RAJIV GANDHI NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF LAW

PATIALA

PROOF OF PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTS

IN EVIDENCE ACT

STATE OF MIND, BODY OR BODILY FEELING

SUBMITTED BY: SUBMITTED TO:

ARNAV BISHNOI DR. MANOJ SHARMA
Roll No. 15244 ASST. PROFESSOR OF LAW,
RGNUL.
Group No. 27
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

As my work gets ready for submission, I recall the assistance, encouragement and inspirations

received from many people. I would like here to put on record humbly and with gratefulness

the necessary help, encouragement and inspirations they extended to me at different stages

during the course of the work.

Gratitude is a noble response of one’s soul to kindness or help generously rendered by another

and its acknowledgment is a duty and a joyance. I am deeply indebted to my supervisor Dr.

Manoj Sharma Sir for approving and giving me this interesting project topic. Also, his precious

guidance and time matched unrelenting support kept me on track throughout the completion of

this project.

ARNAV BISHNOI
IVTH YEAR

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENT............................................................................................................ 1

RESEARCH METHODOLY .................................................................................................... 3

Scope and limitation of the study.................................................................................... 3

INDEX OF AUTHORITY ......................................................................................................... 4

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 6

What Evidence is? .................................................................................................................. 6

What is PSYCHOLOGICAL FACT? .................................................................................... 7

State of Mind or of Body or, Bodily Feeling ............................................................................. 9

Proof of Mental and Physical Conditions ................................................................................ 11

By Evidence of Person Concerned ....................................................................................... 12

By Evidence of Other Persons ............................................................................................. 12

Contemporaneous Manifestations ........................................................................................ 12

Collateral Facts ..................................................................................................................... 13

Similar Acts .......................................................................................................................... 13

Admissibility of Evidence to Prove Knowledge or Intention or other State of Mind ............. 14

Q.) Whether the State of mind, guess or intelligent guess or an Inference be regarded as Fact
within the meaning? ............................................................................................................. 15

Acts Showing Intention, good faith, etc. .............................................................................. 16

Previous or Subsequent Facts .................................................................................................. 17

Evidence of Previous & Subsequent Events ........................................................................ 17

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 20

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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The proposed research work is a Doctrinal and Non-Empirical Research. Hence, this research
work is purely based on the resources from libraries, archives and online databases and various
e-learning resources

 SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

This proposed research work being a Doctrinal and Non-Empirical research did not require any
field data or sample collection. The data collection was restricted to only the primary and
secondary sources. All the relevant sources were broadly classified into two basic categories
namely Primary and Secondary sources, with primary resources being the decisions of the
Court in a number of judgments that I have relied upon to establish the arguments and the
secondary sources being the scholarly works of other researchers either on those decisions or
on the points of arguments that I have attempted to make. The study is limited to analysis of
the Section 14th of the Evidence Act in the light of Proof of Psychological Facts and their
impact upon the several other issues circumscribing to Psychological Facts which are to be
adjudicated on the basis of Case Laws mentioned in the coveted books of C.D. FIELD & SIR
JOHN WOODROFFE. The study does not make an in-depth analysis of those propositions and
provisions which deals with Psychological Facts in Evidence outside of the Contents within
the Project.

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INDEX OF AUTHORITY
CASES
AH Gandhi v. King, AIR 1941 Raj 324............................................................................. 13, 16
Amrit Lal Hazra v. Emperor .................................................................................................... 18
Anant Baburao Sawant v. State, AIR 1967 Bom 109 ........................................................ 10, 15
Ashok Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1980 MPLJ 300..................................................... 9
Averson v Kinnarid (1805) 6 East 188 .................................................................................... 12
Baharuddin v. Emperor, AIR 1914, Cal 589 (2). ..................................................................... 13
Blake v. Albion Life Assurance Society (1878) 4 CPD 94 ....................................................... 8
Chidambram Pillai v. Emperor ................................................................................................ 17
Dariyao v. State, 1969 Cr LJ 1273 ........................................................................................... 10
Edington v. Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459............................................................................ 8
Emperor v. Philip Spratt, AIR 1928 Bom 78 ..................................................................... 16, 17
Goma Rama v. Emperor, AIR 1945, Bom 152 ........................................................................ 13
Habeeb Mohammad v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1954 SC 51 .................................................. 9
Hardwick v. Coleman (1859) 1 F & F 53. ............................................................................... 11
Juggan Khan v. State, AIR 1963, MP 102 ............................................................................... 14
Kakar v. R (1924) 25 Cr LJ 1005. ........................................................................................... 12
Krishna v. R, AIR 1917 Cal 676 .............................................................................................. 14
Makin v. Attorney General for NSW, (1894) A.C. 57 ............................................................ 18
Mansell v. Clements (1874) LR 9 CP 139 ............................................................................... 11
ML Pritchard v. Emperor, AIR 1928 Lah 382 ......................................................................... 13
NN Burjorjee v. Emperor, AIR 1935 Rang 456 ...................................................................... 16
Queen- Empress v. Amba Prasad............................................................................................. 17
Queen- Empress v. Jogendra Chunder Bose ............................................................................ 17
R V. Armstrong........................................................................................................................ 16
R v. Debendra Prasad ILR 36 Cal 573 ....................................................................................... 9
R v. Harrison- Owen, (1915) 2 All. E.R. 726 .......................................................................... 18
R v. Johnson (1895) 2 C & K 354 ........................................................................................... 12
R v. Mortimer........................................................................................................................... 16
R v. Prabhudas (1874) 11 BHCR 90 ........................................................................................ 14
R v. Richardson (1860) 2 F & F 343 ......................................................................................... 8

