Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 90423 September 6, 1991

FRANCIS LEE, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PELAGIA PANLINO DE
CHIN, respondents.

Arturo S. Santos for petitioner.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated June 29, 1989 which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 129 at Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and reinstated
as well as affirmed in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 2,
same city. The RTC decision found the petitioner guilty of the crime of light coercion, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby

modified. The accused Francis Lee is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of light coercion, as penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 287 of the
Revised Penal Code and he is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of TWENTY
(20) DAYS of ARRESTO MENOR and to pay one-third (1/3) of the costs. (p. 40,
Rollo)

On the other hand, the MTC decision convicted the petitioner of the offense of grave
coercion, the pertinent portion of the same is hereby quoted as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Francis Lee, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Grave Coercion, as charged, defined and
penalized under Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of THREE (3) MONTHS, of arresto mayor, medium, and to
pay a fine of P250.00, with cost.

The accused is further ordered to indemnify the offended party, Pelagia Paulino de
Chin, by way of civil liability the sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages and the sum of
P2,000.00 as exemplary damages.

... (p. 33, Rollo)

The facts as stated by the respondent Court of Appeals are undisputed, thus:

At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of June 20, 1984, the complainant Maria
Pelagia Paulino de Chin, 23 years old, was fetched from her house at 112 BLISS
Site, 8th Avenue, Caloocan City by Atanacio Lumba, a bank employee, upon the
instruction of the petitioner Branch Manager Francis Lee of Pacific Banking
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as bank). Upon arriving at the office of Pacific
Banking Corporation located at Caloocan City, petitioner Francis Lee did not attend
to her immediately. After an hour later, the petitioner confronted the complainant
about a forged Midland National Bank Cashier Check No. 3526794, which the latter
allegedly deposited in the account of Honorio Carpio. During the said confrontation,
the petitioner Francis Lee was shouting at her with piercing looks and threatened to
file charges against her unless and until she returned all the money equivalent of the
subject cashier check. Accordingly, the complainant was caused to sign a prepared
withdrawal slip, and later, an affidavit prepared by the bank's lawyer, where she was
made to admit that she had swindled the bank and had return the money equivalent
of the spurious check. During her stay at the said bank, the complainant, who was
five (5) months in the family way, was watched by the bank's employees and security
guards. It was about six o'clock in the afternoon of the same day when the
complainant was able to leave the bank premises.

Upon the other hand, the petitioner, 37 years old, presented his version, basically a
denial of the charges, to wit: he was the Branch Bank Manager of Pacific Banking
Corporation. After having been informed that Midland National Bank Cashier Check
No. 3526794 was dishonored for being spurious, he examined the relevant bank
records and discovered that complainant Maria Pelagia Paulino de Chin was
instrumental in inducing their bank to accept the subject dollar check and was also
the one who withdrew the proceeds thereof, by utilizing a withdrawal slip purportedly
signed by Honorio Carpio. Petitioner, thru Atanacio Lumba, invited the complainant
to his office. Responding to his invitation, the complainant arrived at the bank before
noon of June 20, 1984, but was not attended to immediately as the petitioner had to
attend to other bank clients. The complainant was merely informed about the subject
fake dollar check that was deposited with said bank upon her assurance that it was
genuine. The complainant was not compelled into signing the withdrawal slip, but
she acted freely and voluntarily in executing her affidavit and in returning the money
equivalent of the subject check. There was nothing unusual during her lengthy stay
in the bank. (pp. 44-45, Rollo)

The sole issue posed in this petition is whether or not the acts of petitioner in simply
"shouting at the complainant with piercing looks" and "threats to file charges against her"
are sufficient to convict him of the crime of grave coercion (p. 6, Rollo).

Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 286. Grave coercions. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without authority of
law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not
 prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right
or wrong.

If the coercion be committed for the purpose of compelling another to perform any
religious act or to prevent him from so doing, the penalty next higher in degree shall
be imposed.

Considering that the present case does not involve violence but intimidation, the provisions
of Article 1335 of the New Civil Code on intimidation are relevant. It states:

Art. 1335. ...

There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a

reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or
property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants,
to give his consent.

To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person
shall be borne in mind.

A threat to enforce once's claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or
legal, does not vitiate consent.

As a general rule, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals command utmost respect.
However, such findings are disregarded if there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of
which has been misinterpreted that, if considered, would affect the result of the case (see
San Sebastian College v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 84401, May 15, 1991).

