FORCIBLE ENTRY & UNLAWFUL DETAINER
another occupies the land at the formers tolerance or permission without any
(1) VALDEZ v. CA
Facts: This case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by
petitioners Bonifacio and Venida Valdez against private respondents Gabriel
and Francisca Fabella before the MTC of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint
alleges these material facts that plaintiffs are the registered owners of a
piece of residential lot denominated as Lot No. 3 Blk 19 located at Carolina
Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal which they acquired from
Carolina Realty, Inc. Sometime in November 1992 by virtue of Sales
Contract. That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever occupied the
said lot by building their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein
plaintiffs rightful possession thereof. That for several times, plaintiffs orally
asked the herein defendants to peacefully surrender the premises to them,
but the latter stubbornly refused to vacate the lot they unlawfully occupied.
In their answer, private respondents contended that the complaint failed to
state that petitioners had prior physical possession of the property or that
they were the lessors of the former. In the alternative, private respondents
claimed ownership over the land on the ground that they had been in open,
continuous, and adverse possession thereof for more than thirty years, as
attested by an ocular inspection report from the DENR. They also stressed
that the complaint failed to comply with SC Circular No. 28-91 regarding
affidavits against non-forum shopping.
MTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered private respondents to
vacate the property and to pay rent for the use and occupation of the same
plus attorneys fees. On appeal, RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the
MTC. Private respondents filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. It held that
petitioners failed to make a case for unlawful detainer because they failed to
show that they had given the private respondents the right to occupy the
premises or that they had tolerated private respondents possession of the
same, which is a requirement in unlawful detainer cases. It added that the
allegations in petitioners complaint lack jurisdictional elements for forcible
entry which requires an allegation of prior material possession.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. They claim
that the averments of their complaint make out a case for unlawful detainer
having alleged that private respondents unlawfully withheld from them the
possession of the property in question, which allegation is sufficient to
establish a case for unlawful detainer. They further contend that the
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy available to the owner if
contract between the two as the latter is bound by an implied promise to
vacate the land upon demand by the owner.
Issue: W/N the allegations of the complaint clearly made out a case for
unlawful detainer.
Ruling: NO. Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of
actions available to recover possession of real property: (a) accion
interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria. Accion
interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry
(detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico). In forcible entry, one is
deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force,
intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one
illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to
hold possession under any contract, express or implied.
The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the
possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue
is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer,
possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess. The jurisdiction of these two
actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper MTC or metropolitan
trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of
actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last
demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to
physical possession.
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs
supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of
the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the
possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would
be an improper remedy. It is the nature of defendants entry into the land
which determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful
detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the
intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession
thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it
is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as
brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes
provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 1
jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer,
as where it does not state how entry was affected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC.
Here, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact
that would substantiate petitioners claim that they permitted or tolerated the
occupation of the property by respondents. The complaint contains only bare
allegations that respondents without any color of title whatsoever occupies
the land in question by building their house in the said land thereby depriving
petitioners the possession thereof. Nothing has been said on how
respondents entry was effected or how and when dispossession started.
Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. This failure of
petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful
detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court
had no jurisdiction over the case. It is in this light that this Court finds that the
Court of Appeals correctly found that the municipal trial court had no
jurisdiction over the complaint.
(2) ROSARIO v. GERRY ROXAS FOUNDATION
Facts: The petitioner Manuel del Rosario appears to be the registered owner of Lot
3-A of Psd-301974 located in Roxas City which is described in and covered by TCT
No. T-18397 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Roxas. Sometime in 1991, the
respondent, as a legitimate foundation, took possession and occupancy of said land
by virtue of a memorandum of agreement entered into by and between it and the City
of Roxas. Its possession and occupancy of said land is in the character of being
lessee thereof. In February and March 2003, the petitioners served notices upon the
respondent to vacate the premises of said land. The respondent did not heed such
notices because it still has the legal right to continue its possession and occupancy of
said land.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against the respondent before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Roxas City. It was stated there that the Plaintiffs
have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of the land without any
contractual or legal basis. Hence, defendants possession of the subject property is
only by tolerance. But plaintiffs patience has come to its limits. Hence, sometime in
the last quarter of 2002, plaintiffs made several demands to settle and/or pay rentals
for the use of the property. Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letters, defendant
failed and refused, as it continues to fail and refuse to pay reasonable monthly rentals
for the use and occupancy of the land, and to vacate the subject premises despite
the lapse of the fifteen-day period specified in the said demand letters. Consequently,
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession of the subject property from the
plaintiffs, who are the owners thereof.
In their Answer, they stated there that the defendant took full control and
possession of the subject property, developed the same and has been using the
premises in accordance with its agreements with the City of Roxas and the purposes
of the defendant corporation without any objection or opposition of any kind on the
part of the plaintiffs for over twenty-two long years. And by way of affirmative defense:
The leased property does not belong to the plaintiffs. The property covered by TCT
No. T-18397, is occupied by the [defendant] as [lessee] of the City of Roxas since
1991, the latter having acquired it by purchase from the plaintiffs way back on
February 19, 1981, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale. While, admittedly,
the said certificate of title is still in the name of the plaintiffs, nevertheless, the
ownership of the property covered therein has already transferred to the City of
Roxas upon its delivery to it.
Article 1496 of the Civil Code provides that, ownership of the thing sold is acquired by
the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in
articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the
possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee. It is also provided under
Article 1498 of the CC that, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the
execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, which is the object of
the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be
inferred. Upon execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the plaintiffs have
relinquished ownership of the property subject thereof in favor of the vendee, City of
Roxas. Necessarily, the possession of the property subject of the said Deed of
Absolute Sale now pertains to the City of Roxas and the plaintiffs have no more right,
whatsoever, to the possession of the same. It is defendant foundation by virtue of the
Memorandums of Agreement, which has the legal right to have possession of the
subject property
After the MTCC issued an Order setting the case for preliminary conference,
respondent filed a Motion to Resolve its Defenses on Forum Shopping and Lack of
Cause of Action. Records show that before the instant case was filed, the City of
Roxas had already filed a case against petitioners for Surrender of Withheld
Duplicate Certificate Under Section 107, P.D. No. 1529 docketed as Special Case
No. SPL-020-03 with the RTC of Roxas City. Subsequently, petitioners filed their
Opposition to the said Motion. MTCC ruled in favor of the defendant. RTC affirmed.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Review. However, the CA also
affirmed.
Issue: W/N there exists an unlawful detainer in this case.
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 2
Ruling: NONE. Petitioners alleged in their Complaint before the MTCC, among
others, that: (1) sometime in 1991, without their consent and authority, respondent
took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same and
used it for commercial purposes; and (2) they allowed the respondent for several
years, to make use of the land without any contractual or legal basis. Petitioners thus
conclude that respondents possession of subject property is only by tolerance. Such
allegations constitute judicial admissions.
A judicial admission is one so made in pleadings filed or in the progress of a trial as to
dispense with the introduction of evidence otherwise necessary to dispense with
some rules of practice necessary to be observed and complied with.
Correspondingly, facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admissions of the
plaintiff and binding upon him. The allegations, statements or admissions contained
in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. In this case, petitioners judicially
admitted that respondents took control and possession of subject property without
their consent and authority and that respondents use of the land was without any
contractual or legal basis.
Taken in its entirety, the allegations in the Complaint establish a cause of action for
forcible entry, and not for unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, one is deprived of
physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth. Where the defendants possession of the property is illegal ab
initio, the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) is the remedy to recover
possession.
In their Complaint, petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession and
control of the subject property without any contractual or legal basis. Assuming that
these allegations are true, it hence follows that respondents possession was illegal
from the very beginning. Therefore, the foundation of petitioners complaint is one for
forcible entry that is the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who
has entered without right. Thus, and as correctly found by the CA, there can be no
tolerance as petitioners alleged that respondents possession was illegal at the
inception.
Therefore, Petitioners should have filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry within
the reglementary one-year period from the time of dispossession. However,
considering that the action for forcible entry must be filed within one year from the
time of dispossession (1991), the action for forcible entry has already prescribed
when petitioners filed their Complaint in 2003. As a consequence, the Complaint
failed to state a valid cause of action against the respondent.
(3) LAURORA v. STERLING TECHNOPARK
Facts: In a Complaint for Forcible Entry with Damages filed on 27 September
1997 before the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona and Gen.
Mariano Alvarez, plaintiffs therein, x x x Pedro Laurora and Leonora Laurora
alleged that they were the owners of Lot 1315-G, SWD-40763 of the
Yaptinchay Estate with an area of 39,771 sq. meters and located in
Carmona, Cavite. Pedro Laurora planted trees and has possessed the land
up to the present. On 15 September 1997, [respondents] Sterling
Technopark III and S.P. Properties, Inc. x x x through their Engr. Bernie
Gatchalian bulldozed and uprooted the trees and plants, and with the use of
armed men and by means of threats and intimidation, succeeded in forcibly
ejecting [petitioners]. As a result of their dispossession, petitioners suffered
actual damages in the amount of P3,000,000.00 and P10,000.00 as
attorneys fees.
In their Answer to the Complaint, respondents averred that petitioners were
not the owners of the land because they disposed of it sometime in 1976 as
shown by legal documents. On 02 April 1969, the Land Authority issued an
order of award in favor of [petitioners], approving the application of Pedro
Laurora to buy the subject Lot 1315-G from the government. On 01 March
1974, petitioners requested the Department of Agrarian Reform for the
transfer of the lot to Juan Manaig. Favorably acted upon, the DAR issued a
permit to transfer dated 03 June 1975 through its Regional Director
Benjamin R. Estrellado. On 03 July 1975, Juan Manaig, as transferee and
buyer, paid the required amount of P10,643.65 under Official Receipt No.
8304707 to the government as full payment for the transfer of said lot to him.
On 26 March 1976, the petitioners as sellers and witnessed by their sons,
Efren Laurora and Dominador Laurora, executed a Kasulatan ng Paglilipatan
ng Lupa transferring the land to Juan Manaig as buyer. On 11 June 1976,
the petitioners again witnessed by their sons, Efren and Dominador,
executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan or Deed of Sale wherein they sold
Lot 1315-G including all improvements therein, in favor of Juan Manaig. The
Deed of Absolute Sale was approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform
on 14 June 1976 in DAR Approval of Transfer of Rights signed by DAR
Regional Director, Benjamin R. Estrellado. After the approval of the sale
from the petitioners to Juan Manaig, the latter paid its real estate taxes. The
tax declarations of the land in the name of its previous owners, Yaptinchays,
were cancelled and transferred in the name of petitioner Pedro Laurora as
owner-transferee. Thereupon, the heirs of the late JUAN MANAIG sold the
land to Golden Mile Resources Development Corporation which likewise
sold it to respondent S. P. Properties, Inc.
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 3
After summary proceedings in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, a judgment
was rendered dismissing the complaint. The case was elevated to the
Regional Trial Court and rendered a decision reversing the MCTC judgment.
The CA reversed the RTC and reinstated the Order of dismissal issued by
the MCTC. It held that there was no evidence to support the claim of
petitioners to the prior physical possession of the property. The evidence
allegedly showed that they had already sold the land with the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Accordingly, their subsequent entry
into and possession of the land constituted plain usurpation, which could not
be the source of any right to occupy it. Being planters in bad faith, they had
no right to be reimbursed for improvements on the land, in accordance with
Article 449 of the New Civil Code.
Issue: W/N respondents have a valid and legal right to forcibly eject
petitioners from the premises despite their resistance and objection, through
the use of armed men and by bulldozing, cutting, and destroying trees and
plants planted by petitioners, without court order, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter.
Ruling: NONE. The only issue in forcible entry cases is the physical or
material possession of real property -- possession de facto, not possession
de jure. Only prior physical possession, not title, is the issue. If ownership is
raised in the pleadings, the court may pass upon such question, but only to
determine the question of possession. The ownership claim of respondents
upon the land is based on the evidence they presented. Their evidence,
however, did not squarely address the issue of prior possession. Even if they
succeed in proving that they are the owners of the land, the fact remains that
they have not alleged or proved that they physically possess it by virtue of
such ownership. On the other hand, petitioners prior possession of the land
was not disputed by the CA, which merely described it as usurpation.
We stress that the issue of ownership in ejectment cases is to be resolved
only when it is intimately intertwined with the issue of possession, to such
an extent that the question of who had prior possession cannot be
determined without ruling on the question of who the owner of the land is. No
such intertwinement has been shown in the case before us. Since
respondents claim of ownership is not being made in order to prove prior
possession, the ejectment court cannot intrude or dwell upon the issue of
ownership.