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R v. Whilley (1892) 2 Leach’s CC 983 ..................................................................................... 9
R v. Yakub, AIR 1917 All 251 ................................................................................................ 14
R. v Mason (1914) 10 Cr App Rep 169 ..................................................................................... 9
Raghunath v. R, AIR 1919 Cal 1084 ......................................................................................... 9
Ram Sumiran Pandey v. Emperor, AIR 1942, Pat 291. ........................................................... 13
Ramzan v. Emperor, AIR 1935 Sindh 203 .............................................................................. 10
Rex v. Rhodes .......................................................................................................................... 17
Shankar Gopal Patil & Ors. V. The State Of Maharashtra, MANU/MH/0541/2000 ............... 7
Srinivasmal Bairoliya v. Emperor, AIR 1947 pc 135 .............................................................. 16
State of Bombay v. Purshottam, AIR 1952 SC 317 ................................................................. 10
Thomas v. Connell (1838) 4 M & M 267 ................................................................................ 12
Vacher v. Cocks (1829) M & M 145 ....................................................................................... 12
Wilson v. Wilson (1872) LR 2 P & C 435, 444. ...................................................................... 11
Wright v. Tatham (1834) 7 A & F, 313 ................................................................................... 11

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INTRODUCTION
 WHAT EVIDENCE IS?

Most lawyers and students think of evidence as a collection of rules governing

what facts maybe proved in court, what materials may be placed before the court
to prove those facts, and the form in which those materials should be placed before
the court. What they have in mind is the law of evidence, but not evidence itself.
One of the curiosities of the common law is the emergence of rules of evidence
whose purpose is not to enable a party to bring before the court evidence which
might help his case, but to prohibit a party from bringing some kinds of evidence
if his opponent objects, or even if the court itself refuses to permit it. Because of
the demands made by the realities of practice, it is only natu ral that familiarity
with the rules should be emphasized. What is taught and examined in the field of
evidence is the law of evidence. Yet there is a whole field of inquiry which related
to evidence itself, rather than the law of evidence. The field is a f ascinating
mixture of logic, epistemology, sociology, psychology, and the forensic sciences,
and is, therefore, wide enough to encompass a vast library of its own. Its concern
is the use of evidence as material in the reconstruction of past events. 1

It is a field which has attracted a distinguished, but relatively small number of

investigators, at least as far as lawyers are concerned, and some of its main
contributors have been philosophers and psychologists. Some of these
contributors, for example, Jeremy Bentham, while deeply interested in Science of
Evidence, actually disapproved of the whole concept of a law of evidence.
Bentham perceived rules of evidence to be nothing more than an artificial
restriction on the science of evidence, invented by lawyers for less than honourable
purposes. 2 John Henry Wigmore, the dean of American evidence writers, required
his students to master the science of evidence before turning to the law (a luxury

1
Murphy on Evidence.
2
Namely increasing their potential for earning fees, and making it impossible for lay people to
penetrate the complexities of the law. Bentham saw the attitudes of lawyers as the most
dangerous obstacle to reform. His excoriation of the judiciary and the p rofession in his
monumental treatise on evidence, The Rationale of Judicial Evidence (1827) was, however,
weakened by its intemperance. There are rules of public policy which support some rules of
evidence.

