita
counsel of record.
Sarmiento" when in truth he was merely representing some of the
In his defense, respondent claimed that he was merely representing heirs but not all of them, respondent was guilty of misrepresentation
Zenaida and Wilson Ku who sought his help and told him that they which could have deceived the court. He had no authorization to
wanted to retain his services. They allegedly did not have a lawyer to represent all the heirs. He clearly violated his lawyer's oath that he will
represent them in a hearing scheduled the next day. Because of the "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court."
 to respondent. The complainant verified the authenticity of the
Resolution and obtained a certification dated January 18, 2005[from
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Beniamino A. Lopez is hereby
the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month
complainant to surrender custody of their children to respondent had
been issued.

FLORIDO V. FLORIDO (2004) ISSUE:

FACTS: Whether or not Atty. Florido was liable for making false court
resolution?
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent
Atty. James Benedict C. Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll RULINGS:
of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer “by
YES. A lawyer who used a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals
manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of
is presumed to have participated in its fabrication.
Appeals Resolution.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast
Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido, the complainant, averred that she was
on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value
the legitimate spouse of the respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido,
what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just
the respondent, but because of the estranged relation, they lived
to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be
separately. They have two children whom the complainant has the
imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to
custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage;
display the utmost zeal in the defense of a client’s cause, it must never
meanwhile there, was another related case pending in the Court of
be at the expense of the truth. Thus, the Code of professional
Appeals. Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went
Responsibility states:
to complainant’s residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and
demanded that the custody of their two minor children be surrendered CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO
to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution THE COURT.
issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the
for temporary child custody. Complainant called up her lawyer but the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
latter informed her that he had not received any motion for temporary
misled by any artifice.
child custody filed by respondent.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged
contents of a paper, the language or the argument of an opposing
resolution of the Court of Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to
counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a
her. Complainant then examined the resolution closely and noted that
law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment,
it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001.
or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Sensing something amiss, she refused to give custody of their children
The records show that respondent used offensive language in his
pleadings in describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyers
language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as
befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession. The lawyers arguments whether written or oral should be
gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such
words as may be properly addressed by one gentlemen to another. By
calling complainant, a sly manipulator of truth as well as a vindictive
congenital prevaricator, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech
demanded of a lawyer.
SAMALA V. VALENCIA (2007)
Facts:
Complainant Clarita J. Samala filed against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia for
Disbarment on the following grounds: serving on two separate
occasions as counsel for contending parties, knowingly misleading the
court by submitting false documentary evidence, initiating numerous
cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees and having a
reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the
penalty of suspension for six months. The IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the report and recommendation of
Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of suspension from six
months to one year.
Issue:
Whether or not, the respondent is guilty for violation of Canons 1, 10
and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency
that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a
lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that "conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference
to the opinion of respectable members of the community. In this case,
respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay
who are all over 20 years of age, while his first wife was still alive. He
also admitted that he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest
of whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife died, he married
Lagmay. These admissions made by respondent are more than enough
to hold him liable on the charge of immorality.
The Court also found that the respondent failed to comply with Canon
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a
lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice. It was shown that the respondent knowingly submitted to the
court a title that was already cancelled, thus, false documentary
evidence, in lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba which
misleads the decision of the lower court.
The Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of
misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt of herein
Resolution.
RHEEM OF THE PHILS. V. FERRER (1967)
Facts:
The proceeding for certiorari and contempt is an offshoot of the Court
of Industrial Relations’ (CIR) denial of motion to dismiss the
respondent’s complaint.
The following was filed by the counsel (Atty. Jose S. Armonio) for the
petitioner:
One pitfall into which this Honorable Court has repeatedly fallen
whenever the question as to whether or not a particular subject matter
is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations is the
tendency of this Honorable Court to rely upon its own pronouncement
without due regard to the statutes which delineate the jurisdiction of
the industrial court. Quite often, it is overlooked that no court, not
even this Honorable Court, is empowered to expand or contract
through its decision the scope of its jurisdictional authority as
conferred by law. This error is manifested by the decisions of this
Honorable Court citing earlier rulings but without making any
reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. This manifestation
appears in this Honorable Court's decision in the instant case. As a
result, the errors committed in earlier cases dealing with the
jurisdiction of the industrial court are perpetuated in subsequent cases
involving the same issue. The Court ordered counsel to show cause
why he should not be held in contempt.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Armonio’s statements violated the duty of
respect to courts.
Held:
YES. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that, “it
is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.” Worth
remembering is the attorney’s duty to the courts “can only be
maintained by rendering no service involving disrespect to the judicial
office which he is bound to uphold”.
In the case, the Court felt that Atty. Armonio’s language makes a
sweeping charge that the decisions of the SC blindly adhere to earlier
rulings without making “any reference and analysis” of the pertinent
statutes of the CIR. The statements made by counsel detract much
from the dignity and respect of the SC.
