POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS Ruling: No, PCGG has no jurisdiction. The PCGG created the
A.1 PRELIMINARY MATTERS
1. Republic v. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Pres. Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1
(EO No. 1) creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to
recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates. Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then
Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board
(AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the
active service or retired.
AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained
wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas
(Ramas). Equipment/items and communication facilities and
cash which were found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano,
the mistress of respondent and former clerk-typist in the office
of the respondent, were confiscated. Accordingly, PCGG filed
a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 (RA No.
1379) against Ramas. The case was deferred several times
due to petitioner’s lack of preparation for trial and absence of
witnesses and vital documents to support its case.
Private Respondents then filed their motions to dismiss
arguing that PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate
and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held
without a showing that they are subordinates of former
President Marcos.
Issue: W/N PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute private respondents
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AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices of AFP personnel, whether in the active service or
retired. The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the
necessary recommendations to appropriate government
agencies on the action to be taken based on its findings.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel
who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in
Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who
have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of
former President Marcos by being the latters immediate family,
relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue
advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence
x x x; or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and
corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the
PCGG. Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President
assigned Ramas case to the PCGG. Therefore, Ramas case
should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the
PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over him.
Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate
of former President Marcos because of his position as the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army. The court hold
that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President Marcos
in the sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its
amendments. Mere position held by a military officer does not
automatically make him a subordinate as this term is used in
EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed
close association with former President Marcos. There must
be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully
accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or
relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. The PCGG
has to provide a prima facie showing that Ramas was a close
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
associate of former President Marcos, in the same manner
that business associates, dummies, agents or nominees of
former President Marcos were close to him. This, the PCGG
failed to prove.
(Dimaano v. Sandiganbayan 2012)
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the forfeiture case against
Dimaano and ordered the Republic to return the money and
items it seized from her (The raiding team seized the items
detailed in the seizure receipt together with other items not
included in the search warrant.). Consequently, Dimaano filed
with the Sandiganbayan a motion for the release of the seized
cash and items which were granted. But the Sandiganbayan
assessed Dimaano ₱163,391.50 as sheriff’s percentage
collection fee.
Dimaano filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Sandiganbayan’s assessment order. She assailed it as
unwarranted since the sheriff’s percentage collection fee
applied only to actions for money covering collectibles or
unsatisfied debts or in actions pertaining to interest-bearing
obligations.
W/N the Sandiganbayan rightfully assessed Dimaano a
sheriff’s percentage collection fee on the money that the
Republic returned to her
Yes. First, the imposition of the sheriff’s fee is not a penalty for
some wrong that Dimaano had done. It is an assessment for
the cost of the sheriff’s service in collecting the judgment
amount for her benefit. Second, what determines the
assessment of the disputed court fee is the fact that the court,
through valid processes, ordered a certain sum of money to be
placed in the hands of the sheriff for turnover to the winning
party.
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2. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
Facts: GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel Corp. (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual
strategic partner, is to provide management expertise and/or
an international marketing/reservation system, and financial
support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the
Manila Hotel. In a close bidding, only 2 bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad,
a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator,
which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, petitioner matched the bid price of P44.00 per share
tendered by Renong Berhad. Perhaps apprehensive that
respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching
bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this
Court on prohibition and mandamus. Accordingly, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents
from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian
firm.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier
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generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and
sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to
release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents
and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.
Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the
MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel
which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned
and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent
GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a
part of the national economy.
Issues: 1) W/N Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is a self- executing provision;
2) W/N Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony
Ruling: 1) Yes, it is a self- executing provision. The
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law
of the nation, thus, it deemed written in every statue and
contract. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that
[i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
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preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances
an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to
enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by
its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings.
2) Yes, Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony. The
term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have
very well used the term natural resources, but also to the
cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a
landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute
witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of
the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its
own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has
become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure,
51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the
51% will have actual control and management of the hotel.
3. Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc.
Facts: DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-PDI) constructed
the PDI's Torre de Manila condominium project located near
Taft Avenue, Ermita. On 24 July 2012, the City Council of
Manila issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the
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Building Official to temporarily suspend the Building Permit of
DMCI-PDI, citing among others, that "the Torre de Manila
Condominium, based on their development plans, upon
completion, will rise up high above the back of the national
monument, to clearly dwarf the statue of our hero, and with
such towering heights, would certainly ruin the line of sight of
the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage
point."
KOR, a "civic, patriotic, cultural, nonpartisan, non-sectarian
and non-profit organization", filed a Petition for Injunction
seeking a temporary restraining order, and later a permanent
injunction, against the construction of DMCIPDI's Torre de
Manila condominium project. The KOR argues that the subject
matter of the present suit is one of "transcendental importance,
paramount public interest, of overarching significance to
society, or with far-reaching implication" involving the
desecration of the Rizal Monument. Next, the KOR contends
that the project is a nuisance per se because "the despoliation
of the sight view of the Rizal Monument is a situation that
annoys or offends the senses' of every Filipino.
DMCI-PDI maintains that the KOR has no standing to institute
this proceeding because it is not a real party in interest in this
case. The purposes of the KOR as a public corporation do not
include the preservation of the Rizal Monument as a cultural or
historical heritage site. Also, it argues that the Torre de Manila
is not a nuisance per se. DMCI-PDI reiterates that it obtained
all the necessary permits, licenses, clearances, and
certificates for its construction. It also refutes the KOR's claim
that the Torre de Manila would dwarf all other structures
around it.
Issue: W/N the court can issue a writ of mandamus against
the officials of the City of Manila
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Ruling: No. First, there is no law prohibiting the construction
of the Torre de Manila. Section 47 of Ordinance No. 8119
specifically regulates the "development of historic sites and
facilities." Section 48 regulates "large commercial signage
and/or pylon." There is nothing in Sections 47 and 48 of
Ordinance No. 8119 that disallows the construction of a
building outside the boundaries of a historic site or facility,
where such building may affect the background of a historic
site. In this case, the Torre de Manila stands 870 meters
outside and to the rear of the Rizal Monument and "cannot
possibly obstruct the front view of the [Rizal] Monument."
Likewise, the Torre de Manila is not in an area that has been
declared as an "anthropological or archeological area" or in an
area designated as a heritage zone, cultural property,
historical landmark, or a national treasure by the NHCP.
Second, Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila.
The Rules on Civil Procedure are clear that mandamus only
issues when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office
or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and
when the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to
the performance of such act. Nowhere is it found in Ordinance
No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for that matter, that
the construction of a building outside the Rizal Park is
prohibited if the building is within the background sightline or
view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no legal duty on
the part of the City of Manila "to consider the standards set
under Ordinance No. 8119" in relation to the applications of
DMCI-PDI for the Torre de Manila since under the ordinance
these standards can never be applied outside the boundaries
of Rizal Park. Neither has the area of the Torre de Manila
been designated as a "heritage zone, a cultural property, a
historical landmark or even a national treasure. Even if there
were such legal duty, the determination of whether the City of
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Manila failed to abide by this legal duty would involve factual
matters which have not been admitted or established in this
case. Establishing factual matters is not within the realm of this
Court. Findings of fact are the province of the trial courts.
4. Santiago v. COMELEC
Facts: Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to
Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials
by People’s Initiative.” Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a
founding member of the Movement for Peoples Initiative, a
group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to
institutionalize people power; that he and the members of the
Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power
to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted
under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the
exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings
under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.
The COMELEC then, upon its approval, set the time and dates
for signature gathering all over the country, caused the
necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general
circulation, and instructed local election registrars to assist
petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations.
Thereafter, Miriam Santiago et al filed a special civil action for
prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.)
the constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the
constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress,
2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative
namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local
legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were specifically
provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions
were specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This
omission indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to
amend the Constitution was left to some future law – as
pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.
Issue: W/N RA 6735 was adequate to cover initiative on
amendments to the constitution
Ruling: No. RA 6735 was intended to include the system of
initiative on amendments to the constitution, but is,
unfortunately, inadequate to cover that system. Without
implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. This
provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an
enabling law to be passed by Congress. Thus, although this
mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment
which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still
is dependent on congressional action. In other words, while
the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the
people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason,
does not provide for its implementation.
It is true that Section 3 of the Act defines initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the
three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements)
restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage
of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But
unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act
does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on
the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among
other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the
case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the
petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be
amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.

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 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive
matter are fatal and cannot be cured by empowering the
COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
5. Lambino v. COMELEC
Facts: Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado (“Lambino
Group”), with other groups1 and individuals, commenced
gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the
1987 Constitution. The Lambino Group alleged that their
petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at
least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with
each legislative district represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also
claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative
Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive
Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory
Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
form of government.
Issue: W/N the petition for initiative met the requirements of
Sec. 2 Art. XVII of the Constitution
Ruling: No. The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply
with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting
a people’s initiative. The framers plainly stated that “before
they sign there is already a draft shown to them. The essence
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of amendments “directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face
is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements
must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign
the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on
their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition.
“An initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of
the nature and effect of that which is proposed” and failure to
do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative
void. The Lambino Group did not attach to their present
petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people
signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group
submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet. There is
not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino
Group’s proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither
does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed
changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a
question whether the people approve a shift from the
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary
system of government. The signature sheet does not show to
the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are
asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet
is not the petition that the framers of the Constitution
envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Lambino et al were also proposing a revision and not a mere
amendment of the constitution. Lambino’s group logrolling
initiative also violates the rule that a proposed amendment
should only contain one subject.
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(21 November Resolution)
Maintaining its 8-7 vote, the Supreme Court today denied with
finality the motions for reconsideration of its October 25, 2006
decision dismissing the said petition to amend the 1987
Constitution through a people’s initiative. In a four-page
resolution, the Court held that the basic issues raised had
already been duly passed upon and that no substantial
arguments were presented to warrant the reversal of the
October 25, 2006 decision.
6. Magallona v. Ermita
Facts: Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522.
The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046
compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines
ratified. Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land
ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States
like the Philippines7 and sets the deadline for the filing of
application for the extended continental shelf.8 Complying with
these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline,
optimized the location of some basepoints around the
Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories,
namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the
Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in
their respective capacities as citizens, taxpayers or x x x
legislators, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two
principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine
maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine
states sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987
Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and
ancillary treaties, and (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters
7
landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national
security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and
damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions
Issue: W/N RA 9522 is unconstitutional
Ruling: No. RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional. UNCLOS III has
nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. What
controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the
international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession
and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties
on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to
comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and
continental shelves.
Petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine
territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not
enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the
law commits to text the Philippines continued claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal. Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over
the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to
classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as Regime[s] of
Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with
Article 121 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine States
responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation
under UNCLOS III.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In
fact it increased it. Under the old law, RA 3046, we adhered
with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area
that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.).
But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive
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economic zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to
586,210 sq. na. mi.
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not incompatible with the
Constitutions Delineation of Internal Waters. Whether referred
to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of the
Constitution or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III
(Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the
body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air
space over it and the submarine areas underneath. If any, the
baselines law is a notice to the international community of the
scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within
which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.
7. In the Matter of South China Sea Aritration
- See other reference.
A.2 STATE IMMUNITY
8. DOTC v. ABECINA
DOCTRINE: The State may waive its cloak of immunity and
the waiver may be made expressly or by implication.
FACTS: Respondents/Sps. Abecina are the registered owners
of 5 parcels of land in Sitio Paltik, Barrio Sta. Rosa, Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Sur. The DOTC awarded Digitel a
contract for the management, operation, maintenance and
development of a Regional Telecommunications Development
Project (RTDP) under the National Telephone Program, Phase
I, Tranche 1 (NTPI-1).
- DOTC and Digitel subsequently entered into several
Facilities Management Agreements (FMA) for Digitel to
manage, operate, maintain, and develop the RTDP and NTPI-
1 facilities comprising local telephone exchange lines in
8
various municipalities in Luzon. The FMAs were later
converted to Financial Lease Agreements (FLA).
- Subsequently, municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte, donated 1,200 square-meter parcel of land to the DOTC
for the implementation of the RDTP in the municipality
however the latter erroneously included portions of the
respondents' property in the donation.
- Pursuant to the FLAs, Digitel constructed a telephone
exchange on the property which encroached on the properties
of the respondent spouses. Upon the spouses’ discovery, they
required Digitel to vacate their properties and pay damages,
but the latter refused, insisting that it was occupying the
property of the DOTC pursuant to their FLA.
- The respondent Sps. sent a final demand letter to both the
DOTC and Digitel to vacate the premises and pay the unpaid
rent/damages but neither of them complied, thus, the filing of
an accion publiciana complaint against the DOTC and Digitel
for recovery of possession and damages.
- DOTC claimed immunity from suit and ownership over the
subject properties. In 2007, respondent Sps. and Digitel
executed a compromise agreement and entered into a
Contract of Lease.
- RTC: Brushed aside the defense of state immunity and held
that the spouses being the lawful owners of the properties,
they enjoyed the right to use and to possess them - rights that
were violated by the DOTC's unauthorized entry, construction,
and refusal to vacate.
- CA: Affirmed RTC’s decision. It likewise denied the DOTC's
claim of state immunity from suit, reasoning that the DOTC
removed its cloak of immunity after entering into a proprietary
contract - the Financial Lease Agreement with Digitel. It also
adopted the RTC's position that state immunity cannot be used
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from an
unlawful taking without the proper expropriation proceedings.
- The DOTC asserts that its Financial Lease Agreement with
Digitel was entered into in pursuit of its governmental functions
to promote and develop networks of communication systems.
Therefore, it cannot be interpreted as a waiver of state
immunity. Further, it argues that while the DOTC, in good faith
and in the performance of its mandate, took private property
without formal expropriation proceedings, the taking was
nevertheless an exercise of eminent domain.
- Respondents counter that the state immunity cannot be
invoked to perpetrate an injustice against its citizens. They
also maintain that because the subject properties are titled, the
DOTC is a builder in bad faith who is deemed to have lost the
improvements it introduced.
