G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Collector of Customs, 36
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO,
administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo
is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of
partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased,
opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his
participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion
for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4)
the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the
deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business;
and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent
to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of
the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's
business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions
requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the
partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph
G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of
his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being
in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other
things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in
respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the property or
the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said
testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish
laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what
the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of
evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those
1|Page Wills and Succession –CONFLICT OF LAWS
of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs.
Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish
laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be
given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much
so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having
deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the
receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish
laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove
such laws does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with
the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the
oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent
evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in
the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo
was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which,
not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with
and executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this
respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the
exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he
is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be
taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the
last part of the second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I
am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been
conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor
by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for
a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands
where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that
I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my
property and everything in connection with this, my will,
be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in
force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my
relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and
cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will
favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply
with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and
the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the
testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance
with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any

legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor
who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the
will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving
his legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being
contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the
following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good

morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not
prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever,
even should the testator otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly

ignores the testator's national law when, according to article
10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the
testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above

cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees
in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and
effective even as to the herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will
regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition
imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to
law.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their

dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it
not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's
national law.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is

directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a
manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of
the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the
judicial administrator is approved in all other respects,
without any pronouncement as to costs.

So ordered.

2|Page Wills and Succession –CONFLICT OF LAWS

G.R. No. L-23145 November 29, 1968
TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased. RENATO D.
TAYAG, ancillary administrator-appellee,
vs.
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., oppositor-appellant.
Cirilo F. Asperillo, Jr., for ancillary administrator-appellee.
Ross, Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito and Misa for oppositor-
appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:
Confronted by an obstinate and adamant refusal of the
domiciliary administrator, the County Trust Company of New York,
United States of America, of the estate of the deceased Idonah
Slade Perkins, who died in New York City on March 27, 1960, to
surrender to the ancillary administrator in the Philippines the
stock certificates owned by her in a Philippine corporation,
Benguet Consolidated, Inc., to satisfy the legitimate claims of
local creditors, the lower court, then presided by the Honorable
Arsenio Santos, now retired, issued on May 18, 1964, an order
of this tenor: "After considering the motion of the ancillary
administrator, dated February 11, 1964, as well as the
opposition filed by the Benguet Consolidated, Inc., the Court
hereby (1) considers as lost for all purposes in connection with
the administration and liquidation of the Philippine estate of
Idonah Slade Perkins the stock certificates covering the 33,002
shares of stock standing in her name in the books of the Benguet
Consolidated, Inc., (2) orders said certificates cancelled, and
(3) directs said corporation to issue new certificates in lieu
thereof, the same to be delivered by said corporation to either
the incumbent ancillary administrator or to the Probate Division
of this Court."1
From such an order, an appeal was taken to this Court not by
the domiciliary administrator, the County Trust Company of New
York, but by the Philippine corporation, the Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. The appeal cannot possibly prosper. The
challenged order represents a response and expresses a policy,
to paraphrase Frankfurter, arising out of a specific problem,
addressed to the attainment of specific ends by the use of
specific remedies, with full and ample support from legal
doctrines of weight and significance.
The facts will explain why. As set forth in the brief of
appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc., Idonah Slade Perkins, who
died on March 27, 1960 in New York City, left among others, two
stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of appellant, the
certificates being in the possession of the County Trust Company
of New York, which as noted, is the domiciliary administrator
of the estate of the deceased.2 Then came this portion of the
appellant's brief: "On August 12, 1960, Prospero Sanidad
instituted ancillary administration proceedings in the Court of
3|Page Wills and Succession –CONFLICT OF LAWS
First Instance of Manila; Lazaro A. Marquez was appointed
ancillary administrator, and on January 22, 1963, he was
substituted by the appellee Renato D. Tayag. A dispute arose
between the domiciary administrator in New York and the
ancillary administrator in the Philippines as to which of them
was entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in
question. On January 27, 1964, the Court of First Instance of
Manila ordered the domiciliary administrator, County Trust
Company, to "produce and deposit" them with the ancillary
administrator or with the Clerk of Court. The domiciliary
administrator did not comply with the order, and on February
11, 1964, the ancillary administrator petitioned the court to
"issue an order declaring the certificate or certificates of
stocks covering the 33,002 shares issued in the name of Idonah
Slade Perkins by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., be declared [or]
considered as lost."3
It is to be noted further that appellant Benguet Consolidated,
Inc. admits that "it is immaterial" as far as it is concerned
as to "who is entitled to the possession of the stock
certificates in question; appellant opposed the petition of the
ancillary administrator because the said stock certificates are
in existence, they are today in the possession of the
domiciliary administrator, the County Trust Company, in New
York, U.S.A...."4
It is its view, therefore, that under the circumstances, the
stock certificates cannot be declared or considered as lost.
Moreover, it would allege that there was a failure to observe
certain requirements of its by-laws before new stock
certificates could be issued. Hence, its appeal.
As was made clear at the outset of this opinion, the appeal
lacks merit. The challenged order constitutes an emphatic
affirmation of judicial authority sought to be emasculated by
the wilful conduct of the domiciliary administrator in refusing
to accord obedience to a court decree. How, then, can this order
be stigmatized as illegal?
As is true of many problems confronting the judiciary, such a
response was called for by the realities of the situation. What
cannot be ignored is that conduct bordering on wilful defiance,
if it had not actually reached it, cannot without undue loss of
judicial prestige, be condoned or tolerated. For the law is not
so lacking in flexibility and resourcefulness as to preclude
such a solution, the more so as deeper reflection would make
clear its being buttressed by indisputable principles and
supported by the strongest policy considerations.
It can truly be said then that the result arrived at upheld and
vindicated the honor of the judiciary no less than that of the
country. Through this challenged order, there is thus dispelled
the atmosphere of contingent frustration brought about by the
persistence of the domiciliary administrator to hold on to the
stock certificates after it had, as admitted, voluntarily
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the lower court by
entering its appearance through counsel on June 27, 1963, and
filing a petition for relief from a previous order of March 15,
1963.
Thus did the lower court, in the order now on appeal, impart
vitality and effectiveness to what was decreed. For without it,
what it had been decided would be set at naught and nullified.
Unless such a blatant disregard by the domiciliary
administrator, with residence abroad, of what was previously
ordained by a court order could be thus remedied, it would have
entailed, insofar as this matter was concerned, not a partial
but a well-nigh complete paralysis of judicial authority.
1. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. did not dispute the
power of the appellee ancillary administrator to gain control
and possession of all assets of the decedent within the
jurisdiction of the Philippines. Nor could it. Such a power is
inherent in his duty to settle her estate and satisfy the claims
of local creditors.5 As Justice Tuason speaking for this Court
made clear, it is a "general rule universally recognized" that
administration, whether principal or ancillary, certainly
"extends to the assets of a decedent found within the state or
country where it was granted," the corollary being "that an
administrator appointed in one state or country has no power
over property in another state or country."6
It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary
administrator was, in an earlier case, set forth by Justice
Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have more than one
administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning
property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign
country, administration is had in both countries. That which is
granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is
termed the principal administration, while any other
administration is termed the ancillary administration. The
reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does
not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the
country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator
appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the
[Philippines]. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever
a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last
domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets
of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be
distributed among his heirs."7
4|Page Wills and Succession –CONFLICT OF LAWS
It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to
require that ancillary administrator's right to "the stock
certificates covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in her name
in the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated, Inc...." be
respected is equally beyond question. For appellant is a
Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the
unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock
cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful
court orders.
Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of
Internal Revenue8 finds application. "In the instant case, the
actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the
corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of the above
undeniable proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It
does not dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even if it
were so minded.
2. In the face of such incontrovertible doctrines that argue in
a rather conclusive fashion for the legality of the challenged
order, how does appellant, Benguet Consolidated, Inc. propose
to carry the extremely heavy burden of persuasion of precisely
demonstrating the contrary? It would assign as the basic error
allegedly committed by the lower court its "considering as lost
the stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of Benguet
belonging to the deceased Idonah Slade Perkins, ..."9 More
specifically, appellant would stress that the "lower court could
not "consider as lost" the stock certificates in question when,
as a matter of fact, his Honor the trial Judge knew, and does
know, and it is admitted by the appellee, that the said stock
certificates are in existence and are today in the possession
of the domiciliary administrator in New York."10
There may be an element of fiction in the above view of the
lower court. That certainly does not suffice to call for the
reversal of the appealed order. Since there is a refusal,
persistently adhered to by the domiciliary administrator in New
York, to deliver the shares of stocks of appellant corporation
owned by the decedent to the ancillary administrator in the
Philippines, there was nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in
considering them as lost and requiring the appellant to issue
new certificates in lieu thereof. Thereby, the task incumbent
under the law on the ancillary administrator could be discharged
and his responsibility fulfilled.
Any other view would result in the compliance to a valid judicial
order being made to depend on the uncontrolled discretion of
the party or entity, in this case domiciled abroad, which thus
far has shown the utmost persistence in refusing to yield
obedience. Certainly, appellant would not be heard to contend
in all seriousness that a judicial decree could be treated as a
mere scrap of paper, the court issuing it being powerless to
remedy its flagrant disregard.
It may be admitted of course that such alleged loss as found by
the lower court did not correspond exactly with the facts. To
be more blunt, the quality of truth may be lacking in such a
conclusion arrived at. It is to be remembered however, again to
borrow from Frankfurter, "that fictions which the law may rely
upon in the pursuit of legitimate ends have played an important
part in its development."11
Speaking of the common law in its earlier period, Cardozo could
state fictions "were devices to advance the ends of justice,
[even if] clumsy and at times offensive."12 Some of them have
persisted even to the present, that eminent jurist, noting "the
quasi contract, the adopted child, the constructive trust, all
of flourishing vitality, to attest the empire of "as if"
today."13 He likewise noted "a class of fictions of another
order, the fiction which is a working tool of thought, but which
at times hides itself from view till reflection and analysis
have brought it to the light."14
What cannot be disputed, therefore, is the at times
indispensable role that fictions as such played in the law.
There should be then on the part of the appellant a further
refinement in the catholicity of its condemnation of such
judicial technique. If ever an occasion did call for the
employment of a legal fiction to put an end to the anomalous
situation of a valid judicial order being disregarded with
apparent impunity, this is it. What is thus most obvious is that
this particular alleged error does not carry persuasion.
3. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. would seek to bolster
the above contention by its invoking one of the provisions of
its by-laws which would set forth the procedure to be followed
in case of a lost, stolen or destroyed stock certificate; it
would stress that in the event of a contest or the pendency of
an action regarding ownership of such certificate or
certificates of stock allegedly lost, stolen or destroyed, the
issuance of a new certificate or certificates would await the
"final decision by [a] court regarding the ownership
[thereof]."15
Such reliance is misplaced. In the first place, there is no such
occasion to apply such by-law. It is admitted that the foreign
domiciliary administrator did not appeal from the order now in
question. Moreover, there is likewise the express admission of
appellant that as far as it is concerned, "it is immaterial ...
who is entitled to the possession of the stock certificates ..."
Even if such were not the case, it would be a legal absurdity
5|Page Wills and Succession –CONFLICT OF LAWS
to impart to such a provision conclusiveness and finality.
Assuming that a contrariety exists between the above by-law and
the command of a court decree, the latter is to be followed.
It is understandable, as Cardozo pointed out, that the
Constitution overrides a statute, to which, however, the
judiciary must yield deference, when appropriately invoked and
deemed applicable. It would be most highly unorthodox, however,
if a corporate by-law would be accorded such a high estate in
the jural order that a court must not only take note of it but
yield to its alleged controlling force.
The fear of appellant of a contingent liability with which it
could be saddled unless the appealed order be set aside for its
inconsistency with one of its by-laws does not impress us. Its
obedience to a lawful court order certainly constitutes a valid
defense, assuming that such apprehension of a possible court
action against it could possibly materialize. Thus far, nothing
in the circumstances as they have developed gives substance to
such a fear. Gossamer possibilities of a future prejudice to
appellant do not suffice to nullify the lawful exercise of
judicial authority.
4. What is more the view adopted by appellant Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. is fraught with implications at war with the
basic postulates of corporate theory.
We start with the undeniable premise that, "a corporation is an
artificial being created by operation of law...."16 It owes its
life to the state, its birth being purely dependent on its will.
As Berle so aptly stated: "Classically, a corporation was
conceived as an artificial person, owing its existence through
creation by a sovereign power."17 As a matter of fact, the
statutory language employed owes much to Chief Justice Marshall,
who in the Dartmouth College decision defined a corporation
precisely as "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law."18
The well-known authority Fletcher could summarize the matter
thus: "A corporation is not in fact and in reality a person,
but the law treats it as though it were a person by process of
fiction, or by regarding it as an artificial person distinct
and separate from its individual stockholders.... It owes its
existence to law. It is an artificial person created by law for
certain specific purposes, the extent of whose existence, powers
and liberties is fixed by its charter."19Dean Pound's terse
summary, a juristic person, resulting from an association of
human beings granted legal personality by the state, puts the
matter neatly.20
There is thus a rejection of Gierke's genossenchaft theory, the
basic theme of which to quote from Friedmann, "is the reality
of the group as a social and legal entity, independent of state
recognition and concession."21 A corporation as known to
Philippine jurisprudence is a creature without any existence
until it has received the imprimatur of the state according to
law. It is logically inconceivable therefore that it will have
rights and privileges of a higher priority than that of its
creator. More than that, it cannot legitimately refuse to yield
obedience to acts of its state organs, certainly not excluding
the judiciary, whenever called upon to do so.
As a matter of fact, a corporation once it comes into being,
following American law still of persuasive authority in our
jurisdiction, comes more often within the ken of the judiciary
than the other two coordinate branches. It institutes the
appropriate court action to enforce its right. Correlatively,
it is not immune from judicial control in those instances, where
a duty under the law as ascertained in an appropriate legal
proceeding is cast upon it.
To assert that it can choose which court order to follow and
which to disregard is to confer upon it not autonomy which may
be conceded but license which cannot be tolerated. It is to
argue that it may, when so minded, overrule the state, the
source of its very existence; it is to contend that what any of
its governmental organs may lawfully require could be ignored
at will. So extravagant a claim cannot possibly merit approval.
5. One last point. In Viloria v. Administrator of Veterans
Affairs,22 it was shown that in a guardianship proceedings then
pending in a lower court, the United States Veterans
Administration filed a motion for the refund of a certain sum
of money paid to the minor under guardianship, alleging that
the lower court had previously granted its petition to consider
the deceased father as not entitled to guerilla benefits
according to a determination arrived at by its main office in
the United States. The motion was denied. In seeking a
reconsideration of such order, the Administrator relied on an
American federal statute making his decisions "final and
conclusive on all questions of law or fact" precluding any other
American official to examine the matter anew, "except a judge
or judges of the United States court."23 Reconsideration was
denied, and the Administrator appealed.
In an opinion by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, we sustained the lower
court. Thus: "We are of the opinion that the appeal should be
rejected. The provisions of the U.S. Code, invoked by the
appellant, make the decisions of the U.S. Veterans'
Administrator final and conclusive when made on claims property
submitted to him for resolution; but they are not applicable to
6|Page Wills and Succession –CONFLICT OF LAWS
the present case, where the Administrator is not acting as a
judge but as a litigant. There is a great difference between
actions against the Administrator (which must be filed strictly
in accordance with the conditions that are imposed by the
Veterans' Act, including the exclusive review by United States
courts), and those actions where the Veterans' Administrator
seeks a remedy from our courts and submits to their jurisdiction
by filing actions therein. Our attention has not been called to
any law or treaty that would make the findings of the Veterans'
Administrator, in actions where he is a party, conclusive on
our courts. That, in effect, would deprive our tribunals of
judicial discretion and render them mere subordinate
instrumentalities of the Veterans' Administrator."
It is bad enough as the Viloria decision made patent for our
judiciary to accept as final and conclusive, determinations made
by foreign governmental agencies. It is infinitely worse if
through the absence of any coercive power by our courts over
juridical persons within our jurisdiction, the force and
effectivity of their orders could be made to depend on the whim
or caprice of alien entities. It is difficult to imagine of a
situation more offensive to the dignity of the bench or the
honor of the country.
Yet that would be the effect, even if unintended, of the
proposition to which appellant Benguet Consolidated seems to be
firmly committed as shown by its failure to accept the validity
of the order complained of; it seeks its reversal. Certainly we
must at all pains see to it that it does not succeed. The
deplorable consequences attendant on appellant prevailing
attest to the necessity of negative response from us. That is
what appellant will get.
That is all then that this case presents. It is obvious why the
appeal cannot succeed. It is always easy to conjure extreme and
even oppressive possibilities. That is not decisive. It does
not settle the issue. What carries weight and conviction is the
result arrived at, the just solution obtained, grounded in the
soundest of legal doctrines and distinguished by its
correspondence with what a sense of realism requires. For
through the appealed order, the imperative requirement of
justice according to law is satisfied and national dignity and
honor maintained.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the Honorable Arsenio Santos,
the Judge of the Court of First Instance, dated May 18, 1964,
is affirmed. With costs against oppositor-appelant Benguet
Consolidated, Inc.
G.R. No. 18600 March 9, 1922
B. E. JOHANNES, husband of Carmen Theodora Johannes, deceased,
as a administrator;
CARLOS D'ALMEIDA and IDA JOHANNES, with her husband, J. E.
JOHANNES, relators,
vs.
Honorable GEORGE R. HARVEY, as judge of First Instance of
Manila, ALFREDO D'ALMEIDA, brother of Carmen Johannes, as
administrator, and PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY, as late guardian
for a certain cash deposit of Carmen Johannes, respondent.
Amzi B. Kelly for relators.
Fisher & Dewitt and Francis B. Mahoney for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The relevant facts disclosed by this petition for certiorari
and the return thereto may be stated as follows:
Mrs. Carmen Theodora Johannes nee Carmen D'Almeida, died
intestate in Singapore, Straits Settlements, on August 31, 1921.
Of her immediate family there remained the husband, B. E.
Johannes, the brothers, Frederick Charles D'Almeida and Alfred
D'Almeida, and the sister, Ida D'Almeida Johannes. Of these,
the husband, the brother Frederick, and the sister Ida, were
residents of Singapore, while the brother Alfred was in Manila.
The Singapore heirs apparently joined in asking that letters of
administration be granted by the Supreme Court of the Straits
Settlements to B. E. Johannes, the lawful husband of the
deceased. At least, on September 19, 1921, the husband of the
deceased. At least, on September 19, 1921, the husband was named
the administrator of the property of the deceased wife, which
was locally situate within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
of the Straits Settlements. (Under the British law [22 & 23
Charles II c 10, 29 Charles II c 3, and James II c 17], it would
seem that the husband is entitled to the whole of the estate of
his wife if she die intestate to the exclusive of any other next
of kin.) On October 1, 1921, the brother Alfred D' Almeida was,
on his petition, appointed administrator of the Manila estate
of the deceased consisting of P109,732.55. This sum it appears,
was on deposit in the Manila banks under and by virtue of
guardianship proceedings for the late Carmen Theodora Johannes,
which were finally terminated by the discharge of the guardian,
the Philippine Trust Company, on January 16, 1922.
The burden of the relator's contention is that the Honorable
George R. Harvey, as judge of First Instance of the City of
Manila, has acted in excess of his jurisdiction in appointing
Alfred D'Almeida administrator of the funds of the estate on
deposit in the Philippines, and that an administration in the
jurisdiction is unnecessary. Accordingly, relators pray the
court to annul the appointment of Alfred D'Almeida and to issue
7|Page Wills and Succession –CONFLICT OF LAWS
an order directing the Judge of First Instance to have placed
to the credit of B. E. Johannes as administrator of the estate
of Carmen Theodora Johannes all of the funds of the late Carmen
D'Almeida Johannes, now on deposit and subject to the order of
the court, with P5,000 as damages. The respondents, Judge
Harvey, and the administrator Alfred D'Almeida, in compliance
with the order to show cause why the writ should not issue,
contend that the respondent judge has not in any manner acted
in excess of the jurisdiction duly conferred upon and exercised
by him in the manner provided by law, and that an order
appointing an administrator is a final and appealable order.
Certain general observations may possibly serve to clarify the
situation.
It is often necessary to have more than one administration of
an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in the
country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country,
administration is had in both countries. That which is granted
in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the
principal administration, while any other administration is
termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter
is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio
vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which
it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign
state has no authority in the United States. The ancillary
administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a
country other than that of his las domicile, property to be
administered in the nature of assets of the decedent, liable
for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.
(23 C. J., 1010, et seq.; 24 C. J., 1109, et seq.;
Wilkins vs. Ellett [1882], 108 U. S., 256; Perez vs. Aguerria
[1901], 1 Porto Rico Fed., 443; Vaughn vs. Barret [1833], 5 Vt.,
333.)
The principal administration in this instance is that at the
domicile of the late Carmen Theodora Johannes in Singapore,
Straits Settlements. What is sought in the Philippine Islands
is an ancillary administration subsidiary to the domiciliary
administration, conformable to the provisions of sections 601,
602, and 603 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The proper course
of procedure would be for the ancillary administrator to pay
the claims of creditors, if there be any, settle the accounts,
and remit the surplus to the domiciliary jurisdiction, for
distribution among the next of kin. Such administration appears
to be required in this jurisdiction since the provisions of
section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which permit of the
settlement of certain estates without legal proceedings, have
not been met. The decision of this court in
Baldemor vs. Malangyaon ([1916]), 34 Phil., 368), on which
relators rely, is then not in point because predicated directly
on the provisions of the section last cited.

It is almost a universal rule to give the surviving spouse a

preference when an administrator is to be appointed, unless for
strong reasons it is deemed advisable to name someone else. This
preference has particular force under Spanish law precedents.
(4 Escriche, Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia,
1085.) However, the Code of Civil Procedure, in section 642,
while naming the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
as one to whom administration can be granted, leaves this to
the discretion of the court to determine, for it may be found
that the surviving spouse is unsuitable for the responsibility.
Moreover, nonresidence is a factor to be considered in
determining the propriety of the appointment, and in this
connection, it is to be noted that the husband of the deceased,
the administrator of the principal administration, resides in
Singapore. Undoubtedly, if the husband should come into this
jurisdiction, the court would give consideration to this
petition that he be named the ancillary administrator for local
purposes. Ancillary letters should ordinarily be granted to the
domicilliary representative, if he applies therefor, or to his
nominee, or attorney; but in the absence of express statutory
requirement the court may in its discretion appoint some other
person. (24 C. J., 1114.)

There is still another aspect to the case. This is that pursuant

to section 783 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an order of a
Court of First Instance appointing an administration of the
estate of a deceased person constitutes a final determination
of the rights of the parties thereunder, within the meaning of
the statute, and is appealable. (Sy Hong Eng vs. Sy Lioc Suy
[1907], 8 Phil., 594.)

As we reach the conclusion that the Court of First Instance has

not acted in excess of its jurisdiction, and as there in an
appeal, certiorari will not lie. Accordingly, the writ prayed
for cannot be granted. Costs against the relators. So ordered.

