A SURVEY OF DISBARMENT AND REINSTATEMENT CASES

IN PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE
By

Kremil S. David and Michelle Borromeo

PREFATORY REMARKS

Why do we call it “Bar” anyway?

The Florida Bar Website1 has this story to tell as to the origin of the word Bar and how it
came to be referred to as the members in the legal profession.

According to the website, the history of the term "bar" as representing a legal
organization dates from the early 1300s. The word originated when King Edward II established a

1 Florida Bar Website:

“History of the Florida Bar”, Available at
http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/TFBOrgan.nsf/2FC809811C0105238525671100692F1C/9C81ADC9FC9FC8A58525
6B2F006CD27B?OpenDocument Visited February 3, 2012.

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system of courts throughout his kingdom to settle disputes among the people. Judges moved
from village to village to hear and settle disagreements in the surrounding communities.

The people of this early era derived most of their entertainment and education in public
gathering places. Hearing the plights and disputes of fellow villagers was a great diversion for
them. As the courts grew in number, more people began attending these sessions as a social
gathering. Consequently, the court sessions had to be held in fields or commons to accommodate
the crowds.

It soon became necessary to set up boundaries to separate the spectators from the
proceedings. This was accomplished by surrounding the court with a square of logs. Only those
persons who were part of the court or party to the argument were allowed within the square of
logs or "bars." Thus, the terminology, "admission to the bar," became synonymous with
practicing law. The term "bar" since has come to mean an organized group practicing law in a
given locality.

In the Philippines, admission to the legal profession is a function solely vested in the
Supreme Court. Paragraph 5, Section 5 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
Supreme Court shall have the power to –

[p]romulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,

pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the integrated bar... (Emphasis supplied.)

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute,
its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been
demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly constitutes the most solid of
titles.2

Bar examinations therefore are supervised and administered by the Supreme Court to
determine whether an applicant for admission has the requisite legal learning or intellectual
qualification to become a member of the Bar. Every applicant for admission as a member of the

2 In
the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino
Cunanan, et al., March 18, 1954.

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bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character,
and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude,
have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.3

The power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the
power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested
exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally
renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it.4

The power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is
inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised
without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by
statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner that will give the party be disbarred a
fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature
or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power may provide that certain acts or
conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules merely
regulate the power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not
restrict the general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be
removed for other than statutory grounds.5

DISBARMENT – ITS NATURE, CONCEPT AND OBJECTIVE

Disbarment is the act of the court to in withdrawing from an attorney the privilege to
practice law. The name of the lawyer is stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys. And he does not
have the right to put in his name even the prefix “Atty.”. Neither can he sign pleadings even if he
does not personally appear in court. 6 Disbarment terminates the individual’s status as a lawyer.
As distinguished from Suspension, only the Supreme Court can disbar a lawyer, while the Court

3 Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

4 Inthe matter of proceedings for disciplinary action against Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen in L-27654, Antonio H.
Calero, vs. Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, G.R. no. L-27654 February 18, 1970.

5 Josefina Royon vs. Atty. Ariston Oblena, A.C. No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing 1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958
ed.] 698.

6 Ernesto L. Pineda, Legal Ethics, Central Bookstore: 2009, page 391.

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of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts are empowered to warn, admonish, reprimand and
suspend an attorney who appears before them for the practice of law. 7 Suspension is the act of
the court prohibiting an attorney from practicing law for a definite certain period. It amounts to
a qualified disbarment because the attorney is deprived temporarily of the right to practice his
profession.8

Since the membership to the Bar is being merely a privilege, such membership may be
suspended or removed from the lawyer by the granting authority for reasons provided in the
Rules , law and jurisprudence.9

In distinguishing the power to punish for contempt from the power to disbar, the
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Regalado opined that –

... the power to punish for contempt and the power to disbar are separate and distinct,
and that the exercise of one does not exclude the exercise of the other. A contempt
proceeding for misbehaviour in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the court;
on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the
court's officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the public
from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office. The
principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the
functions of the court and should thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not, on
the vindictive principle. The principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority by
the Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as
much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.10

There is some pronouncement of the Supreme Court which states that disbarment
proceeding is a class by itself, a sui generis. In the case of Gatchalian Promotions vs. Atty. Primo R.
Naldoza11, the Supreme Court had the occasion to state that administrative cases against lawyers
belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of
civil and criminal cases.

7 Section 16, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

8 Ruperto G. Martin, Legal And Judicial Ethics, 1984, page 242, citing therein Archer, Ethical Obligations of the
Lawyer, page 242.

9Ibid, page 389.

10 People of the Philippines vs. Mariano Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09 March 29, 1995.

11 A.C. No. 4017, September 29, 1999.

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 The Court in Gatchalian Promotions, citing its previous decision In Re Almacen12 once
again ruled that –

[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by
the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment,
[they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor
a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is
[their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of
its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for
his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of
the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney.

Although, considered as a sui generis, the power to discipline lawyers – for that matter,
the power to disbar – is judicial in nature and can be exercised only by the court. The authority of
the Supreme Court to discipline lawyers is anchored on the constitutional provision which
mandates the highest tribunal to regulate the practice of law and the admission of individuals to
engage in the legal profession.

However, this judicial power must at all times be exercised with caution. Since
admission to the legal profession is inherently a difficult and an arduous attempt, the Supreme
Court has acknowledged the power of the Court to discipline lawyers should not be exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner. Neither should it be exercised at the pleasure of the court or
from passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. It is the duty of the court to exercise and regulate
its disciplinary power by a sound and just judicial discretion, whereby the rights and
independence of the bar may be scrupulously guarded and maintained by the court as the rights
and dignity of the court itself.13

Being a sui generis proceeding, the procedures in disbarment cases tend to deviate from
regular court proceeding. In some respect, disbarment proceedings are a matter of public

12 31 SCRA 562, 600 (1970).

13 Ruben Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 2003, page 469, citing therein Ex Parte Secombe, 19 How. 9 (1856)
and In Re Almacen, 32 SCRA 562 (1970).

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interest and no private interest is involved. Being so, a real party in interest is not required.
Explaining the rule, the Court in Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos14 tersely put thus –

This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for

suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in
them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.

Nonetheless, the burden of proof still rests upon the lawyer to prove his innocence.
When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. 15.

Disbarment proceeding is akin to an administrative proceeding. The quantum of

evidence required is clearly preponderant evidence. As cited in Gatchalian Promotions, -

Administrative cases against lawyers are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases. The burdens of proof for these types of cases
differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an
administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all
that is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question
even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings.

It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily
result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondent's
acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial
court's finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a
similar finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favourable
disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer.

14 A.C. No. 2884, January 28, 1998.

15 Wellington Reyes vs. Atty. Salvador Gaa, A.C. No. 1048, July 14, 1995, citing therein Malcolm, Legal and
Judicial Ethics 93 (1949).

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 Furthermore, in a disbarment proceeding against Atty. Vicente Aragona, Jr., the Supreme
Court, through Justice Castro held that the object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to
punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting
the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the
profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to
continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. 16

In various cases, other objects of disbarment proceedings have been provided by the
Court. Disbarment has been designed to compel the attorney to deal fairly and honestly with his
clients, and to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.17

The case of Geeslin vs. Navarro 18 further elucidates the purpose of disbarment
proceedings in this wise –

In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the purpose of
disbarment is not meant as a punishment to deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood
but is rather intended to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the
officers of the court and to ensure the proper administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and
trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. Its objectives are
to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with his client and to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proven him unfit for the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges
until the contrary is proved, and that, as an officer of the court; he has performed his
duty in accordance with his oath. Therefore, in disbarment proceedings, the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers,
the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof.

DISBARMENT PROCEDURE UNDER THE RULES

16 Aurora Soriano Deles vs. Vicente Aragona, Jr., A.M. No. 598, March 28, 1969.

17 Daroy vs. Legaspi, A.M. 936, July 25, 1975.

18 A. C. No. 2033, May 9, 1990.

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 Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides for the procedure for disbarment and
suspension of lawyers. The only officers authorized to investigate cases of disbarment are the
following –

1. The Supreme Court;

2. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines through its Commission on Bar Discipline
or authorized investigators; and

3. Office of the Solicitor General.

Any person aggrieved by the misconduct of a lawyer may file the corresponding
administrative case with the proper forum. A complaint for disbarment may be filed directly in
the Supreme Court, the IBP National Office or in any of its chapters.

Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by

the Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the
verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the
facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu propio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or
by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper
charges against erring attorneys including those in the government service.

In proceedings initiated motu propio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings

when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation
to the Solicitor-General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which
case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save
that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court. 19

Based upon the evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor General or other
Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to the Supreme Court a report
containing his findings of fact and recommendations for the final action of the Supreme Court. 20

19 Section 13, Rule 139-B.

20 Section 14, Rule 139-B.

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 Six copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the
Secretary of any of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of
Governors for assignment to an investigator. 21

If the complaint is filed in the IBP, the Board of Governors shall appoint from among IBP
members an Investigator or, when special circumstances so warrant, a panel of three (3)
investigators to investigate the complaint. All Investigators shall take an oath of office in the form
prescribed by the Board of Governors. A copy of the Investigator's appointment and oath shall be
transmitted to the Supreme Court. An Investigator may be disqualified by reason of relationship
within the fourth degree of consanguinity of affinity to any of the parties of their counsel,
pecuniary interest, personal bias, or his having acted as counsel to his acting as such Investigator.
Where the Investigator does not disqualify himself, a party may appeal to the IBP Board of
Governors, which by majority vote of the members present, there being a quorum, may order his
disqualification. Any Investigator may also be removed for cause, after due hearing, by the vote
of at least six (6) members of the IBP Board of Governors. The decision of the Board of Governors
in all cases of disqualification or removal shall be final. 22

If the complaint appears to be meritorious, the Investigator shall direct that a copy
thereof be served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer the same within fifteen (15)
days from the date of service.

Quite clearly, the above provisions plainly show two (2) modes of initiatory actions that
the Investigator is empowered to take upon the complaint – either dismiss the same without
delay or proceed with the investigation. Perforce:

A. The Investigator shall proceed with the investigation of the case:

1. if the complaint appears to be meritorious; or

2. upon joinder of the issues (upon submission of the answer by respondent

within fifteen [15] days from the date of service), when the answer shows
that the complaint is indeed meritorious; or

3. if respondent fails to answer.

21 Section 1, Rule 139-B.

22 Section 2, Ibid.

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 B. On the other hand, the investigator may recommend the dismissal of the same:

1. if the complaint lacks merit; or

2. if the answer shows, to the satisfaction of the Investigator, that the

complaint is not meritorious.

Verily, it is within the sound discretion of the Investigator to determine whether or not
the complaint is meritorious and if an investigation must indeed ensue23.

If the complaint does not merit action, or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of the
Investigator that the complaint is not meritorious, the same may be dismissed by the Board of
Governors upon his recommendation. A copy of the resolution of dismissal shall be furnished the
complainant and the Supreme Court which may review the case motu propio or upon timely
appeal of the complainant filed within 15 days from notice of the dismissal of the complainant. 24

No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance,

settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to
prosecute the same, unless the Supreme Court motu propio or upon recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors, determines that there is no compelling reason to continue with the
disbarment or suspension proceedings against the respondent. 25

The answer shall be verified. The original and five (5) legible copies of the answer shall
be filed with the Investigator, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the complainant or his
counsel. The IBP Board of Governors shall appoint a suitable member of the Integrated Bar as
counsel to assist the complainant of the respondent during the investigation in case of need for
such assistance.26

Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the Investigator
shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power
to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to
defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel.

23 Nicanor Gatmaytan vs. Atty. Isidro Ilao, A.C. No. 6086, January 26, 2005.

24 Section 5, Ibid.

25 Amendment pursuant to Supreme Court Resolution dated May 27, 1993 re Bar Matter 356.

26 Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 139-B.

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However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall
proceed ex parte.

The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the date
of its commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior
application.

Wilful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the
Investigator shall be dealt with as for indirect contempt of court. The corresponding charge shall
be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which shall require the alleged
contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP Board of Governors may
thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule
for hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as practicable be terminated within
fifteen (15) days from its commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within a
like period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations,
which shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and if warranted, the
imposition of penalty.27

Not later than thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation, the Investigator
shall submit a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations to the IBP Board of
Governors, together with the stenographic notes and the transcript thereof, and all the evidence
presented during the investigation. The submission of the report need not await the
transcription of the stenographic notes, it being sufficient that the report reproduce substantially
from the Investigator's personal notes any relevant and pertinent testimonies. 28

Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors
upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision
of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty
(30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's
Report.29

27 Section 8, Rule 139-B.

28 Section 10, Rule 139-B.

29 Paragraph a, Section 12, Rule 139-B.

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 If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution
setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the
case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action. 30

If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it

is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a
decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed
terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the
Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court
orders otherwise.31

Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through
their counsel. A copy of the same shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court. 32

After receipt of respondent's answer or lapse of the period therefor, the Supreme Court,
motu propio, or at the instance of the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the
Investigator, may suspend an attorney from the practice of his profession for any of the causes
specified in Rule 138, Section 27, during the pendency of the investigation until such suspension
is lifted by the Supreme Court.33

GROUNDS FOR DISBARMENT OF LAWYERS

Section 27 of Rule 128 provides for the specific grounds for disbarment of a lawyer.
Accordingly, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for –

1. any deceit;

2. malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office;

30 Paragraph b, Section 12, Rule 139-B.

31 Paragraph c, Section 12, Rule 139-B.

32 Paragraph d, Section 12, Rule 139-B.

33 Section 15, Rule 139-B.

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 3. grossly immoral conduct;

4. by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;

5. for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice;

6. for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; or

7. for corruptly or wilful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without

authority so to do.

These grounds are not exclusive. A lawyer may be disbarred even if the grounds are not
any of those provided in Section 27. Thus the acquisition of an interest in the subject matter of
the litigation, either through purchase or assignment, constitutes not only breach of professional
ethics, but is a patent violation of Article 1491 34 of the Civil Code.

In one case, Tranquilino Rovero was convicted of smuggling. The Solicitor General filed
the complaint for disbarment, based on such conviction. The respondent admits the existence of
the decision of the Collector of Customs, and his conviction by the Court of Appeals, but sets up
the defense that they are not sufficient to disqualify him from the practice of law, especially
because the acts of which he was found guilty, while at most merely discreditable, had been
committed by him as an individual and not in pursuance or in the exercise of his legal profession.
Still, the Court disbarred him, stating that Respondent's conviction of smuggling by final decision
of the Court of Appeals certainly involves an act done contrary at least to honesty or good
morals. The ground invoked by the Solicitor General is aggravated by the fact that the
respondent sought to defraud, not merely a private person, but the Government. 35

In another, case a retired RTC judge penned a decision after his retirement from the
bench. He made the decision appear to have been written prior to his retirement, such that the

34 Thefollowing persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or
through the mediation of another:

34....(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property
and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.

35 In re: Atty. Tranquilino Rovero, A.C. No. 126, October 24, 1952

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plaintiff succeeded in executing the judgment even if rendered seven months after the
retirement of the judge. The Supreme Court ordered the disbarment of the retired judge.36

DISBARMENT IN CONNECTION TO ADMISSION TO THE BAR

Philippine jurisprudence contains several bar examination anomalies committed by

those aspirants to become members of the legal profession. At any rate, the discovery of these
bar scandals caused the disbarment of concerned lawyers and examinees.

The first bar examination scandal took place in 1928. Unable to obtain a passing grade
for the second time, Felipe del Rosario filed a petition in the Supreme Court for a revision of his
test booklet, claiming a mistake for the correction of his grades. The Supreme Court acted in good
faith and granted the petition. Del Rosario was admitted to the bar. But the city fiscal of Manila
conducted an investigation and found out that there was connivance between Del Rosario and
Juan Villaflor, an employee of the Supreme Court, in the manipulation of grades. They were
charged with falsification of public document. Villalfor was convicted. But for lack of evidence,
Del Rosario was acquitted.

But such acquittal did not serve to prevent the disbarment proceeding instituted against
Del Rosario. Justice George Malcolm, speaking in behalf of the Court stated that –

[t]he acquittal of Felipe del Rosario upon the criminal charge is not a bar to these
proceedings. The court is now acting in an entirely different capacity from that which
courts assume in trying criminal cases. It is asking a great deal of the members of the
court to have them believe that Felipe del Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal
machinations culminating in the falsification of public documents, of which he was the
sole beneficiary. Indeed, the conviction of Juan Villaflor in itself demonstrates that Felipe
del Rosario has no legal right to his attorney's certificate. While to admit Felipe del
Rosario again to the bar examination would be tantamount to a declaration of
professional purity which we are totally unable to pronounce. The practice of the law is
not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be
extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The standards of the legal
profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties
of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity
is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its
confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized member of
the bar. (Citing therein In re Terrell [1903], 2 Phil., 266.)37

36 Victoria Rajaie vs Atty. Jose Alovera, A.C. 4748, August 4, 2000.

37 In Re Del Rosario, December 7, 1928, 52 Phil 399 (1928).

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 Del Rosario was thereafter ordered to surrender his certificate of admission to the clerk
of court of the Supreme Court.