While the appellate court emphasized the pregnancy and feminine gender of the
complainant, it overlooked other significant personal circumstances which are material in
determining the presence of coercion in this case.

The records show that complainant is a highly educated person who is familiar with banking
procedures. She is a graduate of Business Administration major in Banking and Finance
from NCBA. She also finished one semester of MA in graduate school. In 1983,
complainant worked with the Insular Bank of Asia and America as a bank teller (TSN,
November 20, 1984, pp. 5-7; Records, pp. 96-98).

Likewise, it appears that complainant actively participated in the deposit and withdrawal of
the proceeds of the controversial check. We find that she told Honorio Carpio (Carpio, for
short), a relative and payee of the check; to open a savings account with the Pacific
Banking Corporation (Bank, for short) and accompanied him; that subsequently, she
presented a Midland National Bank Cashier's check payable to Carpio in the sum of
$5,200.00 to Mr. Lamberto R. Cruz (Cruz, for short), PRO Manager, Foreign Department;
that she claimed that she was requested by her uncle to deposit the check for collection;
that she was a bank depositor and she "knew somebody downstairs"; that she assured
Cruz that the check would be honored between banks (TSN, April 15, 1985, pp. 89-92;
Records, 180-183); that on June 11, 1984, the bank, after the usual clearing period, sent
out a notice to Carpio that the proceeds of the check were already credited to his account
but the same was returned to the bank because the address was false or not true; that the
total amount of the check in pesos was P92,557.44; that the total deposit of Carpio was
P92,607.44, his initial deposit of P50.00 being added to the amount of the check; that on
the same day, complainant personally inquired from the bank whether the proceeds of the
check have already been credited to Carpio's account (TSN, June 11, 1985, p. 163,
records, p. 163); that upon an affirmative answer, the bank records show that on that day,
the complainant withdrew the sum of P12,607.00 thru a withdrawal slip purportedly signed
by Carpio; that in the interim, Carpio allegedly left abroad (Annex C, p. 17, Records); that on
June 13, 1984, she withdrew the sum of P80,000.44 from Carpio's account by means of a
withdrawal slip allegedly signed by Carpio and then, she closed his account; that out of the
said amount, she redeposited the sum of P50,000.00 to her own savings account and
received in cash the remaining balance of P30,000.44; and on June 15 and 18, 1984,
complainant withdrew the amounts of P2,000.00 and P18,000.00, respectively from her
savings account (Exh. "3", Records, p. 15, in relation to TSN, October 8, 1985, pp. 194-195,
Records, pp. 286-287).

In the light of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner's demand that the private respondent
return the proceeds of the check accompanied by a threat to file criminal charges was not
improper. There is nothing unlawful on the threat to sue. In the case of Berg v. National City
Bank of New York (102 Phil. 309, 316), We ruled that:

... It is a practice followed not only by banks but even by individuals to demand
payment of their accounts with the threat that upon failure to do so an action would
be instituted in court. Such a threat is proper within the realm of the law as a means
to enforce collection. Such a threat cannot constitute duress even if the claim proves
to be unfounded so long as the creditor believes that it was his right to do so.

The Solicitor General argues that the complainant was intimidated and compelled into
disclosing her time deposit, signing the typewritten withdrawal slip and the affidavit by the
petitioner's threat to detain her at the bank.

At this point, there is a need to make a distinction between a case where a person gives his
consent reluctantly and against his good sense and judgment and where he gives no
consent at all, as where he acts against his will under a pressure he cannot resist. Thus,
in Vales v. Villa (35 Phil. 769, 789), We ruled:

... It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and independently in the eye of the law when
he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when he acts spontaneously and joyously.
Legally speaking he acts as voluntarily and freely when he acts wholly against his
better sense and judgment as when he acts in conformity with them. Between the
two acts there is no difference in law. But when his sense, judgment, and his will
rebel and he refuses absolutely to act as requested, but is nevertheless overcome
by force or intimidation to such an extent that he becomes a mere automaton and
acts mechanically only, a new element enters, namely, a disappearance of the
personality of the actor. He ceases to exist as an independent entity with faculties
and judgment, and in his place is substituted another — the one exercising the force
 or making use of the intimidation. While his hand signs, the will which moves it is
another's. While a contract is made, it has, in reality and in law, only one party to it;
and, there being only one party, the one using the force or the intimidation, it is
unenforceable for lack of a second party.