8|Page Wills and Succession –CONFLICT OF LAWS

G.R. No. L-4718 March 19, 1920
SY JOC LIENG, SY YOC CHAY, SY JUI NIU and SY CHUA
NIU, plaintiffs, appellees-appellants,
vs.
PETRONILA ENCARNACION, GREGORIO SY QUIA, PEDRO SY QUIA, JUAN SY
QUIA and GENEROSO MENDOZA SY QUIA, defendants, appellants-
appellees.
Bishop and O'Brien, for plaintiffs, appellees and appellants.
Rosado, Sanz and Opisso, M. Legaspi, and Ledesma and Sumulong,
for defendants, appellants and appellees.
TORRES, J.:
On the 4th day of December, 1905, the said Sy Joc Lieng, Sy Joc
Chay, Sy Jui Niu and Sy Chua Niu filed an amended complaint
against the said defendants, alleging: That in or about the year
1847 was married in the city of Amoy to Yap Puan Niu, of which
marriage the following male children were born, to wit; Sy By
Bo and Sy By Guit, they being the only legitimate heirs of the
said Vicente Romero Sy Quia; that in or about the year 1882 Sy
By Bo died intestate in China, leaving as his only surviving
children and legitimate heirs the plaintiffs Sy Yoc Chay and Sy
Jui Niu; that in about the year 1880 the other child of Sy Quia,
Sy By Guit, also died intestate in China, leaving as his only
surviving children and legitimate heirs the other plaintiffs,
Sy Joc Lieng and Sy Chua Niu; that in or about the year 1891
Yap Puan Niu died intestate in grandchildren, who are the
plaintiffs in this case; that in the year 1894 Vicente Romero
Sy Quia died intestate in this city of Manila, leaving his
surviving grandchildren, the plaintiffs, as his only legitimate
heirs.
That Vicente Romero Sy Quia acquired during his lifetime a large
amount of property, consisting of personal and real property in
the Philippine Islands, mostly located in the city of Manila,
amounting to P1,000,000 Philippine currency; that on or about
the 3rd of August, 1990, the defendants illegally, without any
rights, and in the absence of the plaintiffs herein, took
possession of all the said personal and real property left by
the said Sy Quia, deceased, and since then have managed and
administered the same, alleging to be the owners thereof; that
since the said 3rd day of August, 1900, the defendants and each
of them have converted and are converting part of the property
of the said Sy Quia, deceased, to the use and benefit of each
of them, and a large part of the said property, consisting of
real property unknown to the plaintiffs, they being in
possession thereof as owners, exercising over them acts of
ownership, and converting them to their own use; that it has
9|Page Wills and Succession –CONFLICT OF LAWS
been impossible for the plaintiffs to discover, ascertain, and
have knowledge of each and all the items of real and personal
property belonging to the said Vicente Romero Sy Quia, deceased,
at the time of his death, nor the amount of personal and real
property converted by the defendants, except such as is
described in the accompanying document marked: "Exhibit A,"
which is a part of the complaint; that the property described
in said document is a part of the estate left by the deceased
Sy Quia at the time of his death, aside and apart from the
personal and real property converted by the defendants, who are,
and each one of them is, in possession and custody of all the
deeds, instruments, contracts, books, and papers relating to
the title and conversion of the said real and personal property,
which titles and the description thereof could not be proven
without sworn statements of the defendants and of each one of
them; that the plaintiffs are informed and believe that the said
real and personal property belonging to the estate of the said
Sy Quia, and which is now held and controlled by the defendants,
has a value of approximately P1,000,000, Philippine currency.
That the plaintiffs are the only descendants and legitimate
heirs of the deceased Sy Quia, they being entitled to the
possession of all the property of his estate, as well as of the
real and personal property converted as aforesaid, and the
defendants having appropriated the same, with all the rents and
profits thereof, it is impossible for the plaintiffs to
ascertain and discover the true amount of the said rents and
profits, which aggregate several thousand pesos, all of which
said property is in danger of being lost, to the irreparable
damage of the plaintiffs, unless and except a receiver is
appointed to take charge of the preservation and custody of the
same in order to protect the interests of the said plaintiffs,
and enable the court to determine the actual value of the real
and personal property of the estate at the time of the death of
the said Sy Quia, as well as the value of the real and personal
property subsequently converted by the defendants, together with
the rents and profits of the whole estate, converted by the
defendants to their own use and benefit; wherefore it is
necessary that said defendants be required to render detailed
accounts of the real and personal property and rents and profits
of the estate, and that it be ascertained by the sworn statement
of the said defendants what the actual value of the real and
personal property of the said estate, with the rents and
profits, thus converted and held by them, is.
They accordingly prayed that defendants be directed to render
under oath a complete and detailed account of all the property
left by Sy Quia at the time of his death, of the administration,
custody, control, conversion and disposal thereof, of the
conversion of the same, and of the rents and profits of the
original property, as well as of the property thus converted,
including in the said accounting both such properties with the
rents and profits; that, upon the giving of the necessary bond,
a receiver be appointed to administer the original property, as
well as the property converted, during the pendency of the
present litigation, the said complete and detailed account under
oath as aforesaid to be submitted to the court, covering the
original property as well as the property converted, with all
the rents and profits, and that thereupon a receiver be
appointed to take charge and control of the administration of
the whole of said property.
They further prayed that it be adjudged and decreed that the
defendants are the only descendants and heirs of the said
Vicente Romero Sy Quia from and since the time of his death,
and that they are the only legitimate owners of the real and
personal property left by him, and of the whole said property
converted by the defendants, and that they are entitled to the
possession of the whole of the said property and the rents and
profits accruing therefrom; that it be decreed that the
defendants have not and never had any right, title, or interest
to the said property, nor to the rents and profits thereof, the
same being held by them as mere trustees for the benefit of the
plaintiffs and each of them, further praying for any other
relief which the court may deem just and equitable, and for the
costs of this action.
ANSWER
The defendants, Petronila Encarnacion, Pedro Sy Quia, and Juan
Sy Quia, answering the foregoing complaint, specifically deny
the paragraphs 1,2,3, 4, 5, and 6 of the complaint, which relate
to the paternity and status of the plaintiffs, and to the death
of their grandmother and parents, and also deny generally all
and each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 of the complaint relating to the
succession and actual condition of the estate of the deceased
Sy Quia, except as otherwise expressly admitted as true in the
said answer.
As a special defense and in opposition to the complaint, the
defendants allege that prior to the year 1852 Vicente Ruperto
Romero Sy Quia was an infidel known only by the name of Sy Quia,
he having resided in the Philippine Islands for many years prior
thereto; that on June 8, 1852, the said infidel Chinaman Sy Quia
was converted to the Christian religion, and was baptized in
the parish church of San Vicente, Province of Ilocos Sur,
Philippine Islands, under the name of Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy
Quia, as shown by his certificate of baptism marked "Exhibit
1," and made an integral part of the answer; that on June 9,
1853, the Christian Chinaman Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia
contracted canonical marriage in accordance with the laws then
10 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
if force in these Islands, with the defendant Petronila
Encarnacion, a native of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, as shown by his
certificate of marriage marked "Exhibit 2," which is made an
integral part of the answer; that the said Vicente Sy Quia and
his wife, Petronila Encarnacion, fixed their residence and
conjugal domicile in these Islands until the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership by the death of the husband on January 9,
1984; that at the time of their marriage Vicente Romero Sy Quia
had no property, and brought no property into the marriage, but
that the wife brought to the marriage a small capital which was
the foundation of the subsequent fortune acquired by the spouses
by their labor and industry, and by the labor and industry of
the children, five in number, named Apolinaria, Maria, Gregorio,
Pedro and Juan, all of whom have always been in continuous
possession of baptism marked "Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7," to
be considered as an integral part of the answer.
That on January 9, 1894, Vicente Romero Sy Quia died intestate
in the city of Manila, and after the necessary legal proceedings
under the legislation then in force, his surviving children,
Apolinaria, Gregorio, Pedro and Juan, and his grandchildren
Generoso Mendoza, representing his mother, Maria Romero Sy Quia,
deceased, were declared by a decree of the Court of First
Instance of the district of Quiapo, dated January 26 of the said
year, to be the heirs abintestate of the said deceased, as shown
by a copy of the said decree, marked "Exhibit 3," as an integral
part of the answer, Apolinaria Romero Sy Quia, one of the
children recognized as heirs of their deceased father, having
died on the 1st of May, 1900, leaving as her only legitimate
heir her surviving mother, Petronila Encarnacion.
That since January 9, 1894, when Vicente Romero Sy Quia, died
the defendants have been in quiet, peaceful, and uninterrupted
possession as owners in good faith and with a just title, of
the property which constitutes the estate of their deceased
father, they never having been heretofore disturbed therein by
the plaintiffs or any of them, notwithstanding the fact that
the said plaintiffs were here in the Philippine Islands, and
all the property included in the inventory made at the time of
the partition of the estate of the deceased Sy Quia, was acquired
by him subsequent to the year 1853 when he married the defendant
Petronila Encarnacion; that a great portion of the real property
included in the said inventory was acquired by Petronila
Encarnacion after the death of her husband, and that in the
title deeds of a considerable portion of the property bought
during the lifetime of Sy Quia, Petronila Encarnacion appears
as the vendee, wherefore the defendants Pedro Sy Quia, and
Petronila Encarnacion prayed the court that they be acquitted
of the complaint, with the costs against the plaintiffs, and
that they, the defendants, be granted such other and further
relief as might be just and equitable.
The other defendant, Gregorio Sy Quia, answering the complaint,
denied all and each of the allegations therein contained, and
further specifically denied that Sy Quia had married in or about
the year 1847 at Amoy, China, the Chinese woman Yap Puan Niu,
and that said Sy Bi Bo and Sy By Guit were the legitimate
children and heirs of the deceased Sy Quia, also that the
plaintiffs Sy Joc Lieng, Sy Joc Chay, Sy Jui Niu and Sy Chua
Niu were the grandchildren and legitimate heirs of the deceased
Vicente Romero Sy Quia; that as a special defense he alleged
that the deceased Sy Quia, many years prior to 1852, while a
non-Christian Chinese subject, definitely fixed his residence
and domicile in the Philippine Islands, subjecting himself to
the laws then therein force; that in the year 1852 Sy Quia was
baptized, having been converted to the Catholic faith, on the
11th of June of that year, the ceremony taking place at the
parish church of San Vicente, he being then named Vicente
Ruperto Romero Sy Quia, and on June 9 of the following year he
contracted marriage with Petronila Encarnacion in accordance
with the rites of the Catholic Church, and in conformity with
the laws then in the force in the Philippine islands, as shown
by the church certificates marked "Exhibits A and B."
That Sy Quia and his wife Petronila Encarnacion since their
marriage continuously resided in the Philippine Islands until
the 9th of January, 1894, when the husband died intestate, they
having had since their marriage five children, among the,
Gregorio, who subscribes this answer, according to canonical
certificate Exhibit C; that the deceased Sy Quia brought no
property into the conjugal partnership, but Petronila
Encarnacion did bring with her the small capital of P5,000, with
which, through their labor and industry at first, and
subsequently by the labor and industry of their children, they
had acquired the large amount of property existing at the time
of the death of the husband, said property so acquired being
located in the Philippine Islands; that on the 23d of January,
1894, by an order of the Court of First Instance of the district
of Quiapo, the surviving children of Sy Quia, named Apolinaria,
Gregorio, Pedro, and Juan, and Sy Quia's grandchild Generoso
Mendoza, representing his (Generoso's) deceased mother, Maria
Romero Sy Quia, were declared to be the heirs abintestate of
the said Sy Quia, as shown by a copy of the said decree, marked
"Exhibit D," the defendants having taken possession from that
date of the property left by the deceased Sy Quia, they having
continued so in possession in the quality of owners, with just
title and good faith, adversely, publicly, quietly and
peacefully, until the plaintiffs presented their complaint to
the court; that on the 1st day of May, 1900, Apolinaria Romero
Sy Quia died a spinster and intestate, leaving as her only
legitimate heir her mother, Petronila Encarnacion; that the
plaintiffs at the time of death of Vicente Romero Sy Quia had
knowledge of his demise, and had notice that the defendants had
petitioned to the court for a declaration, which they obtained,
11 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
to the effect that they were the heirs of the said Vicente
Romero Sy Quia, deceased; and that at no time were the plaintiffs
or their parents recognized or considered by the said Vicente
Ruperto Romero Sy Quia, as his descendants, heirs or relatives;
wherefore defendant prayed that judgment be entered declaring
that the plaintiffs had no right or interest to or in the estate
of the deceased Vicente Romero Sy Quia, and that the defendants
are the only legitimate heirs of the said Sy Quia, taxing the
costs against the plaintiffs.
The last of the defendants, Generoso Mendoza Sy Quia, answering
the complaint on the 18th of January, 1906, alleged that he
denied all and each of the allegations contained in paragraphs
1 to 16, inclusive, of the complaint, and that he also
specifically denied that the deceased Sy Quia, whose Christian
name is Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia, had married at Amoy,
China, the woman Yap Puan Niu, in or about the year 1847, or at
any time previous or subsequent thereto; that the said Sy By Bo
and Sy By Guit were the legitimate children and heirs of the
deceased Sy Quia; that the plaintiffs Sy Joc Lieng, Sy Joc Chay,
Sy Jui Niu, and Sy Chua Niu were the legitimate descendants or
heirs of the deceased Sy Quia.
As a special defense, defendant alleged that the Chinaman Sy
Quia came to the Philippine Islands as an immigrant a long time
prior to 1852, fixing his residence and domicile therein, and
subjecting himself to the laws then in force in this country;
that in the said year 1852, Sy Quia having been converted to
Christianity, was baptized in the parish church of San Vicente,
Ilocos Sur, and named Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia, as shown
by the canonical certificates exhibited by the defendants, and
marked "Exhibits 1 and A," which are made a part of this answer;
that on June 9, Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia was married by
the Church to Petronila Encarnacion in accordance with the
canonical laws, as shown by the certified copies of the marriage
certificate, marked "Exhibits 2 and B," introduced by the other
defendants; that Sy Quia and his wife Petronila Encarnacion
established themselves and fixed their conjugal domicile in the
Philippine Islands, where they continued to reside until the
9th of January, 1894, when the marriage was dissolved by the
death of the husband in Manila; that the said spouses since
their marriage had five children, of whom Apolinaria died a
spinster, and Maria, who had married, died leaving of a child,
the defendant Generoso Mendoza and the other children of the
deceased Sy Quia, named Gregorio, Pedro, and Juan, having
survived; that Vicente Romero Sy Quia at the time of his marriage
owned no property, while Petronila Encarnacion brought to the
conjugal partnership a small capital, amounting to P5,000, which
was the foundation of the large fortune subsequently acquired
by them through their labor and industry, subsequently augmented
with the aid of their own children.
That on the 9th of January, 1894, Vicente Romero Sy Quia died,
and after the necessary legal proceedings under the law of civil
procedure then in force in these Islands, the Court of the First
Instance by a decree dated the 26th of the said month and year,
declared that the surviving children, Apolinaria, Gregorio,
Pedro, and Juan, and his grandchild Generoso Mendoza,
representing his mother, Maria, deceased, were the heirs of the
deceased Sy Quia, intestate, as shown by Exhibits 8 and D,
introduced by the other defendants; that on May, 1, 1900, the
oldest daughter, Apolinaria, died intestate and single, leaving
as her only heir mother Petronila Encarnacion; that since the
death of the said Vicente Romero Sy Quia the defendants had been
in quiet, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession of the
property left by the deceased Sy Quia, having held the same
adversely, with good faith and just title; and that they have
never disturbed by the plaintiffs in such possession,
notwithstanding the fact that they, the plaintiffs, were in the
Philippine Islands at the time of the death of Vicente Romero
Sy Quia, and had knowledge of the fact that the defendants had
applied to the Court of First Instance for and secured a
declaration to the effect that they were the heirs of the
deceased Sy Quia; and that neither the plaintiffs nor the said
Sy By Bio and Sy By Guit had ever been recognized or considered
by the deceased Vicente Romero Sy Quia as his descendants, heirs
or relatives, they never having been in possession of the legal
status of children or legitimate descendants of the said Sy
Quia; wherefore this defendant prayed that judgment be rendered
in favor of all the defendants, acquitting them of the
complaint, and directing that the plaintiffs pay the costs.
AMENDMENT TO THE COMPLAINT.
The plaintiffs on the 31st of January, 1906, presented by way
of reply to the answers of the various defendants an amendment
to the original complaint, denying generally and specifically
all and each of the material allegations set out in the answers
of the defendants and alleging that the pretended marriage
between Vicente Romero Sy Quia and Petronila Encarnacion was
not a lawful marriage, but a false and fraudulent one, without
any force, efficacy, or legal validity, the certificate of
marriage presented by the defendants not being a true and
correct certificate of marriage, the same being false,
fraudulent, and without any force, efficacy, or legal validity,
for the reason that on June 9, 1853, Vicente Romero Sy Quia was
and thereafter continued to be the lawful husband of one Yap
Puan Niu, until the year 1891, when she died, and that the
marriage of Sy Quia with the said Yap Puan Niu, since 1847 and
until her death in 1891, was continuously in full force and
effect, Sy Quia not having married again after the death of the
said wife; and that Apolinaria, Maria, Gregorio, Pedro and Juan,
the alleged legitimate children of Vicente Romero Sy Quia and
12 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
Petronila Encarnacion, were not and never had been the
legitimate children of Sy Quia, and that they were not and never
had been his legitimate heirs and descendants, the certificates
of baptism produced by the defendants, and marked "exhibits 3,
4, 5, 6, and 7," not being true nor proper, but false and
fraudulent, and of no force, efficacy, or legal validity, the
said children not being the legitimate descendants of the
deceased Sy Quia. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the amended complaint
are a repetition of similar paragraphs contained in the
original.
ANSWER TO THE AMENDED COMPLAINT.
The defendants, Generoso Mendoza, Petronila Encarnacion, Pedro
Sy Quia, Gregorio Sy Quia, and Juan Sy Quia, filed their answers
to the amended complaint on the 7th and 3th of February, 1906,
denying all and each of the allegations contained in paragraphs
2, 3, 4, and 5 of the amended complaint, stating that they
ratified each and all of the allegations, denials and defenses
contained in their previous answer, which they reproduced
therein, and that they renewed their prayer that judgment be
rendered acquitting them of the said complaint, with the costs
against the plaintiffs.
On June 19, 1906, counsel for Petronila Encarnacion notified
the court in writing of the death of the said Petronila
Encarnacion, who died in this city on the 6th of the said month,
and as counsel for the other defendants, Pedro and Juan Sy Quia,
moved the court that in accordance with section 119 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, an order be made directing that the action
be proceeded with in the name of the administrator of her estate,
Pedro Sy Quia, which motion was granted without any objection
on the part of the plaintiffs' attorney, on June 21, 1906.
On August 20, 1906, it was stipulated between counsel for both
parties that by order of the court of deposition of several
witnesses then designated by the plaintiffs be taken at Amoy,
China, before the consul, vice-consul, or a consular agent of
the United States in the said city, during the days and in
manner agreed upon, in accordance with section 362 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, the defendants being authorized to take the
deposition of such witnesses as they might desire to present in
the manner agreed upon.
On November 8, 1906, counsel for plaintiffs informed the court
of the death of one of the plaintiffs, Sy Jui Niu, at Amoy,
China, on or about the 28th of July of the said year, and she
having died intestate, the court on November 8, appointed C. W.
O'Brien as special administrator of her estate, and said counsel
thereupon asked the court to allow the action to be continued
by him, and by a subsequent petition filed on the 13th of the
same month, the administrator C. W. O' Brien, appointed as
aforesaid, filed a written appearance as such administrator of
the estate of the deceased Sy Jui Niu.
On a petition filed on the 17th of November, 1906, counsel for
both parties informed the court that the documents presented by
the defendants, and marked "Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7,
and A, B, C," which are certificates of baptism, marriage, and
burial, should be considered as original and authentic
documents, so as to avoid the necessity of presenting the
originals themselves, which were bound in book form, together
with other documents relating to persons who had no connection
with this litigation.
On the 4rth of January, 1907, the defendants presented a motion
to the Court of First Instance, asking that the depositions
taken before the consul of the United States at Amoy, China, as
given by the witnesses for the plaintiffs, named Li Ung Bing,
Sy Peng, Lim Chio, Yap Si Tan, Yap Chia, Sy Kay Tit, Yap Chong,
Sy Boan, Sy Kong Len, and Sy Hong Oan, whose testimony the
plaintiffs attempted to introduce in this action, be not
admitted, defendants' motion being based on the ground that the
said depositions contained a formal defect concerning the manner
in which the oath was administered to the witnesses.
In a petition filed on a same date, January 4, the defendants
reproduced their former motion, alleging as a further ground in
support thereof that the certificates by the officer who took
the said depositions did not comply with the essential
requisites by law, and after due notice to the plaintiffs, a
hearing was had upon the said petition on January 7, 1907. After
the recital of the evidence introduced by both parties, and
after the documents exhibited by them, together with the
depositions taken at Vigan of various witnesses for the
defendants, and of the depositions taken at Amoy, China, had
been united to the record, the Court of First Instance on the
26th of February, 1908, rendered a judgment declaring that the
plaintiffs Sy Joc Lieng, Sy Yoc Chay, Sy Chua Niu, and C. W. O'
Brien, the latter as guardian of Sian Han, and the defendants
Gregorio Sy Quia, Pedro Sy Quia, Juan Sy Quia, and Generoso
Mendoza Sy Quia, and the heirs of the deceased Petronila
Encarnacion, presented by the one of the defendants, Pedro Sy
Quia, as the administrator of the property, were the heirs of
the property of the estate of Vicente Romero Sy Quia, now
deceased, consisting of one-half of the property distributed by
the order of the Court of the First Instance of the district of
Quiapo of the 3rd of August, 1900, in the following form: To Sy
Joc Lieng, one-ninth; Sy Yoc Chay, one-ninth; Sy Chua Niu, one-
ninth; C. W. O' Brien, as the guardian of Sian Han, one-ninth;
Pedro Sy Quia, one-ninth; Juan Sy Quia, one-ninth, Gregorio Sy
13 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
Quia, one-ninth; Generoso Mendoza Sy Quia, one-ninth, and the
heirs of Petronila Encarnacion, represented by Pedro Sy Quia as
the administrator of the latter's estate, one-ninth; the heirs
of the said Petronila Encarnacion, represented by the
administrator of her estate, being the owners with the right to
possession of the other half of the property left by Vicente
Romero Sy Quia at the time of his death.
That the defendants, Gregorio, Pedro, Juan, and Generoso, and
Pedro Sy Quia, as the administrator of the property of his
mother Petronila Encarnacion and as a representative of the
latter's heirs, render a statement of the property which was
distributed among them under and by virtue of the order of the
Court of First Instance of the 3rd of August, 1900.
That the said defendants and each of them render an accounting
of the rents and profits of all the property respectively
received by them from the dates when they were delivered to
them, it being understood that if upon making the inventory of
the property it appears that the portion thereof assigned to
Petronila Encarnacion as her share does not exceed one-half of
all the property left by Vicente Romero Sy Quia, at the time of
his death, it will not be necessary to render an accounting of
the rents and profits of the portion to her thus assigned.
That a receiver, to be selected later, be appointed upon the
giving of a sufficient bond, the amount of which will be
hereafter fixed, to take charge and possession of all the
property known as aforesaid, it being understood that if upon
making a list of the said property it appears that the part
thereof assigned to Petronila Encarnacion as her share does not
exceed one-half of all the property of the estate of Vicente
Romero Sy Quia at the time of his death, the said receiver shall
only take possession of one-half of the property assigned to
the other persons who have accounted for them. The Court of
First Instance made no special order as to costs.
To this decision of the trial court counsel for the defendants,
Pedro Sy Quia, by himself and as administrator of the estate of
Petronila Encarnacion, Juan Sy Quia, Gregorio Sy Quia, and
Generoso Mendoza, duly excepted, and by a motion presented to
the court asked that the said judgment be set aside and a new
trial granted, on the ground that the evidence was insufficient
to justify the decision in favor of the plaintiffs, and because
the decision of the trial court was contrary to law, the findings
of the fact being plainly and manifestly against the weight of
the evidence. Upon notice to counsel for plaintiffs, a hearing
was had upon said motions, which were subsequently overruled by
the court. Defendants having duly excepted to the order of the
court overruling the same, and upon filing their bill of
exceptions, asked the court to unite to the same all of the
evidence taken and introduced by both parties, with the
documents and pleadings presented during the course of the
trial, the transcript of the stenographic notes containing the
testimony of the witnesses, and the depositions taken at Vigan
and Amoy, which said bill of exceptions defendants asked the
court to approved and certify to the Supreme Court, with all of
the said evidence which was made an integral part thereof.
By an order entered on the 28th of March, 1908, the court upon
certifying the bill of exceptions, directed that the execution
of the judgment be not stayed in so far as it required the
defendants to submit a statement showing the property received
by them, and to render an account of all the rents and profits,
upon giving a bond satisfactory to the court, to secure the
fulfillment of the judgment in case the same be totally or
partially affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The trial court in deciding the motion for appointment of a
receiver, and after hearing both parties, made an order on the
17th of March, 1908, appointing Gregorio Sy Quia as receiver of
the property in question, upon the giving of the bond in the
sum of P400,000, to be approved by the court, and in case that
the person thus appointed did not accept, the appointment would
be set aside, and a stranger duly qualified substituted. To this
order of the court the defendants Pedro Sy Quia and Juan Sy Quia
duly excepted, and on the 27th of March, 1908, there was united
to the proper files the personal bond for P400,000 given by the
receiver.
By another order made on the said 17th day of March, the court
deciding the motion that a time be fixed within which the
defendants should report to the court whatever property
belonging to the deceased Vicente Romero Sy Quia was distributed
among them, directed that the defendants Juan Sy Quia, Generoso
Mendoza and Pedro Sy Quia, the latter by himself and as
administrator of the estate of Petronila Encarnacion, submit a
statement of the property distributed among them under and by
virtue of the order of the 3rd day of August, 1900, on or before
the 23rd day of March, 1908, and that Gregorio Sy Quia submit a
similar statement on or before the 31st day of the said month
and year.
Pedro Sy Quia and Juan Sy Quia excepted to this order of the
court dated March 17 as aforesaid, requiring them to submit a
statement of the property they had received, and asked to the
court to approve and to have united to the original bill of
exceptions, the additional one duly presented by them, and
notwithstanding the objection of counsel for plaintiffs, the
court by an order dated April 4, 1908, certified the
supplementary bill of exceptions; and considering that the
appointment of Gregorio Sy Quia as receiver was made at the
14 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
suggestion of the defendants in open court, at which time the
amount of the bond was fixed with the knowledge of the
defendants, also the order of the court directing that a
statement of the property received by the defendants be
submitted to the court within a specified time, the court
ordered that the execution of the judgment be not stayed in so
far as the latter order of the court was concerned, and the
original bill of exceptions, together with the supplementary
one, was duly forwarded to the clerk of this court in connection
with the appeal taken and allowed.
The plaintiffs, upon being notified of the said judgment of the
court, excepted thereto, and requested in writing that the court
modify its decision and conclusions of law by declaring that
the plaintiffs Sy Joc Lieng, Sy Yoc Chay, Sy Chua Niu, and C.
W. O'Brien, as the guardian of Sian Han, were they were entitled
to all the property left by the latter, and distributed under
the order of the court of the 3rd of August, 1900; that Petronila
Encarnacion, deceased, and her children and heirs had no
interest in the said estate of Sy Quia; that they were not the
heirs of the deceased Vicente Romero Sy Quia; that the receiver
appointed by the court be authorized to take possession of all
the property left by the said deceased, especially the property
which was distributed by the decree of the court of the 3rd of
August, 1900, together with the rents and profits, and that the
said judgment be modified, awarding the plaintiffs the costs of
the action, and directing that defendants submit an accounting
of the property in litigation.
This action has its purpose primarily to recover from the
present possessors the property left at the time of his death
in this city by the Christian Chinaman, Vicente Romero Sy Quia,
the plaintiffs alleging that three of them are the grandchildren
and one the great-grandson of the deceased Sy Quia by his lawful
marriage in his own country with their deceased grandmother,
yap Puan Niu. So that the marriage of the said Sy Quia with this
woman in China is practically the fundamental basis of the
action brought by the plaintiffs for the recovery of the
inheritance against the defendants, who appear to be the
children of the deceased Sy Quia by his marriage in these Islands
with the native, Petronila Encarnacion.
Does the record show that the Chinaman Sy Quia removed from
Vigan, Philippine Islands, to his native town or village of Am
Thau, Amoy, China, in 1847, and then married in accordance with
the rites and ceremonies of his native country, Yap Puan Niu?
Plaintiffs having failed to present at the trial the matrimonial
letters which should have been exchanged between the contracting
parties at the time the said marriage was performed, according
to the ancient laws and customs of the Celestial Kingdom, and
there being no allegation in the complaint as to the day and
month of the common calendar year, or of the Chinese calendar
year, when the said marriage took place, there is no ground on
which to base the conclusion that such an important act in the
life of Sy Quia has been duly established by authentic
documents, nor is his alleged voyage to China from the port of
Manila for the purpose of contracting such marriage,
satisfactorily proven thereby, for the plaintiffs have likewise
failed to introduce in evidence the passport, required by the
legislation then in force, which should and would have been then
issued to Sy Quia in order to enable him to leave this country
and return to his own. (See superior decree of December 20,