The second bar examination scandal took place in 1932. In the case of People of the
Philippines vs. Estela Romualdez38, Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay were charged with the
crime of falsification of public and official documents. Romualdez was appointment as secretary
to Justice Norberto Romualdez. By reason of said duty she had under her care the compositions
and other papers and documents having reference to the examinations for the admission of
candidates to the bar held in the months of August and September 1926. Luis Mabunay, who was
then one of the candidates who took the said Bar Examinations, extracted the compositions,
which were written, prepared and submitted by the accused, Luis Mabunay in that examination.
Romualdez and Luis Mabunay erased the grade of fifty-eight (58%) given by the correctors
Alfonso Felix and M. Guevara to the composition in Remedial Law, which was written and
prepared by the accused Luis Mabunay, and in its place wrote sixty-four (64%); and also erased
the grade of sixty-three (63%) given by correctors Jeronimo Samson and Amado del Rosario to
the composition in Civil Law written and prepared by the said Luis Mabunay, and in its place
wrote 73%.

They succeeded in making it appear that Luis Mabunay obtained the general average
required by the rules of the Supreme Court, and in securing the latter's admission to the practice
of law. The Court found out that Estela Romualdez caused the alteration of the grades, without
authorization from the correctors. The Court found her guilty of falsification of public document.
Mabunay was found guilty as an accomplice. The alterations in the grades made by Estela
Romualdez were made for the sole use and benefit of her co accused Luis Mabunay. They were
made wilfully and illegally, and after the Supreme Court had rejected those candidates that had
received less than 75 per cent. The alterations were therefore made after Mabunay had failed,
and he withdrew the money after he had time to learn from his co accused that he had failed.
Mabunay was not allowed admission to the Bar.

Another scandal in the bar examination which led to the disbarment of Atty. Danilo de
Guzman has to do with the leakage in the 2003 Bar examination. in B.M. No. 1222, In Re: 2003
Bar Examinations, dated February 4, 2004, the Supreme Court ordered the nullification of the
results in the Mercantile Law after a leakage of the questions in the said subject happened. Upon

38 G.R. No. 31012, September 10, 1932, 57 Phil 148 (1932).

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investigation by a committee appointed by the Court, it was found that there was indeed leakage
of test questions in Mercantile Law.

Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, was appointed examiner for the bar examination in
Mercantile Law. Using his personal computer in the law office, he prepared for three consecutive
days, three sets of test questions which covered the entire subject of Mercantile Law. As he did
not know how to prepare the questionnaire in final form, he asked his private secretary, Cheryl
Palma, to format the questions. And, as he did not know how to print the questionnaire, he
likewise asked Cheryl Palma to make a printout. All of this was done inside his office with only
him and his secretary there. His secretary printed only one copy. He then placed the printed copy
of the test questions, consisting of three sets, in an envelope which he sealed, and called up
Justice Vitug, the Chairman of the Bar Examination, to inform him that he was bringing the
questions to the latter’s office that afternoon. However, as Justice Vitug was leaving his office
shortly, he advised Atty. Balgos to give the sealed envelope to his confidential assistant who had
been instructed to keep it. When Atty. Balgos arrived in the office of Justice Vitug, he was met by
Justice Vitug’s confidential assistant to whom he entrusted the sealed envelope containing the
test questions.

Atty. Balgos admitted that he does not know how to operate a computer except to type
on it. He does not know how to open and close his own computer which has a password for that
purpose. In fact, he did not know, as he still does, the password. It is his secretary, Cheryl Palma,
who opened and closed his computer for him. His computer is exclusively for his own use. It is
located inside his room which is locked when he is not in the office. He comes to the office every
other day only. He thought that his computer was safely insulated from third parties, and that he
alone had access to it. He was surprised to discover, when reports of the bar leakage broke out,
that his computer was in fact interconnected with the computers of his nine (9) assistant
attorneys. As a matter of fact, the employees - Jovito M. Salonga and Benjamin R. Katly - of the
Court’s Management Information Systems Office (MISO) who, upon the request of Atty. Balgos,
were directed by the Investigating Committee to inspect the computer system in his office,
reported that there were 16, not 9, computers connected to each other via Local Area Network
(LAN) and one (1) stand-alone computer connected to the internet.

Upon learning from Justice Vitug of the leakage of the bar questions prepared by him in
mercantile law, Atty. Balgos immediately called together and questioned his office staff. He
interrogated all of them except Atty. Danilo De Guzman who was absent then. All of them
professed to know nothing about the bar leakage. Attorney Balgos questioned Attorney Danilo
De Guzman, also a member of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity, FEU chapter. De Guzman
admitted to him that he downloaded the test questions from Attorney Balgos’ computer and

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faxed a copy to a fraternity brother. Attorney Balgos was convinced that De Guzman was the
source of the leakage of his test questions in mercantile law.

DECEIT AS A GROUND FOR DISBARMENT

Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code states that there is deceit when the act is performed
with deliberate intent. This concept of deceit under Criminal Law is applicable in disbarment
proceedings. Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct,
by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed
which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.
The false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud39. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that a
lawyer shall not engage in wilful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

In a case40, lawyer Isaias A. Celestino was disbarred for wanton falsehood when he
notarized an affidavit knowing that the affiant had been dead. This deceitful conduct warranted
the disbarment of Atty. Celestino. The Supreme Court, acting upon the disbarment proceeding
filed against Celestino found out that –

[t]he ex-parte petition wherein he sought another owner's duplicate of original

certificate of title No. 62507 and presented himself as counsel for Julian Agdoma, his
grandfather, whom he knew had been dead since 23 July 1945, and the affidavit which he
(the respondent) represented to have been subscribed and sworn to by Julian Agdoma
before him (the respondent) as notary public, thus making it appear that his late
grandfather was alive, and which he used to support the ex-parte petition, are clear
evidence that the respondent Isaias A. Celestino had committed a wanton falsehood in
court. And this wanton disregard for truth and honesty is aggravated by his forging or
simulating a deed of sale of the parcel of land described in original certificate of title No.
62507 executed in his favour by his deceased grandfather Julian Agdoma when he (the
respondent) knew that his grandfather had been dead ten years before and therefore
could not have executed the deed of sale.

xxx

The respondent avoided attending the hearings conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan. Even in this Court, his whereabouts are totally unknown. His knowledge that
a disbarment proceeding had been file pending against him imposes upon him the duty

39 Bienvenido Ganzaludo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 150910, February 6, 2006.

40 Mercedes Agdoma, Eugenia Agdoma And Pedro Agdoma, vs. Atty. Isaias A. Celestino, A.C. No. 289, November
29, 1962.

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 to make himself or his presence available to this Court for a trial. That he could not be
located at his known address without making his whereabouts known implies that he
had chosen to waive every right and opportunity to put up his defense. The respondent
Isaias A. Celestino is barred from the practice of the legal profession.

In another case41, a previously disbarred lawyer once again faced another disbarment
case wand was charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection with the theft of
some pages from a medical chart which was material evidence in a damage suit filed by his
clients against the doctors of St. Luke's Medical Hospital. On November 12, 1987, he was first
disbarred for his immoral complicity or "unholy alliance" with a judge in Quezon City to rip off
banks and Chinese business firms which had the misfortune to be sued in the latter's court.

Facts of the case revealed that Fe Linda Aves was seven (7) months pregnant when she
was admitted as a patient at St. Luke's Hospital on December 20, 1990. She was examined and
diagnosed to have mild pre-eclampsia. Five days later, on Christmas day, December 25, 1990,
Mrs. Aves was discharged from the hospital, to celebrate Christmas with her family.

However, she was rushed back to the hospital the next day, December 26, 1990. On
December 27, 1990, she died together with her unborn child.

Blaming the doctors of St. Luke's for his wife's demise, Attorney Damaso B. Aves, filed a
complaint. During the trial the medical records of Fe Linda Aves were produced in court by St.
Luke's, as requested by Attorney Grecia, lawyer for the complainant. The records were entrusted
to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina Robles.

