Proposed Reforms to Rules for

Setting Electric Cooperatives’

Wheeling Rates (RSEC-WR)

Consultation Paper

Philippines Energy Regulatory Commission

December
2015
Acronyms and Abbreviations

ANOVA Analysis of Variance

CAPEX Capital Expenditure
CoD Cost of Debt
DSM Distribution, Supply, and Metering
DU Distribution Utility
EC Electricity Cooperative
ERC Energy Regulatory Commission
kWh Kilowatt per hour
OPEX Operating Expenditure
MWh Megawatt per hour
RSEC-WR Rules for Setting Electricity Cooperatives’ Wheeling Rates

1
Table of Contents
1 Introduction 4
2 RSEC-WR Grouping for DSM 5
2.1 Underlying Network Cost Drivers 5
2.2 Revising the RESC-WR Grouping 5
2.3 Effects of New RSEC-WR Grouping 11
2.4 Managing the DSM Transition 16

Appendices
Appendix A : Change in RSEC-WR Grouping by ECs 17
Appendix B : Transition Plan for Setting DSM Charges 19

Tables
Table 2.1: Statistical Differences in EC Groups 6
Table 2.2: Grouping Models Tested 8
Table 2.3: ECs in each grouping 10
Table 2.4: Summary Statistics of Min and Max Group Outliers 11
Table 2.5: Comparison of Median Costs for Current and New Groups 12
Table 2.6: Changes in DSM Median Costs between Current and New
Groups (Option 1) 12
Table 2.7: Basis for setting New DSM Charges (2010-2014 average) 13
Table 2.8: Change in Average DSM Revenue by Region with New
Grouping Approach 15
Table A.1: ECs by Current and New RSEC-WR Grouping 17
Table B.1: Transition Pathway for Setting the Real DSM Charges for
each EC 19

Figures
Figure 2.1: Relationship between Grouping Criteria and Non-Power
Operating Costs per kWh (2014-2010 Average) 7
Figure 2.2: Comparison of Current Grouping to Alternative Grouping
Options 9
Figure 2.3: Aggregate Effect of Proposed Changes on DSM Charges
using the 75th percentile of the groups 14

2
Figure 2.4: Top 5 ECs with the Largest Negative and Positive Change in
the DSM Charge 15

3
 1 1 Introduction
2
3 The Philippines Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) regulates over 120 Electricity
4 Cooperatives (ECs). The ERC introduced the Rules for Setting Electricity Cooperatives’ Wheeling
5 Rates (RSEC-WR) in 2006 based on a benchmark grouping approach for setting EC operating
6 charges. RSEC-WR was a significant step forward but there are a number of issues with its
7 implementation:
8  The current groupings do not achieve the intended objective of grouping ECs with
9 similar underlying cost drivers; and
10
11  The initial cash flow buffer in the Distribution, Service, and Metering (DSM) allowance
12 was not transparent and has not been maintained
13
14 The ERC engaged Castalia to provide advice on a revised approach to the setting of the RSEC-
15 WR for the regulation of ECs from 2016.
16
17 In this consultation paper we detail proposed changes to the criteria for establishing the EC groups
18 including setting a transparent cash flow buffer and suitable transitional measures.
19
20 Consultation Process
21 The aim of this consultation is to get feedback on the four main issues:
22
23  Feedback on the experience of ECs with the current grouping criteria
24
25  The suitability of the proposed new grouping criteria
26
27  The setting of the DSM benchmark at the 75th percentile of the proposed groups; and
28
29  The proposed transitional measures.
30
31 All interested parties are invited to submit their comments on this consultation paper on or before
32 23rd February, 2016. Electronic copies may be sent to tariffs@erc.gov.ph. This consultation paper
33 may be downloaded at the ERC website www.erc.gov.ph or may be photocopied at cost at the
34 ERC Main Office at the Docket Section, 18th Floor, Pacific Center Building, San Miguel Avenue,
35 Pasig City.

