Received 4/8/2019 10:52:50 AM Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

:
CRAIG STEDMAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY :
AS LANCASTER COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, :
:
Petitioner, : No. 146 MD 2019
v. :
:
LANCASTER COUNTY BOARD OF :
COMMISSIONERS; JOSHUA PARSONS, IN HIS :
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE :
LANCASTER COUNTY BOARD OF :
COMMISSIONERS; DENNIS STUCKEY, IN HIS :
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS VICE-CHAIRMAN OF :
THE LANCASTER COUNTY BOARD OF :
COMMISSIONERS; CRAIG LEHMAN, IN HIS :
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS LANCASTER COUNTY :
COMMISSIONER, :
:
Respondents, :
:
JOSHUA SHAPIRO, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY :
AS PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY GENERAL; and :
BRIAN HURTER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS :
LANCASTER COUNTY CONTROLLER, :
:
Indispensable/Non-adverse :
Respondents. :

NOTICE TO PLEAD

To: LANCASTER COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

JOSHUA PARSONS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN

OF THE LANCASTER COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

i
DENNIS STUCKEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS VICE-
CHAIRMAN OF THE LANCASTER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS

CRAIG LEHMAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS LANCASTER

COUNTY COMMISSIONER

JOSHUA SHAPIRO, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY GENERAL

BRIAN HURTER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS LANCASTER

COUNTY CONTROLLER

You are hereby notified to file a written response to the enclosed

petition for review within thirty (30) days from service hereof or a
judgment may be entered against you.

Dated: April 8, 2019 s/ Mark E. Seiberling

Mark E. Seiberling (No. 91256)
KLEINBARD LLC
Three Logan Square
1717 Arch Street, 5th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Ph: (215) 568-2000
Fax: (215) 568-0140
Eml: mseiberling@kleinbard.com

Attorney for District Attorney Craig

Stedman

ii
 IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

:
CRAIG STEDMAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY :
AS LANCASTER COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, :
:
Petitioner, : No. 146 MD 2019
v. :
:
LANCASTER COUNTY BOARD OF :
COMMISSIONERS; JOSHUA PARSONS, IN HIS :
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE :
LANCASTER COUNTY BOARD OF :
COMMISSIONERS; DENNIS STUCKEY, IN HIS :
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS VICE-CHAIRMAN OF :
THE LANCASTER COUNTY BOARD OF :
COMMISSIONERS; CRAIG LEHMAN, IN HIS :
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS LANCASTER COUNTY :
COMMISSIONER, :
:
Respondents, :
:
JOSHUA SHAPIRO, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY :
AS PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY GENERAL; and :
BRIAN HURTER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS :
LANCASTER COUNTY CONTROLLER, :
:
Indispensable/Non-adverse :
Respondents. :

AMENDED PETITION FOR REVIEW IN THE NATURE OF A

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Petitioner Craig Stedman, in his official capacity as Lancaster

County District Attorney, by and through his undersigned counsel, does

hereby bring this petition for review in the nature of a complaint for
declaratory and injunctive relief, and in support thereof, avers as

follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Lancaster County Board of Commissioners and its

constituent members have embarked on a related three-part plan to

encroach upon the independent powers of the Lancaster County District

Attorney.

2. First, they are attempting to interfere in District Attorney

Stedman’s use of funds exclusively committed to his control by the

General Assembly under Act 13 of 2017. In pursuit of these interference

efforts, the Commissioners are also intruding upon audit and

investigation rights exclusively held by the Attorney General and the

County Controller. Their efforts include a campaign of misleading

public releases designed to make it appear as if District Attorney

Stedman bypassed purportedly required procedures, which procedures

are not, in fact, required by law, or, indeed, longstanding procedure in

the County. Moreover, if the Court grants the relief requested in this

Petition, District Attorney Stedman’s use of Act 13 resources will

continue to be, as they have for years, fully and appropriately vetted by

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those parties designated by the General Assembly to review the

expenditures and ensure that the law is followed. That is, District

Attorney Stedman is not trying to hide anything with the relief sought

in this Petition; instead, he is attempting to ensure that the law is

followed in all of its facets, and to ensure that if anything needs

“revealed,” it is done by those authorities (which include the chief law

enforcement attorney in the Commonwealth) with the power and right

to do so.

3. Second, the Commissioners are attempting to interfere with

District Attorney Stedman’s independent statutory rights to control

human resource matters within his office.

