Privileged Communication Rule – Attorney-Client Relationship

TEODORO R. REGALA vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996

FACTS:
The Complaint before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Presidential Commission on Good Government alleged that Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.,
Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo
U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of the Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law
offices (ACCRA) plotted, conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use
of the coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than twenty other coconut
levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares and its
institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. Through insidious
means and machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments
Corporation, and petitioner lawyers became the holder of outstanding capital stock in the aforesaid
corporations.

Petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that the acts with which they are charged with, was in
furtherance of legitimate lawyering; that they became holders of shares of stock in the corporations
listed under their respective names as incorporating or acquiring stockholders only and, as such,
they do not claim any proprietary interest in the said shares of stock.

Respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners,
namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating
the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners
executed in favor of its client covering their respective shareholdings.

Consequently, private respondent Roco was excluded as party-defendant in PCGG Case No.
33. Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-defendant grants him a
favorable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of his client.
Petitioners further argue that they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal
under their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality
of information obtained during such lawyer-client relationship.

Respondent PCGG refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of the identity
of the client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.

ISSUE:
Does the attorney-client privilege prohibit petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the
identity of their clients and the other information requested by the PCGG?
RULING:
Yes.
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio
conductio operarum(contract of lease of services) and mandato (contract of agency). But the
lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee.

In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere
agent or servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by
his client. Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and
duties, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of
necessity and public interest based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a
good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.

The the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded in the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following

persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of,
or with a view to, professional employment, can an attorney's secretary, stenographer,
or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning
any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.

Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril
to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection
with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.

An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence

which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a
dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain
effective representation; the lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but as a
matter of duty and professional responsibility.

The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose
the name of petitioners' clients in the case at bar. The general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in
the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or
identity of this client. The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established. First, the
court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is
flesh and blood. Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has
been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client. Third, the
privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship. Finally, due process
considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. "A
party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." He cannot be obliged to grope in the
dark against unknown forces.

Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some

important exceptions, to wit:

1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the
client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the
lawyer's advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his identity is privileged.
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by
revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form
the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's name
is privileged.

Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as
exceptions to the general rule. For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer
lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client
seeks legal assistance. Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been
previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the
client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of
the entire transaction.

Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall
within the ambit of the privilege when the client's name itself has an independent significance, such
that disclosure would then reveal client confidences.

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore,
clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First,
disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very
fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier,
protects the subject matter or the substance (without which there would be not attorney-client
relationship).

The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought
was duly establishes in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three
specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution
should they accede thereto: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of
documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of
assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients covering their respective shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed
consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate
structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their
professional advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering
their client's shareholdings.

There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel
of petitioners' legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their
duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would
implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations. Furthermore, under the third
main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for the
prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link that would inevitably form
the chain of testimony necessary to convict the client of a crime.

An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on the services
of an attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law for the purpose of
committing illegal activities and a case where a client thinks he might have previously committed
something illegal and consults his attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall within the
privilege because the same cannot be invoked for purposes illegal. The second case falls within the
exception because whether or not the act for which the client sought advice turns out to be illegal,
his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the
prosecution, which might lead to possible action against him.

There are, after all, alternative source of information available to the prosecutor which do
not depend on utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and readily available source of
information in the building of a case against the latter.

We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients
under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant
case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not privileged
information.

If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential privilege under
the circumstances obtaining here does not cover the identity of the client, then it would expose the
lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility
imposed on them in the exercise of their duties. By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the
identity of their clients, but worse, to submit to the PCGG documents substantiating the client-
lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of its clients
covering their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from petitioners a link "that would
inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the client of a crime."
Privileged Communication Rule – Attorney-Client Relationship

GREGORIO R. CASTILLO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 138231 February 21, 2002

FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against several persons one of which is
petitioner. The complaint alleged that Gregorio R. Castillo acted as a dummy, nominee and/or agent
of defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al. in establishing Hotel properties Inc. in order to acquire
beneficial interest and control, and conceal ownership, of Silahis International Hotel.

Petitioner argues that the suit against him is violative of the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege and must be dismissed pursuant to this Court’s decision in Regala vs. Sandiganbayan.

On the other hand, the respondent Republic contends that the ruling in Regala does not
apply to the present case, because petitioner is being sued as principal defendant for being in
conspiracy with the other defendants in the commission of the act complained of, and he is not
being required to name his clients. Moreover, the rule of confidentiality under the lawyer-client
relationship is not a valid ground to dismiss a complaint against a party. It is merely a ground for
disqualification of a witness and may only be invoked at the appropriate time, such as, when a
lawyer is under compulsion to answer as witness

ISSUE:
Can petitioner validly invoke the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege?

RULING:
Yes.
The Court emphasizes the Decision in Regala:

An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege

of attorney-client confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and
that they should wait until they are called to testify and examine as witnesses as to
matters learned in confidence before they can raise their objection. But petitioners
are not mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-
gotten wealth. They have made their position clear from the very beginning that
they are not willing to testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their
constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to
maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.
Privileged Communication Rule – Physician-Patient Relationship

MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 108854 June 14, 1994

FACTS:
In 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married at the Saint Vincent de Paul
Church in San Marcelino, Manila. The relationship between the couple developed into a stormy one.
In 1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the marital strain.
The effort however proved futile. In 1973, they finally separated in fact. In 1975, Edgar was able to
secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio
Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. Presenting the report among others, he obtained a decree from
the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his church marriage with Ma. Paz on
the ground of incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of discretion existent at the time
of the wedding and thereafter.

This confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in evidence before the
trial court in a petition for annulment of marriage grounded on psychological incapacity. Ma. Paz
Fernandez Krohn, invoking the rule on privileged communication between physician and patient,
seeks to enjoin her husband from disclosing the contents of the report.

Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that the rules are very explicit: the
prohibition applies only to a physician. Thus, the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the
case at bar where the person sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged communication
is the husband and not the physician of the petitioner.

ISSUE:
Is the rule on privileged communication between physician and patient applicable in this
case?

RULING:
No.
Statutes making communications between physician and patient privileged are intended to
inspire confidence in the patient and encourage him to make a full disclosure to his physician of his
symptoms and condition. Consequently, this prevents the physician from making public
information that will result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to the patient. For, the
patient should rest assured with the knowledge that the law recognizes the communication as
confidential, and guards against the possibility of his feelings being shocked or his reputation
tarnished by their subsequent disclosure. The physician-patient privilege creates a zone of privacy,
intended to preclude the humiliation of the patient that may follow the disclosure of his ailments.
Indeed, certain types of information communicated in the context of the physician-patient
relationship fall within the constitutionally protected zone of privacy, including a patient's interest
in keeping his mental health records confidential. Thus, it has been observed that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is founded upon the notion that certain forms of antisocial
behavior may be prevented by encouraging those in need of treatment for emotional problems to
secure the services of a psychotherapist.

The following are the requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully invoked: (a)
the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one
duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the
information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the information
was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the information was confidential and, if
disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient.