CENIZA VS. SEBASTIAN
Facts:
Defendant has already filed an Administrative Case against the herein
Presiding Judge in the Supreme Court and the Defendant in the above
case is one of the material witnesses for the complainant in said
Administrative Case; and, that by virtue of these, the bias and
prejudice of the Presiding Judge against the Defendant and her counsel
in the above case, is intensified and heightened, and consequently the
Presiding Judge in the above case, will no longer have that sense of
justice, that equanimity of emotion, that detached and unaffected
feeling and that disinterested and impartial comportment which all
judges ought to have and maintain while hearing and deciding a case
before them." As a result, according to the Petition, "respondent
Judge herein issued a ‘Warrant for the Arrest’ of the petitioner herein,
so that he will be locked-up in jail for having committed, according to
said respondent Judge, ‘Direct Contempt’."
It was further alleged that copies of such warrants of arrest of
petitioner "are now in the hands of several Peace Officers, who are
specifically ordered to arrest the herein petitioner wherever found." 4
Then the Petition went on to state: "That firmly believing that these
warrants for his arrest issued by the herein Respondent Judge is grossly
unlawful and is inspired by the Respondent Judge’s desire for
vengeance, hatred and yearning to persecute and destroy the herein
Petitioner, the latter had fled from his office and residence at Visayan
Village, Tagum, Davao, and dodged arrest by hurriedly and secretly
going to various places and ultimately here in Manila, in order to have
the chance of filing this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction." After reiterating what for
him was the patent illegality of such order for contempt and the
warrant of arrest issued in pursuance thereof thus amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction or at the very least grave abuse of discretion,
petitioner prays that there be an immediate prohibition for their
enforcement, even prior to declaring them null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a direct contempt
Held:
Yes. The court sustains respondent Judge in finding that there was a
direct contempt committed but likewise holds that, conformably to
the controlling doctrine that the power to punish for contempt should
be exercised on the preservative and not vindictive principle, modifies
the judgment by lifting the warrant of arrest but increasing the fine
imposed to P500.
RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN VS. FLORES
Facts:
A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial Court pf
San Mateo Rizal. Respondent Atty. Flores appeared as counsel for the
defendant. He filled his Pre-Trial Brief without proof of MCLE
compliance hence; it was expunged from the records without
prejudice to the filling of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the
required MCLE compliance. The preliminary conference was reset
several times for failure of respondent to appear and submit his Pre-
Trial Brief indicating thereon his MCLE compliance. The court a quo
gave respondent last chance to submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern
warning that failure to do so shall be considered a waiver on his part.
Respondent later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE number
which was merely superimposed without indicating the date and place
of compliance. During the preliminary conference, respondent
manifested that he will submit proof of compliance of his MCLE on the
following day. The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed
to give due respect to the court by failing to obey court orders, by
failing to submit proofs of his compliance with the Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using
intemperate language in his pleadings. The investigating judge
recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended from the practice of law
for one year.
Issue:
Whether respondent should be suspended from practice of law for
using intemperate language in his pleadings.
Held:
No. There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s
order to submit proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the
several opportunities given him. Atty. Flores also employed
intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty.
Flores is expected to be circumspect in his language. However, the
court found the recommended penalty too harsh and not
commensurate with the infractions committed by the respondent. It
appears that this is the first infraction committed by the respondent.
Also the court is not prepared to impose on the respondent the penalty
of one-year suspension for humanitarian reasons. Respondent
manifested before this Court that he has been in the practice of law for
half a century. Thus he is already in his twilight years.
SALABAO V. VILLARUEL
Facts:
In 1995 Salabao filed a case against Elmer Lumberio for his deceitful
or fraudulent conduct of taking her precious real property situated in
Taguig City in which respondent is thecounsel. After hearing, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162, Pasig City issued its resolution
in her favor in 2002. From then on, complainant alleged that the
respondent had made her suffer because of his abuse of processes and
disregard for her rights as a litigant. In 2002, the Regional Trial Court
Branch 162 of Pasig City which tried Civil Case No. 65147 issued it
resolution in favor of the complainant. In order to delay the case,
respondent brought the case on appeal on Court of Appeals but once
again decided on favor of the complainant on January 13 2004 but then
again respondent filed an appeal before the Supreme Court were
Lumberio lost and the case became final and executory. Undeterred,
respondent once again tried to defer the execution of the decision of
the RTC, Branch 162 by bringing to the court of appeals a petition for
annulment of judgement, appealed to supreme court presenting new
arguments than what was presented before CA. Still, respondent filed
a petition for certiorari seeking annul the 29 November 2007 order of
the RTC before the court of appeals, which was still resulted to
dismissal. From hereon, there was no stopping the respondent.
