Mto Report PDF

Ministry of Transportation
Highway Standards Branch

Bridge Office Report
Nipigon River Bridge

West Abutment Bearing
Technical Investigation
BRO-059
Technical Report Documentation
Page
Publication Nipigon River Bridge
Title West Abutment Bearing Technical Investigation
Author(s) Kris Mermigas, Walter Kenedi, David Lai, Ontario Ministry of
Transportation
Originating Office Bridge Office, Highway Standards Branch, Ontario Ministry of

Transportation
Report Number BRO-059; ISBN: 978-1-4606-8708-6
Publication Date September 2016
Ministry Contact Bridge Office, Highway Standards Branch, Ontario Ministry of

Transportation
301 St. Paul Street, St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada L2R 7R3
Tel: (905) 704-2406; Fax: (905) 704-2060
Abstract On January 10, 2016 at 3:05 pm, the Nipigon River Bridge was closed
to traffic. The bridge became impassable after the failure of 40 (7/8”
ASTM A490) bolts at the northwest bearing caused the bridge to lift
approximately 600 mm at the northwest corner. This report summarizes
the Ministry of Transportation’s technical investigation into the cause of
failure, including bolt testing. Factors dealing with management of the
project are not the subject of this report.
The structural analysis of the bearing and its connections to the bridge
revealed that the failure was caused by prying of the flexible shoe plate
the bearing’s inability to accommodate rotation, combined with
improper installation of the bolts on site (snug-fit tightening of nuts
without bevelled washers). Additional factors which contributed to and
accelerated the failure include local bending of the bolts and yielding of
the shoe plate.
Key Words Cable-stayed bridge; uplift bearing failure; bolt failure
Distribution Unrestricted technical audience.

Ministry of Transportation
Highway Standards Branch
Bridge Office Report
BRO-059
Nipigon River Bridge

West Abutment Bearing
Technical Investigation
19 September 2016
Prepared by
Bridge Office
Ontario Ministry of Transportation
301 St. Paul Street,

St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada L2R 7R3
Tel: (905) 704-2406; Fax (905) 704-2060
Published without prejudice as to the application of the findings.

The Ministry of Transportation for Ontario (MTO) wishes to advise that this Report is being released to
provide the factual background and potential causes for the January 10, 2016 occurrence involving the
Nipigon River Bridge on Highway 11/17. These Reports are not intended to ascribe fault or liability to
any particular party nor are the findings intended to be definitive. It will be necessary for the MTO to
carry out further investigation in order to finally determine both causation for the occurrence and the
party or parties responsible for the damages incurred as a result of the occurrence.
Crown copyright reserved.

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Table of Contents
List of Figures .............................................................................................................................................. ii
List of Tables .............................................................................................................................................. iii
Appendices ................................................................................................................................................. iv
1. Executive Summary........................................................................................................................ 1
2. Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 2
2.1. Purpose of the Investigation ............................................................................................................. 2
2.2. Methodology ..................................................................................................................................... 2
2.3. Qualifications of the Authors ............................................................................................................. 3
3. Bridge Behaviour ............................................................................................................................ 4
3.1. Global Behaviour of Nipigon River Bridge ........................................................................................ 5
3.2. Load Path from Back Stays to West Abutment ................................................................................. 7
4. Bearing Requirements ................................................................................................................... 9
4.1. Bearing Drawings ............................................................................................................................. 9
4.2. Bearing Forces ............................................................................................................................... 11
4.3. Shoe Plate ...................................................................................................................................... 12
4.4. Bearing Assembly........................................................................................................................... 13
5. Observations and Testing............................................................................................................ 16
5.1. Physical Observations .................................................................................................................... 16
5.2. Examination and Testing of Fractured Bolts ................................................................................... 20
5.2.1. Fractured Bolts from NW bearing ................................................................................................... 21
5.2.2. Intact Bolts from Centre-West Bearing ........................................................................................... 27
5.2.3. Conclusion Based on Test Results ................................................................................................. 30
5.3. Differences between Contract Drawings and Supplied Bearings .................................................... 31
5.3.1. Bolt Pre-Tension ............................................................................................................................. 31
5.3.2. Shoe Plate Material ........................................................................................................................ 31
5.3.3. Bolt Pattern between the Girder to the Shoe Plate ......................................................................... 32
5.3.4. Bolt Length and Washers ............................................................................................................... 33
6. Evaluation of Bearing and Attachments ..................................................................................... 35
6.1. Evaluation of the Bearing................................................................................................................ 35
6.1.1. Design ............................................................................................................................................ 35
6.1.2. Rotation .......................................................................................................................................... 35
6.1.3. Uplift Guide Bar PTFE Evaluation .................................................................................................. 40
6.1.4. Uplift Guide Bar Capacity Evaluation .............................................................................................. 41
6.1.5. Shoe Plate Attachment to Top of Bearing....................................................................................... 41
6.2. Evaluation of Shoe Plate ................................................................................................................ 42
6.3. Evaluation of Bolts .......................................................................................................................... 43
6.4. Evaluation of Prying in Shoe Plate ................................................................................................. 45
Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

West Abutment Bearing Technical Investigation
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6.4.1. Model of Shoe Plate Prying ............................................................................................................ 47

6.4.2. Analysis Results ............................................................................................................................. 51
6.4.3. Prying of Outer 1” Bolts Connecting the Shoe Plate to the Bearing ................................................ 51
6.4.4. Prying of the 7/8” Bolts in Phase 1 ................................................................................................. 53
6.4.5. Prying of the 7/8” Bolts At Centre-West Bearing Design Loads ...................................................... 55
6.5. Evaluation of Bolt Fatigue ............................................................................................................... 57
7. Discussion .................................................................................................................................... 61
7.1. Design and Construction Requirements ......................................................................................... 62
8. Conclusions .................................................................................................................................. 68
9. References .................................................................................................................................... 69
List of Figures
Figure 1. Response of cable-stiffened, girder-stiffened, and tower-stiffened cable-stayed bridges,
shown with typical proportions of span and girder. ........................................................................... 4
Figure 2. Typical cable arrangements in cable-stayed bridges. ..................................................................... 5
Figure 3. Structural behaviour due to dead load: a) at end of balanced cantilevering, and b) at the end
of construction. ................................................................................................................................. 6
Figure 4. Structural behaviour due to the passage of a truck over a) east span, and b) west span. .............. 7
Figure 5. Load path from Stays to West Abutment in elevation and section. ................................................. 8
Figure 6. Rotations on bearing. ................................................................................................................... 10
Figure 7. Rotational Bearing Design Data Table from the Contract Drawings. ............................................ 11
Figure 8. Shoe plate bolts specified on A-10, revision C (sheet 218-1-R2). ................................................ 12
Figure 9. Shoe plate bolts revised within RFC-176, dated January 31, 2014. ............................................. 13
Figure 10. Components of the west abutment bearing assembly. ............................................................... 14
Figure 11. Northwest Bearing installation on October 5, 2015: a) sliding the sole plate of the bearing
into place after the shoe plate has been connected to the bearing flange and b) washers
stacked 3 high over west half of shoe plate and 4 high over east half of the shoe plate. ................ 16
Figure 12. Northwest Shoe Plate with Failed Bolts of Shoe Plate Failed Bolts Looking East ...................... 17
Figure 13. Northwest Shoe Plate with Failed Bolts – note gap between shoe plate and bearing top
plate towards the middle ................................................................................................................. 17
Figure 14. Bolt numbering and premature bolt failure (north is up). Red indicates confirmed early
failure, blue indicates possible early failure. ................................................................................... 18
Figure 15. Top Surface of the Shoe Plate with Failed Bolts (looking down, north is up) .............................. 19
Figure 16. Northwest Bearing, Northwest corner of uplift restraint with PTFE crushed but still attached
to the bearing masonry plate (top steel surface of the photo) ......................................................... 19
Figure 17. Northwest Bearing, Southwest corner of uplift restraint with PTFE crushed and projecting
beyond the masonry plate (top steel surface of the photo) ............................................................. 19
Figure 18. Bolt sample from southwest bearing. .......................................................................................... 20
Figure 19. Fractured Surface of Failed Bolts with Visible Corrosion Product ............................................... 22
Figure 20. Northwest bearing looking East, after failure on January 10, 2016. ............................................ 23
Figure 21. Transverse crack on elongated side of bolt Z. ............................................................................ 23

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Figure 22. Bolt at the southeast corner of the shoe plate (location 40) which failed at the shank, with
steel-to-steel rub markings on opposite sides of the shank. ........................................................... 24
Figure 23. Cylindrical specimens cut from a bolt shank by EDM at SSW. ................................................... 25
Figure 24. Images of intact bolts with distorted threads. .............................................................................. 28
Figure 25. Shoe plate bolts specified in RFC 176. ....................................................................................... 32
Figure 26. Bottom view of shoe plate with bolts as supplied per drawing Bearing Details-7, revision 8. ..... 32
Figure 27. Counterbore specified on A-10, revision C (sheet 218-1-R2). .................................................... 33
Figure 28. Counterbore detailed per drawing Bearing Details-7, revision 8. ................................................ 33
Figure 29. Separation of guide bars due to longitudinal rotation. ................................................................. 36
Figure 30. Vertical reaction and rotation at northwest bearing due to the CL-625-ONT Truck..................... 37
Figure 31. Amplification of bolt force due to uplift and longitudinal rotation. ................................................ 38
Figure 32. Separation of guide bars bearings due to a rotation of 0.8° in the axis of the girder. ................. 39
Figure 33. Shear Force and Moment Diagrams for Shoe Plate; a) assuming load evenly shared by all
bolts, b) with prying force, and c) assuming all load through exterior line of bolts. ......................... 43
Figure 34. Local Prying of bolt due to lack of beveled washer. .................................................................... 44
Figure 35. Classical Prying of flexible plate in tension connection (Kulak, et al., 1987). .............................. 45
Figure 36. Nipigon River Bridge northwest bearing shoe plate prying under uplift. ...................................... 46
Figure 37. 3-dimensional finite element model of girder end and bearing in a) isometric view, and b)
sectional view. ................................................................................................................................ 47
Figure 38. Deformed bearing assembly due to longitudinal rotation combined with uplift. ........................... 48
Figure 39. Deformed bearing assembly due to transverse rotation combined with uplift. ............................ 49
Figure 40. Shoe plate strip model - properties. ............................................................................................ 49
Figure 41. Shoe plate strip frame model for pretensioned 7/8” bolt behaviour. ........................................... 50
Figure 42. Force in 1" bolts under phase 1 and design loads. ..................................................................... 52
Figure 43. Forces in 7/8" bolts for phase 1 (failure loads at northwest bearing). ......................................... 54
Figure 44. Forces on 7/8" bolts under design loads (centre-west bearing). ................................................. 56
Figure 45. Possible force distribution in bolts, after plasticity. ...................................................................... 59
List of Tables
Table 1. Bearing Contract Drawing Revisions ............................................................................................... 9
Table 2. Bearing Reactions for Phase 1 (Failure Reactions) ....................................................................... 12
Table 3. Shoe Plate Deformation (Maximum Gap Measured between the Shoe and Sole Plates of
West Abutment Bearings and Maximum Deformation after Shoe Plates Removed) ...................... 17
Table 4. Tensile Test Requirements and Results of Specimens Machined from Fractured Bolts ................ 25
Table 5. Charpy Impact Test Results of Fractured Bolts ............................................................................. 26
Table 6. Summary of Tensile Test Results of Full Size Bolts ...................................................................... 29
Table 7. Tensile Test Results of Machined Specimens from Intact Bolts of Centre Bearing........................ 30
Table 8. Design Contact Pressure for PTFE Sliding Surfaces of Uplift Restraint Guide Bars ...................... 40
Table 9. Comparison between Shoe Plate Specified and Shoe Plate Provided .......................................... 42
Table 10. Bolt Forces and Capacities .......................................................................................................... 45
Table 11. Bolt Forces from Structural Model Based on Elastic Analysis (kN) .............................................. 51

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Table 12. Design and Construction Requirements for Each Component of Work Related to the West
Abutment Bearings of the Nipigon River Bridge ............................................................................. 63
Appendices
Appendix A: Contract Drawings ..................................................................................................................... A
Appendix B: Bearing Working Drawings ........................................................................................................ B

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1. Executive Summary
On January 10, 2016 at 3:05 pm, the Nipigon River Bridge was closed to traffic. The bridge
became impassable after the failure of 40 (7/8” ASTM A490) bolts at the northwest bearing
caused the bridge to lift approximately 600 mm at the northwest corner. This report summarizes
the Ministry of Transportation’s technical investigation into the cause of failure. Factors
pertaining to the management of the project are not the subject of this report.
The technical investigation into the failure involved;

1. testing of the bolts,
2. structural analysis of the northwest bearing and the associated connections to the bridge
girders and abutments,
3. evaluation of components in the load path from the girder to the west abutment
according to the Canadian Highway Bridge Design Code (CHBDC) requirements.
The bolt testing was carried out at two independent laboratories, the National Research Council
(NRC) in Ottawa Ontario and Surface Science Western (SSW) at Western University in London
Ontario. Each laboratory issued comprehensive reports and their findings were reviewed as
part of this report. The testing revealed that the bolts met the requirements of applicable
standard ASTM A490 and the CHBDC requirements for use of steel in cold weather and were
therefore not the reason for the failure at the northwest bearing. Detailed examinations of the
bolt failure surfaces by the above laboratories, as well as visual inspection by the Ministry, found
that the failure surfaces had striations consistent with low-cycle high-stress bolt failure. In
addition, corrosion was observed on some of the failure surfaces, indicating that the failure was
progressive and began prior to January 10, 2016.
The structural analysis of the bearing and its connections to the adjacent components of the
bridge revealed that the failure was caused by;
1. prying effects due to the flexible shoe plate leading to higher forces in the exterior line of
bolts,
2. the bearing’s inability to accommodate rotation leading to higher forces in the end rows
of bolts,
3. the lack of pretensioning of the bolts and lack of bevelled washers that lead to high
fatigue stresses and a high-stress, low-cycle fatigue failure.
Each of these of factors on its own is significant and could have led to a failure, but combined
they made failure inevitable. Other factors which also contributed to and accelerated the failure
include local bending of the bolts and yielding of the shoe plate.
The evaluation showed that the shoe plate, bolted connection between shoe plate and girder,
bolted connection between shoe plate and bearing, and bearing design all failed to meet the
requirements of the CHBDC.

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2. Introduction
The existing two lane Nipigon River Bridge, located on highway 11/17 east of Thunder Bay, is
being replaced with a new four lane cable-stayed bridge. In 2013, a $106 M dollar contract was
awarded to Bot-Ferrovial Nipigon Joint Venture (BFNJV). On November 29, 2015, the newly
built westbound lanes were opened to two way traffic and removal of the existing bridge began.
This crossing is a strategic link in the Trans-Canada highway system.
On January 10, 2016 at 3:05 pm, the Nipigon River Bridge was closed to traffic. The bridge
became impassable after the failure of 40 bolts at the northwest bearing which caused the
bridge to lift approximately 600 mm at the northwest corner. Ministry staff and the contractor
worked overnight to level the bridge surface and the structure. Temporary concrete barriers
(TCBs) were placed in the westbound lane, close to the expansion joint, as ballast to bring the
superstructure back to its initial position. The bridge was opened to one lane of traffic the
morning of January 11.
2.1. Purpose of the Investigation

The Assistant Deputy Ministers Office requested that the MTO’s Bridge Office review the design
and construction to determine the cause of the failure, and determine factors that could have
contributed to the failure of the northwest bearing.
The objectives of the investigation are the following.

1. Establish the cause of the northwest bearing failure.
2. Evaluate the ability of all components, in the load path from the girder to the west
abutment, to meet the design requirements.
2.2. Methodology
The report summarizes the findings of the structural investigation into the cause of the failure,
and assesses the ability of the remaining bearings to meet the design requirements. The design
consultant has changed names due to corporate acquisitions during the project. This report will
refer to the design consultant as Marshall Macklin Monaghan Limited (MMM), formerly
McCormick Rankin Corporation. Similarly, the Contractor’s erection engineering firm has
changed names and will be referred to as McElhanney Consulting Services Limited
(McElhanney), formerly Infinity Engineering.
As part of this investigation, failed bolts from the northwest bearing and intact bolts from the
centre-west bearing were tested to determine compliance with the contract requirements.
Northwest Region delivered specimens of the failed bolts to the Bridge Office on January 15,
2016. The Bridge Office examined the bolts the week of January 18. During the same week, the
MTO retained Surface Science Western (SSW) at Western University and the National
Research Council (NRC) Canada to conduct testing of the bolts. The testing covered physical
tests including tensile yield and ultimate strength tests, impact notch-toughness testing,

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microscope examination of the failure surfaces, and chemical testing of the bolt material.
The report is organized according to the Professional Engineers of Ontario Guideline on

Forensic Engineering Investigations.
The report is based on evidence found in drawings, addenda, specifications, bid enquiries,
Working Drawings, correspondence and records, except where noted otherwise.
2.3. Qualifications of the Authors

Kris Mermigas, P.Eng. prepared this report. Kris is Head of Bridge Management with the MTO’s
Bridge Office, is the Chair of the MTO’s Expansion Joint and Bearing Working Group, and is a
technical subcommittee member of Section 11 (Joints and Bearings) of the Canadian Highway
Bridge Design Code (CHBDC). Kris joined the MTO in 2012 as an Engineer in the Rehabilitation
Section of the Bridge Office. Prior to joining the MTO, Kris worked for AECOM and LEA
Consulting where he designed over 40 bridges, inspected over 400, and evaluated many
structures. Kris completed his Master of Applied Science at University of Toronto in 2008. His
thesis entitled Behaviour and Design of Extradosed Bridges, explores the influence of different
geometric parameters such as tower height, girder depth, and pier dimensions on the structural
behaviour, cost, and feasibility of extradosed bridges. Extradosed bridges can be classified as a
subset of cable-stayed bridges.
Walter Kenedi, P.Eng. completed a refined analysis of the girder end including the bearing.
Walter completed his B.A.Sc. and M.A.Sc degrees at the University of Toronto. His
undergraduate thesis studied shear lag in bolted connections, while the graduate thesis studied
concrete filled HSS connections. Walter is Head of Design with the MTO’s Bridge Office, and is
a technical subcommittee member of Section 5 (Methods of Analysis) and Section 14
(Evaluation) of the Canadian Highway Bridge Design Code. As former Head of Evaluations,
Walter has evaluated over 200 bridges, and inspected over 500. He was the lead analyst in the
structural evaluation of the causes and sequence of failure on the Sgt Aubrey Cosens Memorial
(Latchford) Bridge.
David Lai, P.Eng. lead the bolt testing investigation. David Lai completed his undergraduate and
graduate study in civil engineering at McGill University. After graduation, he had worked on
many well-known civil/structural engineering projects, including the design of the BCE Place in
Downtown Toronto, the Scarborough Consilium, the reinforced concrete dome roof for the Metro
Toronto Council Chamber, and the supervision of the subway construction in Singapore. He
worked for T.Y.Lin Consulting Engineers in Singapore, and was an associate with Yolles
Partnership in Toronto prior to joining the Ministry of Transportation of Ontario in 1990. Mr. Lai
is currently the Head of the Bridge Rehabilitation Section of MTO responsible for the
development of all provincial policies and standards for bridge rehabilitation and durability. He is
the current chair of Section 15 (Rehabilitation) of the Canadian Highway Bridge Design Code,
and a committee member of Section 16 (FRP). He is also a committee member of CSA S807
and S808.

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3. Bridge Behaviour
There are three different approaches to providing stiffness in cable-stayed bridges, as shown in
Figure 1, which determines how stability of the bridge is assured under live load. Each approach
provides stiffness primarily in one of the three load-bearing elements of the cable-stayed bridge:
the stays, the deck, or the towers.
Stiffness from Backstay Cable Stiffness in Deck Stiffness in Tower
LL resisted by backstay LL resisted by bending in deck LL resisted by bending in the tower
LL offset by dead load in main LL resisted by bending in deck

span. Short back span prevents
backstay from going slack.
Figure 1. Response of cable-stiffened, girder-stiffened, and tower-stiffened cable-stayed bridges,
shown with typical proportions of span and girder.
Since the 1980s, almost all cable-stayed bridges have been built as ‘multiple-stay’ bridges with
cables spaced at the deck level less than 10 m apart. Combined with an increased
understanding of aerodynamic stability and buckling safety of slender girders, this has led to
slender girders.
There are three main cable arrangements in cable stayed construction – fan, harped, and semi-
fan, as shown in Figure 2. The fan cable configuration has cables anchored at a single point at
the top of the tower, and loads the tower in axial compression only, with backstay cables to
stabilise the tower and control girder deflections due to live load. With stiffer towers, the
backstay cable forces become less significant. A harp cable configuration has roughly parallel
cables with anchorages along the height of the tower and favours stiff towers, since live load at
the quarter points of the main span will cause significant bending in towers, regardless of tower
stiffness. The semi-fan cable arrangement captures the efficiency of a fan cable arrangement,
with a large lever arm between the tension in the cable and the compression in the deck, while
allowing cables to be anchored in a spaced out arrangement within a hollow tower. The tower is
proportioned to provide stability during cantilever construction.