ISSUE: Whether or not DOTC can invoke immunity from suit.
HELD: No. Generally, the State may not be sued without its
consent. But as the principle itself implies, the doctrine of state
immunity is not absolute. The State may waive its cloak of
immunity and the waiver may be made expressly or by
implication.
- It is necessary to distinguish between the State's sovereign
and governmental acts (jure imperii) and its private,
commercial, and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Presently,
state immunity restrictively extends only to acts jure imperii
while acts jure gestionis are considered as a waiver of
immunity.
- There is no doubt that when the DOTC constructed the
encroaching structures and subsequently entered into the FLA
with Digitel for their maintenance, it was carrying out a
sovereign function. Therefore, we agree with the DOTC's
contention that these are acts jure imperii that fall within the
cloak of state immunity. However, as repeatedly pointed out by
9
the respondents, doctrine of state immunity cannot serve as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.
- The Constitution identifies the limitations to the awesome and
near-limitless powers of the State. Chief among these
limitations are the principles that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law and that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. Consequently, our laws require that the State's
power of eminent domain shall be exercised through
expropriation proceedings in court.
- By necessary implication, the filing of a complaint for
expropriation is a waiver of State immunity. If the DOTC had
correctly followed the regular procedure upon discovering that
it had encroached on the respondents' property, it would have
initiated expropriation proceedings instead of insisting on its
immunity from suit. The Department's entry into and taking of
possession of the respondents' property amounted to an
implied waiver of its governmental immunity from suit.
Just in case, the prof asks for this: The exercise of eminent
domain requires a genuine necessity to take the property for
public use and the consequent payment of just compensation.
The property is evidently being used for a public purpose.
However, we also note that the respondent spouses willingly
entered into a lease agreement with Digitel for the use of the
subject properties.
9. REPUBLIC v. HIDALGO
DOCTRINE: It is basic that government funds and properties
may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments.
FACTS: At the core of litigation is a 4, 924.6 sq.m lot in the
name of herein respondent Mendoza. This lot is situated near
the Malacanang Palace Complex. This used to be the
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Presidential Guest House but presently, an office building of
the Office of the President.
- Sometime in June 1999, Mendoza filed a suit with the RTC of
Manila for reconveyance and the corresponding declaration of
nullity of a deed of sale and title against the Republic, the
Register of Deeds of Manila and one Atty. Fidel Vivar. In her
complaint, Mendoza essentially alleged being the owner of the
disputed Arlegui property which the Republic forcibly
dispossessed her of and over which the Register of Deeds of
Manila issued TCT No. 118911 in the name of the Republic.
Answering, the Republic invoked the State’s immunity from
suit.
- The RTC Manila Br. 35 dismissed Mendoza’s complaint and
omnibus motion for reconsideration. The CA reversed the trial
courts assailed orders and remanded the case to the court a
quo for further proceedings. The case was re-raffled to Br. 37
presided by Hon. Hidalgo (respondent).
- On May 5, 2003, Mendoza filed a Motion for Leave of Court
to file a Third Amended Complaint which the RTC admitted.
Thereafter, the Republic is ordered to file its answer within 5
days from May 16.
- In her adverted third amended complaint for recovery and
reconveyance of the Arlegui property, Mendoza sought the
declaration of nullity of a supposed deed of sale dated July 15,
1975. She also asked for the reinstatement of her TCT No.
118527, averring that since time immemorial, she and her
predecessors-in-interest had been in peaceful and adverse
possession of the property until the first week of July 1975
when a group of armed men representing themselves to be
members of the Presidential Security Group [PSG] of the then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had forcibly entered [her]
residence and ordered [her] to turn over to them her Copy of
TCT No. 118525 and compelled her and the members of her
10
household to vacate the same ; thus, out of fear for their lives,
[she] handed her Owners Duplicate Certificate Copy of TCT
No. 118527 and had left and/or vacated the subject property.
- Per verification, the TCT No. 118527 had been cancelled by
virtue of a deed of sale in favor of the Republic. However,
Mendoza alleged that it is fictitious as they did not execute any
deed of conveyance covering the disputed property in favor of
the Republic. Thus, she prayed for the Republic to pay a
reasonable compensation or rental for use of the property as
well as pay their counsel- 25% of the current value of the
property.
- On May 21, 2003, the Republic, represented by the OSG,
filed a Motion for Extension. It accordingly, asked that it be
given a period of thirty (30) days from May 21, 2003 or until
June 20, 2003 within which to submit an Answer. Came June
20, no answer was filed. On July 18, 2003 and again on
August 19, 2003, the OSG moved for a 30-day extension at
each instance. The trial court had meanwhile issued an order
dated July 7, 2003 declaring the petitioner Republic as in
default and allowing the private respondent to present her
evidence ex-parte.
- RTC: Rendered a judgment by default for Mendoza and
against the Republic. To the trial court, the Republic had
veritably confiscated Mendoza’s property, and deprived her not
only of the use thereof but also denied her of the income she
could have had otherwise realized during all the years she was
illegally dispossessed of the same. The court further ordered
the Republic to pay just compensation amounting to P 143,
600, 000.00 for acquisition of property, and pay P 1, 480, 627,
688.00 representing the rental for the use of property.
- The case was set for oral arguments but both parties
manifested their willingness to submit the compromise
agreement. In this recourse, the petitioner urges the Court to
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
strike down as a nullity the trial courts order declaring it in
default and the judgment by default that followed on the
ground that they were issued in grave abuse of discretion. To
the petitioner, the respondent judge committed serious
jurisdictional error when he proceeded to hear the case and
eventually awarded the private respondent a staggering
amount without so much as giving the petitioner the
opportunity to present its defense.
- The petitioner would ascribe jurisdictional error on the
respondent judge for denying its motion for new trial based on
any or a mix of the following factors, viz., (1) the failure to file
an answer is attributable to the negligence of the former
handling solicitor; (2) the meritorious nature of the petitioners
defense; and (3) the value of the property involved.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic can invoke immunity from
suit.
HELD: Yes. It is settled that when the State gives its consent
to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent to an
unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State
waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other
party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a
liability. The functions and public services rendered by the
State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law.
- In this case, while a defaulted defendant may be said to be at
the mercy of the trial court, the Rules of Court and certainly the
imperatives of fair play see to it that any decision against him
must be in accordance with law. In the abstract, this means
that the judgment must not be characterized by outrageous
one-sidedness, but by what is fair, just and equitable that
always underlie the enactment of a law.”
11
- So what should be the reasonable amount? “The process of
balancing the interests of both parties is not an easy one. But
surely, the Arlegui property cannot possibly be assigned, even
perhaps at the present real estate business standards, a
monthly rental value of at least P=500,000.00 or
P=6,000,000.00 a year, the amount private respondent
particularly sought and attempted to prove. This asking figure
is clearly unconscionable, if not downright ridiculous, attendant
circumstances considered. To the Court, an award of
P=20,000.00 a month for the use and occupancy of the Arlegui
property, while perhaps a little bit arbitrary, is reasonable and
may be granted pro hac vice considering the following hard
realities which the Court takes stock of:
1. The property is relatively small in terms of actual
area and had an assessed value of only P=2,388,900.00;
2. What the martial law regime took over was not
exactly an area with a new and imposing structure, if there
was any; and
3. The Arlegui property had minimal rental value during
the relatively long martial law years, given the very restrictive
entry and egress conditions prevailing at the vicinity at that
time and even after.”
- As for the execution aspect, the Court held: “The assailed
trial court’s issuance of the writ of execution against
government funds to satisfy its money judgment is also
nullified. It is basic that government funds and properties may
not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments. Republic v. Palacio teaches that a
judgment against the State generally operates merely to
liquidate and establish the plaintiff’s claim in the absence of
express provision; otherwise, they can not be enforced by
processes of law.” Accordingly, and in fairness to the owner,
the Court said: “Albeit title to the Arlegui property remains in
the name of the petitioner Republic, it is actually the Office of
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
the President which has beneficial possession of and use over
it since the 1975 takeover.
10. UP v. DIZON
DOCTRINE: The funds of the UP are government funds that
are public in character. Hence, the funds subject of this action
could not be validly made the subject of the RTC’s writ of
execution or garnishment.
FACTS: In 1990, the UP, through its then President Abueva,
entered into a General Construction Agreement with
respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders)
represented by its President and General Manager Servillano
dela Cruz, for the construction of the extension building and
the renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences Building in
the campus of the University of the Philippines in Los Baños
(UPLB).
- Stern Builders submitted three progress billings
corresponding to the work accomplished, but the UP paid only
two of the billings. The third billing worth P273,729.47 was not
paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit
(COA). Despite the lifting of the disallowance, the UP failed to
pay the billing, prompting Stern Builders and dela Cruz to sue
the UP and its corespondent officials to collect the unpaid
billing and to recover various damages.
- RTC: Rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs.
Following this denial of motion for reconsideration, UP filed a
notice of appeal. This was opposed by the Stern Builders and
dela Cruz on the ground of its filing being belated, and moved
for the execution of the decision. UP in return, countered that
the notice of appeal was filed within the reglementary period.
- The RTC issued the writ of execution and notice of demand
upon UP. UP then filed an urgent motion to reconsider the
order to quash the writ of execution and to restrain
proceedings. However, the RTC denied such motion.
12
- UP then assailed the denial of due course to its appeal
through a petition for certiorari in the CA. CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari upon finding that the UP’s notice of
appeal had been filed late.
- On May 11, 2004, the UP appealed to the Court by petition
for review on certiorari. The Court denied the petition for
review. Thereafter, Stern Builders and dela Cruz filed in the
RTC their motions for execution despite their previous motion
having already been granted and despite the writ of execution
having already issued.
- On June 23, 2003 and July 25, 2003, respectively, the sheriff
served notices of garnishment on the UP’s depository banks.
The UP assailed the garnishment through an urgent motion to
quash the notices of garnishment. RTC then denied the
motion.
- In 2004, RTC, through respondent Judge Agustin S. Dizon,
authorized the release of the garnished funds of the UP. In
2005, UP was served with order directing DBP to release the
garnished funds. Subsequently, Stern Builders and dela Cruz
moved to cite DBP in direct contempt of court for its non-
compliance with the order of release.
- UP brought a petition for certiorari in the CA to challenge the
jurisdiction of the RTC in issuing the order It argued that
government funds and properties could not be seized by virtue
of writs of execution or garnishment. It further cited ‘’Section
84 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 to the effect that “[r]evenue
funds shall not be paid out of any public treasury or depository
except in pursuance of an appropriation law or other specific
statutory authority.”
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in allowing garnishment of a
State University’s Funds in violation of Article XIV, Section 5(5)
of the Constitution.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
- UP contends that the CA contravened Section 5, Article XIV
of the Constitution by allowing the garnishment of UP funds,
because the garnishment resulted in a substantial reduction of
the UP’s limited budget allocated for the remuneration, job
satisfaction and fulfillment of the best available teachers.
HELD: Yes. The UP was founded on June 18, 1908 through
Act 1870 to provide advanced instruction in literature,
philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and to give professional
and technical training to deserving students. Despite its
establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a
“chartered institution” performing a legitimate government
function.
- In enacting Republic Act No. 9500 (The University of the
Philippines Charter of 2008), Congress has declared the UP
as the national university “dedicated to the search for truth and
knowledge as well as the development of future leaders.
- The UP is a government instrumentality, performing the
State’s constitutional mandate of promoting quality and
accessible education. As a government instrumentality, the UP
administers special funds sourced from the fees and income
enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive
Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve
the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded
in Republic Act No. 9500.
- All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including
any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any
banking institution, constitute a “special trust fund,” the
disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UP’s
mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing
by the COA.
- The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in
character. Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be
13
validly made the subject of the RTC’s writ of execution or
garnishment.
- The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to
which it had impliedly consented was not immediately
enforceable by execution against the UP, because suability of
the State did not necessarily mean its liability. “Suability
depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the
applicable law and the established facts.
- The UP correctly submits here that the garnishment of its
funds to satisfy the judgment awards of actual and moral
damages (including attorney’s fees) was not validly made if
there was no special appropriation by Congress to cover the
liability. It was, therefore, legally unwarranted for the CA to
agree with the RTC’s holding.
- Indeed, an appropriation by Congress was required before
the judgment that rendered the UP liable for moral and actual
damages (including attorney’s fees) would be satisfied
considering that such monetary liabilities were not covered by
the “appropriations earmarked for the said project.” The
Constitution strictly mandated that “(n)o money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.
11. BUISAN v. COA
DOCTRINE: As the State's engineering and construction arm,
the DPWH exercises governmental functions that effectively
insulate it from any suit, much less from any monetary liability.
FACTS: The DPWH undertook the construction of the
Liguasan Cut-off hannel (Project) in Tunggol, Pagalungan,
Maguindanao, to minimize the perennial problem of flooding in
the area. Subsequently, DPWH received various claims from
land owners for damages allegedly caused to their properties,
crops and improvements by the premature opening of the
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
Project. Hence, the Regional Director (RD), DPWH Regional
Office (R.O.) No. XII, Cotabato City, investigated the claims.
- The DPWH R.O. No. XII Technical Working Group (TWG)
recommended in 2004 to pay just compensation to the
claimant, however, it was noted that since the event occurred
in 1989, it could not account physically the actual quantity of
the damaged crops and properties.
- The claims were forwarded to the RD of the DPWH R.O. No.
XII to be returned to the claimants, as such are considered to
be under the jurisdiction of the COA pursuant to Rule VIII of
the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA.
- In 2010, petitioners, represented by Mayor Montawal, filed a
petition with the COA, praying that the DPWH be ordered to
pay the petitioners the sum of ₱122,051,850.00 as
compensation for their damaged crops, properties and
improvements. Thereafter, petitioner Buisan filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Petition alleging that Montawal was not authorized
to represent them. In its Answer, the DPWH averred that the
petitioners failed to establish that they are the owners of crops
and properties allegedly damaged, and that the damage was
caused by the construction of the Project.