Notwithstanding the actual condition of the title to the property, a person in
possession cannot be ejected by force, violence or terror -- not even by the
owners. If such illegal manner of ejectment is employed, as it was in the
present case, the party who proves prior possession -- in this case,
petitioners -- can recover possession even from the owners themselves.
Granting arguendo that petitioners illegally entered into and occupied the
property in question, respondents had no right to take the law into their own
hands and summarily or forcibly eject the occupants therefrom.
Verily, even if petitioners were mere usurpers of the land owned by
respondents, still they are entitled to remain on it until they are lawfully
ejected therefrom. Under appropriate circumstances, respondents may file,
other than an ejectment suit, an accion publiciana -- a plenary action
intended to recover the better right to possess; or an accion reivindicatoria --
an action to recover ownership of real property. The availment of the
aforementioned remedies is the legal alternative to prevent breaches of
peace and criminal disorder resulting from the use of force by claimants out
to gain possession. The rule of law does not allow the mighty and the
privileged to take the law into their own hands to enforce their alleged rights.
They should go to court and seek judicial vindication.
(4) DIU v. IBAJAN
Facts: On 12 July 1996, the spouses Carmelito Ibajan and Finna Josep-
Ibajan, joined by Dominador and Demetria Ibajan, filed against William Diu
and the Register of Deeds of Naval, Biliran, an action for the annulment of
certain deeds of sale with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The
case, docketed Civil Case No. B-0952, was raffled to Branch 16 of the RTC
of Naval, Biliran. Carmelito Ibajan and Finna Josep-Ibajan claimed to be the
owners of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 21540 while Dominador
and Demetria Ibajan, upon the other hand, asserted to be the owners of the
building, partly commercial and partly residential, erected thereon. The
plaintiffs averred that defendant Diu had caused Carmelito Ibajan to sign a
document, supposed to be a deed of real estate mortgage covering the
aforesaid lot but which turned out to be a deed of absolute sale. Diu, it was
also alleged, had caused the execution of a deed of absolute sale over the
residential and commercial building by forging the signature of Dominador
Ibajan.
Shortly following the filing of Civil Case No. B-0952, William and Jean Jane
Diu commenced, in a complaint, an action for forcible entry with damages
before the MTC of Naval, Biliran, docketed Civil Case No. 460, against
Dominador Ibajan, Demetria Ibajan, Nelson C. Sy, Vicente Realino II and
Romeo Alvero. The plaintiffs in the ejectment suit alleged that the spouses
Ibajan, aided by the other defendants who falsely represented themselves to
be agents of the NBI, unlawfully entered his property (the parcel of land
involved in Civil Case No. B-0952), took possession thereof and ejected their
employees therefrom. In a decision, Judge Aniceto A. Lirios ruled in favor of
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 4
plaintiffs and against the defendants and ordered said defendants to vacate
the premises and pay the damages.
Judge Lirios then caused the elevation of the records of the case to the RTC
of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16. In his "Order and Resolution," Judge Aguilos
directed the consolidation of Civil Case No. B-0952 and Civil Case No. B-
0984 (the new docket number of Civil Case No. 460 on appeal). He ruled:
this Court hereby modifies the decision and judgment of the MTC of Naval,
Biliran, Civil Case No. 984 (MTC CC No. 460) for Forcible Entry with
Damages, and presently on Appeal with this Court, and hereby adjudges,
declares and deems aforesaid Civil Case No. 984, for Forcible Entry with
Damages, appealed to this Court by Defendants versus Plaintiff-Spouses
Diu, thereby, and thereafter, lawfully joined, consolidated, intercalated, and
declared, and adjudicated as one (1) sole, single civil action for purposes of
its eventual decision, resolution, and disposal, after a full blown hearing with
Plaintiff-Appellees and Defendants-Appellants presenting and offering their
respective evidences for the Court's final consideration, decision and/or
resolution.
Both parties in Civil Case No. B-0984 moved for the reconsideration of the
"Order and Resolution." Thereafter, Judge Aguilos issued another order
dismissing Civil Case No. B-0984, thus: "The Court finds merit in both
motions for reconsideration. This Court acting as an appellate Court in the
Forcible Entry Case No. B-0984 is precluded by law to try anew the
appealed case. "Of necessity this Court therefore had to meticulously peruse
the entire record of this case. It noted that both plaintiffs and defendants in
their verification and certification on forum shopping did allege that there is
no pending similar action pending in any other court or agency of the
government. This of course is not true in the case of the Spouses Diu for
said spouses are the defendants in Civil Case No. B-0952 for Annulment of
Deeds of Sale presided by the undersigned, and therefore, not only taken
judicial notice of the matter. In fact it is clearly stated in its questioned order
that this annulment case was filed much earlier, on June 11, 1996, while the
Forcible Entry Case was filed much later, on February 10, 1997 in the MTC
of Naval, Biliran. Both cases raise the issue of possession and ownership. It
is of course fundamental that the issue of the possession in Forcible Entry is
only de facto, unlike that in ownership cases which is de jure. Nonetheless
the law allows the MTC to resolve the issue of ownership.
"RA 7691 Section (2) "'Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of Forcible
Entry and unlawful detainer; Provided, that when in such cases, the
defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question
of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession. "In the present case, this is quite improbable, as the issues of
ownership and possession are Intertwined and inseperably linked. In that
case of 'De Luzuriaga Jr. vs. Adila, the Supreme Court sustained the order
of the Court of First Instance enjoining the MTC from continuing a Forcible
Entry Case where there was another case for 'Quieting of Title.' Chief
Justice Teehankee concurred and adhered to the view that the CFI had
equal if not superior jurisdiction to resolve identical issues as to who was
entitled to possession and to issue a preliminary mandatory injunction if a
strong right is established.
"Similarly in the present case, Civil Case No. B-0952 filed eight (8) months
earlier that the Forcible Entry Case B-0984, is still pending. The parties
should have brought this fact to the attention of the Municipal Trial Judge to
obviate or preclude the possibility of making two (2) courts decide on the
same issues. That is exactly the very situation that is obtaining now. This
Court is saddled with two (2) cases involving ownership and possession.
The same documents are relied upon by both parties in the two (2) cases;
the same source of their alleged rights and interests.
"The subject property in this case is Lot No. 84 of the Naval Cadastre
covered by Tax Decl. 00581 and the house standing thereon covered by Tax
Decl. 00583, Annex 'A' and 'B' respectively, in the name of plaintiff William
Diu. Defendant spouses Dominador Ibajan and Demetria Ibajan claimed to
have bought the same Lot 84 of the Naval Cadastre which they caused to be
registered in the name of their son Carmelito Ibajan and wife Finna G. Josep
under TCT T - 21540, Annex 'A'. Thereafter they constructed a 2-storey
building in the name of Dominador Ibajan under a property Field Appraisal,
Annex 'B', and Tax Decl. No. 5365-annex 'C', both in the name of Dominador
Ibajan and which they occupied and possessed since 1985.
"A series of events and transactions transpired over the land and the
building thereon involving millions. The undersigned as Presiding Judge of
RTC Branch 16, recalls the petition for the issuance of a second owner's
copy of the transfer certificate of title to the land in question pursued by the
plaintiff-appellee William Diu by virtue of a power of attorney from Carmelito
Ibajan. All these transactions are now the subject of the annulment case
pending before this Court which can decide the issue of possession only
after the trial involving the issue of ownership. Until then this court is thus
hard put to say who was or who is entitled to possession for which reason
this Court correspondingly orders the DISMISSAL of this appealed Forcible
Entry Case, leaving only the Annulment of Deeds of Sale Case, still pending
for the final determination of the primary issues of possession and
ownership."
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 5
Issue: W/N the dismissal of civil case no. B-0984 for forcible entry on appeal
by the RTC is not in accord with but a drastic deviation from the law and
well-known rules as well as the applicable decisions of this honorable court.
Ruling: Yes. It has repeatedly been held that in ejectment cases, the sole
question for resolution is the physical or material possession (possession de
facto) of the property in question and neither a claim of juridical possession
(possession de jure) nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can
outrightly deprive the court from taking due cognizance of the case.
Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership, and the
plaintiff merely needs to prove prior possession de facto and an undue
deprivation thereof. The pendency of an action questioning the ownership of
property will not divest the city or municipal trial court of its jurisdiction over
the ejectment case and neither will it bar the execution of a judgment
thereon.
In Dizon vs. Court of Appeals where the RTC acting as an appellate court in
an ejectment case made a definite ruling on the issue of ownership, this
Court elaborated: Well-settled is the rule that in an ejectment suit, the only
issue is possession de facto or physical or material possession and not
possession de jure. So that, even if the question of ownership is raised in the
pleadings, as in this case, the court may pass upon such issue but only to
determine the question of possession (Sec. 33(2), B.P. 129 as amended by
RA 7691 provides that 'MTCs shall exercise: Exclusive original jurisdiction
over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when in
such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the ownership shall be resolved only to determine the
issue of possession.' Paragraph 10 of the Interim Rules likewise provides
that 'Metropolitan Trial Courts, x x x without distinction, may try cases of
forcible entry and detainer even if the question of ownership is raised in the
pleadings and the question of possession could not be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, but the question of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession.) especially if the former
is inseparably linked with the latter. It cannot dispose with finality the issue of
ownership - such issue being inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light
on the question of possession. This is why the issue of ownership or title is
generally immaterial and foreign to an ejectment suit.
Verily, the RTC erred in dismissing the forcible entry case on appeal on the
ground that it can only decide the issue of possession after the issue of
ownership would have been resolved elsewhere. The Court likewise agrees
with petitioners that the RTC erred in its appreciation of forum shopping. The
Court has said that there is forum-shopping "when, as a result of an adverse
opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by
appeal or certiorari) in another" or when he repetitively avails himself of
"several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively,
all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential
facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either
pending in, or already resolved adversely by, some other court." In the case
at bar, the two cases, one for the annulment of deeds of sale and the other
for ejectment although concerning the same property, are distinct litigations,
neither involving exactly the same parties nor identical issues.
(5) LABASTIDA v. CA
Facts: Plaintiffs [private respondents Jose C. Deleste. Sr., Jose L. Deleste.
Jr., Raul L. Deleste and Ruben L. Deleste] are the owners of a parcel of land
identified as Lot 226 of Iligan Cadastre survey and covered by TCT No. T-
22148 located at Sabayle Street, Poblacion, Iligan City. A portion of said lot
was leased to defendants [herein petitioners Nonito Labastida and
Constancia Labastida] for the sum of P200.00 as monthly rental.
On December 6, 1983, plaintiffs filed a case against defendants
denominated as one for recovery of possession and damages with
preliminary mandatory injunction (pp. 1-4, records). The complaint alleged,
among others, that in the latter part of 1979 plaintiffs served notice to the
occupants-lessees on their land, including defendants, to vacate the
property because the owners would erect a commercial building thereon;
that defendants, instead of heeding the request, repaired their (defendants')
building, put additional constructions on the lot, partitioned the first storey of
the building and converted the same into 4 stores or business spaces and
subleased the same to other persons without the knowledge and consent of
the plaintiffs; that on October 24, 1980 or after other previous notices,
plaintiffs sent a written demand to defendants to vacate the land but the
latter refused; that "again, on February 20, 1983 plaintiffs made and sent
another written notice to defendants to vacate" but to no avail; and that
plaintiffs suffered actual damage in the amount of P40,000.00 which was the
increase of construction materials and labor costs since 1979 and moral
damages in the amount of P100,000.00.
Plaintiffs prayed that defendants be ordered, inter alia, to remove their
building, makeshift structures and fence, vacate the premises and pay
defendants. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on two
grounds, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of
one of the defendants and over the nature or subject matter of the action
and (b) pendency of an ejectment case filed by the plaintiffs against the
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 6
same defendants in the municipal court of Iligan City involving the same
property. The motion to dismiss was denied by the lower court, ruling that
the complaint was filed after one year from the date of demand. The trial
court also said that it was the manifestation of defendants counsel in open
court that summons was in fact served on Constancia Labastida. On the
issue of lis pendens, it was brought out that the ejectment case was
dismissed on December 2, 1983 or before the complaint in Civil Case No.
186 was filed.