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Figure 2. Typical cable arrangements in cable-stayed bridges.
3.1. Global Behaviour of Nipigon River Bridge

The Nipigon River Bridge is cable-stayed bridge of two spans, three planes of cables, a single
pier, and a 37.21 m wide deck. The main span is 139 m, while the back-span is 112.8 m. The
pier consists of three prestressed concrete towers rigidly connected to prestressed concrete pier
legs and a concrete box girder diaphragm below the deck.
The deck consists of three structural steel girders aligned in the plane of the cables, supporting
structural steel floor beams at 3.6 m spacing. The structural steel components are composite
with a precast concrete deck. The General Arrangement drawing of the bridge is included in
Appendix A.
The Nipigon River Bridge is half of a classical three-span cable-stayed bridge. It is proportioned
with a length of backspan of 82% of the main span (41% when considered as a classical three
span cable-stayed bridge), a girder span to depth ratio of 90 (180), and a semi-fan cable-
arrangement. Two-span cable-stayed bridges commonly have a backspan which is shorter than
the main span. The Nipigon River Bridge is stiffened by the backstay cables at the west
abutment, and by the tower. The deck is integral with the tower which provides additional
stiffness to control deflections during construction and in the permanent condition.
The Nipigon River Bridge was designed to be constructed in balanced cantilever. In each step,
a 10.8 m length of girder is installed onto the east span, a stay cable is installed, and the
concrete deck is installed and made composite with the steel girders, followed by stressing of
the stay. The same operation is repeated to add 10.8 m to the west span, before moving on to
the next step of cantilevering.
The Nipigon River Bridge has three planes of cables (denoted as north, centre, and south) each
supporting a girder. The bridge is built in two halves. In the first phase, the north and centre
towers, girders, and cables are constructed to support the north half of the deck system. In the
second phase, the south tower, girder and cables are constructed to support the south half of
the deck system. In the permanent condition, the north half of the bridge supports the
westbound traffic and the south half of the bridge supports the eastbound traffic. After
construction of phase 1, one lane of traffic in each direction is allowed on the bridge. It is in this
configuration that failure of the northwest bearing occurred.
Since the deck is constructed in balanced cantilever, there is practically no reaction at the
bearing when the deck reaches the west abutment. At that point in time, the bridge
superstructure is balanced about the central pier, cantilevering out 116 m in each direction from
the tower. The loads, reactions, and internal forces are shown in Figure 3a. It is at this point that

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the west abutment bearing is installed. As cantilevering of the east span continues, the dead
load from the additional length of the east span is balanced by uplift at the west abutment
bearings. When the east span lands at the east abutment, there is a permanent uplift at the
west abutment bearings due to dead load of the east span, as shown in Figure 3b. Permanent
uplift exists at the west abutments bearings which stabilise the bridge.
a) b)
Figure 3. Structural behaviour due to dead load: a) at end of balanced cantilevering, and b) at the
end of construction.
The reaction at the west abutment bearings, due to the passage of a truck over the bridge, is
both positive (compression) and negative (uplift). For a truck travelling westbound over the
bridge, the truck first loads the east span of the bridge. The downwards force of the truck is
resisted primarily by an upward component of the force in the nearest stay cables. The tension
in the cable is balanced by tension in the back stay cables, compression in the tower,
compression in the deck, and uplift at the west bearing. The upper portion of the tower bends to
balance tension in the stays across the east span by the back stays of the west span. The back
stays are the stiffest load resisting system of the bridge, and therefore resist most of the truck
load.
Figure 4a shows the loads, reactions and forces within the bridge when a truck loads the east
span. The downward force of the truck is resisted primarily by the upward component of the
force in the nearest east span stay cables. This force is carried to the tower, where the load is
carried by tension primarily by the stiffest cable – the back stay that is anchored at the
abutment. As the truck travels across the west span, the bridge resists load differently. The
downwards force of the truck is resisted primarily by the upwards component of the force in the
nearest west span stay cables. Since the cables of the east span are not directly anchored at
the abutment, they are more flexible and cannot counterbalance the truck load on west span.
Instead, the tension in the stays loaded by the truck is resisted by compression in the back stay,
as shown in Figure 4b. Since the back stays have a large tension due to dead load, the
compression due to the truck load relieves that tension by only a small amount. This results in a
compression on the west abutment bearing due to the live load, although the bearing has a net
uplift force due to all loads at serviceability limit states (SLS).

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a) b)
Figure 4. Structural behaviour due to the passage of a truck over a) east span, and b) west span.
3.2. Load Path from Back Stays to West Abutment

The structural stability of the cable-stayed bridge relies on transfer of uplift force from the
superstructure to the west abutment. The vertical (uplift) force exerted on the bearing from the
back stay cables is resisted by the weight of concrete in the abutment through the following load
path.
1. The tension in the back stays of the west span is transferred into the girder through a fin
plate inserted through the top flange of the girder, and welded directly to the girder’s
web.
2. The force is transferred through the girder’s web to the bottom flange through fillet welds
between the web and flange. Vertical bearing stiffeners are welded on both sides of the
web and welded to the bottom flange, and assist in transferring the force to the bottom
flange.
3. The bottom flange is bolted to a shoe plate.
4. The shoe plate is in turn bolted to the bearing.
5. The bearing is anchored to the abutment by prestressing bars, which are anchored deep
in the abutment in order to engage the weight of the abutment concrete.
Figure 5 illustrates the load path from stay cables to abutment in both longitudinal section (view
cut through the abutment) and section cut through the bearing facing the west abutment.

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Figure 5. Load path from Stays to West Abutment in elevation and section.

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4. Bearing Requirements
4.1. Bearing Drawings
The bearing requirements at the west abutment are described on Contract Drawings A-10 and
A-11, included in Appendix A. The drawings were revised through tender and construction as
described in Table 1. The bearing drawings were largely unchanged after Addendum 3 issued
during tender.
Table 1. Bearing Contract Drawing Revisions

Contract Drawing Revision Date Description of Changes
A-10 (Sheet 218) February, 2013 Initial tender drawing.
Drawings not sealed.
A-10 (Sheet 218-A), Addendum 2 April 5, 2013 Included requirements for post-tensioned anchor rods
Drawings not sealed. at the east abutment. Added shoe plate size and
thickness, shown welded to bottom flange of girder.
A-10 (Sheet 218-B), Addendum 3 April 30, 2013 Bearing information split into two drawings. Reactions
A-11 (Sheet 218-1), Addendum 3 Drawings not sealed. at fatigue limit states added to the bearing design
data table. Size and thickness of shoe plate
increased at both abutments and bolted connection
between west abutment shoe plate and girder added.
East abutment bearing connection to abutment
reverted back to anchor rod grouted in formed hole.
June 5, 2013 Tender Opening
A-10 (Sheet 218-B) July 9, 2013 Drawings reissued as part of full drawing set for
A-11 (Sheet 218-1-R1) Seals applied. construction, with seals applied. On drawing, A-11
west abutment minimum shoe plate thickness at one
end changed from 54 to 52 mm.
A-10 (Sheet 218-B-R1), December 12, 2013 East abutment bearing anchor rod details changed
A-11 (Sheet 218-1-R2), and east abutment bearing grade of material for
Instruction Notice #71 anchor rod changed (Note 11). The drawing contains
two seals but the checker’s stamp is dated July 11,
2013, prior to the final revision – therefore
invalidating it for this revision. Thus, this drawing is
technically sealed by only the design engineer,
whose seal is dated June 9, 2014.
CAN/CSA-S6-06: Canadian Highway Bridge Design Code (CHBDC) Section 11.6.1 General
requires that specific design information be shown on the drawings. The bearing drawings of the
Nipigon River Bridge convey the information required by the CHBDC. The drawings show the
minimum and maximum loads corresponding to the critical combinations at serviceability limit

- 10 -
states (SLS) and ultimate limit states (ULS), including dead load, total load, lateral loads,
rotations, and translations. Drawing A-10 states rotation requirements of the bearings, in all
three axes. Although the table does not state the direction in which the bearing shall rotate in
the horizontal axis, it is understood that live load on the main span will cause an upwards
rotation at the front of the bearing, and maximum uplift force. Live load on the back span will
cause a downwards rotation at the front of the bearing, with a smaller uplift force, since the truck
positioned in the back span will apply a downwards force at the west abutment. There is also
out-of-plane rotation due to deflection of the end floor beam when the truck is near the end of
the bridge. Note 14 on drawing A-10 states that the horizontal rotation shall be about the
horizontal axis in all directions (i.e. longitudinal and transverse rotation), which encompasses
the aforementioned rotations. Rotation about the vertical axis is the rotation of the bearing in
plan. The bearing rotations are shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Rotations on bearing.
The CHBDC further states that for bearings other than elastomeric bearings, the bearings shall
be designed to accommodate the rotations at ULS plus tolerances in fabrication and installation,
plus an additional 1°. This additional tolerance is not referred to on the design drawings, but is
covered by the specification OPSS 1203. The rotational bearing data tables for the northwest
and centre west bearings are shown in Figure 7.

- 11 -
Figure 7. Rotational Bearing Design Data Table from the Contract Drawings.
There is a large range of force specified for the reaction under dead load. At SLS, the uplift
varies from a minimum of 620 kN to a maximum of 3530 kN for the centre-west bearing and
1320 kN to 1900 kN for the northwest bearing. This accounts for forces from construction of the
south half of the bridge, changes in force from before and after the addition of the asphalt
wearing surface, and changes due to long-term time-dependent material properties. The centre-
west bearing supports the central plane of cables which are loaded with nearly double the
weight of the exterior planes of cables. For these reasons, the force demands of the northwest
and centre-west bearing are higher than those at the southwest bearing.
Note 8 states that: “bearings shall be supplied by one of following manufacturers: Goodco Z-
Tech, RJ Watson, Watson Bowman Acme, and Wercholoz Canada.”
4.2. Bearing Forces

The north half of the bridge opened to traffic in November, 2015. The reactions on the bearings
for phase 1, when the north half was open to one lane of traffic in each direction, are provided in
Table 2. MMM provided ULS total load reactions in an email dated January 25, 9:51 am, 2016.
McElhanney provided as-built SLS dead load reactions in an email dated January 13, 9:20 pm,
2016. The remaining reactions were provided by MMM in an email dated February 7, 5:01 pm,
2016.

- 12 -
Table 2. Bearing Reactions for Phase 1 (Failure Reactions)

Load Combination Centre-West Bearing Northwest Bearing
Serviceability Limit State Dead Load -1077 kN -1635 kN
Serviceability Limit State Total -1625 kN -2045 kN
Ultimate Limit States Dead Load -1185 kN -1800 kN
Ultimate Limit States Total Load -2200 kN -2650 kN
FLS Range -194 to 441 kN -150 to 413 kN
(-636 to -1271 kN reaction) (-1222 to -1785 kN reaction)
Note: a negative sign indicates uplift on the bearing.
Neither the design bearing data from the Contract Drawings, nor the forces provided for phase
1, were independently verified as part of this report. McElhanney and MMM compared force
effects during construction and there was generally agreement in the values.
4.3. Shoe Plate

The shoe plate connects each bearing to the structural steel girder above it. The shoe plate and
connection to the girder are designed by the design engineer (MMM) and detailed in the
Contract on Drawing A-10 (Sheet 218-B-R1). A common shoe plate design and bolted
connection to the girder is specified for all west abutment bearings. The shoe plate is the same
size and has the same number of bolts for south, centre and north bearings despite the reaction
at the centre girder being 73% larger than the north girder at ULS, and 40% larger at FLS. The
bearing shoe plate is specified as 1000 mm long, 800 mm wide, with a thickness varying
between 52 and 60 mm from end to end. Since the bearing sits level on the abutment, the shoe
plate is bevelled to accommodate the 0.8% longitudinal slope of the roadway (and
consequently, the girder bottom flange) to provide a level surface at the top of the bearing.
There are a total of 32, A325 (ASTM

Standard A490, 2008), 22 mm diameter
high strength bolts specified on the
Contract Drawings which attach the
bearing shoe plate to the bottom flange
of the girder, as shown in Figure 8. The
CHBDC Clause 10.18.4.2 allows for the
use of 7/8” bolts interchangeably with 22
mm diameter (M22) bolts in 25 mm
diameter holes.
Drawing A-10 (Sheet 218-B-R1) note 1

specifies that all structural steel shall
conform to CAN/CSA G40.21-M04 and
shall be Grade 350W. Exposed metal
Figure 8. Shoe plate bolts specified on A-10, revision surfaces are specified to be hot dipped
C (sheet 218-1-R2). galvanized.

- 13 -
The number of bolts was increased through Request for Clarification (RFC) 176 from BFNJV,
dated January 28, 2014. The RFC was submitted to address a note on drawing S-1 concerning
the compensation of deflections in the longitudinal direction of the bridge. The submission notes
an additional row of bolts at front and back of the bearing (10 rows total), at the same 100 mm
bolt pitch as the original 8 rows of bolts. The additional bolts were added in plan and annotated
with “additional set of bolts on each side allow field adjustment”, as shown in Figure 9. Based on
the RFC, it appears that the 2 additional rows of bolts were for tolerance, not for additional
structural capacity. As such, it may not have been the intent that all 40 bolts would be installed;
however in final construction they were. The RFC was accepted by the MTO on January 31,
2014. This change was made before the initial bearing shop drawings were prepared. The first
date on the shop drawings is August 4, 2014. It is unclear when the bolts were switched from
grade A325 to A490.
Figure 9. Shoe plate bolts revised within RFC-176, dated January 31, 2014.
The bolts are shown to be installed head down in holes couterbored into the shoe plate. The
counterbore is specified on the Contract Drawings as a 60 mm diameter circular recess, 18mm
deep. It is not clear how the Contractor would have gripped the bolt head in the design on the
Contract Drawing, except for installing the shoe plate onto the girder prior to installing the
bearing. As described in Section 5.3.3, this counterbore was later changed.
4.4. Bearing Assembly

The bearing assembly, as supplied, consists of the rotational bearing, the shoe (or top) plate, a
sole (or upper) plate, and the masonry (or bottom) plate sitting on the concrete abutment seat.
The sole plate and masonry plates have interlocking guide bars with stainless steel or
Polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) surfaces to resist uplift loads and allow translation. These
components of the bearings are shown in Figure 10. OPSS 1203 clause 1203.04.01.06 states
that “the top and bottom plates that are permanently attached to the structure shall be provided
with the bearings.” For rotation bearings, the shoe plate, or top plate as referred to in OPSS
1203, is supplied with the bearing assembly, although it is designed by MMM as mentioned
previously.

- 14 -
Figure 10. Components of the west abutment bearing assembly.
The shoe plate acts as an intermediary component between the structural steel girder and the
bearing and is supplied with the bearing assembly for rotational bearings. CAN/CSA-S6-06
clause 11.6.1.1 requires that bearings be “replaceable without damage to the structure or
removal of anchorages permanently attached to the structure.” OPSS 1203, clause 12.04.01.09
Bearing Assembly Replacement states:
“The entire bearing assembly, except for the top plate used to attach it to the
superstructure and the base plate used to anchor it to the substructure but including both
contact surfaces of the sliding interface, shall be replaceable without damage to the
structure and without removal of any concrete, welds, or anchorages permanently
attached to the structure and without lifting the superstructure more than 5 mm. Bearings
shall not be recessed into plates that are permanently attached to the structure.”
The shoe plate, or top plate as it is referred to in OPSS 1203, should be designed to stay in
place while the bearing is replaced (although in most bearing replacements, the shoe plate is
also removed and replaced with the bearing assembly owing to differences in dimensions and
uncertainty about connection details between the bearing and top plate). In the design of typical
highway bridge in Ontario, it is standard practice to provide a bolted connection between the
bearing and the shoe plate, while the connection between the shoe plate and girder is typically
welded. The practice in Ontario is that the connection between the girder and the shoe plate is
specified by the designer, while the connection between the shoe plate and the bearing is
designed by the bearing supplier.
The detailing of the shoe plates at the Nipigon River Bridge follows the practice described
above, although the less common bolted attachment of the bottom flange and shoe plate is
used. The connection between the girder and shoe plate is clearly shown on the design
drawings, while the connection between the shoe plate and the bearing is designed by the
bearing supplier. The drawings do not provide any direction to the supplier on how to connect
the bearing top plate to the shoe plate, nor do they require the bearing supplier to submit the
connection details to the designer for approval.
One feasible way to connect the bearing to the shoe plate is bolting at the edges of the shoe

- 15 -
plate. Section 1 of drawing A-11, revision C (see Appendix A) depicts the west abutment
bearing approximately 750 x 750 mm in plan which is smaller than the shoe plate. Working with
those dimensions, it would be practically impossible to bolt the shoe plate to the bearing at the
edges. A connection distributed across the shoe plate is the alternative to a connection at the
edges. For the shoe plate dimensions and bolting pattern shown on the design drawings, it is
difficult to envision connecting the shoe plate to the bearing within the central area of the shoe
plate.
Below the bearing, the connection between the bearing masonry plate and the abutment seat is
shown schematically on the design drawings, but the final design is left to the Contractor. Post-
tensioning anchorages are shown connecting the bearing to the abutment on drawing A-11 with
a note stating the “bearing anchorage assembly to be designed by the Contractor.” Note 10 on
drawing A-10 describes the materials to be used and level of prestressing to be adopted, but the
geometry and details of the connection are left to the bearing supplier. Standard practice in
Ontario is for the Contractor to design the anchorage of bearing masonry plates into the
substructure.
The detailing of the masonry plate connection on the Nipigon River Bridge follows the standard
practice for rotational bearings. The connection is shown schematically on the design drawings,
while the detailing is left to the Contractor.

- 16 -
5. Observations and Testing

The observations are based on information and correspondence provided by Northwestern
Region. Evidence includes photos and videos taken at the site from January 10 to January 16,
2016. The report also documents observations made by engineers of the Bridge Office during
their site visit of January 14, 2016.
The Bridge Office requested all design calculations from MMM, and reviewed all the calculations
provided. Calculations for the shoe plate design were dated after the failure. The review did not
find calculations for the design of the shoe plate or for the bolted connection between the girder
and shoe plate dated prior to failure.
5.1. Physical Observations

Verbal accounts from multiple sources affirmed that the bolts between the shoe plate and girder
bottom flange were not pretensioned at the time of installation. This appears to be confirmed by
the installation of nuts on stacked washers as shown in Figure 11b, apparently awaiting
fabrication of washer plates. There is also e-mail correspondence between the Contractor and
the bearing supplier on Tuesday, January 12, 2016 3:03 PM and Tuesday, January 12, 2016
4:58 PM, where there is discussion about the bolts not being pre-tensioned, but some
disagreement on the reasons. The bolts likely remained in that condition leading up to their
failure on January 10, 2016. Finally, on the day after the failure, MTO staff reported that the
centre-west bearing bolts were loose and required tightening just to achieve a snug tight
condition.
The west abutment bearings were installed on October 5, 2015. Figure 11 shows the installation
of the bearing sole plate after the shoe plate had already been attached.
a) b)
Figure 11. Northwest Bearing installation on October 5, 2015: a) sliding the sole plate of the
bearing into place after the shoe plate has been connected to the bearing flange and b) washers
stacked 3 high over west half of shoe plate and 4 high over east half of the shoe plate.

- 17 -
Photos of Figure 12 and Figure 13 were taken on January 10, 2016 after failure of the bridge.
The bolts are fractured at the threads in all but a single bolt (the most southwesterly bolt). The
shoe plate is noticeably bent upwards and separated from the bearing sole plate towards the
interior lines of bolts. Northwest region staff measured the gaps between shoe plate and the
sole plate for both the northwest and centre-west bearings. The maximum gaps are summarized
in Table 3. Northwest region staff measured the deformations of the shoe plates after they were
removed from the bridge. Based on the measurements, the northwest bearing shoe plate
appears yielded along the interior bolt lines, whereas the centre-west bearing shoe plate is
deformed primarily on the north side, with a maximum deformation along the exterior bolt line on
the north side of the girder.
Table 3. Shoe Plate Deformation (Maximum Gap Measured between the Shoe and Sole Plates of
West Abutment Bearings and Maximum Deformation after Shoe Plates Removed)
Bearing Measurement West Side (back) East Side (front)
Northwest Bearing Gap measured on site, mm 5 5
Deformation of shoe plate, mm 5.7 7.5
Centre-West Bearing Gap measured on site, mm 2 0
Deformation of shoe plate, mm 1.6 1.1
Figure 12. Northwest Shoe Plate with Failed Figure 13. Northwest Shoe Plate with Failed
Bolts of Shoe Plate Failed Bolts Looking East Bolts – note gap between shoe plate and
bearing top plate towards the middle

- 18 -
Figure 14 shows the numbering assigned

to each bolt location and identifies bolt
with confirmed or potential early failure,
based on initial site observations. At least
2 bolts were immediately observed to
have light corrosion of the failure surface,
indicating they failed in advance of the
girder lifting off the shoe plate on January
10. The bolts with indication of early
failure were in the south exterior gage line
of bolts.
Figure 15 shows a plan view of the bolts

through the shoe plate of the northwest
bearing. Necking of the central fractured
surface can be seen on many bolts, and
Figure 14. Bolt numbering and premature bolt
beach marks, indicating fatigue type failure (north is up). Red indicates confirmed early
failure, are evident and oriented failure, blue indicates possible early failure.
transversely to the bridge centerline.
The bolts were cut on January 10 in order to allow the girder to be lowered back down to bear
on the shoe plate. The exact location of each bolt on the shoe plate was not recorded prior to
cutting the bolts at their bases with a grinder. The bolts were assigned a letter code as an
identifier. The letter codes were correlated to the above numbering where possible. Several
bolts were noticeably bent along the shaft.

- 19 -
Figure 15. Top Surface of the Shoe Plate with Failed Bolts (looking down, north is up)
Figure 16. Northwest Bearing, Northwest corner Figure 17. Northwest Bearing, Southwest
of uplift restraint with PTFE crushed but still corner of uplift restraint with PTFE crushed and
attached to the bearing masonry plate (top steel projecting beyond the masonry plate (top steel
surface of the photo) surface of the photo)
Figure 16 and Figure 17 show damage to the PTFE surfaces at the back (west side) of the
bearing, consistent with excessive contact pressures.