Complainant then filed a complained that respondent had done more
than enough to suppress her rights aswinning litigants and filed a case
for abuse of process pursuant to Rule 10.03 and Rule 10.02 of Canon
10 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). In which denied by the respondent and clarified
that the several pleadings he had filed had centered on the legality of
the court's decision ordering the cancellation of the title of Lumberio
in such ordinary proceeding for cancellation of the title. To
his mind, the said ordinary proceeding for cancellation of title
before the RTC Branch 153, Taguig City was void because the law vests
upon the government through the Solicitor General the power to
initiate a reversion case if there is such a ground to cancel the title
issued by the Land Management Bureau in favor of Lumberio.
Issue:
WON Respondent’s actions violates Rule 10.03 and Rule 10.02 of
Canon 10 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR)
Held:
Yes, While it is true that lawyers owe "entire devotion" to the cause
of their clients, It cannot be emphasized enough that their first and
primary duty is "not to the client but to the administration of justice."
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "A
lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice." Thus, in the use of
Court processes, the lawyer's zeal to win must be tempered by the
paramount consideration that justice be done to all parties involved,
and the lawyer for the losing party should not stand in the way of the
execution of a valid judgment. This is a fundamental principle in legal
ethics and professional responsibility that has iterations in various
forms such as : Lawyers Oath, Rule 138 Sec. 20 of Rules of Court and
Code of Professional Responsibility. Because a lawyer is an officer of
the court called upon to assist in the administration of justice, any act
of a lawyer that obstructs, perverts, or impedes the administration of
justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against
him.
RE: SUSPENSION OF ATTY. BAGABUYO
Facts:
Criminal Case was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Buyser, who
denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that the
evidence thus presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the
crime of homicide and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the
counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond.
Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor
and the deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on
the ground that the original charge of murder, punishable with
reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail.
Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the case because of
the “harsh insinuation” of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that
he “lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate,” by allegedly
suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail bond by
counsel for the accused. The case was transferred to Judge Tan and
Order favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for l
Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented
himself to the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again
attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial court’s disposition in
the proceedings of criminal Case.
Issue: Whether the respondent is guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon
11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and of violating the Lawyer’s Oath?
Held:
Yes, Respondent violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that
Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled,
Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect
to bail out, which appeared in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily.
Respondent’s statements in the article, which were made while
Criminal. Case was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of
Canon 13, which states that “a lawyer shall not make public statements
in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion
for or against a party.” In regard to the radio interview given to Tony
Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities
only for redress of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also
violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its officer when
he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong
aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and
that he was a liar. Respondent also violated the Lawyer’s Oath, as he
has sworn to “conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of
[his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to [his] clients.
MARANTAN V. DIOKNO, ET. AL.
Facts: Petitioner P/Supt. Hansel M. Marantan (Marantan) is the
respondent in G.R. No. 199462, a petition filed on December 6, 2011,
but already dismissed although the disposition is not yet final.
Respondent Monique Cu-Unjieng La’O (La ‘O) is one of the petitioners
in the said case, while respondent Atty. Jose Manuel Diokno (Atty.
Diokno) is her counsel therein. G.R. No. 199462 relates to Criminal Case
Nos. 146413-PSG, 146414-PSG and 146415-PSG, entitled “People of
the Philippines v. P/SINSP Hansel M. Marantan, et al.,” pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 265 (RTC), where
Marantan and his co-accused are charged with homicide. The criminal
cases involve an incident which transpired on November 7, 2005,
where Anton Cu-Unjieng (son of respondent La‘O), Francis Xavier
Manzano, and Brian Anthony Dulay, were shot and killed by police
officers in front of the AIC Gold Tower at Ortigas Center, which incident
was captured by a television crew from UNTV 37 (Ortigas incident). In
G.R. No. 199462, La‘O, together with the other petitioners, prayed,
among others, that the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman
downgrading the charges from murder to homicide be annulled and
set aside; that the corresponding informations for homicide be
withdrawn; and that charges for murder be filed. In the meantime, on
January 6, 2013, a shooting incident occurred in Barangay Lumutan,
Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, where Marantan was
the ground commander in a police-military team, which resulted in the
death of thirteen (13) men (Atimonan incident). This encounter,
according to Marantan, elicited much negative publicity for him.
Marantan alleges that, riding on the unpopularity of the Atimonan
incident, La‘O and her counsel, Atty. Diokno, and one Ernesto
Manzano, organized and conducted a televised/radio broadcasted
press conference. During the press conference, they maliciously made
intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the Court
in handling G.R. No. 199462, as well as contumacious comments on the
merits of the criminal cases before the RTC, branding Marantan and
his coaccused guilty of murder in the Ortigas incident.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for contempt is meritorious.