From these considerations it is clear that every case of alleged intimidation must be
examined to determine within which class it falls. If it is within the first class it is not
duress in law, if it falls in the second, it is.

The circumstances of this case reveal that the complainant, despite her protestations,
indeed voluntarily, albeit reluctantly, consented to do all the aforesaid acts.

Bearing in mind her involvement in the deposit and encashment of the check, the
complainant admitted to being nervous upon being informed that the check was spurious
(TSN, November 20, 1984, p. 15; Record, p. 106)

We find that complainant's lengthy stay at the bank was not due to the petitioner's threat. It
was rather due to her desire to prove her innocence. Her testimony on this point is a
revelation:

Atty. Dizon: (counsel for petitioner)

You are always talking of signing the withdrawal slip by force, is it not that earlier you
admitted that no actual force was employed upon you in connection with the signing
of this document and the force that you are claiming was the alleged shouting
against you coupled with the statement that you could not leave?

A Yes, sir.

Q When Mr. Lee was requiring you to sign the withdrawal slip did it not occur to you
to leave the bank?

Atty. Pangilinan:

The question has already been answered she said she cannot leave because she is
being threatened.

Atty. Dizon:

That was during the time when she first met Mr. Lee.

Court:

Witness may answer.

A When I was about to sign the withdrawal slip I inquired from him If I signed it I can
leave already but he insisted that I should not leave, Sir.
 Q When he told you that did it not occur to you to stand up and go out of the bank?

A No, Sir.

Q Why?

A He was insisting that I return the amount I have withdrawn especially on June 18
when I withdrew P18,000.00, Sir.

COURT:

The question is why did you not leave and disregarded him?

A Because I cannot just leave him that way, Your Honor.

Atty. Dizon:

Why? What was the reason that you cannot leave him?

A Because he is insisting that the responsibility of one person be my responsibility

and at that time I was feeling nervous and he did not tell me to stand up and leave,
Sir. (ibid, pp. 18-20, Records, pp. 109-111)

In her insistence to clear up her name, it is not farfetched for Us to think that the
complainant voluntarily but grudgingly returned the money to show good faith. Thus, it was
she who informed the petitioner about the existence of the RCBC Time Deposit Certificate
(Exh. "A", pp. 4-5, Records). The allegation that she did so because of petitioner's threats
came from the complainant herself. She has not been able to present any other witness to
buttress her claim.

Further, We find that contrary to complainant's allegations in her affidavit (ibid, p. 5) it was
not the petitioner who suggested the encashment of the RCBC Time Deposit Certificate but
her sister; and that again, it was not the petitioner who agreed to the sister's suggestion but
Cruz, the PRO Manager, Foreign Department of the bank (TSN, January 8, 1985, pp. 40-
41, Records, pp. 131-132).

Moreover, while complainant claimed that her freedom of movement was restrained, she,
however, was able to move about freely unguarded from the office of the petitioner situated
at the ground floor to the office of Cruz at the mezzanine floor where her sister found her
(ibid, pp. 39- 40, Records, pp. 130-131). Undoubtedly, during that time, there were many
bank clients who transacted business with the bank (TSN, November 20, 1984, p. 21;
Records, p. 112). The bank security guards then were at their posts. Complainant herself
admitted that they manifested no overt acts to prevent her from leaving despite the alleged
loud threats of the petitioner (ibid, pp. 20- 21, Records, pp. 111-112) which could be heard
considering that the door to petitioner's office was kept open (TSN, October 8, 1985, p. 184,
Records, p. 276). Given such atmosphere, the complainant still did not leave the bank.
The respondent court cited the prepared typewritten withdrawal slip and the non-
presentation of the complainant's passbook as indicators of her involuntary acts.

We disagree. The petitioner testified that the general rule was that the bank requires the
presentation of the passbook whenever withdrawals are made. However, there was an
exception to this rule, i.e. when the depositor is a regular customer in depositing or
withdrawing money in the bank (TSN, October 8, 1985, pp. 189-190, Records, pp. 281-
282). The prosecution failed to submit evidence to rebut his contentions. Besides, the trial
court's conclusion that the withdrawal slip was typewritten was without basis considering
that the complainant merely averred that the withdrawal slip was already prepared when
she signed it (Exh. "A", Records, p. 4).