4. Third, and finally, the Commissioners are attempting to

intimidate and silence District Attorney Stedman and prevent him from

challenging the Commissioners’ illegal and unlawful arrogation of

power by brazenly refusing to approve payment of his attorneys’ fees

and legal costs related to his defense of the statutory and constitutional

boundaries of his elected office. This latest tactic by the Commissioners

violates basic separation of powers principles, and runs contrary to

ordinary budgeting and appropriation procedures. Most critically, if this

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tactic is allowed to stand, it gives the Commissioners the power to

constrain the independence of the District Attorney.

5. Accordingly, the Court’s intervention is needed to declare the

parties’ respective legal rights, end the improper encroachments upon

District Attorney Stedman’s statutory and constitutional authority, and

prevent the Commissioners from unconstitutionally starving out the

District Attorney through their power over the purse.

II. JURISDICTION

6. Petitioner files this Petition in the Court’s original

jurisdiction seeking declaratory judgment under the Declaratory

Judgments Act, 43 Pa.C.S. § 7531, et seq., and injunctive relief.

7. This Court has original jurisdiction over the claims in

Count I under Section 761(a)(1) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 761(a)(1).

8. Further, this Court has ancillary jurisdiction over the claims

in Counts II and III because they are related to and closely intertwined

with the claims within the Court’s original jurisdiction set forth in

Count I, in that, among other things, all claims involve a coordinated

effort by the Commissioners to serially violate the District Attorney’s

4
rights and authority under various statutes and the Pennsylvania

Constitution.

III. PARTY SEEKING RELIEF

9. Petitioner Craig Stedman is the duly elected Lancaster

County District Attorney, an independent county officer under

Article IX, Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. District Attorney

Stedman brings this Petition in his official capacity.

IV. GOVERNMENT UNITS WHOSE ACTIONS ARE IN ISSUE

10. Respondent Lancaster County Board of Commissioners is

the official body, composed of individual county commissioners,

responsible for the transaction of business of Lancaster County, a third

class county, under The County Code, 16 P.S. § 504(a).

11. Respondent Joshua Parsons is a duly elected Lancaster

County Commissioner, an independent county officer under Article IX,

Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Commissioner Parsons

serves as the Chairman of the Board of Commissioners and is named as

a Respondent only in his official capacity.

12. Respondent Dennis Stuckey is a duly elected Lancaster

County Commissioner, an independent county officer under Article IX,

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Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Commissioner Stuckey

serves as the Vice-Chairman of the Board of Commissioners and is

named as a Respondent only in his official capacity.

13. Respondent Craig Lehman is a duly elected Lancaster

County Commissioner, an independent county officer under Article IX,

Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Commissioner Lehman is

named as a Respondent only in his official capacity. (Respondents

Commissioners Lehman, Parsons, and Stuckey are referred to

collectively as the Lancaster County Commissioners or the

Commissioners.)

V. OTHER INDISPENSABLE PARTIES

14. Respondent Joshua Shapiro is the duly elected Pennsylvania

Attorney General, an independent executive officer under Article IV,

Section 4.1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Attorney General Shapiro

is named as a Respondent only in his official capacity. Further,

Attorney General Shapiro is named as a Respondent only because he is

an indispensable party to Count I of this action in that the declaration

of rights sought by District Attorney Stedman in Count I would impact

his authority under Act 13.

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 15. Respondent Brian Hurter is the duly elected Lancaster

County Controller, an independent county officer under Article IX,

Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Controller Hurter is named

as a Respondent only in his official capacity. Further, Controller Hurter

is named as a Respondent only because he is an indispensable party to

Counts I and III of this action in that the declaration of rights sought by

District Attorney Stedman in Counts I and III would impact his

authority under Act 13 and The County Code.

VI. GENERAL STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

A. Asset forfeiture disputes

(1) Act 13 of 2017

16. In 2017, the General Assembly passed Act 13 of 2017

(Senate Bill 8 of the 2017-2018 Regular Session), which added a number

of provisions to Pennsylvania law, chiefly codified at 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 5801-

5808. The laws produced by Act 13 were later slightly amended with

Act 80 of 2018 (Senate Bill 1090 of the 2017-2018 Regular Session).

17. The purpose of Act 13 was to reform civil asset forfeiture

procedures in the Commonwealth and to allow law enforcement to take

possession of certain property involved in criminal activity.

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 18. One of the key aspects of Act 13 was its provision concerning

how the cash and proceeds of property subject to forfeiture could be

used and by whom, codified in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5803.

19. In relevant part, cash or proceeds of property subject to

forfeiture under the law are now “transferred to the custody of the

district attorney” and “shall be placed in the operating fund of the

county in which the district attorney is elected.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5803(g).