1849.)
Seven witnesses, named Sy Peng, Lim Chio, yap Si Tan, Yap Chia,
Sy Kai Tit, Yap Chong, and Sy Boan, whose respective ages are
not less than 71 nor more than 80 years, in their testimony or
depositions before the vice-consul of the United States at Amoy,
having promised to tell the truth, affirmed through an
interpreter that they were present at the ceremony of the
wedding of the said Sy Quia with the Chinese woman Yap Puan Niu;
that Sy Quia, who was in these Islands, having been expressly
called to China by his father for the purpose of marrying the
said Yap Puan Niu, accordingly returned to his native town or
village of Am Thau, and, after being married to Yap Puan Niu,
remained in the said village three of four years with his wife,
by whom he had two children, Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit, the latter
having been born one year after the birth of the former.
To overcome the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiffs,
the defendants presented nine witnesses, to wit: Felix Millan,
Aniceto Singson, Norberta Feril, Remigio Tongson, Estefania
Crisologo, Alejandra Singson, Benita Encarnacion, Paulino
Revilla, and Silveria Damian, whose respective ages were not
less than 71 nor more than 87 years, except Aniceto Singson,
who was only 66 years of age, who testified, some of them in
the Court of First Instance of Manila, and the others before
the justice of the peace of Vigan by virtue of a commission,
that they knew Sy Quia when he was an unmarried resident of the
city of Vigan, for six or seven years according to most of the
said witnesses, and for five years according to others, prior
to his marriage with Petronila Encarnacion, they having known
him when he was a clerk of Jose Gloria Lecaroz, a resident of
Manila, the witness Revilla stating that he was a of the matrimonial letters or cards which should have been
gobernadorcillo in 1852, when Sy Quia, after being converted to
the Christian religion, was baptized in the church of San
Vicente, the priest of which, who was his (Revilla's) uncle,
being frequently visited by the said Sy Quia for the purpose of
the latter's instruction in the new religion, and that Sy Quia
upon being baptized was named Vicente Ruperto Romero, after his
godfather Romero, who was at that time the clerk of the court;
15 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
Silveria Damian further testified that to the best of her
recollection Sy Quia arrived in Vigan in the year 1848, stopping
at her house, Sy Quia being a friend and countryman of her
husband, who was also a Chinaman, and that she knew that Sy Quia
was then bachelor, that he was baptized some years later, and
on the following year was married to Petronila Encarnacion.
Silveria Damian, her husband and other witnesses in the case
attended the wedding.
It will be seen therefore that the record contains strikingly
conflicting evidence, that is to say, the evidence introduced
by the plaintiffs is directly in conflict with that adduced by
the defendants for while the witnesses for the plaintiffs
asserted that Sy Quia was at Am Thau, Amoy, in 1847, and
contracted marriage in that year with Yap Puan Niu, with whom
be continued to live for about three or four years thereafter,
during which time the children Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit were
born; the witnesses for the defendants on the other hand
affirmed that Sy Quia was at the time in Vigan, and that he did
not leave that city during the six or seven years, according to
most of the witnesses, and during the five years, according to
the others, which immediately preceded his marriage with
Petronila Encarnacion in 1853.
In order to determine whether the weight and preponderance of
the evidence is with the plaintiffs or in favor of the
defendants, in accordance with the provisions of section 273 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, it becomes necessary to examine
and analyze each of the declarations of the respective witnesses
presented at the trial, and ascertain the result of their
various declarations taken as a whole, bearing in mind the
circumstances of the case, the probability or improbability of
their testimony, with due regard to the nature of the facts as
to which they testified, their degree of intelligence, and the
manner in which they testified.
The presence of Sy Quia in Vigan, and his presence at the same
time at Am Thau, Province of Amoy, China, for a period of four
years, to wit, from 1847 to 1850, two facts which are directly
inconsistent with each other, might have been satisfactorily
established by the testimony of witnesses, but the only proof
of the fact of the marriage alleged to have been contracted Sy
Quia at the said Chinese town in 1847 could only have consisted
exchanged between the families or the two contracting parties
in the manner referred to by the witness Li Ung Bing, the
interpreter of the American Consulate, who was called by the
plaintiffs themselves, and whose testimony in this respect is
uniformly corroborated by Nicolay in his book entitled "Historia
de las Creencias," by Ratzel in his book entitled "Las Razas
Humanas," by Cantu in his work entitled "Historia Universal,"
and by the authors of the "Spanish American Encyclopedia
Dictionary." These matrimonial letters, once they have been
mutually exchanged by the contracting parties constitute the
essential requisite required by laws of that country in order
that a Chinese marriage may be considered duly solemnized, and
at the same time are the best proof of its having actually taken
place.
The party obliged to exhibit these letters can only be relieved
from the necessity of so doing by proving that the same have
been lost or disappeared, for in the absence of such proof
(there being none of this character in the record), they must
be produced at the trial in order to establish the fact of the
marriage alleged to have taken place, and only in the cases
expressly excepted by law can any other proof, such as testimony
of witnesses, be allowed, but the letters themselves must be
produced as evidence of the contract to which they relate, in
accordance with the provisions of section 285 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
The failure to produce the said matrimonial letters which
according to some of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, were
exchanged between both families prior to the celebration of the
marriage of Sy Quia with yap Puan Niu, and the lack of proof
that they had been destroyed or lost, give rise to the legal
presumption can not be overcome by the testimony of witnesses,
some of them incompetent, while the testimony of others is
conflicting, not to say contradictory, in itself, a s well as
highly improbable; for this is a most important contract, which,
according to the ancient laws and customs of China, must be
evidenced by such letter or cards, and the fact that these
letters have not been produced shows that the marriage never
took place; if they actually exist they should be exhibited,
for it is a well-known rule that where the evidence is wilfully
suppressed, it is presumed that it would be adverse to the party
presenting the same, if produced. (Sec. 334, par. 5, Code of
Civil Procedure.)
Entering upon the an analysis of the testimony of the witness
for the plaintiffs, it will be notice that Sy Peng stated that
upon the death of Sy Quia, the women of his house extended their
sympathy, as customary, to his widow in China. This, however,
is not true, because it appears in the record as a proved fact
that Yap Puan Niu died in 1891, while that Sy Quia died in this
city in 1894. Lim Chio affirmed that Sy By Bo, the alleged son
of Sy Quia, had two children by his wife, one of them being Sy
Yoc Chay.
This is not true, because Sy Yoc Chay was only an adopted son.
The witness Yap Si Tan testified that Yap Puan Niu lost a natural
child, whose name she did not remember, and in his place adopted
16 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
Sy Hoc Chay as her son. This fact is not testified to by any of
the other witnesses, who simply said that the adoption had been
made by Sy By Bo. The witness Yap Chio, 72 years of age, who
testified that he had been present at the wedding of Sy Quia
with Yap Puan Niu, must have been 8 years old at the time. The
other witness, Sy Kai Tit, who was 71 years of age, and who
according to himself, was about 12 years old at that time,
stated that he had taken part in the investigation made as to
the status and condition of the bride, Yap Puan Niu, having
assisted Sy Quia's parents and the mediator in the
investigation. Another witness by the name of Sy Boan testified
that by Sy Quia, when he died in this city, was survived by his
wife, Yap Puan Niu, who was still living in China, this being
in direct contradiction with the established fact that Yap Puan
Niu died before Sy Quia. This witness further said that when Sy
Quia returned for the second time to China, in order to attend
his parent's funeral, his alleged wife, Yap Puan Niu, was still
living, his testimony in this respect being in contradiction
with that of the other witness, Lim Chio, Yap Si Tan, Yap Chio
and Sy Kai Tit.
The testimony of these witnesses, most of whom have seriously
contradicted themselves upon important points in the course of
their examination, and some of them, considering the fact that
they were very young in 1847, having told a very improbable
story, claiming that they had assisted Sy Quias's parents in
bringing about the latter's marriage, can be given no credence
by the courts to sustain a finding that Sy Quia actually married
Yap Puan Niu, much less so the marriages of Sy By Bo and Sy By
Guit, who are alleged to be the legitimate children of the said
Sy Quia and Yap Puan Niu, and the marriage of Sy Jui Niu, the
mother of Sian Han, a grandson of Sy By Bo and a great-grandson
of Sy Quia, for the reason that there were not introduced in
evidence at the trial the matrimonial letters that must have
been exchanged before the celebration of these marriages, all
of these witnesses having simply said that they attended the
wedding of Sy Quia and Yap Puan Niu, that their said sons were
also subsequently married and each had two children, and that
Sy By Bo adopted Sy Yoc Chay in place of one of his deceased
children. From the testimony of these witnesses, taken as a
whole, it is impossible to arrive at the truth and to lay the
foundation of a just judgment in accordance with the law.
The witness Sy Hien, who claims to be a younger of Sy Quia.,
and was a witness for the plaintiffs, among the many conflicting
statements, as may be seen from his testimony, said that this
certificates of marriage, which presumably consisted of similar
matrimonial letters or cards, were unkept in his own town, and
that he was unable to state the difference in age between
himself, who was 59 years old, and his brother Sy Quia, who,
had hew lived, would to-day be about 80 years old, unless he
was permitted to examine a certain book kept in his own home in
China (p. 116 of the record). His testimony clearly shows that
such matrimonial letters are duly preserved and that the date
of birth of the members of a family is noted or entered in a
book kept in the paternal residence, in like manner as the death
of such members of the family is recorded by mortuary
inscriptions on tablets, a practice which is very natural among
people who live in civilized communities and cities with a
civilization of their own and who, like the Chinese,
notwithstanding their remarkable backwardness with reference to
more advanced and cultured races, generally speaking are not
barbarians and do not lived a nomad or savage life.
The mortuary inscription upon one of the tablets presented in
evidence at the time of taking the evidence of some of the
witnesses who were called by the plaintiffs for the purpose of
establishing that the deceased, Sy Quia, had in his lifetime
married Yap Puan Niu, an English translation of which appears
in the records, are not conclusive or supplementary proof of
the said marriage, because they are absolutely false and
contrary to the actual facts with reference to Sy Quia, for the
latter was still alive in 1891, when he was presumed to be dead
according to the said inscription, he having actually died in
January, 1894; therefore the said mortuary tablet, and the
inscriptions appearing thereon, can not serve to corroborate
the testimony of the witnesses who testified to the celebration
of the marriage, because such tablet and inscriptions are
glaringly false, the fact that the witness Sy Peng said that
this tablet, together with others, was taken by him from the
temple or sanctuary of Sy Quia's family at Am Thau, to be
introduced as evidence in this action, to the contrary
notwithstanding. The falsity of the inscription of Sy Quia's
death, when he was still alive, made upon a tablet which was
evidently prepared with remarkable haste and temerity, is borne
out by the witness Li Ung Bing, the interpreter of the American
consulate, who claimed to be familiar with the laws and customs
of his country, for, according to him, where Chinese die out of
China no inscription is made at the place of their former
residence in China, upon such tablets, of the fact of their
death; and as it is a fact, admitted by the plaintiffs, that Sy
Quia died in Manila and was buried in La Loma cemetery, there
is no doubt that the tablet in question was fraudulently
prepared and fabricated to supply the lack of documentary proof
as to the so-much-talked-about marriage in China which is the
fundamental basis of plaintiff's claim.
In the administrative proceedings that Sy Quia must have
instituted for the purpose of securing the necessary permission
to marry Petronila Encarnacion, and at the investigation which,
after the obtaining of such permission, must have been conducted
by the ecclesiastical court of the bishopric of Vigan, he, Sy
17 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
Quia, necessarily must have declared that he was single, as
evidently he did, according to the testimony of the witness
Roman Gray, 72 years of age, then a clerk of that court, whose
testimony under oath is supported by that of other witnesses,
two of them being of the same race as Sy Quia, and in view of
the result of the said proceedings and investigation, conducted
as aforesaid, the parish priest of the said city of Vigan was
authorized to marry Vicente Sy Quia to Petronila Encarnacion,
the certificate of marriage reciting the fact that there was no
impediment whatever to the performance of the marriage.
Without the aforesaid permission of the Governor-General, sought
and obtained in accordance with sections 34 and 35 of the
superior decree of the 20th of December, 1849, the vicar-general
of the bishopric of Vigan would no have admitted the testimony
given by the witnesses in the investigation for the purpose of
proving that Vicente Sy Quia was single and free to marry, nor
could the parish priest have performed the marriage ceremony
without first securing the necessary authority from the court
of the vicar-general in the name of the bishop.
Therefore the result of those proceedings and the canonical
certificate, evidencing the marriage of Vicente Sy Quia and
Petronila Encarnacion, corroborate to the effect that Sy Quia
was single and had resided for many years in that city before
he married Petronila Encarnacion, and that he could not have
spent four years at Am Thau, province of Amoy, China, during
that period, as alleged.
With reference to the validity of the efficacy of the canonical
certificates and the certified copies thereof introduced here
in evidence, we adhere to and follow the doctrine laid down by
this court in the case of the United States vs. Nicolas
Arceo (11 Phil. Rep., 530), No. 4539, wherein this court said:
The canonical entries in parochial books have not lost
the character of public documents for the purpose of
proving such acts as are therein related, inasmuch as,
since the change of sovereignty in these Islands, no
legal provision has been promulgated to destroy the
official and public character that the said entries had
under the former regime.
Parish priests continue in the legal custody of the
parochial books kept during the former sovereignty, and
as such legal custodians kept during the former
sovereignty, and as such legal custodians they may issue
literal copies in the form of certificates of the entries
contained therein, in like manner as custodians of
archives.
To strengthen the proof introduced by the plaintiffs as to Sy
Quia's marriage to Yap Puan Niu, an attempt was made to establish
that the said Yap Puan Niu had been twice in Manila, the last
time in 1886; that on these two occasions she stopped for five
or six months at the house of Sy Tay, Sy Quia's brother, and
that Sy Quia frequently called on her at the said house; but
notwithstanding the testimony of some witnesses who testified
to this effect, particularly Sy Hien, who claimed to be one of
Sy Quia's brothers, and who testified long after Sy Quia's
death, we have in he record the sworn statement to the contrary
by the Chinese woman, Ana Quang Su, the wife of the said Sy Tay,
who positively testified that upon the two occasions that the
said Yap Puan Niu stopped as a guest at the house of her husband
for a period of five or six months, she had never seen Sy Quia
call on her, Yap Puan Niu, and that the said Yap Puan Niu never
went out of the house but remained at home as was customary with
Chinese women, adding that she would have been otherwise,
because said Yap Puan Niu occupied a room adjoining hers in the
same house, the witness being always at home, further saying
that her husband Sy Tay supported the said guest, Yap Puan Niu,
and paid for her transportation both ways between Manila and
China, and that Sy Joc Lien and Sy Yoc Chay, who on successive
dates came to Manila from China, also stopped at her, the
witness's house, where they lived at the expense and under the
orders of her husband Sy Tay. The testimony of this witness is
of the utmost importance, and has not been impugned or
discredited in any way in this case.
The witness, Roman Gray, above referred to, affirmed that while
he was clerk of the ecclesiastical court of Vigan, which
position he had held since 1850, he met the Chinaman Sy Quia
when the latter went to his court for the purpose of being
baptized as a Christian, stating that the said Sy Quia several
years thereafter, in 1853, presented a petition for permission
to marry, whereupon the necessary proceedings were instituted,
in which said proceedings two Chinese witnesses and Sy Quia was
single and free to marry, and a decree was subsequently entered
authorizing the performance of the marriage with Petronila
Encarnacion, the witness further stating that he had read the
proceedings but that in 1898 the papers were destroyed by the
insurgents, who removed everything from the place where the
archives were kept and occupied the premises for some length of
time.
Aside from what has been said before, there is no other evidence
in the record to show that the plaintiffs, particularly Sy Chua
Niu, Sy Joc Lieng and Sy Yoc Chay, were ever recognized as
legitimate grandchildren and adopted grandchild, respectively,
and that Sian Han is the great-grandchild of the said Sy Quia,
nor is there any proof to show that the plaintiffs Sy Joc Lieng
and Sy Chua Niu have been continuously in possession of the
18 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
legal status of children of the said Sy By Guit, and the said
Sy Yoc Chay as the adopted child of Sy By Bo, and Sian Han as
the grandchild of the said of Sy By Bo, and Sian Han as Sy By
Guit, is said to be the legitimate son of Sy Quia by his wife,
Yap Puan Niu.
Further, there is no evidence to the effect that Sy Quia had
ever provided for the support of Yap Puan Niu, nor that Petronila
Encarnacion at any time delivered money, as alleged, to Sy Joc
Lieng and Sy Yoc Chay by reason of their hereditary income,
inasmuch as the delivery of the sum of P4,000 to the said Sy
Joc Lieng, entered in a book kept by Sy Tay, as per the copy of
the entries appearing on page 300 of the book marked "A. S.,"
is no proof of the payment of a part of the inheritance, and
without any express declaration on the part of Petronila
Encarnacion, an entry in a book kept by the firm of Sy Tay could
not be binding upon the said Encarnacion, this, aside from the
fact the entries do not show the reason why this sum of P4,000
was charged to the account of Petronila Encarnacion and credited
to Sy Joc Lieng; and, even if we admit as true the statement of
the witness Emilio Medina that in his presence, the said Sy Joc
Lieng received an additional sum of P2,000 from Petronila
Encarnacion there is no evidence to show why this sum was paid
to and received by the said Sy Joc Lieng; the witness himself
said that the receipt made out at the time set forth that the
money was for commercial purposes.
It likewise appears from the record that the plaintiffs, who
now seek to be recognized as the grandchildren, and Sian Han as
the great-grandchild of the deceased Sy Quia, incidentally
attempting to recover the property which the said Quia left at
the time of his death, have not shown by competent documentary
proof that Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit were in fact the children of
Sy Quia by his wife Yap Puan Niu; that Sy Yoc Lieng and Sy Chua
Niu are the children of Sy By Guit; that Sy Yoc Chay is the
adopted child of Sy By Bo, and Sian Han the son of Sy Jui Niu,
who was the daughter of the said Sy By Bo, for the parentage
and affiliation of the said parties, as well as the marriage of
Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit, the adoption of Sy Yoc Chay, and the
marriage of Sy Jui Niu, should have been established by means
of the documents in which such facts are customarily recorded,
as stated by Sy Hien, one of the witnesses for the plaintiffs
and who also alleged to be a brother of Sy Quia; the testimony
of the witnesses, the most dangerous and risky of evidence, not
being sufficient to sustain a finding that the court erred in
its estimation of the facts, since the preponderance of the
evidence must be fixed precisely where the judge believes the
truth lies, taking into consideration the facts which were
sought to be established, together with the nature of the same
and the circumstances of the case; and it should be noted that
for the lack of documentary evidence it is impossible to
determine on what date Sy Quia was actually married, if he was
married at all, to Yap Puan Niu; and considering as a whole the
evidence introduced by the plaintiffs as to stay and residence
of the said Sy Quia in the city of Vigan, Philippine Islands,
during the three or four years when it is alleged he was at Amoy
and there married, it can not be said that the preponderance of
the evidence lies with the plaintiffs.
It further appears that the record while the body of the deceased
Vicente Romero Sy Quia was lying in state at the house where he
died, in January, 1894, for the purpose of performing the
ceremony of robing a descendant of the deceased with the nine
silk suits which had been prepared for the corpse in accordance
with the Chinese custom, and although Sy Hien, a brother of the
deceased, was in charge of the ceremonies, it did not occur to
him to dress Sy Yoc Chay in these garments, he, Sy Yoc Chay,
being the son of Sy By Bo, and if the said Sy Hien thought that
this would not be proper for the reason that Sy Yoc Chay was
merely an adopted son, it is significant that Sy Joc Lieng, who
was also present or at least in the house, was not dressed in
the said nine suits, but the same were worn by Tomas Sy Quia,
the eldest son of Gregorio, who for this purpose was expressly
taken out of the college where he was at the time, as testified
to by the several witnesses, among them Macario Pavila, a
resident merchant of Pangasinan, who chanced to be at house on
that occasion. The statement of Sy Hien to the effect that he
did not remember the said ceremony, is not worthy of credit in
view of the positive testimony of the defendants Pedro and Juan
and of the witness Pavila, who, together with several Chinese,
among them Sy Yoc Chay and Sy Joc Lieng, witnessed the same.
The latter's statement that he was not present at the ceremony
on account of his having temporarily left the house in order to
carry out certain instructions received by him, can not be
believed, for, if it is a fact that he was the proper person to
wear the said nine silk suits according to the customs of his
country, the master of the ceremonies would have suspended the
same until he, Sy Joc Lieng, returned to the house; but instead
of this eldest son of Gregorio Sy Quia was brought, it is
alleged, from the college where he was, his father Gregorio
being at the time in Vigan, for the investiture of the nine
robes before they were placed upon the corpse. From all this it
may be inferred that Sy Yoc Chay, who denied that the said
ceremony took place, and Sy Joc Lieng, were not, as a matter of
fact, the grandsons of Sy Quia, as Sy Hien, a brother of the
deceased, who conducted the ceremony well knew, and that the
only descendant to be designated in accordance with traditional
customs of the Chinese was Gregorio Sy Quia, the eldest son of
the deceased, and, in his absence, the latter's eldest son,
Tomas Sy Quia, which designation was accordingly made.
19 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
In the addition to the foregoing considerations it should be
stated that the sworn statement by Vicente Romero Sy Quia before
the civil and ecclesiastica authorities of the city of Vigan in
the proceedings which were instituted in 1853 in connection with
his marriage in the parish church of that city, the continued
possession for a period of many years of the status of a single
man enjoyed by him and recognized and accepted by the whole
community of the capital of the Province of Ilocos Sur, the
belief on the part of his townsmen and neighbors that he was in
fact a single man, all these facts being corroborated, as they
are, by the uniform testimony of the witnesses for the
defendants, and the unexplained silence on the part of his
alleged wife, Yap Puan Niu, who might have asserted whatever
rights she may had as the legitimate wife of Sy Quia before the
tribunals of this country, if she really had any, completely
overcome and destroy the improvised parol evidence as to the
pretended marriage of Sy Quia in China, the performance of which
was for the first time alleged in December, 1905, after Sy
Quia's death and the demise of the latter's brother, Joaquin
Martinez Sy Tiong Tay, who, having sheltered in his house the
woman Yap Puan Niu on the two occasions aforesaid, as well as
the plaintiffs Sy Yoc Chay and Sy Joc Lieng since these latter
landed in the Philippines, might have testified to the existence
of the marriage, thus supporting the plaintiff's claim to the
Sy Quia estate.
It is admitted by the plaintiffs in this case that the two of
them, Sy Yoc Chay and Sy Joc Lieng, and the woman Yap Puan Niu,
when they came to this country stopped at the house of the said
Sy Tiong Tay, who provided for their support and maintenance,
gave employment to the first two in his own business and paid
for the transportation of the woman to Manila and back to China
on the two occasions when she came to this country; and,
notwithstanding the truth and certainty of these facts, the
plaintiffs, nevertheless, did not even endeavor to show that
the said Sy Tiong Tay had defrayed all these expenses by order
and on account of his brother Sy Quia, a fact which would appear
from the entries in the books kept by him as a merchant, of such
payments were really made in behalf of the said Sy Quia. The
plaintiffs introduced in evidence a certain book alleged to
belong to the firm of Sy Tay for the purpose of establishing a
certain payment made by Petronila Encarnacion to the said
plaintiffs. They, however, were unable to produce any book to
show that the expenses incurred by the said Sy Tay for the
maintenance and support of the said plaintiffs and of the woman,
Yap Puan Niu, as well as the latter's travelling expenses were
paid by and on account of Sy Quia.
They were unable to explain the reason for these disbursements
made by Sy Tay for the benefit of two of the plaintiffs and
their alleged grandmother, notwithstanding the fact that death
had forever stilled the lips of the two brothers, Sy Tay and Sy
Quia, plaintiffs having confined themselves to attributing to
him whom they believed to be the wealthier of the two brothers,
who unfortunately can not now speak, the paternity and parentage
of a family which is not proved to be his.
This court, in the strictest administration of justice and in
conformity with the law, can not admit that plaintiffs have
proved four marriages and three generations, since the evidence
introduced by them in support of these facts only consists of
the testimony of witnesses, most of whom have made conflicting
statements and some have contradicted themselves, as for
instance the brother of Sy Quia, Sy Hien, whose testimony is
absolutely unworthy of credence, and other witnesses have told
improbable stories and testified as to things which are not
likely to occur in the natural and ordinary course of human
events.
Even assuming that Sy Quia before he became a Christina actually
married Yap Puan Niu in 1847, as alleged, and that his second
marriage in 1853 with a Christian woman, by whom he had five
children and with whom he lived contentedly in these Islands
since the marriage until he died, covering a period of forty-
one years, while the first marriage was still in full force and
effect, was null and void, he, Vicente Romero Sy Quia, having
therefore married twice in violation of the law, the plaintiffs,
nevertheless, would not be entitled to the relief sought by them
in their complaint.
There is not the slightest evidence in the record which even
tends to indicate that Sy Quia, at the time of his marriage at
Vigan in 1853 with Petronila Encarnacion, brought at Vigan in
1853 with Petronila Encarnacion, brought any property or money
into the conjugal partnership. The fact that he dud not is not
surprising, as he was then a mere clerk in the employment of
another Chinaman by the name of Jose Gloria, who was a resident
of this city, with a salary of P200 per annum, as per testimony
of Silveria Damian, an aged woman, whose husband was also a
Chinaman and worked for the same man that Sy Quia did and for
the same salary; while, on the other hand, there is evidence in
the record to the effect that Petronila Encarnacion, who
belonged to a wealthy family of Vigan, brought to the marriage,
as a gift from her parents, the sum of P5,000, which, together
with their common labor and industry, was the basis of the
fortune accumulated by both husband and wife in the course of
years.
Therefore, even assuming that the second marriage which was
contracted by Sy Quia at Vigan was void, while a former marriage
alleged to have been performed at Amoy, China, was still in full
force and effect, and upon which the plaintiffs in this case
20 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
base their contention, the second marriage, however, produced
civil effects under the laws here in force in 1853, the time
when it was performed. These laws are as follows:
Law 3, title 3, Partida 4, provides in part as follows:
Further, if people marry advisably, knowing that such
impediment existed, and that for this reason they should
not have married, the children which may be born will not
be legitimate; but if only one of the contradicting
parties, and not both, was cognizant of the existence of
such impediment, the children will be legitimate, for the
ignorance of one of the contracting parties excuses them,
and no one can say that they are not legitimate children.
Law 1, title 13, Partida 4 provides in part as follows:
And even if it should happen that between those who are
married manifestly in facie ecclesia such impediment
exists which would require that the marriage be set aside,
the children which may be born to them before the
contracting parties knew that the impediment existed,
will be legitimate. And this would also be if neither of
the contracting parties knew that the impediment existed,
will be legitimate. And this would also be the case if
neither of the contracting parties knew that the
impediment existed, as well as if only one of them had
knowledge thereof, for the ignorance on the part of one
of them, would make the children legitimate. But if after
knowing with certainty that the impediment existed
between them, they should have children, any that should
be born subsequent thereto will not be legitimate. But,
if while such impediments exists without the knowledge
of both parties or of either of them, they should be
accused before the judges of the Holy Church, and before
the impediment is duly established and final judgment
entered, children be born to them, such children as may
be born while the doubt exists, will be legitimate.
The Civil Code has merely reproduced with certain modifications
to the provisions of the old legislation in force in 1853 as to
the civil effects of a void marriage where both parties married
in good faith, as well as where only one of them acted in good
faith, for whether one or both married in good faith, the
marriage will produce civil effects only in favor of the
innocent spouse, and of the children born of this void marriage.
If in all the acts of life good faith is to be presumed unless
the contrary is proven, it can no be denied that Petronila
Encarnacion acted in good faith when she married Vicente Romero
Sy Quia in 1853, since there is no evidence in the record to
the effect that she knew before or after her marriage that the
said Vicente Romero Sy Quia was married in China to another
woman.
The marriage contracted by a Christian Chinese at the time when
Sy Quia was married in the Philippines, was preceded by such
formalities, and so many requisites had first to be complied
with, that it was difficult, not to say impossible, that in the
natural and ordinary course of things the marriage could have
been performed if there were any impediment at all thereto. In
the case of Sy Quia, not only for many years was he considered
in the city of Vigan by the community at large as a bachelor,
his name appearing as such in the municipal census, but it must
be fairly assumed that when he instituted the proceedings before
the civil authorities, and ecclesiastical proceedings in the
ecclesiastical court of Vigan, in order to secure permission
and authority to marry in accordance with the various decrees
then in force, among them the decree of the 20th of December,
1849, he must have positively said then that he was a bachelor,
and this fact must have appeared from the summary investigation
conducted by the ecclesiastical authorities of Vigan for the
purpose of ascertaining whether or not he was a bachelor and
free to marry, and when at last the parish priest of Vigan was
authorized to proceed with the marriage ceremony, there is
little room for doubt that Petronila Encarnacion, as well as
her family, relying upon the result of both proceedings, and
upon the license or authority granted by the government, and
the authority given by the vicar-general in the name of the