4
 1 2 RSEC-WR Grouping for DSM
2
3 Grouping the ECs with similar cost drivers has helped incentivise efficiency and has reduced the
4 regulatory burden on ERC. While RSEC-WR was an important step forward, the operating
5 conditions under which the initial groupings were established have changed significantly. Regular
6 revisions to the groups are thus needed to prevent the ECs from facing a DSM charge that does
7 not reasonably reflect their underlying cost drivers. This section summarises the:
8
9  Underlying drivers of network costs;
10
11  Proposed approach for re-grouping the ECs and for calculating the DSM allowance;
12 and
13
14  Effects that the proposed changes will have on the ECs.
15
16 2.1 Underlying Network Cost Drivers
17 Understanding network cost drivers is important for any approach to regulation, but it is especially
18 important for the RSEC-WR approach, that seeks to group ECs according to underlying costs.
19
20 The first step in the RSEC-WR methodology is to estimate required revenue per kWh for each
21 group. Therefore, the objective is to group ECs by factors that determine their costs/kWh. This
22 approach will produce groupings with less variation in costs/kWh within the group and greater
23 differences in the average cost/kWh between groups.
24
25 Evidence from first principles analysis suggest that network length/MWh sold or network
26 length/customer served could be included in the grouping criteria and the impact of other variables
27 such as transformer capacity and geography should be considered.
28
29 2.2 Revising the RESC-WR Grouping
30 In developing the proposed new groupings, we:
31
32  Used the most recent EC cost data—averaged over a five-year period from 2010 to
33 2014, and
34
35  Tested alternative models based on known drivers of DSM costs
36
37 The objective is to create EC groups that are distinct from one another. Statistical analysis can be
38 used to measure the success of the grouping by measuring the differences between groups. The
39 mean costs of each group should be significantly different from the means of each other and from
40 the mean cost of the EC population as a whole. Additionally, the variance within each group
41 should be significantly less than the variance of the population as a whole.
42
43 Failings in the current RSEC-WR grouping
44 Analysis of variance (ANOVA) testing of the current EC groups reveals they are not meaningfully
45 distinct from one another. ANOVA is a statistical technique which measures how likely a set of
46 smaller groups are actually part of a single larger group—with similar ECs. Out of four group
47 comparisons, three did not have statistically significant differences in their means. The analysis of
48 these pairs is summarized below in Table 2.1.

5
 1 Table 2.1: Statistical Differences in EC Groups
2
Group Pairing Mean DSM Cost Variance in DSM Difference in Means
(Pesos per kWh) Cost Statistically
Significant?
Groups A and B A: 1.879 A: 0.106 Yes
B: 1.555 B: 0.131
Groups A and C A: 1.879 A: 0.106 No
C: 1.654 C: 0.232
Groups B and C B: 1.555 B: 0.131 No
C: 1.654 C: 0.232
Groups D and E D: 1.088 D: 0.058 No
E: 1.054 E: 0.058
3
4 Data Source: Regulatory Operations Group, Energy Regulatory Commission, March 2014.
5
6
7 The ERC is interested in feedback from ECs and other stakeholders on their experience with the
8 current groupings. For example, do they believe that their cost characteristics are similar to other
9 ECs in their current group?
10
11 Testing of Network Cost Drivers
12 We tested the grouping of ECs across a range of known network cost drivers. However we found
13 that certain cost drivers such as customers/line length, peak demand, and network losses increased
14 the variance within each group with little improvement in the separation between groups—making
15 these drivers less desirable for setting the group criteria.
16
17 The charts in Figure 2.1 show the correlation between non-power operating costs/kWh to the
18 most attractive grouping criteria—that is sales/customer and sales/network km. We also compare
19 this to customer numbers currently used for setting the groups. The charts show that:
20
21  There are economies of scale especially for low volumes of energy sold and low
22 sales/customer. This is shown by the downward sloping trend on each of the graphs,
23 with the steeper decline at lower scales (e.g. lower levels of sales or sales/customer);
24
25  The relationship with non-power operating costs is strongest for sales/customer—
26 reinforcing the inclusion of this factor in the grouping criteria;
27
28  The relationship with non-power operating costs is weakest for customer numbers—
29 questioning the inclusion of this factor in the grouping analysis; and
30
31  Sales/network km has a stronger relationship with non-power operating costs than
32 with customer numbers.

6
Figure 2.1: Relationship between Grouping Criteria and Non-Power Operating Costs per kWh (2014-2010 Average)

7
 1 Comparing Grouping Options
2 Given the results above and the analysis of network cost drivers from other studies, we tested the
3 two alternative grouping models as set out in the table below—either entirely on the basis of
4 Sales/Customer or on the basis on Sales/Customer and Sales/Network for setting DSM charges.
5
6 Table 2.2: Grouping Models Tested
7
Group Current Option 1—customer Option 2—customer demand and
demand only sales per network length
Customer Sales per Sales per
Sales per customer Sales per customer
no. (000) customer Network km
A 10 – 25 <1 MWh <0.65 MWh <0.95 MWh <23 MWh/km
B 25 – 50 <1 0.65 – 1.1 <0.95 >23
C 50 – 100 <1 1.1 – 1.5 0.95 – 1.5
D 10 – 50 1–2 1.5 – 1.9 1.5 – 1.9
E 50 – 100 1–2 1.9 – 2.3 1.9 – 2.3
F 20 – 150 1–3 2.3 – 3.25 2.3 – 3.25
G 30 – 150 3–5 > 3.25 > 3.25
8
9 The objective is to group ECs with similar underlying costs. This will improve the efficiency and
10 fairness of each group. With that caveat, both alternative groupings perform better than the current
11 grouping—since:
12
13  The grouping criteria better reflects network cost drivers;
14
15  There is a clearer difference in average and median values between groups;
16
17  There is less overlap between inter-quartile ranges for each group (i.e. range from 25th
18 to 75th percentiles; and
19
20  The differences in averages between the groups are consistent with expectations form
21 first principles analysis and other studies. For example, costs are lower for groups with
22 higher sales/customer, or sales/network length.
23
24 The spread for the middle 50 percent of ECs is narrower for the grouping by sales/customer only
25 (option 1) but we note that there is also a clear separation between group averages for the grouping
26 by sales/customer and sales/network km (option 2).
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51 8
Figure 2.2: Comparison of Current Grouping to Alternative Grouping Options

Current Grouping Option 1—Sales per Customer only

Option 2—Sales per Customer & Sales per Network km

9
 1 The proposed options would significantly alter the number of ECs in each group—as
2 illustrated below. Group A would see a substantial reduction, while Groups B and C would
3 see an increase in the number of ECs
4
5 Table 2.3: ECs in each grouping
6
Group Current Option 1 Option 2
A 11 4 3
B 16 33 30
C 5 26 30
D 17 15 15
E 28 13 13
F 15 5 5
G 7 3 3
7
8
9 Preferred Grouping Approach
10 Grouping by sales/customer only (option 1) is preferred because:
11
12  It is a simple and effective method that minimises the variance within the groups
13 while maximizing the variation between groups;
14
15  It is the main driver of economies of scale benefits; and
16
17  It removes the use of customer numbers which had a weaker link to scale effects
18 and is not strongly supported as a key cost driver.
19
20 The new grouping improves the efficiency and allocation of DSM revenues provided under
21 current RSEC-WR framework. We note that the only difference between option 1 and 2
22 is in the allocation of ECs in groups A to C.
23
24 While Option 2 is consistent with first principle analysis—given that networks are asset-
25 driven businesses—the separation between some of the groups is not as strong as in
26 Option 1, and the variation within groups is high, particularly in Group A.
27
28 Both options perform significantly better than the current groupings.
29
30 Assessment of Group Outliers
31 Table 2.4 summarises the key network characteristics of the minimum and maximum ECs
32 in each group. Group A and Group B have the largest variation within their grouping that
33 warrants further investigation of their outliers.
34
35 Generally, we find that the maximum outliers of each group have either lower MWh per
36 network km or a substantially smaller network size that could explain why they have higher
37 costs. For example, in Group A, IFELCO has about 1/3 the volume of electricity per
38 network km to SIARELCO, but both would receive the same DSM charge. Thus, although
39 both have similar customer consumption, there are clear differences in the relative densities
40 of their networks. While the inclusion of these scale factors does not improve the overall
41 performance of the categorisation of ECs, quantitative information on scale factors could
42 be used in assessing applications by ECs for individual price determinations if they
43 consider the group-based DSM charge is unsustainable.
44
45 Ultimately, as a longer term objective, a cost function would be the preferred option for
46 setting DSM charges, especially for the group outliers that have strong justification to

10
 warrant higher cost. The formulation of a cost function is, however, not considered in this
paper.
Table 2.4: Summary Statistics of Min and Max Group Outliers
Group Outliers Group Network MWh/Network Line Load
Varianc Length (km) Length (km) Loss Factor
e
SIARELCO Min A 437 31.79 7.5% 50.7%
0.205 16.1
IFELCO Max A 985 13.17 53.1%
%
19.4
ZAMSURECO II Min B 1955 44.02 44.4%
%
0.104
12.8
CAMELCO Max B 438 34.25 46.0%
%
23.5
ALECO Min C 2171 102.45 38.7%
%
0.045
44.2
MAGELCO Max C 1758 12.84 24.4%
%
13.7
ISELCO I Min D 2292 107.93 48.6%
%
0.020
12.4
ZAMECO II Max D 925 110.40 53.3%
%
17.6
PELCO III Min E 640 197.27 47.8%
%
0.021
17.7
LASURECO Max E 893 105.28 35.4%
%
MORESCO I Min F 2006 96.58 3.6% 53.3%
0.003 11.7
SOCOTECO I Max F 1793 92.63 53.8%
%
11.5
SOCOTECO II Min G 3761 164.33 56.7%
%
0.025
13.0
CENECO Max G 2031 284.99 51.6%
%
1
2
3
4 2.3 Effects of New RSEC-WR Grouping
5 Without any other changes, updating of the DSM charges under the current groupings to
6 current median costs will result in significant reductions in DSM charges across all groups
7 except for Groups A and B.
8
9 Overall the net effect of updating the current groups with current cost data would reduce
10 the average median. The table below shows the changes in median costs for each of the
11 groups.
12
13 Implementation of the revised grouping (under Option 1) will result in further changes for
14 individual ECs because of changes in both the median costs of groups (due to the new
15 group composition) and switches between groups.

11
 1 Table 2.5: Comparison of Median Costs for Current and New Groups
2
(PhP/kWh) A B C D E F G
DSM Allowance
2.42 1.82 1.68 1.14 1.32 0.99 0.69
(Current Groups )
2014-2010 Median
2.15 1.79 1.60 1.26 1.18 0.92 0.70
(Current Groups)
2014-2010 Median
2.62 1.77 1.26 1.07 0.92 0.83 0.44
(New Groups)
3
4
5 Table 2.6 shows the effect on DSM charges from:
6
7  The change in median costs for each group, and
8
9  The effect of ECs switching groups.
10
11 The top number in each cell is the net change in the median DSM charge (in PhP/kWh)
12 from revising the ECs groups, compared to the up-dated median of the current groupings.
13 The bottom number is the number of ECs affected. Empty cells indicate that there are no
14 ECs that change between those groups (e.g. from current group A to new group C).
15
16 Table 2.6: Changes in DSM Median Costs between Current and New Groups
17 (Option 1)
18
Current Group New Group
Total A B C D E F G
A 0.47 -0.38
11
4 7
B -0.02
16
16
C 0.17
5
5
D 0.51 0.00 -0.19 -0.34
17
2 8 6 1
E 0.59 0.08 -0.11 -0.26
28
3 14 7 4
F 0.34 0.15 0.00 -0.09
15
4 2 6 3
G 0.27 0.18 -0.19
7
2 2 3
TOTAL 4 33 26 15 13 5 3
19
20 A detailed table of the ECs corresponding to this table is provided in Appendix A.
21
22 Importance of a DSM Buffer
23 We recommend that the operating revenue requirement for determining the DSM charge
24 is set at the 75th percentile of non-power operating costs for each group based on the latest
25 available data at the time of the determination.
26
27 This creates a buffer for most ECs in the recovery of non-power operating costs that is
28 transparent and predictable, so as to increase certainty in the regulatory framework and
29 help ensure the financial sustainability of the ECs.

12
 1 The approach to the regulation of the ECs, and the need for the buffer, can be
2 distinguished from the approach to the regulation of the private DUs.
3
4  Regulatory risk. Under the building-block approach applied to the private
5 DUs, each DU’s costs provide the starting point for the assessment of efficient
6 costs of the DU. Benchmarks and efficiency analysis may be used, but the use
7 of current costs as the starting point and DU-specific analysis helps ensure
8 specific factors affecting the utility’s costs are taken into account. It is
9 impractical for ERC to undertake this detailed analysis for each of the ECs. The
10 approach of grouping and averaging costs under the RSEC-WR makes the
11 regulation of the ECs feasible and provides strong efficiency incentives.
12 However, it increases the risk of mis-specification of costs and limits the extent
13 to which utility-specific factors are considered.
14
15  Capacity to take-on risk. Consistent with the profit-focus of the private DUs,
16 their regulated prices provide for a return on equity. This enables the utility to
17 absorb financial risks and variations between actual costs and the estimated
18 efficient costs and remain financially viable. In contrast the ECs are
19 cooperatives and are not profit—focused. Reflecting this, the approach under
20 the RSEC-WR does not provide for a return on equity. Hence, unless the ERC
21 ‘aims high’ in the estimation of costs the ECs will have limited capacity to
22 absorb financial risks and remain viable.
23
24  Consequences of risk. There are two potential risks. Firstly, there is the risk
25 for the utility that actual costs will exceed allowed costs. As noted above the
26 ECs have more limited capacity to absorb this risk. The second risk, which
27 regulators are often particularly concerned about, is the risk that the actual
28 efficient cost for the utility will be below the allowed costs and the utility will
29 systematically earn excess returns to the earners. However, in the case of the
30 ECs the consequences of ‘aiming high’ on costs are different. The owners are
31 the customers and excess returns should, in principle, be returned to customers.
32 The key to ensuring this is good governance and regulation of the ECs can be
33 used to support good governance.
34
35 The operating revenue requirement would be translated into DSM charges in accordance
36 with the methodology set out in Article 4 of the RSEC-WR. Based on the average data
37 from 2010 to 2014, the operating revenue requirement (in PhP/kWh) for setting DSM
38 charges for the proposed new groupings would be:
39
40 Table 2.7: Basis for setting New DSM Charges (2010-2014 average)
41
A B C D E F G
New DSM charge =
75th percentile, 2014- 3.06 1.92 1.32 1.12 0.98 0.88 0.70
2010 Average
Comparisons:
Median, 2014-2010
2.62 1.77 1.26 1.07 0.92 0.83 0.44
Averaged
Current DSM charge 2.42 1.82 1.68 1.14 1.32 0.99 0.69
42
43
44 Net Effect on DSM Revenues and Tariffs
45 Setting the DSM charges with a margin substantially offsets the reduction in the DSM from
46 up-dating cost estimates.

13
 1 The chart below shows the cumulative effects on the DSM charges for each of the ECs
2 decomposed into the effects of:
3
4  Up-dating of the cost estimates based on the average data between 2010 and
5 2014—in real terms
6
7  Changing the groups; and
8
9  Setting the DSM at the 75th percentile of the groups.
10
11 Figure 2.3: Aggregate Effect of Proposed Changes on DSM Charges using the 75th
12 percentile of the groups
13
DSM Adjustment by Component for all ECs
1.50
Effect of updating mean of current groups Effect of change in grouping

Effect ofupdating the mean to the 75th percentile Total Change

1.00
Adjustment to DSM Tariff (Php/kWh)

0.50

0.00

-0.50

-1.00

For most ECs the changes are between +0.5 PhP/kWh and -0.5 PhP/kWh. Below we
show the ECs that see the largest change in their DSM charge.

14
1 Figure 2.4: Top 5 ECs with the Largest Negative and Positive Change in the DSM
2 Charge
3
4 DSM Adjustment for ECs with the Largest Change
5
Effect of updating mean of current groups Effect of change in grouping
1.00
Effect ofupdating the mean to the 75th percentile Total Change

0.80
Adjustment to DSM Tariff (Php/kWh)

0.60

0.40

0.20

0.00

KAELCO
QUEZELCO II

MOPRECO

SIARELCO

ILECO III
LEYECO III
QUIRELCO

AURELCO

GUIMELCO

NORECO I
-0.20

-0.40

-0.60

-0.80

-1.00

While the DSM charge changes across the ECs (often substantially) the net effect on total
DSM revenues is relatively small—plus 5.2%. This is on the assumption that all EC’s apply
the new DSM immediately. However, our proposal is to adjust the current DSM to the
new DSM over a three year transition period—see section 2.4 below.
Table 2.8: Change in Average DSM Revenue by Region with New Grouping
Approach
New DSM
Current 2014 Percentage
Number 2014 DSM
Island Region DSM Revenue Increase
of ECs Revenue
(million pesos) |(Decrease)
(million pesos)
I II 6 1,196.9 1,379.5 +15.2%
III 6 889.3 983.4 +10.6%
IV-A 14 2,135.9 1,996.6 (-6.5%)
Luzon V 5 943.9 1,194.5 +26.5%
CAR 8 965.1 1,076.1 +11.5%
5 513.5 549.4 +7.0%
VI 10 1,843.3 1,923.0 +4.3%
Visayas VII 7 1,212.0 1,216.0 +0.3%
VIII 11 1,040.4 1,077.7 +3.6%
IX 4 802.5 855.6 6.6%
Mindanao
X 8 930.0 928.5 (-0.1%)

15
 1
XI XII 3 658.0 607.0 (-7.8%)
ARMM 4 911.4 981.5 7.7%
CARAGA 2 90.6 123.1 +35.9%
6 751.3 773.1 +2.9%
Total All 99 14,884,225 15,664,989 +5.2%
2
3
4 2.4 Managing the DSM Transition
5 For all EC’s it is proposed that there be a three year transition period, which would
6 incrementally adjust the DSM for each EC to its new rate. Appendix B shows the proposed
7 DSM charges over the transition period for each EC under the new RESC-WR grouping—
8 assuming implementation from 2016.
9
10 All changes to regulated DSM prices will likely require a public hearing. The proposed
11 changes would be best managed through a transition process or glide path with agreement
12 from the ECs. For ECs that see a reduction, a three year transition to the new lower level
13 would give the EC time to adjust its costs or seek special consideration from the ERC for
14 an individual higher rate.
15
16 While no explicit ‘off-ramp’ is specified for the recovery of DSM OPEX costs through the
17 DSM charges, the establishment of the RSEC-WR framework (either existing or proposed)
18 does not remove the ECs right to apply for a tariff increase through a standard rate case.
19 Four EC’s have applied for determinations outside the existing RSEC-WR regime.

16
Appendix A: Change in RSEC-WR Grouping by ECs
Table A.1: ECs by Current and New RSEC-WR Grouping
Current New Group
Group
A B C D E F G
A IFLECO, AURELCO, BILECO,
KAELCO, CAMELCO, GUIMELCO,
MOPRECO, LEYECO III, QUEZLCO
SIARELCO II, QUIRELCO
B ABRECO, CASURECO I,
CASURECO IV,
ESMELCO, LANECO,
LEYECO I, LEYECO IV,
MOELCI I,
NORSAMELCO,
SAMELCO I, SAMELCO II,
SOELCO, SORECO I,
SURSECO I, SURSECO II
C BOHECO II, CAGELCO
II, CASURECO III, ISLECO
II, SORECO II
D ILECO III, NORECO I ASELCO, BUSHECO, CEBECO III, SURNECO
DORMECO, FLECO, MOELCI II,
MAGELCO, MORESCO II,
NUVELCO, PRESCO,
PANELCO I, SUKELCO,
ZAMECO I ZAMECO II
E BOHECO I, QUEZELCO I, CAGELCO I, AKELCO, CEBECO II, PALECO
ZAMSURECO II CANORECO, NEECO I, I,DASURECO,
CAPELCO, CEBECO NEECO II(Area II), TARLECO I

17
 I, COTELCO, NORECO II,
FIBECO, ILECO I, PANELCO III,
ILECO II, LEYECO V, ZAMSURECO I,
LUELCO, NEECO ZANECO
II(Area 1), NOCECO,
TARELCO I, VRESCO
F ALECO, CENPELCO, BATELEC I, ANECO, BENECO, MORESCO I,
INEC, ISECO ISLECO I CASURECO II, PENELCO,
DANECO, PELCO II, SOCOTECO I
SAJELCO
G LASURECO, PALECO BATELEC II CENECO,
III LEYECO II,
SOCOTECO II,
ZAMCELCO

18
Appendix B: Transition Plan for Setting DSM Charges
Table B.1 shows the proposed transition plan for setting real DSM charges for the new
RESC-WR grouping. We propose that the DSM charges be adjusted each year by the TGP
that would adjust for charges in inflation and efficiency.
Table B.1: Transition Pathway for Setting the Real DSM Charges for each EC
EC Current New Current 2016 2017 2018
Group Group DSM DSM DSM DSM
ABRECO B B 1.82 1.85 1.89 1.92
AKELCO E D 1.32 1.25 1.19 1.12
ALECO F C 0.99 1.10 1.21 1.32
ANECO F E 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
ANTECO B B 1.82 1.85 1.89 1.92
ASELCO D C 1.14 1.20 1.26 1.32
AURELCO A B 2.42 2.25 2.09 1.92
BATELEC I F D 0.99 1.03 1.08 1.12
BATELEC II G F 0.69 0.75 0.82 0.88
BENECO F E 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
BILECO A B 2.42 2.25 2.09 1.92
BOHECO I E B 1.32 1.52 1.72 1.92
BOHECO II C B 1.68 1.76 1.84 1.92
BUSECO D C 1.14 1.20 1.26 1.32
CAGELCO I E C 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32
CAGELCO II C B 1.68 1.76 1.84 1.92
CAMELCO A B 2.42 2.25 2.09 1.92
CANORECO E C 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32
CAPELCO E C 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32
CASURECO I B B 1.82 1.85 1.89 1.92
CASURECO II F E 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
CASURECO III C B 1.68 1.76 1.84 1.92
CASURECO IV B B 1.82 1.85 1.89 1.92
CEBECO I E C 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32
CEBECO II E E 1.32 1.21 1.10 0.99
CEBECO III D D 1.14 1.13 1.13 1.12
CENECO G G 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.70
CENPELCO F C 0.99 1.10 1.21 1.32
COTELCO E C 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32
DANECO F E 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99

19
DASURECO E E 1.32 1.21 1.10 0.99
DORECO D C 1.14 1.20 1.26 1.32
ESAMELCO B B 1.82 1.85 1.89 1.92
FIBECO E C 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32
FLECO D C 1.14 1.20 1.26 1.32
GUIMELCO A B 2.42 2.25 2.09 1.92
IFELCO A A 2.42 2.63 2.85 3.06
ILECO I E C 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32
ILECO II E C 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32
ILECO III D B 1.14 1.40 1.66 1.92
INEC F C 0.99 1.10 1.21 1.32
ISECO F C 0.99 1.10 1.21 1.32
ISELCO I F D 0.99 1.03 1.08 1.12
ISELCO II C B 1.68 1.76 1.84 1.92
KAELCO A A 2.42 2.63 2.85 3.06
LANECO B B 1.82 1.85 1.89 1.92
LASURECO G E 0.69 0.79 0.89 0.99
LEYECO I B B 1.82 1.85 1.89 1.92
LEYECO II G G 0.69 0.75 0.82 0.88
LEYECO III A B 2.42 2.25 2.09 1.92
LEYECO IV B B 1.82 1.85 1.89 1.92
LEYECO V E C 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32
LUELCO E C 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32
MAGELCO D C 1.14 1.20 1.26 1.32
MOELCI I B B 1.82 1.85 1.89 1.92
MOELCI II D D 1.14 1.13 1.13 1.12
MOPRECO A A 2.42 2.63 2.85 3.06
MORESCO I F F 0.99 0.95 0.92 0.88
MORESCO II D D 1.14 1.13 1.13 1.12
NEECO I E D 1.32 1.25 1.19 1.12
NEECO II-A1 E C 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32
NEECO II-A2 E D 1.32 1.25 1.19 1.12
NOCECO E C 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32
NORECO I D B 1.14 1.40 1.66 1.92
NORECO II E D 1.32 1.25 1.19 1.12
NORSAMELCO B B 1.82 1.85 1.89 1.92
NUVELCO D C 1.14 1.20 1.26 1.32

20
PANELCO I D C 1.14 1.20 1.26 1.32
PANELCO III E D 1.32 1.25 1.19 1.12
PELCO I E E 1.32 1.21 1.10 0.99
PELCO II F E 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
PELCO III G E 0.69 0.79 0.89 0.99
PENELCO F F 0.99 0.95 0.92 0.88
PRESCO D D 1.14 1.13 1.13 1.12
QUEZELCO I E B 1.32 1.52 1.72 1.92
QUEZELCO II A B 2.42 2.25 2.09 1.92
QUIRELCO A B 2.42 2.25 2.09 1.92
SAJELCO F E 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
SAMELCO I B B 1.82 1.85 1.89 1.92
SAMELCO II B B 1.82 1.85 1.89 1.92
SIARELCO A A 2.42 2.63 2.85 3.06
SOCOTECO I F F 0.99 0.95 0.92 0.88
SOCOTECO II G G 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.70
SOLECO B B 1.82 1.85 1.89 1.92
SORECO I B B 1.82 1.85 1.89 1.92
SORECO II C B 1.68 1.76 1.84 1.92
SUKELCO D D 1.14 1.13 1.13 1.12
SURNECO D E 1.14 1.09 1.04 0.99
SURSECO I B B 1.82 1.85 1.89 1.92
SURSECO II B B 1.82 1.85 1.89 1.92
TARELCO I E C 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32
TARELCO II E E 1.32 1.21 1.10 0.99
VRESCO E C 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32
ZAMCELCO G G 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.70
ZAMECO I D C 1.14 1.20 1.26 1.32
ZAMECO II D D 1.14 1.13 1.13 1.12
ZAMSURECO I E D 1.32 1.25 1.19 1.12
ZAMSURECO II E B 1.32 1.52 1.72 1.92
ZANECO E D 1.32 1.25 1.19 1.12

21
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