On July 16, 1991, between 8:30-9:00 o' clock in the morning, upon arriving in court for
another hearing of the case, Attorney Grecia borrowed from Mrs. Robles the folder containing
the medical records of Mrs. Aves.

While leafing through the folder, Grecia surreptitiously tore off two pages of the medical
records. The respondent's act was notified by Mrs. Robles and Maria Arnet Sandico, a clerk. They
saw Grecia crumple the papers and place them inside the right pocket of his coat. He immediately
returned the folder to Mrs. Robles (who was momentarily rendered speechless by his audacious
act) and left the office.

41 AlbertoFernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco, Achilles Bartolome, and St. Lukes Medical Center,, vs. Attorney
Benjamin M. Grecia, A.C. No. 3694, June 17, 1993.

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 Mrs. Robles examined the medical chart and found pages "72" and "73" missing. She
ordered Sandico to follow the respondent. Sandico saw Grecia near the canteen at the end of the
building, calling a man (presumably his driver) who was leaning against a parked car
(presumably Grecia's car). When the man approached, Grecia gave him the crumpled papers
which he took from his coat pocket. Sandico returned to the office and reported what she had
seen to Mrs. Robles. The latter in turn reported it to Judge Capulong. The three of them — Judge
Capulong, Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico — went downstairs. Ms. Sandico pointed to Judge
Capulong the man to whom Grecia had given the papers which he had filched from medical
folder of Linda Aves. Judge Capulong told Sandico to bring the man to her chamber. On the way
back to chamber, Judge Capulong saw the plaintiff, Attorney Damaso Aves, and St. Luke's counsel,
Attorney Melanie Limson. She requested them to come to her office.

In the presence of Attorneys Aves and Limson, Mrs. Robles, Ms. Sandico, and a visitor,
Judge Capulong confronted the man and ordered him to give her the papers which Grecia had
passed on to him. The man at first denied that he had the papers in his possession. However,
when Sandico declared that she saw Grecia hand over the papers to him, the man sheepishly
took them from his pants pocket and gave them to Judge Capulong. When the crumpled pages
"72" and "73" of the medical folder were shown to Sandico, she identified them as the same
papers that she saw Grecia hand over to the man.

After the confrontation, Sandicio and Robles went back to their office. In the ensuing
excitement and confusion of recovering the stolen exhibits, no one thought of ascertaining the
identity of the man from whom they were recovered. Judge Capulong belatedly realized this, so
she directed the Valenzuela Police to find out who he was. She also ordered Sandico to submit a
formal report of the theft of the exhibits to the police.

A police investigator, PO3 Arnold Alabastro, tried to ascertain the name of Grecia's
driver who was known only as "SID." He located Grecia's house in Quezon City. Although he was
not allowed to enter the premises, he was able to talk with a house maid. He pretended to be a
cousin of "SID" and asked for the latter. The housemaid informed him that "SID" was sent home
to his province by Grecia.

He talked with Grecia himself but the latter denied that he had a driver named "SID."
PO3 Alabastro also talked wit one of Grecia's neighbours across the street. The neighbour
confirmed that Grecia's driver was a fellow named "SID".

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 The Court found Attorney Benjamin Grecia guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and
grossly unethical behaviour as a lawyer. Considering that this is his second offense against the
canons of the profession, the Court resolved to impose upon him once more the supreme penalty
of disbarment.

Said the Court in its decision –

On the basis of the evidence presented before Judge Bernad, the Court is convinced that
the charge against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia is true. By stealing two pages from Linda
Aves' medical chart and passing them on to his driver, he violated Rule 1.01, canon 1 of
the Rules of Professional Responsibility as well as canon 7 thereof which provide that:

Canon 1. . . .

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful
conduct.

Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice".

An incorrigible practitioner of "dirty tricks," like Grecia would be ill-suited to discharge

the role of "an instrument to advance the ends of justice."

xxx

By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and
disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral unfitness to continue as a
member of the honorable fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the
Bar.

Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity and good demeanour or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court,
or an unfit or unsafe person to enjoy the privileges and to manage the business of others
in the capacity of an attorney, or for conduct which tends to bring reproach on the legal
profession or to injure it in the favourable opinion of the public.

MALPRACTICE AS A GROUND FOR DISBARMENT

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 Malpractice refers to any dereliction of duty or any act of malfeasance. The term is
occasionally applied to lawyers, and then means generally any evil practice in a professional
capacity, but rather with reference to the court and its practice and process than to the client. 42

In the recent case of Atty. Carmen Alcantara vs. Atty. Eduardo de Vera 43, respondent De
Vera was a member of the Bar and was the former counsel of Rosario P. Mercado in a civil case
filed in 1984 with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and an administrative case filed before
the Securities and Exchange Commission, Davao City Extension Office.

Pursuant to a favourable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in

favour of Rosario P. Mercado. Respondent, as her legal counsel, garnished the bank deposits of
the defendant, but did not turn over the proceeds to Rosario. Rosario demanded that the
respondent turn over the proceeds of the garnishment, but the latter refused claiming that he
had paid part of the money to the judge while the balance was his, as attorney’s fees. Such refusal
prompted Rosario to file an administrative case for disbarment against the respondent. On
March 23, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors promulgated a Resolution holding the respondent
guilty of infidelity in the custody and handling of client’s funds and recommending to the Court
his one-year suspension from the practice of law.

Following the release of the aforesaid IBP Resolution, the respondent filed a series of
lawsuits against the Mercado family. The respondent also instituted cases against the family
corporation, the corporation’s accountant and the judge who ruled against the reopening of the
case where respondent tried to collect the balance of his alleged fee from Rosario. Later on, the
respondent also filed cases against the chairman and members of the IBP Board of Governors
who voted to recommend his suspension from the practice of law for one year.

The Supreme Court ruled out that the respondent committed professional malpractice
and gross misconduct particularly in his acts against his former clients after the issuance of the
IBP Resolution suspending him from the practice of law for one year. In summary, the
respondent filed against his former client, her family members, the family corporation of his
former client, the Chairman and members of the Board of Governors of the IBP who issued the
said Resolution, the Regional Trial Court Judge in the case where his former client received a
favourable judgment, and the present counsel of his former client, a total of twelve different

42 Black’s Law Dictionary, Second Edition: 1910, page 752.

43 A.C. No. 5859 November 23, 2010 (Formerly CBD Case No. 421).

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cases in various fora which included the Securities and Exchange Commission; the Provincial
Prosecutors Office of Tagum, Davao; the Davao City Prosecutors Office; the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline; the Department of Agrarian Reform; and the Supreme Court.

In addition to the twelve (12) cases filed, the respondent also re-filed cases which had
previously been dismissed. The respondent filed six criminal cases against members of the
Mercado family separately docketed as I.S. Nos. 97-135; 97-136; 97-137; 97-138; 97-139; and
97-140. With the exception of I.S. No. 97-139, all the aforementioned cases are re-filing of
previously dismissed cases.

In justifying the penalty of disbarment, the Court explained that –

.... there is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous cases in different fora,
as long as he does so in good faith, in accordance with the Rules, and without any ill-motive
or purpose other than to achieve justice and fairness.

xxx

[T}he barrage of cases filed by the respondent against his former client and others close to
her was meant to overwhelm said client and to show her that the respondent does not fold
easily after he was meted a penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law.

The nature of the cases filed by the respondent, the fact of re-filing them after being
dismissed, the timing of the filing of cases, the fact that the respondent was in conspiracy
with a renegade member of the complainants’ family, the defendants named in the cases
and the foul language used in the pleadings and motions all indicate that the respondent
was acting beyond the desire for justice and fairness. His act of filing a barrage of cases
appears to be an act of revenge and hate driven by anger and frustration against his former
client who filed the disciplinary complaint against him for infidelity in the custody of a
client’s funds.

GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT AS A GROUND FOR DISBARMENT

Grossly immoral conduct as a ground for disbarment is not easy to define. There is no
hard and fast rule to determine whether an act is grossly immoral to warrant the disbarment for
erring lawyers. The Court defined immoral conduct as conduct that is wilful, flagrant or
shameless, and that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community.44 To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and

44 Toledo v. Toledo, A.M. No. P-07-2403, February 6, 2008, 544 SCRA 26.

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false as to constitute a criminal act or an act so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible
to a high degree45.