bishop, for the performance of the marriage, they consented
thereto in the best of good faith, particularly Petronila
Encarnacion, to the latter's union to Vicente Romero Sy Quia in
lawful wedlock.
If, on the contrary, it were true that Sy Quia had married in
China many years before, there is no doubt that he acted in bad
faith by deceiving his wife Petronila Encarnacion, as well as
the civil and ecclesiastical authorities of this country,
perjuring himself. And upon the assumption that the marriage
with Petronila Encarnacion was void by reason of the existence
of a prior undissolved marriage, the second marriage,
nevertheless, produced its civil effects in favor of the
deceived spouse, and of the children born to them, who,
notwithstanding the nullity of the second marriage, are in the
eyes of the law legitimate, as though they had been born of
parents lawfully married.
Therefore, assuming that Vicente Romero Sy Quia acted in bad
faith by concealing the fact of his marriage at the
investigation made by the authorities for the purpose of
determining whether or not he was a bachelor and free to marry,
21 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
one of the civil effects produced by the marriage thus rendered
void was that Sy Quia thereby absolutely forfeited all his
rights and interest to one-half of the conjugal property
appearing in the instrument partition, Exhibit A. F., and by
operation of law all the property which would otherwise have
belonged to him, became the property of his wife, Petronila
Encarnacion, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code
applicable provisions.
Law 16, title 17, Partida 7, with reference to this subject,
provides:
Notorious wickedness is committed by men who knowingly marry
twice while their first wife is living, and the same may be said
of women who marry twice knowing that their first husband is
still alive. Because such marriages give offense to God, and
bring about great damages and dishonor to those who are
deceived, and they should be careful to marry well and properly,
as directed by the holy Church, for they would otherwise be
married to persons with whom they would later live in sin, and
while they endeavor to be happy in their marriage, and have
children, the first wife or first husband appears when least
expected, and disrupts the marriage, and on account of this
rupture many women are dishonored and ruined forever, and men
are disgraced in many ways. We therefore command that everyone
who should knowingly enter into such a marriage, in any manners
specified in this law, be hence banished to some island for five
years, and that he forfeit whatever he may own at the place
where the marriage was performed, and that it be given to his
children or his grandchildren, if he has any, and if he has no
children or grandchildren, one-half of such property should go
to the persons deceived, and the other half to the king's
chamber; and if both parties knew the one of them was married,
and wilfully married to him or her, then both shall be banished,
each to a separate island, and the property of either of them
who may have no children should go to the king's chamber."
Article 1417 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
The conjugal partnership expires on the dissolution of
the marriage or when it is declared void.
The spouse who, by reason of his or her bad faith, caused
the annulment, shall not receive any share of the property
of the partnership.
This article embodies and reproduces under different aspects
the provisions contained in articles 72, 1333, subsection 3,
1373, 1378, and 1429 of the same code, and a mere reading of
this article, together with the provisions of law 16 of
the Partidas above quoted, will show the difference between the
two. It will be noticed that the code contains more favorable
and less strict provisions on this subject than the law of
the Partidas, wherefore, in accordance with the rule 3 of the
transitory provisions of the said code, the intestate succession
of the deceased Vicente Romero Sy Quia should be governed and
regulated by the new code, which was in force on January 9,
1894, the date of Sy Quia's death.
True, article 72 of the said code is included in title 4, the
application and enforcement of which in these Islands was
suspended under the former sovereignty; but there is no doubt
that article 1417 and the other sections cited are now in force,
said article 1417 providing that the spouse who by reason of
his or her bad faith causes the annulment of the marriage, shall
not receive any share of the property of the conjugal
partnership.
It should be born in mind that on account of the unexplained
silence of Yap Puan Niu during her lifetime, and the silence of
the plaintiffs during Sy Quia's lifetime, the conjugal
partnership constituted in 1853 between Sy Quia and Petronila
Encarnacion was dissolved in 1894 by the death of the husband,
and only then, when the Civil Code was already in operation,
would their presumptive heirs have acquired a right to claim
the inheritance, for the right to inherit while the deceased
was still living is a mere right in expectancy, and not until
after the decease of the person whose succession is in concern
can such a right be said to exist or to be duly acquired. See
the preamble to the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down by
the supreme court of Spain on the subject in its judgment of
the 24th of June, 1897, wherein the court said:
That upon the settlement and distribution of the estate
of a person who dies subsequent to the promulgation of
the Civil Code, any action for the recovery of the
property of the estate should be governed by the
provisions of the said code, in conformity with the first
rule and the one preceding the last, of the transitory
provisions, because the rule as to the nonretroactivity
of the new law only applies to rights acquired under the
former legislation; and it is a well-known fact that
hereditary rights exist only after the demise of the
decedent; and the trial court having so decided, it did
not infringe the provisions of laws 11 and 12, title
13, Partida 6, and the general provisions of the
transitory rules for the application of the Civil Code.
However, as a matter of fact the action instituted by plaintiffs
in 1905, claiming the property left by Sy Quia at the time of
his death, is based especially upon the alleged nullity of the
22 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
second marriage on account of the existence of the former
performed in China. Therefore, the rights claimed by the
plaintiffs should be determined in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code which has been in operation since
1899 and under which the rights now asserted by the plaintiffs
might have sprung and been acquired by them, this assuming that
the alleged first marriage was actually performed in China and
that the claimants were in fact the issue of the said pretended
marriage of Sy Quia and Yap Puan Niu.
Since the 9th of June, 1853, when Vicente Romero Sy Quia married
Petronila Encarnacion, the conjugal partnership commenced to
exist between the two spouses. All the property acquired by them
up to the time of the dissolution of the said partnership on
account of the death of Sy Quia on January 9, 1894, belonged to
this partnership. (law 1, title 3, of the Fuero Real; Laws 1, 3
and 4, title 4, book 10, of the Novisima Recopilacion; and arts.
1393, 1401, 1403-1407, Civil Code.)
During the Sy Quia's lifetime the validity of his marriage with
Petronila Encarnacion, as has been said before, was never
questioned, no one having indicated any defect which rendered
the same void. It was only after his death that the plaintiffs
ventured to attack the validity of the same by claiming that
they were his legitimate heirs and as such entitled to his
estate.
The Laws of the Partidas above cited, as well as the Civil Code,
both recognize as a fact that a marriage contracted in good
faith, by one at least of the parties to the same, produces the
same civil effects as a valid marriage with reference to the
innocent spouse and the children born of such marriage, even
though the same be subsequently declared null and void.
It can not be denied that Petronila Encarnacion married Sy Quia
in the best of good faith, there being not the slightest proof
to the contrary so far as the records shows. Therefore, being
innocent, she must be held to have acquired all the rights to
which a wife is ordinarily entitled, and neither she nor her
children can be made to suffer the consequences of the nullity
of such marriage, this, assuming that the marriage was void;
nor can they in any event be made to suffer the consequences of
the bad faith of her husband Sy Quia.
The nullity of the marriage, once declared by the courts, may
deprive the partnership created by the marriage of the alleged
spouses of its otherwise legal character, but can not destroy
the legal consequences of the marital union while it is existed.
Consequently the children are considered legitimate, and the
innocent spouse is unquestionably entitled to one-half of the
conjugal property acquired during the marriage.
From the legal provisions above cited, especially the sections
of the Civil Code referred to, it necessarily follows that the
half of the conjugal property to which Vicente Romero Sy Quia
would have been otherwise entitled, on account of the alleged
nullity of his marriage with Petronila Encarnacion and of his
bad faith in contracting the same, was forfeited by him and by
operation of the law passed to the other spouse, Encarnacion;
and the plaintiffs, in their alleged capacity as legitimate
descendants of the said Sy Quia, deceased, can not now claim
the said property, as the decedent, by the express provisions
of the law, absolutely forfeited his right to the said half of
the property acquired during the marriage. Such marriage must
be considered null and void if it is true, as alleged by the
plaintiffs, that Sy Quia's marriage with Yap Puan Niu was still
in full force and effect when he married Petronila Encarnacion.
Counsel for plaintiffs now ask this court to modify the judgment
appealed from and declare that the said plaintiffs are the only
legitimate heirs of Sy Quia and consequently entitled to his
entire estate, together with all rents and profits, for which
judgment should be entered in their favor with costs. In support
of their contention they have assigned various errors as
committed by the trial court, among them that the court erred
in finding as a conclusion of law that the said Sy Quia was a
subject of the Chinese Empire and that his estate should be
distributed in accordance with the laws of China.
It is an admitted fact that Sy Quia was a native Chinaman and
therefore a foreigner; that he came to this country in 1839 or
1840, when he was 12 years of age. He having resided in these
Islands since then and until January, 1894, when he died, that
is to say, for a period of more than 53 years, having obtained
for this purpose the necessary license or permission, and having
been converted to the Catholic religion, marrying a native woman
in the city of Vigan and establishing his domicile first in the
Province of Ilocos and later in this city of Manila, with the
intention of residing here permanently, engaging in his business
generally and acquiring real estate, it is unquestionable that
by virtue of all these acts he acquired a residence and became
definitely domiciled in these Islands with the same rights as
any nationalized citizen in accordance with the laws in force
in these Islands while he lived here and until his death.
It should be noticed that, as the laws have no retroactive
effect, in order to determine what rights Sy Quia had actually
since he removed to the Philippines in 1839 or 1840, it will be
necessary to resort to the laws in force at that time; and the
provisions of the Civil Code promulgated in November, 1889,
23 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
could not affect in the least rights thus acquired by virtue of
his long residence in these Islands. Article 3 of the Civil Code
is as follows; "Laws shall not have retroactive effect unless
otherwise prescribed therein." This provision is in accordance
with the provisions of law 15, title 14, Partida 3.
The legislation then in force on the subject of naturalization
and residence of foreigners in the Philippine Islands will be
found in the following laws. Law 1, title 11, book 6 of
the Novisima Recopilacion, is as follows:
We permit that the subjects of other kingdoms (provided
they are Catholics and friendly to our Crown) who may
desire to come here to practice their trade or profession
may do so, and we command that if they do now practice
some trade or profession and live twenty leagues inland
from any port, they shall be forever exempt from the
payment of taxes, and shall be likewise exempt for a
period of six years, from the payment of municipal taxes
and from the performance of any ordinary or extraordinary
services, as well as from holding office as members of
municipal councils at the place where they may reside;
and they, like other residents, shall be permitted to use
the common pastures and enjoy all the privileges accorded
to the latter; and we hereby command the authorities to
provide them with house and lands, if necessary. And
other foreigners, whether they have any trade or
profession, provided they have lived in this kingdom for
a period of ten years in a home of their own, and have
been married to native women for a period of six years,
shall be admitted to all the offices of the republic
except to those of magistrate, governor, mayor, elderman,
warden, treasurer, revenue collector, secretary of city
council, or any other government position of trust. As
to these latter offices, as well as to all ecclesiastical
offices, all existing laws shall continue in full force
and effect, etc.
And law 3 of the same title and book of the Novisima
Recopilacion provides:
There shall be considered as denizens, in the first place,
all foreigners who obtain the privilege of naturalization
and those who are born in these kingdoms; those who
residing therein may be converted to our Holy faith;
those who, being self-supporting, establishes their
domicile therein; those who ask for and obtain residence
in any town thereof; those who marry a native woman of
the said kingdoms and are domiciled therein; and in the
case of a foreign woman who marries a native man, she
thereby becomes subject to the same laws and acquires the
 same domicile as her husband; those who establish
themselves in the country by acquiring real property;
those who have a trade or profession and go there to
practice the same; also those who practice some
mechanical trade therein or keep a retail store; those
who hold public or honorary offices or any such position
whatever which can only be held by natives; those who
enjoy the privilege of the common pastures and other
privileges usually accorded to other residents; those who
shall reside in the said kingdoms for a period of ten
years in a home of their own; and also those foreigners
who, in accordance with the common law, royal orders and
other laws of the kingdoms, may have become naturalized
or acquired residence therein, they being obliged to pay
the same taxes as the natives for the legal and
fundamental reason that they also participate in their
privileges, etc.
Article 18 of the Code of Commerce of May 30, 1829, which was
in operation until 1888 , is as follows:
Foreigners who have become naturalized or have the
acquired residence in Spain in the manner provided by law
may freely engage in commerce with the same rights and
under the same conditions as natives of the kingdom.
Although the royal decree to the colonies, with the exception
of section 28 thereof, nevertheless, it is only proper to call
attention to the provisions of the said decree in so far as they
have any bearing upon the case at bar, in view of the provisions
of laws 1 and 2, title 1, book 2, of the Compilation of the Laws
of the Indies, which direct that the laws of Castile shall be
observed in all cases not otherwise covered by said laws.
Section 2 of the said royal decree of 1852 is as follows:
Foreigners who have gained or obtained a residence, in
accordance with the laws, shall be considered Spanish
subjects.
Section 3 provides that all other foreigners who reside in Spain
without having taken out naturalization papers, or otherwise
gained a residence therein, shall continue to be foreigners.
And section 12 provides:
Those persons shall not be legally considered as
foreigners, under any circumstances, who have failed to
register as such in the registry or transients or
domiciled persons kept by the civil authorities of the
provinces or with the consuls of the respective nations.
24 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
It is a proven and undeniable fact that Sy Quia resided in the
Philippines for more than fifty years, he having only absented
himself occasionally for a short time with the intention of
immediately returning to the Islands; and it is also a fact that
in various documents and public instruments executed before
notaries public, which have been introduced in evidence marked
as "Exhibits 1, 2, and 3," he was a resident of the district of
Binondo having declared in one of the said documents that he
was a freeholder. If continuous residence in these Islands for
a period of more than fifty years, and by virtue of the fact
that he had permanently established himself in this country,
living in a house of his own, with his wife and children, and
having acquired real estate therein, did become a domiciled
denizen under the laws then in force, even if it be held that
the royal decree of the 17th of November, 1852, was applicable
to these Islands by virtue of the provision contained in the
Laws of the Indies, the legal status of Vicente Rometro Sy Quia
has not changed, because the provisions of the said decree does
not in any way affect the rights acquired by him and the supreme
court of Spain in a judgment of the 30th of April, 1861, in
construing this provision of the law, declared and held that
the purpose of the royal decree of the 17th of November, 1852,
was not to promulgate a new law, but merely to condense and
embody in one single act the various provisions then in force
with reference to foreigners, and to preserve the fuero de
estranjeria (the rights which foreigners had in certain cases
to invoke their own laws) in the same manner as it existed
before. In another judgment of the 29th of August of the same
year the said supreme court of Spain held that under the
provisions of law 3, title 11, book 6, of the Novisima
Recopilacion, there should be considered as domiciled denizens
of Spain all foreigners who, being self-supporting, established
their domicile in the country; the double inscription in the
registry, as required by the royal decree of the 17th of
November, 1852, being no obstacle thereto.
Many years prior to promulgation of the Civil Code in these
Islands, there was published in the Official Gazette of this
city on September 18, 1870, the decretal law of the 4th of July
of the said relating to foreigners, section 2 of which provides:
Foreigners who, in accordance with the laws, shall be
come naturalized beyond the seas, in any town of the
Spanish provinces beyond the seas, shall be considered
as Spanish subjects.
After dividing into three different classes the foreigners who
should come into and establish themselves in the provinces
beyond the seas, classifying them respectively as domiciled,
transient, and immigrant foreigners, the said section provided
that — "Domiciled foreigners are those who have a regular
residence and have lived for three years in any province or who
may have lived for such residents in the registry of domiciled
persons kept for this purpose," etc.
Section 7 of the said decree provides as follows:
Any foreign residing in the provinces beyond the seas,
in order to be considered as such foreigner under the
laws of the country, shall register in the registry of
foreigners to be kept for this purpose by the civil
supreme authorities and by the consuls of their
respective nations.
The above-quoted sections of the said decree are in harmony with
similar sections contained in the decree of the 17th of
November, 1852, which, as has been said, was never extended to
these Islands — with the exception of section 28 thereof
relating to the settlement of the estates of deceased
foreigners. The doctrine laid down by the supreme court of Spain
with reference to the interpretation and proper construction of
the said decree is not, therefore, inconsistent with the
provisions of the decree or law of 1870, also relating to
foreigners.
True that prior to 1870 there existed in these Islands no
registry of foreigners and that even the civil registry was not
then in operation of titles 4 and 12 of the Civil Code relating
thereto having been suspended by telegraphic order of the 29th
of December, 1889. It is also true that no registry was kept by
the foreign consulates and that there was no Chinese consul here
at that time. However, if the Chinaman Sy Quia had really
intended to preserve his nationality and the protection of the
laws of this country, he would have registered in the registry
which was kept by the Government here after the publication in
these Islands of the said decree of 1870; and under the theory
of the law a foreigner, in order to have the right to invoke
the laws of his own country, must register in the proper
registries as such foreigner; if Sy Quia did not see fit to so
register at any time prior to his death in 1894, we must presume
that he did not do so because he desired to preserve the rights
which he had acquired as a resident of Manila.
Continuous and permanent residence in this country for a period
of years, and the rights thereby acquired as a denizen of any
town, were always taken into consideration by the Spanish
legislators in determining the rights of a foreigner residing
in Spanish territory. The constitution of 1812 provides in
section 5 that there shall be considered as Spanish subjects:
25 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
2. Foreigners who have obtained from the cortes a
certificate of naturalization; and, 3. Those who have
otherwise gained residence in accordance with the laws
of the country and lived as such residents for a period
of ten years in any town of the kingdom.
A similar provision is contained in section 1 of the
constitution of 1845, paragraph 4 of which is as follows:
Spanish subjects are those who, having otherwise obtained
a certificate of naturalization, have, nevertheless,
gained residence in any town of the kingdom.
It becomes necessary to refer to the Spanish laws which were
applicable or in operation in these Islands at the time that
Vicente Romero Sy Quia gained residence and acquired the status
of a domiciled denizen of the municipality of Vigan and
subsequently of this city of Manila, for the reason that they
were the only laws regulating his personal rights.
In addition to what has been said for the purpose of
demonstrating that Vicente Romero Sy Quia acquired the legal
status of a domiciled resident of these Islands, we should not
forget to say that the Chinese residents of these Islands under
the former sovereignty, and particularly at the time that Sy
Quia gained a residence in this Archipelago, were governed by
the Laws of the Indies and other special laws, some of them
quite ancient; although they had no consul or any other
representative of the Chinese Government, they, nevertheless,
had a gobernadorcillo who was elected by their most prominent
citizens, subject to the approval of the Governor-General. They
were governed by laws different from the general laws of the
country and paid a tax different from that which was paid by
the natives and foreigners, and, upon their landing for the
purpose of establishing themselves in the Islands, they had to
obtain what was known as a resident's license and secure
passports and permits whenever they desired to leave the
Islands, and not only had they to obtain such permission from
the Government, but also from their native wife, if they were
married. It should be noticed also that they were not permitted
to land in Manila without first obtaining a permit from the
Government, and that they had to state before the Chinese
immigration authorities whether they came here as mere
transients, or visitors for a period of three months, which
could be extended if they really intended to establish
themselves in the country. For this purpose certain proceedings
were instituted before the immigrant was given the said
resident's license. This license entitled them to more liberty
and privileges in their business journeys and excursions through
the provinces than the other transients who merely had
permission to stay here three months. All this may be verified
by reference to the decrees of the 31st of August, 1839; 16th
of September, 1840; 13th of December, 1843; and 20th of
December, 1849.
It should be noticed further that section 19 of the said decree
of the 16th of September, 1840, provided that the children
always follow the status of their father and pay the same taxes,
except the children of Chinese who, according to the decree of
the 2nd of May, 1786, were considered as Chinese mestizos. These
decrees may be found In the work entitled "Legislacion Ultra
Marina," by Rodriguez San Pedro, vol. 2, pp. 471-483, and vol.
8, p. 401.
The foregoing will clearly show that Vicente Romero Sy Quia
gained residence in these Islands under the laws of the Novisima
Recopilacion. Therefore the questions raised by those who now
claimed to be his descendants should be decided in accordance
with the laws in force in the Philippines to which Sy Quia
submitted himself from the time he applied for a resident's
license and abstained from registering in 1870 as a foreigner.
Most of the property left by him being the real, the same is
subject to the laws of the country in which it is located.
In support of what has been said with reference to the special
laws governing in the Philippines concerning Chinese, we will
cite the decision in a case where a Chinese Christian by the
name of Bonifacio Lim Tuaco requested that the children of
Chinese married to native women, whether pure relatives or half-
castes, pay the same taxes as their father and be permitted to
wear the same costume as the latter up to the age of 25. The
Spanish Government, inspired by the traditional spirit of the
ancient special laws relating to Chinese residents in these
islands, after consulting various heads of departments and
obtaining in a royal order of the 24th of February, 1880, which
was communicated to the Governor-General of these islands and
published in the Official Gazette April 17, 1880.
The plaintiffs in this case have invoked certain provisions of
the Chinese laws as one of the grounds of the action by them
instituted and now contend that the estate of Vicente Romero Sy
Quia, deceased, should be distributed in accordance with the
laws of that country. Even disregarding the fact that the
plaintiffs should have, but have not, alleged in their
complaint, as one of the facts constituting their cause of
action, the existence of a law passed and promulgated in China,
the existence of which law, being foreign, should have been
alleged in the complaint, the fact remains that there is
absolutely no evidence in the record as to the existence of the
Chinese laws referred to by plaintiffs in their subsequent
pleadings, the evidence of this character introduced by them
consisting of books or pamphlets written in Chinese characters
26 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
and marked "Exhibits AH, AI, AJ, and AK," which they claim
contain a compilation of the laws of China, being useless and
of no value.
It may be that they contain, as plaintiffs claim, the laws of
China, but we have no Spanish translation of them, they being
the written with characters which are absolutely unknown to this
court and to the defendants. Further, the plaintiffs have not
introduced expert testimony in the manner and form prescribed
by section 292 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and, finally,
there is no evidence that these four books or pamphlets were
printed by authority of the Chinese Government or that they have
been duly authenticated by the certificate of competent
authorities or that they are properly sealed with the seal of
the nation to which they belong. For this reason the said books
or pamphlets can not, under any circumstance, be considered as
documentary proof of the laws of China.
Section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
Books printed or published under the authority of the
United States, or of one of the States of the United
States, or a foreign country, and purporting to contain
statutes, codes, or other written law of such State or
country, or proved to be commonly admitted in the
tribunals of such State or country as evidence of the
written law thereof, are admissible in the Philippine
Islands as evidence of such law.
Section 301 of the same code provides:
A copy of the written law, or other public writing of any
State or country, attested by the certificate of the
officer having been charge of the original, under the
seal of the State or country, is admissible as evidence
of such law or writing.
Section 302 provides as follows:
The oral testimony of the witnesses, skilled herein, is
admissible as evidence of he unwritten law of the United
States or of any State of the United States, or foreign
country, as are also printed and published books of
reports of decisions of the courts of the United States
or of such State or country, or proved to be commonly
admitted in such courts.
The jurisprudence of American and Spanish tribunals is uniform
on this subject. For he purposes of this decision however it
will be sufficient to refer to the judgment of the supreme court
of Spain of the 26th of May, 1887, wherein it is said:
Whenever a foreign law is invoked in our Tribunals, its
existence must be satisfactorily established as any other
fact.
If the pamphlets or books, written in Chinese characters, do
not satisfactorily establish the existence of certain Chinese
laws invoked by the plaintiffs, no only because such pamphlets
or books lack the aforesaid formalities and requisites, but
further because there is no evidence as to the nature of the
laws contained in those books or pamphlets and the subjects with
which they deal; on the introduced for the purpose of
establishing the authenticity of the laws which, according to
the plaintiffs, are contained in the said books, were unable to
say positively at least that the book marked Exhibit AH consul
of this city, Sy Int Chu, after stating that he had never made
a regular study of the laws of his country, simply consulting
the same in connection with his official reports, admitted that
he had never read or seen the original copy of this alleged
compilation, the books not being duly certified, adding that he
could not say whether the book marked "Exhibit AH" was a exact
copy of the original.
The testimony of the witness Ly Ung Bing, the interpreter, as
to the written and unwritten laws of China, does not show, as
required by the Code of Civil Procedure, that he knew such laws
alleged to be contained in the said books. He merely confined
himself to expressing his own opinion with reference to two
classes thoroughly conversant with the laws of China, his
testimony, considering the manner in which he testified, can
not even be accepted as partial evidence that the said four
books really contain the written and unwritten laws of China.
From the foregoing facts and provisions of law referred to we
conclude:
First. That it has not been duly established in this case that
the Chinaman Sy Quia, married in 1847 at Am Thau, Amoy, China,
the woman Yap Puan Niu, or that the plaintiffs are the
descendants of the said Sy Quia, for the reason that the marriage
of Sy By Bo, Sy By Guit and Sy Jui Niu, respectively, the
affiliation and parentage of the latter and of Sy Chua Niu and
Sian Han, and the adoption of Sy Yoc Chay have not been proven.
Second. That, even assuming that Sy Quia actually married Yap
Puan Niu, in 1847, and that the second marriage with Petronila
Encarnacion in 1853 is, therefore, void, Sy Quia having
contracted this second marriage in bad faith by concealing the
27 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
fact that his former wife was still living his half of the
property of the conjugal partnership between him and his second
wife, who married him in good faith, was forfeited by operation
of law in favor of his said second wife, for although the law
recognizes civil effects to a void marriage, it nevertheless,
deprives the party who married in bad faith of his share in the
community property acquired during the existence of the marriage
up to the time of its annulment.
Third. That, as a consequence of the foregoing conclusion and
under the same hypothesis, the plaintiffs, as the descendants
of Sy Quia by his first marriage, have no right to claim Sy
Quia's share in the conjugal property acquired during his second
marriage with Petronila Encarnacion for the reason that by the
express provision of the law the half of the said conjugal
property which would have otherwise belonged to the husband was
transmitted to Petronila Encarnacion, together with the other
half of the said property to which she was rightfully entitled
under the law as the deceived wife.
Fourth. That, under the same hypothesis that the marriage of Sy
Quia with Petronila Encarnacion is void, his former marriage
not having been dissolved when he married the said Petronila
Encarnacion, the children by the second marriage are,
nevertheless, legitimate, this being one of the civil effects
of a marriage contracted in good faith, as in this case, at
least on the part of one of the contracting parties, Petronila
Encarnacion.
Fifth. That Vicente Romero Sy Quia, having become a regularly
domiciled denizen under the laws above cited by reason of his
long residence in this country for more than fifty years and by
reason of the further fact that he married a native woman,
established himself in this city with a home of his own, acquired
real property and engaged in business generally, most of the
property left by him at the time of his death being the real
property, the questions raised by plaintiff's petition must be
determined in accordance with the laws of the Philippines to
which Sy Quia submitted himself when he came to the Islands and
secured a residence therein, and not in accordance with any
other foreign or unknown law.
Sixth. That, aside from the fact that it does not specifically
appear from the record what are the Chinese laws applicable to
the issues of this case, there is no proof of the existence of
the Chinese laws referred to by the plaintiffs, nor is there
anything to show that the books or pamphlets introduced by them
in evidence contain any specific laws of the Celestial.
The foregoing disposes explicitly or implicitly, affirmatively
or otherwise, of all the questions raised by the various
assignments of error submitted by both parties; and in our
opinion it is not necessary to dispose of each of them in detail
in view of the conclusion at which the court has arrived in this
most important litigation.