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now foreclosed by the tyranny of practice - based syllabi and examinations) and
developed through cumbersome system for the methodological analysis of
evidence to be presented in court. 3

Evidence in general terms maybe defined as any material which has the potential
to change the state of fact -finder’s belief with respect to any factual proposition
which is to be decided and which is in dispute. In more formal terms, Achinstein
defines Evidence as follows:

Evidence E is potential evidence on hypothesis H if and only if (1) is true; (2) E

doesn’t make H necessary; (3) the pro bability of H on E is substantial; and (4) the
probability of an explanatory connection between H and E is substantial. 4

Although, the definition doesn’t make clear the logical role of evidence in proving
a hypothesis. It is, of course, a logical rather t han a legal definition, appropriate
to scientific inquiries of any kind. But, lawyers have superimposed on it the
particular requirements of their own interests in the uses of evidence.

 What is PSYCHOLOGICAL FACT?

In the law of evidence. A fact which can only be perceived mentally; such as the
motive by which a person is actuated. 5

In Sarkar on Evidence 1999, Fifteenth Edition on page 41 the word 'fact' has been
considered by the Author as:

"Bentham has classified into physical and psychological . By "physical facts"

are meant such as either have their seat in some inanimate being or if in one that
is animate, then not by virtue of the qualities which constitute it such: while
"psychological facts" are those which have their seat in an animate being by virtue
of the qualities by which it is constituted animate. Thus, the existence of visible
objects, the outward acts of intelligent agents, range themselves under the former
class: while to the latter belong such as only exist in the mind of an individual. " 6

3
Principles of Judicial Proof (1913).
4
P. Achinstein, The Nature of Explanation (1983).
5
Burrill, Circ. Ev. 130, 131.
6
S HANKAR G OPAL P ATIL & O RS . V . T HE S TATE OF M AHARASHTRA , MANU/MH/0541/2000 .

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In India, it is to be noted that psychological facts, if proved in the court of law are
relevant facts so as to proof that an evidence is admissible. Section 14 of the
Evidence Act, 1872 is the corroborating to the above statement as it states that:

“F ACTS SHOWING THE EXIS TENCE OF ANY STATE O F MIND , SUCH AS INTENTION ,

KNOWLEDGE , GOOD FAITH , NEGLIGENCE , RASHNESS , ILL - WILL OR GOOD - WILL

TOWARDS ANY PARTICUL AR PERSON , OR SHOWING THE EXIS TENCE OF ANY STATE

OF BODY OR BODILY FE ELING , ARE RELEVANT , WHEN THE EXISTENCE OF ANY SUCH

STATE OF MIND OR BOD Y OR BODILY FEELING , IS IN ISSUE OR RELE VANT .”

The first explanation makes it clearer as to ascertain the state of mind of a person,
the fact must show that the state of mind exists, NOT GENERALLY, but in
reference to the particular matter in question.

Thus, if the existence of a mental or bodily state of bodily feeling is, as is assumed
by the section, in issue or relevant, it is clear that facts from which the existence
of such mental or bodily state or bodily fee ling may be inferred are also relevant. 7

7
Evidence under S. 14 or next is not admissible, when the case depends on the proof of actual
facts and not upon the state of mind, Gokul v. R, AIR 1925 Cal 674; Ja g Mohan v. State 1995
JCC 1 (Del).

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S TATE OF M IND OR OF B ODY OR , B ODILY
F EELING
Facts, it has been seen, are either physical or psychological; the former being the
subject of perception by the sense and the latter the subject of consciousness. 8 A
person may testify to his own intent. But, if he acts and conduct are shown to be
at variance and inconsistent with the intent he swears to, his own testimony in his
own favour would ordinarily obtain very little credit. 9 Of facts, which cannot be
perceived by the sense, intention, fraud, good faith and knowledge are examples, 10
But a man’s intention is a matter of fact capable of proof.