The Supreme Court has somehow come up with a common definition of what constitutes
immoral conduct, i.e., "that conduct which is wilful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." In
the case of Atty. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Atty. Leo Palma 46 the Court ruled Atty. Palma’s acts to
be grossly immoral when he abandoned his lawful wife and three children; lured an innocent
young woman into marrying him; and misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could
contract marriage in a foreign land. The elucidation of the Court’s decision in this case is worth
to be quoted –

The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence.
It was respondent’s closeness to the complainant’s family as well as the latter’s complete
trust in him that made possible his intimate relationship with Lisa. When his concern
was supposed to be complainant’s legal affairs only, he sneaked at the latter’s back and
courted his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in the night, he attacked when nobody
was looking. Moreover, he availed of complainant’s resources by securing a plane ticket
from complainant’s office in order to marry the latter’s daughter in Hong Kong. He did
this without complainant’s knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure
complainant that "everything is legal." Clearly, respondent had crossed the limits of
propriety and decency.

Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really loved Lisa and since he married
her, he cannot be charged with immorality. His reasoning shows a distorted mind and a
brazen regard on the sanctity of marriage. In such relationship, the man and the woman
are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity. How could respondent
perform these obligations to Lisa when he was previously married to Elizabeth? If he
really loved her, then the noblest thing he could have done was to walk away.

Respondent’s culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was just a 22-year old college
student of Assumption Convent and was under psychological treatment for emotional
immaturity. Naturally, she was an easy prey.

Anent respondent’s argument that since the validity of his marriage to Lisa has not yet
been determined by the court with finality, the same poses a prejudicial question to the
present disbarment proceeding. Suffice it to say that a subsequent judgment of
annulment of marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. As we held
in In re Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely
criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if
the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative

45Mary Jane Abanag vs. Nicolas Mabute, A.M. No. P2922, April 4, 2011, citing therein Figueroa v. Barranco, Jr.,
SBC Case No. 519, July 31, 1997, 276 SCRA 445.

46 Adm. Case No. 2474, September 15, 2004.

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 case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its
course, then the judgment of annulment of respondent’s marriage does not also
exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof --
- clear preponderance of evidence --- in disciplinary proceedings against members of the
bar is met, then liability attaches.

The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, is that they "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." This is founded on the lawyers’ primordial duty to society as spelled out in
Canon 1 which states:

"CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes."

It is not by coincidence that the drafters of our Code of Professional Responsibility

ranked the above responsibility first in the enumeration. They knew then that more than
anybody else, it is the lawyers -- the disciples of law -- who are most obliged to venerate
the law. As stated in Ex Parte Wall:

"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He
is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the
laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues
recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate
and dangerous elements of the body politic."

Corollarily, the above responsibility is enshrined in the Attorney’s Oath which every
lawyer in the country has to take before he is allowed to practice.

The case of Atty. Noli Eala47, commentator of the Philippine Basketball Association,
discusses gross immorality as basis for disbarment.

Eala, admittedly maintained relationship with Mary Anne Moje, who was married to the
complainant. Out of that illicit relationship, Moje gave birth to a child which Eala acknowledged.
In the disbarment case filed against Eala, he insisted that disbarment does not lie because his
relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court,
grossly immoral under scandalous circumstances.

The Court was not convinced and went to discuss that –

[t]he immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or

suspension uses the phrase "grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous
circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is an element of the
crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman
elsewhere.

47 Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala, A.C. No. 7136, August 1, 2007.

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 Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of
marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the
surrounding circumstances." The case at bar involves a relationship between a married
lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was
carried out discreetly.

xxx

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law."

xxx

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab
initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared
null and void. As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. In carrying on an extra-marital affair
with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null
and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an
institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

xxx

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio
and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his
petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery
after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have
been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

However, not all sexual relations can be considered as act of immorality. In the case of Ui
vs. Bonifacio48, Atty. Iris Bonifacio who entered into a relationship with Carlos Ui, a married man
and bore two children with him was not disbarred. Her defense that she honestly believed that
the man was single was sided by the Court. This is so, because upon discovery of the true civil
status of the man, she parted ways with him. The Supreme Court, thru Justice De Leon
pronounced –

In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos
Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got

48 A.C. No. 3319, June 8, 2000.

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 married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her
knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.

Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are
not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of
our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is
a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers,
as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and
thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us
to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising
situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about
Carlos Ui's personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.

Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent's suspicion
that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask
probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had
children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the
slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also,
despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first
child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering respondent's
allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was
imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her
relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid
marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows
indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action,
the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards."
Respondent's act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon
discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and
proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard
of the legal profession. (emphasis supplied.)

It may be safely assume that a number of disbarred lawyers on the ground of grossly
immoral conduct have committed sexual or marital infidelity. Nonetheless, there have been cases
where the Supreme Court ruled that a certain act, not sexually related is a grossly immoral act,
which may warrant disbarment.

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 In Sebastian vs. Calis49, the act of the lawyer in facilitating the travel of a person to the
United States using spurious travel documents was considered a grossly immoral conduct. The
respondent is guilty of gross misconduct by engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct contrary to Canon I, Rule 101 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent
deceived the complainant by assuring her that he could give her visa and travel documents; that
despite spurious documents nothing untoward would happen; that he guarantees her arrival in
the USA and even promised to refund her the fees and expenses already paid, in case something
went wrong.

The Supreme Court explained –

Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonourable. They
reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer's relationship
with others should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and
candour. This is the essence of the lawyer's oath. The lawyer's oath is not mere facile
words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The
nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral
character. This requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of
law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. We
have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional
or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar,
and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.

It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly jeopardized the life and liberty of
complainant when he made her travel with spurious documents. How often have victims
of unscrupulous travel agents and illegal recruiters been imprisoned in foreign lands
because they were provided fake travel documents? Respondent totally disregarded the
personal safety of the complainant when he sent her abroad on false assurances. Not
only are respondent's acts illegal, they are also detestable from the moral point of view.
His utter lack of moral qualms and scruples is a real threat to the Bar and the
administration of justice.

Running away with P2, 500.00 paid as settlement for a victim killed in a vehicular
accident has also been characterized as a grossly immoral conduct.

In a case50, complainant Victoriano Resureccion, on May 13, 1970, was involved in a

vehicular accident in EDSA resulting in the death of a boy. By reason of the said incident,
Resureccion was accused of homicide thru reckless imprudence before the City Fiscal's Office at

49 A.C.No. 5118, September 9, 1999.

50 Victoriano Resureccion vs. Atty. Ciriaco Sayson, A.C. No. 1037, December 14, 1998.

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Quezon City. In the preliminary investigation, the father of the victim Mr. Armando Basto Sr. was
represented by Atty. Ramon Umali. The case for homicide thru reckless imprudence was
amicably settled on August 8, 1970 and lawyer, Atty. Ciriaco Sayson received from the
Resureccion the amount of P2, 500.00. Atty. Sayson assured Resureccion that the sum would be
delivered to Mr. Armando Basto, Sr. However, he had not delivered the said amount of P2,500.00
and the case was not dismissed for which reason Resureccion was compelled to pay anew the
heirs of the victim the amount P2,500.00. Atty. Sayson was charged of and was convicted with
estafa. But the Supreme Court, acting on the belated disbarment case against him observed that –

Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, would accomplish the end desired. However, in the present case, the Court
notes that even if respondent's culpability for estafa has been indubitably established,
there is no indication that he has served sentence, returned to complainant what was
due him or showed any remorse for what he did. The 27-year delay in the resolution of
this case was, to a large extent, caused by his failure to appear before the Office of the
Solicitor General and to inform the IBP of his change of address, a failure that also
indicated his lack of regard for the very serious charges brought against him. Respondent
Sayson, by his conduct, has shown that he is not worthy to remain a member of the bar.

CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE AS A GROUND FOR

DISBARMENT

To be disbarred under this ground, two requisites must concur: (1) there must be
conviction of a crime and (2) the crime must involve moral turpitude.

One of the requirements before one can be admitted to the practice of law is that
applicant must possess good moral character. This requirement is a continuing one as the Court
has always stressed that lawyers must at all times be of good moral character, otherwise the
privilege to practice law may be withdrawn.

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three ostensible
purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to
protect prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from themselves.

Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the
Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this
exclusive and honoured fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred

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for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanour.51

Anathema to good moral character is moral turpitude. Traditionally defined, moral

turpitude is an act which involves baseness, vileness, or depravity in private and social duties
which man owes to his fellow man or to society in general, contrary to accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and man. In an old case, the crime of abduction with consent
was treated to be a crime involving moral turpitude. However, the Court, during this time,
showed compassion to the young lawyer as he was simply suspended from practice for one year
to take effect after serving his sentence. The decision is hereby reproduced in verbatim thus –

The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the disbarment of Attorney Carlos S.
Basa.

Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California
and the Philippine Islands. Recently he was charged in the Court of Fist Instance of the
city of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent, was found guilt in a decision
rendered by the Honorable M.V. del Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced
to be imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision
correccional. On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the
second division of the Supreme Court. 1

The Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that "A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office of lawyer by the Supreme Court by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude . . ." The sole question presented,
therefore, is whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by article 446 of
the Penal Code, involves moral turpitude.

"Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by numerous
courts.) Although no decision can be found which has decided the exact question, it
cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent
nature of the act is such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right
conduct. (In re Hopkins [1909], 54 Wash., 569; Pollard vs. Lyon [1875], 91 U.S., 225; 5
Ops. Atty.-Gen. P. I., 46, 185; decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 30,
1876 and June 15, 1895.)

When we come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by
the court, we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the
criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the other
hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order that
so promising a career may not be utterly ruined.

51 Emma Dantes vs. Atty. Crispin Dantes, A.C. No. 6486, September 22, 2004.

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 It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Carlos S. Basa shall be
discharged from prison, he be suspended from his office of lawyer for one year. So
ordered.

Although not a disbarment proceeding, the case of International Rice Research Institute
vs. NLRC52 laid down a more specific guide in determining whether a criminal offense involves
moral turpitude. In this case, Micosa, an employee of the IRRI was convicted of homicide.
Consequently, he was terminated from employment for violation of Institute Personnel Manual,
in as much as the provision in the Manual states that an employee maybe dismissed on the
ground of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The Supreme Court held that IRRI
simply assumed that conviction of the crime of homicide is conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. In sustaining the argument of Micosa, the Supreme Court held that –

Moral turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing citing In Re Basa and Tak Ng v. Republic
as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.

As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine. Thus,
the precipitate conclusion of IRRI that conviction of the crime of homicide involves moral
turpitude is unwarranted considering that the said crime which resulted from an act of
incomplete self-defense from an unlawful aggression by the victim has not been so
classified as involving moral turpitude.

IRRI argues that the crime of homicide committed by Micosa involves moral turpitude as
the killing of a man is conclusively an act against justice and is immoral in itself not
merely prohibited by law. It added that Micosa stabbed the victim more than what was
necessary to repel the attack.

IRRI failed to comprehend the significance of the facts in their totality. The facts on
record show that Micosa was then urinating and had his back turned when the victim
drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into
the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and
that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket
of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only
after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention
was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of
the mitigating circumstances of self- defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total
absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and
intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust.

52 G.R. No. 97239, May 13, 1993.

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 This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral
turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of
the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by
every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction
involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
surrounding circumstances. While . . . generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve
moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, it, cannot always be ascertained
whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or
as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely
involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are
mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and
indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or
exclusion as the cases are reached.

VIOLATION OF OATH AS GROUND FOR DISBARMENT

Every lawyer is bound to obey the Oath which reads –

I, _________________________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the

Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of
the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money
or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
So help me God."

By way of enumeration, the following duties as embodied in the Oath when so violated
are grounds for disbarment or suspension –

1. Duty to recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines;

2. Duty to support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein;

3. Duty to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;

4. Duty to refrain from wittingly or willingly promoting or suing any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same;

5. Duty to delay no man for money or malice,

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 6. Duty to conduct oneself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.

The Attorney’s Oath has been expressed in general terms. The Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct supplement these solemn provisions of the Oath.
Such that, any of the grounds for disbarment mentioned in Section 27 of Rule 138 are
complementary to the Oath.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerates Rules that are relevant to
this ground, to wit –

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS

OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any
suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a
controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.

The duty to refrain from wittingly or willingly promoting or suing any groundless, false
or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same is embodied in Canon 28 of the
Professional Ethics. It provides that –

[i]t is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare
cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife
and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is
disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in
order to be employed to bring suit or collect judgment, or to breed litigation by seeking
out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in
order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to
pay or reward, directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such
cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians,
hospital attaches or others who may succeed under the guise of giving disinterested
friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or
others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession
devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the
part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof, to the end that the offender may
be disbarred.

WILFUL DISOBEDIENCE TO LAWFUL ORDER OF A SUPERIOR COURT AS A GROUND FOR

DISBARMENT

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 This ground for disbarment is also embodied in the Attorney’s Oath. Lawyer’s
disobedience of or resistance to the order of the court may also constitute contempt of court.

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for
the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance. Judges, not being wholly free to defend themselves, are peculiarly entitled to receive
the support of the bar against unjust criticism and clamor. Whenever there is proper ground for
serious complaint of a judicial officer, it is the right and duty of the lawyer to submit his
grievances to the proper authorities. In such cases, but not otherwise, such charges should be
encouraged and the person making them should be protected53.

In one case54, while the Supreme Court was convinced that Atty. Lope E. Adriano
committed wilful disobedience of lawful orders of the Court, the High Tribunal simply imposed
upon the lawyer the penalty of suspension for one year.

Adriano has received no less than three resolutions of this Court requiring compliance of
its orders. To be recalled is that on September 25, 1967, this Court directed him, in ten days from
notice, to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for his failure to
file appellant's brief despite the lapse of the time therefor. Nothing was done by counsel for over
a year. To impress upon counsel the gravity of his repeated failure to obey this Court's orders, on
October 3, 1968, a fine of P500 was clamped upon him. He was directed to pay that fine in ten
days. He was in that order also required filing his brief in fifteen days. He was warned that more
drastic disciplinary action would be taken upon his failure to do either. Still he remained
unmoved. Then, this Court issued the peremptory order of December 5, 1968 commanding him
to show cause within ten days from notice thereof why he should not be suspended from the
practice of law for gross misconduct and violation of his oath of office. The Court made it certain
that this order would reach him. He personally acknowledged receipt thereof. He has not paid
the fine. He has done nothing.

CORRUPT OR WILFUL APPEARANCE AS AN ATTORNEY FOR A PARTY TO A CASE WITHOUT

AUTHORITY TO DO SO

An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he

appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his

53 Canon 2, Canons of Professional Ethics.

54 In the Matter of Atty. Lope Adriano vs. Remigio Estebia, G.R. No. 26868, February 27, 1969.

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client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds
therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce
or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue,
the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice
requires. An attorneys wilfully appear in court for a person without being employed, unless by
leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved
in his official transactions.55

In a case, Erwin Javellana, an incumbent member of the City Council or Sanggunian

Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged in the practice
of law without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of
Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same department; that on July 8, 1989. He also, as
counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, filed a case against City Engineer Ernesto C.
Divinagracia of Bago City for "Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages" and in several
criminal and civil cases in the city, without prior authority of the DILG Regional Director. An
administrative complaint was filed against him. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
Memorandum Circular, stating in part in its decision that –

With respect to the present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent, Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), in issuing the
questioned DLG Circulars Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 and in denying petitioner's motion to
dismiss the administrative charge against him.
Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is
completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme
Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local
Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of
conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their
public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the
law allows it.

Of course, this prohibition against lawyer is a special one, as it is embodied in a special

law. The rationale laid down by the Court is stated in this wise –

Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and
doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged
in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members "may practice
their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools expect during session
hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of

55 Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

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 all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the
area of public service.

A disbarred lawyer cannot continue to represent himself as a counsel. 56 More so a

suspended lawyer is also prohibited to practice during his suspension 57.

REINSTATEMENT
The Supreme Court has the exclusive authority to reinstate a disbarred lawyer. The sole
object of the Court upon an application for reinstatement to practice, by one previously
disbarred, is to determine whether or not the applicant has satisfied and convinced the Court by
positive evidence that the effort he has made toward the rehabilitation of his character has been
successful, and, therefore, he is entitled to be re-admitted to a profession which is intrinsically an
office of trust58.

The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is "of
good moral character" in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law
and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney, and
whether his mental qualifications are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to
the public, and the moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate and distinct from his mental
qualifications59.