For the reasons hereinbefore stated, we are of the opinion, and

so hold, that the judgment of the trial court, appealed from
both parties, should be reversed, and that we should, and do
hereby, absolve the defendants of the complaint upon which this
action was instituted, without any special order as to the costs
of both instances. The bond given by the receiver, Gregorio Sy
Quia, is hereby discharged and the petition heretofore made for
the appointment of a new receiver is hereby denied. It is so
ordered.

28 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
G.R. No. L-35694 December 23, 1933
ALLISON G. GIBBS, petitioner-appelle,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, oppositor-appellant.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA, respondent-
appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellants.
Allison D. Gibbs in his own behalf.
BUTTE, J.:
This is an appeal from a final order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, requiring the register of deeds of the City
of Manila to cancel certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and
28331, covering lands located in the City of Manila, Philippine
Islands, and issue in lieu thereof new certificates of transfer
of title in favor of Allison D. Gibbs without requiring him to
present any document showing that the succession tax due under
Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code has been
paid.
The said order of the court of March 10, 1931, recites that the
parcels of land covered by said certificates of title formerly
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and
Eva Johnson Gibbs; that the latter died intestate in Palo Alto,
California, on November 28, 1929; that at the time of her death
she and her husband were citizens of the State of California
and domiciled therein.
It appears further from said order that Allison D. Gibbs was
appointed administrator of the state of his said deceased wife
in case No. 36795 in the same court, entitled "In the Matter of
the Intestate Estate of Eva Johnson Gibbs, Deceased"; that in
said intestate proceedings, the said Allison D. Gibbs, on
September 22,1930, filed an ex parte petition in which he
alleged "that the parcels of land hereunder described belong to
the conjugal partnership of your petitioner and his wife, Eva
Johnson Gibbs", describing in detail the three facts here
involved; and further alleging that his said wife, a citizen
and resident of California, died on November 28,1929; that in
accordance with the law of California, the community property
of spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of
the wife previous to that of the husband, belongs absolutely to
the surviving husband without administration; that the conjugal
partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs, deceased,
has no obligations or debts and no one will be prejudiced by
adjucating said parcels of land (and seventeen others not here
involved) to be the absolute property of the said Allison D.
Gibbs as sole owner. The court granted said petition and on
September 22, 1930, entered a decree adjucating the said Allison
29 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
D. Gibbs to be the sole and absolute owner of said lands,
applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of California. Gibbs
presented this decree to the register of deeds of Manila and
demanded that the latter issue to him a "transfer certificate
of title".
Section 1547 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative
Code provides in part that:
Registers of deeds shall not register in the registry of
property any document transferring real property or real
rights therein or any chattel mortgage, by way of
gifts mortis causa, legacy or inheritance, unless the
payment of the tax fixed in this article and actually due
thereon shall be shown. And they shall immediately notify
the Collector of Internal Revenue or the corresponding
provincial treasurer of the non payment of the tax
discovered by them. . . .
Acting upon the authority of said section, the register of deeds
of the City of Manila, declined to accept as binding said decree
of court of September 22,1930, and refused to register the
transfer of title of the said conjugal property to Allison D.
Gibbs, on the ground that the corresponding inheritance tax had
not been paid. Thereupon, under date of December 26, 1930,
Allison D. Gibbs filed in the said court a petition for an order
requiring the said register of deeds "to issue the corresponding
titles" to the petitioner without requiring previous payment of
any inheritance tax. After due hearing of the parties, the court
reaffirmed said order of September 22, 1930, and entered the
order of March 10, 1931, which is under review on this appeal.
On January 3, 1933, this court remanded the case to the court
of origin for new trial upon additional evidence in regard to
the pertinent law of California in force at the time of the
death of Mrs. Gibbs, also authorizing the introduction of
evidence with reference to the dates of the acquisition of the
property involved in this suit and with reference to the
California law in force at the time of such acquisition. The
case is now before us with the supplementary evidence.
For the purposes of this case, we shall consider the following
facts as established by the evidence or the admissions of the
parties: Allison D. Gibbs has been continuously, since the year
1902, a citizen of the State of California and domiciled
therein; that he and Eva Johnson Gibbs were married at Columbus,
Ohio, in July 1906; that there was no antenuptial marriage
contract between the parties; that during the existence of said
marriage the spouses acquired the following lands, among others,
in the Philippine Islands, as conjugal property:lawphil.net
1. A parcel of land in the City of Manila represented by transfer
certificate of title No. 20880, dated March 16, 1920, and
registered in the name of "Allison D. Gibbs casado con Eva
Johnson Gibbs".
2. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by
transfer certificate of title No. 28336, dated May 14, 1927, in
which it is certified "that spouses Allison D. Gibbs and Eva
Johnson Gibbs are the owners in fee simple" of the land therein
described.
3. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by
transfer certificate of title No. 28331, dated April 6, 1927,
which it states "that Allison D. Gibbs married to Eva Johnson
Gibbs" is the owner of the land described therein; that said
Eva Johnson Gibbs died intestate on November 28, 1929, living
surviving her her husband, the appellee, and two sons, Allison
J. Gibbs , now age 25 and Finley J. Gibbs, now aged 22, as her
sole heirs of law.
Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code entitled
"Tax on inheritances, legacies and other acquisitions mortis
causa" provides in section 1536 that "Every transmission by
virtue of inheritance ... of real property ... shall be subject
to the following tax." It results that the question for
determination in this case is as follows: Was Eva Johnson Gibbs
at the time of her death the owner of a descendible interest in
the Philippine lands above-mentioned?
The appellee contends that the law of California should
determine the nature and extent of the title, if any, that
vested in Eva Johnson Gibbs under the three certificates of
title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331 above referred to, citing
article 9 of the Civil Code. But that, even if the nature and
extent of her title under said certificates be governed by the
law of the Philippine Islands, the laws of California govern
the succession to such title, citing the second paragraph of
article 10 of the Civil Code.
Article 9 of the Civil Code is as follows:
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition, and legal capacity of persons, are
binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a
foreign country." It is argued that the conjugal right
of the California wife in community real estate in the
Philippine Islands is a personal right and must,
therefore, be settled by the law governing her personal
status, that is, the law of California. But our attention
has not been called to any law of California that
30 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
incapacitates a married woman from acquiring or holding
land in a foreign jurisdiction in accordance with the lex
rei sitae. There is not the slightest doubt that a
California married woman can acquire title to land in a
common law jurisdiction like the State of Illinois or the
District of Columbia, subject to the common-law estate
by the courtesy which would vest in her husband. Nor is
there any doubt that if a California husband acquired
land in such a jurisdiction his wife would be vested with
the common law right of dower, the prerequisite
conditions obtaining. Article 9 of the Civil Code treats
of purely personal relations and status and capacity for
juristic acts, the rules relating to property, both
personal and real, being governed by article 10 of the
Civil Code. Furthermore, article 9, by its very terms,
is applicable only to "Spaniards" (now, by construction,
to citizens of the Philippine Islands).
The Organic Act of the Philippine Islands (Act of
Congress, August 29, 1916, known as the "Jones Law") as
regards the determination of private rights, grants
practical autonomy to the Government of the Philippine
Islands. This Government, therefore, may apply the
principles and rules of private international law
(conflicts of laws) on the same footing as an organized
territory or state of the United States. We should,
therefore, resort to the law of California, the
nationality and domicile of Mrs. Gibbs, to ascertain the
norm which would be applied here as law were there any
question as to her status.
But the appellant's chief argument and the sole basis of the
lower court's decision rests upon the second paragraph of
article 10 of the Civil Code which is as follows:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in
respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the property or
the country in which it may be situated.
In construing the above language we are met at the outset with
some difficulty by the expression "the national law of the
person whose succession is in question", by reason of the rather
anomalous political status of the Philippine Islands. (Cf.
Manresa, vol. 1, Codigo Civil, pp. 103, 104.) We encountered no
difficulty in applying article 10 in the case of a citizen of
Turkey. (Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil., 867.) Having regard to
the practical autonomy of the Philippine Islands, as above
stated, we have concluded that if article 10 is applicable and
the estate in question is that of a deceased American citizen,
the succession shall be regulated in accordance with the norms
of the State of his domicile in the United States. (Cf. Babcock
Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil., 130, 137; In re Estate
of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156, 166.)
The trial court found that under the law of California, upon
the death of the wife, the entire community property without
administration belongs to the surviving husband; that he is the
absolute owner of all the community property from the moment of
the death of his wife, not by virtue of succession or by virtue
of her death, but by virtue of the fact that when the death of
the wife precedes that of the husband he acquires the community
property, not as an heir or as the beneficiary of his deceased
wife, but because she never had more than an inchoate interest
or expentancy which is extinguished upon her death. Quoting the
case of Estate of Klumpke (167 Cal., 415, 419), the court said:
"The decisions under this section (1401 Civil Code of
California) are uniform to the effect that the husband does not
take the community property upon the death of the wife by
succession, but that he holds it all from the moment of her
death as though required by himself. ... It never belonged to
the estate of the deceased wife."
The argument of the appellee apparently leads to this dilemma:
If he takes nothing by succession from his deceased wife, how
can the second paragraph of article 10 be invoked? Can the
appellee be heard to say that there is a legal succession under
the law of the Philippine Islands and no legal succession under
the law of California? It seems clear that the second paragraph
of article 10 applies only when a legal or testamentary
succession has taken place in the Philippines and in accordance
with the law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is
consulted only in regard to the order of succession or the
extent of the successional rights; in other words, the second
paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased
was vested with a descendible interest in property within the
jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
In the case of Clarke vs. Clarke (178 U. S., 186, 191; 44 Law
ed., 1028, 1031), the court said:
It is principle firmly established that to the law of the
state in which the land is situated we must look for the
rules which govern its descent, alienation, and transfer,
and for the effect and construction of wills and other
conveyances. (United States vs. Crosby, 7 Cranch, 115; 3
L. ed., 287; Clark vs. Graham, 6 Wheat., 577; 5 L. ed.,
334; McGoon vs. Scales, 9 Wall., 23; 19 L. ed., 545;
Brine vs. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 96 U. S., 627; 24 L. ed.,
31 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
858.)" (See also Estate of Lloyd, 175 Cal., 704, 705.)
This fundamental principle is stated in the first
paragraph of article 10 of our Civil Code as follows:
"Personal property is subject to the laws of the nation
of the owner thereof; real property to the laws of the
country in which it is situated.
It is stated in 5 Cal. Jur., 478:
In accord with the rule that real property is subject to
the lex rei sitae, the respective rights of husband and
wife in such property, in the absence of an antenuptial
contract, are determined by the law of the place where
the property is situated, irrespective of the domicile
of the parties or to the place where the marriage was
celebrated. (See also Saul vs. His Creditors, 5 Martin
[N. S.], 569; 16 Am. Dec., 212 [La.]; Heidenheimer vs.
Loring, 26 S. W., 99 [Texas].)
Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title
which vested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of
the community lands here in question must be determined in
accordance with the lex rei sitae.
It is admitted that the Philippine lands here in question were
acquired as community property of the conjugal partnership of
the appellee and his wife. Under the law of the Philippine
Islands, she was vested of a title equal to that of her husband.
Article 1407 of the Civil Code provides:
All the property of the spouses shall be deemed
partnership property in the absence of proof that it
belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Article
1395 provides:
"The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules of law
applicable to the contract of partnership in all matters in
which such rules do not conflict with the express provisions of
this chapter." Article 1414 provides that "the husband may
dispose by will of his half only of the property of the conjugal
partnership." Article 1426 provides that upon dissolution of
the conjugal partnership and after inventory and liquidation,
"the net remainder of the partnership property shall be divided
share and share alike between the husband and wife, or their
respective heirs." Under the provisions of the Civil Code and
the jurisprudence prevailing here, the wife, upon the
acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes immediately vested
with an interest and title therein equal to that of her husband,
subject to the power of management and disposition which the
law vests in the husband. Immediately upon her death, if there
are no obligations of the decedent, as is true in the present
case, her share in the conjugal property is transmitted to her
heirs by succession. (Articles 657, 659, 661, Civil Code;
cf. also Coronel vs. Ona, 33 Phil., 456, 469.)

It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the
Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible interest, equal to
that of her husband, in the Philippine lands covered by
certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from the date
of their acquisition to the date of her death. That appellee
himself believed that his wife was vested of such a title and
interest in manifest from the second of said certificates, No.
28336, dated May 14, 1927, introduced by him in evidence, in
which it is certified that "the spouses Allison D. Gibbs and
Eva Johnson Gibbs are the owners in fee simple of the conjugal
lands therein described."

The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands

aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance
and this transmission plainly falls within the language of
section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative
Code which levies a tax on inheritances. (Cf. Re Estate of
Majot, 199 N. Y., 29; 92 N. E., 402; 29 L. R. A. [N. S.], 780.)
It is unnecessary in this proceeding to determine the "order of
succession" or the "extent of the successional rights" (article
10, Civil Code, supra) which would be regulated by section 1386
of the Civil Code of California which was in effect at the time
of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.

The record does not show what the proper amount of the
inheritance tax in this case would be nor that the appellee
(petitioner below) in any way challenged the power of the
Government to levy an inheritance tax or the validity of the
statute under which the register of deeds refused to issue a
certificate of transfer reciting that the appellee is the
exclusive owner of the Philippine lands included in the three
certificates of title here involved.

The judgment of the court below of March 10, 1931, is reversed

with directions to dismiss the petition, without special
pronouncement as to the costs.