20. Immediately thereafter, under Section 5803, the

“appropriate county authority shall immediately release from the

operating fund, without restriction, a like amount for the use of the

district attorney for enforcement of or prevention of a violation of the

provisions of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic

Act.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5803(g) (emphasis added).

21. The funds then received by the district attorney, after being

received by the county authority and immediately returned, “shall be

maintained in an account or accounts separate from other revenues of

the office.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5803(g).

22. The law further provides that those funds are then

quarantined from county authority or consideration, stating: “[t]he

8
entity having budgetary control shall not anticipate future forfeitures or

proceeds from future forfeitures in adoption and approval of the budget

for the district attorney.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5803(g).

23. Not only are the funds quarantined from county authority

consideration after being turned over to the district attorney, they are

also beyond the county’s control, with the law stating the district

attorney has sole jurisdiction over them: “Cash or proceeds of property

subject to forfeiture under section 5802 and transferred to the custody

of the district attorney … shall be utilized by the district attorney … for

the enforcement of or prevention of a violation of the provisions of The

Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.” 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 5803(i).

24. While the district attorney has sole control over the

forfeiture funds, his use thereof is subject to two layers of oversight.

25. First, as is relevant here, the county controller must perform

an annual audit of all forfeited property and proceeds obtained and

used by the district attorney. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5803(j). The county

controller’s audit is statutorily confidential, and “shall not be made

public.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5803(j).

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 26. County Controller Hurter has annually audited District

Attorney Stedman’s use of asset forfeiture funds and has found him to

be in compliance every year.

27. Second, the county controller’s audit is then submitted to the

Attorney General for further review. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5803(j). The Attorney

General is also tasked by law with adopting reporting procedures and

guidelines for district attorneys to be used in auditing and reporting the

forfeiture assets. The Attorney General is further tasked with making

an annual report to the Appropriations and Judiciary Committees of the

Pennsylvania House and Senate. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5803(k).

28. The procedures and guidelines developed by the Attorney

General are designed, by statute, “to protect the confidentiality of

forfeited property or proceeds used in ongoing law enforcement

activities.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5803(k)(2).

(2) Forfeiture disputes between District Attorney

Stedman and Lancaster County Commissioners

29. District Attorney Stedman presently is in possession of

certain funds forfeited as provided in Act 13.

30. In 2016, District Attorney Stedman used a portion of those

proceeds to lease a 2016 Toyota Highlander.

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 31. The vehicle was to be used, and has been used, by District

Attorney Stedman and members of his office as an official vehicle.

32. Prior to leasing the vehicle using asset forfeiture funds,

District Attorney Stedman followed well-established practice for use of

asset forfeiture funds in the County and did not lease the vehicle using

procurement procedures in The County Code.

33. District Attorney Stedman did, however, solicit and receive a

certification from County Controller Hurter that District Attorney

Stedman was “duly authorized to lease and/or finance” the vehicle. A

true and accurate copy of Controller Hurter’s certification is attached as

Exhibit A.

34. Notwithstanding Act 13’s provisions, which give District

Attorney Stedman sole control over the forfeiture funds and which give

County Controller Hurter and Attorney General Shapiro sole audit

authority over the use of such funds, the Lancaster County Board of

Commissioners, collectively and individually, have invoked a purported

right to be involved.

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 35. Specifically, the Lancaster County Commissioners have

insisted that the Toyota lease agreement should have been subjected to

the Commissioners’ contracting authority under The County Code.

36. While the Commissioners have not yet, to date, identified

exactly which provision(s) of The County Code they are invoking,

presumably they are invoking 16 P.S. §§ 1800-1807.2, concerning

contracts, and specifically 16 P.S. § 1801(a), which provides that “the

commissioners shall contract for and purchase all services referred to in

Section 508 and personal property for county officers and agencies.”

37. Based on this purported authority, the Lancaster County

Commissioners have further insisted that they can, and will,

investigate all matters concerning the vehicle lease; that is, they intend

to audit the expenditure of Act 13 funds.

38. But this is plainly beyond the Commissioners’ intentionally

limited role under Section 5803.

39. The contracting provisions of The County Code simply do not

apply to expenditures by a district attorney of Act 13 funds.

40. Indeed, the General Assembly made clear that the sole event

involving county commissioners is the immediate appropriation of Act

12
13 funds back to a district attorney after they are deposited with the

county. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5803(g).

41. The Lancaster County Commissioners’ position that Act 13

funds held by District Attorney Stedman are subject to their further

appropriation/contracting authority amounts to an “absurd”

interpretation of the law; namely, that already appropriated funds are

subject to a second appropriation after they are out of the

Commissioners’ control.