T HE STATE OF A MAN ’ S MIND IS AS MUCH A FACT AS THE STATE OF HIS

DIGESTION . I T IS TRUE THAT IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO PROVE WHAT THE STATE

OF A MAN ’ S MIND AT A PARTICULAR TIME IS ; BUT IF IT CAN BE AS CERTAINED

IT IS AS MUCH A FACT AS ANYTHING ELSE . 11

The latter class of facts, however, are incapable of direct proof by the testimony
of witnesses; their existence can only be asce rtained either by the confession of
the party whose mind is their sear or by presumptive inference from physical facts.
It has been debated whether the ‘opinion rule’ excludes testimony to another
person’s state of mind. 12 But, it may be safely and in gener al said that a witness
must speak to facts and let the inference from those facts be drawn by the court or
jury. 13 This action is in accordance with the principle laid down in numerous
cases 14 that, to explain states of mind, evidence is admissible, though i t doesn’t
otherwise bear upon the issue to be tried. As regards this principle, there is no
difference between civil and criminal cases. 15 The present section in context with
the project report makes for general provision for the subject, and the next secti on
is a special application of the rule contained in this present one. The subject of the
existence of states of mind is one of the most important topics with which judicial

8
Vide, S. 3, Ill (d).
9
John Henry Wignmore, Treatise on Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 3 r d Ed, Little, Bro wn
& Co, Boston, 1940
10
First Report of the Select Committee, 31 March 1871
11
Edington v. Fitzmaurice (1885) 2 9 Ch D 459 per Bowen LJ.
12
John Henry Wignmore, Supra note 9.
13
Swift, Evidence, P 111.
14
Judgment of Williams J in R v. Richardson (1860) 2 F & F 34 3.
15
Blake v. Albion Life Assurance Society (1878) 4 CPD 94 .

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enquires are concerned; in criminal cases, they are the main considerations; and
in civil cases, they are often highly material, as for instance, where there is a
question of fraud, malicious intention, or negligence. The present section is framed
to avoid all technicalities as to the class of cases or the time within which the fact
given as evidence of mental or bodily condition, must have occurred. The only
point for the court to consider, in deciding upon the admissibility of evidence
under this section, is, whether the fact can be said to show the existence of the
state of mind or body under investigation. The same considerations will, it is
apprehended, determine the question of the admissibility of facts subsequent to
the fact in issue to prove intent and other like question. 16 So also, though the
collateral facts sought to be proved shouldn’t be so remote in time as not to afford
a reasonably certain ground for inference, yet such remoteness will, as a rule, go
to the weight of the preferred evidence only. 17 In the next case cited, the appellant
was convicted under S. 209, IPC 1860 of having made false claims in three suits
brought against certain persons. Two other persons, besides the appellant were
similarly prosecuted and convicted for bringing other false suits against the same
defendants. It was held that the evidence relating to suits by the appellant other
than those specified in the charges were properly admitted under this and the next
section for the purpose of showing the ill -will or enmity of the appellant towards
the defendants, in those suits as a body, but the evidence r elating to suits brought
by other persons, when no case of a conspiracy between them and the appellant
was alleged or established, was inadmissible. 18 When the allegation against the
accused, an officer, was that he was acting in pursuance of the policy of the
Ittehad- Ul- Muslimen, that his state of mind was to exterminate the Hindus, it was
held that he was entitled to lead evidence to show that he di dn’t possess that state
of mind but that, on the other hand, his behaviour towards the Hindus throughout
his official career had been very good and he couldn’t possibly think of
exterminating them. 19

Evidence of character and state of mind is admissible und er Ss. 8, 14 and 53. 20

16
R. v Mason (1914) 10 Cr App Rep 169 ; R v. Debendra Prasad ILR 36 Cal 573 .
17
R v. Whilley (1892) 2 Leach’s CC 983 ; cited in R v. Vajiram 16 Bom 414.
18
Raghunath v. R, AIR 1919 Cal 1084 .
19
Habeeb Mohammad v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1954 SC 51 .
20
Ashok Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1980 MPLJ 300 .

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PROOF OF MENTAL AND PHYSICAL CONDITIONS

T
he mental and physical conditions of a person maybe proved either by that
person speaking directly to his own feelings, motives, intentions, and the
like, or by the evidence of another person detailing facts from which the
given condition may be inferred; but such other person may not, in general, testify
the state of mind of the first, as to which he can have no direct knowledge, and
may only state those external and perceptible facts, which may form the material
of the court’s decisions. 21

The state of a man’s mind is a question of fact. 22 Whether the state of mind
of a person should be proved by the evidence of that person himself or by the
evidence of another person, it is not a question of law.