32 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974 Related to and involving basically the same main issue as the
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the foregoing petition, thirty-three (33) appeals from different
Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of orders of the same respondent court approving or otherwise
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner, sanctioning the acts of administration of the respondent Magno
vs. on behalf of the testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges.
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. THE FACTS
MAGNO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving
1307). TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES (Sp. a will executed on November 22, 1952 pertinently providing as
Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL follows:
BANK, administrator-appellant,
vs. FIRST: I direct that all my just debts and funeral
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN, expenses be first paid out of my estate.
BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO,
GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN,
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the
PEPITO IYULORES, ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA,
rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both
ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and
personal and real, wherever situated, or located,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, the last as Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No.
to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to
1307, appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-
have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during
appellee.
his natural lifetime.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin for Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank.
Manglapus Law Office, Antonio Law Office and Rizal R. Quimpo THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my
for private respondents and appellees Avelina A. Magno, etc., husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the
et al. right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate
during his lifetime, and he is hereby given the
BARREDO, J.:p right to make any changes in the physical
properties of said estate, by sale or any part
thereof which he may think best, and the purchase
Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
of any other or additional property as he may think
injunction; certiorari to "declare all acts of the respondent
best; to execute conveyances with or without
court in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc.
general or special warranty, conveying in fee
No. 1307 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo) subsequent
simple or for any other term or time, any property
to the order of December 14, 1957 as null and void for having
which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease
been issued without jurisdiction"; prohibition to enjoin the
any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other
respondent court from allowing, tolerating, sanctioning, or
minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass
abetting private respondent Avelina A. Magno to perform or do
the absolute fee simple title to the interest so
any acts of administration, such as those enumerated in the
conveyed in such property as he may elect to sell.
petition, and from exercising any authority or power as Regular
All rents, emoluments and income from said estate
Administratrix of above-named Testate Estate, by entertaining
shall belong to him, and he is further authorized
manifestations, motion and pleadings filed by her and acting on
to use any part of the principal of said estate as
them, and also to enjoin said court from allowing said private
he may need or desire. It is provided herein,
respondent to interfere, meddle or take part in any manner in
however, that he shall not sell or otherwise
the administration of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton
dispose of any of the improved property now owned
Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the same court and branch); with
by us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock,
prayer for preliminary injunction, which was issued by this
Texas, but he shall have the full right to lease,
Court on August 8, 1967 upon a bond of P5,000; the petition
manage and enjoy the same during his lifetime,
being particularly directed against the orders of the respondent
above provided. He shall have the right to
court of October 12, 1966 denying petitioner's motion of April
subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein. and
22, 1966 and its order of July 18, 1967 denying the motion for
may sell unimproved town lots.
reconsideration of said order.
33 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
 FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of
the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both
real and personal, wherever situated or located,
to be equally divided among my brothers and
sisters, share and share alike, namely:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy
Higdon, Saddie Rascoe, Era Roman and Nimroy
Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers
and/or sisters named in item Fourth, above, prior
to the death of my husband, Charles Newton Hodges,
then it is my will and bequest that the heirs of
such deceased brother or sister shall take jointly
the share which would have gone to such brother or
sister had she or he survived.
SIXTH: I nominate and appoint my said husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, to be executor of this, my
last will and testament, and direct that no bond
or other security be required of him as such
executor.
SEVENTH: It is my will and bequest that no action
be had in the probate court, in the administration
of my estate, other than that necessary to prove
and record this will and to return an inventory
and appraisement of my estate and list of claims.
(Pp. 2-4, Petition.)
This will was subsequently probated in aforementioned Special
Proceedings No. 1307 of respondent court on June 28, 1957, with
the widower Charles Newton Hodges being appointed as Executor,
pursuant to the provisions thereof.
Previously, on May 27, 1957, the said widower (hereafter to be
referred to as Hodges) had been appointed Special Administrator,
in which capacity he filed a motion on the same date as follows:
URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION TO ALLOW OR AUTHORIZE
PETITIONER TO CONTINUE THE BUSINESS IN WHICH HE
WAS ENGAGED AND TO PERFORM ACTS WHICH HE HAD BEEN
DOING WHILE DECEASED WAS LIVING
Come petitioner in the above-entitled special proceedings, thru
his undersigned attorneys, to the Hon. Court, most respectfully
states:
34 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
1. — That Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving her last
will and testament, a copy of which is attached to
the petition for probate of the same.
2. — That in said last will and testament herein
petitioner Charles Newton Hodges is directed to
have the right to manage, control use and enjoy
the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in the
same way, a provision was placed in paragraph two,
the following: "I give, devise and bequeath all of
the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, to
my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have
and (to) hold unto him, my said husband, during
his natural lifetime."
3. — That during the lifetime of Linnie Jane
Hodges, herein petitioner was engaged in the
business of buying and selling personal and real
properties, and do such acts which petitioner may
think best.
4. — That deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving
no descendants or ascendants, except brothers and
sisters and herein petitioner as executor
surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the
decedent.
5. — That the present motion is submitted in order
not to paralyze the business of petitioner and the
deceased, especially in the purchase and sale of
properties. That proper accounting will be had
also in all these transactions.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that,
petitioner C. N. Hodges (Charles Newton Hodges) be
allowed or authorized to continue the business in
which he was engaged and to perform acts which he
had been doing while deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
was living.
City of Iloilo, May 27, 1957. (Annex "D",
Petition.)
which the respondent court immediately granted in the following
order:
It appearing in the urgent ex-parte motion filed
by petitioner C. N. Hodges, that the business in
which said petitioner and the deceased were
 engaged will be paralyzed, unless and until
Executor is named and appointed by the Court,
said petitioner is allowed or authorized
continue the business in which he was engaged
to perform acts which he had been doing while
deceased was living.
SO ORDERED.
City of Iloilo May 27, 1957. (Annex "E", Petition.)
Under date of December 11, 1957, Hodges filed as such Executor
another motion thus:
MOTION TO APPROVE ALL SALES, CONVEYANCES, LEASES,
MORTGAGES THAT THE EXECUTOR HAD MADE FURTHER AND
SUBSEQUENT TRANSACTIONS WHICH THE EXECUTOR MAY DO
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAST WISH OF THE DECEASED
LINNIE JANE HODGES.
Comes the Executor in the above-entitled
proceedings, thru his undersigned attorney, to the
Hon. Court, most respectfully states:
1. — That according to the last will and testament
of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, the executor
as the surviving spouse and legatee named in the
will of the deceased; has the right to dispose of
all the properties left by the deceased, portion
of which is quoted as follows:
Second: I give, devise and bequeath all of the
rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both
personal and real, wherever situated, or located,
to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to
have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during
his natural lifetime.
Third: I desire, direct and provide that my
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the
right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate
during his lifetime, and he is hereby given the
right to make any changes in the physical
properties of said estate, by sale or any part
thereof which he may think best, and the purchase
of any other or additional property as he may think
best; to execute conveyances with or without
general or special warranty, conveying in fee
simple or for any other term or time, any property
35 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
the which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease
the any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other
to minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass
and the absolute fee simple title to the interest so
the conveyed in such property as he may elect to sell.
All rents, emoluments and income from said
estate shall belong to him, and he is further
authorized to use any part of the principal of
said estate as he may need or desire. ...
2. — That herein Executor, is not only part owner
of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the
successor to all the properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. That during the
lifetime of herein Executor, as Legatee has the
right to sell, convey, lease or dispose of the
properties in the Philippines. That inasmuch as
C.N. Hodges was and is engaged in the buy and sell
of real and personal properties, even before the
death of Linnie Jane Hodges, a motion to authorize
said C.N. Hodges was filed in Court, to allow him
to continue in the business of buy and sell, which
motion was favorably granted by the Honorable
Court.
3. — That since the death of Linnie Jane Hodges,
Mr. C.N. Hodges had been buying and selling real
and personal properties, in accordance with the
wishes of the late Linnie Jane Hodges.
4. — That the Register of Deeds for Iloilo, had
required of late the herein Executor to have all
the sales, leases, conveyances or mortgages made
by him, approved by the Hon. Court.
5. — That it is respectfully requested, all the
sales, conveyances leases and mortgages executed
by the Executor, be approved by the Hon. Court.
and subsequent sales conveyances, leases and
mortgages in compliances with the wishes of the
late Linnie Jane Hodges, and within the scope of
the terms of the last will and testament, also be
approved;
6. — That the Executor is under obligation to
submit his yearly accounts, and the properties
conveyed can also be accounted for, especially the
amounts received.
 WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that,
all the sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages
executed by the Executor, be approved by the Hon.
Court, and also the subsequent sales, conveyances,
leases, and mortgages in consonance with the
wishes of the deceased contained in her last will
and testament, be with authorization and approval
of the Hon. Court.
City of Iloilo, December 11, 1967.
(Annex "G", Petition.)
which again was promptly granted by the respondent court on
December 14, 1957 as follows:
O R D E R
As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the
Executor for the reasons stated in his motion dated
December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well
taken all the sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of all properties left by the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor
Charles N. Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said
Executor is further authorized to execute
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of the properties left by the said
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the
wishes conveyed in the last will and testament of
the latter.
So ordered.
Iloilo City. December 14, 1957.
(Annex "H", Petition.)
On April 14, 1959, in submitting his first statement of account
as Executor for approval, Hodges alleged:
Pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court,
herein executor of the deceased, renders the
following account of his administration covering
the period from January 1, 1958 to December 31,
1958, which account may be found in detail in the
individual income tax return filed for the estate
of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, to wit:
36 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
That a certified public accountant has examined
the statement of net worth of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges, the assets and liabilities, as well
as the income and expenses, copy of which is hereto
attached and made integral part of this statement
of account as Annex "A".
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is most respectfully
prayed that, the statement of net worth of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets and
liabilities, income and expenses as shown in the
individual income tax return for the estate of the
deceased and marked as Annex "A", be approved by
the Honorable Court, as substantial compliance
with the requirements of the Rules of Court.
That no person interested in the Philippines of
the time and place of examining the herein accounts
be given notice, as herein executor is the only
devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance
with the last will and testament already probated
by the Honorable court.
City of Iloilo April 14, 1959.
(Annex "I", Petition.)
The respondent court approved this statement of account on April
21, 1959 in its order worded thus:
Upon petition of Atty. Gellada, in representation
of the Executor, the statement of net worth of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, assets and
liabilities, income and expenses as shown in the
individual income tax return for the estate of the
deceased and marked as Annex "A" is approved.
SO ORDERED.
City of Iloilo April 21, 1959.
(Annex "J", Petition.)
His accounts for the periods January 1, 1959 to December 31,
1959 and January 1, 1960 to December 31, 1960 were submitted
likewise accompanied by allegations identical mutatis
mutandis to those of April 14, 1959, quoted above; and the
respective orders approving the same, dated July 30, 1960 and
May 2, 1961, were substantially identical to the above-quoted
order of April 21, 1959. In connection with the statements of
account just mentioned, the following assertions related thereto
made by respondent-appellee Magno in her brief do not appear
from all indications discernible in the record to be disputable:
Under date of April 14, 1959, C.N. Hodges filed
his first "Account by the Executor" of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of
Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1958 annexed
thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the combined
conjugal estate earned a net income of
P328,402.62, divided evenly between him and the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he
filed an "individual income tax return" for
calendar year 1958 on the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as
having earned income of P164,201.31, exactly one-
half of the net income of his combined personal
assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Under date of July 21, 1960, C.N. Hodges filed his
second "Annual Statement of Account by the
Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In
the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and
the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December
31, 1959 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported
that the combined conjugal estate earned a net
income of P270,623.32, divided evenly between him
and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to
this, he filed an "individual income tax return"
for calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate
as having earned income of P135,311.66, exactly
one-half of the net income of his combined personal
assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (pp. 91-92. Appellee's Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Under date of April 20, 1961, C.N. Hodges filed
his third "Annual Statement of Account by the
Executor for the Year 1960" of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Net Worth of Mr.
C.N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges"
as of December 31, 1960 annexed thereto, C.N.
37 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate
earned a net income of P314,857.94, divided evenly
between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income
tax return" for calendar year 1960 on the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the
said estate as having earned income of
P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net income of
his combined personal assets and that of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges. (Pp. 92-93, Appellee's
Brief.)
Likewise the following:
In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed,
he listed the seven brothers and sisters of Linnie
Jane as her "heirs" (see p. 2, Green ROA). The
order of the court admitting the will to probate
unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon
(see p. 14, Green ROA). Immediately, C.N. Hodges
filed a verified motion to have Roy Higdon's name
included as an heir, stating that he wanted to
straighten the records "in order the heirs of
deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they
were omitted, and that they were really and are
interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges. .
As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns
for the estate he was administering under American
law. He did file such as estate tax return on
August 8, 1958. In Schedule "M" of such return, he
answered "Yes" to the question as to whether he
was contemplating "renouncing the will". On the
question as to what property interests passed to
him as the surviving spouse, he answered:
"None, except for purposes of
administering the Estate, paying
debts, taxes and other legal charges.
It is the intention of the surviving
husband of deceased to distribute the
remaining property and interests of
the deceased in their Community
estate to the devisees and legatees
named in the will when the debts,
liabilities, taxes and expenses of
administration are finally
determined and paid."
 Again, on August 9, 1962, barely four months before
his death, he executed an "affidavit" wherein he
ratified and confirmed all that he stated in
Schedule "M" of his estate tax returns as to his
having renounced what was given him by his wife's
will.1
As appointed executor, C.N. Hodges filed an
"Inventory" dated May 12, 1958. He listed all the
assets of his conjugal partnership with Linnie
Jane Hodges on a separate balance sheet and then
stated expressly that her estate which has come
into his possession as executor was "one-half of
all the items" listed in said balance sheet. (Pp.
89-90, Appellee's Brief.)
Parenthetically, it may be stated, at this juncture, that We
are taking pains to quote wholly or at least, extensively from
some of the pleadings and orders whenever We feel that it is
necessary to do so for a more comprehensive and clearer view of
the important and decisive issues raised by the parties and a
more accurate appraisal of their respective positions in regard
thereto.
The records of these cases do not show that anything else was
done in the above-mentioned Special Proceedings No. 1307 until
December 26, 1962, when on account of the death of Hodges the
day before, the same lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who had been
previously acting as counsel for Hodges in his capacity as
Executor of his wife's estate, and as such had filed the
aforequoted motions and manifestations, filed the following:
URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX
COMES the undersigned attorney for the Executor in
the above-entitled proceedings, to the Honorable
Court, most respectfully states:
1. That in accordance with the Last Will and
Testament of Linnie Jane Hodges (deceased), her
husband, Charles Newton Hodges was to act as
Executor, and in fact, in an order issued by this
Hon. Court dated June 28, 1957, the said Charles
Newton Hodges was appointed Executor and had
performed the duties as such.
2. That last December 22, 1962, the said Charles
Newton Hodges was stricken ill, and brought to the
38 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
Iloilo Mission Hospital for treatment, but
unfortunately, he died on December 25, 1962, as
shown by a copy of the death certificate hereto
attached and marked as Annex "A".
3. That in accordance with the provisions of the
last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges,
whatever real and personal properties that may
remain at the death of her husband Charles Newton
Hodges, the said properties shall be equally
divided among their heirs. That there are real and
personal properties left by Charles Newton Hodges,
which need to be administered and taken care of.
4. That the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges,
as well as that of Charles Newton Hodges, have not
as yet been determined or ascertained, and there
is necessity for the appointment of a general
administrator to liquidate and distribute the
residue of the estate to the heirs and legatees of
both spouses. That in accordance with the
provisions of Section 2 of Rule 75 of the Rules of
Court, the conjugal partnership of Linnie Jane
Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges shall be
liquidated in the testate proceedings of the wife.
5. That the undersigned counsel, has perfect
personal knowledge of the existence of the last
will and testament of Charles Newton Hodges, with
similar provisions as that contained in the last
will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges. However,
said last will and testament of Charles Newton
Hodges is kept inside the vault or iron safe in
his office, and will be presented in due time
before this honorable Court.
6. That in the meantime, it is imperative and
indispensable that, an Administratrix be appointed
for the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and a Special
Administratrix for the estate of Charles Newton
Hodges, to perform the duties required by law, to
administer, collect, and take charge of the goods,
chattels, rights, credits, and estate of both
spouses, Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane
Hodges, as provided for in Section 1 and 2, Rule
81 of the Rules of Court.
7. That there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration, because the
last will and testament of deceased, Charles
 Newton Hodges, is still kept in his safe or vault,
and in the meantime, unless an administratrix
(and,) at the same time, a Special Administratrix
is appointed, the estate of both spouses are in
danger of being lost, damaged or go to waste.
8. That the most trusted employee of both spouses
Linnie Jane Hodges and C.N. Hodges, who had been
employed for around thirty (30) years, in the
person of Miss Avelina Magno, (should) be
appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and at the same time Special
Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton
Hodges. That the said Miss Avelina Magno is of
legal age, a resident of the Philippines, the most
fit, competent, trustworthy and well-qualified
person to serve the duties of Administratrix and
Special Administratrix and is willing to act as
such.
9. That Miss Avelina Magno is also willing to file
bond in such sum which the Hon. Court believes
reasonable.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is
most respectfully prayed that, Miss AVELINA A.
MAGNO be immediately appointed Administratrix of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special
Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton
Hodges, with powers and duties provided for by
law. That the Honorable Court fix the reasonable
bond of P1,000.00 to be filed by Avelina A. Magno.
(Annex "O", Petition.)
which respondent court readily acted on in its order of even
date thus: .
For the reasons alleged in the Urgent Ex-
parte Motion filed by counsel for the Executor
dated December 25, 1962, which the Court finds
meritorious, Miss AVELINA A. MAGNO, is hereby
appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the
estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the latter
case, because the last will of said Charles Newton
Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and
that the real and personal properties of both
spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless
a Special Administratrix is appointed.
39 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
Miss Avelina A. Magno is required to file bond in
the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), and
after having done so, let letters of
Administration be issued to her." (Annex "P",
Petition.)
On December 29, 1962, however, upon urgent ex-
parte petition of respondent Magno herself, thru
Atty. Gellada, Harold, R. Davies, "a
representative of the heirs of deceased Charles
Newton Hodges (who had) arrived from the United
States of America to help in the administration of
the estate of said deceased" was appointed as Co-
Special Administrator of the estate of Hodges,
(pp. 29-33, Yellow - Record on Appeal) only to be
replaced as such co-special administrator on
January 22, 1963 by Joe Hodges, who, according to
the motion of the same attorney, is "the nephew of
the deceased (who had) arrived from the United
States with instructions from the other heirs of
the deceased to administer the properties or
estate of Charles Newton Hodges in the
Philippines, (Pp. 47-50, id.)
Meanwhile, under date of January 9, 1963, the same Atty. Gellada
filed in Special Proceedings 1672 a petition for the probate of
the will of Hodges,2 with a prayer for the issuance of letters
of administration to the same Joe Hodges, albeit the motion was
followed on February 22, 1963 by a separate one asking that
Atty. Fernando Mirasol be appointed as his co-administrator. On
the same date this latter motion was filed, the court issued
the corresponding order of probate and letters of administration
to Joe Hodges and Atty. Mirasol, as prayed for.
At this juncture, again, it may also be explained that just as,
in her will, Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her whole estate to her
husband "to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during
his natural lifetime", she, at the same time or in like manner,
provided that "at the death of my said husband — I give devise
and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate,
both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be
equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share
alike —". Accordingly, it became incumbent upon Hodges, as
executor of his wife's will, to duly liquidate the conjugal
partnership, half of which constituted her estate, in order that
upon the eventuality of his death, "the rest, residue and
remainder" thereof could be determined and correspondingly
distributed or divided among her brothers and sisters. And it
was precisely because no such liquidation was done, furthermore,
there is the issue of whether the distribution of her estate
should be governed by the laws of the Philippines or those of
Texas, of which State she was a national, and, what is more, as
already stated, Hodges made official and sworn statements or
manifestations indicating that as far as he was concerned no
"property interests passed to him as surviving spouse — "except
for purposes of administering the estate, paying debts, taxes
and other legal charges" and it was the intention of the
surviving husband of the deceased to distribute the remaining
property and interests of the deceased in their Community Estate
to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts,
liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally
determined and paid", that the incidents and controversies now
before Us for resolution arose. As may be observed, the
situation that ensued upon the death of Hodges became rather
unusual and so, quite understandably, the lower court's
actuations presently under review are apparently wanting in
consistency and seemingly lack proper orientation.
Thus, We cannot discern clearly from the record before Us the
precise perspective from which the trial court proceeded in
issuing its questioned orders. And, regretably, none of the
lengthy briefs submitted by the parties is of valuable
assistance in clearing up the matter.
To begin with, We gather from the two records on appeal filed
by petitioner, as appellant in the appealed cases, one with
green cover and the other with a yellow cover, that at the
outset, a sort of modus operandi had been agreed upon by the
parties under which the respective administrators of the two
estates were supposed to act conjointly, but since no copy of
the said agreement can be found in the record before Us, We have
no way of knowing when exactly such agreement was entered into
and under what specific terms. And while reference is made to
said modus operandi in the order of September 11, 1964, on pages
205-206 of the Green Record on Appeal, reading thus:
The present incident is to hear the side of
administratrix, Miss Avelina A. Magno, in answer
to the charges contained in the motion filed by
Atty. Cesar Tirol on September 3, 1964. In answer
to the said charges, Miss Avelina A. Magno, through
her counsel, Atty. Rizal Quimpo, filed a written
manifestation.
After reading the manifestation here of Atty.
Quimpo, for and in behalf of the administratrix,
Miss Avelina A. Magno, the Court finds that
everything that happened before September 3, 1964,
which was resolved on September 8, 1964, to the
satisfaction of parties, was simply due to a
misunderstanding between the representative of the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank and Miss
40 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
Magno and in order to restore the harmonious
relations between the parties, the Court ordered
the parties to remain in status quo as to their
modus operandi before September 1, 1964, until
after the Court can have a meeting with all the
parties and their counsels on October 3, as
formerly agreed upon between counsels, Attys.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta, Attys. Tirol and Tirol
and Atty. Rizal Quimpo.
In the meantime, the prayers of Atty. Quimpo as
stated in his manifestation shall not be resolved
by this Court until October 3, 1964.
SO ORDERED.
there is nothing in the record indicating whatever happened to
it afterwards, except that again, reference thereto was made in
the appealed order of October 27, 1965, on pages 292-295 of the
Green Record on Appeal, as follows:
On record is an urgent motion to allow PCIB to
open all doors and locks in the Hodges Office at
206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City, to take
immediate and exclusive possession thereof and to
place its own locks and keys for security purposes
of the PCIB dated October 27, 1965 thru Atty. Cesar
Tirol. It is alleged in said urgent motion that
Administratrix Magno of the testate estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges refused to open the Hodges
Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City where
PCIB holds office and therefore PCIB is suffering
great moral damage and prejudice as a result of
said act. It is prayed that an order be issued
authorizing it (PCIB) to open all doors and locks
in the said office, to take immediate and exclusive
possession thereof and place thereon its own locks
and keys for security purposes; instructing the
clerk of court or any available deputy to witness
and supervise the opening of all doors and locks
and taking possession of the PCIB.
A written opposition has been filed by
Administratrix Magno of even date (Oct. 27) thru
counsel Rizal Quimpo stating therein that she was
compelled to close the office for the reason that
the PCIB failed to comply with the order of this
Court signed by Judge Anacleto I. Bellosillo dated
September 11, 1964 to the effect that both estates
 should remain in status quo to their modus
operandi as of September 1, 1964.
To arrive at a happy solution of the dispute and
in order not to interrupt the operation of the
office of both estates, the Court aside from the
reasons stated in the urgent motion and opposition
heard the verbal arguments of Atty. Cesar Tirol
for the PCIB and Atty. Rizal Quimpo for
Administratix Magno.
After due consideration, the Court hereby orders
Magno to open all doors and locks in the Hodges
Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City in
the presence of the PCIB or its duly authorized
representative and deputy clerk of court Albis of
this branch not later than 7:30 tomorrow morning
October 28, 1965 in order that the office of said
estates could operate for business.
Pursuant to the order of this Court thru Judge
Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964, it is hereby
ordered:
(a) That all cash collections should be deposited
in the joint account of the estates of Linnie Jane
Hodges and estates of C.N. Hodges;
(b) That whatever cash collections that had been
deposited in the account of either of the estates
should be withdrawn and since then deposited in
the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and the estate of C.N. Hodges;
(c) That the PCIB should countersign the check in
the amount of P250 in favor of Administratrix
Avelina A. Magno as her compensation as
administratrix of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate
chargeable to the testate estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges only;
(d) That Administratrix Magno is hereby directed
to allow the PCIB to inspect whatever records,
documents and papers she may have in her possession
in the same manner that Administrator PCIB is also
directed to allow Administratrix Magno to inspect
whatever records, documents and papers it may have
in its possession;
41 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
(e) That the accountant of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges shall have access to all records of
the transactions of both estates for the
protection of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
and in like manner the accountant or any authorized
representative of the estate of C.N. Hodges shall
have access to the records of transactions of the
Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the protection of
the estate of C.N. Hodges.
Once the estates' office shall have been opened by
Administratrix Magno in the presence of the PCIB
or its duly authorized representative and deputy
clerk Albis or his duly authorized representative,
both estates or any of the estates should not close
it without previous consent and authority from
this court.
SO ORDERED.
As may be noted, in this order, the respondent court required
that all collections from the properties in the name of Hodges
should be deposited in a joint account of the two estates, which
indicates that seemingly the so-called modus operandi was no
longer operative, but again there is nothing to show when this
situation started.
Likewise, in paragraph 3 of the petitioner's motion of September
14, 1964, on pages 188-201 of the Green Record on Appeal, (also
found on pp. 83-91 of the Yellow Record on Appeal) it is alleged
that:
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs
of C.N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol
acting as the two co-administrators of the estate
of C.N. Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as the
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and Messrs. William Brown and Ardell Young acting
for all of the Higdon family who claim to be the
sole beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and various legal counsel representing the
aforementioned parties entered into an amicable
agreement, which was approved by this Honorable
Court, wherein the parties thereto agreed that
certain sums of money were to be paid in settlement
of different claims against the two estates and
that the assets (to the extent they existed) of
both estates would be administered jointly by the
PCIB as administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges
and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of the
 estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, to
the aforesaid October 5, 1963 Motion, namely, the
PCIB's claim to exclusive possession and ownership
of one hundred percent (100%) (or, in the
alternative, seventy-five percent (75%) of all
assets owned by C.N. Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges
situated in the Philippines. On February 1, 1964
(pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672) this
Honorable Court amended its order of January 24,
1964 but in no way changed its recognition of the
afore-described basic demand by the PCIB as
administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges to one
hundred percent (100%) of the assets claimed by
both estates.
but no copy of the mentioned agreement of joint administration
of the two estates exists in the record, and so, We are not
informed as to what exactly are the terms of the same which
could be relevant in the resolution of the issues herein.
On the other hand, the appealed order of November 3, 1965, on
pages 313-320 of the Green Record on Appeal, authorized payment
by respondent Magno of, inter alia, her own fees as
administratrix, the attorney's fees of her lawyers, etc., as
follows:
Administratrix Magno thru Attys. Raul S. Manglapus
and Rizal. R. Quimpo filed a Manifestation and
Urgent Motion dated June 10, 1964 asking for the
approval of the Agreement dated June 6, 1964 which
Agreement is for the purpose of retaining their
services to protect and defend the interest of the
said Administratrix in these proceedings and the
same has been signed by and bears the express
conformity of the attorney-in-fact of the late
Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. James L. Sullivan. It is
further prayed that the Administratrix of the
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges be directed
to pay the retailers fee of said lawyers, said
fees made chargeable as expenses for the
administration of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
(pp. 1641-1642, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
An opposition has been filed by the Administrator
PCIB thru Atty. Herminio Ozaeta dated July 11,
1964, on the ground that payment of the retainers
fee of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo as prayed for
in said Manifestation and Urgent Motion is
prejudicial to the 100% claim of the estate of C.
N. Hodges; employment of Attys. Manglapus and
Quimpo is premature and/or unnecessary; Attys.
42 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
Quimpo and Manglapus are representing conflicting
interests and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
should be closed and terminated (pp. 1679-1684,
Vol, V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Leon P. Gellada filed a memorandum dated
July 28, 1964 asking that the Manifestation and
Urgent Motion filed by Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo
be denied because no evidence has been presented
in support thereof. Atty. Manglapus filed a reply
to the opposition of counsel for the Administrator
of the C. N. Hodges estate wherein it is claimed
that expenses of administration include reasonable
counsel or attorney's fees for services to the
executor or administrator. As a matter of fact the
fee agreement dated February 27, 1964 between the
PCIB and the law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta as
its counsel (Pp. 1280-1284, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which
stipulates the fees for said law firm has been
approved by the Court in its order dated March 31,
1964. If payment of the fees of the lawyers for
the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges will cause prejudice to the estate of C. N.
Hodges, in like manner the very agreement which
provides for the payment of attorney's fees to the
counsel for the PCIB will also be prejudicial to
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1801-1814,
Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a rejoinder dated
August 10, 1964 to the reply to the opposition to
the Manifestation and Urgent Motion alleging
principally that the estates of Linnie Jane Hodges
and C. N. Hodges are not similarly situated for
the reason that C. N. Hodges is an heir of Linnie
Jane Hodges whereas the latter is not an heir of
the former for the reason that Linnie Jane Hodges
predeceased C. N. Hodges (pp. 1839-1848, Vol. V,
Sp. 1307); that Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo
formally entered their appearance in behalf of
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
on June 10, 1964 (pp. 1639-1640, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Manglapus filed a manifestation dated
December 18, 1964 stating therein that Judge
Bellosillo issued an order requiring the parties
to submit memorandum in support of their
respective contentions. It is prayed in this
manifestation that the Manifestation and Urgent
Motion dated June 10, 1964 be resolved (pp. 6435-
6439, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307).
 Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a
counter- manifestation dated January 5, 1965
asking that after the consideration by the court
of all allegations and arguments and pleadings of
the PCIB in connection therewith (1) said
manifestation and urgent motion of Attys.
Manglapus and Quimpo be denied (pp. 6442-6453,
Vol. VII, Sp. 1307). Judge Querubin issued an order
dated January 4, 1965 approving the motion dated
June 10, 1964 of the attorneys for the
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and agreement annexed to said motion. The said
order further states: "The Administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is authorized to issue
or sign whatever check or checks may be necessary
for the above purpose and the administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges is ordered to countersign
the same. (pp. 6518-6523, Vol VII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a
manifestation and motion dated January 13, 1965
asking that the order of January 4, 1965 which was
issued by Judge Querubin be declared null and void
and to enjoin the clerk of court and the
administratrix and administrator in these special
proceedings from all proceedings and action to
enforce or comply with the provision of the
aforesaid order of January 4, 1965. In support of
said manifestation and motion it is alleged that
the order of January 4, 1965 is null and void
because the said order was never delivered to the
deputy clerk Albis of Branch V (the sala of Judge
Querubin) and the alleged order was found in the
drawer of the late Judge Querubin in his office
when said drawer was opened on January 13, 1965
after the death of Judge Querubin by Perfecto
Querubin, Jr., the son of the judge and in the
presence of Executive Judge Rovira and deputy
clerk Albis (Sec. 1, Rule 36, New Civil Code) (Pp.
6600-6606, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a
motion for reconsideration dated February 23, 1965
asking that the order dated January 4, 1964 be
reversed on the ground that:
1. Attorneys retained must render services to the
estate not to the personal heir;
2. If services are rendered to both, fees should
be pro-rated between them;
43 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
3. Attorneys retained should not represent
conflicting interests; to the prejudice of the
other heirs not represented by said attorneys;
4. Fees must be commensurate to the actual services
rendered to the estate;
5. There must be assets in the estate to pay for
said fees (Pp. 6625-6636, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Quimpo for Administratrix Magno of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges filed a motion to
submit dated July 15, 1965 asking that the
manifestation and urgent motion dated June 10,
1964 filed by Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo and other
incidents directly appertaining thereto be
considered submitted for consideration and
approval (pp. 6759-6765, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Considering the arguments and reasons in support
to the pleadings of both the Administratrix and
the PCIB, and of Atty. Gellada, hereinbefore
mentioned, the Court believes that the order of
January 4, 1965 is null and void for the reason
that the said order has not been filed with deputy
clerk Albis of this court (Branch V) during the
lifetime of Judge Querubin who signed the said
order. However, the said manifestation and urgent
motion dated June 10, 1964 is being treated and
considered in this instant order. It is worthy to
note that in the motion dated January 24, 1964
(Pp. 1149- 1163, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which has been
filed by Atty. Gellada and his associates and Atty.
Gibbs and other lawyers in addition to the
stipulated fees for actual services rendered.
However, the fee agreement dated February 27,
1964, between the Administrator of the estate of
C. N. Hodges and Atty. Gibbs which provides for
retainer fee of P4,000 monthly in addition to
specific fees for actual appearances,
reimbursement for expenditures and contingent fees
has also been approved by the Court and said
lawyers have already been paid. (pp. 1273-1279,
Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307 pp. 1372-1373, Vol. V, Sp.
Proc. 1307).
WHEREFORE, the order dated January 4, 1965 is
hereby declared null and void.
 The manifestation and motion dated June 10, 1964
which was filed by the attorneys for the
administratrix of the testate estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges is granted and the agreement annexed
thereto is hereby approved.
The administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges is hereby directed to be needed to implement
the approval of the agreement annexed to the motion
and the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges
is directed to countersign the said check or checks
as the case may be.
SO ORDERED.
thereby implying somehow that the court assumed the existence
of independent but simultaneous administrations.
Be that as it may, again, it appears that on August 6, 1965,
the court, acting on a motion of petitioner for the approval of
deeds of sale executed by it as administrator of the estate of
Hodges, issued the following order, also on appeal herein:
Acting upon the motion for approval of deeds of
sale for registered land of the PCIB,
Administrator of the Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges
in Sp. Proc. 1672 (Vol. VII, pp. 2244-2245), dated
July 16, 1965, filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol in
representation of the law firms of Ozaeta, Gibbs
and Ozaeta and Tirol and Tirol and the opposition
thereto of Atty. Rizal R. Quimpo (Vol. VIII, pp.
6811-6813) dated July 22, 1965 and considering the
allegations and reasons therein stated, the court
believes that the deeds of sale should be signed
jointly by the PCIB, Administrator of the Testate
Estate of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno,
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and to this effect the PCIB should
take the necessary steps so that Administratrix
Avelina A. Magno could sign the deeds of sale.
SO ORDERED. (p. 248, Green Record on Appeal.)
Notably this order required that even the deeds executed by
petitioner, as administrator of the Estate of Hodges, involving
properties registered in his name, should be co-signed by
respondent Magno.3 And this was not an isolated instance.
In her brief as appellee, respondent Magno states:
44 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
After the lower court had authorized appellee
Avelina A. Magno to execute final deeds of sale
pursuant to contracts to sell executed by C. N.
Hodges on February 20, 1963 (pp. 45-46, Green ROA),
motions for the approval of final deeds of sale
(signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and the
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, first
Joe Hodges, then Atty. Fernando Mirasol and later
the appellant) were approved by the lower court
upon petition of appellee Magno's counsel, Atty.
Leon P. Gellada, on the basis of section 8 of Rule
89 of the Revised Rules of Court. Subsequently,
the appellant, after it had taken over the bulk of
the assets of the two estates, started presenting
these motions itself. The first such attempt was
a "Motion for Approval of Deeds of Sale for
Registered Land and Cancellations of Mortgages"
dated July 21, 1964 filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol,
counsel for the appellant, thereto annexing two
(2) final deeds of sale and two (2) cancellations
of mortgages signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno
and D. R. Paulino, Assistant Vice-President and
Manager of the appellant (CFI Record, Sp. Proc.
No. 1307, Vol. V, pp. 1694-1701). This motion was
approved by the lower court on July 27, 1964. It
was followed by another motion dated August 4,
1964 for the approval of one final deed of sale
again signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and D.
R. Paulino (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307. Vol.
V, pp. 1825-1828), which was again approved by the
lower court on August 7, 1964. The gates having
been opened, a flood ensued: the appellant
subsequently filed similar motions for the
approval of a multitude of deeds of sales and
cancellations of mortgages signed by both the
appellee Avelina A. Magno and the appellant.
A random check of the records of Special Proceeding
No. 1307 alone will show Atty. Cesar T. Tirol as
having presented for court approval deeds of sale
of real properties signed by both appellee Avelina
A. Magno and D. R. Paulino in the following
numbers: (a) motion dated September 21, 1964 — 6
deeds of sale; (b) motion dated November 4, 1964
— 1 deed of sale; (c) motion dated December 1,
1964 — 4 deeds of sale; (d) motion dated February
3, 1965 — 8 deeds of sale; (f) motion dated May 7,
1965 — 9 deeds of sale. In view of the very
extensive landholdings of the Hodges spouses and
the many motions filed concerning deeds of sale of
real properties executed by C. N. Hodges the lower
court has had to constitute special separate
 expedientes in Special Proceedings Nos. 1307 and
1672 to include mere motions for the approval of
deeds of sale of the conjugal properties of the
Hodges spouses.
As an example, from among the very many, under
date of February 3, 1965, Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, as
counsel for the appellant, filed "Motion for
Approval of Deeds of Sale for Registered Land and
Cancellations of Mortgages" (CFI Record, Sp. Proc.
No. 1307, Vol. VIII, pp. 6570-6596) the
allegations of which read:
"1. In his lifetime, the late C. N. Hodges executed
"Contracts to Sell" real property, and the
prospective buyers under said contracts have
already paid the price and complied with the terms
and conditions thereof;
"2. In the course of administration of both
estates, mortgage debtors have already paid their
debts secured by chattel mortgages in favor of the
late C. N. Hodges, and are now entitled to release
therefrom;
"3. There are attached hereto documents executed
jointly by the Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No.
1307 and the Administrator in Sp. Proc. No. 1672,
consisting of deeds of sale in favor —
Fernando Cano, Bacolod City, Occ.
Negros
Fe Magbanua, Iloilo City
Policarpio M. Pareno, La Paz, Iloilo
City
Rosario T. Libre, Jaro, Iloilo City
Federico B. Torres, Iloilo City
Reynaldo T. Lataquin, La Paz, Iloilo
City
Anatolio T. Viray, Iloilo City
Benjamin Rolando, Jaro, Iloilo City
and cancellations of mortgages in favor of —
Pablo Manzano, Oton, Iloilo
Ricardo M. Diana, Dao, San Jose,
Antique
Simplicio Tingson, Iloilo City
Amado Magbanua, Pototan, Iloilo
45 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
Roselia M. Baes, Bolo, Roxas City
William Bayani, Rizal Estanzuela,
Iloilo City
Elpidio Villarete, Molo, Iloilo City
Norma T. Ruiz, Jaro, Iloilo City
"4. That the approval of the
aforesaid documents will not reduce
the assets of the estates so as to
prevent any creditor from receiving
his full debt or diminish his
dividend."
And the prayer of this motion is indeed very
revealing:
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, under
Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, this
honorable court approve the aforesaid deeds of
sale and cancellations of mortgages." (Pp. 113-
117, Appellee's Brief.)
None of these assertions is denied in Petitioner's reply brief.
Further indicating lack of concrete perspective or orientation
on the part of the respondent court and its hesitancy to clear
up matters promptly, in its other appealed order of November
23, 1965, on pages 334-335 of the Green Record on Appeal, said
respondent court allowed the movant Ricardo Salas, President of
appellee Western Institute of Technology (successor of Panay
Educational Institutions, Inc.), one of the parties with whom
Hodges had contracts that are in question in the appeals herein,
to pay petitioner, as Administrator of the estate of Hodges
and/or respondent Magno, as Administrator of the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, thus:
Considering that in both cases there is as yet no
judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of
properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto, the
Court believes that payment to both the
administrator of the testate estate of C. N. Hodges
and the administratrix of the testate estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges or to either one of the two
estates is proper and legal.
WHEREFORE, movant Ricardo T. Salas can pay to both
estates or either of them.
SO ORDERED.
 (Pp. 334-335, Green Record on Appeal.)
On the other hand, as stated earlier, there were instances when
respondent Magno was given authority to act alone. For instance,
in the other appealed order of December 19, 1964, on page 221
of the Green Record on Appeal, the respondent court approved
payments made by her of overtime pay to some employees of the
court who had helped in gathering and preparing copies of parts
of the records in both estates as follows:
Considering that the expenses subject of the
motion to approve payment of overtime pay dated
December 10, 1964, are reasonable and are believed
by this Court to be a proper charge of
administration chargeable to the testate estate of
the late Linnie Jane Hodges, the said expenses are
hereby APPROVED and to be charged against the
testate estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges. The
administrator of the testate estate of the late
Charles Newton Hodges is hereby ordered to
countersign the check or checks necessary to pay
the said overtime pay as shown by the bills marked
Annex "A", "B" and "C" of the motion.
SO ORDERED.
(Pp. 221-222, Green Record on Appeal.)
Likewise, the respondent court approved deeds of sale executed
by respondent Magno alone, as Administratrix of the estate of
Mrs. Hodges, covering properties in the name of Hodges, pursuant
to "contracts to sell" executed by Hodges, irrespective of
whether they were executed by him before or after the death of
his wife. The orders of this nature which are also on appeal
herein are the following:
1. Order of March 30, 1966, on p. 137 of the Green Record on
Appeal, approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno
in favor of appellee Lorenzo Carles on February 24, 1966,
pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on June 17,
1958, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner
claims was cancelled by it for failure of Carles to pay the
installments due on January 7, 1965.
2. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 139-140, id., approving the
deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee
Salvador Guzman on February 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to
sell" signed by Hodges on September 13, 1960, after the death
of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it cancelled on
46 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
March 3, 1965 in view of failure of said appellee to pay the
installments on time.
3. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 167-168, id., approving the
deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee
Purificacion Coronado on March 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract
to sell" signed by Hodges on August 14, 1961, after the death
of his wife.
4. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 168-169, id., approving the
deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee
Florenia Barrido on March 28, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to
sell" signed by Hodges on February 21, 1958, after the death of
his wife.
5. Order of June 7, 1966, on pp. 184-185, id., approving the
deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee
Belcezar Causing on May 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to
sell" signed by Hodges on February 10, 1959, after the death of
his wife.
6. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 211-212, id., approving the
deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee
Artheo Thomas Jamir on June 3, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to
sell" signed by Hodges on May 26, 1961, after the death of his
wife.
7. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 212-213, id., approving the
deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees
Graciano Lucero and Melquiades Batisanan on June 6 and June 3,
1966, respectively, pursuant to "contracts to sell" signed by
Hodges on June 9, 1959 and November 27, 1961, respectively,
after the death of his wife.
8. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., approving
the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellees Espiridion Partisala, Winifredo Espada and Rosario
Alingasa on September 6, 1966, August 17, 1966 and August 3,
1966, respectively, pursuant to "contracts to sell" signed by
Hodges on April 20, 1960, April 18, 1960 and August 25, 1958,
respectively, that is, after the death of his wife.
9. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 137-138, id., approving the
deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee
Alfredo Catedral on March 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to
sell" signed by Hodges on May 29, 1954, before the death of his
wife, which contract petitioner claims it had cancelled on
February 16, 1966 for failure of appellee Catedral to pay the
installments due on time.
10. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 138-139, id., approving the counsel for the co-administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P.
deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Mirasol, the following self-explanatory motion was filed:
Jose Pablico on March 7, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell"
signed by Hodges on March 7, 1950, after the death of his wife, URGENT MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND
which contract petitioner claims it had cancelled on June 29, DELIVERY TO ADMINISTRATION OF THE
1960, for failure of appellee Pablico to pay the installments ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF ALL OF THE
due on time. ASSETS OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES
11. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., insofar as AND C N. HODGES EXISTING AS OF MAY
it approved the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in 23, 1957 PLUS ALL THE RENTS,
favor of appellee Pepito Iyulores on September 6, 1966, pursuant EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME THEREFROM.
to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 5, 1951,
before the death of his wife. COMES NOW the co-administrator of the estate of C.
N. Hodges, Joe Hodges, through his undersigned
12. Order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, id., approving attorneys in the above-entitled proceedings, and
three deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno, one in favor to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges:
of appellees Santiago Pacaonsis and two in favor of appellee
Adelfa Premaylon on December 5, 1966 and November 3, 1966, (1) On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in
respectively, pursuant to separate "promises to sell" signed Iloilo City.
respectively by Hodges on May 26, 1955 and January 30, 1954,
before the death of his wife, and October 31, 1959, after her
death. (2) On June 28, 1957 this Honorable Court admitted
to probate the Last Will and Testament of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed November 22,
In like manner, there were also instances when respondent court 1952 and appointed C. N. Hodges as Executor of the
approved deeds of sale executed by petitioner alone and without estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 24-25, Rec. Sp.
the concurrence of respondent Magno, and such approvals have Proc. 1307).
not been the subject of any appeal. No less than petitioner
points this out on pages 149-150 of its brief as appellant thus:
(3) On July 1, 1957 this Honorable Court issued
Letters Testamentary to C. N. Hodges in the Estate
The points of fact and law pertaining to the two of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
abovecited assignments of error have already been
discussed previously. In the first abovecited
error, the order alluded to was general, and as (4) On December 14, 1957 this Honorable Court, on
already explained before, it was, as admitted by the basis of the following allegations in a Motion
the lower court itself, superseded by the dated December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada
particular orders approving specific final deeds as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges:
of sale executed by the appellee, Avelina A. Magno,
which are subject of this appeal, as well as the "That herein Executor, (is) not only
particular orders approving specific final deeds part owner of the properties left as
of sale executed by the appellant, Philippine conjugal, but also, the successor to
Commercial and Industrial Bank, which were never all the properties left by the
appealed by the appellee, Avelina A. Magno, nor by deceased Linnie Jane Hodges."
any party for that matter, and which are now
therefore final.
(p. 44, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis
supplied.)
Now, simultaneously with the foregoing incidents, others of more
fundamental and all embracing significance developed. On October
issued the following order:
5, 1963, over the signature of Atty. Allison J. Gibbs in
representation of the law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta, as