We also take exception to the following ruling of the appellate court:

It must be noted that the position of a bank manager is one of prestige and dignity
and when the said bank was cheated or swindled it certainly reflects on the
capability and efficiency of the manager and one can just imagine the kind of mental
attitude and feeling of anger the latter would have towards the alleged swindler.
Shouting, raising of voice and dagger looks are common characteristics of an angry
man and that was what accused Lee exhibited to a fragile weaker sex and pregnant
offended party. It would be natural to get angry with someone who had victimized
you. Naturalness, however is not always righteous. It is like taking the law into your
hands and that was what the accused Lee did. (CA Decision, pp. 11-12, Rollo, pp.
52-53)

This pronouncement creates an impression that the petitioner had made a personal case
out of the situation. However, the evidence does not support this view. We find that at the
time the check was deposited and encashed, the petitioner was then on leave (TSN, June
11, 1985, p. 156; Records, p. 248). Under this circumstance, it is not fair to consider the
bank's mistake in accepting and paying the check as the petitioner's mistake which could
militate against his efficiency. The petitioner attributed the mistake in the payment of the
forged check to the usual risks in banking business. He stated:

Atty. Pangilinan, Private prosecutor (authorized by the Fiscal to prosecute the case
in the latter's stead)

Q So you no longer consider him (Carpio) as entitled in (sic) the proceeds of the
chek (sic) and therefore at that point of (sic) time you will now concede that the
payment made by you to him was a big mistake?

A When we were asking for the respondent and we were locating Honorio Carpio
and we cannot locate him, I consider that a mistake, Sir.

Q It was a big mistake as a matter of fact?

A When it comes to the falling of the business considering the big amount I would
say big mistake but only a mistake, it was a usual risk in banking business, Sir.
 Q But of course Mr. Lee, being a mistake that mistake will harm and tense your
personality as a Bank Manager?

A It is up to our Manager to decide but when it comes to other transactions I am

handling Three Million plus and considering that check I don't think with all modesty
it will affect me, Sir.

Q But you are called upon to try to recover any money which was in your judgment
was unlawfully taken from you by anybody

A When it comes to procedure I don't think it was unlawfully taken, as a matter of

fact it was our bank who credited this account, Sir.

Q So it is your bounded (sic) duty to recover money which was paid to someonelse
(sic) which payment is not due to him, am I correct?

A It is the duty of our lawyer to recover it, Sir.

Q Is it not a fact that your lawyer is only your agent?

Atty. Dizon:

I think we are going too far, it has nothing to do with the particular incident subject
matter of the criminal offense.

Court:

I see the point of the defense but the witness is very intelligent, I can see the point of
counsel, because in order not to effect his integrity he resorted to this, for example in
case of a bank employee who stole P500.00 and the other one is P200.00, it could
have the same mistake which is supposed to be admonished by removal. You
answer.

A Yes that is the same case whether it is small or big but when it comes to the
Manager the Head Office is very understanding when it comes to bogus checks and
of course my work is a supervisory. Sir. (ibid, pp. 170-171; Records, pp. 263-264)

The most telling proof of the absence of intimidation was the fact that the complainant
refused to sign the promissory note in spite of the alleged threats of the petitioner (TSN,
January 8, 1985, p. 48; Records, p. 139). American authorities have declared that "(t)he
force which is claimed to have compelled criminal conduct against the will of the actor must
be immediate and continuous and threaten grave danger to his person during all of the time
the act is being committed. That is, it must be a dangerous force threatened 'in praesenti.' It
must be a force threatening great bodily harm that remains constant in controlling the will of
the unwilling participant while the act is being performed and from which he cannot then
withdraw in safety." (State v. Hood, 165 NE 2d, 28, 31-32, Emphasis ours).
The complainant proferred excuses for her action. For one, she claimed that her sister's
presence helped her recover her composure (TSN, November 20, 1984, p. 29, Records, p.
120).

We are not persuaded. If indeed she had recovered her composure because of her sister's
presence, she could have just left the premises in a huff without encashing the RCBC Time
Deposit Certificate or if they (complainant and sister) were already at the RCBC, they could
have desisted from encashing the check and then could have left for home notwithstanding
the alleged presence of Mr. Lumba who was no longer in his own bank but among the
RCBC clients or she could have refused to sign the affidavit which was handed to her first
before the promissory note. Yet, she did neither of these logical possibilities.