As a matter of abstract law, the state of man’s mind can be proved by evidence
other than that of the man himself. But whether that would be enough in any given
case, or whether the ‘best evidence rule’ should be applied in strictness in that
particular case, must necessarily depend upon its facts. 23

A distinction has to be drawn between simple mental phenomena, which can

be inferred from the acts relevant, and complex mental phenomena, which will be
no guide on the basis of which one can prove those phenomena and raise an
inference about their existence. 24

In assessing the value of medical evidence to prove injuries on the body of a person
who took the plea of exercise of the right of private defence, what the Doctor had
done in the matter of the grant of certificate in another case is irrelevant. 25

The question of the admissibility of evidence of similar facts under this section is
not free from difficulty. That the question is yet not solved in a wholly satisfactory
way, appears from a collation of criminal appeals. 26

21
Phipson, Evidence, 13 t h Edn, pp 92 -93.
22
Ramzan v. Emperor, AIR 1935 Sindh 203 .
23
State of Bombay v. Purshottam, AIR 1952 SC 317 .
24
Anant Baburao Sawant v. State, AIR 1967 Bom 109
25
Dariyao v. State, 1969 Cr LJ 1273
26
Roscoe’s Criminal Evidence 16 Edn., P. 96, 1952.

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The Existence of a particular state of mind may be proved in the following ways:

1. BY EVIDENCE OF PERSON CONCERNED

The state of man’s mind may be proved by the evidence of the person himself. In
a case for malicious prosecution, where the defendant himself was called and asked
in chief. ‘Had you any other object in view, in taking proceedings, then to further
the ends of justice?’ The question was admitted. 27 And in cases of obtaining goods
on false pretences, the prosecutor is constantly aske d, not only in cross-
examination, but in chief, with what motive, or for what reasons, or on what
impression he parted with the goods. 28 So, on a question of domicile, A may state
what his intention was in residing in a particular place. 29 In a suit by a house agent
against the former owner of a house, in which the question was, whether the former
was entitled to receive from the latter, a commission by reason of having effected
the sale of the house ‘through his intervention’, the judge at the trial, in orde r to
ascertain whether any acts of the plaintiff conducted to the completion of the sale,
put the following question to the purchaser; ‘Would you, if you had not gone to
the plaintiff’s office and got the card ( a card to view the premises, with terms of
sale written by the plaintiff’s clerk on the back), have purchased the house’ and,
overruling an objection, received his answer, which was, ‘I should think not’. 30

2. BY EVIDENCE OF OTHER PERSONS

It is obvious that in many cases, such evidence may not be reliab le, and in other
cases, may not be had. The mental and physical conditions of a person must then
be proved by the evidence of other persons who speak to the outward
manifestations known to them, of states of mind and body. Such manifestations
may be either by conduct, conversation or correspondence. 31

3. CONTEMPORANEOUS MANIFESTATIONS

To prove mental and physical conditions ‘all contemporaneous manifestations’ of

the given condition, whether by conduct, conversation, or correspondence maybe

27
Hardwick v. Coleman (1859) 1 F & F 53.
28
IBID, See, R v. Hewgill Dear C 315.
29
Wilson v. Wilson (1872) LR 2 P & C 435, 444.
30
Mansell v. Clements (1874) LR 9 CP 139 .
31
Wright v. Tatham (1834) 7 A & F, 313 .

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given in evidence as part of the res gestae, it being for the court or jury to consider
whether they are real or feigned. Thus, the answers of patients to enquiries by
medical men and others are evidence of their state of health, provided, they’re
confined to contemporaneous symptoms and are not in the nature of a narrative as
to how, by whom, such symptoms were caused. 32 And, if the condition of the
patient before or after the time in issue, be material, his declarations at such time
as to his then present situation, are equal ly receivable. 33 A statement of an accused
immediately after an occurrence, maybe relevant to show the state of his mind. 34
Not only may a party’s own statements, but those made to him by third persons 35,
be proved for the purpose of showing his state of mind at a given time. 36 Thus,
where the question was whether a person knew that he was insolvent at a certain
time, his own statements implying consciousness of the fact, as well as letters
from third persons refusing to advance him money, were held to be admis sible
after the fact of his insolvency had been proved independently. 37

4. COLLATERAL FACTS
In addition to evidence of contemporaneous manifestations of the given condition,
collateral facts are admitted to show the existence of a particular state of mind.
Acts unconnected with the act in question are frequently to prove psychological
facts such as intent. 38

5. SIMILAR ACTS
In order to show them, similar acts done by the party are relevant, but similar acts
are not relevant to prove the existence of the particular fact in issue, being
inadmissible for the purpose under the rule by which similar but unconnected acts
are excluded.

32
Averson v Kinnarid (1805) 6 East 188
33
R v. Johnson (1895) 2 C & K 354
34
Kakar v. R (1924) 25 Cr LJ 1005.
35
Vacher v. Cocks (1829) M & M 145
36
Phipson, Evidence, 13 t h Edn 97, 98.
37
IBID, 105; Thomas v. Connell (1838) 4 M & M 267 .
38
WM Best, Evidence, P. 255

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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE
KNOWLEDGE OR INTENTION OR OTHER STATE OF
MIND
It is the admissibility of evidence under the third heading, to prove knowledge,
that has to be considered here. It is settled law, that neither under this section nor
under S. 15, can the evidence of facts similar to but not part of the same transaction
as the main fact be received for the purpose of provi ng the occurrence of the main
fact, which must be established by the evidence directly bearing on it. But when
the existence of that fact has been so established and a question arises as to the
state of mind of the person who did it, or whether the act In question was done
accidentally or with a particular knowledge or intention, that evidence of similar
acts may, under certain conditions, be admitted. 39 The section applies only to cases
where the question of guilt or innocence depends upon facts, as it does at a trial
for the offence of arson. 40 Evidence of a collateral offence cannot be received as
substantive evidence of the offence on trial, though und er this section, evidence
maybe given of intention and like matters where the factum of such intention or
like matters was relevant. 41 Evidence tending to show that the accused has been
guilty of criminal acts other than those covered by the indictment is n ot admissibly
unless upon the issue, whether the acts charged against the accused were designed
or accidental, or unless to rebut a defence otherwise open to him. 42 Thus, when a
man, in his trial for a specific crime, such as uttering a forged note or coin, or
receiving an article of stolen property, the issue is whether he is guilty of that
specific act. To admit, therefore, as evidence against him other instances of a
similar nature, clearly is to introduce collateral matter. This cannot be with the
object of inducing the court to infer that, because the accused has committed a
crime of a similar description on other occasions, he is guilt of the present; but to
establish the criminal intent and to anticipate the defence that he acted innocently
and without any guilt of knowledge of that he had no intention or motive to commit

39
ML Pritchard v. Emperor, AIR 1928 Lah 382 at 387.
40
AH Gandhi v. King, AIR 1941 Raj 324
41
Goma Rama v. Emperor, AIR 1945, Bom 152 .
42
Ram Sumiran Pandey v. Emperor, AIR 1942, Pat 291.

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the act, and generally to interpret acts, which without the admission of such
collateral evidence, are ambiguous. 43

In other words, the existence of the fact in issue must be always in dependently
established, and for this purpose, evidence of similar and unconnected acts is
inadmissible, but when once the fact in issue is so established, such similar acts
may be given in evidence to prove the state of mind of the party by whom it was
done. 44 Thus, in a trial of forgery, proof of similar transactions, which are not the
subject of the charge is admissible as evidence of intention, but not of the
forgery, 45 and, in a trial for cheating, evidence of a similar trick (a suggestion that
a certain person would lend money) in another case was admitted to prove the state
of mind of the accused. 46 Where a medical practitioner is tried for causing death
of a patient by administering a lethal dose of DHATURA and the prosecution
shows that even a man of no education is aware of the extremely poisonous nature
of DHATURA, but the defence is that there are cases in which the drug has been
successfully administered for curing a certain disease, it is open to the prosecution
to show that the previous experiment carried out by the accused himself, in exactly
similar circumstances, had shown him that, far from being a cure, the drug was
certain killer. 47

When several offences are so connected that proof of one can be arrived at
through evidence going to prove the others, the evidence is not on that account
excluded. 48

Q.) WHETHER THE STATE OF MIND, GUESS OR INTELLIGENT GUESS OR AN

INFERENCE BE REGARDED AS FACT WITHIN THE MEANING?
“Fact” has been defined by the Indian Evidence Act, in S. 3 to include any mental
condition of which any person is conscious; as has been observed by Lord Justice
Bowan, “the state of mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion”. It is,
however, necessary to note that it is only a mental condition of which a person is
conscious which falls with the inclusive definition of the term “fact”. Section 14

43
Baharuddin v. Emperor, AIR 1914, Cal 589 (2).
44
R v. Prabhudas (1874) 11 BHCR 90
45
Krishna v. R, AIR 1917 Cal 676
46
R v. Yakub, AIR 1917 All 251 .
47
Juggan Khan v. State, AIR 1963, MP 102
48
Prabhudas, Supra Note 44.

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of the Indian Evidence Act says what facts showing the existence of state of mind
are relevant.

The words used, viz. “intention”, “knowledge”, etc. used therein are preceded by
the expression “such as”. Therefore, apparently, what follows is an illustrative list
and is not necessarily exhaustive. On a close consideration, however, it appears
that the list was exhaustive except in those cases where a special plea of
unsoundness of mind, etc. has been raised. The expression used while defining
“fact”, viz., “of which any person is conscious” is significant in that connexion.
The object apparently is to make simple mental phenomena which could be
inferred from the acts relevant. As soon as we are dealing with complex mental
phenomena, such as, fear, apprehension, etc. there will be no guide on the basis of
which we can prove those phenomena and raise an infer ence about their existence.
Hence, it may be held between simple mental phenomena as mentioned in S. 14,
and complex mental phenomena. The question of the unsoundness of the mind
stands entirely on different footing. In any case, it appears clear that an i nference
which is arrived at by a process of rationcination doesn’t stand on the same footing
as a mental condition as defined in S. 3 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is settled
that all that need be mentioned in a sworn statement such as an affidavit is fa cts.
It will be difficult to categorize the guess or calculation which a person might
indulge in as a fact. 49

 ACTS SHOWING INTENTION, GOOD FAITH, ETC.

When there is a question whether a person said or did something, the fact that he
said or did something of the same sort on a different occasion, may be proved if it
shows the existence on the occasion in question of any intention, knowledge, good
or bad faith, malice or other state of mind or of any state of body or bodily feeling,
the existence of which is in issue or is deemed to be relevant to the issue; but such
acts or words may not be proved merely in order to show that person so acting or
speaking was likely on the occasion in question to act in a similar manner. 50

49
Anant Baburao Sawant v. State, AIR 1967 Bom 109.
50
Stephen, Digest of Law of Evidence, Art. 11, Page 15.

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PREVIOUS OR SUBSEQUENT FACTS
Both previous and subsequent events maybe relevant under this section as showing
the state of mind, 51 but as subsequent events can merely show the reflections of
what a man’s mind may have been, previous events are of more importance as
showing the influences which have worked upon the man’s mind to bring it into
the condition, that it was the moment under investigation. 52 Illustration (e) refers
to ‘previous publication’ and ill. (j) refers to threatening letters ‘previously sent”,
but in ill. (m), the test is merely proximity of time, not priority. In a case in which
the accused was tried on charge under S. 124 - A, IPC 1860, it was held, ‘Primarily,
anything he has written is, if it comes within the general words of S. 14, is relevant
and admissible.’ At the same time, of course, the writing should be within a
reasonable time of the particular occurrence, ie., the particular article or other
document in respect of which he is being charged. 53 But the question of proximity
of times goes rather to the weight to be gi ven to the evidentiary facts than to their
admissibility. It is, however, plain from all the decisions that the acts of which
evidence is tendered must be of the same specific kind as that in question. 54

In R V . A RMSTRONG , 55 where the accused was charged with the murder of his wife
by administering arsenic, evidence, that the accused had attempted to poison
another person with arsenic on a subsequent occasion, was held to have been
rightly admitted to rebut the defence that the wife had committed suicide and that
the arsenic was kept by the accused for an innocent purpose, namely, for killing
weeds. As also in R V. M ORTIMER , 56 where the charge was one of murder by
deliberately running down a woman bicyclist with a motor car, evidence was
admitted of similar attacks on other women, immediately before or after the
offence charged.

 EVIDENCE OF PREVIOUS & SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

51
Srinivasmal Bairoliya v. Emperor, AIR 1947 pc 135 .
52
NN Burjorjee v. Emperor, AIR 1935 Ran g 456
53
Emperor v. Philips S Pratt AIR 1928 Bom 78
54
AH Gandhi v. King, AIR 1941 Rang 324 .
55
(1922) 2 KB 555.
56
AIR 1947 PC 135.

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When the state of mind of a party with reference to a transaction is material all
facts from which it may be inferred, whether previous or subsequent thereto, are
in general admissible either for or against him. Subsequent events can merely show
the reflections of what man’s mind ma y have been, previous events are of more
importance as showing the influence which have been, previous events are of more
importance as showing the influence which have worked upon the man’s mind to
bring it into the condition that it was at the moment und er investigation. 57 Ill. (e),
S. 14, refers to “previous publications as being relevant in a libal case”; Ill. (j)
refers to threatening letters “previously sent”. On the other hand, Ill (m) doesn’t
insist on such priority. There the test is merely proximit y of time and not priority.
In Q UEEN - E MPRESS V . J OGENDRA C HUNDER B OSE , 58 which was one of the earliest
sedition trials in Bengal and where the accused was charged in regard to some
articles he had published, the Court allowed other subsequent articles to be put in
evidence. The point has been discussed in another sedition case from Madras, viz.
C HIDAMBRAM P ILLAI V. E MPEROR , 59 and there it will be found that even a
statement that the accused had made after he had been placed before the
committing Magistrate was considered to be admissible evidence of intention
under S. 14. Similarly, in the Allahabad Case in Q UEEN - E MPRESS V. A MBA
P RASAD , 60 the passage, in which Sir John Edge has referred to this point, certainly
makes no limitation in regard to this point of time or as to publication.

Primarily, anything that an accused has written is, if it comes within the general
words of S. 14, relevant and admissible. At the same time, of course, the writing
should be within a reasonable time of the particular occurrence, i.e. the particular
article or other document in respect of which he is being charged. 61 It was, no
doubt, held in the last cited cas e that the acts tendered must have been proximate
in time to that in question but the decision in R EX V. R HODES 62 shows that this
question of proximity of time goes rather to the weight to be given to the

57
N.N. Burjorjee v. Emperor, AIR 1935 Rang. 456 at p. 457
58
I.L.R. 19 Cal. 35
59
I.L.R. 32 Mad. 3
60
I.L.R. 20 All. 55 at p. 69
61
Emperor v. Philip Spratt, AIR 1928 Bom 78 at p. 79
62
(1889) 1 Q.B. 77

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evidentiary facts than to their admissibility. It is, however, plain from all the
decisions that the acts of which evidence is tendered must be of the same specific
kind as that in question. 63 A MRIT L AL H AZRA V. E MPEROR 64 is authority for this
proposition.

In criminal cases it is usually not sufficient to prove that the prisoner did the act
complained of. He may admit so much but plead that
PRIOR SIMILAR ACTS
the acts were not intentional but accidental, or that he
did them under some misapprehension which will entitle him to an acquittal. In
such a case the prosecution must show that he acted intentionally and under no
mistake and a most effective way of doing thi s is to show that he had done similar
acts before. However, if his defence is that the acts are not his acts at all because
he was in a state of automatism at the time, it seems that this cannot be rebutted
by evidence that he has committed similar acts be fore. 65 A was charged with the
murder of B, an infant whom she had promised to adopt and maintain on receipt
of a small premium from B’s mother. B’s body was
IN MURDER CHARGE
found buried in A’s garden in a condition which left
the cause of death uncertain. Evidence that A had received other infants from their
mothers on similar terms, who had afterwards disappeared, and that the bodies of
unidentified infants were found buried in the gardens of other houses occupied by
A was admitted to rebut the defence that B’s death was accidental. 66

63
A.H. Gandhi v. King, AIR 1941 Rang 324.
64
ILR 42 Cal 957
65
R v. Harrison- Owen, (1915) 2 All. E.R. 726
66
Makin v. Attorney General for NSW, (1894) A.C. 57

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CONCLUSION
Which facts are relevant to the fact in issue is usually a matter of reason or
experience but sometimes a matter of law (i.e., where a presumption of law
operates). The connecting link between a fact in issue and a fact alleged to be
relevant thereto is often a presumption of law or of fact. To put in another way, it
is permissible, in establishing a fact in issue, to prove the existence of a basic fact
or facts from which a conclusion must by law, or may, by the use of reason o r
experience, be drawn that the fact in issue exists. 67 The project report based on S.
14 is grounded on the principle that when the intention of the accused is a relevant
fact evidence of similar transaction both prior and subsequent to the alleged
offence is admissible as evidence of intention. The principle on which evidence
on similar acts is admissible, is not to show that, because the defendant has
committed one crime, he would, therefore, be likely to commit another but to
establish the animus of the act and rebut, by anticipation, the defences of
ignorance, accident, mistake or some innocent motive or intention. 68

It is plain that S. 14 is of assistance where the existence of a state of mind such as

intention, knowledge, good faith, negligence, rashnes s, ill- will or good will
towards a person or the existence of a state of body or bodily feeling in issue.

67
Phipson, Manual of Evidence, 8 t h Ed, p. 33
68
Phipson, Evidence, 4 t h Ed. P 153.

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