In their answer, defendants alleged that no verbal or written demand to
vacate was made by the plaintiffs in 1979 or in 1980 and that "if ever there
was any demand it was on February 20, 1983." They alleged that they were
personally operating the small sari-sari store, carinderia and snack center
whose capitalization did not exceed P5,000.00. They insisted that the house
was residential and denied that they expanded the area of their occupancy
by building additional structures, make-shifts or fence thereon. As affirmative
defense, defendants reiterated their defense of lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court, insisting that the case should have been filed before the municipal
court. Petitioners also claimed before the trial court that the case was
covered by the Rent Control Law (B.P. Blg. 25) and the Urban Land Reform
Act (P.D. No. 1517) and therefore private respondents did not have a cause
of action against them.
The trial court gave judgment for the private respondents based on the
findings.. . . that the contract of lease was on a month-to-month basis which
gave the plaintiffs the right to eject the defendants after the expiration of
each month; that the demands to vacate had been made more than a year
before the filing of the complain; that [in violation of the provisions of B.P.
Blg. 25] defendants had subleased portions of the premises for business
purposes: that even assuming that the beauty parlor, carinderia and snack
center in the premises were operated by defendants themselves, the total
capitalization thereof was more than P6,000.00; that defendants failed to pay
the monthly rentals starting March, 1981.
Petitioners appealed to the CA which, as already stated, affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
Issue: W/N the action is for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) or for
ejectment (desahucio) and whether it was brought within one year.
Ruling: It is for ejectment. First. Although entitled "For Recovery of
Possession, Damages, with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction," it is evident
from the allegations of the complaint filed by private respondents that the
case was actually for unlawful detainer.
In their complaint, private respondents alleged that they were the registered
owners of the lot subject of the case and thus entitled to possession thereof:
that petitioners were their lessees, paying rent on a month-to-month basis;
and that despite repeated demands to vacate the land made by private
respondents, petitioners refused to leave the premises. This amounts to an
allegation that petitioners were unlawfully withholding possession of the
land. A lease on a month-to-month basis is deemed to expire at the end of
the month upon notice to vacate addressed by the lessor to the lessee. The
refusal of the lessee to leave the premises gives rise to an action for
unlawful detainer. Private respondents' action is not recovery of possession.
It is not for a determination which party has a better right of possession. Both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found the action to be for
ejectment.
Second. As the action below was for unlawful detainer, the question is
whether it was brought within one year after the unlawful withholdings of
possession 8 so as to sustain petitioners' contention that the action should
have been filed before the Municipal Trial Court rather than in the Regional
Trial Court. In the case several demands to vacate are made, the period is
reckoned from the date of the last demand. 9 In this case, several demands
to vacate were alleged to have been made by private respondents, the last
of which was dated February 20, 1983. As the complaint was filed on
December 3, 1983, that is, within one year from February 20, 1983, it is clear
that the case should have been brought in the MTC.
The RTC would have jurisdiction if the deprivation of possession had been
committed through other means than those enumerated in Rule 70, or if the
period of dispossession under Rule 70 has lasted for more than a year. The
complaint attached to the records of this case shows on its face that it was
received by the Regional Trial Court of Iligan on "Date: 12-6-83." Clearly, the
case was filed within one year from February 20, 1983, the date of the last
demand to vacate addressed to petitioners. Private respondents do not deny
this. What they assert, however, is that the one-year period should be
reckoned from the time oral demands was made by them on petitioners in
1979. This is error. As we have already stated, where there are several
demands made, the period of unlawful withholding starts to run from the date
of the last demand on the theory that if the lessor brings no action shortly
after the demand, it may be because he has agreed to the renewal of the
lease.
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 7
Third. The CA held petitioner estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the trial court on the ground that in the beginning they denied having
received the notice to vacate sent to them dated February 20, 1983 and it
was only in their answer later filed that they said that "if ever there was any
demand it was on February 20, 1983" for the purpose of arguing that the
case should have been filed in the MTC. But if private respondents are to be
bound by any representation that no demand had ever been served on
them, then, as provided by Rule 70, §2, all the more no action can be
brought against them.
Pursuant to the said provision, no action could be brought against petitioners
for alleged violation of the terms and conditions of their lease agreement
unless a notice to vacate is given to the lessee. On the other hand, if as the
appellate court held, the action for unlawful detainer is based on the
expiration of the lease, no notice is required. Any notice given only serves to
negate any inference that the lessor has agreed to extend the period of the
lease. Such a notice is needed only when the action is due to the lessee's
failure to pay rent or to comply with the conditions of the lease.
(6) GUANZON v. BAN
FACTS: Epifiana Vda. de Guanzon and defendant Tan Kue entered into a
written contract of lease of the former's property located at Nos. 1008 and
1010 Lavezares, Binondo, Manila effective March 15, 1941, up to March 15,
1946. Tan Kue abandoned the property in December, 1944, because he
evacuated with his family to Batangas, failing to pay the monthly rentals from
January, 1945.
- Finding defendants Ang Ban and Ang Chung occupying without any legal
ground at all, the premises abandoned by defendant Tan Kue, original
complaint was filed on April 1945 for the ejectment of these defendants. By
amendments in the pleadings, Tan Kue was later included among the
defendants.
- Tan Kue, however, testified that upon his return to Manila in March 1945,
he resided with his family in Manila and that he failed to offer plaintiff the
rents in arrears because he was very busy.
- Horacio A. Guanzon testified that Ang Ban and Ang Chung transferred to
the premises in question because their house was burnt; that he required
them to move out of the premises; that on May 4, 1945, Tan Kue asked him
for another lease upon the premises, with the promise to sue Ang Ban and
Ang Chung, but Tan Kue did not offer payment of the rents due for the first
months of 1945.
- Ang Ban alleged that he was left in the premises by Tan Kue to take care
of the latter's belongings, and that Ang Chung is a mere host from the
province.
RTC: Declared that the contract between Vda. de Guanzon and Tan Kue
was deemed terminated and it ordered defendants to move out of the
premises and to pay jointly and severally the sum of P130 per month from
January, 1945, until the property is vacated, and the costs.
- Defendants point out two errors allegedly committed by the lower court: (1)
that it did not dismiss the complaint notwithstanding plaintiff's failure to serve
the notice required by Section 2 of Rue 72 (now, Rule 70) of the Rules of
Court; and (2) that it did not declare that Tan Kue's failure to pay the rents
was due to force majeure.
ISSUE: Whether or not notice to Tan Kue is indispensable in this case. (Di
ko magets kasong to, ang gulo, 1949 pa kasi)
HELD: NO. Defendant Tan Kue cannot invoke it because he was and is not
sued for ejectment. In the amended complaint of May 21, 1945, he was sued
only for a sum of money, consisting of unpaid rents, liquidated damages,
attorney's fees, and costs. Other defendants cannot as well invoke it for they
are not tenants of the plaintiff, but are mere intruders.
- Whether Tan Kue's failure to pay the rents was due to force majeure or not
is immaterial for purposes of determining his obligation of paying the rents
due at the time is irrelevant to the question of whether he is duty bound to
pay said rents. That obligation is not denied by any one. If there was any
reason or justification for delay in payment of said rents before, now there is
none any more. It appearing from defendants' own evidence that Tan Kue
had something to do for his co-defendants' unjustifiably occupying the
premises, he is equally responsible for the rents until Ang Ban and Ang
Chung shall have completely vacated the property.
- Rents due up to March 10, 1945, subject to moratorium (Executive Order
No. 32 and Presidential Proclamation No. 6), the lower court's decision is
affirmed with the sole modification that it is necessary to order the ejectment
of defendant Tan Kue, it appearing that he has already ceased to occupy the
premises since December, 1944, and his lease contract having been
terminated in accordance with the facts of this case and the terms of the
contract itself, with the costs against the appellants.
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 8
(7) DAKUDAO v. CONSOLACION
FACTS: Plaintiffs are co-owners of a parcel of land identified as Lot 202-F-
13 embraced on Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-34254 of the Registry of
Deeds of Davao City. On this land stands the house of defendant Francisco
Ang Singco who had a verbal lease contract with herein plaintiffs. The
monthly agreed rental is P25.00.
- On July of 1977, without the knowledge and consent of plaintiffs, defendant
Ang Singco sold his house to his co defendants, the Laurecios. When
plaintiff Marietta Dakudao visited the premises in question, she was told of
the transaction that transpired between Ang Singco and the Laurecios.
- Ang Singco left the premises in July or August of 1977 knowing that he was
in arrears in his rentals for one year and seven months. Since the house is
at present occupied by the Laurecios, plaintiffs through Marietta Dakudao
demanded that they vacate the premises and for the payment of the use and
occupation of the same at P100.00 a month.
- The Laurecios were willing to pay P50.00 a month and for failure to reach
an agreement for the rental of the premises, plaintiffs filed this suit. Having
received an adverse judgment, applicants elevated the same with the
assignment of errors.
City Court of Davao: Dismissed the case for unlawful detainer against the
Laurecios. With respect to defendant Ang Singco, the Court ruled that the
action against him was converted into a simple one for collection of back
rentals since he was no longer in possession of the land leased to him.
As regards the respondents Federico and Carmen Laurecio: There has
never been a contract of lease, expressed or implied, between the plaintiff
and the defendant Laurecios as regards that portion of land occupied by the
house sold to them by the original lessee, Francisco Ang Singco. The
defendants Laurecios cannot be considered as the lawful successor-in-
interest of the original lessee of the land occupied by the house sold. (Art.
1649 Civil Code);
- That the demand of the plaintiffs upon the defendant Laurecios was to
vacate the premises occupied by the house they purchased from the
defendant Ang Singco and to pay the reasonable compensation for the use
of said premises, not back rentals. Due to adverse judgment, the petitioners
elevated the case to the Court of First Instance of Davao
CFI: Does not agree with the foregoing findings. When defendant Ang
Singco sold his house to his co-defendants without the consent and
knowledge of herein plaintiffs, there was stealth employed and this allegation
is incorporated in the pleadings as well as in the trial of this case. However,
an implied contract of lease was created when plaintiffs demanded of the
Laurecios to pay rental over the parcel of land as compensation for the
occupation thereof hence an unlawful detainer case can be filed against the
Laurecios.
- The respondents filed an MR stating that the evidence is insufficient to
justify the decision of the CFI and that such is against law or jurisprudence.
CFI then, reconsidered and set aside its decision and affirmed that of the
City Court’s. That, the fact of lease and the expiration of its terms are the
essential elements of an unlawful detainer case. Since no contract had been
executed, either express or implied, an action for unlawful detainer will not
lie against the Laurecios.
- The petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the amended ruling.
However, the CFI denied the motion for reconsideration.
Plaintiffs’ contentions:
(a) Although there is no contract express or implied, between plaintiffs and
defendants Laurecios, an action for unlawful detainer nevertheless lies
against said respondents.
(b) That respondents Laurecios who occupy the land of petitioners at the
latter’s tolerance, without any contract between them are necessarily bound
by an implied promise that they will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for a unlawful detainer is the proper remedy against them.
(c) That even assuming for the sake of argument that an action for unlawful
detainer will not lie against respondents Laurecios, petitioners have
nevertheless alleged and proven strategy and stealth on the part of said
respondents regarding their entry into, and occupation of, the leased
premises sufficient to make out an action for forcible entry against them.
- City Court of Davao City admitted that the plaintiffs had a right to recover
possession of the land involved in the litigation but "unfortunately" for them
their cause of action did not fit within an unlawful detainer case. Neither
could it be a forcible entry case, according to the judge, because the
plaintiffs failed to allege in the pleadings or prove with evidence the fact that
the defendants occupied the land through stealth and strategy.
Respondents’ contentions:
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 9
(a) They are not unlawfully withholding possession from the petitioners after
the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any
contract because there never was any contract express or implied between
them and the petitioners.
(b) That they cannot be considered privies or successors-in-interest of the
former lessee, Francisco Ang Singco, because Article 1649 of the Civil Code
provides that "the lessees cannot assign the lease without the consent of the
lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary."
- The respondents fail to state by what right they are occupying the land. If
they have no contract, express or implied, with the owners and they have no
claim as successors-in-interest of the former lessee, they become mere
usurpers or squatters through their own admission. Article 1649 of the Civil
Code is intended to protect the owner of the leased property.
- The defendants averred that the Laurecios and the petitioners agreed to
maintain the P25.00 monthly rentals at the time of the sale in July, 1977 but
a year later, the lot owners suddenly raised the rent to P50.00 monthly and
that "if defendants Laurecio have failed to pay their rental, the same is due to
plaintiffs’ unreasonable and malicious refusal to receive the payments."