Secondly, she averred that she refused to sign the promissory note because she was able
to read its contents unlike the affidavit and she realized that she would have a great
responsibility to return the amount taken by Carpio (ibid, pp. 27-28, Records, pp. 118-119).

Such an excuse is flimsy and weak. It is strange that complainant's sister, who was with
her, failed to corroborate her statement that she was denied the opportunity to read the
affidavit. Her bare assertion simply confirms the voluntariness of her actions. All her
disputed acts were geared towards proving her good faith. Complainant was willing to return
the sum of P48,000.00 she took since it was only up to this amount where her involvement
lies. However, as soon as she realized that she would have the enormous task of
reimbursing the bank the balance of the proceeds of the forged check allegedly taken by
Carpio, she refused to cooperate any further. Notwithstanding the alleged threats of
petitioner, she did not budge. Thus, We find it as a logical consequence that she merely
asked for the receipt of the P18,000.00 she deposited rather than the cancellation of her
earlier withdrawal. On this point, complainant claimed that after her refusal to sign the
document, she no longer insisted on the return of the money because she felt that it was the
only way she could leave the bank premises (TSN, November 20, 1984, p. 31, Records, p.
120). This pretense, however, was belied by her subsequent actuations. We find that she
and her sister left the bank unescorted to eat their snack; that they were required by the
petitioner to come back; and that they decided not to eat but instead went home (TSN,
November 20, 1984, pp. 31-32, Records, pp. 122-123 and January 8, 1965, pp. 49-50,
Records, pp. 140-141). With such behavior, We are at a loss to understand how coercion
could attach in this case. Obviously, the complainant has not been cowed into submission.

Against this backdrop, We hold that coercion did not exist in this case. Consequently, the
petitioner should be acquitted.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and a new one hereby
entered ACQUITTING the accused of the crime of grave coercion.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

G.R. No. 176291 December 4, 2009

JORGE B. NAVARRA, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, SAMUEL NAMANAMA, FELIXBERTO LAZARO and
DANILO MEDINA,Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The petition is one for certiorari.

Far East Network of Integrated Circuit Subcontractors Corporation (FENICS) leased the
premises of Food Terminal, Inc. (FTI) in Taguig, Metro Manila from 1995 up to 2002.

It appears that before the expiration of the lease contract or on the night of September 16,
2002, armed elements of the FTI took over the FTI premises in Taguig, Metro Manila and
forced two building custodians to leave following which the gates were welded, drawing
FENICS’ president- herein petitioner Jorge B. Navarra to file before public respondent,
Office of the Ombudsman, a complaint for grave coercion, malicious mischief, and/or grave
threats against herein private respondents Samuel Namanama (Namanama, head of FTI’s
legal department) and Danilo Medina (Medina, FTI’s Senior Manager) along with Felixberto
Lazaro (FTI’s Legal Assistant).

The pertinent portions of petitioner’s affidavit read:

x x x [On September 16, 2002] Gerry informed me that our people had already been ejected
from our premises and that they could not re-enter through the welded gates. Armed FTI
policemen were guarding the perimeters and FTI employees had forcibly opened the doors
to our building and had gone inside. x x x

In the morning of September 17, the employees working in our compound were not allowed
to enter the FENICS compound and were forced to stay outside the gates. xxx I went to the
group of FTI policemen who were positioned near Gate 1 and inquired from them why they
welded our gates and prevented our people from entering our place of work. They replied
that they were acting on orders from FTI higher-ups. I inquired on what grounds the FTI
management had ordered the take-over of our compound without a court order. They
replied that FENICS owed unpaid rentals to FTI and that "matagal nang plano ng aming
management na gawin ito." x x x

Then, I walked to Gate 2 which was not welded but which was guarded from both the
outside and the inside by FTI policemen without nameplates and FTI employees in civilian
clothes. x x x I talked to the security guards occupying the FENICS guard house inside Gate
2. I asked him if he could allow me to enter thru Gate 2. He replied that his orders were not
to allow anyone to go in, except FTI personnel. I asked what the FTI personnel were doing
inside. He said he did not know. I asked him who went inside. He mentioned the name of
Mr. [Felixberto] Lazaro as the only person he knew because he was the leader of the group.
xxx

xxxx

[At about 2:00 PM, a van] arrived and was heading towards Gate 2. [The driver was
signaled] to stop and identify himself. x x x A man got out and he was asked his named. He
identified himself as Danny Medin[a] of FTI Legal Department. [He was asked] why the
FENICS premises were padlocked and repossessed by FTI. Danny Medin[a] replied that
"FENICS owed rentals to FTI." He was asked what he and the people [with] him would be
doing inside FENICS. Danny Medin[a] answered that they were taking inventories. I told him
that FENICS personnel should be present to ensure that things would be done correctly.
Danny answered that the barangay was with them.1