42. Their position is further absurd since the General Assembly

expressly directed that Act 13 funds, once possessed by a district

attorney, shall only be “utilized by the district attorney” and the county

authority is expressly forbidden from even budgeting for the use or

expenditure of the funds by the district attorney. See 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 5803(g), (i).

43. The Lancaster County Commissioners’ position that they can

subject the Act 13 funds to ordinary County Code contracting

procedures improperly inserts the Commissioners into the use of funds

that only District Attorney Stedman is statutorily permitted to use.

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 44. Further, the purported investigatory powers the

Commissioners assert is unlawful.

45. The so-called “investigation” is nothing more than a

differently named “audit” by the County Commissioners.

46. That audit is impermissible because it (1) usurps authority

that is only held, by statute, by the Controller and the Attorney

General, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 5803(j); and (2) seriously risks a violation of

the express confidentiality provisions in Section 5803 concerning

forfeiture proceeds. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5803(j), (k)(2).

47. District Attorney Stedman has brought all of these legal

issues and concerns to the attention of the Lancaster County Board of

Commissioners in a series of three letters sent on March 5, 2019 and

March 7, 2019. True and accurate copies of the March 5th and March 7th

correspondence are attached as Exhibits B, C, and D, respectively.

48. Each letter, by their express caption, sought to have the

Commissioners cease and desist their “unlawful oversight” of District

Attorney Stedman in his official capacity as an independent

constitutional officer of the Commonwealth. See id.

14
 49. But, in response to those letters, the County Commissioners

have remained steadfast and resolute in their belief that they have the

ability to review and/or audit “Mr. Stedman’s use of drug forfeiture

funds” as part of the County’s “procurement process.” A true and

accurate copy of the County Solicitor’s March 7th correspondence is

attached as Exhibit E.

50. Indeed, not only have the County Commissioners previously

sought District Attorney Stedman’s records related to Mr. Stedman’s

expenditure of Act 13 funds, but they continue to seek “invoices and

detail” of Act 13 expenditures, as evidenced by a March 22, 2019 email

from the County’s Budget Office seeking records related to parking

expenses paid by District Attorney Stedman’s office with Act 13 funds.

A true and accurate copy of the March 22nd Email Chain is attached as

Exhibit F.

51. This is so despite the County Controller’s letter of March 13,

2019, which expressly states that Act 13 expenditures have always been

“handled at the discretion of the Lancaster County District Attorney

since the inception of the [Drug Task Force]” subject to the Controller’s

annual audit, and without any separate audit or independent oversight

15
from the County Commissioners. A true and accurate copy of the

County Controller’s March 13th correspondence is attached as Exhibit

G.

52. Moreover, the County Controller’s letter further explains:

This is the first time since I took office in November 2013

where this practice has been questioned. Based on discussion
with my team I am not aware of this practice ever being
questioned. The normal procurement process for the county
would typically run through purchasing; however, with the
[Drug Task Force] funds being handled at the discretion of
the DA, the normal county procurement process has never
been followed for the [Drug Task Force].

Exhibit G at 2.

53. This has been the case since Commissioner Stuckey

previously served as County Controller and conducted these same

annual audits of Act 13 funds.

54. Accordingly, to forestall the unlawful encroachment on the

authority of District Attorney Stedman under Act 13 by the Lancaster

County Board of Commissioners and the individual members thereof,

District Attorney Stedman seeks a declaration of the rights and powers

of the parties involved.

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 B. Employment disputes

55. The encroachments by the Lancaster County Commissioners

upon District Attorney Stedman’s independent statutory and

constitutional powers are not limited to intrusions under Act 13.

56. Indeed, as part of an overall related scheme to interfere with

District Attorney Stedman’s independent powers, the Lancaster County

Commissioners are also violating his official capacity rights under The

County Code.

(1) Employment provisions under The County Code

57. Under The County Code, the district attorney is empowered

to “appoint such number of assistants, licensed to practice law in this

Commonwealth, to assist in the discharge of duties.” 16 P.S. § 1420(a).

58. Further, employees hired by a district attorney, who is an

independent county officer, see Pa. Const. Art. IX, § 4, are exclusively

subject to his hiring, discharging and supervising rights, with The

County Code stating: “The exercise of [certain representation rights] by

the county commissioners shall in no way affect the hiring, discharging

and supervising rights and obligations with respect to such employees

as may be vested in the judges or other county officers.” 16 P.S. § 1620.

17
 (2) Employment disputes between District Attorney
Stedman and Lancaster County Commissioners

59. In February 2019, District Attorney Stedman suspended,

with pay, an assistant district attorney within his office, exercising his

powers under Sections 1420 and 1620 of The County Code.

