That the creation of the Graft and Corrupt Practices Board (Board) is

constitutional as it is in accordance with the following:

A. Checks and Balances

It is stated in the constitutional principle of Checks and Balances that it

allows one department to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or to
rectify mistakes or excesses committed by other departments. In the given
principle the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of the government
have checks on the other coexisting branches. It is given in this principle that
the legislature has a legislative check on the Judiciary and it is practiced by
having the power to revoke or amend the decisions of the judiciary by either
enacting a new law or amending and old law, giving it certain definition and
interpretation different from the old. It is also practiced in impeachment of
Supreme Court members and it is also provided that the legislature has the
power to define, prescribe, and apportion jurisdiction of lower courts.

It is given in statement of facts that the legislature, through the

Congress, created the Graft and Corrupt Practices Board (GCPB) or the
(Board) to provide the President with an agency which could help in the
investigation, discipline, as well as prosecution of government officials and
employees which are engaged in graft and corruption practices. Such creation
of the Board is not contrary to the constitution the test to determine whether a
given power has been validly exercised by a particular department is that
whether the power has been constitutionally conferred upon the department
claiming its exercise. However, the following rule is subject to an exception
called the Doctrine of Necessary Implication which means that which is
plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a part of it as that which
is expressed. It also qualifies that the exercise of the power may be justified
in the absence of an express conferment, because the grant of express power
carried with it all other powers may be reasonably inferred from it.1 The

1
Chua v. The Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 88979, February 7, 1992
 congress, in the given case, organized the Board by making a law to
institutionalize or give power to the Board and such act is within the scope of
the legislature even though such act is a prerogative belongs to the Supreme
Court. The legislature, in line with the abovementioned test enacted the law
that established or institutionalized the GCPB in which it gives additional
powers to the JBC as its mandate and such additional powers conferred to eh
JBC is based on a prior authorization from the Supreme Court. Hence, such
contention by Nutt O. Riouse that the legislature has no power to enact such
law is without merit.

B. Separation of Powers

The following act may be translated or seen as an oversight by Nutt O.

Riouse but such act by the Congress has already been explained and decided
upon by the Supreme Court in the case of ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST
v. PURISIMA. It was ruled that congressional oversight does not violate the
separation of powers. That the power of oversight embraces all activities
undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over
the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns
post enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic
compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are
properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to
prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (e) to assess
executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.2

2
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, G.R. No. 166715, August
14, 2008