The pertinent portions of the affidavit of petitioner’s witness Freddie San Juan, a FENICS
employee, read:

x x x Nang bandang mga alas 8:30 ng gabi ng [ika-16 ng Septiyebre 2002], x x x may isang
sasakyan ang Fuji Reynolds na lumalabas sa aming Gate 1 kaya binuksan ng kasama kong
si Jun Abalajen ang gate nang biglang dumating at pumasok sa nakabukas na gate ang
maraming taong naka-uniporme ng FTI police na may dalang mga baril at shotgun at
hinarangan ang L-300 na kasalukuyang minamaneho palabas na sana ng gate.

x x x Pinatigil ang sasakyan at pinalabas ang driver. Kinuha ang papel ng registration na
pinakita ng driver at hindi na binalik pagkatapos sigawan ang driver na lisanin na ang lugar.
Sinabi ng driver na may mga kargamento siyang kailangan ihatid sa mga proyekto ng Fuji
Reynolds ngunit siya ay pinilit na pinalabas ng mga armadong FTI police. Mahigit kumulang
sa tatlumpo (30) katao silang lahat.

Nagtanong kami kung bakit nila ginagawa iyon. Sinagot lang kami na utos ng mga Boss nila
(at kasama na doon ang isang Attorney Samuel Namanama). Natakot na rin ako dahil sa
dami nilang mga armado, may dalang mga shotgun, at sabay-sabay na nagsisigawan.
Pinilit nila kaming pina-alis sabay ang panakot na may masamang mangyayari sa amin
dahil bubuksan at papasukin na nila ang loob ng aming opisina. x x x Nakita ko rin na ang
kasama kong si Jun Abalajen ay pilit ding pinalabas at pilit pang kinukuha ang kanyang
bisikleta.

Pagkalabas namin, agad ni-welding nila ang paikot na steel bar sa poste ng aming Gate 1.
xxx

Noong nasa labas kami ng gate dahil napilitang lumabas at natakot na baka kami ay saktan
o barilin, sinabi ko sa mga FTI police na huwag sanang magkasakitan dahil pareho lang
kaming lahat na ginagampanan ang aming katungkulan. Nilista ko sa isang papel ang mga
pangalan ng ilan sa kanila na may mga pangalan sa kanilang uniporme. x x x Habang
sinusulat ko ang mga pangalan ng ilan sa kanila, biglang inagaw sa aking kamay ang aking
papel ng isang FTI policeman na walang nameplate o namepatch sa dibdib. Wala akong
magawa dahil bigla niyang ginawa iyon AT NARINIG KO NA MAY NAGPAPUTOK NG
BARIL SA LOOB NG FENICS COMPOUND. x x x

xxxx

Magdamag kaming nagbantay sa labas. Kinabukasan sa umaga ng ika-17 ng Septiyembre,

dumating ang mga empleyadong pumapasok sa FENICS compound ngunit sinalubong sila
ng mga FTI police x x x.2 (Capitalization in the original)

Donato Abalajen, another witness of petitioner, executed another affidavit substantially

corroborating that of Freddie de Juan.3

Neither petitioner nor FENICS employees had thereafter been allowed to enter the FTI
premises.

Upon the other hand, private respondents claimed that, among other things, they acted
under the orders of their superiors, and that FTI was merely exercising its right under a
Compromise Agreement forged between FTI and FENICS wherein FENICS undertook to
pay the outstanding obligation of a previous lessee of FTI, the pertinent portion of which
Compromise Agreement reads:

xxxx

In the event that FENICS shall default in at least three (3) consecutive monthly amortization
payments on its rental arrearages or one (1) semestral or annual payment of its current
rentals, FTI shall be entitled to rescind the lease contract without need of judicial action or
intervention and all unpaid rentals, including unpaid arrearages shall automatically be
considered due and demandable plus interest of one (1%) percent per month commencing
from due date.4

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

Private respondents also cited Article 21 of the lease contract between FTI and FENICS
which provides:

It is expressly agreed that if the rent hereby stipulated shall be unpaid after becoming
payable, whether formally demanded or not, or if any covenant herein contravened shall not
be performed or observed, then in any of said cases, it shall be lawful for the LESSOR to
re-enter the leased premises and the lease shall automatically terminated, without
prejudice, however, to the right of action of the LESSOR with respect to any covenant
herein contained. The LESSOR shall in such case, be entitled likewise to forfeit
improvements on the leased premises without any obligation to pay the value
thereof.5 (Underscoring supplied)

By Resolution of February 22, 2005, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer Janet
Cabigas-Vejerano found probable cause to hale private respondents into court for grave
coercion under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code6 under the following disquisition:
The strong assertion by the respondents that FENICS property was voluntarily opened to
them cannot stand in the light of the surrounding circumstances that precipitated the take-
over of FENICS premises. The undeniable facts, to wit: the circumstance of nighttime, the
overwhelming number of armed respondents as against two (2) caretakers of FENICS
marching at the compound, their failure to notify complainant of the date of actual
repossession, and their lack of any court order authorizing their action, convince this Office
that respondents truly abused their authority. This notwithstanding any rightful claim that FTI
may have over the subject property. No man is above the law. It is elementary even to
some respondents from the FTI legal department that any such kind of repossession
requires a court order to be implemented by the proper officer of the court, or at the very
least a notice to the party concerned, provisions in their contract notwithstanding, The
purported witness, a Barangay Tanod, did not even submit his account of what actually
transpired. He would have then attested to whether FENICS was indeed invited to observe
the inventory undertaken. It is unfortunate that respondents, who are government
employees at that, took the matter into their own hands.

Under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) the crime of Grave Coercion in
"imposed upon any person who, without any authority of law, shall, by means of violence,
threats, or intimidation, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong."

On the other hand, Grave Threats under Article 282, RPC, is imposed upon "any person
who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor or property of the latter
or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime."

xxxx

While it may be true that FTI had the right to collect payment for the outstanding obligation
of the company complainant represents, the immediate actual and imminent force employed
by the respondents to compel complainants caretakers to leave their posts at FENICS, and
to prevent complainant as President of FENICS as well as all other officers and employees
of FENICS from entering the compound, truly amount to coercion.

Notably, the presence of conspiracy in the present case is clear as it is founded on a firm
basis by sizing up the concerted action of all the respondents who have common criminal
design and purpose, which is to repossess the FENICS compound, and they in fact
succeeded.7 (Citation omitted)

The Ombudsman, on recommendation of Over-all Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P.

Gervacio, Jr., dismissed petitioner’s complaint, however, by Order of September 1, 2005. 8

In dismissing the complaint, public respondent held:

Records show that respondent Namanama sent several demand letters to Mr. Jorge
Navarra, the herein complainant, reminding the latter of their indebtedness to FTI and at the
same time warning him that in case of non-payment, FTI would resort to a more drastic
action.
In the same token, [in] the Compromise Agreement entered into between the FTI and
FENICS there is a proviso which states:

8. In the event that FENICS shall default in at least three (3) consecutive monthly
amortization payments on its rental arrearages or one (1) semestral or annual payment of
its current rentals, FTI shall be entitled to rescind the lease contracts without need of judicial
action or intervention and all unpaid rentals…"

In like manner, respondent Lazaro made mention that not only FENICS refused to comply
with the terms agreed upon in its Compromise Agreement with FTI but also subleased a
portion of the leased premises without approval of FTI.

On their entering FENICS premises, respondent Lorenzo [sic] argued that they only
exercised their authority to re-enter the premises because FENICS refused to pay its rentals
and due to its blatant violations of the terms and conditions of their Contract of Lease.

Indeed, while respondent may have acted in such a way, the same could be said to have
been done in good faith and without any intention of doing harm against their adversaries.

From the narrations given by the parties to this case, it has been established that FENICS
had been indebted to FTI in an aggregate sum of more than P35M and the check it paid the
latter even bounced; [a]lso FENICS even subleased its leased premises in violation of its
contract of lease. Thus, the long delay in its payment of its obligation to FTI could also be
said to have caused the latter undue injury. To resort to court at that time could even
prolong the situation inasmuch as court processes nowadays are also delayed. Hence, in
order to protect FTI’s interest, respondents herein have to resort to some extraordinary
measures as what was done under the circumstances.9

xxxx

In like manner, and except for his bare allegations/arguments, complainant-movant failed to
substantiate his claims. For one, why did he sign the Compromise Agreement if the same is
a mere draft considering that in the agreement, it has been specifically mentioned that
FENICS had agreed to pay P12,551,841.82 to FTI? Logic would dictate that no one could
ever affix his signature on a document, more particularly that which would create an
obligation on his part, if FENICS has not been indebted to FTI. (Italics in the original,
underscoring supplied.)