47 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
 "As prayed for by Attorney Gellada,
counsel for the Executory, for the
reasons stated in his motion dated
December 11, 1957 which the court
considers well taken, all the sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of
all properties left by the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges are hereby
APPROVED. The said executor is
further authorized to execute
subsequent sales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of the
properties left by the said deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance
with the wishes contained in the last
will and testament of the latter."
(p. 46, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis
supplied.)
(5) On April 21, 1959 this Honorable Court approved
the inventory and accounting submitted by C. N.
Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on April
14, 1959 wherein he alleged among other things
"That no person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place of
examining the herein account, be
given notice, as herein executor is
the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased, in accordance with the last
will and testament already probated
by the Honorable Court."
(pp. 77-78, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307;
emphasis supplied.).
(6) On July 30, 1960 this Honorable Court approved
the "Annual Statement of Account" submitted by C.
N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on
July 21, 1960 wherein he alleged among other
things:
"That no person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place of
examining the herein account, be
given notice as herein executor is
the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in
accordance with the last will and
48 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
testament of the deceased, already
probated by this Honorable Court."
(pp. 81-82. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307;
emphasis supplied.)
(7) On May 2, 1961 this Honorable court approved
the "Annual Statement of Account By The Executor
for the Year 1960" submitted through Leon P.
Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein he alleged:
That no person interested in the
Philippines be given notice, of the
time and place of examining the
herein account, as herein Executor
is the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in
accordance with the last will and
testament of the deceased, already
probated by this Honorable Court.
(pp. 90-91. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307;
emphasis supplied.)
(8) On December 25, 1962, C.N. Hodges died.
(9) On December 25, 1962, on the Urgent Ex-
parte Motion of Leon P. Gellada filed only in
Special Proceeding No. 1307, this Honorable Court
appointed Avelina A. Magno
"Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the estate
of Charles Newton Hodges, in the latter case,
because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges
is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that
the real and personal properties of both spouses
may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a
Special Administratrix is appointed."
(p. 100. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(10) On December 26, 1962 Letters of
Administration were issued to Avelina Magno
pursuant to this Honorable Court's aforesaid Order
of December 25, 1962
 "With full authority to take
possession of all the property of
said deceased in any province or
provinces in which it may be situated
and to perform all other acts
necessary for the preservation of
said property, said Administratrix
and/or Special Administratrix having
filed a bond satisfactory to the
Court."
(p. 102, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(11) On January 22, 1963 this Honorable Court on
petition of Leon P. Gellada of January 21, 1963
issued Letters of Administration to:
(a) Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
(b) Avelina A. Magno as Special Administratrix of
the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges; and
(c) Joe Hodges as Co-Special Administrator of the
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges.
(p. 43, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(12) On February 20, 1963 this Honorable Court on
the basis of a motion filed by Leon P. Gellada as
legal counsel on February 16, 1963 for Avelina A.
Magno acting as Administratrix of the Estate of
Charles Newton Hodges (pp. 114-116, Sp. Proc.
1307) issued the following order:
"... se autoriza a aquella (Avelina
A. Magno) a firmar escrituras de
venta definitiva de propiedades
cubiertas por contratos para vender,
firmados, en vida, por el finado
Charles Newton Hodges, cada vez que
el precio estipulado en cada contrato
este totalmente pagado. Se autoriza
igualmente a la misma a firmar
escrituras de cancelacion de
hipoteca tanto de bienes reales como
personales cada vez que la
consideracion de cada hipoteca este
totalmente pagada.
49 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
"Cada una de dichas escrituras que
se otorguen debe ser sometida para
la aprobacion de este Juzgado."
(p. 117, Sp. Proc. 1307).
[Par 1 (c), Reply to Motion For
Removal of Joe Hodges]
(13) On September l6, 1963 Leon P. Gellada, acting
as attorney for Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, alleges:
3. — That since January, 1963, both
estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and
Charles Newton Hodges have been
receiving in full, payments for those
"contracts to sell" entered into by
C. N. Hodges during his lifetime, and
the purchasers have been demanding
the execution of definite deeds of
sale in their favor.
4. — That hereto attached are
thirteen (13) copies deeds of sale
executed by the Administratrix and
by the co-administrator (Fernando P.
Mirasol) of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges
respectively, in compliance with the
terms and conditions of the
respective "contracts to sell"
executed by the parties thereto."
(14) The properties involved in the aforesaid
motion of September 16, 1963 are all registered in
the name of the deceased C. N. Hodges.
(15) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information
and belief, has been advertising in the newspaper
in Iloilo thusly:
For Sale
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles
Newton Hodges.
 All Real Estate or Personal Property will be sold Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
on First Come First Served Basis. and Special Administratrix of the estate of C. N.
Hodges. However, from manifestations made by
A Avelina A. Magno and her legal counsel, Leon P.
v Gellada, there is no question she will claim that
e at least fifty per cent (50%) of the conjugal
l assets of the deceased spouses and the rents,
i emoluments and income therefrom belong to the
n Higdon family who are named in paragraphs Fourth
a and Fifth of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 5,
A Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
.
M WHEREFORE, premises considered, movant
a respectfully prays that this Honorable Court,
g after due hearing, order:
n
o (1) Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and
A accounting of all of the funds, properties and
d assets of any character belonging to the deceased
m Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have
i come into her possession, with full details of
n what she has done with them;
i
s
t (2) Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to
r the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges
a all of the funds, properties and assets of any
t character remaining in her possession;
r
i (3) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of
x the aforesaid issues, Avelina A. Magno to stop,
unless she first secures the conformity of Joe
(16) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information Hodges (or his duly authorized representative,
and belief, has paid and still is paying sums of such as the undersigned attorneys) as the Co-
money to sundry persons. administrator and attorney-in-fact of a majority
of the beneficiaries of the estate of C. N. Hodges:
(17) Joe Hodges through the undersigned attorneys
manifested during the hearings before this (a) Advertising the sale and the sale of the
Honorable Court on September 5 and 6, 1963 that properties of the estates:
the estate of C. N. Hodges was claiming all of the
assets belonging to the deceased spouses Linnie (b) Employing personnel and paying them any
Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges situated in compensation.
Philippines because of the aforesaid election by
C. N. Hodges wherein he claimed and took possession
(4) Such other relief as this Honorable Court may
as sole owner of all of said assets during the
deem just and equitable in the premises. (Annex
administration of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
"T", Petition.)
on the ground that he was the sole devisee and
legatee under her Last Will and Testament.
Almost a year thereafter, or on September 14, 1964, after the
co-administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol were
(18) Avelina A. Magno has submitted no inventory
replaced by herein petitioner Philippine Commercial and
and accounting of her administration as
50 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
Industrial Bank as sole administrator, pursuant to an agreement
of all the heirs of Hodges approved by the court, and because
the above motion of October 5, 1963 had not yet been heard due
to the absence from the country of Atty. Gibbs, petitioner filed
the following:
MANIFESTATION AND MOTION, INCLUDING
MOTION TO SET FOR HEARING AND RESOLVE
"URGENT MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND
DELIVERY TO ADMINISTRATORS OF THE
ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF ALL THE
ASSETS OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES
AND C. N. HODGES EXISTING AS OF MAY
23, 1957 PLUS ALL OF THE RENTS,
EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME THEREFROM OF
OCTOBER 5, 1963.
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank (hereinafter referred to as PCIB), the
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges,
deceased, in Special Proceedings No. 1672, through
its undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable
Court respectfully alleges that:
1. On October 5, 1963, Joe Hodges acting as the
co-administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges
filed, through the undersigned attorneys, an
"Urgent Motion For An Accounting and Delivery To
Administrator of the Estate of C. N. Hodges of all
Of The Assets Of The Conjugal Partnership of The
Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges
Existing as Of May, 23, 1957 Plus All Of The Rents,
Emoluments and Income Therefrom" (pp. 536-542, CFI
Rec. S. P. No. 1672).
2. On January 24, 1964 this Honorable Court, on
the basis of an amicable agreement entered into on
January 23, 1964 by the two co-administrators of
the estate of C. N. Hodges and virtually all of
the heirs of C. N. Hodges (p. 912, CFI Rec., S. P.
No. 1672), resolved the dispute over who should
act as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges
by appointing the PCIB as administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges (pp. 905-906, CFI Rec. S.
P. No. 1672) and issuing letters of administration
to the PCIB.
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs
of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol
51 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
acting as the two co-administrators of the estate
of C. N. Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as the
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, and Messrs. William Brown and Ardel Young
Acting for all of the Higdon family who claim to
be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and various legal counsel representing
the aforenamed parties entered into an amicable
agreement, which was approved by this Honorable
Court, wherein the parties thereto agreed that
certain sums of money were to be paid in settlement
of different claims against the two estates
and that the assets (to the extent they existed)of
both estates would be administrated jointly by the
PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges
and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, to
the aforesaid October 5, 1963 Motion, namely, the
PCIB's claim to exclusive possession and ownership
of one-hundred percent (10017,) (or, in the
alternative, seventy-five percent [75%] of all
assets owned by C. N. Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges
situated in the Philippines. On February 1, 1964
(pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672) this
Honorable Court amended its order of January 24,
1964 but in no way changes its recognition of the
aforedescribed basic demand by the PCIB as
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges to one
hundred percent (100%) of the assets claimed by
both estates.
4. On February 15, 1964 the PCIB filed a "Motion
to Resolve" the aforesaid Motion of October 5,
1963. This Honorable Court set for hearing on June
11, 1964 the Motion of October 5, 1963.
5. On June 11, 1964, because the undersigned
Allison J. Gibbs was absent in the United States,
this Honorable Court ordered the indefinite
postponement of the hearing of the Motion of
October 5, 1963.
6. Since its appointment as administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges the PCIB has not been able
to properly carry out its duties and obligations
as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges
because of the following acts, among others, of
Avelina A. Magno and those who claim to act for
her as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges:
 (a) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts
as if she is in exclusive control of
all of the assets in the Philippines
of both estates including those
claimed by the estate of C. N. Hodges
as evidenced in part by her locking
the premises at 206-208 Guanco
Street, Iloilo City on August 31,
1964 and refusing to reopen same
until ordered to do so by this
Honorable Court on September 7, 1964.
(b) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts
as though she alone may decide how
the assets of the estate of C.N.
Hodges should be administered, who
the PCIB shall employ and how much
they may be paid as evidenced in
party by her refusal to sign checks
issued by the PCIB payable to the
undersigned counsel pursuant to
their fee agreement approved by this
Honorable Court in its order dated
March 31, 1964.
(c) Avelina A. Magno illegally gives
access to and turns over possession
of the records and assets of the
estate of C.N. Hodges to the
attorney-in-fact of the Higdon
Family, Mr. James L. Sullivan, as
evidenced in part by the cashing of
his personal checks.
(d) Avelina A. Magno illegally
refuses to execute checks prepared
by the PCIB drawn to pay expenses of
the estate of C. N. Hodges as
evidenced in part by the check drawn
to reimburse the PCIB's advance of
P48,445.50 to pay the 1964 income
taxes reported due and payable by the
estate of C.N. Hodges.
7. Under and pursuant to the orders of this
Honorable Court, particularly those of January 24
and February 1, 1964, and the mandate contained in
its Letters of Administration issued on January
24, 1964 to the PCIB, it has
52 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
"full authority to take
possession of all the
property of the
deceased C. N. Hodges
"and to perform all other acts
necessary for the preservation of
said property." (p. 914, CFI Rec.,
S.P. No. 1672.)
8. As administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges,
the PCIB claims the right to the immediate
exclusive possession and control of all of the
properties, accounts receivables, court cases,
bank accounts and other assets, including the
documentary records evidencing same, which existed
in the Philippines on the date of C. N. Hodges'
death, December 25, 1962, and were in his
possession and registered in his name alone. The
PCIB knows of no assets in the Philippines
registered in the name of Linnie Jane Hodges, the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, or, C. N. Hodges,
Executor of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on
December 25, 1962. All of the assets of which the
PCIB has knowledge are either registered in the
name of C. N. Hodges, alone or were derived
therefrom since his death on December 25, 1962.
9. The PCIB as the current administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges, deceased, succeeded to all
of the rights of the previously duly appointed
administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges, to
wit:
(a) On December 25, 1962, date of C.
N. Hodges' death, this Honorable
Court appointed Miss Avelina A. Magno
simultaneously as:
(i) Administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 102, CFI Rec.,
S.P. No. 1307) to replace the
deceased C. N. Hodges who on May 28,
1957 was appointed Special
Administrator (p. 13. CFI Rec. S.P.
No. 1307) and on July 1, 1957
Executor of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges (p. 30, CFI Rec., S. P. No.
1307).
 (ii) Special Administratrix of the
estate of C. N. Hodges (p. 102, CFI
Rec., S.P. No. 1307).
(b) On December 29, 1962 this
Honorable Court appointed Harold K.
Davies as co-special administrator
of the estate of C.N. Hodges along
with Avelina A. Magno (pp. 108-111,
CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1307).
(c) On January 22, 1963, with the
conformity of Avelina A. Magno,
Harold K. Davies resigned in favor
of Joe Hodges (pp. 35-36, CFI Rec.,
S.P. No. 1672) who thereupon was
appointed on January 22, 1963 by this
Honorable Court as special co-
administrator of the estate of C.N.
Hodges (pp. 38-40 & 43, CFI Rec. S.P.
No. 1672) along with Miss Magno who
at that time was still acting as
special co-administratrix of the
estate of C. N. Hodges.
(d) On February 22, 1963, without
objection on the part of Avelina A.
Magno, this Honorable Court
appointed Joe Hodges and Fernando P.
Mirasol as co-administrators of the
estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 76-78, 81
& 85, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672).
10. Miss Avelina A. Magno, pursuant to the orders
of this Honorable Court of December 25, 1962, took
possession of all Philippine Assets now claimed by
the two estates. Legally, Miss Magno could take
possession of the assets registered in the name of
C. N. Hodges alone only in her capacity as Special
Administratrix of the Estate of C.N. Hodges. With
the appointment by this Honorable Court on
February 22, 1963 of Joe Hodges and Fernando P.
Mirasol as the co-administrators of the estate of
C.N. Hodges, they legally were entitled to take
over from Miss Magno the full and exclusive
possession of all of the assets of the estate of
C.N. Hodges. With the appointment on January 24,
1964 of the PCIB as the sole administrator of the
estate of C.N. Hodges in substitution of Joe Hodges
and Fernando P. Mirasol, the PCIB legally became
the only party entitled to the sole and exclusive
53 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
possession of all of the assets of the estate of
C. N. Hodges.
11. The PCIB's predecessors submitted their
accounting and this Honorable Court approved same,
to wit:
(a) The accounting of Harold K.
Davies dated January 18, 1963 (pp.
16-33, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672); which
shows or its face the:
(i) Conformity of Avelina A. Magno
acting as "Administratrix of the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
Special Administratrix of the Estate
of C. N. Hodges";
(ii) Conformity of Leslie Echols, a
Texas lawyer acting for the heirs of
C.N. Hodges; and
(iii) Conformity of William Brown, a
Texas lawyer acting for the Higdon
family who claim to be the only heirs
of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 18, 25-
33, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
Note: This accounting was approved by this
Honorable Court on January 22, 1963 (p. 34, CFI
Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
(b) The accounting of Joe Hodges and
Fernando P. Mirasol as of January 23,
1964, filed February 24, 1964 (pp.
990-1000, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672 and
pp. 1806-1848, CFI Rec. S.P. No.
1307).
Note: This accounting was approved by this
Honorable Court on March 3, 1964.
(c) The PCIB and its undersigned
lawyers are aware of no report or
accounting submitted by Avelina A.
Magno of her acts as administratrix
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
or special administratrix of the
estate of C.N. Hodges, unless it is
 the accounting of Harold K. Davies
as special co-administrator of the
estate of C.N. Hodges dated January
18, 1963 to which Miss Magno
manifested her conformity (supra).
12. In the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964, Miss Avelina
A. Magno agreed to receive P10,000.00
"for her services as administratrix
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges"
and in addition she agreed to be employed, starting
February 1, 1964, at
"a monthly salary of P500.00 for her
services as an employee of both
estates."
24 ems.
13. Under the aforesaid agreement of January 24,
1964 and the orders of this Honorable Court of
same date, the PCIB as administrator of the estate
of C. N. Hodges is entitled to the exclusive
possession of all records, properties and assets
in the name of C. N. Hodges as of the date of his
death on December 25, 1962 which were in the
possession of the deceased C. N. Hodges on that
date and which then passed to the possession of
Miss Magno in her capacity as Special Co-
Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges or
the possession of Joe Hodges or Fernando P. Mirasol
as co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
14. Because of Miss Magno's refusal to comply with
the reasonable request of PCIB concerning the
assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB
dismissed Miss Magno as an employee of the estate
of C. N. Hodges effective August 31, 1964. On
September 1, 1964 Miss Magno locked the premises
at 206-208 Guanco Street and denied the PCIB access
thereto. Upon the Urgent Motion of the PCIB dated
September 3, 1964, this Honorable Court on
September 7, 1964 ordered Miss Magno to reopen the
aforesaid premises at 206-208 Guanco Street and
permit the PCIB access thereto no later than
September 8, 1964.
54 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
15. The PCIB pursuant to the aforesaid orders of
this Honorable Court is again in physical
possession of all of the assets of the estate of
C. N. Hodges. However, the PCIB is not in exclusive
control of the aforesaid records, properties and
assets because Miss Magno continues to assert the
claims hereinabove outlined in paragraph 6,
continues to use her own locks to the doors of the
aforesaid premises at 206-208 Guanco Street,
Iloilo City and continues to deny the PCIB its
right to know the combinations to the doors of the
vault and safes situated within the premises at
206-208 Guanco Street despite the fact that said
combinations were known to only C. N. Hodges during
his lifetime.
16. The Philippine estate and inheritance taxes
assessed the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges were
assessed and paid on the basis that C. N. Hodges
is the sole beneficiary of the assets of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines.
Avelina A. Magno and her legal counsel at no time
have questioned the validity of the aforesaid
assessment and the payment of the corresponding
Philippine death taxes.
17. Nothing further remains to be done in the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges except to resolve the
aforesaid Motion of October 5, 1963 and grant the
PCIB the exclusive possession and control of all
of the records, properties and assets of the estate
of C. N. Hodges.
18. Such assets as may have existed of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges were ordered by this
Honorable Court in special Proceedings No. 1307 to
be turned over and delivered to C. N. Hodges alone.
He in fact took possession of them before his death
and asserted and exercised the right of exclusive
ownership over the said assets as the sole
beneficiary of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PCIB
respectfully petitions that this Honorable court:
(1) Set the Motion of October 5, 1963 for hearing
at the earliest possible date with notice to all
interested parties;
 (2) Order Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory
and accounting as Administratrix of the Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and Co-Administratrix of the
Estate of C. N. Hodges of all of the funds,
properties and assets of any character belonging
to the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges
which have come into her possession, with full
details of what she has done with them;
(3) Order Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver
to the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C.
N. Hodges all of the funds, properties and assets
of any character remaining in her possession;
(4) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of
the aforesaid issues, order Avelina A. Magno and
her representatives to stop interferring with the
administration of the estate of C. N. Hodges by
the PCIB and its duly authorized representatives;
(5) Enjoin Avelina A. Magno from working in the
premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City as
an employee of the estate of C. N. Hodges and
approve her dismissal as such by the PCIB effective
August 31, 1964;
(6) Enjoin James L. Sullivan, Attorneys Manglapus
and Quimpo and others allegedly representing Miss
Magno from entering the premises at 206-208 Guanco
Street, Iloilo City or any other properties of C.
N. Hodges without the express permission of the
PCIB;
(7) Order such other relief as this Honorable Court
finds just and equitable in the premises. (Annex
"U" Petition.)
On January 8, 1965, petitioner also filed a motion for "Official
Declaration of Heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges Estate" alleging:
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter
referred to as PCIB), as administrator of the estate of the late
C. N. Hodges, through the undersigned counsel, and to this
Honorable Court respectfully alleges that:
1. During their marriage, spouses Charles Newton
Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, American citizens
originally from the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
acquired and accumulated considerable assets and
55 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
properties in the Philippines and in the States of
Texas and Oklahoma, United States of America. All
said properties constituted their conjugal estate.
2. Although Texas was the domicile of origin of
the Hodges spouses, this Honorable Court, in its
orders dated March 31 and December 12, 1964 (CFI
Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. ----; Sp. Proc.
No. 1672, p. ----), conclusively found and
categorically ruled that said spouses had lived
and worked for more than 50 years in Iloilo City
and had, therefore, acquired a domicile of choice
in said city, which they retained until the time
of their respective deaths.
3. On November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges
executed in the City of Iloilo her Last Will and
Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached
as Annex "A". The bequests in said will pertinent
to the present issue are the second, third,
and fourth provisions, which we quote in full
hereunder.
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath
all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, both personal
and real, wherever situated, or
located, to my husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, to have and to hold
unto him, my said husband during his
natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide
that my husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, shall have the right to
manage, control, use and enjoy said
estate during his lifetime, and he
is hereby given the right to make any
changes in the physical properties
of said estate by sale of any part
thereof which he think best, and the
purchase of any other or additional
property as he may think best; to
execute conveyances with or without
general or special warranty,
conveying in fee simple or for any
other term or time, any property
which he may deem proper to dispose
of; to lease any of the real property
for oil, gas and/or other minerals,
and all such deeds or leases shall
 pass the absolute fee simple title
to the interest so conveyed in such
property as he may elect to sell. All
rents, emoluments and income from
said estate shall belong to him, and
he is further authorized to use any
part of the principal of said estate
as he may need or desire. It is
provided herein, however, that he
shall not sell or otherwise dispose
of any of the improved property now
owned by us located at, in or near
the City of Lubbock, Texas, but he
shall have the full right to lease,
manage and enjoy the same during his
lifetime, as above provided. He shall
have the right to sub-divide any
farmland and sell lots therein, and
may sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I
give, devise and bequeath all of the
rest, residue and remainder of my
estate both real and personal,
wherever situated or located, to be
equally divided among my brothers and
sisters, share and share alike,
namely:
"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard
Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era
Boman and Nimray Higdon."
4. On November 14, 1953, C. N. Hodges executed in
the City of Iloilo his Last Will and Testament, a
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B ". In
said Will, C. N. Hodges designated his wife, Linnie
Jane Hodges, as his beneficiary using the
identical language she used in the second and third
provisos of her Will, supra.
5. On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in
Iloilo City, predeceasing her husband by more than
five (5) years. At the time of her death, she had
no forced or compulsory heir, except her husband,
C. N. Hodges. She was survived also by various
brothers and sisters mentioned in her Will
(supra), which, for convenience, we shall refer to
as the HIGDONS.
56 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
6. On June 28, 1957, this Honorable Court admitted
to probate the Last Will and Testament of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), and
appointed C. N. Hodges as executor of her estate
without bond. (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp.
24-25). On July 1, 1957, this Honorable Court
issued letters testamentary to C. N. Hodges in the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (CFI Record, Sp.
Proc. No. 1307, p. 30.)
7. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respect to
the order of succession, the amount of
successional rights, and the intrinsic of its
testamentary provisions, should be governed by
Philippine laws because:
(a) The testatrix, Linnie Jane
Hodges, intended Philippine laws to
govern her Will;
(b) Article 16 of the Civil Code
provides that "the national law of
the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless
of the country wherein said property
may be found", shall prevail.
However, the Conflict of Law of
Texas, which is the "national law"
of the testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges,
provide that the domiciliary law
(Philippine law — see paragraph
2, supra) should govern the
testamentary dispositions and
successional rights over movables
(personal properties), and the law
of the situs of the property (also
Philippine law as to properties
located in the Philippines) with
regards immovable (real properties).
Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine",
as approved and applied by our
Supreme Court in the case of "In The
Matter Of The Testate Estate of
Eduard E. Christensen", G.R. No.
L-16749, promulgated January 31,
1963, Philippine law should apply to
the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges and
to the successional rights to her
estate insofar as
her movable and immovable assets in
 the Philippines are concerned. We
shall not, at this stage, discuss
what law should govern the assets of
Linnie Jane Hodges located in
Oklahoma and Texas, because the only
assets in issue in this motion are
those within the jurisdiction of this
motion Court in the two above-
captioned Special Proceedings.
8. Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or
community estate of spouses shall, upon
dissolution, be divided equally between them.
Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May
23, 1957, one-half (1/2) of the entirety of the
assets of the Hodges spouses constituting their
conjugal estate pertained automatically to Charles
Newton Hodges, not by way of inheritance, but in
his own right as partner in the conjugal
partnership. The other one-half (1/2) portion of
the conjugal estate constituted the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. This is the only portion of
the conjugal estate capable of inheritance by her
heirs.
9. This one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal
assets pertaining to Linnie Jane Hodges cannot,
under a clear and specific provision of her Will,
be enhanced or increased by income, earnings,
rents, or emoluments accruing after her death on
May 23, 1957. Linnie Jane Hodges' Will provides
that "all rents, emoluments and income from said
estate shall belong to him (C. N. Hodges) and he
is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or desire."
(Paragraph 3, Annex "A".) Thus, by specific
provision of Linnie Jane Hodges' Will, "all rents,
emoluments and income" must be credited to the
one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal estate
pertaining to C. N. Hodges. Clearly, therefore,
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, capable of
inheritance by her heirs, consisted exclusively of
no more than one-half (1/2) of the conjugal estate,
computed as of the time of her death on May 23,
1957.
10. Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil
Code provide that the surviving spouse of a
deceased leaving no ascendants or descendants is
entitled, as a matter of right and by way of
irrevocable legitime, to at least one-half (1/2)
57 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
of the estate of the deceased, and no testamentary
disposition by the deceased can legally and
validly affect this right of the surviving spouse.
In fact, her husband is entitled to said one-half
(1/2) portion of her estate by way of legitime.
(Article 886, Civil Code.) Clearly, therefore,
immediately upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges,
C. N. Hodges was the owner of at least three-
fourths (3/4) or seventy-five (75%) percent of all
of the conjugal assets of the spouses, (1/2 or 50%
by way of conjugal partnership share and 1/4 or
25% by way of inheritance and legitime) plus all
"rents, emoluments and income" accruing to said
conjugal estate from the moment of Linnie Jane
Hodges' death (see paragraph 9, supra).
11. The late Linnie Jane Hodges designated her
husband C.N. Hodges as her sole and exclusive heir
with full authority to do what he pleased, as
exclusive heir and owner of all the assets
constituting her estate, except only with regards
certain properties "owned by us, located at, in or
near the City of Lubbock, Texas". Thus, even
without relying on our laws of succession and
legitime, which we have cited above, C. N. Hodges,
by specific testamentary designation of his wife,
was entitled to the entirely to his wife's estate
in the Philippines.
12. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides
that "the rights of the successor are transmitted
from the death of the decedent". Thus, title to
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was transmitted
to C. N. Hodges immediately upon her death on May
23, 1957. For the convenience of this Honorable
Court, we attached hereto as Annex "C" a graph of
how the conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges
should be divided in accordance with Philippine
law and the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges.
13. In his capacity as sole heir and successor to
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges as above-stated,
C. N. Hodges, shortly after the death of Linnie
Jane Hodges, appropriated to himself the entirety
of her estate. He operated all the assets, engaged
in business and performed all acts in connection
with the entirety of the conjugal estate, in his
own name alone, just as he had been operating,
engaging and doing while the late Linnie Jane
Hodges was still alive. Upon his death on December
25, 1962, therefore, all said conjugal assets were
 in his sole possession and control, and registered
in his name alone, not as executor, but as
exclusive owner of all said assets.
14. All these acts of C. N. Hodges were authorized
and sanctioned expressly and impliedly by various
orders of this Honorable Court, as follows:
(a) In an Order dated May 27, 1957, this Honorable
Court ruled that C. N. Hodges "is allowed or
authorized to continue the business in which he
was engaged, and to perform acts which he had been
doing while the deceased was living." (CFI Record,
Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 11.)
(b) On December 14, 1957, this Honorable Court, on
the basis of the following fact, alleged in the
verified Motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by
Leon P. Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N.
Hodges:
That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of
the properties left as conjugal, but also, the
successor to all the properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.' (CFI Record, Sp.
Proc. No. 1307, p. 44; emphasis supplied.)
issued the following order:
"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for
the Executor, for the reasons stated in his motion
dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers
well taken, all the sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of all the properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the
Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby
APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized
to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases
and mortgages of the properties left by the said
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the
wishes contained in the last will and testament of
the latter." (CFI Record. Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p.
46; emphasis supplied.)
24 ems
(c) On April 21, 1959, this Honorable Court
approved the verified inventory and accounting
submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon
58 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
P. Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein he alleged
among other things,
"That no person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place of
examining the herein account, be
given notice, as herein executor is
the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased, in accordance with the last
will and testament already probated
by the Honorable Court." (CFI Record,
Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 77-78;
emphasis supplied.)
(d) On July 20, 1960, this Honorable Court approved
the verified "Annual Statement of Account"
submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon
P. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein he alleged,
among other things.
"That no person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place of
examining the herein account, be
given notice as herein executor is
the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in
accordance with the last will and
testament ofthe deceased, already
probated by this Honorable Court."
(CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp.
81-82; emphasis supplied.)
(e) On May 2, 1961, this Honorable Court approved
the verified "Annual Statement of Account By The
Executor For the Year 1960" submitted through Leon
P. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein he alleged:
"That no person interested in the Philippines be
given notice, ofthe time and place of examining
the herein account, as herein executor is the only
devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges, in accordance with the last will and
testament ofthe deceased, already probated by this
Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307,
pp. 90-91; emphasis supplied.)
15. Since C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive
heir of Linnie Jane Hodges, not only by law, but
in accordance with the dispositions of her will,
there was, in fact, no need to liquidate the
 conjugal estate of the spouses. The entirely of
said conjugal estate pertained to him exclusively,
therefore this Honorable Court sanctioned and
authorized, as above-stated, C. N. Hodges to
manage, operate and control all the conjugal
assets as owner.
16. By expressly authorizing C. N. Hodges to act
as he did in connection with the estate of his
wife, this Honorable Court has (1) declared C. N.
Hodges as the sole heir of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges, and (2) delivered and distributed her
estate to C. N. Hodges as sole heir in accordance
with the terms and conditions of her Will. Thus,
although the "estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" still
exists as a legal and juridical personality, it
had no assets or properties located in the
Philippines registered in its name whatsoever at
the time of the death of C. N. Hodges on December
25, 1962.
17. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"),
fourth paragraph, provides as follows:
"At the death of my said husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise
and bequeath all of the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate both real
and personal, wherever situated or
located, to be equally divided among
my brothers and sisters, share and
share alike, namely:
"Esta Higdon, Emma
Howell, Leonard
Higdon, Roy Higdon,
Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman
and Nimray Higdon."
should not, in anyway, affect the rights of the
estate of C. N. Hodges or his heirs to the
properties, which C. N. Hodges acquired by way of
inheritance from his wife Linnie Jane Hodges upon
her death.
(a) In spite of the above-mentioned
provision in the Will of Linnie Jane
Hodges, C. N. Hodges acquired, not
merely a usufructuary right, but
absolute title and ownership to her
estate. In a recent case involving a
very similar testamentary provision,
the Supreme Court held that the heir
first designated acquired full
ownership of the property bequeathed
by the will, not mere usufructuary
rights. (Consolacion Florentino de
Crisologo, et al., vs. Manuel
Singson, G. R. No. L-13876, February
28, 1962.)
(b) Article 864, 872 and 886 of the
New Civil Code clearly provide that
no charge, condition or substitution
whatsoever upon the legitime can be
imposed by a testator. Thus, under
the provisions of Articles 900, 995
and 1001 of the New Civil Code, the
legitime of a surviving spouse is 1/2
of the estate of the deceased spouse.
Consequently, the above-mentioned
provision in the Will of Linnie Jane
Hodges is clearly invalid insofar as
the legitime of C. N. Hodges was
concerned, which consisted of 1/2 of
the 1/2 portion of the conjugal
estate, or 1/4 of the entire conjugal
estate of the deceased.