60. The employee was, a short time later, reinstated by District

Attorney Stedman.

61. Recently, District Attorney Stedman learned that the

Lancaster County Board of Commissioners is investigating District

Attorney Stedman for both the suspension and the reinstatement of the

employee.

62. As such, District Attorney Stedman sent a letter to the

County Commissioners on March 7, 2019, separately advising them

that, as with their attempts to audit and investigate his use of Act 13

funds, the County Commissioners were equally without the legal

authority or power to investigate his employment actions. A true and

accurate copy of the March 7th correspondence is attached as Exhibit H.

63. Later, the Lancaster County Commissioners responded,

through the Human Resources Director, by publicly releasing (at the

same time they released it to District Attorney Stedman) a so-called

18
“Final Summary” on March 13, 2019, in which, utterly contrary to The

County Code, the Commissioners revealed that they had unlawfully

completed a significant “review” of District Attorney Stedman’s actions.

A true and accurate copy of the March 13th Final Summary is attached

as Exhibit I.

64. In the Final Summary, the Commissioners revealed

information that should have remained utterly confidential to protect

the privacy and reputational rights of the parties involved, including

allegations and purported findings involving employees within the

District Attorney’s Office involved in the matter.

65. Indeed, the Final Summary revealed enough information

that a local news outlet was able to associate the allegations in the

Summary with current and former employees of the District Attorney’s

Office.

66. In the Final Summary the Commissioners also use their

unlawful investigation as a platform to make policy and employment

recommendations to District Attorney Stedman and to make certain

demands for information.

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 67. The Commissioners’ investigation of District Attorney

Stedman is troubling because, as the chief law enforcement official for

the County, District Attorney Stedman’s records contain sensitive

information, including information protected under the Criminal

History Record Information Act, 18 Pa.C.S. § 9101 et seq.

68. Further, and critically, District Attorney Stedman, as an

independent constitutional officer, is not himself a county employee or a

person subject to review or investigation by the Lancaster County

Board of Commissioners or the members thereof.

69. Accordingly, to forestall the unlawful encroachment on the

authority of District Attorney Stedman under The County Code and the

Pennsylvania Constitution by the Lancaster County Board of

Commissioners and the individual members thereof, District Attorney

Stedman seeks a declaration of the rights and powers of the parties

involved.

C. Legal expense approval dispute

70. Since undertaking their encroachments upon District

Attorney Stedman’s independent statutory and constitutional powers,

the Lancaster County Commissioners have taken the additional step of

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attempting to intimidate and silence him by seeking to defund his

attempts to defend himself against their illegal and unlawful

encroachments.

71. Specifically, the Commissioners have the taken the

retaliatory step of trying to prevent District Attorney Stedman from

legally challenging the Commissioners’ constitutional and statutory

overreaches by refusing to approve payment of his attorneys’ fees and

legal expenses in this litigation, even though basic separation of powers

principles mandate that such fees and expenses be paid by the

Commissioners.

(1) Separation of powers

72. “A basic precept of our form of government is that the

executive, the legislature and the judiciary are independent, co-equal

branches of government.” Com., ex rel. Jiuliante v. Cty. of Erie, 657 A.2d

1245, 1251 (Pa. 1995) (quoting Beckert v. Warren, 439 A.2d 638, 642

(1981) (citations omitted)).

73. The “prophylactic effect” of the separation of powers doctrine

is to prevent “one branch from usurping the powers committed to the

other branches of government.” Id. at 1252.

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 74. “The very genius of our tripartite Government is based upon

the proper exercise of their respective powers together with harmonious

cooperation between [sic] the three independent Branches.” Id. at

(quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193, 197 (Pa.

1971) (citation omitted)).

75. Based on basic separation of powers principles, our Supreme

Court has recognized a “limited exception” to the general rule that a

litigant cannot recover counsel fees from an adverse party where one

branch of government “genuinely threatens or interferes with the

inherent authority” of a coordinate branch of government. See id. at

1252.

76. Indeed, our Supreme Court has recognized that one branch

of government “should never be intimidated nor forced to deplete

financial resources which are dedicated to its intended functions in

order to defend its constitutional role in the government of this

Commonwealth” by a coordinate branch of government. Id.

77. As such, under general separation of powers principles, the

County Commissioners cannot simply choose to defund or refuse to

approve payment of the legal expenses of District Attorney Stedman if,

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as here, he is defending his independent, constitutional role in the

County government from illegal encroachments by a coordinate branch

of County government. See id.

78. Moreover, under The County Code, the Lancaster County

Commissioners, as a core legislative function, are responsible for

preparing and providing notice of a proposed annual budget and to

adopt a final budget by December 31st of each year. See 16 P.S. §§ 1780-

85.

79. To this end, each year, the Lancaster County Commissioners

adopt a final budget with regard to the Lancaster County District

Attorney’s Office, which includes an enumerated, annual appropriation

of funds designated for attorneys’ fees and legal expenses incurred by

District Attorney Stedman and his office.

80. As this Court as recognized, once those funds are budgeted

and appropriated to the District Attorney, the County Commissioners

cannot, as they are attempting to do here, retroactively undo those

already budgeted and appropriated funds simply because they may,

after-the-fact, disagree with or disapprove of how those funds are being

spent. See Yost v. McKnight, 865 A.2d 979, 986 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005)

23
(“[T]he District Attorney is an elected officer of the county … and may

enter into such contracts … for those services for which he has funds in

his budget.”).

(2) Legal expense approval dispute between District

Attorney Stedman and Lancaster County
Commissioners

81. On March 27, 2019, the County Commissioners sent a letter

to Controller Hurter advising that, “effective immediately, and until

further notice,” the Commissioners “will not approve payment of any

invoices or expenditures incurred by Craig Stedman, or the District

Attorney’s office, resulting from [this] lawsuit[.]” A true and accurate

copy of the March 27th Letter is attached as Exhibit J.

82. According to the County Commissioners’ letter, this

prohibition on the payment of District Attorney Stedman’s attorneys’

fees and legal costs “includes, but is not limited to, any pre-litigation

outside counsel representation costs in connection with claims or

litigation brought by Craig Stedman.” Id.

83. Incredibly, and telling of the punitive and retaliatory nature

of the correspondence, the County Commissioners’ letter expressly

made clear that their own legal fees could continue to be paid, stating:

24
“[t]his position does not limit or preclude, in any way, the County’s

responsibility to defend itself” in this action. Id.

84. In response to the County Commissioners’ letter, the County

Controller advised that, pursuant to The County Code, he is required to

obtain approval of at least two of the three County Commissioners

before issuing any payment for District Attorney Stedman’s attorneys’

fees and legal expenses.

85. But, the position of the County Commissioners, and the

County Controller’s apparent acquiescence to this unlawful position, is

in clear violation of basic separation of powers principles.

86. The County Commissioners, acting in their legislative

capacity, are attempting to intimidate and deplete the financial

resources of the District Attorney’s Office merely because District

Attorney Stedman has chosen to defend his constitutional and statutory

role in the County government. See Jiuliante, 657 A.2d at 1252.

87. Moreover, because the funds for District Attorney Stedman’s

attorneys’ fees and legal costs already have been budgeted and

appropriated by the County Commissioners, the Commissioners have no

authority or power to direct how, when, or for what purpose District

25
Attorney Stedman spends those budgeted funds. See Yost, 865 A.2d at

986.

88. To allow otherwise, would permit the County Commissioners

to entirely defund and render inoperative the District Attorney’s Office

merely because they may disagree with or disapprove of the District

Attorney’s policies or prosecutorial decisions.

89. Accordingly, to forestall the brazen attempt by the Lancaster

County Commissioners and the individual members thereof to

intimidate, silence and defund District Attorney Stedman and his office

in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution and basic separation of

powers principles, District Attorney Stedman seeks a declaration of the

rights and powers of the parties involved.

COUNT I—DECLARATORY RELIEF

(DISTRICT ATTORNEY STEDMAN v. ALL RESPONDENTS)

90. The foregoing Paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if

set forth in full herein.

91. A party may obtain a declaration of existing legal rights,

duties, or status of parties by filing a petition under the Declaratory

Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7531, et seq.

26
 92. The purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act is to “settle

and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to

rights, status, and other legal relations, and is to be liberally construed

and administered.” See Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus.,

8 A.3d 866, 874 (Pa. 2010) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 7541(a)).

93. In this matter, District Attorney Stedman has taken the

position that his use of Act 13 funds is not subject to the Lancaster

County Board of Commissioners’ contracting authority under The

County Code nor are his expenditure of Act 13 funds subject to audit or

investigation by the Commissioners.

94. The Lancaster County Board of Commissioners and the

individual Commissioners have taken an opposite legal position,

insisting they have the power to control District Attorney Stedman’s

actions and the power to audit and review Act 13 expenditures in

addition to County Controller Hurter and Attorney General Shapiro.

95. Respondents County Controller Hurter and Attorney

General Shapiro are indispensable parties to this dispute because the

declaration of rights sought by District Attorney Stedman would impact

their authority under Act 13.

27
 96. Accordingly, there exists a clear legal dispute between

Petitioner and Respondents.

97. Declaratory judgment from the Court would resolve the

present legal controversy between the parties.

98. District Attorney Stedman is entitled to declaratory

judgment to resolve the present legal dispute.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner District Attorney Stedman requests

that the Court enter judgment in his favor and grant the following

relief:

a. declare that only County Controller Hurter and Attorney

General Shapiro have the authority under Act 13 to audit or investigate

District Attorney Stedman’s use of Act 13 funds;

b. declare that the Lancaster County Board of Commissioners

and Commissioners Parsons, Stuckey, and Lehman cannot investigate

or audit District Attorney Stedman’s use of Act 13 funds;

c. declare that contracting procedures under The County Code

do not apply to District Attorney Stedman’s expenditure of Act 13

funds;

28
 d. permanently enjoin the Lancaster County Board of

Commissioners and Commissioners Parsons, Stuckey, and Lehman

from auditing or investigating District Attorney Stedman’s expenditure

of Act 13 funds;

e. award attorneys’ fees and costs; and

f. such other and further relief as this Court deems just and

proper.

COUNT II—DECLARATORY RELIEF

(DISTRICT ATTORNEY STEDMAN V. LANCASTER COUNTY
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS AND COMMISSIONERS
PARSONS, STUCKEY, AND LEHMAN)

99. The foregoing Paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if

set forth in full herein.

100. A party may obtain a declaration of existing legal rights,

duties, or status of parties by filing a petition under the Declaratory

Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7531, et seq.

101. The purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act is to “settle

and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to

rights, status, and other legal relations, and is to be liberally construed

and administered.” See Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus.,

8 A.3d 866, 874 (Pa. 2010) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 7541(a)).

29
 102. District Attorney Stedman has taken the position that his

employment actions under The County Code, specifically under 16 P.S.

§§ 1420, 1620, are not subject to review by the Lancaster County Board

of Commissioners and the members thereof, and also he is not subject to

their review because, under the Pennsylvania Constitution, he is an

independent official, and thus not subject to their review.

103. The Commissioners, however, have taken a contrary legal

position, insisting they have the power to review the actions of District

Attorney Stedman, who is not a County employee subject to their

review, and who has independent, employment powers under The

County Code.

104. Accordingly, there exists a clear legal dispute between

Petitioner and Respondents Lancaster County Board of Commissioners

and Commissioners Parsons, Stuckey, and Lehman.

105. Declaratory judgment from the Court would resolve the

present legal controversy between the parties.

106. District Attorney Stedman is entitled to declaratory

judgment to resolve the present legal dispute.

30
 WHEREFORE, Petitioner District Attorney Stedman requests

that the Court enter judgment in his favor and grant the following

relief:

a. declare that District Attorney Stedman’s employment

decisions are not subject to review or investigation by the Lancaster

County Board of Commissioners and Commissioners Parsons, Stuckey,

and Lehman;

b. declare that the Lancaster County Board of Commissioners

and Commissioners Parsons, Stuckey, and Lehman cannot investigate

District Attorney Stedman, since he is not a county employee subject to

their control or authority;

c. permanently enjoin the Lancaster County Board of

Commissioners and Commissioners Parsons, Stuckey, and Lehman

from reviewing or investigating District Attorney Stedman’s

employment decisions;

d. award attorneys’ fees and costs; and

e. such other and further relief as this Court deems just and

proper.

31
 COUNT III—DECLARATORY RELIEF
(DISTRICT ATTORNEY STEDMAN V. LANCASTER COUNTY
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, COMMISSIONERS PARSONS,
STUCKEY, AND LEHMAN, AND CONTROLLER HURTER)

107. The foregoing Paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if

set forth in full herein.

108. A party may obtain a declaration of existing legal rights,

duties, or status of parties by filing a petition under the Declaratory

Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7531, et seq.

109. The purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act is to “settle

and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to

rights, status, and other legal relations, and is to be liberally construed

and administered.” See Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus.,

8 A.3d 866, 874 (Pa. 2010) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 7541(a)).

110. District Attorney Stedman has taken the position that, as an

independent constitutional officer, he is entitled to have his attorneys’

fees and legal costs paid for when, as here, he is challenging a

coordinate branch of government’s illegal encroachments on his

constitutional and statutory authority, particularly where the funds for

those fees and costs already have been budgeted and appropriated by

the County Commissioners.

32
 111. The Lancaster County Board of Commissioners and the

individual Commissioners, however, have taken a contrary legal

position, issuing a directive to the County Controller on March 27, 2019,

advising that they will not approve of the payment of District Attorney

Stedman’s attorneys’ fees and legal costs related to this litigation.

112. The County Controller has advised that, pursuant to The

County Code, he will not issue any payment for District Attorney

Stedman’s attorneys’ fees and legal costs absent approval of at least two

of the three County Commissioners.

113. Accordingly, there exists a clear legal dispute between

Petitioner and Respondents Lancaster County Board of Commissioners,

Commissioners Parsons, Stuckey, and Lehman, and Controller Hurter.

114. Declaratory judgment from the Court would resolve the

present legal controversy between the parties.

115. District Attorney Stedman is entitled to declaratory

judgment to resolve the present legal dispute.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner District Attorney Stedman requests

that the Court enter judgment in his favor and grant the following

relief:

33
 a. declare that, pursuant to basic separation of principles,

District Attorney Stedman is entitled to payment of his attorneys’ fees

and legal costs incurred as a result of this litigation;

b. declare that District Attorney Stedman is entitled to

payment of his attorneys’ fees and legal costs incurred as a result of this

litigation with those funds already budgeted and appropriated by the

County Commissioners;

c. declare that payment of District Attorney Stedman’s

attorneys’ fees and legal costs incurred as a result of this litigation do

not require the approval of the Lancaster County Board of

Commissioners, Commissioners Parsons, Stuckey, and Lehman, or

Controller Hurter;

d. permanently enjoin the Lancaster County Board of

Commissioners, Commissioners Parsons, Stuckey, and Lehman, and

Controller Hurter from refusing to approve the payment of District

Attorney Stedman’s attorneys’ fees and legal costs related to this

litigation;

e. permanently enjoin the Lancaster County Board of

Commissioners, Commissioners Parsons, Stuckey, and Lehman, and

34
Controller Hurter from attempting to defund or otherwise limit

payments to District Attorney Stedman or his office as a result of this

litigation;

f. award attorneys’ fees and costs; and

g. such other and further relief as this Court deems just and

proper.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: April 8, 2019 s/ Mark E. Seiberling

Mark E. Seiberling (No. 91256)
Joshua J. Voss (No. 306853)
KLEINBARD LLC
Three Logan Square
1717 Arch Street, 5th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Ph: (215) 568-2000
Fax: (215) 568-0140
Eml: mseiberling@kleinbard.com
jvoss@kleinbard.com

Attorneys for District Attorney Craig

Stedman

35
Exhibit A
Exhibit B
Exhibit C
Exhibit D
Exhibit E
Exhibit F
From: Resh, Joanne
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2019 1:41 PM
To: Stedman, Craig <StedmanC@co.lancaster.pa.us>
Subject: FW: Question
From: Gable, Beth
Sent: Friday, March 22, 2019 2:58 PM
To: Resh, Joanne <RESHJ@co.lancaster.pa.us>
Subject: FW: Question
Joanne,
Please see below. Do you have invoices or detail for the PCard transactions from DTF funds for parking in 2018?
Beth Gable
Budget Analyst
IT & Budget Services
2
From: Burkhart, John <JBurkhart@co.lancaster.pa.us>
Sent: Friday, March 22, 2019 1:46 PM
To: Gable, Beth <BGable@co.lancaster.pa.us>
Cc: Evans, Joanna <JoEvans@co.lancaster.pa.us>
Subject: RE: Question
I do not. If this is parking and a PCard purchase it is coming from the DA’s office. DTF’s only parking expense is to the City for spaces at the police station. I know that
some of the ADA parking is paid for out of 6587. You might want to contact Det. Joanne Resh with the County Detective’s office.
From: Gable, Beth
Sent: Friday, March 22, 2019 11:40 AM
To: Burkhart, John <JBurkhart@co.lancaster.pa.us>
Subject: FW: Question
John,
Joanna Evans said you would probably be the person to contact about this. If not, please forward as necessary.
Do you happen to have any invoices or detail on the following PCard transactions that you could send me? Just looking to find out who this parking covers. Thanks!
Beth Gable
Budget Analyst
IT & Budget Services
County of Lancaster
3
150 N. Queen St., Suite 322
Lancaster, PA 17603
(717) 295-5960
This communication, including any attachment, contains information which may be confidential or privileged, and is intended solely for the individual(s) to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended
recipient, please notify the sender at once and delete this message. You are hereby further notified that any disclosure, copying, or distribution of confidential or privileged material in this message without the
express written approval of the Lancaster County IT Department is strictly prohibited.
4
Exhibit G
Exhibit H
Exhibit I
Exhibit J