Held: No. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the
issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice. A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect
contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,4 which reads:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.
– x x x a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt: x x x (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice.
The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in
nature. This form of contempt is conduct that is directed against the
dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act
obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court
into disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in criminal
contempt, and no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless
the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it. For a
comment to be considered as contempt of court “it must really
appear” that such does impede, interfere with and embarrass the
administration of justice. What is, thus, sought to be protected is the
all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of
a pending case. The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that
courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from
every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon
evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts
should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies. The power of
contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct
their business unhampered by publications and comments which tend
to impair the impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the
administration of justice. As important as the maintenance of freedom
of speech, is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary.
The “clear and present danger” rule may serve as an aid in determining
the proper constitutional boundary between these two rights. The
“clear and present danger” rule means that the evil consequence of
the comment must be “extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high” before an utterance can be punished.
There must exist a clear and present danger that the utterance will
harm the administration of justice. Freedom of speech should not be
impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of court
unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a serious
and imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute
an imminent, not merely a likely, threat.
IN RE ALMACEN
FACTS:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a “Petition to Surrender the Lawyer’s
Certificate of Title” to the Supreme Court as a sign of his protest as
against to what he call a tribunal “peopled by people who are calloused
to our pleas for justice…”. He also expressed strong words as against
the judiciary like “justice… is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.” .
The petition rooted from the case he lost due to the absence of time
and place in his motion in the trial court. His appeal was dismissed in
the Court of Appeals by reason of jurisprudence. In a petition for
certiorari in the Supreme Court, it was again dismissed thru a minute
resolution. With the disappointments, he thought of this sacrificial
move. He claimed that this petition to surrender his title is only in trust,
and that he may obtain the title again as soon as he regained
confidence in the justice system.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary
actions for his acts.
HELD:
YES. Indefinite suspension imposed. It has been pointed out by the
Supreme Court that there is no one to blame but Atty. Almacen himself
because of his negligence. Even if the intentions of his accusations are
so noble, in speaking of the truth and alleged injustices,so as not to
condemn the sinners but the sin, it has already caused enough damage
and disrepute to the judiciary. Since this particular case is sui generis
in its nature, a number of foreign and local jurisprudence in analogous
cases were cited as benchmarks and references. Between disbarment
and suspension, the latter was imposed. Indefinite suspension may
only be lifted until further orders, after Atty. Almacen may be able to
prove that he is again fit to resume the practice of law.
CABANSAG V. FERNANDEZ
FACTS:
Apolonio Cabansag filed a complaint seeking the ejectment of
Germiniana Fernandez from a parcel of land. He later wrote a letter to
the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC) regarding
the delay in the disposition of his case before the CFI Pangasinan. The
judge ordered Cabansag and his lawyers to show cause why he should
not be held liable for contempt for sending such letter which tended
to degrade the court in the eyes of the President (Magsaysay) and the
people. After due hearing, the court rendered a decision finding
Cabansag and his lawyers guilty of contempt and sentencing them to
pay a fine.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Cabansag’s letter created a sufficient danger to a fair
administration of justice?
Held:
NO. The letter was sent to the Office of the President asking for help
because of the precarious predicament of Cabansag. While the course
of action he had taken may not be a wise one for it would have been
proper had he addressed his letter to the Secretary of Justice or to the
Supreme Court, such act alone would not be contemptuous. To be so
the danger must cause a serious imminent threat to the administration
of justice. Nor can we infer that such act has “a dangerous tendency”
to belittle the court or undermine the administration of justice for the
writer merely exercised his constitutional right to petition the
government for redress of a legitimate grievance.
FOODSPHERE V. MAURICIO
FACTS:
[A] certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a
grocery in Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver
spread. As Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO
Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and soon discovered a
colony of worms inside the can. This was complained before the BFAD.
After conciliation meetings between Cordero and the petitioner, the
Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN seeking the withdrawal of
their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the
complaint. Respondent, Atty. Mauricio, Jr., who affixed his signature
to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his
articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the document.
Complainant filed criminal complaints against respondent and several
others for Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and
356 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending at
the time of the filing of the present administrative complaint. Despite
the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status
quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and
broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO,
respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its
products.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Respondent suspended for three (3) years from the practice of
law. The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule
13.03 of the Canon of Professional Responsibility which reads: “A
lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a
pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.”
The language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions
on the integrity of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the
Prosecutors connected with said Office. Respondent clearly assailed
the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling cases filed
before it and did not even design to submit any evidence to
substantiate said wild allegations. The use by respondent of the above-
quoted language in his pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11
and the fundamental Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to “uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.” Respondent defied said status quo order, despite his
(respondent’s) oath as a member of the legal profession to “obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities.”
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandate, and by failing to live up to
his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal
profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to “at all times
uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession.”