In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who
wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not
fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the
prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician
who examined the patient and executed the report.
Admissions – Kinds

ESTRADA v. DESIERTO

GR no 146710, April 3 2001

FACTS

During EDSA Revolution II, Petitioner President Joseph Estrada pursuant to the calls for
resignation, left Malacanang. In light of this finding that petitioner has resigned before 12 oclock
noon of Janaury 20, 2001. And pursuant to this, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then the Vice President
under Estrada’s reign took his place. Estrada now goes to the court on February 6, 2001, Thru
another counsel and filed for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be
the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be
holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution." Moreover, contested the legitimacy of Macapagal-Arroyo’s presidency, arguing that
he never resigned as President and the resignation was due to duress and an involuntary
resignation is no resignation at all. Hence, claims to still be the lawful President of the Philippines.
Among the pieces of evidence offered to prove that Estrada had indeed resigned from the
presidency is the Angara Diary, chronicling the last moments of Estrada in Malacanang.

Petitioner Estrada devotes a large part of his arguments on the alleged improper use by this
Court of the Angara Diary. It is urged that the use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind
of the petitioner on the issue of his resignation violates the rule against the admission of hearsay
evidence.

The Court rejected the contention that petitioners resignation was due to duress and
an involuntary resignation as per finding in the records that petitioner had several
options available to him other than resignation. He proposed to the holding of snap elections. He
transmitted to the Congress a written declaration of temporary inability. He could not claim he was
forced to resign because immediately before he left Malacaang, he asked Secretary Angara: Ed, aalis
na ba ako? which implies that he still had a choice of whether or not to leave. To be sure, pressure
was exerted for the petitioner to resign. But it is difficult to believe that the pressure completely
vitiated the voluntariness of the petitioners resignation.

ISSUE

Is the Angara Diary an inadmissible for being hearsay evidence?

RULING

No. To begin with, the Angara diary is not an out of court statement. The Angara Diary is part of
the pleadings in the cases at bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the
Angara Diary. Nor can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the said Diary was frequently
referred to by the parties in their pleadings.

Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not
covered by the hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole
or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is
sought to produce it. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross
examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the oath. Not at all hearsay
evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body of hearsay evidence has
been admitted by courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness and necessity.

The ban on hearsay does not cover independently relevant statements, which consist of
statements that are independently relevant of the truth asserted therein. They belong to two
classes: 1. Those statements which are the very facts in issue, 2. Those statements which are
circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue.

The second class includes the following: Statement of a person showing his state of mind; Statement
of a person showing his physical condtion; Statement of a person to infer a state of mind of another
person; Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; Statements to show
a lack of credibility of a witness.

The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized
as admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not be a
candidate; his statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of Staff Angelo
Reyes; his statements that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be opened by
Monday and Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape,
bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its too painful. I’m tired of the
red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue). I just want to clear my name, then I will go.We noted that
days before, petitioner had repeatedly declared that he would not resign despite the growing
clamor for his resignation. The reason for the meltdown is obvious - - - his will not to resign has
wilted.
It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence, non-
binding on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission
is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the
partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person.
 The Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner which reflect his state of mind and are
circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains statements of Secretary Angara from
which we can reasonably deduce petitioners intent to resign. They are admissible and they are not
covered by the rule on hearsay. This has long been a quiet area of our law on evidence and
petitioners attempt to foment a belated tempest cannot receive our imprimatur.
Admissibility of Offer of Compromise

TRANS-PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES, INC. v. CA

G.R. No. 109172 August 19, 1994

FACTS

Unable to settle its obligation in full with private respondent Associated Bank, petitioner
Trans Pacific requested for, and was granted by respondent bank, a restructuring of the remaining
indebtedness which amounted to P1,057,500.00, as all the previous payments made were applied
to penalties and interests.

To secure the re-structured loan of P1,213,400.00, three new promissory notes were
executed by Trans-Pacific among others is PN No. TL-9077-82. The mortgaged parcels of land were
substituted by another mortgage covering two other parcels of land and a chattel mortgage on
petitioner's stock inventory. The released parcels of land were then sold and the proceeds
amounting to P1,386,614.20, according to petitioner, were turned over to the bank and applied to
Trans-Pacific's restructured loan. Subsequently, respondent bank returned the duplicate original
copies of the three promissory notes to Trans-Pacific with the word "PAID" stamped thereon.

Despite the return of the notes, or on December 12, 1985, Associated Bank demanded from
Trans-Pacific payment of the amount of P492,100.00 representing accrued interest on PN No. TL-
9077-82. According to the bank, the promissory notes were erroneously released.

Initially, Trans-Pacific expressed its willingness to pay the amount demanded by

respondent bank as evidenced by a letters dated December 16,1985 and August 20, 1986. The
letters are offer for settlement or compromise. Later, it had a change of heart and instead initiated
an action before the Court for specific performance and damages and prayed that the mortgage
over the two parcels of land be released and its stock inventory be lifted and that its obligation to
the bank be declared as having been fully paid. On the other hand, the respondent bank filed a
counterclaim against Petitioner for the unpaid obligation. The trial court rendered judgment in
favor of Trans-Pacific. The bank appealed and posited that the offer for settlement or compromise is
an admission by Trans-Pacific of its obligation. On the contrary, petitioner maintains that the offer
of settlement or compromise is not an admission that anything is due and is inadmissible against
the party making the offer (Sec. 24, Rule 130, Rules of Court).

ISSUE

Is the offer of settlement or compromise inadmissible as evidence in this case?

RULING

No, the offer of settlement or compromise is admissible. To determine the admissibility or

non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of the case and the intent of the
party making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the existence of a debt but
offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of
settlement is inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer admits the existence
of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the admission is
admissible to prove such indebtedness. Indeed, an offer of settlement is an effective admission of a
borrower's loan balance. This is what petitioner did in the present case before the court as evidence
by the letters which reads:

“We have had a series of communications with your bank regarding our proposal for
the eventual settlement of our remaining obligations . . .

As you may be able to glean from these letters and from your credit files, we have
always been conscious of our obligation to you which had not been faithfully serviced
on account of unfortunate business reverses. Notwithstanding these however, total
payments thus far remitted to you already exceede (sic) the original principal
amount of our obligation. But because of interest and other charges, we find ourselves
still obligated to you by P492,100.00. . . .

. . . We continue to find ourselves in a very fluid (sic) situation in as much as

the overall outlook of the industry has not substantially improved. Principally for
this reason, we had proposed to settle our remaining obligations to you by way of
dacion en pago of the equipments (sic) and spare parts mortgaged to you to (the)
extent of their applicable loan values.”
Res Inter Alios Acta Rule

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMILING et. al.

G.R. No. 140405 March 4, 2004

FACTS

On September 2, 1995, Ysiong Chua, the owner of Masterline Grocery and his helper Mario
were about to close the store when someone knocked on the door to buy some cigarettes. As soon
as Mario opened the door, three masked, armed men suddenly barged into the store and announced
a hold-up. Ysiong darted to the adjacent Good Taste Bakery and out to the Tayug Police Station to
report the incident.

SPO1 Rolando Torio, PO3 Erwil Pastor and SPO4 Emilio Nagui of the Tayug Police Station rushed to
the crime scene. While SPO1 Torio was standing outside the store's door, he heard three gunshots
coming from inside the store, all directed towards Bonifacio Street. PO3 Pastor was then on the
street while Nagui was some 50 meters away. PO3 Pastor ran and hid behind a concrete marker,
then moved westward as if to return to the police headquarters. Unfortunately, in his attempt to
flee, PO3 Pastor was shot in the face. He was rushed to the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital. On
September 6, 1995, PO3 Pastor died from the injury he suffered.