Hence, the present petition for review, petitioner arguing as follows:

All the elements of Grave Coercion were extant.

That a person prevented another from doing something not prohibited by law, or that he
compelled him to do something against his will, be it right or wrong. – In this case, Private
Respondents prevented Petitioner and his employees from entering their own premises.
They had also compelled Petitioner’s caretakers to leave the premises against their will.
That the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, either by material force or such
display of force as would produce intimidation and control of the will of the offended party. –
In this case, when Private Respondents entered the FENICS compound in the evening,
they had a contingent of about 20-30 armed personnel as against Petitioner’s two (2)
caretakers. They forced their way into the gates, threatened the caretakers and a driver,
admittedly destroyed one padlock and welded the gates to prevent entry.

That the person that restrained the will and liberty of another had not the authority of law or
the right to do so (that the restraint shall not be made under authority of law or in the
exercise of a lawful right.) – In this case, the possessor of the FENICS compound exhibited
its opposition to any takeover. Certainly, Private Respondents had no right to enter the
compound and evict the occupants against their will. They had no court order to evict the
existing occupants.10 (Italics in the original)

The Court finds for petitioner.

Ordinarily, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s determination of whether
probable cause exists, except when the Ombudsman commits grave abuse of discretion. 11

"Probable cause" is defined as "such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded

belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial."12

For grave coercion to lie, the following elements must be established:

1) that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; 2) that the prevention or
compulsion is effected by violence, threats, or intimidation; and 3) that the person who
restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so, or in other words, that the
restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right. 13
1avvphi 1

In the case at bar, the affidavits of petitioner and his witnesses prima facie show that the
elements of grave coercion are present.

Whether FENICS is indebted to FTI is immaterial. It is elementary that in no case may

possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who
objects thereto, and that he who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another
of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court if the holder should
refuse to deliver the thing.14

In United States v. Mena,15 the Court, affirming the conviction of therein respondent for
coaccion under Article 497 of the old Penal Code, rejected the defense that he owned the
carabaos which he forced therein complaining witness to release. It held:

The defendant was not clothed with any judicial or administrative authority, and it is a
maxim of the law that no man is authorized to take the law into his own hands and enforce
his rights with threats of violence, except in certain well-defined cases, where one acts in
the necessary defense of one’s life, liberty, or property, against unlawful aggression, and
manifestly the defendant can not successfully maintain that his action was taken in defense
of life, liberty or property. The carabaos were in the possession of the complaining witness
for the purpose of turning them over to the justice of the peace; the defendant denied the
right of the complaining witness to this possession and claimed the absolute right to
possession in himself; but in forcibly depriving the complaining witness of possessionof the
carabaos the defendant was not acting in defense of his right to the possession of the
carabaos from unlawful aggression, but rather asserting his right to take the possession
from another, and thus he himself became the aggressor.16

Private respondents Namanama and Medina cite the ruling in University of the Philippines
v. de los Angeles17 in which this Court, noting therein petitioner’s right to rescind the
contract – subject of the case, held:

x x x [T]he law definitely does not require that the contracting party who believes itself
injured must first file suit and wait for a judgment before taking extrajudicial steps to protect
its interest. Otherwise, the party injured by the other’s breach will have to passively sit and
watch its damages accumulate during the pendency of the suit until the final judgment of
rescission is rendered when the law itself requires that he should exercise due diligence to
minimize its own damages.18

Private respondents’ citation of the above-said ruling is misplaced. Unlike in the present
case, that case did not allege an act by which therein petitioner employed violence, threats,
or intimidation to compel therein respondent to relinquish possession of the premises
subject of the agreement.

As to good faith and lack of "any intention of doing harm against their adversaries" which
public respondent ascribes to private respondents, these are matters of defense which are
better ventilated during the trial than during the preliminary investigation. 19

In fine, public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s

complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the Ombudsman dated September
1, 2005 is SET ASIDE, and the Ombudsman is ORDERED to file an Information for Grave
Coercion under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice