Although divorce is not allowed under Philippine laws, Article 26 of the Family Code recognizes the

validity of a divorce decree obtained in a foreign country in respect of mixed marriages. Article 26,
particularly second paragraph thereof, states:

Art. 26. X x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

For the provision to apply, the Supreme Court laid down the following requisites:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

It was held that under the second requisite it should be the foreigner spouse who initiated the divorce
proceeding. If it was the Filipino spouse who filed the case for divorce, the decree would not be
recognized as valid in the Philippines. Consequently, under Philippine laws, the Filipino spouse remained
married to his or her foreigner spouse and incapacitated to contract marriage. Recently, however, the
Supreme abandoned that view in Republic v. Manalo.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, – versus – MARELYN TANEDO MANALO,

Respondent.

G.R. NO. 221029

24 April 2018

Facts:

On January 20, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of
entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce
rendered by a Japanese court. The petition was later amended and captioned as a petition for recognition
and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

The petition alleged, among others, that:

 Petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHIDO

MINORO;
 Recently, a case for divorce was filed by petitioner in Japan and after due proceeding, a divorce
decree was rendered by the Japanese Court;

The trial court (RTC) denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in
Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine
law “does not afford Filipinos the right to file a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if
they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in
another country” and that unless Filipinos “are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws
shall have control over issues related to Filipino family rights and duties, together with determination of
their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including marriages”.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family
Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former,
capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary, et al. [663 Phil. 546
(2011)] ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of
the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to consider Manalo as still
married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the
fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential.

Issue:

Whether a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a favorable
judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has the capacity to
remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.

Ruling:

Yes.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry”. Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires
that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien
spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does
not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding.

The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country
where it is rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse...

The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country
where it is rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to
address the anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to
remarry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien
spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or a
wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as
a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision
should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect
of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operation of the latter’s national law.

There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding
and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of
the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in
an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make
a distinction between them are based merely on superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce
proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly
discriminate against the other.
Thus, a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a favorable
judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has the capacity to
remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
GARCIA v. DRILON
G.R. No. 179267
June 25, 2013
699 SCRA 352

FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity
emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent wounded.
Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take
away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle,
she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold
office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against
respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA
9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING: No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition
against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put
them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of
women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between
men and women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims
of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human
rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special
remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact
essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or
middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal
protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution

Oposa vs Factoran

Legal Standing: Common and General Interest

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, JR

G.R. NO. 101083. 224 SCRA 792 July 30, 1993

OPOSA et al, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondents.

Facts:

The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as
an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-
profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the
protection of our environment and natural resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), continued approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial logging
companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests of the country. Petitioners request the defendant, his
agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

 Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

 Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license

agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are
so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource
property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have
exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served
upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country. Defendant, however, fails and
refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

Issues:

 Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.

 Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the

respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.

 Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the

requisite hearing violates the requirements of due process.

Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

 The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.

1. The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified

in his opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court.

According to him, the subject matter of the complaint is of common interest, making this civil

case a class suit and proving the existence of an actual controversy. He strengthens this

conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

2. The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as

generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can

only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a

balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,

considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means the created world in its entirety.

Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,

management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,

wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,

development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future

generations.

3. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the

full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion

of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their

obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

 The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with

sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the

complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.

1. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and

healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly

incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly

provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
 1. This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same

article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.

1. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles

and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any

of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of

rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly

and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all

governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in

the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.

 The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s pronouncement.

1. The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If

he had done so, Justice Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by

providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders

because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses

according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of

public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into

every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705)

which provides that when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify,

replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege

granted herein .

2. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property

or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.

Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18
July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The petitioners amend their complaint to
implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. VS. ALBIOS CASE DIGEST - CIVIL LAW

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. VS. ALBIOS G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

FACTS:
Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before the sala of Judge Calo in
Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed with the RTC a petition
for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. According to her, the marriage was a marriage in
jest because she only wed the American to acquire US citizenship and even arranged to pay him $2,000
in exchange for his consent. Adding that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived
as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state and
complying with their marital obligations. The court even sent summons to the husband but he failed to file
an answer.

Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios declaring that the marriage was void ab initio for lack of
consent because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to
be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00.. However, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) elevated the case to the SC. According to
the OSG, the case do not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest as the parties intentionally
consented to enter into a real and valid marriage. That the parties here intentionally consented to enter
into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American
citizenship would be rendered futile.

ISSUE:

Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

RULING:

NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there was real consent because it was
not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.

Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.

That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the
marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal
tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to
accomplish their goal.

Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer.

A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage.

Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of
consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence. None of these are present in the case.

Therefore, their marriage remains valid.

MBONG VS OCHOA

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children,
LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health,
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.

3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.

4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.

5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.

6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.

7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.

8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1. Power of Judicial Review

2. Actual Case or Controversy

3. Facial Challenge

4. Locus Standi

5. Declaratory Relief

6. One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:

1. Right to life

2. Right to health

3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech

4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom

6. Due process clause

7. Equal protection clause

8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:

Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1. Actual Case or Controversy

2. Facial Challenge

3. Locus Standi

4. Declaratory Relief

5. One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:

PROCEDURAL

Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess
locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the
issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or
issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a
decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is
a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court
may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of

Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in
the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people
to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the
fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component
rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are
externalized.

Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental
act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.

Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance,
of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.”

One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the
title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and
the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested
are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover,
this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to
cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law
must not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating
one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”

Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no

rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon
the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the
Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such
statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must
be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law;
and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.

Ruling/s:

SUBSTANTIAL
 1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and

medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence.

However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life
of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
“conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization.
Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization”
and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those
that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally
permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the
Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH
Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining
abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but
also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH
Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect
it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the
approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization.
This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of
contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.

2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court

believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to

the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the

provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or

pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices

will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these
devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot
determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.
 3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of

modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to

one’s dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law

contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one
religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5
of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program
through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g.
the petitioners.

4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the

spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and

autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social

institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a)

the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands

of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the

planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe

upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written
consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-
kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services.
Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may
assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may
be made in life-threatening procedures.

5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the

State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although

educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court

reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet
formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development
of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is
superior to that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather
than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in

developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the
religious beliefs of the petitioners.

6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several

terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH
Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under
Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.

The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and
rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from
rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law)
as well as from giving RH information and procedures.

The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms
“incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public
as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of

the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which

states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women,

and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does
not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide
priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section
14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions
especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of
reproductive health education

8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service

providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for

two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both

the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
 welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to

render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do

otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow
them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL

1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is

ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already

taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is

evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action

of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a

right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.

2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally

maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial

challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating

free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The

underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court,

under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual

controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine

whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our

Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of

the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional
human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been
violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions
and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the
simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive
branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of
the Filipino people.

3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied challenge,

still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded

certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by

a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule

on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one

occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,

taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly

injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.

The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance
of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially
pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their
proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as

petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-

reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for

prohibition under Rule 65.

5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the

various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are

interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed

in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears
to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the
Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the
contents of the assailed legislation.

Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the
following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health
facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to
refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement
of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care
service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act
that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily” in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELECG.R. No. 190582April 8, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBT’s). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for
registration with the COMELEC in 2006 as a party-list organization under Republic Act 7941, otherwise
known as the Party-List System Act. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the
organization had no substantial membership base. In 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a petition for
registration with the COMELEC upon which it was dismissed on moral grounds.

Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First Resolution, stating that “the
party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are
also the nation’s. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations
and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list
system will remain just that.” That “the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and
Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped into society
and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.” COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national poltical agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the
sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941. Thus Ladlad filed this petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner should be accredited as a party-list organization under RA 7941.

HELD:

The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the resolutions of the COMELEC. It also
directed the COMELEC to grant petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation.

The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies
with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Nowhere in the records has the respondent ever
found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the
requisites under RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment
clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious
justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.”

Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors.

The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to elections be
applied to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.