The disbarred lawyer in the 2003 Bar examination scandal Petition for Judicial Clemency and
Compassion dated November 10, 2008. He prays that this Honorable Court "in the exercise of
equity and compassion, grant petitioner’s plea for judicial clemency, and thereupon, order his
reinstatement as a member in good standing of the Philippine Bar. As culled from the records of
the Court, he prayed before the Court by narrating the following –

56 Nicolas Tan vs. Atty. Amadeo Balon, Jr. A.C. No. 6483, August 31, 2007.

57 In re David G.R. No. L-98, July 13, 1958.

58 In Re: Administrative Case against Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana of Cebu City, A.C. No. 270 March 29, 1974.

59 Jesus Ma. Cui vs. Antonio Cui, G.R. No. L-18727, August 31, 1964 citing therein 7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec.
41, p. 816.

59

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 Petitioner narrated that he had laboured to become a lawyer to fulfill his father’s
childhood dream to become one. This task was not particularly easy for him and his
family but he willed to endure the same in order to pay tribute to his parents.
Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he already imposed upon himself the
duty of rendering service to his fellowmen. At 19 years, he started his exposure to public
service when he was elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of Barangay
Tuktukan, Taguig City. During this time, he initiated several projects benefiting the youth
in their barangay.
Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up Bachelor of Arts in Political
Science and eventually pursuing Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in law school, he
was elected as the President of the Student Council of the Institute of Law of the Far
Eastern University (FEU). Here, he spearheaded various activities including the conduct
of seminars for law students as well as the holding of bar operations for bar examinees.
Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and student leader, petitioner still
managed to excel in his studies. Thus, he was conferred an Academic Excellence Award
upon his graduation in Bachelor of Laws.
Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner immediately entered government
service as a Legal Officer assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig. Simultaneously,
he also rendered free legal services to less fortunate residents of Taguig City who were
then in need of legal assistance.
In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate Lawyers at the Balgos and
Perez Law Offices. It was during his stay with this firm when his craft as a lawyer was
polished and developed. Despite having entered private practice, he continued to render
free legal services to his fellow Taguigeños.
Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioner’s flourishing career was cut
short as he was stripped of his license to practice law for his alleged involvement in the
leakage in the 2003 Bar Examinations.
Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside his house to avoid the rather
unavoidable consequences of his disbarment.
Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act which unfortunately,
compromised the integrity of the bar examinations. As could be borne from the records
of the investigation, he cooperated fully in the investigation conducted and took personal
responsibility for his actions. Also, he has offered his sincerest apologies to Atty. Balgos,
to the Court as well as to all the 2003 bar examinees for the unforeseen and unintended
effects of his actions.

Accompanying his petition are fourteen numerous testimonials and letters of

indorsement from various sectors and officers of the judiciary. The Supreme Court was
convinced that petitioner has indeed reformed and thus ordered his reinstatement in this
manner –

The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken in part. We deem
petitioner worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty to seven (7) years
suspension from the practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years he has already served
his disbarment. Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct
offenders. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it

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 also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its
purpose.
xxx
Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. While
the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to
show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose.3
However, the record shows that the long period of respondent's disbarment gave him
the chance to purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and
to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up once again to the exacting
standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar and officer of the court.
During respondent's disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date for his
professional infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies and pleas for
reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that he has
regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and
unblemished record as an elected public servant, as attested to by numerous civic and
professional organizations, government institutions, public officials and members of the
judiciary.
Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the
gravity of his transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus
since his disbarment towards public service, particularly with the People’s Law
Enforcement Board. The attestations submitted by his peers in the community and other
esteemed members of the legal profession, such as retired Court of Appeals Associate
Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval and Atty. Lorenzo
Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testify to his positive
impact on society at large since the unfortunate events of 2003.
Petitioner’s subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope that if
he were to reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a lawyer
would redound to the general good and more than mitigate the stain on his record.
Compassion to the petitioner is warranted. Nonetheless, we wish to impart to him the
following stern warning:
"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He
is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the
laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues
recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate
and dangerous elements of the body politic."
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial Clemency and
Compassion is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The disbarment of DANILO G. DE GUZMAN
from the practice of law is hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS SUSPENSION
FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW, reckoned from February 4, 2004.

In cases where the Court has deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of
disbarment imposed on the lawyer, the remorse of the disbarred lawyer and the conduct of his
public life during his years outside of the bar have been taken into account. There is no concrete
guideline as to how long must it take for a disbarred lawyer to be reinstated. In a case, it took
twenty-eight year for Atty. Tranquilino Rovero to be reinstated. He was found guilty for violation

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of Administrative Code for smuggling. The Court pointed out the twilight years of the petitioner
being at age 71 year old, and in his favor considered the following -

1. Since his disbarment in 1952, Rovero has honourably dealt with his citizens.
2. He had demonstrated his moral rehabilitation and reformation as to be fit, once more, to
engage in the practice of law.

3. He was appointed the secretary of the Provincial Board of Aklan where that province
was organized. He had also been the duly accredited delegate of the Aklan Chapter of the
Philippine National Red Cross to its Aklan Chapter of the Philippine National Red Cross
to its Second Biennial National Convention held in Manila on August 23 to 26, 1957.

4. He was president of the Quezon City Central Lions Club which he helped organize, and
for a time, he was president of the Board of Trustees of the Northwestern Visayan
Colleges in Kalibo, Aklan.

5. He has also held high positions of trust in commercial establishments. He had been
elected the president of the Filipino Industrial Corporation; the vice-president of the
Meteor Company, Inc., and the president of the Rural Bank of Hermosa (Bataan), a
position which he holds up to the present.
6. Testimonials have been presented regarding the high esteem accorded him in the
community to which he belongs.

7. His good conduct is certified to by the president of the Aklan Bar Association and the
parish priest of Christ the King Church who stated that Mr. Rovero "is a devoted
parishioner who always gets voluntarily involved in the various charitable activities of
the parish," and "is cooperative and responsible and gets along fine with his fellow
parishioners.”

8. His conduct has also merited the approval of the late Pres. Ramon Magsaysay who
granted him an absolute and unconditional pardon for his crime.

Still in another reinstatement case60, the Court laid down this criterion in determining
the fitness of the applicant to be reinstated.

Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound
discretion of the court, The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or
not it decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of
justice will be conserved by the applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an
attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the
bar, satisfy the court that he is a person of good moral character — a fit and proper
person to practice law. The court will take into consideration the applicant's character
and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which
he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has
elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.

60 In Re: Petition For Reinstatement In The Roll Of Attorneys, Juan T. Publico, petitioner, February 20, 1981.

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 But not all who seek reinstatement may be granted by the Supreme Court. In the case of
Tan vs. Sabandal61, the Court denied the petition for reinstatement after it has received
numerous petitions preventing the reinstatement. Although there are testimonials attesting to
his good moral character; these were confined to lack of knowledge of the pendency of any
criminal case against him and were obviously made without awareness of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case instituted by the Government against him. Those
testimonials can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and lack of good
moral character.

In another case, Atty. Goldwin Valdez was not reinstated into the bar. Torben Overgaard
(Overgaard) engaged the services of Atty. Valdez as his legal counsel in two cases filed by him
and two cases filed against him. Despite the receipt of the full amount of legal fees of P900,
000.00 as stipulated in a Retainer Agreement, the respondent refused to perform any of his
obligations under their contract for legal services, ignored the complainant’s request for a report
of the status of the cases entrusted to his care, and rejected the complainant’s demands for the
return of the money paid to him. Atty. Valdez was disbarred. He filed a motion for
reconsideration, stating among others that the Integrated Bar of the Philippines has no
jurisdiction to investigate him; hence its recommendation is null. He contended that he was not
properly notified of the disbarment complaint. The Court however, in rejecting this contention
ruled out –

The respondent’s feeble excuse that he was no longer holding office at his Makati office
address at the time the Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline was sent to him is
unacceptable. Ordinary prudence would have guarded against his alleged failure to
receive the notices. All notices to the respondent were sent to his Makati office address,
which was the address made known to the public and to the complainant. This is even
the address printed on the letterhead of the Retainer Agreement between the
complainant and the respondent. And although the respondent claims that he had to
"make himself ‘scarce’"due to threats to his life and safety, this does not mean that he
avoids the responsibility of taking account of his mail. The respondent owes it to himself
and to his clients to adopt a system whereby he would be able to receive mail sent to his
law office during his absence. Assuming that circumstances would justify the
respondent’s abrupt abandonment of his Makati office, it absolutely does not give him
the license to abandon his clients as well.

61B.M. No. 44, February 24, 1992.