- The City Court found the following facts: That, plaintiffs have never
consented or ratified the sale of the house in question by the defendant Ang
Singco to the Laurecios. There has never been any definite agreement
between the plaintiff and the Laurecios as to the amount of rentals the latter
were going to pay. In fact the Laurecios have not paid any amount by way of
rentals to the plaintiff except that which they deposited in Court during the
pendency of this case on February 2, 1979 in the amount of P450.00 for the
period from August, 1977 to January, 1979.
ISSUE: Whether the unlawful detainer case is proper.
HELD: YES. Since there was no contract between the lot owners and the
Laurecios, the latter’s occupation of the land is only as successors of Ang
Singco from whom they purchased the house built on the lot. If Article 1649
had been followed and the consent of the owners to the sale secured, the
Laurecios would be more than mere successors-in-interest. They would
have become the new lessees. The unlawful detainer case was proper.
- If we view the failure of the petitioners to file an ejectment case from
February, 1978 when they first learned of the respondents presence on their
land up to June 1, 1978 when the letter demanding that they vacate the lot
was sent, as tolerance or permission by the owners, the unlawful detainer
case is still proper.
- We held in the case of Vda. de Cachuela v. Francisco (98 SCRA 172)
citing the case of Calubayan v. Pascual (21 SCRA 146, 148) that a person
who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
- As far as the petitioners are concerned, it may rightly be said that any
supposed tolerance of the occupation by the respondents Laurecios was
from February, 1978, when they first discovered the respondents to be in
possession of the premises. To petitioners, this was the start of the
respondent Laurecios’ occupation since the latter’s actual entry into the
premises in July or August, 1977 had been concealed from the petitioners.
- The private respondents are ordered to vacate the disputed premises.
Respondents Laurecio are ordered to pay the amount of Fifty Pesos
(P50.00) a month as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
the premises beginning August, 1977 until they finally vacate the premises.
(8) ARCAL v. CA
FACTS: Petitioner as plaintiffs filed on August 31, 1995 a complaint for
unlawful detainer against private respondents as defendants. Subject of the
complaint was a 21,435 square meter parcel of land designated as Lot No.
780 of Santa Cruz de Malabon Estate Subdivision, Cavite and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26277 in the names of Maria, Josefina,
Marciana and Marcelina Arcal.
- The complaint alleged, among others: Defendants herein occupied the
subject parcel of land described above thru plaintiffs implied tolerance, or
permission but without contract with herein plaintiffs. From the dates of their
occupancy, plaintiffs did not collect any single centavo from defendants, nor
the latter pay to plaintiffs any rental for their occupancy therein;
- On June 18, 1984, plaintiffs herein, except Virgilio Arcal, filed an ejectment
suit against substantially all of defendants herein with the Municipal Trial
Court of Tanza, Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 285 covering the subject
parcel of land in dispute;
- Meanwhile, on September 18, 1984, Lucio Arvisu the alleged son of
Gaudencio Arvisu and Natalia Ricafrente Arvisu, and substantially all
defendants herein filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Trece
Martires, Cavite, a civil case for Annulment of Title, with Reconveyance and
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 10
Damages against Salud Arcal Arbolante, Marcelina Arcal (deseased), Maria
Arcal, Josefina Arcal and Marciana Arcal.
- Defendants therein, plaintiffs herein, filed their Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim. On May 28, [1985], the said complaint was ordered to be
dismissed by the trial court for failure to prosecute.
- Dissatisfied therefrom, on March 10, 1987, Lucio Ricafrente Arvisu, one of
the plaintiffs in the immediately cited Civil Case No. TM-59, filed another
case for Registration of Claim Under Section 8, RA26, entitled Lucio R.
Arvisu vs. Marcelina Arcal (deseased), Maria Arcal, Josefina Arcal, Marciana
Arcal and the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City, before the Regional
Trial Court of Branch 23, Trece Martires City. Private respondent therein
filed a Motion to Dismiss basically on the ground of lack of cause of action
and res adjudicata. In the Order of the trial court dated July 22, 1988, the
complaint filed by Lucio Arvisu was dismissed though he thereafter filed an
appeal with the Court of Appeals.
- With regard to the ejectment suit filed by plaintiffs herein, except Virgilio
Arcal, with the Municipal Trial Court of Tanza, Cavite, the said court
rendered a favorable judgment in favor of plaintiffs ordering defendants
therein among others, to vacate the property in question and remove
residential houses and improvements introduced therein and return the
possession thereof to plaintiffs.
- Unfortunately on appeal with the RTC, Branch 23, Trece Martires City, by
defendants therein, the foregoing decision was reversed and set aside, and
the said complaint for ejectment was dismissed without prejudice to the filing
of the proper action after the prejudicial question in Civil Case No. TM-146 is
resolved in a fair and adversary proceeding. Said decision attained finality
for failure of plaintiffs former counsel to interpose an appeal.
- Several demands were made by plaintiffs for defendants to vacate the
premises in question, the last written demand was made by plaintiffs lawyer
on July 23, 1995, but they proved futile as they refused and failed, and still
refuse and fail to vacate the premises, to the damage and prejudice of
plaintiffs.
- Private respondents failed to file their answer within the reglementary
period, prompting petitioners to file a motion to render judgment.
MTC: That petitioners are registered owners of the property and as much
they have the right to enjoy possession thereof. Ordered all the defendants
to vacate the property they are occupying and remove their houses and
improvements thereon.
RTC: Affirmed in toto MTC’s decision.
- Private respondents filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals,
arguing inter alia that the respondent trial court erred in not dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction, the complaint being one for recovery of right of
possession. äläwvirtualibräry
CA: Ruled in favor of private respondents, granted the petition, reserved and
set aside the decision of trial court and dismissed Civil Case No. 370.
- In commencing this suit for unlawful detainer private respondents are
banking in their allegation that they merely tolerated petitioners to stay on
the premises in question, but which tolerance they already withdrew on July
23, 1995. However, the other allegations and admissions of private
respondents in their complaint would show that the case is not one of
unlawful detainer as petitioners did not actually occupy the subject property
upon the tolerance of private Respondents.
First. Herein private respondents, as plaintiffs, filed on June 18, 1984 an
ejectment suit against substantially all of herein petitioners, as defendants,
also before the MTC of Tanza and this was docketed as Civil Case No. 285.
In the case, it was the position of private respondents that for humanitarian
consideration they tolerated petitioners to construct their respective houses
on the subject premises sometime in 1974. However, this tolerance was
withdrawn sometime in 1984 when demands to vacate were made on
petitioners by private respondents before the commencement of Civil Case
No 285. Consequently, this present action for unlawful detainer based on the
same theory of tolerance has no leg to stand on as in fact the supposed
tolerance given by private respondents in 1974 was, as they themselves
admit, already withdrawn way back in 1984.
Second. The MTC of Tanza decided Civil Case No. 285 in favor of private
respondents. This decision was reversed however on appeal by the RTC of
Trece Martires, Branch 23. The RTCs decision then gained finality for failure
of private respondents to elevate the case to the property appellate court.
Without passing upon the propriety of the decision of both the NTC and RTC
in Civil Case No. 285, the admission by private respondents in that case that
they withdrew sometime in 1984 the tolerance they supposedly extended to
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 11
petitioners stands. That is, inasmuch as private respondents admit that they
already made a demand to vacate upon petitioners in 1984, they are bound
by this demand. And since they pursued this demand with the filing of Civil
Case No. 285, no tolerance can be spoken of in this present case. Thus, the
written demand to vacate of July 3, 1995 made by private respondents on
petitioners did not terminate any right of the latter to stay on the subject
premises supposedly founded on tolerance.
Third. As further alleged and admitted by private respondents in their
complaint, a certain Lucio R. Arvisu and substantially all of the petitioners
filed against them on September 18, 1984 an action for Annulment of Title,
with Reconveyance and Damages before the RTC of Trece Martires, Branch
23, docketed therein as Civil Case No. TM-59. Although that case was later
dismissed for failure to prosecute, there is no question that its institution
constituted an open challenge to the title of private respondents over the
premises in dispute. In effect, petitioners never really recognized private
respondents as owners thereof. With this position of petitioners which private
respondents became aware of with the filing of Civil Case No. TM-59, the
former can hardly be considered to have occupied the subject premises by
mere tolerance of the latter.
Fourth. On March 10, 1987, Lucio R. Arvisu again commenced a suit for
Registration of Claim Under Section 8, R.A. 26 also before the RTC of Trece
Martires City, Branch 23, docketed as Civil Case No. TM-146. Albeit
dismissed later, this case also served as an opposition to private
respondents title over the subject property. Thus, like Civil No. Tm-59, Civil
Case No. TM-146 also destroys private respondents theory of tolerated
possession.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the complaint filed before
the MTC of Cavite does not constitute an unlawful detainer suit and in
dismissing the same for lack of jurisdiction.
HELD: YES. The jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the action,
are determined by the averment in the complaint.
- To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or
deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint should embody
such statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases
for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary
in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court
jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.
- From a reading of the allegations of the complaint quoted above, we find
that the action is one for unlawful detainer. Petitioners alleged in their
complaint that they are the registered owners of the subject property. The
cases filed by certain Lucio Arvisu and several of the private respondents
casting doubt on petitioners ownership of the property, namely Civil Case
No. TM-59 for Annulment of Title, with Reconveyance and Damages and
Civil Case No. TM-146 for Registration of Claim Under Section 8, R.A No.
26, were resolved with finality adverse to private respondents.räry
- Petitioners also alleged in the complaint that the possession of the property
by private respondents was with petitioners tolerance, and that they
(petitioners) had served written demands upon private respondents, the
latest demand being on July 23, 1995, but that private respondents refused
to vacate the property.
- The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession
becomes unlawful upon demand to vacate made by the owner and the
possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such demand. A person who
occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without
any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that
he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is
the proper remedy against him. The status of the possessor is analogous to
that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose
occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such case , the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of
the demand to vacate.
- The filing of the first ejectments case, Civil Case No. 285, in the 1984
signified that petitioners sought the ouster of private respondents from
possession of the property. Because of the pendency of the cases involving
ownership, the proceedings in the first ejectment case were suspended.
Petitioner could not but await the outcome of these case and preserve the
status quo As the Court has stated:
- In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the purpose
of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in
case of controverted right, it requires the parties to preserve the status quo
until one or the other of them sees fit invoke the decision of the court of
competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just
that the person who has first acquired possession should remain in
possession pending this decision; and the parties cannot be permitted
meanwhile to engage in a petty warfare over the possession of the property
which is the subject of the dispute. To permit this would be highly dangerous
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 12
to individual security and disturbing to social order. Therefore, where a
person supposes himself to be owner of a piece of property and desires to
vindicate his ownership against the party actually in possession, it is
incumbent upon him to institute an action to this end in a court of competent
jurisdiction; and he cannot be permitted, by invading the property and
excluding the actual possessor, to place upon the latter the burden of
instituting an action to try the property right.23cräläwvirtualibräry
- An unlawful detainer suit involves solely the issue of physical or material
possession over the property or possession de facto, that is who between
the plaintiff and the defendant has a better right to possess the property in
question. Where, however, the issue is who has the better and the legal right
to possess or to whom possession de jure pertains, accion publiciana in
proper.28 In the case at bar, petitioners complaint for unlawful detainer was
confined to recovery of de facto or physical possession of the property and
was resorted to after private respondents has indubitably failed in their suit
assailing petitioners right to ownership.
Notably, inferior courts retain jurisdiction over ejectment cases even if the
defendant raises the question of the ownership and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding provisionally the issue of
ownership.29 A contrary rule would pave the way for the defendant to trifle
with the ejectment suit, which is summary in nature, as he could easily
defeat the same through the simple expedient of asserting ownership. 30
Also, the issue of ownership raised in a separate case, such as an accion
publiciana or an action for quieting of title,31 is not prejudicial to an ejectment
suit and does not abate the ejectment case.
In William Auto supply Corporation, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., the
Court, speaking through Chief Justice Narvasa, enumerated the cases which
should not be regarded as prejudicial to an ejectment suit:
1. Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in ejectment actions in
the municipal trial courts or other courts of the first level do not abate the
latter, and neither do proceedings on consignation of rentals.
2. An accion publiciana does not suspend an ejectment suit against the
plaintiff in the former.
3. A writ of possession case where ownership is concededly the principal
issue before the Regional Trial Court does not preclude nor bar the
execution of the judgment in an unlawful detainer suit where the only issue
involved is the material possession or possession de facto of the premises.
4. An action for quieting of title to the property is not a bar to an ejectment
suit involving the same property.