Meanwhile, Ysiong discovered that he lost three gold necklaces worth P26,000 and cash
amounting to P81,000.

On September 26, 1995, bothered by her conscience, prosecution witness Naty Panimbaan
decided to reveal to police authorities what she knew about the case. During the trial, she testified
that she was present in all the four meetings in which the plan to rob the Masterline Grocery was
hatched.

On the other hand, all the accused denied culpability for the felony. Each of them claimed to
be somewhere else at the time the crime happened on September 2, 1995. The witnesses for the
defense also tried to impugn the credibility of the lead witness for the prosecution, Naty
Panimbaan. Comiling on the other hand, posits that Naty's testimony was inadmissible against him
to prove conspiracy because of the res inter alios acta rule.

On September 1, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision, convicting MAJ. EMILIO
COMILING, GERALDO GALINGAN alias "Bong” and RICKY MENDOZA,
ISSUE

Did the trial court err in not applying Res inter alios rule?

RULING

Appellant Comiling, assails his conviction by asserting that the killing of PO3 Erwil Pastor
happened after the robbery took place, hence the "homicide" could not have been a necessary
means of committing the robbery. Neither could it be said that the robbery produced another
offense.

The argument is specious. As correctly stressed by the Solicitor General, robbery with
homicide is a "special complex crime." It is enough that in order to sustain a conviction for this
crime, the killing, which is designated as "homicide," has a direct relation to the robbery, regardless
of whether the latter takes place before or after the killing. For as long as the killing occurs during
or because of the heist, even if the killing is merely accidental, robbery with homicide is committed.

Appellant Comiling likewise contends that Naty's testimony was inadmissible against him to
prove conspiracy because of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court which provides:

Admission by conspirator. – The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

This rule prescribes that any declaration made by a conspirator relating to the conspiracy is
admissible against him alone but not against his co-conspirators unless the conspiracy is first
shown by other independent evidence.

According to Comiling, Naty's testimony showed that she was also a conspirator, thus, the
existence of conspiracy must be shown by evidence other than Naty's admission. As there was no
independent proof of conspiracy except the testimony of Naty, the latter's testimony concerning
appellant's participation in the conspiracy was inadmissible against him. This contention is
misplaced. The res inter alios acta rule refers only to extrajudicial declarations or admissions and
not to testimony given on the witness stand where the party adversely affected has the opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant.8 In the present case, Naty's admission implicating appellant
Comiling was made in open court and therefore may be taken in evidence against him.
 While we are convinced that appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with
homicide, we cannot impose the penalty of death on them. Under Article 294 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code,24 the crime of robbery carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In imposing
the death penalty, the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of band, evident
premeditation, craft and disguise against appellants. However, these circumstances were not
specifically alleged in the information as required under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Hence, inasmuch as no aggravating and mitigating circumstances can be
deemed to have attended the commission of the offense, the lower penalty of reclusion
perpetua should be
Res inter alios acta Rule

People v. Magpayo

G.R. Nos. 92961-64, September 1, 19993

FACTS: Appellant Benjamin C. Magpayo was charged with Rape, Robbery, Robbery with Hold-up
and Forcible Abduction with Rape before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon in four (4) separate
complaints and informations. Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all the
charges. After trial, he was found guilty of all the offenses charged in a joint decision rendered by
the trial court. Appellant appeals from the aforementioned joint decision of the court a quo

ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo erred in convicting him in all charges?

RULING: No. In resolving whether or not rape was committed, the evidence for conviction must be
clear and convincing to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Appellant
vehemently questions the trial court's decision finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt because
the prosecution witnesses allegedly failed to positively identify him. He avers that when he was
arrested to answer for an alleged wrongdoing on May 22, 1988, complainants were hesitant to
point at him and kept on looking at their parents. However, the Court is of the opinion that the
lingering shock caused by such harrowing experience at the hands of appellant could have caused
the minor complainants to hesitate in directly identifying him. Hence, the fact that complainants
kept on looking at their parents is of no moment. They were simply scared, looked at their parents
for assurance, and such initial hesitation could by no means indicate that complainants were guilty
of fabrication. Also, although Lilibeth Bobis admitted that she was not able to immediately identify
the appellant at the police station after his arrest, she declared that she thought it over very
carefully if the appellant was indeed the offender. Also, what is important is that Bobis remembered
the square shape of appellant's face, his eyes to be "singkit" and his nose as "matangos" Indeed,
familiarity with the physical features, particularly those of the face, is actually the best way to
identify the person.

Furthermore, it is well settled that the testimony of a single witness, free from any signs of
impropriety or falsehood, is sufficient to convict an accused, even if uncorroborated. In the instant
case, the testimonies of eight-year old Daniel and the pedicab driver would have been merely
corroborative. Furthermore, there is no showing that the privilege to present Chico's brother and
the pedicab driver was withheld from appellant. In any event, the prosecution has the prerogative
to present as many witnesses it deems proper and the non-presentation of some does not militate
against the State for the number of such witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the
prosecuting officers. Thus, the testimony of Mara Chico, if positive, reasonable and credible, is
sufficient to support a conviction especially if her testimony bears the earmarks of truth and
sincerity and had been delivered spontaneously, naturally and in a straightforward manner.
Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the
witness falsified the truth or that his observation had been inaccurate. In the present case, such
criteria were more than met by the testimony of the young and innocent victim who could not have
possibly concocted her testimony. Just as unavailing is appellant's defense of alibi. Appellant failed
to show that it was impossible for him to be in the crime scene at the time the said crimes were
committed. In order to be given full faith and credit, alibi must be clearly established and must not
leave any room for doubt as to its plausibility and verity. It has been repeatedly held that for alibi to
prosper, it is not enough to prove that the appellant was somewhere else when the crime was
committed, but must likewise demonstrate that he could not have been physically present at the
place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.

Appellant also assails the application of the doctrine of res inter alios acta (Sec. 34, Rule 130
of the Revised Rules of Evidence) allegedly because the similarity of the acts involved (i.e.,
molestation) was not sufficiently established. After careful review of the records before us, we hold
that the trial court committed no error in applying the exception to the above doctrine.

The Rules provide: Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence. Evidence that one did or did not a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar
thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan,
system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.

As a rule, evidence is not admissible which shows or tends to show, that the accused in a
criminal case has committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is on trial. It is
not competent to prove that he committed other crimes of a like nature for the purpose of showing
that he committed the crime charged in the complaint or information. An exception to this rule is
when such evidence tends directly to establish the particular crime, and it is usually competent to
prove the motive, the intent, the absence of mistake or accident, a common scheme or plan
embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to
establish the other, or the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial.

In the case at bar, evidence was introduced in Criminal Case No. 6443 (Forcible Abduction
with Rape) committed by appellant against 11-year old Mara N. Chico on November 20, 1987, not
as evidence of similar acts to prove that on April 10, 1988, the said appellant also committed a
similar act of rape (and robbery) against the person of 10-year old Lilibeth Bobis (Criminal Case No.
6436). These offenses are separate crimes and are the subject of separate complaints and proofs
though jointly tried. Hence, the evidence in one was not offered and admitted to prove the other but
only to show the plan, scheme or modus operandi of the offender. In the present case, We see no
cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the trial court. The prosecution has satisfactorily
established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the author of the crimes charged in the
aforementioned informations.
Admission by third-party – Exceptions

People v. Raquel

G.R. No. 119005, December 2, 1996

FACTS: At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and Agapito
Gambalan, Jr. Thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to the person knocking at the
backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed men emerged at the door, declared a
hold-up and fired their guns at him.

Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband’s lifeless while a man
took her husband’s gun and left hurriedly. She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall
beside their water pump while two (2) other men ran away but she did not seen their faces. The
police came and found one of the perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters
from the victim’s house. He was identified as Amado Ponce.

Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were
the perpetrators of the crime.

Upon arraignment thereafter, all the accused pleaded not guilty. While trial was in progress,
however, and before he could give his testimony, accused Amado Ponce escaped from jail. Upon the
other hand, appellants relied on alibi as their defense and presented witnesses to support their
alibi.

The trial court rendered judgment finding all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced them accordingly.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the appellants of the crime charged,
despite absence of evidence positively implicating them as the perpetrators of the crime?

RULING: A careful review and objective appraisal of the evidence convinces us that the prosecution
failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of the perpetrators of, much less the
participation of herein appellants in, the crime charged.

The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband as base
from his testimonies.

A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of herein
appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce
pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated, the said accused escaped
from jail before he could testify in court and he has been at large since then.

The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the
latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-
examine his co-accused on the latter’s extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are
hearsay as against said accused. That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of
appellants, in the case at bar.

The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration,
or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not
admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and
mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon him, and are evidence against him. So are
his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly
unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought
not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence
against him.

This extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence, was made in violation
of the constitutional rights of accused Amado Ponce.Extrajudicial statements made during custodial
investigation without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the
adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be made with
the assistance of counsel. These rights, both constitutional and statutory in source and foundation,
were never observed.
Admission by third-party – Exceptions

People v. Bokingco

G.R. No. 187536, August 10, 2011

FACTS: Noli and Elsa Pasion were an owner of a pawnshop and a two-row apartment in Angeles
City, Pampanga. In the midnight of February 2000, Dante Vitaliano saw Michael Bokingco hitting
something on the floor. He headed on his apartment unit and there he discovered that it was Noli
Pasion, his brother-in-law, that was hit by Bokingco. Upon seeing him, Bokingco ran towards him
and attacked him with a hammer. Vitaliano managed to push him away and proceeded to Pasion’s
house to inform Elsa, Noli’s wife, that his husband was already dead.

Meanwhile, Elsa also heard the commotion while she was in the master’s bedroom. She
immediately went down to check what was happenning but before reaching the kitchen, she was
blocked by co-accused Reynante Col. She asked Col why he was in their house but he refused to
answer, instead, he sprayed tear gas on Elsa’s eyes. Col instructed her to open the vault of their
pawnshop but she told him that she doesn’t know the combination lock. He then proceeded to drag
her in the back door. Before they reached the door, Bokingco opened the screen door and shouted
“tara na, patay na s’ya!” Col immediately let her go and ran away with Bokingco.

Later, Vitaliano and Elsa discovered Noli lying on the floor, bathing with his own blood. Necropsy
reported that Noli suffered 29 injuries, and that the injuries sustained by Noli on his skull were the
cause of his death.

Prosecution filed a case against Bokingco and Col. RTC found them guilty of murder and sentenced
them to suffer the penalty of death. CA affirmed the decision but reduced the sentence to life
imprisonment without parole.

Appellant sought reversal to the decision contending that Col is not guilty of conspiring with
Bokingco.

ISSUE: WON Col is guilty of murder as co-conspirator.

RULING: NO. Indeed, in order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the case before
us, it is necessary that conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved. Conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred from the
conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts
of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest. Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to
establish the existence of conspiracy.

Based on these acts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired with Bokingco in killing
Pasion. At the most, Col’s actuations can be equated to attempted robbery, which was actually the
initial information filed against appellants before it was amended, on motion of the prosecution, for
murder.

Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had been killed and that they had to
leave the place. This does not prove that they acted in concert towards the consummation of the
crime. It only proves, at best, that there were two crimes committed simultaneously and they were
united in their efforts to escape from the crimes they separately committed.

Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already killed Pasion
even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco was killing
Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop.

Appellant Reynante Col is ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt. Appellant Michael Bokingco
is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. He is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of six years (6) and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Dying Declaration – Requisites for Admissibility

G.R. No. L-45470 February 28, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO LAQUINON, alias "JOLLY"
CONCEPCION, JR., J.

FACTS:

Late in the evening, Samama Buat, Barrio Captain of Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur, was at his
residence when he heard gunshots coming from the bank of a river some three hundred meters to
the south of his house. He proceeded to the place where the man was. His brother and the barrio
councilman soon arrived at the scene. The man lying in the sand identified himself as Pablo
Remonde when he was asked. Buat then took the "ante mortem" statement of Remonde. He asked,
"who shot you" and Remonde said that it was Gregorio Laquinon. He asked Remonde whether from
the gunshot wounds he suffered he would survive to which the victim answered, "I do not know".

After that, Buat went to the municipality of Hagonoy and reported to Vice Mayor Antonio
Biran the shooting of Remonde. Vice Mayor Biran went to the scene of the incident and asked the
victim who shot him to which the latter answered that he was shot by Gregorio Laquinon. Remonde
was then placed on a jeep and brought to the hospital where he later died because of bullet wounds.

Accused Gregorio Laquinon was then charged with the crime of murder in the Court of First
Instance for the killing of Pablo Remonde. From the foregoing judgment, Laquinon interposed an
appeal and prayed for the reversal of the appealed judgment on the ground that the lower court
erred in finding him guilty of the crime charged based on the statement attributed to the deceased
Pablo Remonde. He argues that the statement is inadmissible in evidence as an ante-mortem
declaration because it was not executed under a consciousness of an impending death; and that the
deceased was not a competent witness.

ISSUE:

Should the dying declaration of deceased Pablo Remonde be admissible as an ante-mortem

declaration?

RULING:

The dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as an ante-mortem
declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration fails
to show that the deceased believed himself in extremist, "at the point of death when every hope of
recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to
the hearsay rule."

It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made
immediately after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a
charge against the accused. Overall, the findings of the trial court were correct that the accused was
responsible for the killing of Pablo Remonde.
Dying Declaration – Requisites for Admissibility

G.R. No. L-26193 January 27, 1981

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODULFO SABIO, alias "PAPU"
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J

FACTS:

Paulino Fuentes, a policeman, received a report at about 5:30 o'clock in the morning, that
Catalino “Ino” Espina, 80-years old, single and sari-sari store owner, was hacked in his house. He
and another policeman, Pedro Burgos, proceeded to the victim's house where he saw the latter
lying on the floor, wounded and bleeding on the forehead. Fuentes asked the victim who had
hacked him, and the latter answered that it was "Papu" Sabio, son of Menes. Fuentes asked the
victim why "Papu" hacked him and the latter answered that "Papu" had demanded money from
him. Fuentes also asked the victim how much money he had lost but the latter was not able to
answer that question. Sensing that the wound was serious since it was bleeding profusely Fuentes
decided to take down the statement of the victim. He detached a leaf from a calendar and wrote
down on it the questions he propounded as well as the answers of the victim. He then had it
thumbmarked by the victim with the latter's own blood as no ink was available. Present at the time
were Pedro Burgos, another police officer, and Camilo Semilla, the grandnephew who called for the
police. Fuentes himself and Burgos signed as witnesses.

Thereafter, Fuentes advised Semilla to bring the victim to the hospital. Fuentes observed
that the things of Catalino and the store items like canned sardines were all in disarray while the tin
can was already opened. Catalino died three days later from the wound on his forehead.

Admitting Catalino’s antemortem declaration, the trial court found the accused guilty of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide attend by the aggravating circumstances of disregard of respect
due to the victim, an octogenarian and recidivism, without any mitigating circumstance.

On appeal, the defense questions the admissibility of Exhibit "A" of the prosecution as an
antemortem statement arguing that there is no evidence showing that when the declaration was
uttered the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death; that, in fact, the victim had
hopes of recovery or his first word to Camilo Semilla was for the latter to fetch the police. Defense
counsel argues further that there are doubts as to when said Exhibit "A" was thumb-marked
because, although it was already in existence in the morning of October 5, 1965, as alleged by
Patrolman Fuentes, the accused was never confronted with the document when he was taken in to
custody by the police for the first time from the morning of October 5 to October 6, 1965, thereby
implying that the document did not yet exist at that time.

ISSUE:

Did the lower court err in admitting the antemortem declaration of the victim?

RULING:

No, the arguments advanced by the defense are unavailing and the lower court
appropriately admitted the antemortem declaration.
 The seriousness of the injury on the victim's forehead which had affected the brain and was
profusely bleeding; the victim's inability to speak until his head was raised; the spontaneous
answer of the victim that "only Papu Sabio is responsible for my death"; and his subsequent demise
from the direct effects of the wound on his forehead, strengthen the conclusion that the victim must
have known that his end was inevitable. That death did not ensue till three days after the
declaration was made will not alter its probative force since it is not indispensable that a declarant
expires immediately thereafter. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of
death, in fact, that renders the dying declaration admissible.

Further, the fact that the victim told his grandnephew to fetch the police, does not negate
the victim's feeling of hopelessness of recovery but rather emphasizes the realization that he had so
little time to disclose his assailant to the authorities. The mere failure of the police to confront the
accused with the antemortem declaration the first time the latter was arrested and incarcerated
from October 5 to October 6, 1965, neither militates against the fact of its execution considering
that it was evidence that the police was under no compulsion to disclose.
Dying Declaration – Requisites for Admissibility

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v JOSUE MOLAS

G.R. Nos. 97437-39; February 5, 1993; Grino-Aquino, J.

FACTS:
Josue Molas and Dulcesima Resonable were sweethearts. They were engaged to be married
in May, 1983. Dulcesima was the daughter of Bernardo Resonable and Soledad Resonable. The
couple had two (2) sons namely Nicolas and Abelardo.
In the evening of February 2, 1983, Bernardo Resonable arrived at his house and was
surprised to find his eight-year-old son, Abelardo, at the doorway of his house, bathed with his own
blood. Abelardo informed his father that the Molas, was the person who inflicted his injuries and
stabbed his sister Dulcesima and his mother Soledad. He found the lifeless body of Dulce in a dried
carabao mud pool while his wife’s corpse was found near the bench by the door of the house. He
ran to report the matter to the barangay captain. Abelardo died the next day due to injuries
sustained.
Accused Molas, with bloodstained clothes, surrendered to Patrolman Geronimo Vallega in
the municipal hall of Pamplona, Negros Oriental. He also surrendered the hunting knife that I used
in killing the mother, the daughter and the boy. Molas freely and voluntarily gave his confession
without the assistance or presence of counsel.

ISSUE:
1. Is the dying declaration of Abelardo regarding the incident transpired admissible as
evidence against accused Molas?
2. Is the extrajudicial confession of accused Molas admissible as evidence to prove that he
committed the crime of murder?

RULING:
1. YES. To be admissible, a dying declaration must: (a) concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) that at the time it was made, the declarant was
under a consciousness of impending death; (c) that he was a competent witness; and (d)
that his declaration is offered in evidence in a criminal case for homicide, murder or
parricide in which the declarant is the victim.

2. NO. While it is true that the Molas’ extrajudicial confession was made without the advice
and assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible as evidence, it could be treated as a verbal
admission of the accused established through the testimonies of the persons who heard it or
who conducted the investigation of the accused.
Dying Declaration – Requisites for Admissibility

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v BERNABE P. PALANAS

G.R. No. 214453; June 17, 2015; Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
In the morning of March 26, 2006, SPO2 Borre took his five month old grandson outside his
residence at Block 14, Kenneth Street corner Eusebio Avenue, Pasig City. PO3 Leopoldo Zapanta,
who slept at SPO2 Borre’s residence, was watching television when four successive gunshots rang
out. PO3 Zapanta looked through the open door of SPO2 Borre’s house and saw two armed men
with 0.38 caliber revolvers standing a meter away from SPO2 Borre. He saw accused Palanas
deliver the fourth shot to SPO2 Borre but he could not identify the other shooter who is, at the time
of the filing of the information against Palanas was still at large. After the two assailants fled on a
motorcycle, SPO2 Borre was immediately brought to the Pasig City General Hospital who, on the
way to the said hospital, made a statement that the one who shot him was “Abe,” “Aspog,” or “Abe
Palanas” –referring to his neighbour, Palanas. The RTC convicted Palanas of the crime of murder
which was affirmed with modifications by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Is the statement made by SPO2 Borre before his death considered as a dying declaration or
part of res gestae?

RULING:
YES.
For a dying declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule, four (4)
conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances
of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant is conscious of
his impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is
offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim. On
the other hand, a statement to be deemed to form part of the res gestae, and thus, constitute
another exception to the rule on hearsay evidence, requires the concurrence of the following
requisites: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
In the case at bar, SPO2 Borre’s statements constitute a dying declaration, given that they
pertained to the cause and circumstances of his death and taking into consideration the number
and severity of his wounds, it may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the same under a fixed
belief that his own death was already imminent. This declaration is considered evidence of the
highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death
would make a careless and false accusation. Verily, because the declaration was made in extremity,
when the party is at the point of death and when every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind
is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth, the law deems this as a situation
so solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath
administered in court.
 In the same vein, SPO2 Borre’s statements may likewise be deemed to form part of the res
gestae. “Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main
fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the
main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence
as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a
part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony.” In this case, SPO2 Borre’s statements refer to a startling occurrence, i.e.,
him being shot by Palanas and his companion. While on his way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre had no
time to contrive the identification of his assailants. Hence, his utterance was made in spontaneity
and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such statement is relevant because it
identified Palanas as one of the authors of the crime. Therefore, the killing of SPO2 Borre,
perpetrated by Palanas, is adequately proven by the prosecution.
Dying Declaration vs. Independently Relevant Statement

VIRGILIO BON v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 152160; January 13, 2004; Panganiban, J.

FACTS:
Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for violating Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended, together with Rosalio Bon.
Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza owns a titled agricultural land located in Basud, Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
administered by Virgilio Bon. Receiving information that trees inside the land were being stolen, cut
and sawed into lumber by her administrator and/or workers, she sent her brother Manuel
Dangalan to investigate the report. During their investigation, the group discovered six (6) stumps
of trees: four (4) Narra trees, one cuyao-yao tree and one amugis tree. On the land, Virgilio Bon
admitted ordering the cutting and sawing of the trees into lumber. Scaling the four stumps, it was
his estimate that the lumber produced was 11.97 cubic meters or 4,315 board feet, with a value of
P25,376.00
Rosalio Bon, the son of Virgilio Bon denied the charge. He claimed that he was in Manila
from December 1989 and returned to Sorsogon on March 21, 1990. He mentioned that the purpose
of filing this case was to eject his father as tenant of the land.

ISSUE:
Is the verbal admission made by Virgilio Bon admissible as evidence to indict him on
violation of Section 68 of PD 705?

RULING:
YES.
What was sought to be admitted as evidence was the fact that the utterance was actually
made by Bon, not necessarily that the matters stated therein were true. On this basis, a statement
attributed to a person who is not on the witness stand is admissible; it is not covered by the hearsay
rule. Gotesco Investment Corporation v. Chatto ruled that evidence regarding the making of such
statement is not secondary but primary, because the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue
or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact.
A party’s verbal admission that is established through the testimonies of the persons who
heard it fall under Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to this provision, “the act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.” This
rule is based upon the notion that no man would make any declaration against himself, unless it is
true. The testimony of petitioner may, therefore, be received in evidence against him.
Dying Declaration vs. Independently Relevant Statement

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ROLANDO "Botong" MALIBIRAN, et.al.

G.R. No. 178301, April 24, 2009, THIRD DIVSION

Facts:

Reynaldo Tan (Reynaldo) died on February 5, 1995. Reynaldo left his common-law wife,
Rosalinda Fuerzas (Rosalinda), and their two (2) children in Davao and went to Manila to seek
greener pastures. While in Manila, Reynaldo had a relationship with appellant Beverly Tibo-Tan.
They eventually married in 1981 and they begot three (3) children – Renevie, Jag-Carlo and Jay R.In
1984, Reynaldo's and Rosalinda's paths crossed again and they resumed their relationship. This led
to the "souring" of Reynaldo's relationship with Beverly; and in 1991, Reynaldo moved out of the
conjugal house and started living again with Rosalinda, although Reynaldo maintained support of
and paternal ties with his children.

On February 5, 1995, Reynaldo and Beverly were in Greenhills. At around 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, the family stepped out of the shopping mall and Reynaldo proceeded to the parking lot
to get his red Honda Accord. Immediately thereafter, the family heard an explosion coming from the
direction where Reynaldo parked his car. They saw the Honda Accord burning, with Reynaldo lying
beside the driver's seat burning and bleeding profusely.

Two separate Informations for Murder and Parricide were filed against Beverly, Rolando
and one Oswaldo Banaag (Oswaldo. Rolando and Beverly pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Their
co-accused, Oswaldo, was later discharged and utilized as one of the prosecution witnesses.

The RTC found Rolando guilty of Murder and Beverly Tibo-Tan, of Parricide. Beverly then
appealed to this Court; the appeal was, however, referred to the CA. The CA affirmed the Decision of
the RTC. Thus, Beverly Tibo-Tan appelas to this Court arguing that the RTC should have not
appreciated the testimony of prosecution witness Oswaldo Banaag was in some parts hearsay and
replete with inconsistencies.18 Specifically, appellant contends that the testimony of Oswaldo that
"he overheard a conversation between Malibiran (Rolando) and Beverly (appellant) that they will
fetch a man in Bulacan that knows how to place a bomb in a vehicle" is hearsay. Likewise, in her
Reply Brief, Beverly claims that the testimony of Janet is hearsay.

Issue:

Is the testimony of Oswaldo and Janet inadmissible for being a mere hearsay?

Ruling:

No. The testimonies of Oswaldo and Janet are not covered by the hearsay rule.The hearsay
rule states that a witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because
he was told, or he read or heard the same. This is derived from Section 36, Rule 130, Revised Rules
of Court, which requires that a witness can testify only to those facts that he knows of or comes
from his personal knowledge, that is, that are derived from his perception. Hearsay testimony may
not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.
 The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One is the doctrine of
independently relevant statements, where only the fact that such statements were made is relevant,
and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply; hence, the
statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of such a fact. The witness who testifies thereto is competent because
he heard the same, as this is a matter of fact derived from his own perception, and the purpose is to
prove either that the statement was made or the tenor thereof.

In this case, Oswaldo's testimony that he overheard a conversation between Rolando and
Beverly that they would fetch a man in Bulacan who knew how to place a bomb in a vehicle is
admissible, if only to establish the fact that such statement was made and the tenor thereof.
Likewise, Janet may testify on matters not only uttered in her presence, since these may be
considered as independently relevant statements, but also personally conveyed to her by Beverly
and Rolando.

The testimony of Janet as corroborated by Oswaldo, though circumstantial, leaves no doubt

that Beverly had in fact conspired with Rolando in bringing about the death of her husband
Reynaldo.
Dying Declaration vs. Independently Relevant Statement

LEODEGARIO BAYANI v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 15561, August 14, 2007, THIRD DIVISION

Facts:

Leodegario Bayani (petitioner) was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. After
trial, Bayani was convicted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) The RTC made the following
findings:The check in question is postdated, issued and drawn on August 20, 1992, and dated
August 26, 1992. It was presented to complaining witness, Dolores Evangelista, for encashment by
Alicia Rubia whom the former knows. After the check was deposited with the bank, it was returned
to Evangelista for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, she pursued the following events to demand
payment of the value of the check. After the confrontation at the office of Atty. Emmanuel Velasco,
Evangelista has had another confrontation with the accused Bayani and Alicia Rubia at Candelaria
municipal building before Brgy. Captain Nestor Baera, but again the accused and Rubia pointed to
each other for the settlement of the amount involved in the check in question. Of these two (2)
confrontations Evangelista had with the accused Bayani and Alicia Rubia, including the chances to
have met or known the complaining witness Evangelista since 1977 up to the filing of the instant
case in the Municipal Trial Court of Candelaria, all what the accused Leodegario Bayani could say
were flat denials of having talked with, or otherwise met Evangelista, regarding the latter’s claim of
payment of the value of Check No. 054924, admittedly from the check booklet of the said accused
Bayani issued by PS Bank, Candelaria Branch. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in
toto the trial court’s decision.

Issue:

May Evangelista’s testimony be considered as an independently relevant statement?

Ruling:

Bayani denies having issued the check subject of this case. He argues that the evidence
pinpointing him as the signatory on the check is merely hearsay. Section 36 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court provides that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in
these rules.. Hence, information that is relayed to the former by the latter before it reaches the court
is considered hearsay. In the present case, complainant Evangelista testified that she was
approached by Alicia Rubia who told her that she was requested by Bayani to have the check
exchanged for cash, as he needed money badly. Evangelista’s testimony is hearsay since she had no
personal knowledge of the fact that Bayani indeed requested Rubia to have the check exchanged for
cash, as she was not personally present when Bayani supposedly made this request. What she
testified to, therefore, was a matter that was not derived from her own perception but from Rubia’s.

However, petitioner is barred from questioning the admission of Evangelista’s testimony

even if the same is hearsay. In failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay,
the evidence offered is admitted since no objection to the admissibility of Evangelista’s testimony
was timely made – from the time her testimony was offered and up to the time her direct
examination was conducted – then Bayani has effectively waived any objection to the admissibility
thereof and his belated attempts to have her testimony excluded for being hearsay has no ground to
stand on.

In this case, Evangelista’s testimony may be considered as an independently relevant

statement, an exception to the hearsay rule, the purpose of which is merely to establish the fact that
the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. Independent of the truth or the falsity of
the statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant. When Evangelista said that Rubia told her
that it was Bayani who requested that the check be exchanged for cash, Evangelista was only
testifying that Rubia told her of such request. It does not establish the truth or veracity of Rubia’s
statement since it is merely hearsay, as Rubia was not presented in court to attest to such utterance.
On this score, evidence regarding the making of such independently relevant statement is not
secondary but primary, because the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact. Indeed, independent of its truth or
falsehood, Evangelista’s statement is relevant to the issues of Bayani’s falsehood, his authorship of
the check in question and consequently, his culpability of the offense charged.

The Court sustains the CA in affirming petitioner’s conviction by the RTC.

Declaration Against Interest – Requisites for Admissibility

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v EUGENIO TOLEDO and SISENANDO HOLGADO
G.R. No. L-28655, August 6, 1928, EN BANC
Facts:

Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes about the occupation of certain
land. On the morning of June 15, 1927, the two men happened to meet. The argument was renewed,
and they agreed to fight. They did engage in a bolo duel with a fatal result for Filomeno Morales was
killed almost instantly. Sisenando Holgado was also seriously wounded but was able to proceed to a
neighboring house. From there Sisenando Holgado was taken to the municipal building where he
made a sworn statement before the municipal president, in which he declared that only he and
Filomeno Morales fought. About one month later, Sisenando Holgado died from the wounds
received in the fight.

The prosecution and the defense alike agree on the facts above outlined. The disputable
point is whether the accused Eugenio Toledo intervened in the quarrel and dealt a mortal blow to
Filomeno Morales. For the prosecution, there was presented the witness Justina Villanueva, the
querida of Filomeno Morales, who testified to the presence and participation of Eugenio Toledo.
Her testimony was partially corroborated by that of the witness Justina Llave.

On the other hand, the theory for the defense was that Toledo was in another place when
the fight between Morales and Holgado occurred and that his only participation was on meeting
Holgado, who was his landlord or master, in helping him to a nearby house. To this effect is the
testimony of the accused and of Conrado Holgado, the son of Sisenando Holgado. The defense also
relied upon the affidavit of Sisenando Holgado, Exhibit 1, which was identified by the municipal
president of Pinamalayan.

Issue:

Did the lower court err in not admitting in evidence Exhibit 1?

Ruling:

Yes. Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions, it has been said on high
authority, is excluded by courts in the United States that adhere to the principles of the common
law. One universally recognized exception concerns the admission of dying declarations. But the
general rule is stated to be that the declarations of a person other than accused confessing or
tending to show that he committed the crime are not competent for accused on account of the
hearsay doctrine.In the Philippine jurisdiction, we have never felt bound to follow blindly the
principles of the common law. A reexamination of some of those principles discloses anomalies.
A dying declaration is admitted of necessity in order, "to reach those man slayers who perpetrate
their crimes when there are no other eyewitnesses." But the person accused of a crime, under the
same principle of necessity, is not permitted to free him by offering in evidence the admission of
another under oath that this other committed the crime. Again admissions are receivable against
either a pecuniary or a proprietary interest, but not against a penal interest. This Court fail to see
why it can be believed that a man will be presumed to tell the truth in the one instance but will not
be presumed to tell the truth in the other instance. Again the exhibit would have been admitted
against its maker at his trial, if he had not died. But the document is held inadmissible to exonerate
another. Yet the truth of the exhibit is not different in the first case that in the second.
 Here the declarant is deceased and his statements were made under oath. They also read in
such a way as to ring with the truth. When Sisenando Holgado declared "When we fought, there was
nobody present," it was at the end of just such a rambling statement as a wounded man would be
expected to make. When Sisenando Holgado declared "I met one of my workers named Eugenio
Toledo, who accompanied me to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic," he did so in response to a
question by the municipal president. Exhibit 1 should have been received not as conclusive
evidence of innocence, but as evidence to be taken into consideration in connection with the other
proven facts.The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth.

Any man outside of a court and unhampered by the pressure of technical procedure,
unreasoned rules of evidence, and cumulative authority, would say that if a man deliberately
acknowledged himself to be the perpetrator of a crime and exonerated the person charged with the
crime, and there was other evidence indicative of the truthfulness of the statement, the accused
man should not be permitted to go to prison or to the electric chair to expiate a crime he never
committed.

The defendant-appellant Eugenio Toledo should be given the benefit of the reasonable
doubt and an order will immediately issue directing his release.
Declaration Against Interest – Requisites for Admissibility

G.R. No. 152364, April 15, 2010

ALEJANDRA S. LAZARO, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND, ISAURO M. LAZARO; LEONCIO D.

SANTOS; ADOLFO SANTOS; NENITA S. LACAR; ANGELINA S. SAGLES, ASSISTED BY HER
HUSBAND, ALBERTO SANTOS, JR.; REGINA SANTOS AND FABIAN SANTOS, vs. MODESTA
AGUSTIN, FILEMON AGUSTIN, VENANCIA AGUSTIN, MARCELINA AGUSTIN, PAUL A. DALALO,
NOEL A. DALALO, GREGORIO AGUSTIN AND BIENVENIDO AGUSTIN

FACTS: The plaintiffs and the defendants are the descendants of the late Simeon C. Santos,
married to Trinidad Duldulao, who died intestate leaving the subject parcel of land.

The petitioners (plaintiff) file a complaint against the respondent (defendant) for claiming as
one of the co-owners of a parcel of land Lot No. 10676. Alleging the following:

a. that Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, all surnamed Santos, who are the children of Simeon
Santos, consented that the parcel of land of this complaint be titled in the name of Basilisa,
the latter being the eldest. And so the Original Cettificate of Title No. 20742 in the name of
Basilisa Santos. However,it did not does not necessarily mean that Basilisa Santos is the sole
and exclusive owner of this parcel of land, and as embodied in the Title obtained in the
name of Basilisa Santos;
b. that without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs, the title of the lot with Original
Certificate of Title No. 20742 was transferred into another title which is now Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-20695 in the names of Modesta Agustin, Filemon Agustin, Venancia
Agustin, Marcelina Agustin, Monica Agustin, Gregorio Agustin and Bienvenido Agustin who
are the children of the late Basilisa Santos-Agustin
c. that during the lifetime of Basilisa Santos-Agustin, plaintiff Alejandra Santos-Lazaro
informed her sister Basilisa, that the transfer of the title in the name of Basilisa Santos into
the names of her children would erroneously imply that the lot is solely and exclusively
owned by Basilisa Santos-Agustin's children, but Basilisa Santos-Agustin replied [to]
plaintiff Alejandra Santos-Lazaro not to worry because an affidavit was already executed by
her recognizing and specifying that her brothers Alberto Santos and Leoncio Santos, and her
sister Alejandra Santos-Lazaro would each get one fourth (¼) share of the lot;

Plaintiffs now invoke the intervention of the court to partition the lot in accordance with the law on
intestate succession and to partition the residential house as specified below. Herein respondents
filed their Answer with Counterclaim, alleging that the subject parcel of land is owned exclusively
by them as heirs of the late Basilisa Santos, who was the original registered owner of the property
evidenced by OCT No. 20742; the plaintiffs never became owners of said land
The MTCC ruled, among others, that no evidentiary value could be given to the affidavit allegedly
executed by Basilisa, wherein she purportedly acknowledged her co-ownership of the subject
property with her siblings Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, because the affiant was not presented on
the witness stand, such that all the statements made in her affidavit were hearsay. The RTC
affirmed the decision with modification. The CA affirmed also the decision of MTCC with
modification.

ISSUE:

Is the sworn statement of Basilisa S. Agustin a declaration against interest which establishes
the co-ownership of lot no. 10676 by and among the petitioners and respondents.

RULING:

No.It is not a declaration against interest. Instead, it is an admission against interest.

Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or
identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is
available as a witness.

Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and declarations
against interest. Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in
privity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the
declarant is available as a witness. Declarations against interest are those made by a person who is
neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and constitute an
exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a
witness.

In the present case, since Basilisa is respondents' predecessor-in-interest and is, thus, in
privity with the latter's legal interest, the former's sworn statement, if proven genuine and duly
executed, should be considered as an admission against interest.

A cursory reading of the subject sworn statement also reveals that it refers to a parcel of
land denominated as Lot No. 10678 while the property being disputed is Lot No. 10676. On this
basis, it cannot be concluded with certainty that the property being referred to in the sworn
statement is the same property claimed by petitioners.
Family Reputation or Tradition Regarding Pedigree

G.R. No. L-24989 July 21, 1967

PEDRO GRAVADOR, vs EUTIQUIO MAMIGO, THE DISTRICT SUPERVISOR OF BAYAWAN-STA.
CATALINA SCHOOL DISTRICT, THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF NEGROS
ORIENTAL, THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS and THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, (all
sued in their official and personal capacities),

Facts: The petitioner Pedro Gravador (Gravador) was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary
School in Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental on August 15, 1964 when he was advised by the then,
Superintendent of Schools Angel Salazar, Jr., through the respondent Supervisor Teodulfo E. Dayao,
of his separation from the service on the ground that he had reached the compulsory retirement
age of 65. The advice was based on Gravador’s pre-war records which indicates that he was was
born on November 26, 1897. Thus, as of that date, he is now 66 years, 8 months, and 22 days old.

Gravador wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his forced retirement on the ground that
the date of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901.

According to the trial court, the post-war records were intended to replace the pre-war records and
therefore the correct date of birth of the petitioner is December 11, 1901. The court also took into
account the verified answer in a cadastral proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental, dated March 15, 1924, filed by the petitioner's brother, Romulo Gravador, now deceased.
It is therein stated that the petitioner, said to be one of the co-owners of a piece of land, was at the
time 23 years old.

ISSUE: Is the testimony of petitioner’s brother admissible?

RULING:

Yes.

The lower court correctly relied upon the post-war records, for three cogent reasons.

In the first place, as Moran states, although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of
his birth, he may testify as to his age as he had learned it from his parents and relatives and his
testimony in such case is an assertion of a family tradition. Indeed, even in is application for back
pay which he filed with the Department of Finance, through the Office of the Superintendent of
Schools, on October 7, 1948, the petitioner stated that the date of his birth is December 11, 1901. He
repeated the same assertion in 1956 and again in 1960 when he asked the Government Service
Insurance System and the Civil Service Commission to correct the date of his birth to December 11,
1901.

In the second place, the import of the declaration of the petitioner's brother, contained in a verified
pleading in a cadastral case way back in 1924, to the effect that the petitioner was then 23 years
old, can not be ignored. Made ante litem motam by a deceased relative, this statement is at once a
declaration regarding pedigree within the intendment and meaning of section 33 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
Thus, December 11, 1901 is established as the date of birth of the petitioner not only by evidence of
family tradition but also by the declaration ante litem motam of a deceased relative.

Finally, the patties are agreed that the petitioner has a brother, Constantino, who was born on June
10, 1898 and who retired on June 10, 1963 with full retirement pay. The petitioner then could not
have been born earlier than Constantino, say in 1897 as pre-war records indicate, because
Constantino is admittedly older than he.
Opinion Rule – Exception (Expert Witness)

G.R. No. 200013 January 14, 2015

BETTY GEPULLE-GARBO, represented by Attorney-in-Fact, MINDA G. ROSALES (now
represented by her new Attorney-in-Fact, GARY LLOYD G. ROSALES), Petitioner, vs.SPOUSES
VICTOREY ANTONIO GARABATO and JOSEPHINE S. GARABATO, Respondents.

FACTS: This case pertains to a Deed of Sale over a parcel land in Pasay City, originally owned by
Spouses Eduviges and Nick Garbo. In March 1977, Eduviges, with the supposed consent and
signature of Nick, sold said lot to their daughter, Florence. Florence registered the property in her
name in October 1996. In 1996, Florence sold said lot to respondents Spouses Victorey and
Josephine Garabato wherein the latter registered the said property under their names. Thereafter,
Eduviges. And Nick married petitioner Betty Gepulle-Garbo. Meanwhile, Florence also died.

Petitioner Betty, Nick’s second wife after the death of Eduviges in 1978, alleges that the sale
between Eduviges and Florence in March 1977 was void as Eduviges’ and Nick’s signatures therein
were forged. To support her claim, petitioner presented as witness, Mr. Bienvenido Albacea, a
handwriting expert and retired employee of the NBI, who at the time of the conduct of the
examination of the subject deed of sale was a Document Examiner II of the NBI. Albacea stated that
in 1992, he was requested to examine the signatures of Nick appearing in the deeds of sale dated
June 17, 1977 and June 15, 1977 and comparedit with the specimen signatures appearing in the
Alien Registration Form No. 3, a document from the Treasurer’s Office of Pasay City and several
receipts issued by Nick to his lessees. After he conducted an examination of the signatures in these
documents, he concluded that the questioned and the standard signatures of Nick were not written
by one and the same person.

On the other hand, respondent Victorey denied that Florence forged the signature of Nick Garbo.

ISSUE: Is Albacea’s, opinion, a handwriting expert, binding upon the court?

RULING:

No.

The opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the court, the expert’s
function being to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own opinion. This
principle holds true especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or
dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the questioned
signatures with those of the currently existing ones. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely
on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent
examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its
authenticity.

Here, both the RTC and CA found that Albacea did not explain the manner of examination of the
specimen signatures in reaching his conclusion. Albacea did not point out distinguishing marks,
characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which
would ordinarily escape notice or detection by an untrained observer.

The Court also aptly ruled that courts are not bound by expert testimonies especially that the
examination was upon the initiative of Nick and Betty and they had complete control on what
documents and specimens to be examined by the NBI. Betty, in coming before us, had the onus of
showing that the signatures were forged. She fell short of demonstrating that her case fell within
the limited exceptions for disturbing conclusiveness of factual findings of lower courts. The
petitioner having not shown any reason for us to disturb the ruling of the courts a quo, we are
constrained to affirm the decision of the CA.
Opinion Rule – Exception (Expert Witness)