- In 2012, COA denied the money claims of the petitioners
contending that for the petitioners' failure to file their money
claims within a reasonable time, they are deemed to have
committed laches. Furthermore, the petitioners' cause of
action had already prescribed in view of Article 1146 of the
Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DPWH can invoke immunity from
suit.
HELD: Yes. As the State's engineering and construction arm,
the DPWH exercises governmental functions that effectively
insulate it from any suit, much less from any monetary liability.
14
The construction of the Project which was for the purpose of
minimizing the perennial problem of flood in the area of
Tunggol, Montawal, Maguindanao, is well within the powers
and functions of the DPWH as mandated by the Administrative
Code of 1997.
- Hence, the Doctrine of Non-Suability clothes the DPWH from
being held responsible for alleged damages it performed in
consonance with its mandated duty. Nowhere does it appear
in the petition that the State has given its consent, expressly or
impliedly, to be sued before the courts. The failure to allege
the existence of the State's consent to be sued in the
complaint is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, should
cause the dismissal of the complaint.
- In case, prof asks about this: Undeniably, the petitioners'
money claims which were only filed with the DPWH in 2004 or
even in 2001 had already prescribed. It will be the height of
injustice for respondent DPWH to be confronted with stale
claims, where verification on the plausibility of the allegations
remains difficult, either because the condition of the alleged
inundation of crops has changed, or the physical impossibility
of accounting for the lost and damaged crops due to the
considerable lapse of time."
On the other hand, "[l]aches has been defined as the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence could or should
have been done earlier."
In the case at bar, laches has set in as the elements thereof
are present. Firstly, the premature opening by the DPWH of
the Project allegedly causing flash floods, and damaging the
petitioners' properties took place in 1989 or even in 1992.
Secondly, the petitioners took 15 years to assert their rights
when they formally filed a complaint in 2004 against the
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
DPWH. Thirdly, as the petitioners failed to file a formal suit for
their claims before the COA, there is an apparent lack of
notice that would give the DPWH the opportunity to defend
itself.
- The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COA in denying the petitioners' money claims for failure to
present substantial evidence to prove that their properties
were damaged by floods due to the premature opening of the
Project of the DPWH. In the absence of grave abuse of
discretion, the factual findings of COA, which are undoubtedly
supported by the evidence on record, must be accorded great
respect and finality. COA, as the duly authorized agency to
adjudicate money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities has acquired special knowledge and
expertise in handling matters falling under its specialized
jurisdiction.
12. NHA v. ROXAS
DOCTRINE: The power of the court ends when the judgment
is rendered because government funds and property may not
be seized pursuant to writs of execution or writs of
garnishment to satisfy such judgments.
FACTS: The National Housing Authority (NHA), a
government-owned and -controlled corporation created and
existing under Presidential Decree No. 757, may sue and be
sued. It is charged, among others, with the development of the
Dagat-dagatan Development Project (project) situated in
Navotas. Respondent Ernesto Roxas applied for commercial
lots in the project, particularly Lot 9 and Lot 10 in Block 11,
Area 3, Phase III A/B, with an area of 176 square meters, for
the use of his business of buying and selling gravel, sand and
cement product which the NHA approved.
15
- NHA issued the notice of award for the lots in favor of Roxas.
The latter made his downpayment and subsequently paid it in
full. A relocation/reblocking survey resulted in the renumbering
of Lot 9 to Lot 5 and Lot 10 to Lot 6. In the meanwhile, the
NHA conducted a final subdivision project survey, causing the
increase in the area of the subject lots from 176 to 320 square
meters.
- The NHA informed Roxas about the increase in the area of
the subject lots, and approved the award of the additional area
of 144 square meters to him at P3,500.00/square meter. He
appealed for the reduction of the price to Pl,500.00/square
meter,13 pointing out that Lot 5 and Lot 6 were a substitution
unilaterally imposed by the NHA that resulted in the increase
of 144 square meters based on the technical description.
- After the NHA rejected his appeal, he commenced in the
RTC this action for specific performance and damages, with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The
NHA countered in its answer that Roxas' prayer to include in
the original contract the increase in lot measurement of 144
square meters was contrary to its existing rules and regulation;
that he could not claim more than what had been originally
awarded to him.
- RTC: Rendered judgment against the NHA, declaring plaintiff
Ernesto Roxas the legal awardee of subject lots 5 and 6 in the
full total area thereof of 320 sq. meters. Ordering defendant
NHA to execute the corresponding Contract to Sell for the
entire area of subject lots 5 and 6 totaling to 320 sq. meters at
the cost of PI,500.00 per sq. meter.
- CA: Affirmed RTC’s ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NHA can invoke immunity from
suit.
HELD: No. The mantle of the State's immunity from suit did
not extend to the NHA despite its being a government-owned
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
and -controlled corporation. Under Section 6(i) of Presidential
Decree No. 757, which was its charter, the NHA could sue and
be sued. As such, the NHA was not immune from the suit of
Roxas. And, secondly, for purposes of the implementation of
the writ of execution, it is necessary to distinguish between, on
the one hand, main relief which was the specific performance
and the other, secondary relief for the attorney’s fees.
- The execution of the contract to sell by the NHA conformably
with the main relief under the judgment would be in the
ordinary course of the management or disposition of the
Dagat-dagatan Development Project undertaken by the NHA.
In other words, the NHA possessed the legal competence and
authority to directly afford the main relief without Roxas
needing to first submit to the COA the contract to sell for
review and approval. To maintain otherwise is to
unconstitutionally grant to the COA the power of judicial review
in respect of the decision of a court of law.
However, settling or paying off the secondary relief for the
attorney's fees of P30,000.00, being a monetary obligation of
the NHA, would not be in the usual course of the activities of
the NHA under its charter. That such relief was the
consequence of the suit that granted the main relief did not
matter.
- The audit jurisdiction of the COA extends to all government-
owned or -controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, and other
self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the
Government, as well as to all non-governmental entities
subsidized by the Government, or funded by donations
through the Government, or required to pay levies or
government share, or for which the Government has put up a
counterpart fund, or those partly funded by the Government.
There is no distinction as to the class of claims.
- In other words, there should be no distinction in the
application of a statute where none is indicated.
16
- There is no question that the NHA could sue or be sued, and
thus could be held liable under the judgment rendered against
it. But the universal rule remains to be that the State, although
it gives its consent to be sued either by general or special law,
may limit the claimant's action only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution.
13. Arigo v. Swift
FACTS:
 Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park via
Proclamation No. 306 in 1988 and was declared a
World Heritage Site in 1993 by UNESCO. In 2010, RA
10067 prohibited and penalized many human activities
around the area including fishing, gather, destroying,
and disturbing resources within the Tubbataha Reefs
Natural Park (TRNP).
 USS Guardian, an Avenger-class mine
countermeasures ship of US, ran aground on the
northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs.
No injury. No reports of leaking fuel or oil.
 By March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team
finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship
from the coral reef.
 Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and
post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause
and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan,
Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental,
Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu,
and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also
seek a directive from this Court for the institution of
civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
committed in violation of environmental laws and
regulations in connection with the grounding incident.
 Petitioners cite the following violations under RA
10067:
o Unauthorized entry
o Nonpayment of conservation fees
o Obstruction of law enforcement officer
o Damages to the reef
o Destroying and disturbing resources
 Petitioners also want the SC to declare certain
provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) to
be nullified for being unconstitutional.
 Since only the Philippine respondents filed their
comment to the petition, petitioners also filed a motion
for early resolution and motion to proceed ex parte
against the US respondents.
ISSUE:
 Whether this Court has jurisdiction over the US
respondents who did not submit any pleading or
manifestation in this case.
HELD:
 NONE (No jurisdiction). The principle of State immunity
bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the
persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
 The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the
doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the
State, is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution which states:
o Section 3. The State may not be sued without
its consent.
17
 In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded
in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is
expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet
imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot
assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary
disposition would, in the language of a celebrated
case, “unduly vex the peace of nations.”
 While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against
the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such
officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages awarded against them, the suit must be
regarded as against the state itself although it has not
been formally impleaded. In such a situation, the state
may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
it has been filed without its consent.
 In the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is not
an immunity from the observance of the law of the
territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is,
rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial
jurisdiction.
 Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State
immunity extends only to acts “jure imperii”
(governmental acts; as opposed to proprietary acts or”
jure gestionis”). The restrictive application of State
immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out
of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
 In this case, the US respondents were sued in their
official capacity as commanding officers of the US
Navy who had control and supervision over the USS
Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission
resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS
Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were
performing official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will
require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by
the US government, the suit is deemed to be one
against the US itself. Therefore, the principle of State
immunity bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court
over Swift, Rice, and Robling.
CARPIO’s ARGUMENT: UNCLOS; WARSHIP EXCEPTION
 Justice Carpio argues that although warships enjoy
sovereign immunity, Art. 31 of UNCLOS creates an
exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply
with the rules and regulations of the costal State
regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters
and the territorial sea.
 Carpio argues that although US has not ratified
UNCLOS, it is the long-standing policy of the US that it
considers itself bound to customary international rules
as codified in UNCLOS which can be gleaned from the
statements of former US Presidents Reagan and
Clinton, and the US case of US v. Royal Carribean
Cruise Lines.
 SC fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-
membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the
US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a
Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial
sea. We thus expect the US to bear “international
18
responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS
Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs.
PETITIONER’s ARGUMENT #2: VFA, US laws as basis of
waiver of State Immunity
 No. SC disagreed with Petitioner’s argument that there
is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the VFA,
other federal statutes of the US waiving immunity, as
well as under common law tort claims.
 VFA1 cannot be the basis for such immunity because it
only pertains to criminal jurisdiction and NOT to special
civil actions such as the Writ of Kalikasan in the current
petition.
 The application or non-application of criminal
jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who
may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS
Guardian, would be premature and beyond the
province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We also
find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether
such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In
the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have
resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The
Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the
collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067,
in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with
1 The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States
troops and personnel visiting the Philippines to promote “common security
interests” between the US and the Philippines in the region. It provides for
the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further
defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine government in
the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft,
importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
the criminal action charging the same violation of an
environmental law.
 Under the Rules of Court (Section 15, Rule 7) does not
allow the award of damages to individual petitioners for
a judgment granting or denying the writ of kalikasan.
 SC agreed with the respondents arguing that the case
is now moot because the salvage was already
accomplished and that the US and PH governments
expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the
matter of compensation for the damage caused by the
USS Guardian.
o SC noted that the petitioners are entitled to the
reliefs as far as the directives to PH
respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral
reef structure and marine habitat adversely
affected by the grounding.
 SC deferred to the Executive Branch the matter of
compensation and rehabilitation through diplomatic
channels.
 SC cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for to
review the VFA and nullify immunity provisions therein
as it is a valid and binding agreement.
 The Writ of Kalikasan DENIED.
14. Senate v. Ermita
FACTS:
 On Sept. 21-23, 2005, Senate issued invitations to
various officials of the Executive Department for them
to appear on Sept.29 as resource speakers in a public
hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon
Railways Corporations with the China National
Machinery and Equipment Group (A.K.A North Rail
19
Project) in connection with Sen. Enrile’s privileged
speech urging the Senate to conduct an investigation
over the alleged overpriced contract and other unlawful
provisions of such.
 The Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security also invited various officials of the AFP.
 Sec. Ermita wrote a letter to Sen. Drilon requesting the
postponement of the hearing in order to give ample
time and opportunity to study and prepare for the
various issues so that they may better enlighten the
Senate Committee on its investigation.
 Drilon denied the request because it was sent late and
all the preparations and arrangements, notices, to all
resource persons were completed the previous week.
 The President issued EO 464 “Ensuring Observance of
the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to
the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the
Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution
and For Other Purposes which required all heads of
departments of the Executive Branch of the
government to secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either House of Congress.
 Exec. Sec. Ermita and Gen. Senga wrote to Sen.
Drilon attaching the EO 464 saying that no consent
was given by the President to attend the hearings.
 Col. Balutan and Birg. Gen. Gudani attended the
hearings despite the lack of consent and were relieved
from their military posts and subjected to court martial
proceedings.
 3 petitions were filed before the SC questioning the
constitutionality of EO 464.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
o GR 16959: Bayan Muna, Counsels for the
Defense of Liberties (CODAL) – claims that EO
464 is unconstitutional, that Ermita should be
prohibited from sanctioning officials who appear
before Congress due to congressional
summons, that EO 464 infringes their rights and
impedes them from fulfilling their respective
obligations to conduct investigation in aid of
legislation and to participate in governance.
o GR 169660: Chavez, as a citizen, taxpayer,
and law practitioner, petitions that the EO 464
be declared unconstitutional
o GR 169667: Alternative Law Groups, Inc., non-
governmental organizations engaged in
developmental lawyering and work with the
poor and marginalized sectors in different parts
of the country, and as an organization of
citizens of the Philippines and a part of the
general public, it has legal standing to institute
the petition to enforce its constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern, a right
which was denied to the public by E.O. 464
petitions that the EO 464 be declared
unconstitutional
o GR 169777: Senate arguing that it stands to
suffer imminent and material injury, as it has
already sustained the same with its continued
enforcement since it directly interferes with and
impedes the valid exercise of the Senate's
powers and functions and conceals information
of great public interest and concern, filed its
petition for certiorari and prohibition
o GR 169834: PDP-Laban arguing that EO 646
hampers its legislative agenda to be
20
implemented through its members in Congress,
particularly in the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation and transcendental issues need to
be resolved to avert a constitutional crisis
between the executive and legislative branches
of the government.
 Another investigation was conducted by the Senate
Committee on Agriculture and Food and the Blue
Ribbon Committee on the alleged mismanagement and
use of the fertilizer fund under the Ginintuang
Masaganang Ani program of DA. Only Presidential
Spokesperson Bunye was allowed to attend by Exec.
Secretary Bunye.
ISSUE:
 Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry
vested in Congress;
HELD: YES. EO 464 Sec.1, 3, and 4 contravenes the power
of inquiry by Congress.
Constitutionality of EO 464; Power of Inquiry
 The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized
in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
 Since Congress has authority to inquire into the
operations of the executive branch, it would be
incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not
extend to executive officials who are the most familiar
with and informed on executive operations.
 Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are
still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry,
which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive
privilege." Since this term figures prominently in the
challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions,
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018

its preambular clauses, and in its very title, a Validity of Section 1

discussion of executive privilege is crucial for
determining the constitutionality of E.O. 464.  Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the
officials covered by them to secure the consent of the
Executive Privilege President prior to appearing before Congress.
 Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It
 Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of
does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior
the Government to withhold information from the
determination by any official whether they are covered
public, the courts, and the Congress." Similarly, Rozell
by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the
defines it as "the right of the President and high-level
challenged order, made the determination that they
executive branch officers to withhold information from
are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of
Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public."
department heads under Section 1 is not made to
 SC recognized executive privilege in Almonte v
depend on the department heads' possession of any
Vasquez and Chavez v PCGG stating that there are
information which might be covered by executive
certain types of information which the government may
privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-á-
withhold from the public and that there is a
vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive
"governmental privilege against public disclosure with
privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under
respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic
Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the
and other national security matters". In Chavez v.
Constitution on what has been referred to as the
Public Estates Authority, SC also ruled that the right to
question hour.
information does not extend to matters recognized as
 A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of
"privileged information under the separation of powers"
legislation and the question hour. While attendance
meaning Presidential conversations, correspondences,
was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it
and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.
was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation.
 While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a
 When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how
claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the
department heads are implementing the statutes which
ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is
it has issued, its right to such information is not as
made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that
imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief
executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose
Executive, such department heads must give a report
information by the mere fact of being executive
of their performance as a matter of duty. In such
officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the
instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines
powers, states that Congress may only request their
heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of
appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which
disclosure.
Congress require their appearance is "in aid of

21
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is
mandatory because the Congress has the right to
obtain information from any source – even from
officials of departments and agencies in the executive
branch.
 When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only
way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted
from this power - the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress
except through the power of impeachment. It is based
on her being the highest official of the executive
branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal
branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-
standing custom.
 By the same token, members of the Supreme Court
are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the
Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body;
hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis
not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal
autonomy and the constitutional independence of the
judiciary.
 Therefore, Sec. 1 can only be applied in the
question hour NOT in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Validity of Sec. 2 and 3
 Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of
the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all
senior officials of executive departments, all officers of
22
the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security
officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices
designated in the same section (i.e. department heads,
Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the
National Security Adviser), are "covered by the
executive privilege” and as those to be determined by
the President.
 In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464
to justify his failure to be present, such invocation must
be construed as a declaration to Congress that the
President, or a head of office authorized by the
President, has determined that the requested
information is privileged, and that the President has not
reversed such determination. Such declaration,
however, even without mentioning the term "executive
privilege," amounts to an implied claim that the
information is being withheld by the executive branch,
by authority of the President, on the basis of executive
privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege.
 While there is no Philippine case that directly
addresses the issue of whether executive privilege may
be invoked against Congress, it is gathered from
Chavez v. PEA that certain information in the
possession of the executive may validly be claimed as
privileged even against Congress.
 Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed
outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions
claims of executive privilege. This Court must look
further and assess the claim of privilege authorized by
the Order to determine whether it is valid.
 Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the
executive considers the requested information
privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the
President, or an authorized head of office, has
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
determined that it is so, and that the President has not
overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves
Congress in the dark on how the requested information
could be classified as privileged. That the message is
couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem
like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious.
It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the
question of why the executive branch is not providing it
with the information that it has requested. A claim of
privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation
to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly
asserted.
 Due respect for a co-equal branch of government,
moreover, demands no less than a claim of privilege
clearly stating the grounds therefor.
 In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must
be invalidated because it authorizes implied claims
of executive privilege.
15. Kilusang Mayo uno v. Director General-NEDA
FACTS
 Under EO 420, the President directs all government
agencies and government-owned and controlled
corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and
format for their existing identification (ID) systems.
 Petitioners in G.R. No. 167798 allege that EO 420 is
unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of
legislative functions by the executive branch of the
government.
 The Executive has usurped the legislative power of
Congress as she has no power to issue EO 420.
Furthermore, the implementation of the EO will use
23
public funds not appropriated by Congress for that
purpose.
ISSUE
 Whether EO 420 is a usurpation of legislative power by
the President.
HELD
 NO MERIT.
 Section 2 of EO 420 provides, "Coverage. - All
government agencies and government-owned and
controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their
members or constituents shall be covered by this
executive order." EO 420 applies only to government
entities that issue ID cards as part of their functions
under existing laws. These government entities have
already been issuing ID cards even prior to EO 420.
Examples of these government entities are the GSIS,
SSS, Philhealth, Mayor's Office, LTO, PRC, and similar
government entities.
 Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities
to "adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system." Thus, all
government entities that issue IDs as part of their
functions under existing laws are required to adopt a
uniform data collection and format for their IDs.
 In short, the purposes of the uniform ID data collection
and ID format are to reduce costs, achieve efficiency
and reliability, insure compatibility, and provide
convenience to the people served by government
entities. Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be
collected and recorded under the uniform ID system to
only 14 specific items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home
Address; (3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
Birth; (7) Place of Birth; (8) Marital Status; (9) Name of
Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight; (12) Two index
fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent
distinguishing features like moles or others; and (14)
Tax Identification Number.
 These limited and specific data are the usual data
required for personal identification by government
entities, and even by the private sector. Anyone who
applies for or renews a driver's license provides to the
LTO all these 14 specific data.
 A unified ID system for all these government entities
can be achieved in either of two ways. First, the heads
of these existing government entities can enter into a
memorandum of agreement making their systems
uniform. If the government entities can individually
adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to their regular
functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by
mutual agreement a uniform ID format, especially if the
uniform format will result in substantial savings, greater
efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is purely an
administrative matter and does not involve the exercise
of legislative power.
 Second, the President may by executive or
administrative order direct the government entities
under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID
data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution provides that the "President shall
have control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices." The same Section also mandates the
President to "ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed." Certainly, under this constitutional power of
control the President can direct all government entities,
in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to
adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to
24
achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility,
and convenience to the public. The President's
constitutional power of control is self-executing and
does not need any implementing legislation.
 Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power
of the President to promulgate. The President has not
usurped legislative power in issuing EO 420.
 In issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or
repeal any law but merely implemented and executed
existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures
efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness
in the implementation of current ID systems of
government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420
is simply an executive issuance and not an act of
legislation.
 Three aspects that would make a government
maintained ID card system require legislation:
o When the implementation of an ID card system
requires a special appropriation because there
is no existing appropriation for such purpose.
o When the ID card system is compulsory on all
branches of government, including the
independent constitutional commissions, as
well as compulsory on all citizens whether they
have a use for the ID card or not.
o When the ID card system requires the collection
and recording of personal data beyond what is
routinely or usually required for such purpose,
such that the citizen's right to privacy is
infringed.
 In the present case, EO 420 does not require any
special appropriation because the existing ID card
systems of government entities covered by EO 420
have the proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
compulsory on all branches of government and is not
compulsory on all citizens. EO 420 requires a very
narrow and focused collection and recording of
personal data while safeguarding the confidentiality of
such data. In fact, the data collected and recorded
under EO 420 are far less than the data collected and
recorded under the ID systems existing prior to EO
420.
 EO 420 does NOT establish a national ID card system.
 If government entities under the Executive department
decide to unify their existing ID data collection and ID
card issuance systems to achieve savings, efficiency,
compatibility and convenience, such act does not
involve the exercise of any legislative power.
 Thus, the issuance of EO 420 does NOT constitute
usurpation of legislative power.
16. IN RE: PRODUCTION OF COURT RECORDS
FACTS:
 During the impeachment proceedings against Chief
Justice Corona, the Prosecution Panel manifested in a
COMPLIANCE dated January 27, 2012 that it would
present about 100 witnesses and almost a thousand
documents, to be secured from both private and public
offices. The list of proposed witnesses included
Justices of the Supreme Court, and Court officials and
employees who will testify on matters, many of which
are, internal to the Court.
 The letters sent to the SC asked for the examination of
records, and the issuance of certified true copies of the
rollos and the Agenda and Minutes of the Deliberations
of
25
o Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of
the Philippines v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.
o Navarro v. Ermita
o Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, et al
o League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) v.
COMELEC.
 Instead of issuing subpoenas as requested, the Hon.
Presiding Senator-Judge Juan Ponce Enrile, on
February 8, 2012, issued an Order denying the
Prosecution Panel’s request for subpoena ad
testificandum to JJ. Villarama, Sereno, Reyes and
Velasco (In re: Impeachment Trial of Hon. Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona, Case No. 002-2011). Thus, the
attendance of Supreme Court Justices under
compulsory process now appears to be moot and
academic.
 On February 10, 2012, Atty. Vidal, Clerk of the
Supreme Court, brought to our attention the Subpoena
Ad Testificandum et Duces Tecum and Subpoena Ad
Testificandum she received, commanding her to
appear at 10:00 in the morning of the 13th of February
2012 with the original and certified true copies of the
documents listed above, and to likewise appear in the
afternoon at 2:00 of the same day and everyday
thereafter, to produce the above listed documents and
to testify.
ISSUE
 Whether the Court will comply with the subpoenas and
the letters of the Prosecution Impeachment Panel
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
HELD
 The doctrine of separation of powers is an essential
component of our democratic and republican system of
government. The doctrine inures not by express
provision of the Constitution, but as an underlying
principle that constitutes the bedrock of our system of
checks and balances in government.
 Each branch is considered separate, co-equal,
coordinate and supreme within its own sphere, under
the legal and political reality of one overarching
Constitution that governs one government and one
nation for whose benefit all the three separate
branches must act with unity.
 A lesser known but no less important aspect of the
principle of separation of powers – deemed written into
the rules by established practice and rendered
imperative by the departments’ inter-dependence and
need for cooperation among themselves – is the
principle of comity or the practice of voluntarily
observing inter-departmental courtesy in undertaking
their assigned constitutional duties for the harmonious
working of government.
 Where doubt exists, no hard and fast rule obtains on
how due respect should be shown to each other;
largely, it is a weighing of the public interests involved,
as against guaranteed individual rights and the
attendant larger public interests, and it is the latter
consideration that ultimately prevails.
 A case in point is on the matter of impeachment whose
trial has been specifically assigned by the Constitution
to the Senate. Where doubt exists in an impeachment
case, a standard that should not be forgotten is the
need to preserve the structure of a democratic and
26
republican government, particularly the check and
balance that should prevail.
 Court deliberations are traditionally recognized as
privileged communication. The rules on confidentiality
will enable the Members of the Court to “freely discuss
the issues without fear of criticism for holding
unpopular positions” or fear of humiliation for one’s
comments. The privilege against disclosure of these
kinds of information/communication is known as
deliberative process privilege, involving as it does the
deliberative process of reaching a decision. “Written
advice from a variety of individuals is an important
element of the government’s decision-making process
and that the interchange of advice could be stifled if
courts forced the government to disclose those
recommendations;” the privilege is intended “to prevent
the ‘chilling’ of deliberative communications.”
 Court records which are “predecisional” and
“deliberative” in nature are thus protected and
cannot be the subject of a subpoena if judicial
privilege is to be preserved.
o Communications are considered predecisional
if they were made in the attempt to reach a final
conclusion.
o A material is “deliberative,” on the other hand, if
it reflects the give-and-take of the consultative
process. The key question in determining
whether the material is deliberative in nature is
whether disclosure of the information would
discourage candid discussion within the
agency.
 Two other grounds may be cited for denying access to
court records, as well as preventing members of the
bench, from being subjected to compulsory process:
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
(1) the disqualification by reason of privileged
communication and (2) the pendency of an action or
matter.
 Under the law, therefore, the Members of the Court
may not be compelled to testify in the impeachment
proceedings against the Chief Justice or other
Members of the Court about information they acquired
in the performance of their official function of
adjudication, such as information on how deliberations
were conducted or the material inputs that the justices
used in decision-making, because the end-result would
be the disclosure of confidential information that could
subject them to criminal prosecution. Such act violates
judicial privilege (or the equivalent of executive
privilege) as it pertains to the exercise of the
constitutional mandate of adjudication.
 Jurisprudence implies that justices and judges may not
be subject to any compulsory process in relation to the
performance of their adjudicatory functions.
 With respect to Court officials and employees, the
same rules on confidentiality that apply to justices and
judges apply to them. They are barred from disclosing
(1) the result of the raffle of cases, (2) the actions taken
by the Court on each case included in the agenda of
the Court’s session, and (3) the deliberations of the
Members in court sessions on cases and matters
pending before it. They are subject as well to the
disqualification by reason of privileged communication
and the sub judice rule. As stated above, these rules
extend to documents and other communications which
cannot be disclosed.
27
17. Silverio v Republic
FACTS
 On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto
Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first
name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8.
 His name was registered as “Rommel Jacinto Dantes
Silverio” in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate).
His sex was registered as “male.”
 He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is,
“anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female” and that he had always identified himself with
girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s body,
he consulted several doctors in the United States. He
underwent psychological examination, hormone
treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to
transform himself to a “woman” culminated on January
27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment
surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter
examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic
and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who
issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner)
had in fact undergone the procedure.
 From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in
fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his
name in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel
Jacinto” to “Mely,” and his sex from “male” to “female.”
ISSUE
 Whether or not the change of his name and sex in his
birth certificate be allowed on the ground of equity
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
HELD
 NO.
 The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was
in consonance with the principles of justice and equity.
It believed that allowing the petition would cause no
harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
 The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and
wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences.
 It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that
“[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the
law.” However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or
interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
 In our system of government, it is for the legislature,
should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines
should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines
becomes particularly important in this case where the
claims asserted are statute based. To reiterate, the
statutes define who may file petitions for change of first
name and for correction or change of entries in the civil
registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be
invoked, what proof must be presented and what
procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends
to confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex
to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact
legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing
the conferment of that privilege.
 It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write
a protocol on when a person may be recognized as
having successfully changed his sex. However, this
28
Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter,
or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law
where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the
written word of its co-equal branch of government,
Congress. Petitioner pleads that “[t]he unfortunates are
also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and
[the] realization of their dreams.” No argument about
that.
 The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the
commonly recognized parameters of social convention
and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal.
However, the remedies petitioner seek involve
questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.
18. Republic v Gingoyon
FACTS
 In the first case that reached this Court, Agan v.
PIATCO,the contracts which the Government had with
the contractor were voided for being contrary to law
and public policy. The second case now before the
Court involves the matter of just compensation due the
contractor for the terminal complex it built.
 After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA
3 facilities have remained in the possession of
PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government
to put the airport terminal into immediate operation.
The Government and PIATCO conducted several
rounds of negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities.
 The Government filed a Complaint for expropriation
with the Pasay City Regional Trial Court (RTC),
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
together with an Application for Special Raffle seeking
the immediate holding of a special raffle. The
Government sought upon the filing of the complaint the
issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take
immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3
facilities.
 Accordingly, on the basis of Sections 4 and 7 of Rep.
Act No. 8974 and Section 10 of the Implementing
Rules, the RTC made key qualifications to its earlier
issuances. First, it directed the Land Bank of the
Philippines, Baclaran Branch (LBP-Baclaran), to
immediately release the amount of US$62,343,175.77
to PIATCO, an amount which the RTC characterized
as that which the Government "specifically made
available for the purpose of this expropriation;" and
such amount to be deducted from the amount of just
compensation due PIATCO as eventually determined
by the RTC. Second, the Government was directed to
submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds
signed by authorized officials to cover the payment of
just compensation. Third, the Government was directed
"to maintain, preserve and safeguard" the NAIA 3
facilities or "perform such as acts or activities in
preparation for their direct operation" of the airport
terminal, pending expropriation proceedings and full
payment of just compensation. However, the
Government was prohibited "from performing acts of
ownership like awarding concessions or leasing any
part of [NAIA 3] to other parties."
ISSUE
 Whether the RTC could prohibit the Government from
enjoining the performance of acts of ownership
29
HELD
 SC emphasized its 2004 resolution in the case of
Agan where it required the government to
compensate PIATCO before it can take over the
facility.
 The pronouncement in the 2004 Resolution is
especially significant to this case in two aspects,
namely: (i) that PIATCO must receive payment of just
compensation determined in accordance with law and
equity; and (ii) that the government is barred from
taking over NAIA 3 until such just compensation is
paid. The parties cannot be allowed to evade the
directives laid down by this Court through any mode of
judicial action, such as the complaint for eminent
domain.
 It cannot be denied though that the Court in the 2004
Resolution prescribed mandatory guidelines which the
Government must observe before it could acquire the
NAIA 3 facilities. Thus, the actions of respondent judge
under review, as well as the arguments of the parties
must, to merit affirmation, pass the threshold test of
whether such propositions are in accord with the 2004
Resolution.
 The Government does not contest the efficacy of this
pronouncement in the 2004 Resolution, thus its
application to the case at bar is not a matter of
controversy. Of course, questions such as what is the
standard of "just compensation" and which particular
laws and equitable principles are applicable, remain in
dispute and shall be resolved forthwith.
 The Government insists that Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court governs the expropriation proceedings in this
case to the exclusion of all other laws.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
 Rule 67 merely requires the Government to deposit
with an authorized government depositary the
assessed value of the property for expropriation for it to
be entitled to a writ of possession. On the other hand,
Rep. Act No. 8974 requires that the Government make
a direct payment to the property owner before the writ
may issue. Moreover, such payment is based on the
zonal valuation of the BIR in the case of land, the value
of the improvements or structures under the
replacement cost method, or if no such valuation is
available and in cases of utmost urgency, the proffered
value of the property to be seized.
 NO. Rule 67 cannot be applied without violating the
2004 Resolution. RA 8974 should be applied.
 The appropriate standard of just compensation is a
substantive matter. It is well within the province of the
legislature to fix the standard, which it did through the
enactment of Rep. Act No. 8974. Specifically, this
prescribes the new standards in determining the
amount of just compensation in expropriation cases
relating to national government infrastructure projects,
as well as the manner of payment thereof. At the same
time, Section 14 of the Implementing Rules recognizes
the continued applicability of Rule 67 on procedural
aspects when it provides "all matters regarding
defenses and objections to the complaint, issues on
uncertain ownership and conflicting claims, effects of
appeal on the rights of the parties, and such other
incidents affecting the complaint shall be resolved
under the provisions on expropriation of Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court." Given that the 2004 Resolution
militates against the continued use of the norm under
Section 2, Rule 67, is it then possible to apply Rep. Act
No. 8974? We find that it is, and moreover, its
30
application in this case complements rather than
contravenes the prescriptions laid down in the 2004
Resolution
A.3 SEPARATION OF POWERS & CHECKS AND
BALANCES
19. Office of the Court Administrator v Reyes
FACTS: A complaint for gross misconduct was filed against
Rene De Guzman by Atty. Sansano, relative to the alleged
incompetence/inefficiency of the RTC of Guimba, Nueva Ecija,
Branch 31, in the transmittal of the records of Criminal Case
No. 1144-G to the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court adopted the finding and recommendation
of the OCA, declaring the matter closed and terminated, and
also exonerating Rene De Guzman. The Court also requested
De Guzman to comment on the allegation that he uses illegal
drugs while at work. Judge Sta. Romana requested the Nueva
Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office to conduct a drug test
on De Guzman. De Guzman underwent a qualitative
examination the results of which yielded positive for
Tetrahydrocannabinol metabolites (marijuana) and
Methamphetamine (shabu), both dangerous drugs.
In a Resolution, the Court requested De Guzman to submit his
comment on the charge of misconduct relative to the alleged
use of prohibited drugs within 10 days from notice.
Notwithstanding the Courts directive, De Guzman failed to file
his Comment. on January 23, 2008, the Court directed De
Guzman to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for
failure to comply with the September 17, 2007 Resolution. At the
same time, we resolved to require him to submit his comment within
10 days from notice. De Guzman complied with our directive only on
March 12, 2008. In his letter, De Guzman claimed that he failed to
comply with the Courts directive because he lost his copy of the
September 17, 2007 Resolution.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
The OCA submitted the following recommendation:
1. Matter be re-docketed as an administrative case; and
2. Rene De Guzman be dismissed from service.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Guzman shall be dimissed from service.
HELD: YES.
The Court adopted the recommendations of OCA.
De Guzman ignored court directives and even failed to comply with
the Court’s show cause order. Anent to the illegal use of drugs, it is
valid and constitutional to conduct random drug testing to officers
and employees of public and private sector.
The Court also adopted guidelines for a program to deter the
use of dangerous drugs and institute preventive measures
against drug abuse for the purpose of eliminating the hazards
of drug abuse in the Judiciary, particularly in the first and
second level courts. In the instant administrative matter, De
Guzman never challenged the authenticity of the Chemistry
Report of the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office.
Likewise, the finding that De Guzman was found positive for
use of marijuana and shabu remains unrebutted. De Guzmans
general denial that he is not a drug user cannot prevail over
this compelling evidence. This Court is a temple of justice. Its
basic duty and responsibility is the dispensation of justice. As
dispensers of justice, all members and employees of the Judiciary
are expected to adhere strictly to the laws of the land, one of which
is Republic Act No. 9165 which prohibits the use of dangerous
drugs.
The Court agrees with OCA that by his repeated and
contumacious conduct of disrespecting the Courts directives,
De Guzman is guilty of gross misconduct and has already
forfeited his privilege of being an employee of the Court.
31
Likewise, the Court can no longer countenance his
manifestations of queer behavior, bordering on absurd,
irrational and irresponsible, because it has greatly affected his
job performance and efficiency. By using prohibited drugs, and
being a front-line representative of the Judiciary, De Guzman
has exposed to risk the very institution which he serves. It is
only by weeding out the likes of De Guzman from the ranks
that we would be able to preserve the integrity of this
institution.
20. Mamiscal vs Abdullah
FACTS: This involves a complaint of Mamiscal againts Abdullah
Clerk of Court, Shari'a Circuit Court, Marawi City, for partiality,
violation of due process, dishonesty, and conduct unbecoming of a
court employee. Originally, the complaint also charged Judge Cali
for his participation in the alleged controversy. However, the Court
dismissed the charge against Judge Cali.
On September 26, 2010, he and his wife, Adelaidah Lomondot
(Adelaidah) had a heated argument. In a fit of anger, Mamiscal
decided to divorce his wife by repudiating her (talaq). The
repudiation was embodied in an agreement (kapasadan) signed by
Mamiscal and Adelaidah. Adelaidah left their conjugal dwelling in
Iligan City and went back to her family's home in Marinaut, Marawi
City. A few days later, during the obligatory period of waiting ('iddah),
Mamiscal had a change of heart and decided to make peace with
his wife. For the purpose, he sent their common relatives to see
Adelaidah and make peace with her on his behalf.
Adelaidah filed a Certificate of divorce with the office of
Abdullah for registration. Although unsigned, the certificate,
purportedly executed by Mamiscal, certified that he had
pronounced talaq in the presence of two (2) witnesses and in
accordance with Islamic Law for the purpose of effecting
divorce from Adelaidah. A notation on the certificate stated
that it was being filed together with the kapasadan. On the
same day, Abdullah in the exercise of his duty as both Clerk of
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
Court and Circuit Civil Registrar, issued the Invitation notifying
the couple and their representatives to appear before the
Shari'a Circuit Court on February 28, 2011, in order to
constitute the Agama Arbitration Council (AAC) that would
explore the possibility of reconciling the spouses.
Abdullah issued a CRD (Certificate of Registration of Divorce),
finalizing the divorce between Mamiscal and Adelaidah.
Mamiscal sought the revocation of the CRD, questioning the
validity of the kapasadan on which the CRD was based. In his
motion, Mamiscal contended that the kapasadan was invalid
considering that he did not prepare the same. Moreover, there
were no witnesses to its execution. He claimed that he only
signed the kapasadan because of Adelaidah's threats.
Mamiscal also questioned the validity of the COD, denying that
he had executed and filed the same before the office of
Abdullah. Insisting that he never really intended to divorce his
wife, Mamiscal pointed out the fact that on December 13,
2010, before the expiration of the 'iddah, he wrote his wife to
inform her that he was revoking the repudiation he made on
September 26, 2010 and the kapasadan they entered into on
the same day because he did it on the "spur of the moment."
Abdullah denied Mamiscal's motion. In sustaining the divorce
between Mamiscal and Abdullah, Abdullah opined that it was
simply his ministerial duty to receive the COD and the
attached kapasadan filed by Adelaidah. Abdullah also noted
that when the AAC was convened, only Mamiscal and his
representatives appeared. Considering the fact that Adelaidah
manifested her opposition in writing to any reconciliation with
her husband and the fact that the 90-day period of 'iddah had
already lapsed, Abdullah ruled that any move to reconstitute
the AAC would have been futile because the divorce between
Mamiscal and his wife had already become final and
irrevocable.
32
Contending that the issuance of the CRD was tainted with
irregularity, Mamiscal comes to this Court, through the subject
complaint, charging Abdullah with partiality, violation of due
process, dishonesty, and conduct unbecoming of a court
employee.
Petitioner’s Contention: In his complaint, Mamiscal averred
that Abdullah should not have entertained or acted upon the
COD and the kapasadan filed by Adelaidah. He contended
that under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, a divorce under
talaq could only be filed and registered by the male spouse,
considering that female Muslims could do so only if the divorce
was through tafwid.
Respondent’s Contention: Abdullah countered that although
he had the authority to process the registration of the divorce
as court registrar, he could not be held responsible for the
contents of the COD and the kapasadan because his functions
were only ministerial. Nevertheless, Abdullah asserted that the
divorce between Mamiscal and Adelaidah had already attained
finality, not only because of the lapse of the required 'iddah,
but also because the kapasadan and Adelaidah's opposition
both proved that there could be no reconciliation between the
spouses.
ISSUE: Whether this Court has jurisdiction to impose
administrative sanction against Abdullah for his acts.
HELD: No.
Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court enjoys the privilege
of wearing two hats: first, as Clerk of Court of the Shari'a
Circuit Court, and second, as Circuit Registrar within his
territorial jurisdiction.
Article 185 of the Muslim Code provides:
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
Article 185. Neglect of duty by registrars. Any district
registrar or circuit registrar who fails to perform properly
his duties in accordance with this Code shall be penalized in
accordance with Section 18 of Act 3753.
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 3753[25] is the primary law that
governs the registry of civil status of persons. To ensure that
civil registrars perform their duties under the law, Section 18 of
C.A. No. 3753 provides:
Section 18. Neglect of duty with reference to the
provisions of this Act. — Any local registrar who fails to
properly perform his duties in accordance with the provisions
of this Act and of the regulations issued hereunder, shall
be punished for the first offense, by an administrative fine in a
sum equal to his salary for not less than fifteen days nor
more than three months, and for a second or repeated
offense, by removal from the service.
The same Act provides:
Section 2. Civil Registrar-General his duties and
powers. - The director of the National Library shall be
Civil Registrar-General and shall enforce the provisions
of this Act. The Director of the National Library, in his
capacity as Civil Registrar-General, is hereby authorized to
prepare and issue, with the approval of the Secretary of
Justice, regulations for carrying out the purposes of this Act,
and to prepare and order printed the necessary forms for
its proper compliance. In the exercise of his functions as Civil
Registrar- General, the Director of the National Library
shall have the power to give orders and instructions to the
local Civil registrars with reference to the performance
of their duties as such. It shall be the duty of the Director of
the National Library to report any violation of the provisions of
this Act and all irregularities, negligence or incompetency on
the part of the officers designated as local civil registrars to the
(Chief of the Executive Bureau or the Director of the
33
Non-Christian Tribes) Secretary of the Interior, as the case
may be, who shall take the proper disciplinary action
against the offenders.
It becomes apparent that this Court does not have jurisdiction
to impose the proper disciplinary action against civil registrars.
While he is undoubtedly a member of the Judiciary as Clerk of
Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court, a review of the subject
complaint reveals that Mamiscal seeks to hold Abdullah liable
for registering the divorce and issuing the CRD pursuant to his
duties as Circuit Registrar of Muslim divorces. It has been said
that the test of jurisdiction is the nature of the offense and not
the personality of the offender. The fact that the complaint
charges Abdullah for "conduct unbecoming of a court
employee" is of no moment. Well-settled is the rule that what
controls is not the designation of the offense but the actual
facts recited in the complaint. Verily, unless jurisdiction has
been conferred by some legislative act, no court or tribunal
can act on a matter submitted to it.
It was only with the advent of the Local Government Code that
the power of administrative supervision over civil registrars
was devolved to the municipal and city mayors of the
respective local government units. Under the "faithful
execution clause" embodied in Section 455(b)(l)(x) and
Section 444(b)(l)(x) of the Local Government Code, in relation
to Section 479 under Article IX, Title V of the same Code, the
municipal and city mayors of the respective local government
units, in addition to their power to appoint city or municipal civil
registrars are also given ample authority to exercise
administrative supervision over civil registrars.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
A.4 DELEGATION OF POWERS
21. Ampatuan vs Puno
FACTS: On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome
massacre of 57 men and women, including some news
reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and
Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency. She directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to undertake
such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by
law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in
the named places. Three days later or on November 27,
President Arroyo also issued Administrative Order 273 (AO
273) transferring supervision of the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office of the President to
the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). But,
due to issues raised over the terminology used in AO 273, the
President issued Administrative Order 273-A (AO 273-A)
amending the former, by delegating instead of transferring
supervision of the ARMM to the DILG.
Claiming that the Presidents issuances encroached on the
ARMMs autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan,
Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM
officials, filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They
alleged that the proclamation and the orders empowered the
DILG Secretary to take over ARMMs operations and seize the
regional governments powers, in violation of the principle of
local autonomy under Republic Act 9054 (also known as the
Expanded ARMM Act) and the Constitution. The President
gave the DILG Secretary the power to exercise, not merely
administrative supervision, but control over the ARMM since
the latter could suspend ARMM officials and replace them.
34
Petitioner ARMM officials claimed that the President had no
factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in
the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato,
where no critical violent incidents occurred. The deployment of
troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid
exercise of the Presidents emergency powers. Petitioners
asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A
be declared unconstitutional and that respondents DILG
Secretary, the AFP, and the PNP be enjoined from
implementing them.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) insisted that the
President issued Proclamation 1946, not to deprive the ARMM
of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject
places. She issued the proclamation pursuant to her calling
out power as Commander-in-Chief under the first sentence of
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate
the principle of local autonomy under the Constitution and The
Expanded ARMM Act;
2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised
emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP
to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City; and
3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her
actions.
HELD:
1. NO. The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG
Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the
ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the respondent
Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the
Maguindanao Massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner
Adiong, assumed the vacated post on 10 Dec. 2009 pursuant
to the rule on succession found in Sec. 12 Art.VII of RA 9054.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of
the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali‐Generale,
Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary therefore
did not take over the administration or the operations of the
ARMM.
2. NO. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of
emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions
as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper
to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall
cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a
state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did
not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that
authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling
out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly
vests in the President. She did not need a congressional
authority to exercise the same.
3. YES. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in
her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which
provides:
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-
in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. x x x
35
While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases
for the President’s exercise of the above power, it would
generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court
acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon.
Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the Constitution
entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the
armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence.
Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by
grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the
President’s judgment.
Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the
proclamation of state of emergency in the subject places and
the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the Court
must respect the President’s actions.
22. SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. CEMENT MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE and
THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,
respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation
(Southern Cross) is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of cement manufacturing, production, importation
and exportation. Its principal stockholders are Taiheiyo
Cement Corporation and Tokuyama Corporation, purportedly
the largest cement manufacturers in Japan.
Private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers
Corporation (Philcemcor) is an association of domestic cement
manufacturers. It has eighteen (18) members, per Record.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
While Philcemcor heralds itself to be an association of
domestic cement manufacturers, it appears that considerable
equity holdings, if not controlling interests in at least twelve
(12) of its member-corporations, were acquired by the three
largest cement manufacturers in the world, namely Financiere
Lafarge S.A. of France, Cemex S.A. de C.V. of Mexico, and
Holcim Ltd. of Switzerland (formerly Holderbank Financiere
Glaris, Ltd., then Holderfin B.V.).
The DTIs disagreement with the conclusions of the Tariff
Commission, but at the same time, ultimately denying
Philcemcors application for safeguard measures on the ground
that he was bound to do so in light of the Tariff Commissions
negative findings.
Philcemcor challenged this Decision of the DTI Secretary by
filing with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to set aside the DTI
Decision, as well as the Tariff Commissions Report. The Court
of Appeals Twelfth Division, partially granted Philcemcors
petition.
Southern Cross filed the present petition, arguing that the
Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over Philcemcors petition,
as the proper remedy is a petition for review with the CTA
conformably with the SMA, and; that the factual findings of the
Tariff Commission on the existence or non-existence of
conditions warranting the imposition of general safeguard
measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary.
Despite the fact that the Court of Appeals Decision had not yet
become final, its binding force was cited by the DTI Secretary
when he issued a new Decision on 25 June 2003, wherein he
ruled that that in light of the appellate courts Decision, there
36
was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding
Philcemcors application for definitive safeguard measures.
The Court of Appeals had held that based on the foregoing
premises, petitioner’s prayer to set aside the findings of the
Tariff Commission in its assailed Report dated March 13, 2002
is DENIED. On the other hand, the assailed April 5, 2002
Decision of the Secretary of the Department of Trade and
Industry is hereby SET ASIDE. Consequently, the case is
REMANDED to the public respondent Secretary of
Department of Trade and Industry for a final decision in
accordance with RA 8800 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. Hence, the appeal.
Yet on 25 June 2003, the DTI Secretary issued a new
Decision, ruling this time that that in light of the appellate
courts Decision there was no longer any legal impediment to
his deciding Philcemcors application for definitive safeguard
measures. He made a determination that, contrary to the
findings of the Tariff Commission, the local cement industry
had suffered serious injury as a result of the import surges.
Accordingly, he imposed a definitive safeguard measure on
the importation of gray Portland cement, in the form of a
definitive safeguard duty in the amount of P20.60/40 kg. bag
for three years on imported gray Portland Cement. Hence, the
appeal.
Republic Act No. 8800, the Safeguard Measures Act (SMA),
which was one of the laws enacted by Congress soon after the
Philippines ratified the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade
(GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.
The SMA provides the structure and mechanics for the
imposition of emergency measures, including tariffs, to protect
domestic industries and producers from increased imports
which inflict or could inflict serious injury on them.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018

ISSUE: Whether or not DTI Secretary can impose safeguard that the agent may not act beyond the specifically delegated
measures. powers or disregard the restrictions imposed by the principal.
In short, Congress may establish the procedural framework
HELD: NO. under which such safeguard measures may be imposed, and
assign the various offices in the government bureaucracy
The safeguard measures imposable under the SMA generally
respective tasks pursuant to the imposition of such measures,
involve duties on imported products, tariff rate quotas, or
the task assignment including the factual determination of
quantitative restrictions on the importation of a product into the
whether the necessary conditions exists to warrant such
country. Concerning as they do the foreign importation of
impositions. Under the SMA, Congress assigned the DTI
products into the Philippines, these safeguard measures fall
Secretary and the Tariff Commission their respective
within the ambit of Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution,
functions[50] in the legislatures scheme of things.
which states:
What are the limitations and restrictions that are material to
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to
the present case? The entire SMA provides for a limited
fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
framework under which the President, through the DTI and
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
Agriculture Secretaries, may impose safeguard measures in
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties
the form of tariffs and similar imposts. The limitation most
or imposts within the framework of the national development
relevant to this case is contained in Section 5 of the SMA,
program of the Government.
captioned Conditions for the Application of General Safeguard
The Court recognizes that the authority delegated to the Measures, and stating:
President under Section 28(2), Article VI may be exercised, in
The Secretary shall apply a general safeguard measure
accordance with legislative sanction, by the alter egos of the
upon a positive final determination of the [Tariff]
President, such as department secretaries. Indeed, for
Commission that a product is being imported into the
purposes of the Presidents exercise of power to impose tariffs
country in increased quantities, whether absolute or relative
under Article VI, Section 28(2), it is generally the Secretary of
to the domestic production, as to be a substantial cause of
Finance who acts as alter ego of the President. The SMA
serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry;
provides an exceptional instance wherein it is the DTI or
however, in the case of non-agricultural products, the
Agriculture Secretary who is tasked by Congress, in their
Secretary shall first establish that the application of such
capacities as alter egos of the President, to impose such
safeguard measures will be in the public interest.
measures. Certainly, the DTI Secretary has no inherent power,
even as alter ego of the President, to levy tariffs and imports. Section 13 of the SMA further bolsters the interpretation as
argued by Southern Cross and upheld by the Decision. The
When Congress tasks the President or his/her alter egos to
first paragraph thereof states that upon its positive
impose safeguard measures under the delineated conditions,
determination, the Tariff Commission shall recommend to the
the President or the alter egos may be properly deemed as
Secretary an appropriate definitive measure, clearly referring
agents of Congress to perform an act that inherently belongs
to the Tariff Commission as the entity that makes the positive
as a matter of right to the legislature. It is basic agency law
determination. On the other hand, the penultimate paragraph

37
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
of the same provision states that in the event of a negative
final determination, the DTI Secretary is to immediately issue
through the Secretary of Finance, a written instruction to the
Commissioner of Customs authorizing the return of the cash
bonds previously collected as a provisional safeguard
measure. Since the first paragraph of the same provision
states that it is the Tariff Commission which makes the positive
determination, it necessarily follows that it, and not the DTI
Secretary, makes the negative final determination as referred
to in the penultimate paragraph of Section 13.
23. Sema vs COMELEC
FACTS: The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM.
Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is
not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its
inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two
legislative districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of
Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act
and vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities,
cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM
Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the
municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the
exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially
stated that the 1st district is now only made of Cotabato City
(because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that
status quo should be retained; however, just for the purposes
of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a
decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabato’s status as
a legislative district (or part of any).
38
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the
legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district).
Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a
separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be
excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen
was from there and D was winning – in fact he won). She
contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a
province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains
legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes
Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a
representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there
and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the
legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional and
whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local
government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay
may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject
to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units
province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three
conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must
follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code.
Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of
the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the
political units affected.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of
authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to
regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units, subject to reasonable
standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of
the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial
boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create
barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with
the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the
plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff
Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a
population of at least 250k, and that a province, once created,
should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note
further that in order to have a legislative district, there must at
least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not
meet the population requirement so Sema’s contention is
untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the
province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative
district. But this can never be legally possible because the
creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At
most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and
provinces.
24. NPC Drivers and Mechanics Assoc v Napocor
FACTS: Before Us is a special civil action for Injunction to
enjoin public respondents from implementing the National
Power Board (NPB) Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-
125, both dated 18 November 2002, directing, among other
things, the termination of all employees of the National Power
Corporation (NPC) on 31 January 2003 in line with the
restructuring of the NPC.
39
On 8 June 2001, Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as
the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law),
was approved and signed into law by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and took effect on 26 June 2001.
Under the EPIRA Law a new National Power Board of
Directors was constituted composed of the Secretary of
Finance as Chairman, with the Secretary of Energy, the
Secretary of Budget and Management, the Secretary of
Agriculture, the Director-General of the National Economic and
Development Authority, the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government, the Secretary of the Department of Trade and
Industry, and the President of the National Power Corporation
as members.
On 18 November 2002, pursuant to Section 63 of the
EPIRA Law and Rule 33 of the IRR, the NPB passed NPB
Resolution No. 2002-124 which provided for the Guidelines on
the Separation Program of the NPC and the Selection and
Placement of Personnel in the NPC Table of
Organization. Under said Resolution, all NPC personnel shall
be legally terminated on 31 January 2003, and shall be entitled
to separation benefits. On the same day, the NPB approved
NPB Resolution No. 2002-125, whereby a Transition Team
was constituted to manage and implement
the NPCs Separation Program.
Contending that the assailed NPB Resolutions are void
and without force and effect, herein petitioners, in their
individual and representative capacities, filed the present
Petition for Injunction to restrain respondents from
implementing NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-
125. In support thereof, petitioners invoke Section 78 of the
EPIRA Law, to wit:Section 78. Injunction and Restraining
Order. The implementation of the provisions of this Act shall
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
not be restrained or enjoined except by an order issued by the
Supreme Court of the Philippines.
In assailing the validity of NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and
No. 2002-125, petitioners maintain that said Resolutions were
not passed and issued by a majority of the members of the
duly constituted Board of Directors since only three of its
members, as provided under Section 48 of the EPIRA Law,
were present, namely: DOE Secretary Vincent S. Perez, Jr.;
Department of Budget and Management
Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin; and NPC OIC-President
Rolando S. Quilala. According to petitioners, the other four
members who were present at the meeting and signed the
Resolutions were not the secretaries of their respective
departments but were merely representatives or designated
alternates of the officials who were named under the EPIRA
Law to sit as members of the NPB. Petitioners claim that the
acts of these representatives are violative of the well-settled
principle that delegated power cannot be further
delegated. Thus, petitioners conclude that the questioned
Resolutions have been illegally issued as it were not issued by
a duly constituted board since no quorum existed because
only three of the nine members, as provided under Section 48
of the EPIRA Law, were present and qualified to sit and vote.
ISSUE: WON NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-
125 were properly enacted.
RULING: NO.We agree with petitioners. In enumerating under
Section 48 those who shall compose the National Power
Board of Directors, the legislature has vested upon these
persons the power to exercise their judgment and discretion in
running the affairs of the NPC. Discretion may be defined as
the act or the liberty to decide according to the principles of
justice and ones ideas of what is right and proper under the
circumstances, without willfulness or favor. Discretion, when
40
applied to public functionaries, means a power or right
conferred upon them by law of acting officially in certain
circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment
and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience
of others. It is to be presumed that in naming the respective
department heads as members of the board of directors, the
legislature chose these secretaries of the various executive
departments on the basis of their personal qualifications and
acumen which made them eligible to occupy their present
positions as department heads. Thus, the department
secretaries cannot delegate their duties as members of the
NPB, much less their power to vote and approve board
resolutions, because it is their personal judgment that must be
exercised in the fulfillment of such responsibility.
There is no question that the enactment of the assailed
Resolutions involves the exercise of discretion and not merely
a ministerial act that could be validly performed by a delegate,
thus, the rule enunciated in the case
of Binamira v. Garrucho is relevant in the present controversy,
to wit:
An officer to whom a discretion is
entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the
presumption being that he was chosen because
he was deemed fit and competent to exercise
that judgment and discretion, and unless the
power to substitute another in his place has
been given to him, he cannot delegate his
duties to another.
In those cases in which the proper
execution of the office requires, on the part of
the officer, the exercise of judgment or
discretion, the presumption is that he was
chosen because he was deemed fit and
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
competent to exercise that judgment and
discretion, and, unless power to substitute
another in his place has been given to him, he
cannot delegate his duties to another.
Respondents assertion to the contrary is not
tenable. The ruling in the case cited by respondents to support
their contention is not applicable in the case at bar. While it is
true that the Court has determined in the case of American
Tobacco Company v. Director of Patents[11] that a delegate
may exercise his authority through persons he appoints to
assist him in his functions, it must be stressed that the Court
explicitly stated in the same case that said practice is
permissible only when the judgment and
discretion finally exercised are those of the officer
authorized by law. According to the Court, the rule that
requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment
and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter
of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates,
so long as it is the legally authorized official who makes
the final decision through the use of his own personal
judgment.
In the case at bar, it is not difficult to comprehend that
in approving NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-
125, it is the representatives of the secretaries of the different
executive departments and not the secretaries themselves
who exercised judgment in passing the assailed Resolution, as
shown by the fact that it is the signatures of the respective
representatives that are affixed to the questioned
Resolutions. This, to our mind, violates the duty imposed upon
the specifically enumerated department heads to employ their
own sound discretion in exercising the corporate powers of the
NPC. Evidently, the votes cast by these mere representatives
in favor of the adoption of the said Resolutions must not be
considered in determining whether or not the necessary
41
number of votes was garnered in order that the assailed
Resolutions may be validly enacted. Hence, there being only
three valid votes cast out of the nine board members, namely
those of DOE Secretary Vincent S. Perez, Jr.; Department of
Budget and Management Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin; and
NPC OIC-President Rolando S. Quilala, NPB Resolutions No.
2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are void and are of no legal
effect.
A.5 STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
25 Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v Commission of
Internal Revenue
FACTS: In accordance with Section 28(A)(5)4 of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, petitioner withheld
and remitted to respondent on 21 October 2003 the amount of
PHP 67,688,553.51, which represented the fifteen percent
(15%) branch profit remittance tax (BPRT) on its regular
banking unit (RBU) net income remitted to Deutsche Bank
Germany (DB Germany) for 2002 and prior taxable years.5
Believing that it made an overpayment of the BPRT, petitioner
filed with the BIR Large Taxpayers Assessment and
Investigation Division on 4 October 2005 an administrative
claim for refund or issuance of its tax credit certificate in the
total amount of PHP 22,562,851.17. On the same date,
petitioner requested from the International Tax Affairs Division
(ITAD) a confirmation of its entitlement to the preferential tax
rate of 10% under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
Due to Inaction with Bir, a petition for review was filed with
CTA. Cta DENIED the claim on the ground that the application
for a tax treaty relief was not filed with ITAD prior to the
payment by the former of its BPRT and actual remittance of its
branch profits to DB Germany, or prior to its availment of the
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
preferential rate of ten percent (10%) under the RP-Germany
Tax Treaty provision. The court a quo held that petitioner
violated the fifteen (15) day period mandated under Section III
paragraph (2) of Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 1-
2000. Further, the CTA Second Division relied on Mirant
(Philippines) Operations Corporation (formerly Southern
Energy Asia-Pacific Operations [Phils.], Inc.) v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue (Mirant) where the CTA En Banc ruled
that before the benefits of the tax treaty may be extended to a
foreign corporation wishing to avail itself thereof, the latter
should first invoke the provisions of the tax treaty and prove
that they indeed apply to the corporation.
CTA en banc affirmed cta division ruling. Citing Mirant, the
CTA En Banc held that a ruling from the ITAD of the BIR must
be secured prior to the availment of a preferential tax rate
under a tax treaty. Applying the principle of stare decisis et
non quieta movere, the CTA En Banc took into consideration
that this Court had denied the Petition in G.R. No. 168531 filed
by Mirant for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in
the assailed judgment.11 The CTA En Banc ruled that once a
case has been decided in one way, any other case involving
exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same
manner.The court likewise ruled that the 15-day rule for tax
treaty relief application under RMO No. 1-2000 cannot be
relaxed for petitioner, unlike in CBK Power Company Limited
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. In that case, the rule
was relaxed and the claim for refund of excess final
withholding taxes was partially granted. While it issued a ruling
to CBK Power Company Limited after the payment of
withholding taxes, the ITAD did not issue any ruling to
petitioner even if it filed a request for confirmation on 4
October 2005 that the remittance of branch profits to DB
Germany is subject to a preferential tax rate of 10% pursuant
to Article 10 of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
42
ISSUE: Whether the failure to strictly comply with RMO No. 1-
2000 will deprive persons or corporations of the benefit of a
tax treaty.
RULING: NO. Our Constitution provides for adherence to the
general principles of international law as part of the law of the
land. The time-honored international principle of pacta sunt
servanda demands the performance in good faith of treaty
obligations on the part of the states that enter into the
agreement. Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties,
and obligations under the treaty must be performed by them in
good faith. More importantly, treaties have the force and effect
of law in this jurisdiction.
Tax treaties are entered into "to reconcile the national fiscal
legislations of the contracting parties and, in turn, help the
taxpayer avoid simultaneous taxations in two different
jurisdictions."18 CIR v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc. further
clarifies that "tax conventions are drafted with a view towards
the elimination of international juridical double taxation, which
is defined as the imposition of comparable taxes in two or
more states on the same taxpayer in respect of the same
subject matter and for identical periods. The apparent rationale
for doing away with double taxation is to encourage the free
flow of goods and services and the movement of capital,
technology and persons between countries, conditions
deemed vital in creating robust and dynamic economies.
Foreign investments will only thrive in a fairly predictable and
reasonable international investment climate and the protection
against double taxation is crucial in creating such a climate."
Simply put, tax treaties are entered into to minimize, if not
eliminate the harshness of international juridical double
taxation, which is why they are also known as double tax
treaty or double tax agreements.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
"A state that has contracted valid international obligations is
bound to make in its legislations those modifications that may
be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken." Thus, laws and issuances must ensure that the
reliefs granted under tax treaties are accorded to the parties
entitled thereto. The BIR must not impose additional
requirements that would negate the availment of the reliefs
provided for under international agreements. More so, when
the RP-Germany Tax Treaty does not provide for any pre-
requisite for the availment of the benefits under said
agreement.
Likewise, it must be stressed that there is nothing in RMO No.
1-2000 which would indicate a deprivation of entitlement to a
tax treaty relief for failure to comply with the 15-day period. We
recognize the clear intention of the BIR in implementing RMO
No. 1-2000, but the CTA’s outright denial of a tax treaty relief
for failure to strictly comply with the prescribed period is not in
harmony with the objectives of the contracting state to ensure
that the benefits granted under tax treaties are enjoyed by duly
entitled persons or corporations.
Bearing in mind the rationale of tax treaties, the period of
application for the availment of tax treaty relief as required by
RMO No. 1-2000 should not operate to divest entitlement to
the relief as it would constitute a violation of the duty required
by good faith in complying with a tax treaty. The denial of the
availment of tax relief for the failure of a taxpayer to apply
within the prescribed period under the administrative issuance
would impair the value of the tax treaty. At most, the
application for a tax treaty relief from the BIR should merely
operate to confirm the entitlement of the taxpayer to the relief.
The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take
precedence over the objective of RMO No. 1-
2000.1âwphi1 Logically, noncompliance with tax treaties has
43
negative implications on international relations, and unduly
discourages foreign investors. While the consequences sought
to be prevented by RMO No. 1-2000 involve an administrative
procedure, these may be remedied through other system
management processes, e.g., the imposition of a fine or
penalty. But we cannot totally deprive those who are entitled to
the benefit of a treaty for failure to strictly comply with an
administrative issuance requiring prior application for tax treaty
relief.
Prior Application vs. Claim for Refund
Again, RMO No. 1-2000 was implemented to obviate any
erroneous interpretation and/or application of the treaty
provisions. The objective of the BIR is to forestall assessments
against corporations who erroneously availed themselves of
the benefits of the tax treaty but are not legally entitled thereto,
as well as to save such investors from the tedious process of
claims for a refund due to an inaccurate application of the tax
treaty provisions. However, as earlier discussed,
noncompliance with the 15-day period for prior application
should not operate to automatically divest entitlement to the
tax treaty relief especially in claims for refund.
The underlying principle of prior application with the BIR
becomes moot in refund cases, such as the present case,
where the very basis of the claim is erroneous or there is
excessive payment arising from non-availment of a tax treaty
relief at the first instance. In this case, petitioner should not be
faulted for not complying with RMO No. 1-2000 prior to the
transaction. It could not have applied for a tax treaty relief
within the period prescribed, or 15 days prior to the payment of
its BPRT, precisely because it erroneously paid the BPRT not
on the basis of the preferential tax rate under
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, but on the regular rate as
prescribed by the NIRC. Hence, the prior application
requirement becomes illogical. Therefore, the fact that
petitioner invoked the provisions of the RP-Germany Tax
Treaty when it requested for a confirmation from the ITAD
before filing an administrative claim for a refund should be
deemed substantial compliance with RMO No. 1-2000.
Corollary thereto, Section 221 of the NIRC provides the
taxpayer a remedy for tax recovery when there has been an
erroneous payment of tax.1âwphi1 The outright denial of
petitioner’s claim for a refund, on the sole ground of failure to
apply for a tax treaty relief prior to the payment of the BPRT,
would defeat the purpose of Section 229.Petitioner is entitled
to a refund
26 Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v Comelec
FACTS: This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang
Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 20092 (the First
Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 20093 (the Second
Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the
Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the
COMELEC’s refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list
organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise
known as the Party-List System Act.4
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women
who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-
gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang
Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in
2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the
ground that the organization had no substantial membership
44
base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a
Petition5 for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT
community is a marginalized and under-represented sector
that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of
exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of
negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide
their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the
8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.6 Ang
Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of
individual members and organizational supporters, and
outlined its platform of governance.7
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s
evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the
Petition on moral grounds, stating that:This Petition is
dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community,
thus:a marginalized and under-represented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation
and gender identity. and proceeded to define sexual
orientation as that which refers to a person’s capacity for
profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and
intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different
gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender."
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that
petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.
In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:For this cause God gave them
up into vile affections, for even their women did change the
natural use into that which is against nature: And likewise also
the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their
lust one toward another; men with men working that which is
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of
their error which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye
are indeed a people transgressing beyond bounds." (7.81)
"And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then
see what was the end of those who indulged in sin and crime!"
(7:84) "He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me against people
who do mischief" (29:30).
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which
defines nuisance as ‘Any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x
(3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality .
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: ‘The
contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that
‘Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy’ are
inexistent and void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes ‘Immoral
doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent
shows’
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it
justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of
45
speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines’ international
obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad’s petition and argued
that the COMELEC erred in denying petitioner’s application for
registration since there was no basis for COMELEC’s
allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their
own special interests and concerns which should have been
recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification.
However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioner’s
freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were
concerned, the OSG maintained that there had been no
restrictions on these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does
not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to
benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed
on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the
LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful
statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence
contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field
personnel.
Reconsideration decision of Comelec:
Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having
mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is
beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under
the party-list system will remain just that.
No substantial differentiation- there can be no denying that
Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will
remain either male or female protected by the same Bill of
Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
Public morals- as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its
more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such
that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have
sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted
moral norms.
Provisions-But above morality and social norms, they have
become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon "Those
who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly
contrary to public morals." It penalizes "immoral doctrines,
obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows."
"Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under these legal provisions.
This is clear from its Petition’s paragraph 6F: "Consensual
partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are
already of age’ It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition
which waves for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex with
Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000.
Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as
any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks,
defies or disregards decency or morality x x x." These are all
unlawful
ISSUE: WON Comelec erred in denying the accreditation of
Ang Ladlad
RULING: Yes. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation.
Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the
belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records
has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not
qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of
the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong
Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang
Ladlad’s morality, or lack thereof.
46
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad’s
Petition for Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in
religious matters."24 Clearly, "governmental reliance on
religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality."25 We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and
the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the
Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the
COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings
beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise
stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways
that have primarily secular effects.