5. Suit for specific performance with damages do not affect ejectment
actions (e.g., to compel renewal of lease contract)
(9) REFORMINA v. ADIANO (RESOLUTION)
FACTS: Filed with this Court is the verified complaint of one Adela
Reformina against Dominador Adriano, Deputy Sheriff of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila charging the latter with grave abuse of authority.
- The instant complaint arose from Civil Case No. 85-30855, entitled
"Guillermo Uy, Jr. v. Tan Chong Hoo substituted by Adela Reformina" for
ejectment, which was decided in favor of the plaintiff. The decision was
affirmed in toto by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch VIII.
- On October 15, 1985, Judge Gonong issued an order granting a writ of
ejectment execution pending appeal; on the same date, October 15, 1985, a
writ of execution was issued by then Clerk of Court, Atty. Cesar P. Javier,
commanding the Deputy Sheriff of Branch 8, respondent Dominador
Adriano, to carry out the writ of execution;
-On the same day, October 15, 1985, at 4:20 p.m., the defendant through
counsel, filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, an urgent motion for
reconsideration and to stay execution, duly verified and scheduled for
hearing on October 31, 1985 at 8:30 a.m.;
- On October 16, 1985, early in the morning, without the aforementioned
motion for reconsideration being resolved by Judge Gonong, respondent
Deputy Sheriff Dominador Adriano assisted by three (3) hired helpers and
policemen of the Western Police, Chinatown Detachment, immediately
proceeded to the premises in question to carry out the writ of execution.
- At that time, even though he knew that the motion for reconsideration was
unresolved, and without giving the occupant a reasonable time to pack up
her personal belongings, respondent Deputy Sheriff carried out the
execution by moving out the personal belongings of the said occupant,
complainant Adela Reformina.
- At that time, complainant Adela Reformina was out and upon the latter’s
arrival, she informed the respondent sheriff that her lawyers were securing a
restraining order from the appellate court and requested respondent to stop
the eviction process. Respondent sheriff did not heed the request. At about
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 13
1:30 p.m. of October 16, 1985, a representative of complainant’s lawyer
requested the respondent sheriff to stop the execution because a restraining
order was already issued by the appellate court and was being typed, but
still, respondent sheriff did not oblige. At 3:00 p.m. of the said date, a
restraining order from the Intermediate Appellate Court was served on the
plaintiff. At that time, the respondent sheriff had turned over possession of
the premises to the plaintiff.
- Respondent Deputy Sheriff explained in his Comment dated November 26,
1985, that he enforced the writ of ejectment execution at the insistence of
the prevailing party’s lawyer because there was no contrary order issued by
Judge Gonong or any restraining order from the appellate court.
- It appears that respondent deputy sheriff acted precipitately in carrying out
immediately the writ of execution to restore possession of the premises to
the plaintiff. Respondent deputy sheriff acted with undue haste and enforced
the writ of execution on the same date he received it by taking out the
belongings of the complainant from the premises even though he knew that
there was a pending motion for reconsideration, and that the losing party
was seeking a restraining order from the appellate court. In fact, a
restraining order was issued by the afternoon of the same day.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of authority exercised by
Deputy Sheriff in enforcing the writ of ejectment.
HELD: YES. Under the Rules of Court, the immediate enforcement of a writ
of ejectment execution is carried out by giving the defendant notice of such
writ, and making a demand that defendant comply therewith within a
reasonable period, normally from three (3) to five (5) days, and it is only after
such period that the sheriff enforces the writ by the bodily removal of the
defendant and his personal belongings.
- In this case, the precipitate act of the respondent sheriff in carrying out the
writ of ejectment execution rendered the motion for reconsideration before
the trial court and the petition for review filed with the Intermediate Appellate
Court moot and academic. Indeed, a temporary restraining order was issued
by the appellate court enjoining the respondent deputy sheriff from
implementing the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 85-30855, until
further orders of the court.
CONTEMPT
(1) IN RE SOTTO
FACTS: This is a proceeding for contempt of our court against the
respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto, who was required by their Court to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt to court for having
issued a written statement in connection with the decision of this Court in In
re Angel Parazo for contempt of court, which statement, as published in the
Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality, reads as follows:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.)
interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo,
reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days
imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a news
published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not
only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more
putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow mindedness o the
majority of its members, In the wake of so many mindedness of the
majority deliberately committed during these last years, I believe
that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the
members of the Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one
of the first measures, which as its objects the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, a
constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very
loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court very of
today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those
memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel
Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of
the Philippine Judiciary.
- The respondent was granted ten days more besides the five originally
given him to file his answer, and although his answer was filed after the
expiration of the period of time given him the said answer was admitted. This
Court could have rendered a judgment for contempt after considering his
answer, because he does not deny the authenticity of the statement as it has
been published. But, in order to give the respondent ample opportunity to
defend himself or justify the publication of such libelous statement, the case
was set for hearing or oral argument. As the respondent did not appear at
the date set for hearing, the case was submitted for decision.
- In his answer, the respondent does not deny having published the above
quoted threat, and intimidation as well as false and calumnious charges
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 14
against this Supreme Court. But he contends that under section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, "this Court
has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the
Supreme Court can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law,
and has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief
Executive."
- He also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech
guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the
press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the
majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion,
erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended
to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.' The other arguments set forth
by the respondent in his defenses observe no consideration.
- Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as for
contempt of court an act which was not punishable as such under the law
and the inherent powers of the court to punish for contempt. The provisions
of section 1 and 3 of said Rule 64 are a mere reproduction of section 231
and 232 of the old Code of Civil Procedure in connection with the doctrine
laid down by this Court on the inherent power if the superior courts to punish
for contempt is several cases, among them In re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944. That
the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior statue,
is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last
resort in the United States.
- This Court, in In re Kelly, held that mere criticism or comment on the
correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the
court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well
founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an
error if committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it
should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision.
- Had the respondent in the present case limited himself to as statement that
our decision is wrong or that our construction of the intention of the law is not
correct, because it is different from what he, as proponent of the original bill
which became a law had intended, his criticism might in that case be
tolerated, for it could not in any way influence the final disposition of the
Parazo case by the court; inasmuch as it is of judicial notice that the bill
presented by the respondent was amended by both Houses of Congress,
and the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by
the interest of the State" was added or inserted; and that, as the Act was
passed by Congress and not by any particular member thereof, the intention
of Congress and not that of the respondent must be the one to be
determined by this Court in applying said act.
- But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published
in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the
decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending
reconsideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only
intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill
in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the
Supreme Court and reducing the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court
and reducing the members of Justices from eleven to seven, so as to
change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who
according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to
influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or
obstruct the administration of justice.
- To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years
committing deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that
it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is
on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the
decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would
tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty
and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower or
degrade the administration of justice by this Court.
- Respondent's assertion in his answer that "he made his statement in the
press with the utmost good faith and without intention of offending any of the
majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal," if true may mitigate
but not exempt him from liability for contempt of court; but it is belied by his
acts and statements during the pendency of this proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of contempt of court.
HELD: YES. While it is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of
speech and the press must be protected to its fullest extent, license or abuse
of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in
its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and
the free exercise of the right of the citizen, is the maintenance of the
independence of the judiciary. As Judge Holmes very appropriately said U. S
vs Sullens (1929), 36 Fed. (2nd), 230, 238, 239: "The administration of
justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are
equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 15
the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold
the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its
prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity
must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid
impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose
of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to
impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of
justice, this court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish
for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition if
its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive
of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an
impartial court, and, as a last resort, as a individual exercises the right of
self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. .
. ."
- It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under
special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the
courts, he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys
as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L. R. A. [N.S.], 586, 594).
- In view of all the foregoing, we find the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto
guilty of contempt of this Court by virtue of the above-quoted publication,
and he is hereby sentenced to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the
promulgation of this judgment, a fine of P1,000, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The respondent is also hereby required to appear, within the same period,
and show cause to this Court why he should not be disbarred form practicing
as an attorney-at-law in any of the courts of this Republic, for said
publication and the following statements made by him during the pendency
of the case against Angel Parazo for contempt of Court.
- In all said statements the respondent misrepresents to the public the cause
of the charge against him for contempt of court. He says that the cause is for
criticizing the decision of this Court in said Parazo case in defense of the
freedom of the press, when in truth and in fact he is charged with intending
to interfere and influence the final disposition of said case through
intimidation and false accusations against this Supreme Court. So ordered.
(2) HARDEN v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
FACTS: The petitioner, Fred M. Harden, is being confined in prison for
contempt of court by virtue of an order of the following tenor:
It appearing that the defendant Fred M. Harden has not up to this
date complied with the orders of this court of October 7, 1947 and
March 27, 1948;
As prayed for, the court orders the arrest of the defendant Fred M.
Harden as well as his confinement at the New Bilibid Prisons,
Muntinlupa, Rizal, until he complies with the aforementioned
orders.
The proceedings for contempt arose in a civil case between Mrs. Harden as
plaintiff and the petitioner and another person as defendants, commenced
on July 12, 1941, and involving the administration of a conjugal partnership,
payment of alimony, and accounting. In that case, a receiver was appointed
and a preliminary injunction was issued restraining Fred M. Harden and his
codefendant, Jose Salumbides, from transferring or alienating, except for a
valuable consideration and with the consent of the court first had and
obtained, moneys, shares of stock, and other properties and assets, real or
personal, belonging to the aforesaid partnership, and which might be found
in the names of said defendants or either of them.
On various dates in 1946, Fred M. Harden transferred to the Hongkong &
Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia &
China, both in Hongkong, over P1,000,000 in drafts or cash; to Virginia
Recreation Center, Long Beach, California, P20,196.80, and to an unknown
person, P50,000.
On September 9, 1947, Mrs. Harden moved the court to order Harden to
return all these amounts and to redeposit them with the Manila branch of the
Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China.
After a petition for certiorari was instituted by Harden in the Supreme Court
and decided, and after various motions were filed and heard, Judge Peña,
on March 27, 1948, entered an order, which was a modification of that of
October 7, 1947, directing Harden "to deposit with the Manila Branch of the
Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China within five days from receipt of a
copy of this order the money and drafts that he has actually in Hongkong,
without prejudice to passing upon later on the different amounts that the
defendant has spent according to his attorney, after he has submitted to the
court an itemized account of those expenses.
In the same order there was this decree:
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 16
 With respect to the plaintiff's motion filed on March 16, 1948
praying that Fred M. Harden be ordered to deliver the certificate
covering the 368,553 Balatoc Mining Company shares either to the
Clerk of this Court or to the receiver in this case for safekeeping
after his compliance with the order of January 17, 1948, the Court,
after considering the different pleadings filed, denies defendant's
motion for extension of time to register the said certificate of stock,
thereby maintaining its order of January 17, 1948. The said
defendant is further ordered, after the registration of the said
certificate, to deposit the same with the Manila Branch of the
Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China.
The last part of the order was the culmination of another series of motions
with their corresponding hearings. The facts taken from the pleading were in
brief as follows:
In a motion dated May 28, 1947, the receiver appointed in the main case
prayed that the certificates of stock of the conjugal partnership, among them
368,553 shares of the Balatoc Mining Co., alleged to be in the possession of
defendant Harden, be ordered turned over to him (receiver) so that he might
have them registered in pursuance of the provisions of Republic Act No. 62.
On June 7, 1947, the court "authorized" Harden "to register not later than
June 30, 1947 the stock certificates in his possession, notifying the court
afterwards of such action.
On July 28, 1947, Mrs. Harden complained that her husband failed to
comply with the above order and prayed that he be ordered to show cause
why he should not be declared in contempt. On August 1, 1947, Harden filed
a perfunctory compliance, and in order dated August 2, 1947, he was
required to "make a detailed report of the stock certificates which have been
duly registered in accordance with Republic Act No. 62." In his "compliance"
dated August 7, 1947, Harden stated that he had been granted an extension
until December 31, 1947, within which to register the Balatoc Mining Co.
shares under Republic Act No. 62.
In a motion dated January 7, 1948, the receiver informed the court that,
notwithstanding the expiration on December 31, 1947, of Harden's extended
time to comply with Republic Act No. 62, the records of the Balatoc Mining
Co. showed that the certificate had not been registered as of January 7,
1948; and upon his request, an order dated January 17, 1948, was issued
giving Harden "an extension until March 31, 1948 within which to comply
with the Order dated June 7, 1947."
