SILVERIO VS.

REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007
Petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
Respondent: Republic of the Philippines
Ponente: J. Corona
Facts:
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
(a) “Petitioner filed to present petition… solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex”;
(b) “Granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity.
(c) Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
(d) The court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition as it would
only grant the petitioner his much awaited happiness and the realization of their (his fiance’) dreams.
On August 18, 2003, the Republic, thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. On February 23, 2006, the CA rendered a
decision in favor of the Republic, thus, this petition.
Issue:
The issue raised in this petition is:
(1) Whether or not the change of the petitioner’s name and sex in his birth certificate are allowed under Articles 4007 to 413 of the Civil
Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
Held:
(1) No. It is not allowed. A person’s name cannot be changed on the ground of sex reassignment. No law allows the change of entry in
the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Statutes control petitions
for change of name. Neither may entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex be changed on the ground of equity. Article 376
of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. Article 412 provides that no entry
in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
The petition is DENIED.

Morigo vs People of the Philippines Case Digest

Morigo vs. People of the Philippines
G. R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004

Facts: Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, for a period of
four years. After school year, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to
receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In
1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to
get married. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court. Appellant
Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at Tagbilaran City. Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in
the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The complaint seeks among others, the declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage with Lucia, on the
ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Appellant was charged with Bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of
Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.

Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with
Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, Lucio pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Issue: Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his defense of good faith.

Ruling: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One
who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if
the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio Morigo and
Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance
to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage for which Lucio might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage. The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of
an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the
circumstances of the present case, Supreme Court held that petitioner has not committed bigamy and that it need not tarry on the issue
of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
SY vs CA Case Digest

[G.R. No. 142293. February 27, 2003]

VICENTE SY, TRINIDAD PAULINO, 6B’S TRUCKING CORPORATION, and SBT TRUCKING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS and JAIME SAHOT, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Jaime Sahot started working as a truck helper for petitioners’ family-owned trucking business named Vicente Sy
Trucking. Throughout all the changes in names and for 36 years, private respondent continuously served the trucking business of petitioners. When
Sahot was already 59 years old, he had been incurring absences as he was suffering from various ailments. Particularly causing him pain was his left
thigh, which greatly affected the performance of his task as a driver. Sahot had filed a week-long leave sometime in May 1994. On May 27th, he was
medically examined and treated for EOR, presleyopia, hypertensive retinopathy G II), HPM, UTI, Osteoarthritis and heart enlargement. On said grounds,
Belen Paulino of the SBT Trucking Service management told him to file a formal request for extension of his leave. At the end of his week-long
absence, Sahot applied for extension of his leave for the whole month of June, 1994. It was at this time when petitioners allegedly threatened to
terminate his employment should he refuse to go back to work. They carried out their threat and dismissed him from work, effective June 30, 1994. He
ended up sick, jobless and penniless.

On September 13, 1994, Sahot filed with the NLRC NCR Arbitration Branch, a complaint for illegal dismissal for recovery of separation pay against
Vicente Sy and Trinidad Paulino-Sy, Belen Paulino, Vicente Sy Trucking, T. Paulino Trucking Service, 6B’s Trucking and SBT Trucking, herein petitioners.

Petitioners, on their part, claimed that sometime prior to June 1, 1994, Sahot went on leave and was not able to report for work for almost seven
days. On June 1, 1994, Sahot asked permission to extend his leave of absence until June 30, 1994. It appeared that from the expiration of his leave,
private respondent never reported back to work nor did he file an extension of his leave. Instead, he filed the complaint for illegal dismissal against the
trucking company and its owners. Petitioners add that due to Sahot’s refusal to work after the expiration of his authorized leave of absence, he should
be deemed to have voluntarily resigned from his work. They contended that Sahot had all the time to extend his leave or at least inform petitioners of
his health condition.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the company. It held that Sahot failed to return to work. However, upon appeal, the NLRC modified the LA’s decision,
ruling that Sahot did not abandon his job but his employment was terminated on account of his illness, pursuant to Article 284 of the Labor Code.

ISSUE

Whether or not there was valid termination of employment due to his illness.

HELD

The SC held that although illness can be a valid ground for terminating an employee, the dismissal was invalid. Article 284 of the Labor Code authorizes
an employer to terminate an employee on the ground of disease. However, in order to validly terminate employment on this ground, Book VI, Rule I,
Section 8 of the Omnibus Implementing Rules of the Labor Code requires:

Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal- Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial
to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by competent public
health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical
treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a
leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health.

The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and
arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employee’s illness and thus defeat the public policy in the protection of labor.

In the case at bar, the employer clearly did not comply with the medical certificate requirement before Sahot’s dismissal was effected. Since the burden
of proving the validity of the dismissal of the employee rests on the employer, the latter should likewise bear the burden of showing that the requisites
for a valid dismissal due to a disease have been complied with. In the absence of the required certification by a competent public health authority, this
Court has ruled against the validity of the employee’s dismissal. It is therefore incumbent upon the private respondents to prove by the quantum of
evidence required by law that petitioner was not dismissed, or if dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal; otherwise, the dismissal would be
unjustified. This Court will not sanction a dismissal premised on mere conjectures and suspicions, the evidence must be substantial and not arbitrary
and must be founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant his separation from work.

In addition, we must likewise determine if the procedural aspect of due process had been complied with by the employer. From the records, it clearly
appears that procedural due process was not observed in the separation of private respondent by the management of the trucking company. The
employer is required to furnish an employee with two written notices before the latter is dismissed: (1) the notice to apprise the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, which is the equivalent of a charge; and (2) the notice informing the employee of his
dismissal, to be issued after the employee has been given reasonable opportunity to answer and to be heard on his defense. These, the petitioners
failed to do, even only for record purposes. What management did was to threaten the employee with dismissal, then actually implement the threat
when the occasion presented itself because of private respondent’s painful left thigh.

All told, both the substantive and procedural aspects of due process were violated. Clearly, therefore, Sahot’s dismissal is tainted with invalidity.
Petition is denied.