Government action, including its proscription of immorality as
expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a
secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this
conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of
human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by
the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly,
moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling
influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what
actions would be considered a moral disapprobation
punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a
religion and thus have religious opinions and moral codes with
a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to
regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a
uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly
put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable
and discernible secular purpose and justification to pass
scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious
nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in
society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses
prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent
neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular
goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold
religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated
by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does
not offend compelling state interests.27
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a
sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The
denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial
public interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to
the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets
homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any
particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective
targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to
promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the
validity of its position through normal democratic means.39 It is
in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing
opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held
in Estrada v. Escritor:40
47
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and
moral ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens are
free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and
every moral discernment has access to the public square
where people deliberate the order of their life together.
Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped
by, or espousing religious belief, and these citizens have equal
access to the public square. In this representative democracy,
the state is prohibited from determining which convictions and
moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation.
Through a constitutionally designed process, the people
deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in
this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on
moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will
largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e.,
the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very
act of adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it
specifies – including protection of religious freedom "not only
for a minority, however small – not only for a majority, however
large – but for each of us" – the majority imposes upon itself a
self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise
could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential
foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies
not only to those that are favorably received but also to those
that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this
sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the
COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace.
Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to
interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an
approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that
homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows that
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
both expressions concerning one’s homosexuality and the
activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT
individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule
that even overwhelming public perception that homosexual
conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing
same-sex conduct.41 European and United Nations judicial
decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both
privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal
protection provisions in foreign and international texts.42 To the
extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that
have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence
is certainly illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not
formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have
persuasive influence on the Court’s analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United
States courts have ruled that existing free speech doctrines
protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order
to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion,
public institutions must show that their actions were caused by
"something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint."43
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of
ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights
tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has
repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a
change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it
uses legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes
are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has
emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing
order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means
must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through
48
the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may
seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the
majority of the population. A political group should not be
hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate
controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable
of satisfying everyone concerned. Only if a political party
incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible
with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the
freedom of association guarantee.
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that
homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant.
They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other
hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe
with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the
same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships.
They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However,
as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes
using the religious or moral views of one part of the community
to exclude from consideration the values of other members of
the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a
golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may be that this
Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between
the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more
complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that
public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut
strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we
neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of
homosexuality through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior
restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad,
and its members have not been deprived of their right to
voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
their freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues
that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or
any assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its
authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as
a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-list system.
This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a
transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November
11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are
hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed
to GRANT petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation.
27 Imbong v Ochoa Exec Secretary 2014
FACTS: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as
the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said
law, challengers from various sectors of society came
knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the
sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of
the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce,
the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in
fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to
wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by
spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C.
Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens,
lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor
49
children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center,
Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution
(Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the
Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its
president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and
several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens
and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for
Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in
their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force
Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by
Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale
Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned
educational institution, and several others,13 in their
capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his
capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by
Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace
Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in their capacities as a
citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the
Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several
others19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
(PAX);
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and
several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by
spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty.
Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens,
taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan
F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a
member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by
Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several
others,25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
and on behalf of its associates who are members of the
Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint
Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita
Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni
Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens,
taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by
John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their
capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by
Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several
others,31in their capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi
Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities
as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
50
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S.
Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer
(Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang
Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners
are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following
GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its
declared policy against abortion, the implementation of
the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables
which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II
of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right
to protection against hazardous products. The
petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal
access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's
health, as it causes cancer and other health
problems.36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the
constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it
authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement
of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public
funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to
their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate
ensuring religious freedom.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious
objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other
forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to
refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health
programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct
information on reproductive health programs and service,
although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that
skilled health professionals who are public officers such as,
but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers,
medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians,
hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health
midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to
implement these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation
of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed
as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.
While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious
freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to
satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling
state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free
exercise of religion and the right to free speech.42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on
involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the
RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary
servitude because, to be accredited under the
PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide
forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent
women, under threat of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment.43
51
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are
covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively
be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack
of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the
public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners
services.44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of
the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates
against the poor as it makes them the primary target of
the government program that promotes contraceptive
use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks
to introduce contraceptives that would effectively
reduce the number of the poor.45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the
due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the
penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation,"
it is vague because it does not define the type of
conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law
violates the right to due process by removing from them (the
people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide
what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of
services they shall offer."47 It ignores the management
prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct
their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and
judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To
compel a person to explain a full range of family
planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to
expound only his own preferred way of family planning.
The petitioners note that although exemption is granted
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
to institutions owned and operated by religious groups,
they are still forced to refer their patients to another
healthcare facility willing to perform the service or
procedure.48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's
family protected by the Constitution. It is contended
that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive
health education intrudes upon their constitutional right
to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person
who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law
forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes
the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining
to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is
also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a
miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine
whether their child should use contraceptives.50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of
non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners
question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the
power to determine whether a product is non-
abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency
Drugs List (EDL).51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule
provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of
Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended
52
that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health
measures at the local government level and the
ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs
and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and
R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their
respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the
constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in
behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C.
Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr.
Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G.
Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive
Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty.
Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-
Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4,
2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave
to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive
arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the
petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual
case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe
for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to
question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially
petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the
enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and
arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order
(SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty
(120) days, or until July 17, 2013.
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with
the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the
pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by
which these issues were to be discussed in the oral
arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and
27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16,
2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of
the Court.
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same
time posed several questions for their clarification on some
contentions of the parties.64
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of
the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From
a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the
population of the country reached over 76 million in the year
2000 and over 92 million in 2010. The executive and the
legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate.
To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide
Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and
information to the full range of modem family planning
methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the
peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it
more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health
providers to provide information on the full range of modem
family planning methods, supplies and services, and for
schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth
to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry
out its mandates.
53
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to
fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception,
women's health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be
declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues
that the government sponsored contraception program, the
very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of
women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to
protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo
ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must
be maintained."
It explains: x x x. The instant Petition does not question
contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under
Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale
and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless
dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What
the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH
Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire
bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the
barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is
made to play in the implementation of the contraception
program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money.
The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of
family planning methods and the implementer of the program
by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal
access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and
supplies.
ISSUES:
1) WON RH Law violates the right to Life and health of the
unborn child ( art .II sec 12)
2) WON RH Law violates the right to health
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
3) WON Section 3.01 a and 3.01 G of IRR of RH is
unconstitutional.
4) WON RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee
respecting religion.
RULING:
`1) NO. It is a universally accepted principle that every human
being enjoys the right to life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being
grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a
creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or
belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of
men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample
protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family
planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage.
From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To
Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966,
prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which
prevent fertilization, to the promotion of male vasectomy and
tubal ligation, and the ratification of numerous international
agreements, the country has long recognized the need to
promote population control through the use of contraceptives
in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through
the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family
54
planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the promotion
of public health, particularly, reproductive health.
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures
promoting women's rights and health and the overall
promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No.
4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines"
and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta
of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm
shift, the Philippine national population program has always
been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-
abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will be
discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on
administrative policy, but rather, originates from the
constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection
to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that
the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical
issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper
hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was
agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could
express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins
at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be
made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn
from conception. This is undisputable because before
conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it
is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any
proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The
problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters
who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that
conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the
view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when
life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that
conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female
ovum by the male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum
are those who assert that conception refers to the
"implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary
meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar
Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is
that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language employed in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the
55
words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense
they have in common use. What it says according to the text of
the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.
Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute
there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First,
because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily
a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in
whose consciousness it should ever be present as an
important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning
of the word "conception" which, as described and defined by
all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at
fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as
the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the
fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing
into a being like its parents.Black's Law Dictionary gives legal
meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the
female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life
capable of survival and maturation under normal
conditions.Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already
a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S.
Montano, it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not
acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a
child inside the womb already has life. No less than the
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,
that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If
the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even
prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
[Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart, Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for
the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for
human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate
and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life."
Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited,
as a baby or a child.
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on
the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception"
used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their
deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization.
the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State
shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the
unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon
fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the
female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the
Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting
measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the
Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on
the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a
contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact
which should be left to the courts to decide on based on
established evidence.155
56
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy
the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus
prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent
the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those
that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible. The clear
and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution
in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to
prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing
abortion. Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners,
the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the
Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has
life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The
conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits
any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as
discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the
killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second,
prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother's womb
2) NO.the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the
unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale,
distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and
devices will still require the prescription of a licensed
physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate
safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that
are safe are made available to the public. Contraceptives
cannot be dispensed and used without prescription. With all of
the foregoing safeguards(RA 4729 , Section 25 of RA No.
5921,Sec 10 of RH Law), as provided for in the RH Law and
other relevant statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that
the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of
contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely
unwarranted and baseless.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these
provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly
express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should
be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation
to implement these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila
Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative
act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic.
That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-
executing rather than non-self-executing. Unless the contrary
is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall
be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the
will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
The provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other
safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the
EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by
the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning products and supplies. There can be
no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of
contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective"
without the proper scientific examination.
57
3) YES. Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR must be struck
down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section
3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It
contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore,
be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the
qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the
RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only
be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is
abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the
implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would
permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually
abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification
by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive.
With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under
Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against
abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to
be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those
contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb
or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not
have the secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting
abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be
construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the
RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily"
in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared
void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the
RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the
primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the
floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm
or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in
violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution
4.) Yes. The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty
God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and
consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical
experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that
the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so
far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality.
Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to
society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain
benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions
such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious
officers in government institutions, and optional religious
instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier
so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the
church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church
and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based
on mutual respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the State cannot
meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question
its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one
religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand,
the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the
State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the
nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they
are good for the country.
58
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should
ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-
cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense,
which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other
house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious
organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious
congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to
provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit
of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the
following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI,
Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two
guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from
sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against
other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among
religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of
a state religion and the use of public resources for the support
or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the
respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. Under
this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited
from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's
belief and faith.
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is
the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is
comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the
freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
The second part however, is limited and subject to the
awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with
proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the
public welfare. Thus, in case of conflict between the free
exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the
doctrine of benevolent neutrality.
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to
these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may
be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is
to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's
or institution's religion." "What is sought under the theory of
accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a
facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its
'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court
to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's
participation in the support of modem reproductive health
measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the
same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For
the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith,
practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom
and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts.” The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the
case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it
has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without
authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the
Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the
RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
59
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and
respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is
replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to
violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious
convictions against his free will.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their
supposition that the State cannot enhance its population
control program through the RH Law simply because the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious
beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its
legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by
the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his
taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The
demarcation line between Church and State demands that one
render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God
the things that are God's.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly
burdened by government legislation or practice, the
compelling state interest test in line with the Court's
espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor,
finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's
claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from
obligations under the RH Law, unless the government
succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in
the accomplishment of an important secular objective.
Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for
exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict
scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious
objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As in
Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a
conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to
the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of
penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of
medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent
with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by
the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against
his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem
reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has
been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As
Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has
written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect
for the inviolability of the human conscience.
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral
convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the
State, on the other, to provide access and information on
reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number
and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the
strong view that the religious freedom of health providers,
whether public or private, should be accorded primacy.
Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from
compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be
compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction,
it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion"
enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which
would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious
objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If
60
the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy
of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to
believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act
according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated
when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is
prevented from acting according to one's belief.
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to
the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of
the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing,
number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a
future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother
decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or
supply given to her or whether she even decides to become
pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon
those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs
the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive
health matters.
Granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the
infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom,
the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or
override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom.
Also, the respondents have not presented any government
effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its
legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually
replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal
deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended
pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to
substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from
reputable sources.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid
exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare
service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive
health care procedures if doing it would contravene their
religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening
cases that require the performance of emergency procedures.
In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be
given preference, considering that a referral by a medical
practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to
unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger.
Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing
CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are
objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does
not contemplate an emergency."
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life
of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save
both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to
one should not be deliberate
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health
facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to
refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health facility which is conveniently accessible;
and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of
61
family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails and or refuses to disseminate information
regarding programs and services on reproductive
health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision
in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case,
as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo
reproductive health procedures without the consent of
the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision
in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of
parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service
provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any public officer who refuses to support
reproductive health programs or shall do any act that
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the
RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR,
which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra
vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19,
2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby
LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which
have been herein declared as constitutional.
28 Republic v Albios
FACTS: On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen,
and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC),
as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No.
2004-1588.
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She
alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated
and never lived as husband and wife because they never
really had any intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She
62
described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore,
null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his
answer. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a
collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor
complied and reported that she could not make a
determination for failure of both parties to appear at the
scheduled investigation.At the pre-trial, only Albios, her
counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend
the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After
the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
RTC said marriage is void.The RTC was of the view that the
parties married each other for convenience only. Giving
credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she
contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to
acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she
agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer
returned to the United States and never again communicated
with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00
because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The
RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family
life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its
inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February
5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that
the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to
freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018
intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means
to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA. CA
said void. In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011,
the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential
requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the
parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence
of getting married and that their case was similar to a marriage
in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to
enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live as
husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to
obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of
$2,000.00
ISSUE: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00,
void ab initio?
RULING: No. Although the Court views with disdain the
respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though
the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or
fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab
initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the
ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only
the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code
may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous
conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the
wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a
sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug
addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
63
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground
for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for
the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify
under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under
Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the
injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no
injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to
enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of
marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared
void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The
Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the
parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have
availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it.
These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the
courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios
already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of
convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to
get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in
violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting
parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage
may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the
parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family
Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life.
The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no
real intention to establish a life together is, however,
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in
accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the
nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS- FEUJD4401 2018

by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus,
only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided
by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or
law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites
prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money,
status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid
cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by
law, may validly support a marriage.

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex.

The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a
couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise
serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy
allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost
any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have
children or no children, to love one another or not, and so

64