In a motion dated March 15, 1948, Mrs. Harden prayed for the reasons
therein stated, that defendant Harden "be ordered to deliver the certificates
covering the 368,553 Balatoc Mining Co. shares either to the Clerk of this
Court or to the Receiver herein for safekeeping, immediately after registering
them pursuant to Republic Act No. 62." On March 24, 1948, Harden filed a
motion stating that the registration of shares of stock under Republic Act No.
62 had been extended until June 30, 1948, and prayed that he "be allowed
to register the stock certificates in question within such period as by law or
regulations is or may be provided."
It was at this stage of the case that the present petitioner was committed to
jail.
ISSUE: WON contempt is proper?
RULING: Yes. The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor
excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U. S., 436, the United States Supreme
Court said that "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning
of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman
and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.
The punishment meted out to the petitioner is not excessive. It is suitable
and adapted to its objective; and it accords with section 7, Rule 64, of the
Rules of Court which provides that "when the contempt consists in the
omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to perform, he
may be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs it.
If the term of imprisonment in this case is indefinite and might last through
the natural life of the petitioner, yet by the terms of the sentence the way is
left open for him to avoid serving any part of it by complying with the orders
of the court, and in this manner put an end to his incarceration. In these
circumstances, the judgment can not be said to be excessive or unjust.
(Davis vs. Murphy [1947] 188 P., 2nd, 229-231.) As stated in a more recent
case (De Wees [1948], 210 S.W., 2d, 145-147), "to order that one be
imprisoned for an indefinite period in civil contempt is purely a remedial
measure. Its purpose is to coerce the contender to do an act within his or her
power to perform. He must have the means by which he may purge himself
of the contempt." The latter decision cites Stanley vs. South Jersey Realty
Co., 83 N.J. Eq. 300, 90 A., 1042, 1043, in which the theory is expressed in
this language:
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 17
 In a "civil contempt" the proceeding is remedial, it is a step in the
case the object of which is to coerce one party for the benefit of the
other party to do or to refrain from doing some act specified in the
order of the court. Hence, if imprisonment be ordered, it is remedial
in purpose and coercive in character, and to that end must relate to
something to be done by the defendant by the doing of which he
many discharge himself. As quaintly expressed, the imprisoned
man "carries the keys to his prison in his own pocket."
The failure of the order of commitment to state that the acts which the
contemner fails to do are still in his power to perform, does not void the order
of imprisonment. Section 7 of Rule 64 does not require such finding to
appear in the order, unlike section 1219 of the Code of Civil Procedure of
California on which the petitioner's contention is rested. Petitioner is in error
in saying that section 237 of the former Philippine Code of Civil Procedure,
from which section 7 of Rule 64, supra, has been copied, was of California
origin. Former Justice Fisher is authority for the statement that section 237
of Act No. 190 was borrowed from section 1456 of the Ohio Code of Civil
Procedure. (Fisher's Code of Civil Procedure, 3rd ed., p. 136.) The exact
similarity in substance though not in language between the two provisions is
a confirmation of this statement.
At any rate, the order of commitment contains the alleged missing element if
it is taken, as it should be taken, in connection with the orders of October 7,
1947, and March 27, 1948, and with the charges for contempt. It expressly
gives non-compliance with the two last mentioned orders as the grounds for
the warrant of commitment, and thus by reference makes them part of it. The
orders of October 7, 1947, and March 27, 1948, in turn clearly specify the
acts with the petitioner was commanded to fulfill. It is equally clear from
these orders that in the opinion of the court the petitioner is in a position to
bring back to the Philippines from Hongkong part of the cash and the
Balatoc shares he had remitted to that colony.
(3) PEOPLE v. GODOY
FACTS: Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate
informations filed before the Regional Trial Court, for Palawan and Puerto
Princesa City, Branch 47, with rape and kidnapping with serious illegal
detention, respectively punished under Articles 335 and 267 of the Revised
Penal Code.
During the arraignment on both indictments, appellant pleaded not guilty to
said charges and, after the pre-trial was terminated, a joint trial of the two
cases was conducted by the trial court.3
According to complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 P.M. of January 21,
1994, she went to the boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan,
at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point which is near the Palawan National School
(PNS), Pulot Branch, where she was studying. When she saw that the house
was dark, she decided to pass through the kitchen door at the back because
she knew that there was nobody inside. As soon as she opened the door,
somebody suddenly grabbed her, poked a knife on her neck, dragged her by
the hand and told her not to shout. She was then forced to lie down on the
floor. Although it was dark, complainant was able to recognize her assailant,
by the light coming from the moon and through his voice, as accused-
appellant Danny Godoy who was her Physics teacher at PNS.
When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her panty with one
hand while holding the knife with the other hand, opened the zipper of his
pants, and then inserted his private organ inside her private parts against
her will. She felt pain because it was her first experience and she cried.
Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter a word. She was very frightened
because a knife was continually pointed at her. She also could not fight back
nor plead with appellant not to rape her because he was her teacher and
she was afraid of him. She was threatened not to report the incident to
anyone or else she and her family would be killed.
Thereafter, while she was putting on her panty, she noticed that her skirt
was stained with blood. Appellant walked with her to the gate of the house
and she then proceeded alone to the boarding house where she lived. She
did not see where appellant went after she left him at the gate. When she
arrived at her boarding house, she saw her landlady but she did not mention
anything about the incident.
The following morning, January 22, 1994, complainant went home to her
parents' house at Ipilan, Brooke's Point. She likewise did not tell her parents
about the incident for fear that appellant might make good his threat. At
around 3:00 P.M. of that same day, appellant arrived at the house of her
parents and asked permission from the latter if complainant could
accompany him to solicit funds because she was a candidate for "Miss PNS
Pulot." When her parents agreed, she was constrained to go with appellant
because she did not want her parents to get into trouble.
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 18
Appellant and complainant then left the house and they walked in silence,
with Mia following behind appellant, towards the highway where appellant
hailed a passenger jeep which was empty except for the driver and the
conductor. She was forced to ride the jeep because appellant threatened to
kill her if she would not board the vehicle. The jeep proceeded to the Sunset
Garden at the poblacion, Brooke's Point where they alighted.
At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to a room
where they staye d for three days. During the entire duration of their stay at
the Sunset Garden, complainant was not allowed to leave the room which
was always kept locked. She was continuously guarded and constantly
raped by appellant. She was, however, never drunk or unconscious.
Nonetheless, she was forced to have sex with appellant because the latter
was always carrying a knife with him.
In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought her to the house
of his friend at Edward's Subdivision where she was raped by him three
times. She was likewise detained and locked inside the room and tightly
guarded by appellant. After two days, or on January 27, 1994, they left the
place because appellant came to know that complainant had been reported
and indicated as a missing person in the police blotter. They went to see a
certain Naem ** from whom appellant sought help. On that same day, she
was released but only after her parents agreed to settle the case with
appellant.
The records show that, on the basis of the complaints for rape 7 and
kidnapping with serious illegal detention 8 filed by Mia Taha and Helen Taha,
respectively, the Municipal Trial Court of Brooke's Point issued a
resolution9 on February 4, 1994 finding the existence of a prima facie case
against appellant. On February 10, 1994, the spouses Adjeril Taha and
Helen Taha executed an affidavit of desistance withdrawing the charge of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention.10 However, pursuant to a joint
resolution11 issued on March 11, 1994 by Prosecutor II Reynaldo R. Guayco
of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, two separate informations for rape
and for kidnapping with serious illegal detention were nevertheless filed
against appellant Danny Godoy with no bail recommended in both charges.
ISSUE: WALANG ISSUE NG CONTEMPT JUSKO
RULING: Generally, an affidavit of desistance by the complainant is not
looked upon with favor. It may, however, create serious doubts as to the
liability of appellant, especially if it corroborates appellant's explanation
about the filing of criminal charges.79
In the cases at bar, the letters written by complainant to appellant are very
revealing. Most probably written out of desperation and exasperation with
the way she was being treated by her parents, complainant threw all caution
to the winds when she wrote: "Oo, aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo,
pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako
sa sulsul nila, hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban," obviously
referring to her ineptitude and impotence in helping appellant out of his
predicament. It could, therefore, be safely presumed that the rape charge
was merely an offshoot of the discovery by her parents of the intimate
relationship between her and appellant. In order to avoid retribution from her
parents, together with the moral pressure exerted upon her by her mother,
she was forced to concoct her account of the alleged rape.
The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the
Philippines, young ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and
prudence. Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain
untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character
humiliates their entire families.80 It could precisely be that complainant's
mother wanted to save face in the community where everybody knows
everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter's indiscretion and
escape the wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to
weave the scenario of this rape drama.
Although the trial court did observe that a mother would not sacrifice her
daughter to tell a story of defloration, that is not always the case as this
Court has noted a long time ago. The books disclose too many instances of
false charges of rape.81 While this Court has, in numerous cases, affirmed
the judgments of conviction rendered by trial courts in rape charges,
especially where the offended parties were very young and presumptively
had no ill motives to concoct a story just to secure indictments for a crime as
grave as rape, the Court has likewise reversed judgments of conviction and
acquitted the accused when there are strong indications pointing to the
possibility that the rape charges were merely motivated by some factors
except the truth as to their commission.82 This is a case in point. The Court,
therefore, cannot abdicate its duty to declare that the prosecution has failed
to meet the exacting test of moral certainty and proof of guilt of appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.
This is not to say that the Court approves of the conduct of appellant.
Indisputably, he took advantage of complainant's feelings for him and
breached his vow of fidelity to his wife. As her teacher, he should have acted
as adviser and counselor to complainant and helped her develop in manners
and virtue instead of corrupting her.83Hence, even as he is freed from
physical detention in a prison as an instrument of human justice, he remains
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 19
in the spiritual confinement of his conscience as a measure of divine
retribution. Additionally, these ruminations do not rule out such other legal
options against him as may be available in the arsenal of statutory law.
(4) OCLARIT v. PADERANGA
FACTS: Petitioner is a lawyer engaged in the private practice of law
principally in the City of Cagayan de Oro and the province of Misamis
Oriental.[2]
At times material hereto, petitioner was counsel for the plaintiffs in the
case entitled, spouses Gregorio and Pelegrina Babatido v. Elnora and
Teodoro Abella, et al., Civil Case No. 99-194, Regional Trial Court, Misamis
Oriental, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City. Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga
was the presiding judge, Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch
38.[3]
On June 1, 1999, the aforecited case was scheduled for continuation of
pre-trial before the lower court. The case was first heard on pre-trial on April
30, 1999. In that hearing, petitioner filed a motion to approve compromise
agreement entered into by the parties pointing out that the compromise
agreement was reached before a barangay captain. [4] Counsel for the
defendants opposed the motion[5] because the defendants were placed in a
disadvantageous condition, arguing that the case was before the court, not
before the barangay. The court ruled that the compromise agreement was
not before the barangay captain but before the court. The parties settled
before the barangay captain. At this point, petitioner informed the court that
the compromise agreement was signed and was explaining further when the
court told him repeatedly to shut up. Then petitioner requested the court to
stop shouting at him. The court rhetorically asked: why should the court
precisely not cite you for contempt for doing that, that is, for settling the case
before the barangay captain.[6]
Consequently, the presiding judge cited petitioner in contempt of court
and imposed on him a fine of P1,000.00. Petitioner remarked that the
presiding judge was becoming very arrogant. In reply to that, respondent
judge declared: I will put you in jail. Get a policeman. At that moment, the
court issued a verbal order holding petitioner for direct contempt of court and
sentencing petitioner to serve one (1) day in jail and to pay a fine of
P1,000.00. Petitioner indicated that he would challenge the ruling. [7] Then,
respondent judge issued a detention commitment to the Jail Warden, City
Jail, Cagayan de Oro City, committing the person of petitioner Conchito J.
Oclarit for direct contempt.[8]
The next day, with petitioner in jail, he received a copy of the written
order declaring him in direct contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a
fine of P1,000.00 and also to serve One (1) day in jail. [9]He was released
after serving one (1) day in jail.[10] Apparently, he also paid the fine of
P1,000.00.[11]
On July 30, 1999, petitioner filed the instant petition.[12]
ISSUE: (1) whether petitioner was guilty of direct contempt of court; (2) if
guilty, may the respondent judge declare him guilty by an order without
stating the facts on which it is based and imposing upon him the
corresponding penalty; and finally (3) if the court could do so, is the order
finding petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court immediately executory?
RULING: In the first place, there was nothing contumacious in the
submission to the court of a motion for approval of compromise agreement
reached before a barangay captain in a case pending before the court. It is
not required that a compromise agreement be executed before the court. It
may be executed before anyone or even among the parties themselves and
then submitted to the court for approval.