- 20 -
The bearing Working Drawings specify 7/8” bolts 6” long

for the connection of the shoe plate to the girder. As a
point of reference, the Handbook of Steel Construction
(Canadian Institute of Steel Construction, 2008) lists a 150
mm bolt as appropriate for a minimum grip length of 105
mm and the maximum grip length of 124 mm. The required
grip length for this application varies from 98 mm to 106
mm along the length of the bevelled shoe plate.
As measured from a spare bolt obtained from site, and

shown in Figure 18, the bolt thread started approximately
113 mm from the bolt head – which exceeds the grip for all
locations. Based on the actual range of grip lengths
required for this connection, the length of bolts specified
on the Working Drawings, which were the bolts supplied,
were too long for the application.
On October 8, 2015, BFNJV issued non-conformance

report (NCR) 2013-6000-224 which identified that the RJ
Figure 18. Bolt sample from Watson shop drawing specified bolts that were too long..
southwest bearing. As a corrective action, RJ Watson proposed a 16 mm thick
structural steel washer plate to be installed under each
quadrant of 10 bolts.
There were several shortcomings of RJ Watson’s proposed solution to the excess bolt length.
The drawings are not sealed, they do not provide any indication of a bevel in the washer plates
to account for the slope of the bevelled shoe plate, and they do not specify the grade of material
for the washer plate. The drawings do not identify an installation method for these plates.
Installation of such a plate would necessitate removal of the capacity of 10 bolts at a time, with a
corresponding decrease in capacity of the connection of at least a quarter. Despite these
uncertainties, the proposal of the NCR was accepted by the MTO on October 21, 2015.
However, the washer plates were never installed.
5.2. Examination and Testing of Fractured Bolts

Except for one bolt that fractured immediately adjacent to the head, all bolts fractured
immediately adjacent to the nut and therefore had to be cut at the top of the shoe plate in order
to be removed. All the 40 bolts were first delivered to the Bridge Office of the MTO Highway
Standards Branch in St. Catharines, for visual examination and for a photographic record of
their conditions and marking. David Lai of the Bridge Office inspected the bolts on January 18
and January 19.
The Ministry submitted bolts to the NRC and SSW for chemical composition analysis, fracture
surface analysis, tensile testing of machined specimens, toughness testing (Charpy impact
testing), and corrosion product analysis. NRC and SSW were first given the opportunity to
examine the bolts separately and select their bolts for testing. The bolts were divided into three
groups with more or less equal number. NRC and SSW were each provided 14 bolts while MTO

- 21 -
kept 12 bolts for reference and possible future actions.
A complete description of the testing and investigation by NRC is contained in Makar (2016). A
complete description of the testing and investigation by SSW is contained in Ramamurthy et al.
(2016).
5.2.1. Fractured Bolts from NW bearing
5.2.1.1. Visual Examination by the Bridge Office
Based on visual examination with the aid of only a hand-held magnifying glass, the following
observations could be made:
 Nine bolts had a varying degree of brown coloured corrosion product at the fracture
surface, indicating that these bolts might have failed earlier than the rest. It is difficult to
determine the time difference between the first bolt fracture and the final total failure of
the bearing, however, it is quite clear that not all bolts failed at the same time. Figure 19
shows the fracture surfaces of the bolts which had corrosion product.
 Most of the bolts exhibited striations at the fracture surface that is typically associated
with cyclic loading, and as can be seen in Figure 15, Figure 19, and Figure 20, the
fracture surfaces of many bolts have a striated zone at opposite sides of the cross-
section that is consistent with cyclic rotation in the east-west direction, that is, in the
longitudinal direction of the bridge.

- 22 -
Bolt No. C - Location 29 Bolt No. I - Location 4 Bolt No. AA - Location 34
Bolt No. G - Location 23 Bolt No. K - Location 6 Bolt No. CC - Location 33
Bolt No. H - Location 21 Bolt No. Z - Location 35 Bolt II - Location 31 (unverified)
Figure 19. Fractured Surface of Failed Bolts with Visible Corrosion Product

- 23 -
Crack with
rust stain
Figure 20. Northwest bearing looking East, after Figure 21. Transverse crack on elongated
failure on January 10, 2016. side of bolt Z.
 Bending of the threaded portion appears to be an important contribution to the failure of

many of the bolts. Some samples showed the threads are compressed on one side and
elongated on the opposite side, while some also have a transverse crack on the
elongated side, as observed in Figure 21.
 Only one bolt (EE from location 40) failed immediately adjacent to the head and so it
was possible to retrieve a much longer shank of the bolt after the failure. As can be
seen in Figure 22, there are steel to steel rub markings on opposite sides of the shank,
the upper marking is within the bottom flange of the girder while the lower marking is
within the shoe plate.

- 24 -
Figure 22. Bolt at the southeast corner of the shoe plate (location 40) which failed at the shank,
with steel-to-steel rub markings on opposite sides of the shank.
5.2.1.2. Chemical Composition Analysis
Both NRC and SSW conducted chemical composition analysis of the fractured bolts, the test
results meet the requirement of ASTM A490 Type 1 bolts and compare well with the mill
certificate submitted by the Contractor.
5.2.1.3. Fracture Surface Analysis
The fracture surfaces were examined under scanning electronic microscope (SEM) at high
magnification. The following conclusions are drawn from the combined observations of NRC
and SSW.
 Most of the fracture surfaces show fatigue striations.
 The number of striations are relatively low ranging from 50 to 140, indicating that the
bolts failed due to low cycle (ductile) fatigue; the load levels in service were high enough
to cause plastic deformation on each cycle.
 There are three types of failure indicated by the fracture surfaces:
1. One sided crack growth caused by either direct tensile loading or in combination
with bending, but the cyclic bending does not reverse much in magnitude beyond
the neutral position
2. Two opposite-sided crack growth caused by unidirectional cyclic bending
3. Cyclic tensile loading with other factors
 In all cases, cracks seem to have originated from the root of the threads and grew
towards the bolt centre; the outer crack growth zones are usually much flatter with

- 25 -
striations, and the microstructure exhibits limited ductility compared with the centre zone
where final ductile failure occurred.
5.2.1.4. Tensile Test of Machined Specimens
Since all the bolts were cut at the top of the shoe plate, the bolt heads were removed and so the
remaining specimens were not suitable for full size bolt tensile testing. The bolt specimens were
typically less than 70 mm long. ASTM A490 (ASTM Standard A490, 2008) states that when the
length of bolts makes full size bolt testing impractical, then machined specimens shall be tested
for tensile properties and shall meet the stipulated yield and tensile strength, elongation and
reduction in area; the testing shall be in accordance with ASTM F606 and E8.
Figure 23 shows four cylindrical specimens cut from one bolt shank by the Electric-Discharge
Machining Technique (EDM) at SSW. This technique does not generate enough heat to alter
the properties of the bolt and causes very little wastage of material.
Figure 23. Cylindrical specimens cut from a bolt shank by EDM at SSW.
Table 4. Tensile Test Requirements and Results of Specimens Machined from Fractured Bolts
0.2% Offset Ultimate Elongation at Reduction of Remarks
Yield Stress, Tensile Fracture, % Area at
MPa Stress, (based on 50 necking, %
MPa mm gauge
length)
A490 Specification 896 min. 1034 to 1192 14 min. 40 min.
Requirements
SSW Test Results 1046 1120 15.85* 57.6 Mean value
NRC Test Results 1043 1089 18 58 Mean value
Note : * Strain at fracture based on 20 mm gauge length

- 26 -
Table 4 summarises the tensile test results from both laboratories and in comparison with the
ASTM A490 requirements. As can be seen in Table 4, the tensile test results from the two
laboratories are close to each other and all the test specimens met the requirements of ASTM
A490. The only uncertainty is that due to insufficient length of the specimens, a 50 mm gauge
length cannot be achieved for the testing at SSW and the reported elongation is based on a 20
mm gauge length. The reduction of area at the necking fractured section is well exceeding the
specification requirement indicating a very ductile behaviour.
Prior to the testing, a concern was raised whether the tensile straining of the bolts to failure in
the field has changed the mechanical properties of the bolts such that the test results do not
truly represent the original properties. Generally, steel material that has been strained to beyond
yield could be into strain-hardening and subsequently the yield point could be higher while
losing some ductility. It should be noted that the tensile specimens were taken from the solid
shank of the bolts and the failure is in the threaded area; the stress in the shank area is only
around 75% of the stress in the threaded area and therefore likely would not have gone beyond
yield. Therefore, the test results should be representative of the original properties of the bolts.
5.2.1.5. Cold Temperature Charpy Impact Tests
There was speculation that the in-service cold temperature might have rendered the bolt
material to be brittle, and therefore not absorb the impact energy due to uplift at the bearing.
Although ASTM A490 does not specify any cold temperature impact test requirements, these
bolts have been used in cold weather environments when additional testing is specified. It is
prudent, as part of the forensic analysis, to conduct the cold temperature impact tests and see
how the bolt material performs comparing with other high quality structural steel.
CHBDC stipulates that for fracture critical components subject to minimum in-service
temperature above -30º C, the test temperature shall be -20º C and the minimum impact energy
required is 27 Joules. Table 5 shows the test results reported by the two laboratories. It can be
seen from the table that the bolt material absorbed impact energy far greater than that specified
for fracture critical bridge components according to CHBDC. Therefore, these A490 bolts are
considered suitable for use in cold temperature.
Table 5. Charpy Impact Test Results of Fractured Bolts

Laboratory Test Temperature Absorbed Energy
Cambridge Materials Testing Limited (CMTL)* -20 C 50 Joules
CMTL -30 C 45 Joules
NRC -28 C 50.6
NRC +21 C 77.9
* CMTL was retained by SSW for testing.

- 27 -
5.2.1.6. Corrosion Product Analysis
The fracture surface of bolts exhibiting corrosion products were analysed by SSW to determine
the chemistry of the products; the following conclusions could be made:
 There are three distinct regions on the fracture surface: a grey-coloured region, white
deposit region, and a heavily corroded region in brown colour.
 The grey-coloured regions are covered with a mixture of iron oxides and smaller amount
of iron hydroxides.
 Some locations within the grey-coloured regions were covered with only a thin layer of
oxide/hydroxide since the metallic iron substrate was detected. This implies the areas
had different time of exposure to the weathering.
 The white deposits were enriched in carbonate, mostly present as sodium carbonate; the
source is undetermined.
 The heavily corroded regions exhibit greater accumulations of iron hydroxides compared
with iron oxides. The hydroxide forms are consistent with those expected to form in a
chloride environment.
5.2.2. Intact Bolts from Centre-West Bearing
5.2.2.1. Distribution of Samples
A total of 40 intact bolts were first delivered to the Bridge Office for visual examination and for a
photographic record of their conditions and marking. NRC and SSW were given the opportunity
to examine the bolts separately and select their bolts for testing. NRC and SSW were each
provided 10 bolts while MTO kept 20 bolts for reference and possible future actions. The bolt
numbering does not follow the same pattern as the bolts from the northwest bearing.
5.2.2.2. Visual Examination
Out of the 40 bolts, 11 of them were cut with the grinder in order to remove the nut and free the
bolt from the bearing shoe plate, and 5 others have distorted threads such that the nut could not
be put back on properly. Hence, there are only 24 bolts available for full size bolt tension test.
The identification marking on the bolt head clearly shows A490 Type 1.
Figure 24 shows some examples of bolts with distorted threads. Although none of these bolts
fractured in service, the loading condition and the installed detail might have caused significant
straining and distortion of the threaded portion, and bending of the bolts in the threaded portion
was observed.

- 28 -
Bolt 1 Bolt 2 Bolt 13
Figure 24. Images of intact bolts with distorted threads.
5.2.2.3. Tensile Test of Full Size Bolts
Tensile testing of full size bolts was conducted by both laboratories according to ASTM
F606/F606M-14a using a 10 degree wedge at the head. In addition, NRC tested one bolt with a
10 degree wedge at the nut which is a more severe condition not required by the ASTM F606.
On the other hand, SSW tested some bolts with a 1 degree wedge at the nut to simulate the
field condition at the west abutment of the Nipigon River Bridge. SSW also performed the proof
load test on 4 bolts to 246 KN according to the requirements of ASTM A490 and they all
passed. NRC did not perform the proof load test. Table 6 summarizes all the tensile test results
of full size bolts.

- 29 -
Table 6. Summary of Tensile Test Results of Full Size Bolts

Laboratory Bolt No. Max Tensile Load Max Tensile Max Tensile ASTM A490
with 10 degree Load with 1 Load with 10 Min. 308 KN
wedge at head degree wedge at degree wedge at
Max. 356 KN
(KN) nut (KN) nut (KN)
SSW B3 346.9 Passed
SSW B10 346.0 Passed
SSW B6 338.5 Passed
SSW B8 343.8 Passed
NRC B7 346 Passed
NRC B11 343 Passed
NRC B17 342 Passed
NRC B22 340 Passed
As shown in Table 6, all the tensile test results met the requirements of ASTM A490. The results
from the two laboratories are very consistent with a small coefficient of variation.
5.2.2.4. Tensile Test of Machined Specimens
Although the intact bolts are long enough to be tested as full size bolts, it is advisable to test
some machined specimens from them for comparison with those from the fractured bolts. The
following Table 7 shows the tensile test results of the machined specimens from both testing
laboratories. It can be seen that they all meet the yield stress, ultimate tensile strength, and
reduction in area requirements of ASTM A490 and compares well with those from the fractured
bolts. There is however an issue with the elongation value at fracture for the SSW specimens;
the diameter of the specimens is 4 mm and the gauge length to diameter ratio is therefore much
bigger than the specified ratio of 4 according to ASTM F606. NRC’s specimens have a diameter
of 12.5 mm and therefore the aspect ratio is 4, resulting in an elongation well in excess of 14%.
It is conceivable that a smaller diameter specimen does not have the same volume of material
to undergo necking and therefore the corresponding longitudinal deformation is smaller. Table
E-1 in the SSW report does show improving elongation with smaller gauge lengths and much
closer to meeting the 14% requirement when the aspect ratio is close to 4.

- 30 -
Table 7. Tensile Test Results of Machined Specimens from Intact Bolts of Centre Bearing
0.2% Offset Ultimate Elongation at Reduction of Remarks
Yield Stress, Tensile Stress, Fracture, % Area at
MPa MPa (based on 50 mm necking, %
gauge length)
A490 Specification 896 min. 1034 to 1192 14 min. 40 min.
Requirements
SSW Test 1059 1124 6.2 57.5 Mean value
NRC Test 1031 1103 17.67 58.0 Mean value
5.2.2.5. Fractured Surface Analysis
The fracture surfaces after the full size tensile test were examined using the SEM and it is
concluded that fracture usually initiates at the root of the first thread below the nut and
progresses across the bolt either on a flat surface or at an angle to a thread root below the nut.
All regions of the fracture surfaces display characteristics of ductile fracture.
Both NRC and SSW sectioned some bolts longitudinally to examine them under microscope
and cracks of length 100 to 400 microns have been observed throughout the threaded portion,
including areas where the bolts have not experienced any load. These cracks are also on the
top side of the thread crests and are heavily oxidized. Since the observed fracture planes
always originate from the root of the thread, it is likely that these cracks are pre-existing due to
the manufacturing process of the bolts and did not play a role in the failure of the bolts.
5.2.3. Conclusion Based on Test Results
The following conclusions are drawn from the test results from the two independent laboratories.
 The test results from the two laboratories agree very well with each other with no
outlying data, the differences were within the order of accuracy of the test methods and
the normal variability of material.
 The bolts met all the requirements of ASTM A490.
 The bolts exhibit good ductility and impact energy absorption under cold temperature
comparable to high quality structural steel normally used for bridge construction.
 The bolts failed at different times and not simultaneously based on the appearance of
the fracture surfaces and the development of corrosion products on some; it can
therefore be construed that the bolts were subjected to uneven loading and those with
higher loading would fail first, then the remaining ones had to carry a higher share of
load than before leading to progressive failure.
 The majority of bolts failed by low cycle high strain fatigue, the load levels in service
were high enough to cause plastic deformation on each cycle.
 The bolts were likely not tightened according to normal requirements for bridge
construction since most of the fracture surfaces exhibit fatigue striations on opposite
ends of the fracture surface; indicating the cycle rotation is in the longitudinal direction of
the bridge.
 Bending is a contributing factor for the failure of many bolts based on the deformation of

- 31 -
the threaded portion. However, the laboratory static tests for the full size bolts
incorporated inclined surfaces (a 10 degree wedge under the bolt head or a 1 degree
tapered washer under the nut) to create a bending effect in combination with tensile
load, and the ultimate tensile capacity for either case still met the specification
requirement. Hence, the failure of the bolts is due to overloading in service beyond what
each bolt is meant to carry.
5.3. Differences between Contract Drawings and Supplied Bearings

There are a number of notable differences between the bearing requirements of the Contract
Drawings and the bearings supplied according to the Working Drawings (included in Appendix
B), as listed below and described in the following sections.
1) Based on the submitted Working Drawings, the bearing could not accommodate rotation
(see Section 6.1.2 for further discussion).
2) The bolts connecting the shoe plate to the girder bottom flange were specified on the
Contract Drawings as A325, but were supplied as A490 (see Section 4.3).
3) The bolts were not adequately pretensioned.
4) The shoe plate material specified in the Working Drawings and supplied was a different
material and grade than specified on the Contract Drawings.
5) The bolt configuration and counterbore details supplied were different than on the
Contract Drawings and somewhat different from the submitted change proposal.
6) The bolts specified in the Working Drawings, and those supplied, did not have bevelled
washers and were too long for the actual grip length.
5.3.1. Bolt Pre-Tension
The connection of the shoe plate to the girder bottom flange was specified on the Contract
Drawings and is covered by the CHBDC as referenced by OPSS 922 and OPSS 1203.
CHBDC clause 10.18.2.1 states that all high-strength bolts shall be pretensioned in accordance
with Clause 10.24.6.3. Clause 10.24.6.3 further refers to Clause 10.24.6.6 which mandates the
use of turn-of-nut pretensioning for bolts. Based on the evidence identified in Section 5.1 of this
report, the bolts were not properly pre-tensioned in accordance with the CHBDC. The CHBDC
Clause 10.17.2.6, in the fatigue section, also states that high strength bolt shall be pretensioned
in accordance with clause 10.24.6.3. Makar (2016) describes and illustrates the effect of
pretension on the cyclic stress range in the bolts.
CHBDC Clause 10.24.2.2 states that the erection procedures shall include the bolt installation
requirements. Since the erection procedures for the installation of the bearings did not identify
the tightening requirements, the submission of the erection procedures was not in conformance
with the requirements of the CHBDC.
5.3.2. Shoe Plate Material
The size and thickness of the bearing shoe plate supplied matches the shoe plate specified on
the design drawings, but the grade of material is different. Drawings A-10 note 1 specifies that
all structural steel shall conform to CAN/CSA G40.21-M04 and shall be Grade 350W. The

- 32 -
bearing assemblies as supplied for the northwest and centre-west bearings respectively are
detailed on drawings titled DB440MR Type I Assembly, revision 8, and DB440MR Type II
Assembly, revision 8. The material for the shoe plates, sole plates, and masonry plates is
specified as ASTM A36 which has a yield strength of 248 MPa as compared with the 350 MPa
yield strength specified on the design drawings.
5.3.3. Bolt Pattern between the Girder to the Shoe Plate
As stated in Section 4.3, there were a total of 32, A325 22 mm diameter (M22) high strength
bolts specified on the Contract Drawings which attach the bearing shoe plate to the bottom
flange of the girder, as shown in Figure 8. Request for Clarification (RFC) 176 increased the
number of bolt holes to 40 and is shown in Figure 25. The bearing shoe plate is specified as
1000 mm long, 800 mm wide, with a thickness varying between 52 and 60 mm from end to end
in order to accommodate the longitudinal slope of the roadway. The supplied shoe plate is the
same overall dimensions as specified, but is connected to the bottom flange with 40, A490 7/8”
bolts as explained in Section 4.3 and as shown in Figure 26. There were differences in the
spacing of the bolts, perhaps because stiffeners make the exact location of the additional bolts
shown in the RFC infeasible.
Figure 25. Shoe plate bolts specified in RFC Figure 26. Bottom view of shoe plate with bolts
176. as supplied per drawing Bearing Details-7,
revision 8.

- 33 -
Figure 27. Counterbore specified on A-10, Figure 28. Counterbore detailed per drawing
revision C (sheet 218-1-R2). Bearing Details-7, revision 8.
The bolts are shown on the Contract Drawings, head side down, in holes couterbored into the
shoe plate. The counterbore is specified on the Contract Drawings as a 60 mm diameter circular
recess, as shown in Figure 27. As supplied, the counterbore is machined into the shoe plate as
a rectangular recess with rounded corners, as shown in Figure 28. The recess is longer in one
direction than the other with the intent to accommodate the hexagonal bolt head and prevent it
from rotating. However, the bolt specifications allows the corner to corner dimension of the bolt
head to be from 39.5 mm to 41.5 mm, meaning that a bolt on the low end of tolerance would still
be able to freely turn in the counterbore.
The effective width of the plate as supplied, on a line through the centres of the 10 bolts, is 400
mm, as compared with 480 mm in the Contract Drawings. The width of shoe plate material
removed by the counterbore at the bolt centrelines, on a line through 10 bolts, is 176 mm
compared with 240 mm specified in the Contract Drawings. It appears that the change in the
counterbore did not affect the shoe plate capacity, and may have actually assisted with it when
considered separately from the material strength of the shoe plate. The evaluation of this effect
is covered in Section 6.2.
The size and thickness of the bearing shoe plate supplied per the Working Drawings matches
the shoe plate specified on the design drawings (and RFC 176). There were minor changes to
the bolt spacings and counterbores which did not appear to negatively affect the strength.
5.3.4. Bolt Length and Washers
Detail A of design drawing A-11 specifies beveled washers to be installed below the nut of the
A490 bolts between the shoe plate and bottom flange, as shown in Figure 27. This is a
requirement of CHBDC clause 10.24.6.5 to compensate for any lack of parallelism between the
outer clamped surfaces.
In the Working Drawings, a hardened washer was specified, but it is not specified to be beveled.
Therefore, the bolt assembly shown on the Working Drawings does not comply with the
requirement of the design drawings for a beveled washer, and does not meet the requirements
of CHBDC clause 10.24.6.5.

- 34 -
CHBDC Clause 10.24.6.4 (b)(ii) specifies that hardened washers be provided under the head
and nut when steel with a minimum yield strength of less than 280 MPa is specified. This is a
requirement to prevent galling and indentation of the steel (Kulak & Grondin, 2006). The
Working Drawings do not specify washers between the bolt head and the A36 shoe plate, and
therefore do not meet this requirement of the CHBDC for the grade of material.
From the time of installation of the bearings until the failure of the northwest bearing on January
10, 2016, the bolts were installed with 3 or 4 stacked washers under the nut in order to
compensate for a bolt with grip length in excess of the required grip length. The bolts detailed
on the Working Drawings were too long for the grip length of the steel plates being connected.
Revision 8 (as-built) Working Drawings are sealed November 24, 2015 and show the bolts with
single washers. Therefore, the as-built Working Drawings for the bearings do not reflect the
actual installation with respect to the bolts connecting the girder to the shoe plate.

- 35 -
6. Evaluation of Bearing and Attachments

The evaluation follows all components in the load path from the girder to the abutment. Simple
calculations and models were used to evaluate the forces in each of the components under two
load cases: the loads at failure of the northwest girder (phase 1 when only the north half of the
bridge was opened), and the loads specified on the design drawings. In some cases the
components are inadequate to accommodate the loads at failure, and by extrapolation cannot
accommodate full design loads specified on the drawings. Refined analysis validated the
findings of the simple models. This section discusses the capacity of individual components
followed by the behaviour considering the interaction between components.
6.1. Evaluation of the Bearing

6.1.1. Design
The bearing design consists of a disc bearing to transfer compression (positive reaction),
surrounded by a large masonry plate and sole plate each with guide bars that interlock to resist
uplift, as shown in Figure 5 and Figure 10. When subjected to uplift, the bearing slides along the
plane of interlocking guide bars. The lower guide bar is laminated with a stainless steel surface,
while the upper guide is laminated with a PTFE sheet filled with glass fibre. The guide bars
accommodate transverse displacements and longitudinal displacements by sliding between the
stainless steel and PTFE surfaces. When in uplift, the disc bearing sees no load and does not
participate in the function of the bearing.
The bearings are not designed for rotation in uplift, neither longitudinal nor transverse rotation.
Rotation is usually accommodated with convex and concave surfaces that slide against each
other – something that did not exist on this bearing. The reactions on the design drawings
(Figure 7) indicate the west abutment bearings are to be in uplift at all times at SLS with
corresponding rotations clearly specified. Note 14 on drawing A-10 requires that the bearing
accommodate the horizontal rotations in all directions (longitudinal and transverse). These same
requirements exist in phase 1, although as shown in Table 2, the loading is lower, but still uplift
at all times. The only way the bearings allow rotation in uplift is for the guides to separate, as
explained in Section 6.1.2.
6.1.2. Rotation
The rotation specified on the design drawings is a maximum of 0.8° (0.014 radians) at SLS, and
as stated in Section 5, the bearing must be designed for an additional 1°. The only way the
bearing can accommodate an imposed rotation is for the guide bars to separate.
There is uplift across the guide bars due to permanent loads. The uplift creates a restraining
moment across the bearing which has to be overcome in order for the plates to separate. The
bearing is fixed against rotation until the restraining moment is overcome by an applied moment
of larger magnitude. As the applied moment increases, the stresses increase at one end of the
bearing and decrease at the other end until the one end separates and the bearing rotates
about the far end.

- 36 -
Any separation of the uplift restraint guide bars at SLS occurs simultaneously with high contact
pressures at the other end of the bearing. This is unacceptable and constitutes failure because
the pressure on the PTFE surface exceeds the limits allowed by the CHBDC. This is explained
further in Section 6.1.2.1 and Section 6.1.2.2.
6.1.2.1. Longitudinal Rotation
Longitudinal rotation occurs from deflection of the main girder. The imposed rotation of 0.8°
(0.014 radians), as specified in the design, causes both guide bars to rock up onto the ends of
the guide, as shown in Figure 29. The uplift force is transferred across a small contact area
between the interlocking guide bars, at the front or back of the bearing. The overlap of
interlocking guide bars is at least 785 mm. A rotation of 0.8° corresponds to a separation of 11
mm at one end. The PTFE has some ability to distribute the force over a longer length, but over
time the PTFE will crush and deteriorate since the pressure at each end of the guide bar will
exceed the allowable pressure. Figure 16 and Figure 17 show photographic evidence of
crushing of the PTFE.
Figure 29. Separation of guide bars due to longitudinal rotation.
Live load on the bridge imposes a rotation at the west abutment bearings. On February 26,
2016, McElhanney Consulting Services Inc. provided information about the forces and rotations
at the west abutment bearings from the model of the north half of the bridge, representative of
the bridge’s state of completion at failure. Figure 30 describes the rotation of the northwest
bearing (if it were free to rotate) as a CL-625-ONT design truck travels across the bridge. The
model does not include dynamic load allowance. The northwest bearing is most heavily
influenced by a truck in the westbound lane, and therefore the truck travels in the westerly
direction from right to left. The maximum counterclockwise rotation of 0.06° (0.001 radians)
occurs when a truck is in the east span 80 m from the tower, while the maximum clockwise
rotation of 0.16° (0.003 radians) occurs when the truck is 20 m from the west abutment. While
these rotations are much smaller than the SLS requirement of 0.8° (0.014 radians), the
maximum clockwise rotation of 0.16° corresponds to a separation of 2 mm at the guide bars.
This rotation occurs when the truck causes a positive (compressive) reaction at the bearing,
although due to the pre-existing dead loads, the bearing remains in net uplift. Even before
separation occurs, the rotation causes the PTFE and bolts at the front or back of the bearing

- 37 -
(depending on direction of rotation) to take most of the load and the opposite end with reduced
contact pressure to take virtually none.
Rotation at Northwest Bearing, degrees

350 West 0.2
Tower East
Reaction at Northwest Bearing, kN
Abutment Reaction at Abutment

NW Bearing
250 (uplift is positive)
Rotation at 0.1
150 NW Bearing
Direction of Travel
50
0.0
-50-140 -120 -100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Lead axle position when last
truck axle leaves bridge
-150 -0.1
Position of Lead Axle Relative to the Tower, m
Figure 30. Vertical reaction and rotation at northwest bearing due to the CL-625-ONT Truck.
Temperature effects also impose rotations on the bearing in all three axes. Rotations occur due
to temperature range effects (overall temperature drop or rise applied to the entire bridge),
temperature gradients in the deck (deck slab surface at a higher temperature than steel), and
differential temperature between the deck and cables. Differential temperature accounts for the
cables warming up at a faster rate than the deck and girders, due to their smaller relative
thermal mass, and their exposure above the deck. As the cables elongate, the deck deflects
downwards under permanent loads, imposing a clockwise rotation at the northwest bearing. The
magnitude of this rotation is enough to cause the bearing to engage more at the back side of the
guide bars during a sunny winter day. Similarly, when the temperature rapidly cools, the cables
shorten and engage more on the front side of the guide bars.
MMM provided a breakdown of rotations about the three axes of the bearing in an email of
March 2, 2016. At ULS, the magnitude of rotation due to combined temperature effects is
smaller than the rotations due live load, but the live load rotations represent a rare occurrence
where one span of the bridge is fully loaded with trucks while the other is completely unloaded.
In service, the rotations due to live load are lower than those due to temperature. Figure 30
ignores any temperature effects (and dynamic load allowance), thus underestimating the force
effects caused by separation by a fair amount.
With rotation of the girder, separation occurs at one end of the bearing guide bars as previously
shown in Figure 29. This means that the highest force is transferred between the bearing and
the girder at the end where the contact pressure is highest, varying linearly to almost no force
transfer at the end where the separation occurs. For example, for a clockwise rotation, the bolt
forces are illustrated in Figure 31.

- 38 -
Figure 31. Amplification of bolt force due to uplift and longitudinal rotation.
Bolt forces were calculated based on a linear distribution across the bolted connection, similar
to design of a bolted web field splice. All the bolts across the connection see tension, the
highest of which is at the end where the guide bars are in contact. At the end where the guide
bars are separated, there is compression at the contact surface between the shoe plate and the
girder. In this simplified elastic analysis in isolation of transverse effects, the front row of bolts
sees a force which is 2.8 times larger than the average force in a bolt row. With deflection of the
shoe plate and sole plate, the front row of bolts could be subject to an even higher force. The
effects are further described in Section 6.4. Similarly, the guide bars, sole plate, and shoe plate
also see similar increases in load effects.
6.1.2.2. Transverse Rotation
Transverse rotation occurs from deflection of the transverse floor beam. About the horizontal
axis aligned with the girder, an imposed rotation of 0.8° (0.014 radians), as given in the Contract
Drawings (see Section 4.1) would cause one guide bar to disengage and one guide bar to resist
the entire uplift force. The guide bars are spaced 580 mm centre-to-centre. A transverse rotation
of 0.8° corresponds to a separation of 8 mm at one of the guide bars, as shown in Figure 32. In
reality, that scenario is implausible in service since the girder would have to rotate 17 mm out-
of-plumb in order to impose such a rotation. However, the girder does rotate some amount
along its axis due to deflection of the floor beams under dead and live load, as well as torsion
imposed by the cantilevered sidewalk.

- 39 -
Figure 32. Separation of guide bars bearings due to a rotation of 0.8° in the axis of the girder.
A built-in rotation may also exist due to the construction sequence. As each section of
cantilevered construction progresses, the 10.8 m length of girder is installed followed by the
floor beams. The deck panels load the floor beams causing them to deflect downwards. In turn,
the floor beams impose a rotation at their connection with the girders, as they are connected
with a moment connection.
The construction sequence leads to the potential for unequal distribution of tensile force
between the south and north interlocking guide bars due to the transverse rotation. Even though
the shoe plate was attached to the girder bottom flange, the west abutment bearings were only
fully installed after placing the structural steel girders and floor beams (see Figure 11), but
before placing the deck panels. It is therefore possible that the level plane of the bearing does
not match the plane of the bottom flange which may not be level. The distribution of the force to
both guide bars may not be perfectly uniform.
Similar to longitudinal rotation, when separation of the guide bars occurs, all the force is
transferred through the remaining guide bar that is in contact. Accordingly, the bolts on the side
in contact are required to carry the full uplift force. This simplified analogy indicates that one line
of the bearing sole plate to shoe plate 1” bolts (plus the 7/8” shoe plate to flange bolts on this
side) sees a force which is two times larger than the average force. Similarly, the guide bars,
sole plate, and shoe plate also see similar increases in load effects.
On January 10, the failure of the northwest bearing imposed a large transverse rotation on the
centre-west bearing. Additionally, the uplift reaction at the centre-west bearing when the
northwest corner of the bridge was elevated would have been higher than in service. The
centre-west shoe plate is yielded along the line of exterior bolts closest to the north guide bar
which is at the side of the bearing where the guide would be engaged to transmit the full uplift
reaction. The deformed shape of the shoe plate at the centre-west bearing provides evidence
that the south guide bar disengaged and the reaction on the north guide bar increased
substantially. Although not indicative of the performance of the bearing in service, this illustrates
that the uplift reaction is not shared equally between guide bars when subjected to an imposed
transverse rotation.

- 40 -
6.1.2.3. Plan Rotation
The bearing demand requirements for plan rotation were +/-1.0°. Bridge Office was not
provided with any plan rotation values under the phase 1 loading. Plan rotation was not
considered to have contributed to the failure and no analysis was done for it. It is noted that
geometrically, there would be contact between the metal surfaces of guidebars at this
magnitude of plan rotation.
6.1.3. Uplift Guide Bar PTFE Evaluation
The uplift restraint guide bars are laminated to allow longitudinal translation along the bridge
through sliding of the guide bars. The upper guide bars are laminated with PTFE, while the
lower guide bars are laminated with stainless steel sheet.
The PTFE specified on the bearing Working Drawings is 52 mm wide x 785 mm long. The
dimensions of PTFE are the same for both centre-west and northwest bearings. The PTFE is
15% glass filled sheet, mechanically anchored, attached to the top guide bar and is unconfined.
CHBDC Clause 11.6.3.6 establishes clear limits on the maximum pressure which can be
applied on PTFE.
OPSS 1203 requires that the PTFE be unfilled sheet, recessed in the backing material. The
unconfined, filled sheet PTFE supplied for the uplift bearings at the Nipigon River Bridge does
not meet this requirement.
Table 8 summarizes the average contact pressure across the PTFE, assuming the reactions
across the bearings are distributed uniformly to both guide bars, and uniformly across the area
of surface of the PTFE, and compares the design to the CHBDC limits.
Table 8. Design Contact Pressure for PTFE Sliding Surfaces of Uplift Restraint Guide Bars
Criteria Centre-West Bearing Northwest Bearing
SLS Dead Load Uplift 3530 kN 1900
Average contact pressure on PTFE 43.2 MPa 23.3 MPa
Maximum average contact pressure (CHBDC 30 MPa 30 MPa
Table 11.3)
Assessment The average pressure exceeds Meets the CHBDC
the CHBDC limit by 44%. requirements.
SLS Total Uplift 4410 kN 2540 kN
Average contact pressure on PTFE 54.0 MPa 31.1 MPa
Maximum average contact pressure (CHBDC 45 MPa 45 MPa
Table 11.3)
Assessment The average pressure exceeds Meets the CHBDC
the CHBDC limit by 20%. requirements.

- 41 -
The average contact pressures for the northwest bearing would be within the CHDBC limits if
the contact pressure was uniform along the length of both guide bars. The PTFE contact
pressures of the centre-west bearing exceed the CHBDC limits even when a uniform pressure
was assumed.
The CHBDC allows the maximum contact pressure at the edge of the PTFE to exceed the limits
in the table by 20%. It is clear that any separation of a guide bar to allow rotation only increases
the contact pressure beyond the limits of the CHBDC. Any separation of the guide bar would
result in double or triple the average pressure values at the heavily loaded guide bar end, which
would mean that neither bearing would meet the requirements of CHBDC Clause 11.6.3.6. Any
separation of guide bars due to an imposed rotation represents failure to meet the SLS
requirements of the CHBDC. Any larger separation would cause the pressures to be exceeded
by a greater extent, or at lower loads, including the loads for phase 1. Although the failure of the
PTFE violates the CHBDC, it is expected to lead to local damage to the PTFE, steel on steel
contact, and increased friction, but likely not a significant contribution to the January 10 failure
that occurred.
6.1.4. Uplift Guide Bar Capacity Evaluation
Uplift is provided by interlocking guide bars between the sole plate and the masonry plate of the
bearing. Assuming that uplift force across the bearing is shared equally between the two guide
bars, and no rotation on the bearing, the uplift at each guide bar imposes a moment on that
guide bar. The factored moment at ULS on each guide bar is 123 kNm (corresponding to the
maximum uplift force of 3370 kN shared equally between both guide bars and accounting for the
transverse displacement across the bearing), whereas the factored resistance of the guide bar
is 251 kNm. The two top and bottom guide bars are all of the same dimensions and therefore
have equal capacities. The guide bars of the northwest bearing are adequately detailed to resist
uplift without rotation. With the same assumptions but higher uplift reaction of 5300 kN at ULS,
the guide bars of the centre-west bearing are adequately detailed to resist uplift without rotation
albeit with less reserve capacity.
Upon longitudinal rotation, the guide bar plates separate (or have reduced pressure at one end)
and the uplift force is transferred at the front or back of the guide bars. The full length of the
guide bar is not effective in resisting this force, and therefore the capacity of the guide bars is
less than the aforementioned value. Similarly, with transverse rotation, the right and left guide
bars (depending on the direction of rotation) will not be evenly loaded and one guide bar will
have an applied factored moment greater than the aforementioned value. With these higher
factored moments, local bending and yielding of the guide bars could have occurred.
The evaluation of guide bars shows that they were designed assuming uniform loading from a
bearing that can properly rotate. The guide bars do not have the capacity to accommodate any
separation of the guide bars, and therefore are not designed to accommodate any rotation in
uplift as it actually occurred.
6.1.5. Shoe Plate Attachment to Top of Bearing
The Contract Drawings do not provide any direction to the Contractor on how to connect the
bearing upper plate to the shoe plate; such as schematic diagrams, notes, or requirements to

- 42 -
obtain approval for the connection from the designer. The Working Drawings adopt a bolted
connection along the outer edges of the shoe plate, utilizing one row of 12, 1” diameter A490
bolts along each edge of the shoe plate.
The bearing connection with the shoe plate interacts with the shoe plate connection to the
girder. The shoe plate pries against the outer edge of the bearing sole place, and pries against
the central contact surface between the shoe plate and the girder bottom flange right below the
web. An analysis of prying between the flange and shoe plate, and shoe plate and sole plate,
are provided in Section 6.4.
6.2. Evaluation of Shoe Plate

As explained in Section 5.3, the bearing supplier supplied; 1) a different material grade of the
shoe plate, 2) a different bolt arrangement, and 3) different counterbore details, than shown on
the design drawings, and in RFC 176. The tapered shoe plate was intended to be connected to
the bottom flange with pretensioned bolts. However, even if they were pretensioned, it was
found that the applied uplift force reduces the contact pressure between the shoe plate and
flange to such a degree that two plates could not transfer adequate shear forces between them
to act compositely for the working, serviceability or ultimate loads. Table 9 summarizes the
section properties and capacity of the shoe plate through a line of 8 or 10 bolts, on the Contract
Drawings and on the Working Drawings.
Table 9. Comparison between Shoe Plate Specified and Shoe Plate Provided
Property 8 bolts, per design drawing A- 10 bolts, per as-built
11, revision B bearing Working Drawings
Area, mm² 40,060 39,150
Moment of Inertia, mm4 9,868,650 9,950,440
Material G40.21-M04, Grade 350W ASTM A36
Yield Strength, MPa 350 248
Applied ULS Moment at Outer Line of Bolts 158 (phase 1)*
(assuming case a) or c) in Figure 33), kN 317 (design load, centre-west)*
Nominal Moment Resistance at Yield, kNm 123.7 87.0
Factored Moment Resistance (Mr), kNm 175.5 125.7
* After failure of the outer line of bolts, moments would be much larger.
The net area and the moment of inertia of shoe plate at the bored sections is approximately the
same in the design and Working Drawings. However, the bending resistance of the shoe plate
supplied per the Working Drawings is considerably lower owing to the lower strength of material.
Adding bolts to the connection did not weaken the capacity of the shoe plate, but changing the
material in the shoe plate reduced its capacity by 29% due to the lower yield strength.
Determining the bending moment in the shoe plate is not simple and depends on the flow of
forces and any prying action in the bolted connection. The values are presented in Section 6.4

- 43 -
and the values can only be determined with a detailed analysis. For reference, schematic shear
force and moment diagrams of the shoe plate based on all bolts remaining elastic, for three
scenarios, are shown in Figure 33. The first case has the uplift force shared evenly by all 7/8”
bolts with no prying. The second has a prying force applied at the edge of the shoe plate and at
the centre of the web. Details of the exact distribution of this force are provided in Section 6.4.
The third case has the uplift force resisted entirely by the outer line of 7/8” bolts. These
diagrams show the same value for the moment at the outside line of bolts for the first and third
cases, and a somewhat reduced moment for the realistic second case where prying is
considered. Figure 33b is the realistic representation of the forces on the shoe plate. These
scenarios illustrate that prying does not increase the forces in the shoe plate compared with
simplified assumptions that may have been used to design the shoe plate.
a) b) c)
Figure 33. Shear Force and Moment Diagrams for Shoe Plate; a) assuming load evenly shared by
all bolts, b) with prying force, and c) assuming all load through exterior line of bolts.
6.3. Evaluation of Bolts

As explained in the Section 5.1, the Contractor installed the bolts without bevelled washers and
did not pretension the bolts. The bolts are loaded eccentrically as one side of the nut contacts
the steel surface which is sloped at 0.8% in the longitudinal direction, resulting in local bending
of the fastener, referred to in literature as local prying. This effect is well-documented and
explains the scatter in tests of bolt prying (Kulak, et al., 1987). The local prying of the bolt head
imposes a bending stress in the bolt which adds to the axial tensile stress in the bolt (see Figure
34). Premature failure of the bolt, at lower than ultimate tensile strength, is then possible. The
local prying effect is pronounced when the distance between the prying surface and the bolt is
much larger than the distance between the bolt and the applied load, as is the case for the shoe
plate to girder connection at the west bearings.

- 44 -
Figure 34. Local Prying of bolt due to lack of beveled washer.
The stress on a uniformly loaded bolt nut is determined from Force / Area (P/A). For an
eccentrically loaded bolt nut, the extreme stress also has a bending component ( P/A + Pe / S).
Assuming the resultant force of a 7/8” A490 bolt loads the plate at half of the bolt diameter (i.e.
the bolt is loaded with an eccentricity of d/2), an axial force of 75 kN results in a stress of about
195 MPa when evenly loaded, and 5 times that value (985 MPa) with the eccentric loading.
This magnitude of stress is likely to cause yielding of bolt (which has specified yield strength of
about 940 MPa). In the extreme, the eccentricity could be as large as ¾ of the diameter (at the
edge of the nut). This would result in the stress with eccentric loading being 7 times the
uniformly loaded value.
Although the 7/8” A490 bolts can be expected to yield at less than 100 kN due to this local
prying, they do not necessarily fail under static load. Bolts with sufficient ductility would be
expected to deform to the extent that the contact pressure between the bolt-head (or nut) and
the prying plate becomes more uniform. Therefore, the local effect of bolt prying can relieve
itself through deformation of the bolt shank.
ASTM A490M – 09, Standard Specification for High-Strength Steel Bolts, clauses 10.9 and
10.9.3, for Structural Steel Joints (Metric), requires tensile, proof load, and hardness tests be
conducted with Test Method F606M. A490M bolts require a wedge test (ASTM F606/F606M) of
full scale specimens for 7/8” bolts. The wedge test requires the bolt head be tested in contact
with a surface bevelled at 10° to the bolt head. For 7/8” bolts, a minimum tensile load of 308 kN
is specified. The requirements of this test impose considerable local bending and yielding of the
bolt prior to achieving the full tensile load. The test requires that the fracture occur through the
threads and not at the junction of the bolt head to shank. Bolt testing conducted at both NRC
and SSW, as discussed in Section 5.2.2, confirmed that under static load the ultimate strength
is not affected by eccentricity.
The increased stress due to eccentric loading, and the ASTM test described above are true for
bolts with large differences in slopes between the steel and bolt nut surfaces, and consequently
a large gap between the nut and flange at one end. With the 0.8% grade, the gap between the
nut and the flange is only about 0.3 mm. This means that the first amount of force goes towards
elongating and bending the bolt to match the slope of the bottom flange. The result is that the

- 45 -
first amount of force on the bolts goes towards a locked-in bending stress of about 160 MPa
(with compression on one side, tension on the other) to get the surfaces to mate. This effect is
discussed farther in Section 6.5 on fatigue in bolts. With longitudinal girder rotation alternating
depending on which span the load is in, this creates alternating compression and tension on
opposite sides of the bolts – which is similar to the failure surface described in Section 5.2
The factored bolt resistance for 1” bolts in tension, with their 1040 MPa ultimate strength,
determined from CHBDC clause 10.18.2.2.1, is 316 kN. The yield stress (using the 2% offset
method as per ASTM A490) of 940 MPa results in a yield force (and therefore the force due to
pre-tensioning), of 286 kN (ASTM A490 gives a value of 351 kN for the yield strength, although
it does not include a material reduction factor, ϕb). The failure load of the bolt is 404 kN (ASTM).
For 7/8” bolts, the factored ultimate strength is 242 kN, the yield strength is 219 kN and the
failure load is 308 kN (from ASTM). The bolt forces for 1” and 7/8” bolts are summarized in
Table 10.
Table 10. Bolt Forces and Capacities

1” Bolt 7/8” Bolt
Pre-Tension Force 286 kN 219 kN
Factored Resistance 316 kN 242 kN
Ultimate Strength 404 kN 308 kN
(Minimum Tensile Load specified in ASTM A490)
6.4. Evaluation of Prying in Shoe Plate

Prying is the phenomenon in structural connections where the tensile bolt forces are magnified
due to bending of the plates and the resulting concentrated contact pressure forces between the
plates (Kulak, et al., 1987). A classical prying situation is shown in Figure 35. The magnitude of
the prying is related to the distances between bolt lines and the edges of plates, as well as the
thickness of the plates.
Figure 35. Classical Prying of flexible plate in tension connection (Kulak, et al., 1987).
For the Nipigon Bridge, the shoe plate connection to the bottom flange consists of two gage
lines of 7/8” bolts, arranged symmetrically about the girder web. The shoe plate connection to

- 46 -
the bearing sole plate is by means of one line of 1” bolts at each side of the shoe plate. The
girder exerts an upward force on the shoe plate, which in turn is “pulled down” at the edges by
the 1” bolts to the bearing, resulting in the deformed shape shown in Figure 36. There is minimal
upwards bending of the bearing sole plate due to the distance between the guide bars and the
1” bolt line.
Two gage lines of bolts are generally not advisable for T-stub connections because the majority
of the load is resisted by one line of bolts, unless the plates are stiffened (Kulak, et al., 1987).
The bottom flange was stiffened with the three vertical bearing stiffeners, however, the shoe
plate cannot be stiffened and relies on its thickness alone to provide stiffness. The deformed
shape of the shoe plate at the Nipigon River Bridge, collaborates the theory and analysis that
shows the interior gage lines of bolts connecting the girder to the shoe plate are less effective
and the exterior gage lines are subject to considerably higher than average forces.
Figure 36. Nipigon River Bridge northwest bearing shoe plate prying under uplift.
There are two potential locations where prying can occur. The first is at the tip of the shoe plate
where it deflects and causes a high concentrated contact pressure against the bearing sole
plate. This is shown as force Q25 in Figure 36. The magnitude of this prying was determined
using the structural model described in Section 6.4.1. Looking at a free body diagram, the two
Q25 forces are added to the uplift reaction as the force that must be resisted by the 1” bolts.
The second location where prying could occur is at the centreline of the girder web (and some
distance on either side), where the shoe plate may deflects upwards and react against the
flange. This is shown as force Q22 in Figure 36. Looking at a free body diagram, the force Q22 is
added to the uplift reaction as the force that must be resisted by the 7/8” bolts. The magnitude
of this prying was determined using the structural model described in Section 6.4.1.
The magnitudes of the forces in the bolts are discussed in the subsequent sections. The
CHBDC Clause 10.17.2.6 states that connected parts shall be arranged so that prying forces

- 47 -
are minimized and the prying force shall not exceed 30% of the external load. The CHBDC’s
wording has some uncertainty as to whether this prying force is only the additional force due to
contact pressure, or whether it includes the uneven force distribution between two lines of bolts.
For a single bolt line, as likely envisaged by the Code writers, the latter component would not
exist. Referring to the reference in the CHBDC (Kulak, 2005), the intent of the prying limit is to
ensure evenness in the bolt loads and the prying factor can be taken as the ratio of the
maximum bolt force to the nominal bolt force (total force divided by 40 bolts). The subsequent
sections will show that this amount had been exceeded for both the 1” and 7/8” bolts.
6.4.1. Model of Shoe Plate Prying
The Bridge Office created an elastic finite element model of the beam end and the components
in the bearing. It consisted of shell elements to represent the various steel plates in the girder
and bearing, along with tension only member to represent the bolts and compression only
members to represent the contact pressure between connected plates. A constant thickness of
56mm was used for the shoe plate, which is the average thickness, and the bolt holes and
counterbores were also modelled as thinner plates. Shell elements beyond the shoe plate
connection have a coarser grid. The model is shown in Figure 37.
Figure 37. 3-dimensional finite element model of girder end and bearing in a) isometric view, and
b) sectional view.
Four types of loading were considered as independent and were never combined;
1. concentric uplift (representing a bearing that is free to rotate without creating uneven
loading of bolts) with snug tight bolts,
2. longitudinal rotation of 0.8 degrees (0.014 radians) with uplift, with snug tight bolts,
3. transverse rotation with uplift of 0.8 degrees, with snug tight bolts,

- 48 -
4. concentric uplift with bolts that were pre-tensioned to represent turn-of-nut tightening
specified in the Contract.
The result of the analysis are described and shown graphically in the subsequent sections. The
forces in the bolts where determined at the loads that occurred under phase 1, as well as the
final design loads.
The deformed shape of the bearing assembly and girder end is shown in Figure 38 and Figure
39 for an imposed longitudinal rotation of 0.8 degrees and an imposed transverse rotation of 0.8
degrees, respectively.
Figure 38. Deformed bearing assembly due to longitudinal rotation combined with uplift.

- 49 -
Figure 39. Deformed bearing assembly due to transverse rotation combined with uplift.
6.4.1.1. Calibration Model
As a calibration to the 3 dimensional model, prying action was also investigated with simple
frame models of a strip of the shoe plate (800 mm length with an 83 mm wide section). The
section properties are calculated for the minimum shoe plate thickness of 52 mm, and reflect the
reduction in shoe plate material at bolt holes and counter bores. Figure 40 shows the
representative strip of shoe plate.
Figure 40. Shoe plate strip model - properties.

- 50 -
The simple model makes several assumptions. The girder bottom flange, which is stiffened with
transverse stiffeners at the centre of the shoe plate and at either end of the shoe plate, can be
modelled as a rigid plane. The 1” and 7/8” bolts are modelled as members with bolt area and
length of bolt shank from bolt head to nut, assuming a single washer at each bolt according to
the design drawings. Two models were used to represent snug-fit and pretensioned bolt
installation.
In an initial model for snug-fit bolts, an imposed displacement is applied equally to all 7/8” bolts,
which represent uplift from the bottom flange. The same displacement is applied to the
centreline of the shoe plate since its upwards deflection is restricted by the bottom flange.
Reactions were placed at the tips of the shoe plate to represent the restraint offered by the sole
plate from below. This initial model quantified prying at both 7/8” and 1” bolts for snug fit
installation (initial assumption of no tension in bolt). The upper reaction at the centre of the plate
is the prying force Q22 while the lower reactions at the tips of the shoe plate are the prying
forces Q25 from Figure 36.
In a subsequent model load was applied in a downwards direction at the 1” bolts, neglecting
prying of the 1” bolts, and an incremental analysis was performed to accumulate the forces in
the elements representing the bolts as they change from a prestressed compression element to
a bolt in tension. These are the bolt forces B22 from Figure 36. The frame model, with
pretensioned bolt behaviour, is shown in Figure 41.
CONTACT BETWEEN SHOE PLATE AND FLANGE PLATES

(COMPRESSION ONLY)
7/8” BOLTS (AREA OF CONTACT SURFACE BETWEEN SHOE PLATE AND

FLANGE PLATE IN COMPRESSION, BOLT AREA IN TENSION)
VERTICAL
SUPPORT
SHOE PLATE HORIZONTAL SUPPORT
1” BOLTS
LOADING APPLIED AT 1” BOLTS

(PRETENSIONED BOLT BEHAVIOUR)
Figure 41. Shoe plate strip frame model for pretensioned 7/8” bolt behaviour.
The results of the refined and simple models were in agreement. The simple model slightly
underestimates the magnitude of prying and the corresponding bolt forces since it assumes the
girder flange and bearing sole plate are infinitely stiff. The refined model accounts for the actual
stiffness of the bottom flange and the sole plate of the bearing.

- 51 -
6.4.2. Analysis Results
The analysis is summarized in several charts showing the uplift load and the maximum force in
the bolt. Figure 42 shows the chart for the force in the 1” bolt under design loads. Figure 43
shows the chart for the force in the 7/8” bolt under loading in phase 1. Figure 44 shows the
force in the 7/8” bolts under design loads. The values from these figures are summarized in
Table 11 below.
Table 11. Bolt Forces from Structural Model Based on Elastic Analysis (kN)
Phase 1 (Failure) Loading Design Loading
FLS SLS ULS FLS SLS ULS
Force with even load distribution on 286 - 286 286 286 286 - 286 286 286
bolts
Bolt Force with no rotation 286 - 286 286 286 286 - 286 302 *351
1” Bolts
Bolt Force with Longitudinal Rotation 286 - *330 #385 #445 315 - #410 #700 #823
Bolt Force with Transverse Rotation 286 - 286 286 286 286 - 286 *395 #465
Bolt Force with Pre-Tensioned 1” 286 286 286 286 302 *351†
Bolts and no rotational effect
Force with even load distribution on 31 - 45 51 66 44-61 110 133
bolts (uplift divided by 40 bolts, snug-
fit installation, neglects prying)
7/8” Bolts
Bolt Force with no rotation 110-160 184 238 157-220 #396 #476
Bolt Force with Longitudinal Rotation #320 - #440 #495 #630 #410 - #495 #1156 #1156
Bolt Force with Transverse Rotation *265 - #365 #405 #515 #310 - #480 #702 #790
Bolt Force with Pre-Tensioned 7/8” 219 - 219 220 *249 219 -*239 #396 #476†
Bolts and no rotational effect

* Bolts with Force Exceeding Factored Resistance.
# Bolts with Force Exceeding Ultimate Strength – likely some plastic deformation would occur prior to failure.
† Due to limitations in the modelling, the forces in the pretensioned bolts could be higher than stated.
6.4.3. Prying of Outer 1” Bolts Connecting the Shoe Plate to the Bearing
Figure 42 shows that the maximum force in the 1” bolts. As described below, the 1” bolts were
adequate under the loading for phase 1, and would have been somewhat deficient under the full
design loads.

- 52 -
Figure 42. Force in 1" bolts under phase 1 and design loads.
1) Pure Uplift (no rotation)
The detailed analysis considers scenarios for 1” bolts both snug-tight and pre-tensioned. The
detailed analysis found that there was a prying force on the 1” bolts for the uplift without rotation.
The bolt force ranged from 154% to 140% of the average bolt force (i.e. total uplift divided by 24
bolts), being slightly larger near the locations of the vertical stiffeners. Using the simple model,
the value was 128%. The difference can be explained by the bending of the bearing sole plate
and of the bottom flange – both which were assumed to be infinitely stiff in the simple model.

- 53 -
For calibration, when the flange and sole plate were made infinitely rigid in the 3-D model, the
value of bolt force amplification was 126%.
From Figure 42, it can be seen that the 1” bolts would have been adequate for the full loading in
phase 1, and for SLS design loads. The 1” bolts would have been overloaded for the ULS
design loads.
2) Uplift With Rotation
With the full design rotation, there is separation of the guide bars and the uplift force is
concentrated on only part of the bearing. This leads to only some of the 1” being partly or even
minimally being involved in resisting the uplift force. Under the normal fatigue range (1750 kN
to 2450 kN) of design loads, the force in the 1” bolt would be at or exceeding the bolt resistance
for longitudinal rotation. For the SLS and ULS design loads, the 1” bolts would likely exceed
their ultimate strength for both longitudinal and transverse rotation.
For the fatigue range and SLS loading in phase 1 (not shown in Figure 42), the 1” bolt forces
would have also been close to the ultimate capacity of the bolt under longitudinal rotation.
Under transverse rotation, the 1” bolts would have adequate capacity in phase 1. However, the
7/8” bolts would have been even more overloaded and their yielding, plastic deformation and
load sharing would have reduced the forces on the 1” bolts as well compared to the above linear
analysis. It is also possible that the actual rotations were not quite this high as there was no
physical indication of damage to the 1” bolts.
3) Uplift with Pre-tensioned Bolts (no rotation)
At low uplift force values, the bolt force remains constant at the pre-tension value of about 286
kN. At high uplift forces, the contact pressure induced by the pre-tensioning is fully relieved and
the behaviour of the connection is similar to the case where there was no pretension.
From Figure 42, it can be seen that the bolts would have remained fully pre-tensioned for the
fatigue cyclic loads and for the ULS loads in phase 1. At about 3500 kN, separation of the
plates would begin to occur. At the design SLS load of 4410 kN, the bolt force would be just
over 300 kN. At the ULS design load of 5300 kN, the force would be similar to the case without
pre-tension, and would be in excess of the bolt factored resistance, although still below a value
that would cause likely failure. The 1” bolts were under-designed for the design loads, but this
deficiency likely played no part in the failure.
6.4.4. Prying of the 7/8” Bolts in Phase 1
Figure 43 shows that the maximum force in the 7/8” bolts under the loading in phase 1. As
described below, the 7/8” bolts and shoe plate would have been adequate or marginally
adequate for the loading in phase 1 if the bearing could accommodate rotation. The bolts
would, however, be subject to large cyclic loading if they were not pre-tensioned, and small
cyclic loads (which is still undesirable) if they were pre-tensioned. Without the ability of the
bearing to properly rotate, the bolt forces and cyclic forces would be excessive, the exact
magnitude depending on the actual values of rotation that was imposed.

- 54 -
Figure 43. Forces in 7/8" bolts for phase 1 (failure loads at northwest bearing).
The maximum force amplification for the exterior lines of bolts was found to be 350% of the
average bolt force (i.e. total uplift divided by 40 bolts). For the simple calibration model, the
magnitude of the force amplification was found to be 286%. To isolate this difference, the flange
stiffness was increased in the 3D model and the bolt amplification was found to be 290%, which
was very close to the simple model. Thus the differences can be explained by the longitudinal
variation of the flange stiffness due to the vertical bearing stiffeners. There were two other
factors that contributed to the bolt force amplification. The first is the true prying force, caused
by contact pressure near the girder centreline from the upward deflection of the shoe plate. The

- 55 -
second is because the stiffer load path is through the outer line of bolts since it involves less
bending of the shoe plate in the load path. The contribution of this second component could be
isolated by removing the contact pressure elements from the 3D model. It was found that the
stiff load path was the largest factor and accounted for about 50% of the total bolt force
amplification, while true prying accounted for about 30% and varying stiffness of the bottom
flange accounted for about 20%.
The inner line of bolts carried virtually no tension. This varied from zero tension away from the
vertical stiffener plates, to a force of about 10% of the average bolt force near the stiffener
plates.
Under ULS loading in phase 1, the maximum bolt force would be roughly equal to the factored
capacity. The weaker A36 shoe plate would have exceeded its yield capacity at a load between
the SLS and ULS load.
With the full design rotation, the force in the bolt would have exceeded the capacity of the 7/8”
bolt at loads below the normal fatigue range. At the SLS load, the bolt force would have
exceeded its ultimate strength. The shoe plate would have also yielded at loads within the
normal fatigue range. Failure of the bolts and shoe plate did not happen immediately after
opening since the actual rotations were likely less than the design rotation and since plastic
deformation of the bolts allowed some load sharing and load redistribution.
At low uplift force values, the bolt force remains constant at the pre-tension value of about 219
kN. At high uplift forces, the contact pressure induced by the pre-tensioning is fully relieved and
the behaviour of the connection is similar to the case where there was no pretension.
At the normal fatigue load range in phase 1, the bolt force would remain unchanged at the pre-
tension value. At roughly the SLS load, the shoe plate would begin to separate at the most
heavily loaded bolt. Somewhat prior to the ultimate load, the A36 shoe plate would yield. At the
ULS load, the bolt force would roughly equal the factored bolt capacity.
6.4.5. Prying of the 7/8” Bolts At Centre-West Bearing Design Loads
Figure 44 shows that the maximum force in the 7/8” bolts under the full design loading at the
centre-west bearing. As described below, the 7/8” bolts and shoe plate would not have been
adequate for the SLS or ULS design loading. The bolts would have also been subject to cyclic
loading since the flange and shoe plate would separate under fatigue loading.

- 56 -
Figure 44. Forces on 7/8" bolts under design loads (centre-west bearing).
Under ULS design loading, and even SLS loading, the maximum bolt force would greatly
exceed the factored capacity and even the ultimate capacity. The weaker A36 shoe plate would
have exceeded its yield capacity at a load at the top of the fatigue range, while even a shoe
plate with 350A steel would have yielded before the SLS load.

- 57 -
This condition was not explored for the design loads since it became obvious that even under
the reduced loading in phase 1, the bolts and shoe plate would have had their capacities greatly
exceeded.
The bolt pretension would have been overcome near the top of the normal fatigue range. The
bolts would have not failed, but been subjected to fatigue loading, under which they perform
very poorly. The A36 shoe would have also yielded with a load near the top of the fatigue
range. Before the SLS load, the 7/8” bolts would have exceeded their ultimate capacities and
even the 350A shoe plate would have yielded.
6.5. Evaluation of Bolt Fatigue

The following factors contribute to fatigue of the 7/8” A490 bolts connecting the bottom flange
with the shoe plate.
1. Axial tension of the bolts due to the force range on the bearings in uplift, which are
amplified by prying of the shoe plate since the 7/8” bolts are not tightened.
2. Local prying of the bolts due to eccentricity of bearing on the nut, due to lack of bearing
in the longitudinal direction of the bridge (no bevelled washer and lack of pretension of
bolts). As described in Section 6.3, this amounts to about 160 MPa.
3. Local prying of the bolts due to eccentricity of bearing on the nut, in the transverse
direction, due to prying and bending of the shoe plate with lack of pretension of bolts.
4. Amplification of applied tension of the bolts due to inability to accommodate rotation.
This line in shown in the preceding charts and results in greatly increased bolt forces.
The first item, prying of the shoe plate, is discussed in Section 6.4. At failure, the force range at
the northwest bearing due to FLS was 563 kN (see Table 2) which corresponds to an average
bolt fatigue force range with no rotation of about 50 kN (see Figure 43) and a stress range fsr of
142 MPa. Without prying, and having the FLS force divided evenly on the 40 bolts, the stress
range would be 40 MPa. At FLS, the CHBDC requires that average fatigue stress range, 0.52
fsr, (74 MPa, or 20 MPa for evenly loaded bolts) is less than the fatigue stress range resistance
Fsr.
The fatigues stress range resistance is calculated based on the number of cycles of live load or
the constant amplitude threshold stress range. A490 bolts have a constant amplitude threshold
stress range Fsrt of 262 MPa according to CHBDC, however implicit in this is the assumption
that the bolts would be fully pre-tensioned. For simple threaded parts without pretension, the
fatigue category is “E”, with a constant amplitude threshold stress range, Fsrt of 31 MPa.
Therefore, based on infinite cycles, Fsr is 16 MPa (Fsrt/2). At failure, the number of trucks which
crossed the bridge is estimated at 1300 trucks per day for 50 days. For the number of fatigue
cycles at 50 days in service, the fatigue stress range resistance (Fsr= 177 MPa), exceeds the
applied 0.52 fsr stress value of 74 MPa, therefore, fatigue of the bolts in axial tension alone from
prying does not explain the failure at this early time. The resistance at an infinite fatigue life (16

- 58 -
MPa), is less than the applied 0.52 fsr stress value (of 20 MPa) with full even load distribution,
meaning that the lack of tightness could have eventually lead to failure even if prying did not
exist or at least an inadequate amount of safety against fatigue failure. Since the bolts were not
pretensioned, they would loosen after several load cycles, and there could be an additional
impact added to the bolt loading not accounted for above.
The second item, the lack of bevelled washer, is expected to add a cyclic stress of about 160
MPa to the extreme fibre of the bolt, as described in Section 6.3. This high value would be on
the west face of the bolt, although it could exist to a lesser degree on the east face depending
on which span is loaded and the resulting direction of girder rotation. With this added to the 74
MPa, the actual stress range is larger than the fatigue stress range resistance (160 + 74 = 234
> 177 MPa), and failure could be expected, or at least an inadequate amount of safety against
fatigue failure.
The third item relates to local prying of the bolts due to lack of pretension. As discussed
previously, local prying causes local yielding of the bolts which has the potential to alleviate the
local prying effects. Nevertheless, local prying is unpredictable and often leads to premature
failure of bolts (Kulak, et al., 1987). At service loads, this is expected to be a smaller effect.
The fourth item, amplification of applied tension due to inability of the bearing to accommodate
rotation, increases the applied loading on the bolts at the front and back of the bearing
considerably. Assuming an amplification factor of 3 (as is visible from Figure 43), the bolt fatigue
stress range due the passage of a fatigue truck (3 x 74 = 222 MPa). This in itself exceeds the
stress range resistance for the actual number of cycles at failure (222 > 177 MPa). In
combination with the lack bolt tightness and lack of bevelled washer, the fatigue stress (222 +
160 = 382 MPa) would exceed the allowable at the time of failure (177 MPa) by about 115%.
Finally, the bolts are beyond yield for the above noted amplification and the CHBDC equations
are strictly for loads within the elastic range. These load levels would mean that the bolts would
be subject to an alternating plasticity mechanism and not true fatigue. This is also referred to as
or low cycle fatigue , since the steel can tolerate significantly less stress cycles than when within
the elastic range. Figure 19 shows beach marks on the fracture surface which are consistent
with high stress, lower cycle loading.
At the northwest bearing which failed, the capacity of the bolted connection between the girder
bottom flange and shoe plate is weaker than the applied forces required to separate the guide
bars of the bearing. Simply put, the bolts could have exhibited plastic behaviour before
separation occurred.

- 59 -
a)
b)
c)
d)
Figure 45. Possible force distribution in bolts, after plasticity.

- 60 -
A plastic analysis was not performed on the shoe plate connection since the elastic analysis
showed significant enough overload to conclude the deficient elements within the connection.
Conceptually, it would be expected that the bolts at one end or the other would elongate when
the girder is subject to longitudinal rotation since they are subject to the highest loading (see
Figure 45a). This elongation would open a small gap between the shoe plate and flange. When
the rotation switches directions, the bolts at the other end would elongate and a gap would open
at that end (see Figure 45b). When the connection is then subject to pure uplift load (or minimal
rotation), much of the load would be carried by bolts closer to the bearing centerline since they
did not previously elongate during the girder rotations. These bolts could be carrying more load
than calculated using the elastic analysis. This is shown in Figure 45c). When next subject to
rotation and uplift, the gap would open some more, leading to plastic elongation of the extreme
bolts. This plastic elongation would progress to not just the extreme bolt (west most bolt in
Figure 45d), but also to the neighbouring bolts. Depending on the number of pure uplift load
cycles and uplift with rotation, it could be either the bolts at the centerline of bearing, or the edge
bolts, that fail in low cycle fatigue first. Once the first bolt fails, the load on other bolts increases,
leading to a progressive failure of the connection.

- 61 -
7. Discussion
To summarize the pertinent results of the evaluation, there are 6 mechanisms that contributed
to failure of the bolts at the northwest bearing, with the first 3 being the most significant.
1. Amplification of applied tension of the bolts due to prying of the flexible shoe plate.
The prying of the shoe plate, the relative stiffness of the load path through the outside
line of bolts, and the varying stiffness of the bottom flange, amplifies the bolt force in the
exterior 7/8” bolt lines and renders the bolts of the interior 7/8” bolts almost completely
ineffective. Prying action of the shoe plate is influenced by the detailing of the 1” bolts
between the shoe plate the bearing, by the bearing supplier. However, it is not clear that
another connection would have been feasible, and the designer specified the 7/8” bolt
configuration between girder bottom flange and shoe plate without conditions. In simple
terms, based on elastic analysis, the total effect of prying of the shoe plate leads to bolt
forces which could be up to 3.5 times greater than the average bolt force (assuming
uplift reaction divided by 40 bolts connecting the girder bottom flange to the shoe plate).
2. Amplification of applied tension of the bolts due to the bearing’s inability to

accommodate rotation.
The bearing’s inability to accommodate rotation causes an amplification of the applied

tension in the 7/8” bolts. In isolation of other mechanisms, the bolt force at front or back
of the shoe plate could be amplified 2.8 times the average force at a 7/8” bolt row.
3. Local prying of the snug tight bolts due to eccentricity of bearing on the nut (loose bolt
and no beveled washer).
Local prying increases the bolt tension on one side caused by bending of the bolt from
the uneven contact. It was found that this would add a cyclic stress of about 160 MPa to
the extreme fibre of the bolt. This effect would have been eliminated with properly pre-
tensioned bolts.
When combined with the effects described 1 and 2, local prying makes it more likely that
the extreme fibre of the bolt would exceed yield stress at working and fatigue loads.
With fatigue stress due to bending in addition to the direct cyclic axial tension on the bolt,
the fatigue resistance was exceeded at a small number of cycles and lead to high fatigue
stresses and a high-stress, low-cycle fatigue failure.
4. Local prying of the bolts due to eccentricity of bearing on the nut, in the transverse
direction due to bending and prying of the shoe plate.
Similar to the local prying due to the lack of bevelled washer, this local prying is caused
by uneven bearing of the nut against a shoe plate that bends. Since the shoe plate was
expected to yield at some load levels, this local prying is expected to occur, although its
magnitude is difficult to quantify. It is a factor that leads to unpredictable behaviour and

- 62 -
potentially premature failure of bolts (Kulak, et al., 1987).
5. Premature yielding and inadequate bending capacity of the shoe plate as specified in the
design, separate from its flexibility.
6. Premature yielding and inadequate capacity of the shoe plate due to a lower supplied
material grade than specified.
Premature yielding of the shoe plate before yielding of bolts can increase local prying,
and lead to greater elongation and non-concentric loading of the bolts. The inadequate
shoe plate could have been a catalyst of failure but is not likely a large cause of the
failure. The capacity of the shoe plate would have been a larger factor in the final
configuration if the bolts were properly pre-tensioned and the bearing could properly
accommodate rotation. Even with a Grade 350A shoe plate, the capacity would have
been exceeded under the design loads.
The llikely load on the northwest bearing was 2045 kN (based on SLS phase 1 load). The
supplier used a common design for all bearings at the west abutment. The highest load
specified at ULS at a west abutment bearing was 5300 kN, for the centre bearing. This means
that the failure occurred at a load of only 40% of the load the bearing was designed to take.
Another purpose of the report was to evaluate the ability of the components, in the load path
from the girder to the west abutment, to meet the requirements of the CHBDC. The evaluation
showed that the shoe plate, bolted connection between shoe plate and girder, bolted connection
between shoe plate and bearing, and bearing design all failed to meet the requirements of the
CHBDC. These are summarized in Table 12.
7.1. Design and Construction Requirements

Table 12 summarizes the design and construction requirements of each component of work
related to the west abutment bearings, and compares the installed conditions to the contractual
requirements. The comments explain the inter-relationships between components.

- 63 -
Table 12. Design and Construction Requirements for Each Component of Work Related to the West Abutment Bearings of the Nipigon River Bridge
Component What are the requirements? Was the provided information complete? Comments
Were the requirements met?
Overall bridge design, calculation Bridge to be designed according to the CHBDC Yes – the provided design information was complete. The Conformance with the CHBDC was not independently verified by the MTO.
of reactions, movements, and to satisfy SLS, ULS and FLS. correctness of the design data was not verified by the The Specialist Construction Engineer was able to design the erection respecting the limit states of the CHBDC. The as-
rotations at the bearings MTO. built reactions provided by the Specialist Engineer are within the limits of the Contract Drawings.
Contract Documents Contract Documents are complete and convey Yes – the structural requirements for the bearings are Although the requirements are complete, the designer may not have included the appropriate requirements. The designer
(for bearings) to the Contractor all the necessary requirements completely defined in the Contract Drawings (loads, used OPSS 1203 in the Contract although the specification is written for supply of bearings already prequalified by the
to the design. movements and rotations at all limit states). The shoe MTO and on the DSM, not for the supply bearings subject to permanent uplift. OPSS 1203 places the responsibility for
plate and bolted connection to the girder are detailed on the design of the shoe plate connection to the bearings with the Contractor. Meanwhile, the same connection between the
the Contract Drawings. bearing and shoe plate affects the forces on the shoe plate and the capacity of the bolted connection to the girder. The
designer did not require the Contractor to verify the impact of their bearing design on the structure, and did not require the
Contractor to submit the connection for approval.
Shoe plate Shoe plate to be designed to the CHBDC for the Yes – the shoe plate and the bolted connection to the The force effects on the shoe plate are affected by the way the shoe plate is connected to the bearing (to be designed by
loads transferred from the girder to the bearings. girder are detailed on the Contract Drawings, indicating the Contractor). The responsibility for verifying the shoe plate was not transferred to the Contractor. No requirements
they were designed by the bridge designer. were included in the Contract to require the Contractor submit the final connection to the Design Engineer for review or
No – as designed, the shoe plates do not meet the approval.
requirements of the CHBDC for the bearing reactions MMM did not provide calculations for the shoe plate design, or for the bolted connection between the girder and shoe
specified on the Contract Drawings. plate that were dated prior to failure.
OPSS 1203 requires the shoe plate be supplied No – the shoe plate supplied was a different grade of The material specified on the Contract Drawings was CAN/CSA-G40.21 350W with a yield strength of 350 MPa. The
with the bearing. Contractor to supply the shoe material. shoe plate supplied was ASTM A36 steel with a yield strength of 248 kPa. As supplied, the shoe plate’s capacity was only
plate as specified on the Contract Drawings. 71% of the design on the Contract Drawings.
Bolted connection between the Bolted connection to be designed to the CHBDC Yes – the shoe plate and the bolted connection to the The capacity of the bolted connection is affected by the attachment of the bearing to the shoe plate. However, no
girder and shoe plate for the loads transferred from the girder to the girder are detailed on the Contract Drawings, indicating requirements were included in the Contract to require the Contractor to evaluate the connection or submit the final
bearings. they were designed by the bridge designer. connection or bearing design to the Design Engineer for review or approval.
No – the bolted connection does not have adequate
strength to meet the requirements. Prying of the shoe
plate amplifies the force on the bolts.
Contract Drawings specified 32 - M22 A325 high Yes – the information provided by the Contractor was Imperial 7/8” bolts supplied are an acceptable equivalent of M22 bolts. Bolts detailed and supplied were too long for the
strength bolts complete with bevelled washers. complete. application. The Contractor issued a non-conformance report (NCR 213-6000-224) identifying the long bolts and
No – 32 - 7/8” A490 bolts detailed on Working Drawings proposing 16 mm structural steel washer plates. The proposal was accepted but never implemented. It is unclear why the
but were too long and not detailed with bevelled washers. supplied bolts were A490 instead of A325 as specified in the contract documents and it is unclear when the decision for
the substitution was made.
Supply A490 high strength bolts compliant with Yes The Contractor submitted Bolt Certifications as required in the specifications. NRC and Surface Science Western
the requirements of the ASTM A490 conducted strength and notch toughness testing of failed bolt specimens. Tests on failed bolt specimens confirmed that
specification the material requirements for the A490 bolts met the requirements.
Bolts to be pretensioned by turn-of-nut method No – Bolts were not pretensioned Without properly pretensioned bolts, the moment in the shoe plate is 50% higher than with pretensioned bolts. The shoe
per the CHBDC. plate yields in service.
Non-pretensioned bolts in this connection are subjected to local prying which causes uneven loading of the bolt head and
nut, bending of the bolts along their shank, and local yielding of the bolts.
Non-pretensioned bolts are subject to cyclic loading, and subject to a large fatigue stress range in service.
The CHBDC requires that all high strength bolts in a bridge be pretensioned.

- 64 -
Component What are the requirements? Was the provided information complete? Comments
Were the requirements met?
Bolted connection between the OPSS 1203 requires the bearing be Yes/No – the bolted connection is adequate, but only if The bolted connection is adequate only if the bearing permits rotation in uplift. Since the bearing does not permit rotation
shoe plate and the bearing mechanically fastened to the shoe plate and the the bearing were able to rotate. in uplift, the bolted connection is inadequate considering the amplification of the bolt force due to inability to
connection be designed for the loads on the accommodate rotation in uplift.
Contract Drawings.
Bearing design Bearing shall meet the design requirements of No Uplift is restrained by interlocking guide bars between the sole plate and the masonry plate of the bearing which slide
the Contract Documents.  The bearings do not allow rotation in uplift. along a horizontal plane. In uplift, the bearing does not allow the rotations specified in the Contract Drawings. When
forced to rotate, the guide bars separate and the uplift force is transferred at the front or back of the guide bars. The
 The bearings do not use the material and grade of bearings were not designed to accommodate any separation of the guide bars. Therefore, the bearings are not designed
steel specified in the Contract. to accommodate any rotation in uplift.
 The bearing sliding surfaces of the uplift restraint The material specified on the Contract Drawings was CAN/CSA-G40.21 350W with a yield strength of 350 MPa. The
guide bars at the centre-west bearing do not meet bearings were manufactured of ASTM A36 steel with a yield strength of 248 kPa.
the requirements of CHBDC and OPSS 1203.
The average contact pressures for the northwest bearing are within the CHDBC limits, but the contact pressures of the
centre-west bearing exceed the CHBDC limits. The centre-west bearing PTFE sliding surface is inadequate, even for
uniformly applied pressure.
Connection of the bearing to the The bearing to be prestressed down to the Yes Prestressing bars were detailed on the bearing drawings and meet the requirements stated on the Contract Drawings and
abutment abutments with 120% of the ultimate uplift load the Bearings NSSP in Addendum 2.
indicated on the Contract Drawings. Addendum
2 requires the prestressing bars be detailed by
the Contractor.
Bars installed and prestressed to the level Yes Bar stressing report confirms stressing of 16 bars on October 6, 2015.The bars were stressed to 120% of the ultimate
indicated on the bearing Working Drawings. uplift load as required by the design.
Working Drawings OPSS 1203 requires the Contractor submit Yes – the Working Drawings and Certificate of Working Drawings revision No. 7 were submitted to the CA with two seals dated March 11, 2015. A Certificate of
Working Drawings to the CA at least 1 week Compliance were submitted. Compliance was written by Remisz Consulting Engineers Ltd. stating that the Disktron Bearing shop drawings were in
prior to commencement of fabrication. OPSS general compliance with the Contract Drawings and Specifications, the applicable sections of the CAN/CSA-S6-06,
1203 requires the Contractor submit a Certificate CAN/CSA-G40.21-M04, OPSS 1203, and AASHTO LRFD Bridges Design Specifications for Highway Bridges, 6th Edition.
of Compliance to the CA upon completion of the Working Drawings and Certificate of Compliance were received by the MTO on March 30, 2015.
fabrication and prior to installation of the
bearings.
Per OPSS 1203, verify that the drawings are No – the Engineer (working for the bearing supplier) The bearings fail to meet the requirements of the Contract Documents. The incorrect grade of steel is used, the bearings
consistent with the Contract Documents and sealed the Working Drawings even though the do not accommodate rotation in uplift, the PTFE is overstressed, and the bolts are not equipped with bevelled washers.
sound engineering practices. requirements were not met. The Engineer sealed the drawings without properly verifying the Working Drawings were consistent with the Contract
Documents.
Per OPSS 922, submit a Certificate of No – the Quality Verification Engineer (QVE) submitted a The QVE issued a Certificate of Conformance, sealed November 24, 2015, stating the bearings were installed in general
Conformance stating that the fabrication, Certificate of Conformance even though the requirements conformance with the stamped Working Drawings and the requirements of the Contract Documents. The Certificate of
installation and adjustments are in general of the Contract Documents were not met. Conformance was received by the MTO on November 29, 2015. Despite this, the bearings fail to meet the requirements
conformance with the requirements of the layout of the Contract Documents. The incorrect grade of steel is used, the bearings do not accommodate rotation in uplift, the
and installation drawings, Working Drawings, bolts were not equipped with bevelled washers, and the bolts were not pretensioned upon installation. The QVE sealed
and Contract Documents for the bearings. as-built drawings.
Verify the submission contains all the Yes – the information listed in OPSS 1203 appears on Although OPSS 1203 only requires that one Engineer affix his or her seal and signature on the Working Drawings,
submission requirements outlined in the the Working Drawings. The Working Drawings were verifying that the drawings are consistent with the Contract Documents, the Working Drawings submitted contained 2
Contract Documents, specifically OPSS 1203. sealed stamps.

- 65 -
8. Conclusions
The structural analysis of the bearing and its connections to the adjacent components of the
bridge revealed that the failure at the northwest bearing of the Nipigon River Bridge was caused
by:
1. prying effects due to the flexible shoe plate leading to higher forces in the exterior line of
bolts,
2. the bearing’s inability to accommodate rotation leading to higher forces in the end rows
of bolts,
3. the lack of pretensioning of the bolts and lack of bevelled washers that lead to high
fatigue stresses and a high-stress, low-cycle fatigue failure.
Each of these of factors on its own is significant and could have led to a failure, but combined
they made failure inevitable. Other factors which also contributed to and accelerated the failure
include local bending of the bolts, yielding of the shoe plate.
Another purpose of the report was to evaluate the ability of the components, in the load path
from the girder to the west abutment, to meet the requirements of the CHBDC. The evaluation
showed that the shoe plate, bolted connection between shoe plate and girder, bolted connection
between shoe plate and bearing, and bearing design all failed to meet the requirements of the
CHBDC.

- 66 -
9. References
ASTM Standard A490, 2008. Standard Specification for High-Strength Bolts, Classes 10.9 and
10.9.3, for Structural Steel Joints. West Conshohocken, PA: ASTM International.
Canadian Institute of Steel Construction, 2008. Handbook of Steel Construction. Tenth Edition
ed. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Steel Construction.
Canadian Standards Association, 2006. CAN/CSA-S6-06: Canadian Highway Bridge Design

Code. Mississauga, Ontario: CSA.
Kulak, G. L., 2005. High Strength Bolting for Canadian Engineers. 1st ed. Toronto: Candadian
Institute of Steel Construction.
Kulak, G. L., Fisher, J. W. & Struik, J. H. A., 1987. Guide to Design Criteria for Bolted and
Riveted Joints. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Kulak, G. L. & Grondin, G. Y., 2006. Limit States Design in Structural Steel. Eighth Edition ed.
Toronto: Canadian Institute of Steel Construction.
Makar, J., 2016. Evaluation of Failed Nipigon River Bridge West Abutment Bolts, May 16 2016,
Ottawa: National Research Council Canada.
Ramamurthy, S. et al., 2016. Report on the Evaluation of the Bolts Provided by MTO, 18 April
2016, London: Surface Science Western.

Appendix A: Contract Drawings
Drawings G-1, sheet 190-A-R2, General Arrangement
Drawing A-1, sheet 208-C-R2, West Abutment Details
Drawing A-10, sheet 218-B-R1, Bearing Plan and Design Data
Drawing A-11, sheet 218-1-R2, Bearing Details
Drawing S-3, sheet 292-B-R1, Structural Steel West Span North & South Girder
Drawing S-7, sheet 296-B-R1, Structural Steel Girder Stiffener Details
Drawing S-13, sheet 302-C-R1, Structural Steel Typical Floor Beam

RECEIVED OCTOBER 10, 2014 - RFC #310
INSTRUCTION NOTICE #71 - JUNE 11, 2014
INSTRUCTION NOTICE #71 - JUNE 11, 2014
RECEIVED OCTOBER 9, 2013 - RFC#012
RECEIVED OCTOBER 9, 2013 - RFC#012
RECEIVED NOVEMBER 13, 2013
Appendix B: Bearing Working Drawings
Bearing Working Drawings, RJ Watson Inc., Revision No. 8, As-built, October 21, 2015
Sheet 1 – Notes and Revisions Log

Sheet 2 – Bearing Installation
Sheet 3 – DB440MR Type I Assembly
Sheet 4 – DB2860MR Assembly
Sheet 5 – DB1860MR Assembly
Sheet 6 – DB440MR Type II Assembly
Sheet 7 – Bearing Details-1
Sheet 15 – As Built Measurements

NOTES: REVISIONS DRAWING INDEX
GENERAL REV. DESCRIPTION SHEET NO. DATE SHEET NO. DESCRIPTION

1. MARK CENTERLINES ON BEARING MASONRY PLATE, BEVELED SHOE PLATE, AND
SOLE PLATE EDGES. THESE IDENTIFICATION MARKS WILL BE USED TO MEASURE POST-TENSIONING SYSTEM
OFFSETS IN THE FIELD. USE INDELIBLE INK TO PLACE THESE MARKS. 1 2-3, 6 9/3/2014 1 NOTES AND REVISIONS LOG
ADJUSTMENTS
2. MARK EACH BEARING WITH THE NAME OF THE MANUFACTURER, MODEL NUMBER, 2 BEARING INSTALLATION
INSTALLATION LOCATION, AND DATE OF MANUFACTURE. 2 ADDED GROUT TUBE 2-3, 6 9/25/2014
3 DB440MR TYPE I ASSEMBLY
3. ALL WORK SHALL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CSA STANDARD CAN/CSA G40.21-
M04, OPSS 1203, AASHTO LRFD BRIDGE DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS FOR HIGHWAY 3 FIXED PARTMARK LABEL 8-9 9/30/2014 4 DB2860MR ASSEMBLY
BRIDGES, 6TH EDITION, AND THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS.
5 DB1830MR ASSEMBLY
MATERIALS 4 CONNECTION BOLT QTY 3 10/8/2014
6 DB440M TYPE II ASSEMBLY
1. STEEL PLATES SHALL BE AS NOTED ON BILL OF MATERIALS. ASTM A36 SHALL
BE SUPPLIED AS ASTM A36 OR BETTER BASED ON MATERIAL AVAILABILITY. GRADE 5 POST-TENSIONING SYSTEM 2-3, 6 10/21/2014 7 BEARING DETAILS-1
50 (345) STEEL SHALL BE SUPPLIED AS EITHER ASTM A572 GR 50 (345) AND/OR
ASTM A588 BASED ON MATERIAL AVAILABILITY. A490 DACROMET BOLTS, TOP 8 BEARING DETAILS-2
6 ANCHOR ROD 1-3, 6 11/3/2014
2. ALL STAINLESS STEEL SHALL BE 12 GAUGE ASTM A240, TYPE 304 AND HAVE 9 BEARING DETAILS-3
A NO. 8 BRIGHT MIRROR FINISH UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.
7 CORRECTION 10 1/27/2015 10 BEARING DETAILS-4
3. PTFE SHEET SHALL CONFORM TO THE CANADIAN HIGHWAY DESIGN CODE,
SECTION 11.6.3, WITH SPHERICAL RESERVOIRS FOR LUBRICATION WHICH ARE 8MM 2-3, 6-8, 11 BEARING DETAILS-5
DIAMETER AND 2.5MM DEEP. THE RESERVOIRS SHALL BE EVENLY DISTRIBUTED 8 CONTRACTOR COMMENTS 10/21/2015
10-13
ACROSS THE SURFACE AND SHALL OCCUPY 20 TO 30% OFF THE SURFACE. ALL 12 BEARING DETAILS-6
SHEET PTFE SHALL BE ETCHED ON ONE SIDE PRIOR TO BONDING. A UNIFORM
LAYER OF CHEMGRIP OR RJ WATSON APPROVED EQUAL EPOXY ADHESIVE SHALL BE 13 BEARING DETAILS-7
APPLIED FOR EFFECTIVE PTFE BONDING.
14 BEARING DETAILS-8
4. THE POLYTRON DISC SHALL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CAN/CSA-56-00
SECTION 11.6.7.2. THE TOP AND BOTTOM SURFACES OF THE POLYTRON DISC
SHALL BE ROUGHENED. THE DUROMETER SHALL BE 62D 3 AND THE COLOR SHALL 15 AS BUILT MEASURMENTS
BE RED.
COATINGS
1. REMOVE MILL SCALE PRIOR TO HOT-DIP GALVANIZING USING CHEMICAL CLEANING
METHODS.
2. HOT-DIP GALVANIZE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASTM A123/A123-M STANDARD
SPECIFICATION FOR ZINC (HOT-DIP GALVANIZED) COATINGS ON IRON AND STEEL
PRODUCTS. CL WEST ABUTMENT UPSTATION CL EAST ABUTMENT
GALVANIZING SHALL NOT BE APPLIED TO THE FOLLOWING SURFACES:
-AREAS DIRECTLY ABOVE, BENEATH OR WITHIN 1/4" OF THE POLYTRON DISC
-AREAS OF PTFE BONDING
-SRM AND SRM CLEARANCE HOLE
-STAINLESS STEEL SHEET. CL NORTH GIRDER
BEARING #1 BEARING #4
REPAIR GALVANIZED COATINGS USING GALVAGUARD BY TECK COMINCO LTD.
3. CONNECTION BOLTS, ANCHOR RODS, HEAVY HEX NUTS AND HARDENED WASHERS
SHALL BE HOT-DIP GALVANIZED BY A METHOD CONFORMING TO ASTM A153/A153M.
4. ASTM A490 BOLTS SHALL RECIEVE A DACROMET COATING IN ACCORDANCE WITH 6
ASTM F1136. CL CENTER GIRDER
WELDING BEARING #2 BEARING #5
1. ALL OTHER WELDING SHALL BE PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CAN/CSA-W59-
M. ALL WELDING SHALL BE DONE WITH ELECTRODES CERTIFIED BY THE CANADIAN
WELDING BUREAU TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF CAN/CSA W48.
2. ALL STAINLESS STEEL WELDING SHALL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AWS D1.6
WELDING
CODE-STAINLESS STEEL. CL SOUTH GIRDER
BEARING #3 BEARING #6
3. WELDING TO BEARING PLATES AFTER ASSEMBLY IS PERMITTED PROVIDED WELDING
PROCEDURES RESTRICT THE MAXIMUM TEMPERATURE IN THE AREAS OF THE POLYTRON
DISC AND PTFE TO NO MORE THAN 107 C AS DETERMINED BY USE OF TEMPERATURE
INDICATING WAX PENCILS. PROTECTIVE MATERIAL SHALL BE PLACED OVER THE ALL WEIGHTS IN KG.
BEARING ASSEMBLY TO PROTECT AGAINST SPARKS AND FLASH. AFTER WELDING IS ALL DIMENSIONS IN MILLIMETERS
COMPLETE, EXPOSED STEEL SHALL BE TOUCHED UP IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
SPECIFIED COATING SYSTEM. PLAN BEARING LOCATIONS
SHIPPING AND HANDLING SCALE: NONE
1. PTFE AND STAINLESS STEEL SHALL BE PROTECTED FROM DAMAGE, AIRBORNE DEBRIS
AND CONTAMINANTS AT ALL TIMES. THESE SURFACES SHALL BE INSPECTED FOR SUCH
DAMAGE AND DEBRIS PRIOR TO FINAL ASSEMBLY AND INSTALLATION.
2. COMPLETED BEARINGS SHALL BE INDIVIDUALLY BANDED IN THE UPRIGHT POSITION.
BANDS SHALL PREVENT SEPARATION OF UPPER AND LOWER BEARING COMPONENTS AND
SHALL NOT BE REMOVED PRIOR TO INSTALLATION.
SERIAL NO: 13003-*; (*)=BEARING NUMBER
3. BEARING ASSEMBLIES SHALL BE HANDLED BY THEIR BOTTOM SURFACES ONLY, AND
SHALL NOT BE LIFTED BY THEIR TOPS, SIDES AND/OR SHIPPING BANDS. BEARING MODEL NUMBER BEARING LOCATION GIRDER
NUMBER
4. BEARINGS SHALL BE STORED IN A CLEAN, DRY, AND UPRIGHT POSITION. 1 DB440MR TYPE I WEST ABUTMENT NORTH
5. AT NO TIME PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE PROJECT MAY ANY BEARING BE 2 DB440MR TYPE II WEST ABUTMENT CENTER
DISASSEMBLED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM RJ WATSON, INC. 3 DB440MR TYPE I WEST ABUTMENT SOUTH
4 DB1830MR EAST ABUTMENT NORTH
INSTALLATION 5 DB2860MR EAST ABUTMENT CENTER
1. CONTRACTOR SHALL TAKE SPECIAL CARE TO PROTECT STAINLESS STEEL AND PTFE 6 DB1830MR EAST ABUTMENT SOUTH
SURFACES FROM DAMAGE AND/OR DEBRIS INTRUSION DURING THE INSTALLATION OF
BEARINGS AND ANCHORAGE.
2. BEARINGS SHALL BE INSTALLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TOLERANCES PROVIDED

IN AASHTO LRFD BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATIONS, SECTION 18.3.5.
5. CONTRACTOR SHALL ADJUST PEDESTAL ELEVATIONS TO ACCOMMODATE FINAL
BEARING HEIGHT.
6. BEARINGS ARE TO BE SET LEVEL. REV.NO. 8 DATE : 10/21/15
LEGEND PROJECT INFORMATION: TITLE:

NIPIGON RIVER BRIDGE REPLACEMENT
THUNDER BAY, CANADA NOTES AND REVISIONS LOG
##
DENOTES QTY. CONTRACT NO. 2013-6000
WP NO. 124-90-01
CLOUD NOTES ARE TO BE
PERMANENTLY MARKED IN DO NOT SCALE DRAWING
POSITIONS SHOWN ON DETAILS 11035 WALDEN AVE,
ALDEN, NEW YORK 14004
OWNER: ONTARIO MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION DTL'D BY: MR DATE: 8/4/2014
TYP=TYPICAL TOLERANCING: ORDER 13003
NO:
TPI= THREADS PER INCH AS PER AASHTO LRFD BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION CONSULTANT: MMM CHK'D BY: TWB DATE: 8/18/2014
SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 18.1.4.2-1.
DENOTES THICK END UNLESS NOTED OTHERWISE CONTRACTOR: BOT CONSTRUCTION BEARING TYPE: DISKTRON SHEET: 1 TO 15
CL BEARING &
GIRDER
CL GIRDER &
BEARING
CL BEARING
LONGITUDINAL
LONGITUDINAL
UPSTATION
CL BEARING
UPSTATION
DB440MR TYPE I SHOWN

DB1830MR SHOWN PLAN DB440MR TYPE II INSTALLED SIMILAR
PLAN DB2860MR INSTALLED SIMILAR CONNECTION BOLT (HD1)
24 PLACES
CL BEARING & GIRDER
HEAVY HEX NUT (HF1)
24 PLACES GIRDER
HARDENED WASHER (HE1) CONNECTION BOLT (HA1)
48 PLACES 32 PLACES
HEAVY HEX NUT (HC1)
32 PLACES
BEVELED SHOE PLATE (PA1)
HARDENED WASHER (HB1)
CL BEARING & GIRDER GIRDER 32 PLACES
LONGITUDINAL
ONLY. 10 HEAVY HEX NUT (HC3) 1 TOP ANCHOR ROD (HG1A)
SEE WELDING 8 PLACES
10 6 PLACES 1 6
NOTE #1
HARDENED WASHER (HB3) 8 UPPER BEARING BLOCK (PE1)
12 PLACES
HEAVY HEX NUT (HJ1)
BEVELED SHOE PLATE (PA3) 16 PLACES
10.000 THICK, NON-SHRINK
SOLE PLATE (PE3) BEDDING GROUT
CONNECTION BOLT (HA3)
6 PLACES HARDENED WASHER (HH1) ALL WEIGHTS IN KG.
10.000 THICK, NON-SHRINK 8 PLACES
ANCHOR ROD (HG3) ALL DIMENSIONS IN MILLIMETERS
BEDDING GROUT 4 PLACES
8 LOWER BEARING BLOCK (PC1)
HEAVY HEX NUT (HJ3) CONCRETE PEDESTAL
8 PLACES
HARDENED WASHER (HH3) 1 STOP-TYPE COUPLER (HM1)

8 PLACES 8 PLACES
EMBEDMENT
MASONRY PLATE (PC3) 1 BOTTOM ANCHOR ROD (HG1B)
8 PLACES
3300
600 CONCRETE PEDESTAL 5
EMBEDMENT CONCRETE PIER CONCRETE PIER
2 INTERNAL GROUT TUBE (HN1)

8 PLACES
5 TOP OF PILE CAP
WASHER PLATE (HL1)

DB1830MR SHOWN 8 PLACES DB440MR TYPE I SHOWN
ELEV DB2860MR INSTALLED SIMILAR ELEV DB440MR TYPE II INSTALLED SIMILAR
REV.NO. 8 DATE : 10/21/15

THUNDER BAY, CANADA INSTALLATION VIEWS
##
WP NO. 124-90-01
NO:
DB440MR TYPE I BEARING CAPACITY TABLE
VERTICAL SERVICE LOAD (kN) 440
VERTICAL ULTIMATE LOAD (kN) 1160
HORIZONTAL SERVICE LOAD (kN) 441
HORIZONTAL ULTIMATE UPLIFT LOAD (kN) 530
ULTIMATE UPLIFT LOAD (kN) 5300
FATIGUE UPLIFT LOAD (kN) 2450
TOTAL LONGITUDINAL DISPLACEMENT (mm) +75/-130
TOTAL TRANSVERSE DISPLACEMENT (mm) 40.00
SERVICE ROTATION (rad) ±.0175
STRENGTH ROTATION (rad) ±.0244
WEIGHT (KG) 2967.81
NOTE: (+) LONGITUDINAL DISPLACEMENT REPRESENTS
SUPERSTRUCTURE EXPANSION & (-) LONGITUDINAL APPROX. DEAD LOAD DEFLECTION (mm) 1.60
DISPLACEMENT REPRESENTS SUPERSTRUCTURE LOCATION WEST ABUTMENT, NORTH & SOUTH GIRDERS
CONTRACTION.
QUANTITY 2
ITEM Job Part Mark QTY. TotalQty Length Width Thickness Ø ID DESCRIPTION Material REMARKS
NO. Number
1 13003-01 PA1 1 2 1000 800 63.500 - - BEVELED SHOE PLATE ASTM A36
2 13003-01 PB1 1 2 820 232 44.450 - - UPPER BEARING PLATE ASTM A36
LONGITUDINAL
8 3 13003-01 PC1 1 2 1000 1232 304.8 - - LOWER BEARING BLOCK ASTM A36
UPSTATION
4 13003-01 PD1 1 2 - - 114.300 232 - LOWER BEARING PLATE ASTM A36

8 5 13003-01 PE1 1 2 1000 800 304.8 - - UPPER BEARING BLOCK ASTM A36
6 13003-01 ST1 1 2 990 228 2.667 - - TOP STAINLESS STEEL ASTM A240 TYPE 304
7 13003-01 SS1 2 4 990 25 2.667 - - SIDE STAINLESS STEEL ASTM A240 TYPE 304
8 13003-01 SL1 2 4 990 91 2.667 - - LOWER STAINLESS STEEL ASTM A240 TYPE 304
9 13003-01 BA1 1 2 75.620 - - 127 - SRM AISI 4000 SERIES Fy min = 105 ksi
10 13003-01 MA1 1 2 - - 16 182 130 POLYTRON DISC POLYETHER URETHANE 62D
11 13003-01 TT1 1 2 785 182 4.760 - - TOP PTFE PTFE UNFILLED DIMPLED LUBRICATED
12 13003-01 TS1 2 4 785 19 4.760 - - SIDE PTFE 15% GLASS FILLED SHEET
13 13003-01 TL1 2 4 785 52 4.760 - - LOWER PTFE 15% GLASS FILLED SHEET
6 14 13003-01 HA1 32 64 6.000 - - 0.875 - CONNECTION BOLT ASTM A490 DACROMET, MM EQUIV. 22 x 152.4
6 15 13003-01 HB1 32 64 - - - 0.875 - HARDENED WASHER ASTM F436 HDG DACROMET, MM EQUIV. 22
6 16 13003-01 HC1 32 64 - - - 0.875 - HEAVY HEX NUT ASTM A563 HDG DACROMET, MM EQUIV. 22
6 4 17 13003-01 HD1 24 48 8.000 - - 1.000 - CONNECTION BOLT ASTM A490 DACROMET, MM EQUIV. 25.4 x 203.2
6 18 13003-01 HE1 48 96 - - - 1.000 - HARDENED WASHER ASTM F436 HDG DACROMET, MM EQUIV. 25.4
6 19 13003-01 HF1 24 48 - - - 1.000 - HEAVY HEX NUT ASTM F436 HDG DACROMET, MM EQUIV. 25.4
5 1 20 13003-01 HK1 8 16 131.650 - - 4.000 - CORRUGATED SHEATH AASHTO M270 GR 36 MM EQUIV. 102 x 3344
6 1 21 13003-01 HG1A 8 16 24.500 - - 1.750 - TOP ANCHOR ROD ASTM A722 HDG MM EQUIV. 44.5 x 620
PLAN DB440MR TYPE I ASSEMBLY
5 1 22 13003-01 HG1B 8 16 127.800 - - 1.750 - BOTTOM ANCHOR ROD ASTM A722 HDG MM EQUIV. 44.5 x 3243
2 WEIGHT: 2967.81 KG.
23 13003-01 HH1 8 16 - - - 1.750 - HARDENED WASHER ASTM F436 HDG MM EQUIV. 44.5 R9F-16
24 13003-01 HJ1 16 32 - - - 1.750 - HEAVY HEX NUT ASTM A563 HDG MM EQUIV. 44.5 R73-14
2 25 13003-01 HL1 8 16 200 200 22 44.500 - WASHER PLATE ASTM A36 HDG
1 26 13003-01 HM1 8 16 8.500 - - 1.750 - STOP-TYPE COUPLER ASTM A29 GR C1045 MM EQUIV. 44.5 x 215.90 R72-14
2 27 13003-01 HN1 8 16 - - - 0.500 0.375 INTERNAL GROUT TUBE - MM EQUIV. 12.7 O.D. X 9.525 I.D.
NOTE: DIMENSIONS IN BILL OF MATERIALS REFLECT THE DIMENSIONS OF RAW
MATERIALS TO BE ORDERED. SEE DETAIL SHEETS FOR FINAL DIMENSIONS
OF FABRICATED INDIVIDUAL PARTS.
ST1 20 GAP 25 GAP
2 PLACES 2 PLACES
ALL WEIGHTS IN KGS.
ALL DIMENSIONS IN MILLIMETERS
TT1
PA1 SEE MATERIALS
NOTE #3
PE1 TL1
+6.0
477 0.0 AT CL
SEE DETAIL A
UNLOADED SEE MATERIALS
NOTE #3 5 GAP
+6.0 2 PLACES
421 0.0
UNLOADED
PB1 SL1
SS1
PD1 MA1 BA1 PC1
ELEV DB440MR TYPE I ASSEMBLY DET GAP DETAIL

2 WEIGHT: 2967.81 KG. A
REV.NO. 8 DATE : 10/21/15

THUNDER BAY, CANADA DB440MR TYPE I ASSEMBLY
##
WP NO. 124-90-01
NO:
DB2860MR BEARING CAPACITY TABLE
HORIZONTAL ULTIMATE LOAD (kN) 452
WEIGHT (KG) 774.19
NOTE: (+) LONGITUDINAL DISPLACEMENT REPRESENTS APPROX. DEAD LOAD DEFLECTION (mm) 3.0
SUPERSTRUCTURE EXPANSION & (-) LONGITUDINAL
DISPLACEMENT REPRESENTS SUPERSTRUCTURE LOCATION EAST ABUTMENT, CENTER GIRDER
CONTRACTION. QUANTITY 1
ITEM NO. Job Number Part Mark QTY. TotalQty Length Width Thickness Ø ID DESCRIPTION Material REMARKS
1 13003-02 PA2 1 1 800 800 63.500 - - BEVELED SHOE PLATE ASTM 572 GR 50
2 13003-02 PB2 1 1 390 390 31.750 - - UPPER BEARING PLATE ASTM 572 GR 50
3 13003-02 PC2 1 1 800 1000 31.750 - - MASONRY PLATE ASTM 572 GR 50
4 13003-02 PD2 1 1 - - 31.750 390 - LOWER BEARING PLATE ASTM 572 GR 50
5 13003-02 PE2 1 1 800 800 31.750 - - SOLE PLATE ASTM 572 GR 50
LONGITUDINAL
UPSTATION
10 13003-02 GB2A 2 2 642 76.200 76.200 - - LOWER GUIDE BAR ASTM 572 GR 50
11 13003-02 GB2B 2 2 642 76.200 76.200 - - UPPER GUIDE BAR ASTM 572 GR 50
12 13003-02 MA2 1 1 30 336 86 POLYTRON DISC POLYETHER URETHANE 62D
13 13003-02 TT2 1 1 - - 4.760 336 - TOP PTFE PTFE UNFILLED DIMPLED LUBRICATED
16 13003-02 HA2 6 6 5.500 - - 0.875 - CONNECTION BOLT ASTM A325 HDG MM EQUIV. 22 x 139
17 13003-02 HB2 12 12 - - - 0.875 - HARDENED WASHER ASTM F436 HDG MM EQUIV. 22
18 13003-02 HC2 6 6 - - - 0.875 - HEAVY HEX NUT ASTM A563 HDG MM EQUIV. 22
19 13003-02 HG2 4 4 33.250 - - 1.375 - ANCHOR ROD ASTM F1554 GR 55 HDG MM EQUIV. 35 x 844.5
20 13003-02 HH2 8 8 - - - 1.375 - HARDENED WASHER ASTM F436 HDG MM EQUIV. 35
21 13003-02 HJ2 8 8 - - - 1.375 - HEAVY HEX NUT ASTM A563 HDG MM EQUIV. 35

PLAN DB2860MR ASSEMBLY
1 WEIGHT: 774.19 KG.
11 GAP
2 PLACES
5 GAP
2 PLACES
ST2 ALL WEIGHTS IN KG.
TT2 SEE MATERIALS
NOTE #3
GB2A
PA2
SEE MATERIALS
NOTE #3
PE2
5 GAP
2 PLACES
+6.0 SEE DETAIL B TS2
219 0.0 AT CL +6.0
UNLOADED 162 0.0
UNLOADED
PB2 SL2
TL2
PD2 BA2 MA2 PC2 SS2 GB2B
ELEV DB2860MR ASSEMBLY DET GAP DETAIL
1 WEIGHT: 774.19 KG. B
REV.NO. 8 DATE : 10/21/15

THUNDER BAY, CANADA DB2860MR ASSEMBLY
##
WP NO. 124-90-01
NO:
DB1830MR BEARING CAPACITY TABLE
TOTAL LONGITUDINAL DISPLACEMENT (MM) NORTH GIRDER: +115/-165, SOUTH GIRDER:

+95/-165
TOTAL TRANSVERSE DISPLACEMENT (MM) 40.00
WEIGHT (KG) 750.52
NOTE: (+) LONGITUDINAL DISPLACEMENT REPRESENTS APPROX. DEAD LOAD DEFLECTION (MM) 2.54
SUPERSTRUCTURE EXPANSION & (-) LONGITUDINAL
DISPLACEMENT REPRESENTS SUPERSTRUCTURE LOCATION EAST ABUTMENT, NORTH & SOUTH GIRDERS
CONTRACTION. QUANTITY 2
ITEM Job Part Mark QTY. TotalQty Length Width Thickness Ø ID DESCRIPTION Material REMARKS
NO. Number
1 13003-03 PA3 1 2 800 800 63.500 - - BEVELED SHOE PLATE ASTM 572 GR 50
LONGITUDINAL
2 13003-03 PB3 1 2 312 312 31.750 - - UPPER BEARING PLATE ASTM 572 GR 50
UPSTATION
3 13003-03 PC3 1 2 800 1000 31.750 - - MASONRY PLATE ASTM 572 GR 50

4 13003-03 PD3 1 2 - - 31.750 312 - LOWER BEARING PLATE ASTM 572 GR 50
5 13003-03 PE3 1 2 800 800 31.750 - - SOLE PLATE ASTM A572 GR 50
10 13003-03 GB3A 2 4 600 76.200 95.250 - - LOWER GUIDE BAR ASTM 572 GR 50
11 13003-03 GB3B 2 4 600 76.200 95.250 - - UPPER GUIDE BAR ASTM 572 GR 50
12 13003-03 MA3 1 2 25.400 270 67 POLYTRON DISC POLYETHER URETHANE 62D
13 13003-03 TT3 1 2 - - 4.760 270 - TOP PTFE PTFE UNFILLED DIMPLED LUBRICATED
16 13003-03 HA3 6 12 5.500 - - 0.875 - CONNECTION BOLT ASTM A325 HDG MM EQUIV. 22 x 139
17 13003-03 HB3 12 24 - - - 0.875 - HARDENED WASHER ASTM F436 HDG MM EQUIV. 22
18 13003-03 HC3 6 12 - - - 0.875 - HEAVY HEX NUT ASTM A563 HDG MM EQUIV. 22
PLAN DB1830MR ASSEMBLY 19 13003-03 HG3 4 8 33.250 - - 1.375 - ANCHOR ROD ASTM F1554 GR 55 HDG MM EQUIV. 35 x 844.5
2 WEIGHT: 750.52 KG. 20 13003-03 HH3 8 16 - - - 1.375 - HARDENED WASHER ASTM F436 HDG MM EQUIV. 35
21 13003-03 HJ3 8 16 - - - 1.375 - HEAVY HEX NUT ASTM A563 HDG MM EQUIV. 35
20 GAP 25 GAP
2 PLACES 2 PLACES
ST3
SEE MATERIALS
NOTE #3
TT3
GB3A
ALL WEIGHTS IN KG.
PA3 ALL DIMENSIONS IN MILLIMETERS
TL3
PE3 SEE MATERIALS
NOTE #3
+6.0 5 GAP
214 0.0 AT CL SEE DETAIL C 2 PLACES
+6.0
UNLOADED 157 0.0
PB3
UNLOADED
SL3
PD3 BA3 MA3 PC3

SS3 GB3B
TS3
DET GAP DETAIL

ELEV DB1830MR ASSEMBLY
C
REV.NO. 8 DATE: 10/21/15

THUNDER BAY, CANADA DB1830MR ASSEMBLY
##
WP NO. 124-90-01
NO:
DB440MR TYPE II BEARING CAPACITY TABLE
FATIGUE UPLIFT LOAD (kN) 2450
WEIGHT (KG) 2967.81
NOTE: (+) LONGITUDINAL DISPLACEMENT REPRESENTS
SUPERSTRUCTURE EXPANSION & (-) LONGITUDINAL APPROX. DEAD LOAD DEFLECTION (mm) 1.60
DISPLACEMENT REPRESENTS SUPERSTRUCTURE LOCATION WEST ABUTMENT, CENTER GIRDER
CONTRACTION.
QUANTITY 1
ITEM Job Part QTY. TotalQty Length Width Thickness Ø ID DESCRIPTION Material Remarks
NO. Number Mark
LONGITUDINAL
1 13003-04 PA4 1 1 1000 800 63.500 - - BEVELED SHOE PLATE ASTM A36
2 13003-04 PB4 1 1 820 232 44.450 - - UPPER BEARING PLATE ASTM A36
UPSTATION
8 3 13003-04 PC4 1 1 1000 1232 304.8 - - LOWER BEARING BLOCK ASTM A36
4 13003-04 PD4 1 1 - - 114.300 232 - LOWER BEARING PLATE ASTM A36
8 5 13003-04 PE4 1 1 1000 800 304.8 - - UPPER BEARING BLOCK ASTM A36
10 13003-04 MA4 1 1 - - 16 182 130 POLYTRON DISC POLYETHER URETHANE 62D
11 13003-04 TT4 1 1 785 182 4.760 - - TOP PTFE PTFE UNFILLED DIMPLED LUBRICATED
6 14 13003-04 HA4 32 32 6.000 - - 0.875 - CONNECTION BOLT ASTM A490 DACROMET, MM EQUIV. 22 x 152.4
6 15 13003-04 HB4 32 32 - - - 0.875 - HARDENED WASHER ASTM F436 HDG DACROMET, MM EQUIV. 22
6 16 13003-04 HC4 32 32 - - - 0.875 - HEAVY HEX NUT ASTM A563 HDG DACROMET, MM EQUIV. 22
6 17 13003-04 HD4 24 24 8.000 - - 1.000 - CONNECTION BOLT ASTM A490 DACROMET, MM EQUIV. 25.4 x 203.2
6 18 13003-04 HE4 48 48 - - - 1.000 - HARDENED WASHER ASTM F436 HDG DACROMET, MM EQUIV. 25.4
PLAN DB440MR TYPE II ASSEMBLY 6 19 13003-04 HF4 24 24 - - - 1.000 - HEAVY HEX NUT ASTM F436 HDG DACROMET, MM EQUIV. 25.4
1 WEIGHT: 2967.81 KG. 5 1 20 13003-04 HK4 8 8 131.650 - - 4.000 - CORRUGATED SHEATH AASHTO M270 GR 36 MM EQUIV. 102 x 3344
6 1 21 13003-04 HG4A 8 8 24.500 - - 1.750 - TOP ANCHOR ROD ASTM A722 HDG MM EQUIV. 44.5 x 620
5 1 22 13003-04 HG4B 8 8 127.800 - - 1.750 - BOTTOM ANCHOR ROD ASTM A722 HDG MM EQUIV. 44.5 x 3243
23 13003-04 HH4 8 8 - - - 1.750 - HARDENED WASHER ASTM F436 HDG MM EQUIV. 44.5 R9F-16
24 13003-04 HJ4 16 16 - - - 1.750 - HEAVY HEX NUT ASTM A563 HDG MM EQUIV. 44.5 R73-14
2 25 13003-04 HL4 8 8 200 200 22 44.500 - WASHER PLATE ASTM A36 HDG
1 26 13003-04 HM4 8 8 8.500 - - 1.750 - STOP-TYPE COUPLER ASTM A29 GR C1045 MM EQUIV. 44.5 x 215.90 R72-14
2 27 13003-04 HN4 8 8 - - - 0.500 0.375 INTERNAL GROUT TUBE - MM EQUIV. 12.7 O.D. X 9.525 I.D.

5 GAP 7.5 GAP
2 PLACES 2 PLACES ALL WEIGHTS IN KGS.
PA4 ALL DIMENSIONS IN MILLIMETERS
ST4
TT4
SEE MATERIALS
+6.0 NOTE #3
477 0.0 AT CL
TL4
UNLOADED SEE DETAIL D
+6.0
421 0.0
UNLOADED SEE MATERIALS
NOTE #3
5 GAP
2 PLACES
PB4
PD4 MA4 BA4

SS4
SL4
ELEV DB440MR TYPE II ASSEMBLY
1 WEIGHT: 2967.81 KG. DET GAP DETAIL
D
REV.NO. 8 DATE : 10/21/15

THUNDER BAY, CANADA DB440MR TYPE II ASSEMBLY
##
WP NO. 124-90-01
NO:
1000
1230
734.2
1074
429.6
537 19 X 45
124.8 CHAMFER 196
65 R6
167.2 8
232
R19
130 THRU
PD1 ONLY #10-32 TPI
W/ 3 x 45 62.5 73.5 97
1000 X 15.875 DEEP
CHAMFER 6 PLACES
214.9
877
86 THRU 367.1
PD2 ONLY 438.5 8
390
LONGITUDINAL
W/ 3 x 45
CHAMFER
UPSTATION
1000
GUIDE BAR DETAIL

844
282
DET
E
141
150
8
422
642
LONGITUDINAL
286 19 70
UPSTATION
R6
568.28
800
284.14
+0.4 #10-32 TPI
364.427-0.0 X 15.875 DEEP 143 25
8 3 PLACES
INSIDE GUIDE BARS 73.97
35.5
57.2 THRU
+0.8 8 PLACES
728.854-0.0
INSIDE GUIDE BARS
41.275 x 150
8 DET GUIDE BAR DETAIL
SLOT THRU
4 PLACES F
+0.4
288.427-0.0 41.275
INSIDE GUIDE BARS
+0.8
576.854-0.0 SEAL ENDS
+0.8 INSIDE GUIDE BARS 4 PLACES
530.854-0.0
INSIDE GUIDE BARS
SEE DETAIL E +0.8
486.854-0.0
+0.4 ALL WEIGHTS IN KG.
8 265.427-0.0 INSIDE GUIDE BARS ALL DIMENSIONS IN MILLIMETERS
19 X 45 INSIDE GUIDE BARS GB2A
114.3 CHAMFER SEE GUIDE BAR +0.4
DETAIL F 243.427-0.0
INSIDE GUIDE BARS
31.75 8(8) SEE WELDING
8(8) NOTE #1
8 R19
R6 8 8
31.75 PD2 10
PC2
114.3 DB2860MR MASONRY
PD1 ASSY PLATE ASSEMBLY
12 1 WEIGHT: 254.05 KG.
PC1
DB440MR TYPE I
8 ASSY LOWER BEARING BLOCK ASSEMBLY
2 WEIGHT: 1471.57 KG.
TOTAL PC2 MASONRY PLATE TOTAL GB2A LOWER GUIDE BAR
1 1 WEIGHT: 198.34 KG. 2 2 WEIGHT: 13.68 KG.
TOTAL PC1 UPPER BEARING BLOCK TOTAL PD1 LOWER BEARING PLATE
TOTAL PD2 LOWER BEARING PLATE

1 1 WEIGHT: 28.36 KG.
REV.NO. 8 DATE : 10/21/15

THUNDER BAY, CANADA BEARING DETAILS-1
##
WP NO. 124-90-01
NO:
600
220
1230 69.37 110 19 90
1074 R6
1000
537
877
67 THRU
PD3 ONLY 438.5 #10-32 TPI
312 X 15.875 DEEP
W/ 3 x 45 55.5 25
CHAMFER 3 PLACES
DET GUIDE BAR DETAIL

232
150
8 G
130 THRU
PD4 ONLY
W/ 3 x 45
LONGITUDINAL
CHAMFER
UPSTATION
LONGITUDINAL
1000
844
282
UPSTATION
568.28
141
800
THREAD
LENGTH
1.5875 X 45
CHAMFER
422
2 PLACES
284.14
LENGTH
12 TPI
41.275 x 150
SLOT THRU 57.2 THRU
4 PLACES 8 +0.4 8 8 PLACES
331.927 0.0
+0.4 41.275 INSIDE GUIDE BARS Part Thread
298.427-0.0 Quantity Ø Length Weight (KG)
Mark Length
INSIDE GUIDE BARS +0.8
SEAL ENDS 663.854 0.0 BA1 2 127 75.620 41.280 7.51
+0.8 4 PLACES INSIDE GUIDE BARS
596.854-0.0 BA2 1 83 78.620 29.620 3.33
INSIDE GUIDE BARS
BA3 2 64 70.620 29.620 1.78
SEE GUIDE BAR +0.8
DETAIL E 465.854 0.0
3 BA4 1 127 75.620 41.280 7.51
SHEET 7 INSIDE GUIDE BARS
+0.8 +0.4
GB3A 466.854-0.0 232.927 0.0
114.3 19 X 45
SEE GUIDE BAR INSIDE GUIDE BARS
DETAIL G CHAMFER INSIDE GUIDE BARS
ALL WEIGHTS IN KG.
+0.4 ALL DIMENSIONS IN MILLIMETERS
31.75 233.427-0.0
INSIDE GUIDE BARS
8(8) SEE WELDING R19
R6 8
8(8) NOTE #1
PC3 PD3
10
31.75 12
PC4 PD4
114.3 DB440MR TYPE II
DB1830MR MASONRY 8 ASSY LOWER BEARING BLOCK ASSEMBLY
ASSY PLATE ASSEMBLY
1 WEIGHT: 1471.57 KG.
TOTAL PC4 LOWER BEARING BLOCK TOTAL PD4 LOWER BEARING PLATE
TOTAL PC3 MASONRY PLATE TOTAL GB3A LOWER GUIDE BAR
TOTAL PD3 LOWER BEARING PLATE

2 1 WEIGHT: 18.19 KG.
REV.NO. 8 DATE : 10/21/15

##
WP NO. 124-90-01
NO:
+0.0
232.000-0.8
185.175
RECESS
+0.0
390.000-0.8
+0.0
312.000-0.8
339
RECESS
273
RECESS
83 x
143
12 TPI THRU
64 x
110
LONGITUDINAL
12 TPI THRU
LONGITUDINAL
410
390
286
367.5
312
220
215.1
#10-32 TPI
X 15.875 DEEP
#10-32 TPI 6 PLACES
X 15.875 DEEP
6 PLACES
62.7
LONGITUDINAL
788.175
RECESS
430.2
125.4
820
735
127 x
12 TPI THRU 15.875 2.38 RECESS
15.875 2.38 RECESS
31.75
#10-32 TPI PB3 UPPER BEARING PLATE
X 15.875 DEEP
12 PLACES 2 WEIGHT: 22.51 KG.
31.75 ALL WEIGHTS IN KG.
PB2 UPPER BEARING PLATE ALL DIMENSIONS IN MILLIMETERS
1 WEIGHT: 35.09 KG.
R12.7
22.225 2.38 RECESS
44.45
TOTAL PB1 PB4 UPPER BEARING PLATE

3
3 2 1 WEIGHT: 59.60 KG.
REV.NO. 8 DATE : 10/21/15

##
WP NO. 124-90-01
NO:
BOTTOM VIEW
TOP VIEW
+0.8
286.85-0.0
INSIDE GUIDE BARS
800 (TYPE I)
719
+0.8
256.85 0.0
359.5 INSIDE GUIDE BARS 7
B C C (TYPE II)
B
1000 97
8
R19
155
R6 8
65
500
455.55
196
372.7
289.9
H
207.07
STAINLESS STEEL
124.24
E E E E
414.14
248.48
911.1
745.4
579.8
1000
82.8
990
41.4
STX
NORTH, CENTER &

SOLE PLATE THICKNESS
WEST ABUTMENT,
SOUTH GIRDERS
TABLE
POINT THICKNESS
A 127
28.6 THRU B 127
24 PLACES
C 127
A D D A D 127
8 E 127
SEE WELDING +0.4
#1 & 2 FOR MARKINGS
128.43 0.0
SEE GENERAL NOTES
NOTE #2
LONGITUDINAL
INSIDE GUIDE BARS PE1 SOLE PLATE

UPSTATION
(TYPE II)
+0.4 3 WEIGHT: 747.80 KG. ALL WEIGHTS IN KG.
143.42-0.0 ALL DIMENSIONS IN MILLIMETERS
INSIDE GUIDE BARS
(TYPE I)
DB440 TYPE I & II

ASSY SOLE PLATE ASSEMBLY
PEX 3 WEIGHT: 1094.72 KG.
81
R6 8 TOTAL PE1 PE4 SOLE PLATE TOTAL SL1 SL4 LOWER STAINLESS STEEL
31 3 2 1 WEIGHT: 1085 KG. 6 4 2 WEIGHT: 1.92 KG.
8
TOTAL ST1 ST4 TOP STAINLESS STEEL TOTAL SS1 SS4 SIDE STAINLESS STEEL
155 SSX R19 8 3 2 1 WEIGHT: 4.82 KG. 6 4 2 WEIGHT: 0.53 KG.
127.13
BOTTOM OF SLX SEE GUIDE BAR
8 GUIDE BAR TO DETAIL H
CL STAINLESS SEEL 3 SIDES
2 PLACES REV.NO. 8 DATE : 10/21/15
TACK 4TH SIDE
SEE WELDING
NOTE #2 LEGEND PROJECT INFORMATION: TITLE:
##
WP NO. 124-90-01
NO:
TOP VIEW
BOTTOM VIEW
800
722
+0.8
361 414.85-0.0
INSIDE GUIDE BARS
B C C B
#1 & 2 FOR MARKINGS

SEE GENERAL NOTES
642 25
361
19
75
R6
STAINLESS STEEL
70
E E E E
800
722
616
J
LONGITUDINAL
ST2
UPSTATION
25.4 THRU
6 PLACES
EAST ABUTMENT, CENTER

SOLE PLATE THICKNESS
TABLE
SEE WELDING
GIRDER
NOTE #2
POINT THICKNESS
A 31.750
A D D +0.4 A B
C
31.750
31.750
207.427-0.0
D 31.750
INSIDE GUIDE BARS
E 31.750
SEAL ENDS
4 PLACES
PE2 SOLE PLATE
ALL WEIGHTS IN KG.

PE2
TOTAL PE2 SOLE PLATE TOTAL GB2B UPPER GUIDE BAR

75
SS2
G
8 TOTAL ST2 TOP STAINLESS STEEL TOTAL SS2 SIDE STAINLESS STEEL
SEE WELDING
3 SIDES NOTE #1
2 PLACES 8 1 1 WEIGHT: 4.63 KG. 2 2 WEIGHT: 0.33 KG.
54.075 TACK 4TH SIDE
BOTTOM OF SEE WELDING
8 NOTE #2 SL2
GUIDE BAR TO
CL STAINLESS STEEL TOTAL SL2 LOWER STAINLESS STEEL
2 2 WEIGHT: 0.38 KG.
GB2B
SEE GUIDE BAR
DETAIL J
REV.NO. 8 DATE : 10/21/15

##
WP NO. 124-90-01
NO:
TOP VIEW 600 25
BOTTOM VIEW
800
75
722
+0.8 R6
361 366.854-0.0
INSIDE GUIDE BARS
B C C B 19 90

K
361
550 STAINLESS STEEL

E E E E SOLE PLATE THICKNESS
NORTH & SOUTH

EAST ABUTMENT,
800
722
TABLE
GIRDERS
ST3 POINT THICKNESS
A 31.750
B 31.750
C 31.750
D 31.750
E 31.750
SEE WELDING
NOTE #2 PE3 SOLE PLATE
A D D +0.4 A
183.427-0.0
INSIDE GUIDE BARS
#1 & 2 FOR MARKINGS
SEAL ENDS
SEE GENERAL NOTES
4 PLACES
25.400 THRU
6 PLACES
LONGITUDINAL
UPSTATION

2 WEIGHT:
ALL WEIGHTS IN KG.
TOTAL PE3 SOLE PLATE TOTAL GB3B UPPER GUIDE BAR

PE3
TOTAL ST3 TOP STAINLESS STEEL TOTAL SS3 SIDE STAINLESS STEEL
SS3 G 2 1 WEIGHT: 3.71 KG. 4 2 WEIGHT: 0.29 KG.

75
8 SEE WELDING
8 NOTE #1
3 SIDES
54.075 2 PLACES SL3
BOTTOM OF TACK 4TH SIDE TOTAL SL3 LOWER STAINLESS STEEL
8
GUIDE BAR TO SEE WELDING
CL STAINLESS STEEL NOTE #2 4 2 WEIGHT: 0.69 KG.
GB3B
SEE GUIDE BAR
DETAIL K
REV.NO. 8 DATE : 10/21/15

##
WP NO. 124-90-01
NO:
TOP VIEW
BOTTOM VIEW
800
719 8 480
359.5 8 160
B C C B
500
455.55
420
372.7
340
289.9
260
207.07
180
124.24
100
E E E E
414.14
248.48
911.1
745.4
579.8
1000
82.8
200
360
520
680
840
8 8
41.4
25.4 THRU
8 40 PLACES
40
(TYP.)
28.6 THRU
24 PLACES
A D D A
18 RECESS 44 80
(TYP.) (TYP.)
240
#1 & 2 FOR MARKINGS
R13
SEE GENERAL NOTES
(TYP.) 8
LONGITUDINAL
ALL WEIGHTS IN KG.

UPSTATION
CENTER & SOUTH GIRDERS TOTAL PA1 PA4 BEVELED SHOE PLATE
WEST ABUTMENT, NORTH,
3 2 1 WEIGHT: 333.48 KG.

BEVELED SHOE PLATE
THICKNESS TABLE
POINT THICKNESS
A 52
B 60
C 60
D 52
E 56
THICK EDGE: B-C
REV.NO. 8 DATE : 10/21/15

##
WP NO. 124-90-01
NO:
800
722
361
B C
NORTH, CENTER &

BEVELED SHOE PLATE
EAST ABUTMENT,
SOUTH GIRDERS
THICKNESS TABLE
POINT THICKNESS
A 54
B 60
C 60
D 54
E 57
THICK EDGE: B-C
25.400 THRU
6 PLACES
E E
800
722
#1 & 2 FOR MARKINGS

SEE GENERAL NOTES
LONGITUDINAL
UPSTATION
361
ALL WEIGHTS IN KG.

A D
TOTAL PA2 PA3 BEVELED SHOE PLATE
3 1 2 WEIGHT: 285.41 KG.
REV.NO. 8 DATE : 10/21/15

##
WP NO. 124-90-01
NO:
+0.8
465.854 0.0
802
INSIDE GUIDE BARS
+0.4 80 643.5 80
232.927 0.0
INSIDE GUIDE
BARS
197.8 196.6
94 94
114.3
66 66 31
167 167
100 97
155 154
65 65
116 196 255.5 195

187 99 663 98 185
1232
DB440 TYPE II
DB440MR TYPE II ASSY SOLE PLATE ASSEMBLY
ASSY MASONRY PLATE ASSEMBLY
WEIGHT: 1094.72 KG.
WEIGHT: 1471.57 KG.
PC4 MASONRY PLATE GB4A LOWER GUIDE BAR PE4 SOLE PLATE GB4B UPPER GUIDE BAR
WEIGHT: 1089.79 KG. WEIGHT: 177.89 KG. WEIGHT: 747.80 KG. WEIGHT: 168.60 KG.
PD4 LOWER BEARING PLATE ST4 TOP STAINLESS STEEL SS4 SIDE STAINLESS STEEL
WEIGHT: 26.00 KG. WEIGHT: 4.82 KG. WEIGHT: 0.53 KG.
SL4 LOWER STAINLESS STEEL

WEIGHT: 1.92 KG.
2.1 8.61 6.9 3.1
ALL WEIGHTS IN KG.

4 9.5 4 8.5
5 SE NE 10.5
4 NW SW 9
E
W
WEIGHT: 2967.81 KG. WEIGHT: 2967.81 KG.
REV.NO. 8 DATE : 10/21/15

THUNDER BAY, CANADA AS BUILT MEASURMENTS
##
WP NO. 124-90-01
NO:

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Ministry of Transportation

Highway Standards Branch

Nipigon River Bridge

Originating Office Bridge Office, Highway Standards Branch, Ontario Ministry of

Report Number BRO-059; ISBN: 978-1-4606-8708-6

Publication Date September 2016

Ministry Contact Bridge Office, Highway Standards Branch, Ontario Ministry of

Key Words Cable-stayed bridge; uplift bearing failure; bolt failure

Distribution Unrestricted technical audience.

Nipigon River Bridge

301 St. Paul Street,

Published without prejudice as to the application of the findings.

Crown copyright reserved.

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

6.4.1. Model of Shoe Plate Prying ............................................................................................................ 47

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

The technical investigation into the failure involved;

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

2.1. Purpose of the Investigation

The objectives of the investigation are the following.

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

The report is organized according to the Professional Engineers of Ontario Guideline on

2.3. Qualifications of the Authors

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

Stiffness from Backstay Cable Stiffness in Deck Stiffness in Tower

LL resisted by backstay LL resisted by bending in deck LL resisted by bending in the tower

LL offset by dead load in main LL resisted by bending in deck

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

Figure 2. Typical cable arrangements in cable-stayed bridges.

3.1. Global Behaviour of Nipigon River Bridge

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

3.2. Load Path from Back Stays to West Abutment

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

Table 1. Bearing Contract Drawing Revisions

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

Figure 6. Rotations on bearing.

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

4.2. Bearing Forces

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

Table 2. Bearing Reactions for Phase 1 (Failure Reactions)

4.3. Shoe Plate

There are a total of 32, A325 (ASTM

Drawing A-10 (Sheet 218-B-R1) note 1

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

4.4. Bearing Assembly

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

Figure 10. Components of the west abutment bearing assembly.

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

5. Observations and Testing

5.1. Physical Observations

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

Figure 14 shows the numbering assigned

Figure 15 shows a plan view of the bolts

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

Nipigon River Bridge BRO-059

The bearing Working Drawings specify 7/8” bolts 6” long

As measured from a spare bolt obtained from site, and