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 The Court in reinstating the lawyer, may require additional conditions. In the case of
Quingwa vs. Puno62, the Supreme Court required respondent to formally acknowledge his child
who is in the care of the mother. The Court, in its resolution ordered –

Respondent Armando Puno, of Zamboanga City, in Administrative Case No. 389, petitions
for the lifting of the disbarment decree issued against him by this Court in its decision of
28 February 1967, pleading that since then he has striven to lead and has led a model
and exemplary life, despite the hardships undergone by him and his family. His
exemplary conduct since his disbarment is attested by public officials and civic
organizations of Zamboanga City, specially the local chapters of the Jaycees and the Boy
Scouts, the Family Workshop of the Philippines, the Zamboanga City Amateur Athletic
Federation and the Amateur Basketball Association, in which he has served as officer
thereof. All of them have certified to this petitioner's proper and irreproachable
behaviour during the past four years.

Considering that the complainant has expressed no objection to his reinstatement in the
practice of the law, provided said respondent supports his child by the aforesaid
complainant, to which condition respondent Armando Puno has expressly agreed: and
considering that this Court is now convinced that said respondent has evidenced his
moral reform and willingness to atone for the misconduct that led to his exclusion from
the bar, and will endeavor in the future to lead an upright and irreproachable life,
assiduously avoiding occasion to bring the profession into disrepute.

As prayed for, respondent Armando Puno is ordered reinstated in the practice of the law
as a member of the Philippine Bar, subject to the conditions that (1) he shall formally
acknowledge his child, Armando Puno, Jr., now in the care of the mother, complainant
Flora Quingwa, and (2) the said petitioner will provide a minimum amount of P125.00
per month for the support of said child starting from 31 January 1971. Let the name of
said respondent be restored to the roll of attorneys upon his taking anew the
corresponding oath of office before this Court, and upon his submittal of the formal
acknowledgment of his child. So ordered.

And in another case63, the respondent Atty. Rusiana was required to enrol in and pass
the regular fourth year review classes in a recognized law school. to take anew the lawyer's oath
and sign the Roll of Attorneys after paying to the court the requisite fees.

SOME OTHER RELEVANT CASES

62 In Re: Disbarment of Armando Puno. Flora Quingwa, vs. Armando Puno, G.R. No. 389 January 31, 1972.

63 In Re: Administrative Case Against Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana of Cebu City, A.C. No. 270 March 29, 1974

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 One interesting case that caused the dismissal from service of a judge, in effect
disbarring him from the legal profession is the case of Judge Florentino Floro, Jr 64. He was
ordered by the Supreme Court relieved of his functions as Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 73, Malabon City and considered him separated from the service due to a medically
disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his office.

The common thread which binds the 13 seemingly unrelated accusations against Judge
Floro is his mental incapacity. The Supreme Court Clinic first had occasion to interview Judge
Floro when the latter applied for judgeship (which application he later voluntarily withdrew)
way back in September 1995. Relying on the psychiatric evaluation, the Court was convinced that
there are evidences of developing psychotic process on the part of Floro. The Supreme Court
explained thus –

There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable man. And, in fact, in
our disposition of the 13 charges against him, we have not found him guilty of gross
misconduct or acts or corruption. However, the findings of psychosis by the mental
health professionals assigned to his case indicate gross deficiency in competence and
independence.

Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in "psychic visions," of

foreseeing the future because of his power in "psychic phenomenon." He believes in
"duwendes" and of a covenant with his "dwarf friends Luis, Armand and Angel." He
believes that he can write while on trance and that he had been seen by several people to
have been in two places at the same time. He has likened himself to the "angel of death"
who can inflict pains on people, especially upon those he perceived as corrupt officials of
the RTCs of Malabon. He took to wearing blue robes during court sessions, switching
only to black on Fridays. His own witness testified that Judge Floro explained that he
wore black from head to foot on Fridays to recharge his psychic powers. Finally, Judge
Floro conducted healing sessions in his chambers during his break time. All these things
validate the findings of the Supreme Court Clinic about Judge Floro’s uncommon beliefs
and that such beliefs have spilled over to action.

Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief system. However, such beliefs,
especially since Judge Floro acted on them, are so at odds with the critical and impartial
thinking required of a judge under our judicial system.

Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty bound to
apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in resolving
controversies. Thus, Judge Floro’s reference to psychic phenomena in the decision he
rendered in the case of People v. Francisco, Jr. sticks out like a sore thumb. In said
decision, Judge Floro discredited the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness by
concluding that the testimony was a "fairytale" or a "fantastic story." He then went to
state that "psychic phenomena" was destined to cooperate with the stenographer who
transcribed the testimony of the witness.

64 Office of The Court Administrator, vs. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, March 31, 2006.

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 In a recent case, the lady senator, Miriam Defensor Santiago also faced disbarment
proceeding65 in connection to her privilege speech delivered in the floors of the Senate. The
complainant, Atty. Antero Pobre, in his complaint stated that the following statements of Senator
Santiago reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of
court.

I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am

humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living
my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would
rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken
against the lady senator.

The Court, in dismissing the petition sided with Senator Santiago in her defense that the
speech delivered are covered by her legislative immunity. Her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. But the Supreme Court
nonetheless expressed its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago used in her speech
and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly
crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her
statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she
was quoted as stating that she wanted "to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
and his cohorts in the Supreme Court," and calling the Court a "Supreme Court of idiots." Said the
Court –

A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were
expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of
Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official
parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used
as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its
magistrates, nor as armour for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that
parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members
of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the
benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.

65 Antero J. Pobre vs. Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009.

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 Case law teaches us that a public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a
Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be
removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the
incumbency of such public officer.66 Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot
be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence which
carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount
to removal from office. In a case, a letter-complaint against Justice Marcelo Fernan was filed
before the Office of the Tanodbayan. Acting upon the letter, Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez indorsed
the complaint to Justice Fernan for his comment. The Court resolved that the Tanodbayan or
other prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against
a Member of this Court. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file
impeachment proceedings. The Court opined in this wise –

There is another reason why the complaining for disbarment here must be dismissed.
Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be
members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment
(Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the
Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to
run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from
office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2)
of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and
his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2], Id.), a majority of the members of
the Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], Id. and the
members of the Commission on Audit who are not certified public accountants (Article XI
[D] [1][1], Id.), all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine
Bar.

xxx

It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it Members or the
other constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability
for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other
supposed misbehaviour. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental
procedural requirements that must be observed before such liability may be determined
and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the
constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by
impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by

66 In Re First Indorsement From Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez Dated 16 March 1988 Requesting
Honorable Justice Marcelo B. Fernan To Comment On An Anonymous Letter-Complaint, A.M. No. 88-4-5433 April
15, 1988.
66
66
66

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 disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehaviour that may be proven against him
in appropriate proceedings.
The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and
separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is important.
Without the protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be brought
against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any
number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

“The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.”

The lines were spoken by one of the characters in William Shakespeare’s play, Henry VI.
On first impression, those who are not acquainted with Shakespearean literature would think of
the statement as a pejorative attack in the legal profession. But on the contrary, this statement is
a homage paid by Shakespeare in ennobling the legal profession.

The accolade is spoken by Dick the Butcher, a follower of anarchist Jack Cade, whom
Shakespeare depicts as "the head of an army of rabble and a demagogue pandering to the
ignorant," who sought to overthrow the government. Shakespeare's acknowledgment that the
first thing any potential tyrant must do to eliminate freedom is to "kill all the lawyers" is, indeed,
a classic and well-deserved compliment to our distinguished profession. 67

Unlike any other profession, law has always been regarded as a noble calling imbued
with great responsibility. The ethical and moral standards that a lawyer must possess and
maintain all through out his legal career is a clear evidence of the nobility inculcated in the
profession. The disbarment and reinstatement cases shown in this work can only provide for a
bird’s eye view of the intricate and exacting world of lawyers. However, one thing remains true –
in pursuit of a just and orderly society, what we need are not smart and assidious lawyers. More
importantly, ethical lawyers who maintain their moral qualifications as members of the bar are
what we really need.

John Davis, an American lawyer and politician has a fitting description for the lawyers.
Describing the legal profession he observes –

67 Shakespeare’s Tribute to All Lawyer, by Howard L. Nations, available at

http://www.howardnations.com/shakespeare.html. Last accessed February 29
Last accessed February 29, 2012.

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 True, we build no bridges. We raise no towers. We construct no
engines. We paint no pictures - unless as amateurs for our own principal
amusement. There is little of all that we do which the eye of man can see. But we
smooth out difficulties; we relieve stress; we correct mistakes; we take up other
men's burdens and by our efforts we make possible the peaceful life of men in a
peaceful state.

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