In the second place, the presiding judge must state expressly in the
order the facts constituting the contemptuous behavior of petitioner and
declaring him in direct contempt of court.
In this case, the court did not state the specific cause for declaring
petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court. Indeed, it would seem that the
court cited petitioner for direct contempt of court for submitting such
compromise agreement for approval though the compromise was reached
before a barangay captain.[13] As we said, there is nothing contumacious in
such act. However, the impression of lawyers in the courtroom at that time
was that the presiding judge was irked because petitioner shouted back and
banged the table as petitioner charged the presiding judge with
arrogance.[14] This incident is not recorded in the transcript, leaving us in
doubt if it occurred. It is apparent, however, that the presiding judge
continuously ordered petitioner to shut up.
Even then, an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or
enforceable. The contemner must be afforded a reasonable remedy to
extricate or purge himself of the contempt. Thus, in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, the Court introduced a new provision granting a
remedy to a person adjudged in direct contempt by any court. Such person
may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of certiorari or
prohibition. In such case, the execution of the judgment shall be suspended
pending resolution of such petition provided the contemner files a bond fixed
by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide
by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him. [15]
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 20
 In fact, petitioner asked the court presided over by respondent judge to
fix a bail for his temporary liberty pending the filing of a petition for
certiorari.[16] This written motion was filed on the first hour the very next
day. It was timely filed because the written order of contempt was issued
only the next day and given to petitioner when he was in jail. [17] The
respondent judge did not act on the motion. [18] By such inaction, respondent
judge deprived petitioner of an effective relief from an order of direct
contempt of court. This is a violation of the Rules on contempt of
court.[19] Under Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
petitioner has sixty (60) days within which to file his petition. [20]
We find that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in declaring
petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court, sentencing him to pay a fine of
P1,000.00 and to serve one day in jail. It was the respondent judge who first
shouted successively at petitioner to shut up. When petitioner persisted in
making his explanation, the court declared him in direct contempt, to the
extent of stating that the judge had absolute power. [21] The lawyers remarks
explaining his position in the case under consideration do not necessarily
assume the level of contumely that justifies the court to exercise the power
of contempt.[22] Courts must be slow to punish for direct contempt. This
drastic power must be used sparingly in cases of clearly contumacious
behavior in facie curiae.[23] The salutary rule is that the power to punish for
contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindicative
principle,[24] and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of
punishment.[25] The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt
for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a
safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they
exercise
(5) LORENZO SHIPPING CORP. v. DISTRIBUTION MGT. ASSOC. OF
THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: On June 4, 2001, the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued
a Letter-Resolution,[1] advising respondent Distribution Management
Association of the Philippines(DMAP) that a computation of the required
freight rate adjustment by MARINA was no longer required for freight rates
officially considered or declared deregulated in accordance with MARINA
Memorandum Circular No. 153 (MC 153).
For clarity, MARINA issued MC 153 pursuant to Executive Order
No. 213 (EO 213) entitled Deregulating Domestic Shipping
Rates promulgated by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 24, 1994.[2]
On July 2, 2001, in order to challenge the constitutionality of EO 213, MC
153, and the Letter-Resolution dated June 4, 2001, DMAP commenced in
the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition,
with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction or temporary restraining
order (CA-G.R. SP No. 65463). On November 29, 2001,[3] however, the CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition and upheld the
constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the Letter-Resolution dated June 4,
2001.[4] Later, on April 10, 2002, the CA denied DMAPs motion for
reconsideration.[5]
DMAP appealed to the Court (G.R. No. 152914), but on June 5, 2002, [6] the
Court denied DMAPs petition for review on certiorari for petitioners failure to:
(a) take the appeal within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56, in
view of the foregoing denial of petitioners' motion for extension of time to file
the petition; and (b) pay the deposit for sheriff's fee and clerk's commission
in the total amount of P202.00 in accordance with Sections 2 and 3, Rule 45
in relation to Section [c], Rule 56 and paragraph 1 of Revised Circular No. 1-
88 of this Court.
On August 12, 2002,[7] the Court denied with finality DMAPs motion
for reconsideration.
In October 2002, DMAP held a general membership meeting (GMM) on the
occasion of which DMAP, acting through its co-respondents Lorenzo Cinco,
its President, and Cora Curay, a consultant/adviser to Cinco, publicly
circulated the Sea Transport Update.
Thereupon, the petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt
against the respondents, insisting that the publication of the Sea Transport
Update constituted indirect contempt of court for patently, unjustly and
baselessly insinuating that the petitioners were privy to some illegal act, and,
worse, that the publication unfairly debased the Supreme Court by making
scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo [9] to the effect that
the Supreme Court had allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners as
to lead the respondents to conclude that the Supreme Court ruling issued in
one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months. [10] They averred
that the respondents purpose, taken in the context of the entire publication,
was to defy the decision, for it was based on technicalities, and the Supreme
Court was influenced![11]
In their comment dated January 20, 2003,[12] the respondents denied any
intention to malign, discredit, or criticize the Court. [13] They explained that
their statement that the Supreme Court ruling issued in one month time only,
normal lead time is at least three to six months [14] was not per
se contemptuous, because the normal and appropriate time frame for the
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 21
resolution of petitions by the Court was either less than a month, if the
petition was to be denied on technicality, and more or less from three to six
months, if the petition was to be given due course; that what made the
petitioners describe the statement as contemptuous was not the real or
actual intention of the author but rather the petitioners false, malicious,
scurrilous and tasteless insinuations and interpretation; and that the
petitioners, not being themselves present during the GMM, had no basis to
assert that the DMAPs presentor, the author of the material, or any of the
speakers during the GMM had any evil intention or made any malicious
insinuations.[15]
The respondents further stated that the term time frame was laymans
parlance to explain to DMAP members that the petition had been dismissed
due to a technicality, considering that the appeals process in the case before
the Court had taken only a month instead of the expected three to six
months;[16] that the term lead time, although not the proper legal term to
describe the process that the respondents petition had undergone in the
Court, was common parlance in the business sector in which the
respondents belonged; that the discussions during the presentation focused
on the legal options of DMAP with respect to the 20% increase, i.e., to go
back to MARINA for the resolution of the propriety and reasonableness of
the 20% increase;[17] that a lead time was indicated in the presentation
material simply to tell DMAP members that the lead time to go back to
MARINA had been cut short in view of the denial of the petition for review;
and that, on the other hand, had the Court given due course to the petition,
the expected time for the Court to resolve the appeal on the merits would
have been from three to six months, a normal expectation. [18]
Lastly, the respondents submitted that a serious study and analysis of the
decision of the CA, which the Court affirmed, revealed that the decision of
the CA centered only on the constitutionality of the assailed executive
issuances, and did not include any determination of the reasonableness and
propriety of the 20% increase; that, accordingly, the discussion of the
recourse with respect to the 20% increase, which was to go back to MARINA
for the resolution on the matter, could not be considered as a defiance of the
order of the Court because the CA itself decreed that the propriety and
reasonableness of the 20% increase should be brought to and resolved by
MARINA;[19] and that considering that there was yet no entry of judgment in
relation to the denial of the petition at the time of the GMM on October 17,
2002, the respondents were not defying any final order or writ of the Court
and thereby commit any act of indirect contempt. [20]
ISSUE: WON the statements contained in the Sea Transport
Update constitute or amount to indirect contempt of court?
RULING: No.
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of
a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or
disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an
interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in
its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the
respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt
comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a
court.[21] The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal
signification a variety of different acts.[22]
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, [23] and need not
be specifically granted by statute.[24] It lies at the core of the administration of
a judicial system.[25]Indeed, there ought to be no question that courts have
the power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect, and
decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to
preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of
pollution.[26] The power to punish for contempt essentially exists for the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the
due administration of justice.[27]The reason behind the power to punish for
contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their
institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the courts would be
resting on a very shaky foundation.[28]
Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is
committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the
administration of justice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which
consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court. [29]
The punishment for the first is generally summary and immediate,
and no process or evidence is necessary because the act is committed in
facie curiae.[30] The inherent power of courts to punish contempt of court
committed in the presence of the courts without further proof of facts and
without aid of a trial is not open to question, considering that this power is
essential to preserve their authority and to prevent the administration of
justice from falling into disrepute; such summary conviction and punishment
accord with due process of law.[31] There is authority for the view, however,
that an act, to constitute direct contempt punishable by summary
proceeding, need not be committed in the immediate presence of the court,
if it tends to obstruct justice or to interfere with the actions of the court in the
courtroom itself.[32] Also, contemptuous acts committed out of the presence
of the court, if admitted by the contemnor in open court, may be punished
summarily as a direct contempt,[33] although it is advisable to proceed by
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 22
requiring the person charged to appear and show cause why he should not
be punished when the judge is without personal knowledge of the
misbehavior and is informed of it only by a confession of the contemnor or
by testimony under oath of other persons.[34]
In contrast, the second usually requires proceedings less summary
than the first. The proceedings for the punishment of the contumacious act
committed outside the personal knowledge of the judge generally need the
observance of all the elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written
charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such charges before guilt
is adjudged and sentence imposed.[35]
Plainly, therefore, the word summary with respect to the
punishment for contempt refers not to the timing of the action with reference
to the offense but to the procedure that dispenses with the formality, delay,
and digression that result from the issuance of process, service of complaint
and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments,
awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a conventional
court trial.[36]
A distinction between in-court contempts, which disrupt court
proceedings and for which a hearing and formal presentation of evidence
are dispensed with, and out-of-court contempts, which require normal
adversary procedures, is drawn for the purpose of prescribing what
procedures must attend the exercise of a courts authority to deal with
contempt. The distinction does not limit the ability of courts to initiate
contempt prosecutions to the summary punishment of in-court contempts
that interfere with the judicial process.[37]
The court may proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts without
further proof and without issue or trial in any form to punish a contempt
committed directly under its eye or within its view. [38] But there must be
adequate facts to support a summary order for contempt in the presence of
the court.[39] The exercise of the summary power to imprison for contempt is
a delicate one and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive
conclusions.[40] The reason for the extraordinary power to punish criminal
contempt in summary proceedings is that the necessities of the
administration of justice require such summary dealing with obstructions to
it, being a mode of vindicating the majesty of the law, in its active
manifestation, against obstruction and outrage.[41]
Proceedings for contempt are sui generis, in nature criminal, but may be
resorted to in civil as well as criminal actions, and independently of any
action.[42] They are of two classes, the criminal or punitive, and the civil or
remedial. A criminal contempt consists in conduct that is directed against the
authority and dignity of a court or of a judge acting judicially, as in unlawfully
assailing or discrediting the authority and dignity of the court or judge, or in
doing a duly forbidden act. A civil contempt consists in the failure to do
something ordered to be done by a court or judge in a civil case for the
benefit of the opposing party therein.[43] It is at times difficult to determine
whether the proceedings are civil or criminal. In general, the character of the
contempt of whether it is criminal or civil is determined by the nature of
the contempt involved, regardless of the cause in which the
contempt arose, and by the relief sought or dominant purpose.[44] The
proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily
punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or
remedial.[45] Where the dominant purpose is to enforce compliance with an
order of a court for the benefit of a party in whose favor the order runs, the
contempt is civil; where the dominant purpose is to vindicate the dignity and
authority of the court, and to protect the interests of the general public, the
contempt is criminal.[46] Indeed, the criminal proceedings vindicate the
dignity of the courts, but the civil proceedings protect, preserve, and enforce
the rights of private parties and compel obedience to orders, judgments and
decrees made to enforce such rights.[47]
Indirect contempt is defined by and punished under Section 3, Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after
charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been
filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by
the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person
guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the
performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of
a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from
any real property by the judgment or process
of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts o
r induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 23
 in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person
adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with
the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting
direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a
court, and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or
property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or
process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as
to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the
respondent into court, or from holding him in custody
pending such proceedings. (3a)
Misbehavior means something more than adverse comment or
disrespect.[48] There is no question that in contempt the intent goes to the
gravamen of the offense.[49] Thus, the good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged
contemnor should be considered.[50] Where the act complained of is
ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is
one which, if the party is acting in good faith, is within his rights, the
presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held to
be determinative of its character.[51] A person should not be condemned for
contempt where he contends for what he believes to be right and in good
faith institutes proceedings for the purpose, however erroneous may be his
conclusion as to his rights.[52] To constitute contempt, the act must be done
willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.[53]
Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to
embarrass the court or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading.
Their employment serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they constitute
direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and, when committed by
a lawyer, a violation of the lawyers oath and a transgression of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Utterances in Sea Transport Update, Not Contemptuous.
The petitioners did not sufficiently show how the respondents
publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted any of the acts
punishable as indirect contempt of court under Section 3 of Rule 71, supra.
The petitioners mere allegation, that said publication unfairly
debases the Supreme Court because of the scurrilous, malicious, tasteless,
and baseless innuendo therein that the Court allowed itself to be influenced
by the petitioners as concocted in the evil minds of the respondents thus
leading said respondents to unjustly conclude: Supreme Courtruling issued
in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months,[54] was
insufficient, without more, to sustain the charge of indirect contempt.
Nor do we consider contemptuous either the phrase contained in
the Sea Transport Update stating: The Motion for Reconsideration filed with
the Supreme Court was denied based on technicalities and not on the legal
issue DMAP presented,[55] or the phrase in the Sea Transport
Update reading Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal
leadtime is at least 3 to 6 months. Contrary to the petitioners urging that
such phrases be considered as scurrilous, malicious, tasteless and baseless
innuendo [56] and as indicative that the Court allowed itself to be influenced
by the petitioners[57] or that the point that respondents wanted to convey was
crystal clear: defy the decision, for it was based on technicalities, and the
Supreme Court was influenced!,[58] we find the phrases as not critical of the
Court and how fast the resolutions in G.R. No. 152914 were issued, or as
inciting DMAPs members to defy the resolutions. The unmistakable intent
behind the phrases was to inform DMAPs members of the developments in
the case, and on the taking of the next viable move of going back to
MARINA on the issues, as the ruling of the Court of Appeals instructed.
We have long recognized and respected the right of a lawyer, or of any other
person, for that matter, to be critical of the courts and their judges as long as
the criticism is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels.
We have no cause or reason to depart from such recognition and respect,
for the Court has long adhered to the sentiment aptly given expression to in
the leading case of In re: Almacen:[59]
xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon
and criticize the actuations of public officers. This
right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is
aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by
a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where
the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 24
 then the courts actuation are thrown open to public
consumption.
xxx
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They
should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. For like the executive and the legislative
branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of
democratic society, nourished by the periodic
appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a
lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen,
to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.xxx
xxx
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer
is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may
abridge this right. Nor is he professionally answerable
for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges,
which would not expose him to legal animadversion
as a citizen. xxx
xxx
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that
it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls
of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between
fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action. (bold emphasis supplied)[60]
The test for criticizing a judges decision is, therefore, whether or not the
criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls
of decency and propriety. Viewed through the prism of the test, the Sea
Transport Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and did not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Thereby, the respondents
were not guilty of indirect contempt of court. In this regard, then, we need to
remind that the power to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally should
a court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which
the administration of justice must falter or fail.[61] As judges we ought to
exercise our power to punish contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost
restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the power for the correction and
preservation of the dignity of the Court, not for retaliation or vindictiveness.
(6) RADIO PHILS. v. YAP
FACTS: Petitioner Radio Philippines Network, Inc. (RPN), represented by
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), is a government
sequestered corporation with address at Broadcast City, Capitol Hills Drive,
Quezon City, while petitioners Mia Concio (Concio), Leonor Linao (Linao),
Ida Barrameda (Barrameda) and Lourdes Angeles (Angeles) were the
President, General Manager, Assistant General Manager (AGM) for
Finance, and Human Resources Manager, respectively, of RPN who were
impleaded and charged with indirect contempt, the subject matter of the
present petition. Respondents Ruth F. Yap (Yap), Bannie Edsel B. San
Miguel (San Miguel), Ma. Fe G. Dayon (Dayon), Marisa Lemina (Lemina)
and Minette Baptista (Baptista) were employees of RPN and former
members of the Radio Philippines Network Employees Union (RPNEU), the
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the said company.
On November 26, 2004, RPN and RPNEU entered into a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with a union security clause providing that a
member who has been expelled from the union shall also be terminated from
the company. The CBA had a term of five (5) years, commencing on July 1,
2004 and expiring on June 30, 2009.
A conflict arose between the respondents and other members of RPNEU.
On November 9, 2005, the RPNEU’s Grievance and Investigation
Committee recommended to the union’s board of directors the expulsion of
the respondents from the union. On January 24, 2006, the union wrote to
RPN President Concio demanding the termination of the respondents’
employment from the company.
On February 17, 2006, RPN notified the respondents that their employment
would be terminated effective March 20, 2006, 3 whereupon the respondents
filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of benefits.
On September 27, 2006, the LA rendered a decision4 ordering the
reinstatement of the respondents with payment of backwages and full
benefits and without loss of seniority rights after finding that the petitioners
failed to establish the legal basis of the termination of respondents’
employment. The LA also directed the company to pay the respondents
certain aggregate monetary benefits.
On October 27, 2006, the petitioner, through counsel submitted a
Manifestation and Compliance dated October 25, 2006 to the LA stating that:
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 25
"In compliance with the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated September 27,
2006, Respondent RPN9 most respectfully manifests that it has
complied with the reinstatement of the complainants, namely: Ruth Yap,
Ma. Fe Dayon, Bannie Edsel San Miguel, Marisa Lemina and Minette
Baptista by way of payroll reinstatement."5
A copy of the said Manifestation was sent to the respondents by registered
mail on even date.6
Alleging that there was no compliance yet as aforestated and that no notice
was received, respondents filed with the LA a Manifestation and Urgent
Motion to Cite for Contempt7 dated November 3, 2006.
Therein, they narrated that on October 27, 2006, they went to RPN to
present themselves to the petitioners for actual reinstatement to their former
positions. They arrived while a mass was being celebrated at the lobby, at
which they were allowed to attend while waiting for RPN General Manager
Linao to meet them. Linao informed them that they had been reinstated, but
only in the payroll, and that the company would endeavour to pay their
salaries regularly despite its precarious financial condition. Four (4) days
later, on October 31, 2006 at 11 a.m., the respondents returned to RPN to
collect their salaries, it being a payday; but they were barred entry upon
strict orders of Concio and Linao. The respondents returned in the afternoon
but were likewise stopped by eight (8) guards now manning the gate.
Respondents nonetheless tried to push their way in, but the guards
manhandled them, pulled them by the hair and arms and pushed them back
to the street. Some even endured having their breasts mashed, their blouses
pulled up and their bags grabbed away. This incident was reported to the
police for the filing of charges. Later that afternoon, the respondents
somehow managed to enter the RPN lobby. It was AGM for Finance
Barrameda who came out, but instead of meeting them, Barrameda ordered
the guards to take them back outside the gate, where she said they would
be paid their salaries. Their removal was so forcible and violent that they
sustained physical injuries and had to be medically treated. Claiming that
RPNEU President Reynato Sioson also assisted the guards in physically
evicting them, they concluded from their violent ouster that Concio and Linao
played a direct role in their expulsion from RPNEU.
The respondents prayed that the LA issue an order finding Concio and Linao
liable for contempt after hearing; that the respondents be reinstated with full
benefits, or in case of payroll reinstatement, that they be paid every 15th and
30th of the month as with all regular employees; that their salaries shall be
paid at the Cashier’s Office, and finally, that the respondents shall not be
prevented from entering the premises of RPN.8
On November 14, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for the Issuance of
Writ of Execution/Garnishment,9 alleging that in addition to the violent events
of October 31, 2006, the respondents were again forcibly denied entry into
RPN to collect their 13th month pay on November 10, 2006. They prayed
that a writ of execution/garnishment be issued in order to implement the
decision of the LA.10
In their joint Opposition11 to the respondents’ Manifestation and Urgent
Motion to Cite for Contempt, as well as the Motion for the Issuance of Writ of
Execution/Garnishment, the petitioners denied any liability for the narrated
incidents, insisting that the respondents had been duly informed through a
letter dated November 10, 2006 of their payroll reinstatement. The
petitioners explained that because of the intra-union dispute between the
respondents and the union leaders, they deemed it wise not to allow the
respondents inside the company premises to prevent any more untoward
incidents, and to release their salaries only at the gate. For this reason, the
respondents were asked to open an ATM account with the Land Bank,
Quezon City Circle Branch, where their salaries would be deposited every
5th and 20th day of the month, rather than on the 15th and 30th along with
the other employees. "This measure was for the protection not only of
complainants [herein respondents] but also for the other employees of RPN9
as well," according to the petitioners.12
On January 19, 2007, the respondents moved for the issuance of an alias
writ of execution13 covering their unpaid salaries for January 1-15, 2007,
claiming that the petitioners did not show up at the agreed place of payment,
and reiterating their demand to be paid on the 15th and 30th of the month at
RPN, along with the rest of the employees. In their Opposition14 dated
January 30, 2007, the petitioners insisted that they could only pay the
respondents’ salaries on the 5th and 20th of the month, conformably with the
company’s cash flows.
On February 20, 2007, the petitioners manifested to the LA that the
respondents could collect their salaries at the Bank of Commerce in
Broadcast City Branch, Quezon City.15 On March 9, 2007, the petitioners
manifested that the respondents’ salaries for the second half of February
2007 were ready for pick-up since March 5, 2007.16 On March 15, 2007, the
petitioners informed the LA that the respondents refused to collect their
salaries. To prove their good faith, they stated that the respondents’ salaries
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 26
shall, henceforth, be deposited at the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC)-Cashier on the 5th and 20th of every month.
On appeal, the NLRC dismissed the same in a Resolution dated May 27,
2008, and on August 15, 2008 it also denied the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.19
Thus, on November 3, 2008, the petitioners filed with the CA a petition
for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 105945. In its
Resolution20 dated November 14, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition for
failure to attach copies of pertinent pleadings mentioned in the petition,
namely: (a) respondents’ Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of
Execution (Annex "H"); (b) petitioners’ Opposition to said motion (Annex "I");
(c) petitioners’ Manifestation dated February 20, 2007 (Annex "J"); (d)
petitioners’ Manifestation dated March 9, 2007 (Annex "K"); and (e)
petitioners’ Manifestation dated March 15, 2007 (Annex "L").
In their motion for reconsideration,21 the petitioners pleaded with the CA not
to "intertwine" the LA’s contempt order with the main case for illegal
dismissal, now subject of a separate petition for certiorari in the said court.
They contended that the respondents’ Urgent Motion to Cite for
Contempt22 and Motion for the Issuance of Writ of
Execution/Garnishment,23 and the petitioners’ Opposition24 thereto, suffice to
resolve the charge of indirect contempt against the petitioners.
On March 9, 2009,25 the CA denied the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, citing again the failure to submit the documents it
enumerated in its Resolution dated November 14, 2008. The CA stated that
the petitioners should have attached these supporting documents to the
petition for certiorari. Without them, the allegations contained in the petition
are nothing but bare assertions.26
ISSUE: WON petitioners are guilty of indirect contempt?
RULING: No.
Indirect contempt58 refers to contumacious or stubbornly disobedient acts
perpetrated outside of the court or tribunal and may include misbehaviour of
an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions; disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,
judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge;
any abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a
court not constituting direct contempt; or any improper conduct tending
directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of
justice.59 To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to
or prohibited by the order of the court or tribunal. A person cannot, for
disobedience, be punished for contempt unless the act which is forbidden or
required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no
reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden
or required.60
The power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the preservative,
not on the vindictive, principle. Only occasionally should a court invoke this
inherent power in order to retain that respect, without which the
administration of justice will falter or fail. Only in cases of clear and
contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised. Such power,
being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless
necessary in the interest of justice.61
It is not denied that after the order of reinstatement of the respondents, RPN
forthwith restored them in its payroll without diminution of their benefits and
privileges, or loss of seniority rights. They retained their entitlement to the
benefits under the CBA. Respondents regularly received their salaries and
benefits, notwithstanding that the company has been in financial straits. Any
delays appear to have been due to misunderstandings as to the exact place
and time of the fortnightly payments, or because the respondents were tardy
in collecting them from the Bank of Commerce at Broadcast City Branch or
from the NLRC cashier. The petitioners tried proposing opening an ATM
accounts for them, but the respondents rejected the idea.
We are convinced under the circumstances that there was no sufficient basis
for the charge of indirect contempt against the petitioners, and that the same
was made without due regard for their right to exercise their management
prerogatives to preserve the viability of the company and the harmony of the
workplace. Indeed, the LA in the Order dated January 12, 20 I 0 found no
more legal basis to execute his Order dated May 3, 2007, and declared that
the said order has been mooted by the petitioners' compliance.
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 27
SCA DIGESTS_Nov. 23 | 28