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TRESPASS TO GOODS

TORTS PROJECT

STUDENT NAME: DIVIJA PIDUGU

ROLL NUMBER: 18LLB064

SEMSTER I

SECTION B

FACULTY NAME: Prof. Dr. P. SRI DEVI

DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

VISAKHAPATNAM

OCTOBER 2018
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would sincerely like to put forward my heartfelt appreciation to our respected Torts Prof. Dr.P.
Sri Devi madam for giving me a golden opportunity to take up this project regarding –Trespass
to goods. I have tried my level best to collect information about the project in various possible
ways to depict the clear picture about the given project topic.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction…………………………………………………………………….…………..4

Trespass to chattels…………………………………………………………….…………. 6

Elements of trespass to chattels……………………………………….…………………. 8

Conversion……………………………………………………………..……………….. 10

Elements of Conversion………………………………………………………………… 12

Detinue…………………………………………………………………………………… 15

Case Analysis………………………………………………………………..…………… 17

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………22

Bibliography………………………………………………………………….…………….23
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INTRODUCTION

The torts of trespass to chattels and conversion provide ways to sue people who mess with your
stuff. Both torts concern chattels. The universe of tangible property is divided into two
categories: chattels and realty. The difference between a chattel and realty is whether it is
moveable or fixed to the earth.

The action for trespass to goods trespass de bonis asportatis gives a remedy where there has been
a direct interference with goods in the claimant’s possession at the time of the trespass whether
that by taking goods from him or damaging the goods without removing them.

The oldest of the chattel torts the writ of detinue developed to provide a remedy for wrongful
detention of goods. Detinue is abolished by the torts Act 1977. The one clear instance of detinue
loss or destruction of goods in breach of duty by a bailee, which did not constitute conversion at
common law is converted into a statutory conversion by that Act.

The action for remedies in conversion developed upon a legal fiction. The original form of the
pleadings alleged that the defendant had found the claimant’s chattels and had wrongfully
converted them into his own use. The allegation of finding could not be contested and the
essence of the tort became the wrongful conversion of the goods to the use of the defendant. But
only moving or damaging goods without converting them to the defendant’s own use remains
remediable in trespass alone.

Trespass and conversion deal with intentional interference with the goods of plaintiff1. Where
goods are lost or damaged as a result of the defendant’s breach of a duty of care an action may
lie in negligence.

The torts, interference with goods Act 1977, introduces a collective description ‘wrongful
interference with goods’ to cover conversion, trespass to goods, negligence resulting in damage
to goods or to an interest in goods and any other tort in so far as it results in damage to goods or
an interest in goods. This is done to facilitate common treatment of all chattel torts in respect to
remedies and procedure. The Act neither redefines nor replaces the existing substantive rules on
trespass, conversion, or the residual chattel torts. The substantive impact of the Act is extremely

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limited. Detinue is abolished and the one clear instance of detinue which did not constitute
conversion at common law, wrongful loss or destruction of goods by a bailee is declared to be
conversion. New provision is made for bailees to dispose of uncollected goods.

The main impact of the 1977 Act is as we shall see to simplify and rationalize the remedies and
procedures relating to chattel torts.
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TRESPASS TO CHATTELS

IT IS A WRONG AGAINST POSSESION

Any person whose possession of good is directly interfered with, can bring this action. A person
may be either in the direct physical possession of the goods or may have their constructive
possession, for example, as an owner of the goods or, he may possess them through his servant
or agent, as a carrier of goods or as some other bailee. But when the owner has given up his
possession, for instance, by pledging the goods or giving them to another person under a hire
purchase agreement such a right cannot be exercised. Trespass being a wrong against possession
rather than ownership a person in possession can maintain an action even though somebody else
is the owner of those goods. In Winkfield2, the post master general who was a mere bailee of
mails could recover their value from the wrong doer due to whose negligence the mails on the
board of a ship were lost. His right to recover was not affected by the fact that he himself was not
bound to compensate the owners of the mails for their loss. As between bailee and stranger
possession gives title and he is entitled to receive back a complete equipment of the thing itself3.

A person in possession can sue even without any proof of his title to the goods. A trespasser
cannot take the defense of ‘ jus terti’ that is he cannot be allowed to say that some third party and
not the possessor of it had a good title to goods.

A person having a reversionary interest in the goods not being entitled to their immediate
possession cannot bring an action in respect of trespass to them unless the trespass amounts to
permanent injury to the goods affecting his reversionary interest.

DIRECT INTERFERENCE

Direct physical interference without lawful justification is a trespass. The wrong may be
committed intentionally, negligently4, or even by an honest mistake. A person driving away the
car believing that to be his own car will be liable to the person in possession even though the
later does not have a good title for the same.

2
(1902) p. 42, 85 L.T. 688.
3
Law of torts, Dr. R.K Bhangia, Allahabad Law Agency, 2017
4
Covell V. Laming, (1808) 1 Camp. 487.
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WITHOUT LAWFUL JUSTIFICATION

When there is interference is without any lawful justification, an action for trespass lies. There is
justification when the defendant has seized plaintiff’s goods or cattle under the exercise of thye
right of distress damage feasant. There is also a justification when the damage to the other
person’s goods is caused in exercise of the private defense. Inevitable accident has also been held
to be good defense to an action for trespass to goods5.

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THE ELEMENTS OF TRESPASS TO CHATTELS

Here is the black letter formulation of trespass to chattels:

A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case for trespass to chattels by showing: the defendant

(1) intentionally

(2) interfered with the

(3) plaintiff’s right of possession in a chattel.

As was the case with trespass to land, it makes sense to take these elements slightly out of order,
starting with the last.

Trespass to Chattels: Plaintiff’s Right of Possession in Chattel

There is no requirement that the plaintiff be the owner of the chattel merely that the plaintiff
have a current right of possession. This mirrors the requirement of trespass to land. Thus, a
defendant who takes a baseball bat to the plaintiff’s leased car is not protected from liability by
the fact that the plaintiff does not hold the car’s title.

Trespass to Chattels: Intent

The intent requirement for trespass to chattels is somewhat analogous to that for trespass to land.
Assuming the defendant does not have permission to touch or use the chattel, the defendant need
only intend to act upon the chattel. There is no requirement that the defendant intend to invade
any legal right of the plaintiff or intend to harm the chattel6. Nor is the defendant excused by way
of honest mistake. For instance, if the defendants, innocently believing they are using their own
mule, mistakenly use the plaintiff’s mule to plow their field, then the defendants are liable for
trespass to chattels for the value of the plowing. If the mule is injured despite defendant’s best
efforts to treat it properly, the defendants are on the hook for that damage as well.

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Trespass to Chattels: Interference

It is in the interference element that trespass to chattels differs most starkly from trespass to land.
Merely touching a chattel does not create liability. For liability to arise, the defendant must
interfere with the plaintiff’s possession.

Interference can be established by any of the following:

(1) Actual damage to the chattel,

(2) Actual dispossession of the chattel,

(3) Loss of use of the chattel for some appreciable amount of time, or

(4) Harm to the plaintiff, or to something or someone in whom the plaintiff had a legal interest,
on account of the defendant’s action.
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CONVERSION

Conversion consists in willfully and without any justification dealing with the goods in such a
manner that another person, who is entitled to immediate use and possession of the same, is
deprived of that. It is dealing with the goods in a manner which is inconsistent with the right of
the owner. The same must have been done with an intention on the part of the defendant to deal
with the goods in such a way that amounts to denial of plaintiff’s right to eat. Refusing to deliver
the plaintiff’s goods, putting them to one’s own use or consuming them, transferring the same to
a third party, destroying them or damaging them in a way that they lose their identity, or dealing
with them in any other manner which deprives the plaintiff to it’s use and possession or some of
the examples of the of the wrong.

WRONGFUL INTENTION NOT NECESSARY

A person dealing with the goods of another person in a wrongful way does so at his own peril
and it is no defense that he honestly believed that he has a right to deal with the goods or he had
no knowledge of the owner’s right in them. 7According to lord porter, conversion consists in an
act intentionally done inconsistent with the owner’s right, though the doer may not know of, or
intend to challenge, the property or possession of the true owner.

IMMEDIATE RIGHT OF A POSSESSION OR USE NECESSARY

For an action for conversion, it is also necessary that the plaintiff must have a right to the
immediate possession of the goods at the time of their conversion. A plaintiff having such a
right, for example, a bailee, can sue a third party for conversion 8. In some cases, the bailor can
also sue as he is considered to be in constructive possession of the goods through the bailee, but
in such cases an action by one will be a bar to action by the other. Such an action, therefore, may
be brought by a finder of the goods, master of a ship, pledgee of the goods, person in possession
under a hiring agreement, or an auctioneer.

7
Caxton Publishing Co. Ltd. V. Sutherland Publishing Co. Ltd., (1939) A.C 178, 202
8
Burton V. Hughes, (1824) 2 Bing. 173
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DENAIL OF PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT TO GOODS NECESSARY

It has been noted above that the defendants intended act must amount to denial the plaintiff’s
right to the goods to which he is lawfully entitled. Removing the goods from one place to another
may be trespass9 but it is not conversion.

9
Kirk V. Gregory, (1876) 1 Ex. D. 55
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The Elements of Conversion

Trespass to chattels has a big sibling – the tort of conversion. Here is a black letter formulation
of the conversion tort:

A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case for conversion by showing: the defendant

(1) intentionally
(2) interfered with
(3) the plaintiff’s right of possession in a chattel
(4) in so substantial a manner as to warrant the remedy of a forced sale.

Conversion: Intent

The intent requirement for conversion works like that for trespass to chattels. Conversion
requires only that the defendant intend the actions that constitute conversion. There is no
requirement of bad motive, nor is there a requirement that the defendant intend to effect a
conversion. An example that is used in the Restatement concerns an auctioneer who takes a fine-
art painting from a third party, honestly and reasonably believing that the third party is the true
owner of the painting. If the auctioneer sells the painting, as instructed by the third party, the
intended act, the auctioneer is liable for conversion to the painting’s actual owner10.

As loose as the intent element may be, it is still there. If a person does not intentionally exercise
unpermitted dominion over the property, then there is no conversion. Suppose a museum is given
artifacts on loan, and the museum negligently loses them. There may be a good negligence case
here, but there is no conversion, because the intent element is unsatisfied.

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Conversion: Interference and substantiality to warrant remedy

For an interference with a chattel to qualify as a conversion, the defendant must exercise
dominion over the chattel in a way that is so substantial that it warrants the remedy of the forced
sale. There is no way to precisely delineate the threshold – it’s a matter of degree. Let’s extend
the example of the borrowed motorcycle that we used to illustrate trespass to chattels: The
defendant borrows a motorcycle for a couple of hours to go to a nail salon a couple of miles
away and then returns the bike to where it was originally parked. That is a trespass to chattels,
since it constitutes a dispossession. Yet it is not conversion. Why not? The defendant has not
exercised dominion over the chattel so seriously as to force the defendant to purchase the
motorcycle. Now, if we change the hypothetical so that, instead of going to the nearby nail salon,
the defendant drives the motorcycle from Milwaukee to South Dakota, then the dispossession
unquestionably qualifies as a conversion.

Conversion: The Remedy of Forced Sale or Forced Purchase

The sine qua non of the conversion action is the availability of the forced-sale remedy, in which
the defendant is ordered to pay full value for the converted chattel. So if someone takes a joyride
in your car and drives it into a lake, you can get the court to order the joyrider to pay the full fair
market value of the car at the time it was taken, with the joyrider then taking title to the
waterlogged car. Pursuing the tort of conversion is a choice. No plaintiff can be required to sue
for conversion rather than trespass to chattels. Because of this, conversion cannot be used to
require an unwilling plaintiff to sell her or his goods. For this reason, the terminology of forced
sale is confusing. In this sense, it is more accurate to call the remedy a forced purchase. In fact,
some commentators use this term. The doctrine of conversion doesn’t force anyone to sell
anything. Instead, it can be used to force the defendant to buy something. An example will help
make this clear. Suppose you want your roommate’s signed first edition of Harry Potter and the
Sorcerer’s Stone, but your roommate won’t sell it. It is not possible to game the conversion tort
so that you wind up getting what you want. If you take the book and your roommate wants it
back, your roommate can choose to sue for trespass to chattels. Also, using something called a
writ of replevin, your roommate can get a court order, even before trial, compelling you to return
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the book. Alternatively, your roommate can chose to sue for conversion, yet elect the trespass-to
chattels remedy of compensatory damages for the dispossession. The remedy of the forced sale
or forced purchase is something plaintiffs seek when they no longer want the chattels at issue11.

Conversion: Intangibles and capturing increased value

Beyond the forced-sale remedy, conversion has some other superpowers that the tort of trespass
to chattels lacks. For one, conversion can be used with many intangible assets that are tied to
tangible artifacts, such as stock certificates. And conversion can be used by the plaintiff to
capture the benefit of increased market values. Suppose, the defendant steals certificates of 100
shares of stock on monday, when they are worth $100,000. On Tuesday, the price of the stock
skyrockets, and the shares are worth $200,000. At that point, the plaintiff can use conversion to
get a judgment of $200,000. Now suppose the plaintiff waits to sue, and on Wednesday morning,
the value of the stock plummets to $50,000, at which point the defendant sells the shares for a
loss. The plaintiff can still use conversion to get a judgment of $200,000. In this way, conversion
can be used like a ratchet to capture increases in value without a possibility of slippage to a lower
value.

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DETINUE

When the defendant is wrongfully detaining the goods belonging to the plaintiff and refuses to
deliver the same on lawful demands the plaintiff can recover the same by bringing an action for
detinue. It is thus an action for the recovery of goods unlawfully detained by the defendant. If the
original possession is lawful but subsequently the goods are wrongfully detained, an action for
detinue can be brought. Thus, if a bailee refuses to deliver the goods after the bailment is
determined, he is liable in detinue.

In such an action, the defendant has to either return the specific chattel or pay it’s value to the
plaintiff. This remedy is, however, of no help when the goods are returned to the plaintiff in a
damaged condition.

An action for detinue may be distinguished from trespass. In an action for detinue, the defendant
assumes the possession of the goods whereas there could a trespass to the goods while the same
continue to be in the possession of the plaintiff.

In England, by the passing of torts Act 1977, detinue has been abolished however, the tort of
conversion has been extended to include those situations also which were termed as detinue.
Where the goods are detained by the defendant, the plaintiff can still claim relief by way of order
for the delivery of the goods or payment of damages equivalent to the value of the goods and
consequential damages resulting from wrongful detention.

In India, although detinue as such has not been mentioned as wrong but similar action for
recovery of specific movable property has been recognized by the specific relief Act, 1963. 12The
courts sometimes term such an action as that for detinue.

Sec 7 and 8 of the specific relief Act, 1963 enable the recovery of specific movable property. Sec
7 enables a person entitled to the possession of the property to recover it in a manner provided by
the code of civil procedure, 1908. However, in cases, provided in sec 8, the plaintiff entitled to
the immediate possession of the goods may claim a speedier relief and recover the specific
movable property from the person who is in possession or control of the thing. The cases when
such relief is possible are as follows:

12
Banshi V. Goverdhan, AIR 1976 M.P. 125.
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1. When the thing claimed is held by the defendant as the agent or trustee for the plaintiff.
2. When compensation in money would not afford the plaintiff adequate relief for the loss
of the thing claimed. For instance, Z has got possession of an idol belonging to A’s
family, and of which A is the proper custodian. Z may be compelled to deliver the idol to
A.
3. When it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the actual damage caused by it’s loss.
For instance, A is entitled to a picture by a dead printer and a pair of rare china vases. B
has possession of them. The articles are of too special a character to bear an ascertainable
market value. B may be compelled to deliver them to A.
4. When the possession of the thing claimed has been wrongfully transferred from the
plaintiff13.

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CASE ANALYSIS

1. In the case of Armory V. Delamire14 is a famous English case on personal property law
and finder’s rights. It is one of the first cases that established possession as a valuable
property right and as evidence of ownership. The defendant in the case was Paul de
Lamerie a great producer of silver works in the 18th century. His name was misspelled by
the court reporter. The facts of the case are the chimney sweepers boy who after finding a
jewel had given it to a jeweler to be valued was held entitled to recover it’s full value
from the jeweler on his refusing to return the same jewel. A person having a revisionary
interest in the goods, not being entitled to their immediate possession, cannot bring an
action in respect of trespass to them unless the trespass amounts to permanent injury to
the goods affecting his reversionary interest.

2. In the case of Kirk V. Gregory15 on A’s death his sister in law removed some jewelllery
from the room where his dead body was lying to another room under a reasonable but
mistaken belief that the same was necessary for it’s safety. The jewellary of the person A
who was dead and lying in the room was stolen by an unknown person from the room
where the dead person’s sister in law kept it that is where it was now kept. In an action
for the jewellary or the amount which is equal to it by the executor’s of A, A’s sister in
law was held liable for trespass to the jewellary. This is the case of direct interference to
the goods.
3. In the case of Creswell V. Sirl16, the defendant’s son shot the plaintiff’s dog because the
dog was attacking his sheep and pigs frequently. In an action by the plaintiff for the
damage caused to him, the court of Appeal held that it was for the defendant to justify the
killing and he could do the same by proving that the dog was either attacking the animals
or there was an apprehension of the attack to his sheep and goat and also the shooting

14
(1721) 1 Str. 505.
15
(1876) 1 Ex. D. 55.
16
(1948) 1 K.B. 241 : (1948) 2 All. E.R. 730.
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was the reasonable means preventing the invasion to the attack his sheep and goat. This is
a case in which lawful justification is held as defense.

4. In the case of National coal board V. Evans is an authority for the lawful justification in
the trespass to goods. There the defendants, a country counsel, had employed certain
independent contractors to make excavations on their land. Beneath the land there were
laid some electric cables by the plaintiff’s predecessors in title, of which the defendant’s
had no knowledge of that electric wires lying beneath the ground. The contractors, not
having been aware of the underground lying cables, these same underground cables were
damaged during excavations. The damage having been caused without any fault on the
part of the defendants, they were held not liable.
5. In the case of Richardson V Atkinson17 the defendant that is Atkinson and the plaintiff is
Richardson. The defendant that is Atkinson drew some wine out of the plaintiff’s cask
and he mixed some water with the remainder to make good the deficiency. He was held
liable for the conversion of the whole cask as he had converted part of the cask of the
contents by taking them away and converting the remaining part of the cask by
destroying their identity.
6. In the case of M S Chokkalingam V State of Karnataka18 the respondent, the forest
department of the state government, purchased two hundred and six rose wood logs from
the petitioner that is M S Chokkalingam and refused to pay for the same for nine years
inspite of repeated demands from the petitioner. It was held that the conduct of the
respondents in retaining the amount to which the petitioner is entitled inspite of the
demands, amounts to conversion. The High court of Karnataka directed the respondents
to pay to the petitioner the sum of money equivalent to the value of two hundred and six
logs of rose wood with interest at the rate of six percent from the date of delivery of logs
until payment of the value, and costs of rupees two thousand. This is a case of
conversion.

17
(1723) 1 Str. 576.
18
AIR 1991Kant. 116.
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7. In Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd. V Finch the defendant used the plaintiff’s car for
transporting uncustomed watches. The car was seized and forfeited by the custom
officials under the custom and exercise Act, 1952. Forfeiture of the car was held to be the
natural and probable consequence of the defendant’s act and he was deemed to have
intended the same and as such the defendant was liable for the tort of conversion.
8. In the case of Rooplal V Union of India some military jawans found some firewood by
the river side. They thought that the wood being unmarked probably belonged to the
government and they had every right to take away the same. They took away the wood in
the military vehicle for camp fire and fuel. Ultimately it turned out that the wood
belonged to the plaintiff that is Rooplal. In an action against the Union of India for the
tort of conversion committed by it’s servant, it was held that the union of India was liable
to compensate for the plaintiff for the loss and the fact that the jawans did not intend to
commit the theft did not absolve the state from it’s liability. So the state is liable though
there is no wrongful intention.
9. In the case of Hollins V Fowler19 the defendant, a cotton broker obtained possession of
thirteen bails of the plaintiff’s from one B and the sold the same further, receiving only
his own commission. B had obtained these goods from the plaintiff by doing the fraud,
but the defendant had absolutely no knowledge of the same. The defendant was held
liable to the plaintiff to the tort of conversion.
10. In the case of Consolidated company V Curtis 20 the owner of some household furniture
assigned the furniture to the plaintiff by the bill of sale. She subsequently engaged the
defendants who were auctioneers to sell the same for her. The defendant’s knowing
nothing of the bill of sale sold the furniture and also delivered the same to a purchaser.
The defendants thus were held liable for conversion.
11. In the case of Paramanda Mohnaty V Bira Behara21 and others the plaintiff took the lease
of big tank belonging to the gram panchayat for fishing for a period of three years
expiring on thirty first march, 1965. The defendant initiated proceedings under sec 145,
criminal procedure code contending that the said lease was taken by the plaintiff not for
himself but on the behalf of the village. There upon, the executive magistrate prohibited

19
(1875) L.R. 7 H.L.757.
20
(1892) 1 Q.B. 495
21
A.I.R. 1978 Orissa 114.
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the plaintiff from catching fish but finally disposed of the proceedings on thirty march
1965 just a day before the expiry of the plaintiff’s lease, ordering that the plaintiff had a
right over the tank till thirty first march 1965. In the middle of may 1965, the defendant,
acting on behalf of the villagers, obtained permission from the gram panchayat for fishing
which was granted. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendants and other
villages contending that their fishing the tank in may 1965 was conversion. It was held
since the plaintiff’s lease had expired on thirty first march 1965, he had no right in
respect of the tank in may 1965 and as such, he had no right to sue for the tort of
conversion. It was observed that it did not make any difference that the plaintiff earlier
could not make use of the tank because of the proceedings initiated against him by the
defendant.
12. In the case of Gordon V. Harper22 the plaintiff who gave on hire his furniture for a fixed
team, was not entitled to sue a third party for conversion, the wrongful act having been
committed during the continuance of hiring. But when a person having once given up the
possession requires the right to an immediate possession of goods, he can bring an action
for conversion, thus, if a person taking an article on hire purchase basis makes default in
payment an installment, the hire purchase owner acquires the right to possession and will
be entitled to sue for conversion if anyone converts that article after such a default.
13. In the case of Fouldes V Willough23 by the plaintiff embarked his horses on the
defendant’s ferry boat for crossing the river. Some dispute having arisen between the
plaintiff and the defendant before the boat started, the defendant asked the plaintiff to
remove his horse from the boat. On his refusal, the defendant put the horses of on to the
highway. The plaintiff himself declined to get down and he was carried across the river.
The plaintiff brought an action contending that the defendant’s act had amounted to
conversion. It was held that the defendant’s act might have been trespass to the horses, it
did not amount to conversion.
14. In the case of Municipal Corporation Of Delhi vs J.B. Bottling Company Pvt. Ltd. on 12
May, 1978, I feel myself impelled to hold that the very act of seizure of Chander Singh
being unlawful the entire prosecution case falls like a house of cards. The case is founded

22
(1769) 7 Terms Rep. 9.
23
(1842) 8M and W 540.
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on the power of seizure of the food inspector. Chander Singh was not a food inspector as
he was not validly appointed. He was no more than a private person. A private person has
no power of seizure. Any act which if not done with the authority of law would amount to
trespass to goods. It is a general invasion of the liberty of the citizen. To take possession
of an article in pursuance of a statutory provision of food law is perfectly lawful,
sanctioned as it is by the command of the sovereign. But seizure by a private person is
without authority of law. It is naked power. It is brute force. Such evidence of guilt
cannot be used in the prosecution of a criminal action for some crime or offence with
which an accused is charged.
15. In the case of K.M. Abdul Subhan vs S. Ramaiah on 5 November, 195124, Trespass on
goods has been described as an unlawful disturbance of the possession of the goods by
seizure or removal by a direct act causing damage to goods, and the remedies available to
a plaintiff against whom such trespass is committed is independent of his claims for other
wrongs in respect of the property which are described as conversion or detention.
Detenue is the form of action which lies when one person wrongfully detains the goods
of another. The gist of the action is the unlawful failure to deliver them up when
demanded.

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CONCLUSION

There are many circumstances where the violation of interests in goods is not protected by
trespass, conversion or even the tort of negligence. The action analogous to the old action on the
case has proved very fruitful in filling these gaps; and what now follows is to be treated as
illustrative of this wider right of action and not as exhaustively defining the circumstances in
which it may be held available in the future. These torts are forms of 'wrongful interference with
goods' so that, where relevant, the provisions of the 1977 Act apply.

Trespass and conversion are especially restrictive in that they are not available to a claimant who
neither possesses nor has an immediate right to possess the goods. The leading case of Mears v
London and South Western Railway (1862) 11 CBNS 850, has firmly established that if goods
are destroyed or damaged, the owner may sue without having possession or an immediate right
to possess. The rule benefits, for example, a bailor, a purchaser where the vendor has a lien for
unpaid purchase money, and a mortgagee. He must prove damage to his interest - taking the
goods from the possessor without affecting title is insufficient.

A bailee disregarding the terms of his bailment may sometimes be liable in case, though not in
conversion and that to deny the claimant access to his goods or to interfere with his freedom of
using them is also actionable on the case. Further, to place baited traps on one's land near the
highway so as to attract dogs into the traps, and in consequence of which dogs are so trapped, is
a tort of this category (Townsend v Wathen (1808) 9 East 277).
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BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Law of torts, Dr. R.K Bhangia, Allahabad Law Agency, 2017

2. www.indiankanoon.org [ Last accessed on 20th Oct. 2018, 11.00PM ]
3. The Law of Torts, Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, Lexis Nexis, 2018