Because of the facts hereinabove set out there is (c) There are generally only two
no "rest, residue and remainder", at least to the kinds of substitution provided for
extent of the Philippine assets, which remains to and authorized by our Civil Code
vest in the HIGDONS, assuming this proviso in (Articles 857-870), namely,
Linnie Jane Hodges' Will is valid and binding (1) simple or common substitution,
against the estate of C. N. Hodges. sometimes referred to
as vulgar substitution (Article
18. Any claims by the HIGDONS under the above- 859), and (2) fideicommissary
quoted provision of Linnie Jane Hodges' Will is substitution (Article 863). All
without merit because said provision is void and other substitutions are merely
invalid at least as to the Philippine assets. It variations of these. The

59 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
 substitution provided for by (d) In view of the invalidity of the
paragraph four of the Will of Linnie provision for substitution in the
Jane Hodges is not fideicommissary Will, C. N. Hodges' inheritance to
substitution, because there is the entirety of the Linnie Jane
clearly no obligation on the part of Hodges estate is irrevocable and
C. N. Hodges as the first heir final.
designated, to preserve the
properties for the substitute heirs. 19. Be that as it may, at the time of C. N. Hodges'
(Consolacion Florentino de Crisologo death, the entirety of the conjugal estate
et al. vs. Manuel Singson, G. R. No. appeared and was registered in him exclusively as
L-13876.) At most, it is owner. Thus, the presumption is that all said
a vulgar or simple substitution. assets constituted his estate. Therefore —
However, in order that
a vulgar or simple substitution can
be valid, three alternative (a) If the HIGDONS wish to enforce their dubious
conditions must be present, namely, rights as substituted heirs to 1/4 of the conjugal
that the first designated heir (1) estate (the other 1/4 is covered by the legitime
should die before the testator; or of C. N. Hodges which can not be affected by any
(2) should not wish to accept the testamentary disposition), their remedy, if any,
inheritance; or (3) should be is to file their claim against the estate of C. N.
incapacitated to do so. None of these Hodges, which should be entitled at the present
conditions apply to C. N. Hodges, time to full custody and control of all the
and, therefore, the substitution conjugal estate of the spouses.
provided for by the above-quoted
provision of the Will is not (b) The present proceedings, in which two estates
authorized by the Code, and, exist under separate administration, where the
therefore, it is void. Manresa, administratrix of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate
commenting on these kisses of exercises an officious right to object and
substitution, meaningfully stated intervene in matters affecting exclusively the C.
that: "... cuando el testador N. Hodges estate, is anomalous.
instituyeun primer heredero, y por
fallecimiento de este nombra otro u
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that
otros, ha de entenderse que estas
after trial and reception of evidence, this
segundas designaciones solo han de
Honorable Court declare:
llegar a tener efectividad en el caso
de que el primer instituido muera
antes que el testador, fuera o no 1. That the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was and
esta su verdadera intencion. ...". is composed exclusively of one-half (1/2) share in
(6 Manresa, 7 a ed., pag. 175.) In the conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges,
other words, when another heir is computed as of the date of her death on May 23,
designated to inherit upon the death 1957;
of a first heir, the second
designation can have effect only in 2. That the other half of the conjugal estate
case the first instituted heir dies pertained exclusively to C. N. Hodges as his share
before the testator, whether or not as partner in the conjugal partnership;
that was the true intention of said
testator. Since C. N. Hodges did not
die before Linnie Jane Hodges, the 3. That all "rents, emoluments and income" of the
provision for substitution contained conjugal estate accruing after Linnie Jane Hodges'
in Linnie Jane Hodges' Willis void. death pertains to C. N. Hodges;

60 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
 4. That C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive
heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
5. That, therefore, the entire conjugal estate of
the spouses located in the Philippines, plus all
the "rents, emoluments and income" above-
mentioned, now constitutes the estate of C. N.
Hodges, capable of distribution to his heirs upon
termination of Special Proceedings No. 1672;
6. That PCIB, as administrator of the estate of C.
N. Hodges, is entitled to full and exclusive
custody, control and management of all said
properties; and
7. That Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the
HIGDONS, has no right to intervene or participate
in the administration of the C. N. Hodges estate.
PCIB further prays for such and other relief as
may be deemed just and equitable in the premises."
(Record, pp. 265-277)
Before all of these motions of petitioner could be resolved,
however, on December 21, 1965, private respondent Magno filed
her own "Motion for the Official Declaration of Heirs of the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as follows:
COMES NOW the Administratrix of the Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and, through undersigned
counsel, unto this Honorable Court most
respectfully states and manifests:
1. That the spouses Charles Newton Hodges and
Linnie Jane Hodges were American citizens who died
at the City of Iloilo after having amassed and
accumulated extensive properties in the
Philippines;
2. That on November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges
executed a last will and testament (the original
of this will now forms part of the records of these
proceedings as Exhibit "C" and appears as Sp. Proc.
No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 17-18);
61 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
3. That on May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died
at the City of Iloilo at the time survived by her
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, and several
relatives named in her last will and testament;
4. That on June 28, 1957, a petition therefor
having been priorly filed and duly heard, this
Honorable Court issued an order admitting to
probate the last will and testament of Linnie Jane
Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 24-25,
26-28);
5. That the required notice to creditors and to
all others who may have any claims against the
decedent, Linnie Jane Hodges has already been
printed, published and posted (Sp. Proc. No. 1307,
Folio I. pp. 34-40) and the reglamentary period
for filing such claims has long ago lapsed and
expired without any claims having been asserted
against the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, approved
by the Administrator/Administratrix of the said
estate, nor ratified by this Honorable Court;
6. That the last will and testament of Linnie Jane
Hodges already admitted to probate contains an
institution of heirs in the following words:
"SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath
all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, both personal
and real, wherever situated or
located, to my beloved husband,
Charles Newton Hodges to have and to
hold unto him, my said husband,
during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide
that my husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, shall have the right to
manage, control, use and enjoy said
estate during his lifetime, and, he
is hereby given the right to make any
changes in the physical properties
of said estate, by sale of any part
thereof which he may think best, and
the purchase of any other or
additional property as he may think
best; to execute conveyances with or
without general or special warranty,
conveying in fee simple or for any
 other term or time, any property
which he may deem proper to dispose
of; to lease any of the real property
for oil, gas and/or other minerals,
and all such deeds or leases shall
pass the absolute fee simple title
to the interest so conveyed in such
property as he elect to sell. All
rents, emoluments and income from
said estate shall belong to him, and
he is further authorized to use any
part of the principal of said estate
as he may need or desire. It is
provided herein, however, that he
shall not sell or otherwise dispose
of any of the improved property now
owned by us located at, in or near
the City of Lubbock Texas, but he
shall have the full right to lease,
manage and enjoy the same during his
lifetime, above provided. He shall
have the right to subdivide any farm
land and sell lots therein, and may
sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I
give, devise and bequeath all of the
rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, both real and personal,
wherever situated or located, to be
equally divided among my brothers and
sisters, share and share alike,
namely:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard
Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era
Boman and Nimroy Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any
of my brothers and/or sisters named
in item Fourth, above, prior to the
death of my husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, then it is my will and
bequest that the heirs of such
deceased brother or sister shall take
jointly the share which would have
gone to such brother or sister had
she or he survived."
62 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
7. That under the provisions of the last will and
testament already above-quoted, Linnie Jane Hodges
gave a life-estate or a usufruct over all her
estate to her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, and
a vested remainder-estate or the naked title over
the same estate to her relatives named therein;
8. That after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges and
after the admission to probate of her last will
and testament, but during the lifetime of Charles
Newton Hodges, the said Charles Newton Hodges with
full and complete knowledge of the life-estate or
usufruct conferred upon him by the will since he
was then acting as Administrator of the estate and
later as Executor of the will of Linnie Jane
Hodges, unequivocably and clearly through oral and
written declarations and sworn public statements,
renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life-
estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges;
9. That, accordingly, the only heirs left to
receive the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges pursuant
to her last will and testament, are her named
brothers and sisters, or their heirs, to wit: Esta
Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline Higdon
and David Higdon, the latter two being the wife
and son respectively of the deceased Roy Higdon,
Sadie Rascoe Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon, all of
legal ages, American citizens, with residence at
the State of Texas, United States of America;
10. That at the time of the death of Linnie Jane
Hodges on May 23, 1957, she was the co-owner
(together with her husband Charles Newton Hodges)
of an undivided one-half interest in their
conjugal properties existing as of that date, May
23, 1957, which properties are now being
administered sometimes jointly and sometimes
separately by the Administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and/or the Administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges but all of which are under
the control and supervision of this Honorable
Court;
11. That because there was no separation or
segregation of the interests of husband and wife
in the combined conjugal estate, as there has been
no such separation or segregation up to the
present, both interests have continually earned
exactly the same amount of "rents, emoluments and
 income", the entire estate having been continually
devoted to the business of the spouses as if they
were alive;
12. That the one-half interest of Linnie Jane
Hodges in the combined conjugal estate was earning
"rents, emoluments and income" until her death on
May 23, 1957, when it ceased to be saddled with
any more charges or expenditures which are purely
personal to her in nature, and her estate kept on
earning such "rents, emoluments and income" by
virtue of their having been expressly renounced,
disclaimed and repudiated by Charles Newton Hodges
to whom they were bequeathed for life under the
last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges;
13. That, on the other hand, the one-half interest
of Charles Newton Hodges in the combined conjugal
estate existing as of May 23, 1957, while it may
have earned exactly the same amount of "rents,
emoluments and income" as that of the share
pertaining to Linnie Jane Hodges, continued to be
burdened by charges, expenditures, and other
dispositions which are purely personal to him in
nature, until the death of Charles Newton Hodges
himself on December 25, 1962;
14. That of all the assets of the combined conjugal
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton
Hodges as they exist today, the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges is clearly entitled to a portion more
than fifty percent (50%) as compared to the portion
to which the estate of Charles Newton Hodges may
be entitled, which portions can be exactly
determined by the following manner:
a. An inventory must be made of the
assets of the combined conjugal
estate as they existed on the death
of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957
— one-half of these assets belong to
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
b. An accounting must be made of the
"rents, emoluments and income" of all
these assets — again one-half of
these belong to the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges;
63 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
c. Adjustments must be made, after
making a deduction of charges,
disbursements and other dispositions
made by Charles Newton Hodges
personally and for his own personal
account from May 23, 1957 up to
December 25, 1962, as well as other
charges, disbursements and other
dispositions made for him and in his
behalf since December 25, 1962 up to
the present;
15. That there remains no other matter for
disposition now insofar as the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges is concerned but to complete the
liquidation of her estate, segregate them from the
conjugal estate, and distribute them to her heirs
pursuant to her last will and testament.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most
respectfully moved and prayed that this Honorable
Court, after a hearing on the factual matters
raised by this motion, issue an order:
a. Declaring the following persons, to wit: Esta
Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline Higdon,
David Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy
Higdon, as the sole heirs under the last will and
testament of Linnie Jane Hodges and as the only
persons entitled to her estate;
b. Determining the exact value of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges in accordance with the system
enunciated in paragraph 14 of this motion;
c. After such determination ordering its
segregation from the combined conjugal estate and
its delivery to the Administratrix of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges for distribution to the heirs
to whom they properly belong and appertain.
(Green Record on Appeal, pp. 382-391)
whereupon, instead of further pressing on its motion of January
8, 1965 aforequoted, as it had been doing before, petitioner
withdrew the said motion and in addition to opposing the above
motion of respondent Magno, filed a motion on April 22, 1966
alleging in part that:
 1. That it has received from the counsel for the
administratrix of the supposed estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges a notice to set her "Motion for
Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges";
2. That before the aforesaid motion could be heard,
there are matters pending before this Honorable
Court, such as:
a. The examination already ordered
by this Honorable Court of documents
relating to the allegation of Avelina
Magno that Charles Newton Hodges
"through ... written declarations
and sworn public statements,
renounced, disclaimed and repudiated
life-estate and usufruct over the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges';
b. That "Urgent Motion for An
Accounting and Delivery to the Estate
of C. N. Hodges of All the Assets of
the Conjugal Partnership of the
Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C.
N. Hodges Existing as of May 23, 1957
Plus All the Rents, Emoluments and
Income Therefrom";
c. Various motions to resolve the
aforesaid motion;
d. Manifestation of September 14,
1964, detailing acts of interference
of Avelina Magno under color of title
as administratrix of the Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges;
which are all prejudicial, and which involve no
issues of fact, all facts involved therein being
matters of record, and therefore require only the
resolution of questions of law;
3. That whatever claims any alleged heirs or other
persons may have could be very easily threshed out
in the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges;
4. That the maintenance of two separate estate
proceedings and two administrators only results in
64 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
confusion and is unduly burdensome upon the
Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges,
particularly because the bond filed by Avelina
Magno is grossly insufficient to answer for the
funds and property which she has inofficiously
collected and held, as well as those which she
continues to inofficiously collect and hold;
5. That it is a matter of record that such state
of affairs affects and inconveniences not only the
estate but also third-parties dealing with it;"
(Annex "V", Petition.)
and then, after further reminding the court, by quoting them,
of the relevant allegations of its earlier motion of September
14, 1964, Annex U, prayed that:
1. Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for
and deliver to the administrator of the Estate of
C. N. Hodges all the assets of the conjugal
partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and
C. N. Hodges, plus all the rents, emoluments and
income therefrom;
2. Pending the consideration of this motion,
immediately order Avelina Magno to turn over all
her collections to the administrator Philippine
Commercial & Industrial Bank;
3. Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
(Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed;
4. Defer the hearing and consideration of the
motion for declaration of heirs in the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges until the matters
hereinabove set forth are resolved.
(Prayer, Annex "V" of Petition.)
On October 12, 1966, as already indicated at the outset of this
opinion, the respondent court denied the foregoing motion,
holding thus:
O R D E R
On record is a motion (Vol. X, Sp. 1672, pp. 4379-
4390) dated April 22, 1966 of administrator PCIB
praying that (1) Immediately order Avelina Magno
to account for and deliver to the administrator of
the estate of C. N. Hodges all assets of the
 conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the rents,
emoluments and income therefrom; (2) Pending the
consideration of this motion, immediately order
Avelina Magno to turn over all her collections to
the administrator PCIB; (3) Declare the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307)
closed; and (4) Defer the hearing and
consideration of the motion for declaration of
heirs in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
until the matters hereinabove set forth are
resolved.
This motion is predicated on the fact that there
are matters pending before this court such as (a)
the examination already ordered by this Honorable
Court of documents relating to the allegation of
Avelina Magno that Charles Newton Hodges thru
written declaration and sworn public statements
renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life-
estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges (b) the urgent motion for accounting and
delivery to the estate of C. N. Hodges of all the
assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges existing as of
May 23, 1957 plus all the rents, emoluments and
income therefrom; (c) various motions to resolve
the aforesaid motion; and (d) manifestation of
September 14, 1964, detailing acts of interference
of Avelina Magno under color of title as
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges.
These matters, according to the instant motion,
are all pre-judicial involving no issues of facts
and only require the resolution of question of
law; that in the motion of October 5, 1963 it is
alleged that in a motion dated December 11, 1957
filed by Atty. Leon Gellada as attorney for the
executor C. N. Hodges, the said executor C. N.
Hodges is not only part owner of the properties
left as conjugal but also the successor to all the
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges.
Said motion of December 11, 1957 was approved by
the Court in consonance with the wishes contained
in the last will and testament of Linnie Jane
Hodges.
65 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
That on April 21, 1959 this Court approved the
inventory and accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges
thru counsel Atty. Leon Gellada in a motion filed
on April 14, 1959 stating therein that executor C.
N. Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of Linnie
Jane Hodges in accordance with the last will and
testament already probated by the Court.
That on July 13, 1960 the Court approved the annual
statement of accounts submitted by the executor C.
N. Hodges thru his counsel Atty. Gellada on July
21, 1960 wherein it is stated that the executor,
C. N. Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges; that on May 2, 1961
the Court approved the annual statement of
accounts submitted by executor, C. N. Hodges for
the year 1960 which was submitted by Atty. Gellada
on April 20, 1961 wherein it is stated that
executor Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges;
That during the hearing on September 5 and 6, 1963
the estate of C. N. Hodges claimed all the assets
belonging to the deceased spouses Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges situated in the
Philippines; that administratrix Magno has
executed illegal acts to the prejudice of the
testate estate of C. N. Hodges.
An opposition (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4415-4421)
dated April 27, 1966 of administratrix Magno has
been filed asking that the motion be denied for
lack of merit and that the motion for the official
declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges be set for presentation and reception of
evidence.
It is alleged in the aforesaid opposition that the
examination of documents which are in the
possession of administratrix Magno can be made
prior to the hearing of the motion for the official
declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, during said hearing.
That the matters raised in the PCIB's motion of
October 5, 1963 (as well as the other motion) dated
September 14, 1964 have been consolidated for the
purpose of presentation and reception of evidence
with the hearing on the determination of the heirs
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. It is further
 alleged in the opposition that the motion for the
official declaration of heirs of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges is the one that constitutes a
prejudicial question to the motions dated October
5 and September 14, 1964 because if said motion is
found meritorious and granted by the Court, the
PCIB's motions of October 5, 1963 and September
14, 1964 will become moot and academic since they
are premised on the assumption and claim that the
only heir of Linnie Jane Hodges was C. N. Hodges.
That the PCIB and counsel are estopped from further
questioning the determination of heirs in the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges at this stage since
it was PCIB as early as January 8, 1965 which filed
a motion for official declaration of heirs of
Linnie Jane Hodges that the claim of any heirs of
Linnie Jane Hodges can be determined only in the
administration proceedings over the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and not that of C. N. Hodges,
since the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges are claiming
her estate and not the estate of C. N. Hodges.
A reply (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4436-4444) dated
May 11, 1966 of the PCIB has been filed alleging
that the motion dated April 22, 1966 of the PCIB
is not to seek deferment of the hearing and
consideration of the motion for official
declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges but to
declare the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
closed and for administratrix Magno to account for
and deliver to the PCIB all assets of the conjugal
partnership of the deceased spouses which has come
to her possession plus all rents and income.
A rejoinder (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4458-4462) of
administratrix Magno dated May 19, 1966 has been
filed alleging that the motion dated December 11,
1957 only sought the approval of all conveyances
made by C. N. Hodges and requested the Court
authority for all subsequent conveyances that will
be executed by C. N. Hodges; that the order dated
December 14, 1957 only approved the conveyances
made by C. N. Hodges; that C. N. Hodges represented
by counsel never made any claim in the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and never filed a motion to
declare himself as the heir of the said Linnie
Jane Hodges despite the lapse of more than five
(5) years after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges;
that it is further alleged in the rejoinder that
there can be no order of adjudication of the estate
66 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
unless there has been a prior express declaration
of heirs and so far no declaration of heirs in the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. 1307) has been
made.
Considering the allegations and arguments in the
motion and of the PCIB as well as those in the
opposition and rejoinder of administratrix Magno,
the Court finds the opposition and rejoinder to be
well taken for the reason that so far there has
been no official declaration of heirs in the
testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and therefore
no disposition of her estate.
WHEREFORE, the motion of the PCIB dated April 22,
1966 is hereby DENIED.
(Annex "W", Petition)
In its motion dated November 24, 1966 for the reconsideration
of this order, petitioner alleged inter alia that:
It cannot be over-stressed that the motion of
December 11, 1957 was based on the fact that:
a. Under the last will and testament
of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges,
the late Charles Newton Hodges was
the sole heir instituted insofar as
her properties in the Philippines are
concerned;
b. Said last will and testament
vested upon the said late Charles
Newton Hodges rights over said
properties which, in sum, spell
ownership, absolute and in fee
simple;
c. Said late Charles Newton Hodges
was, therefore, "not only part owner
of the properties left as conjugal,
but also, the successor to all the
properties left by the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges.
Likewise, it cannot be over-stressed that the
aforesaid motion was granted by this Honorable
Court "for the reasons stated" therein.
 Again, the motion of December 11, 1957 prayed that
not only "all the sales, conveyances, leases, and
mortgages executed by" the late Charles Newton
Hodges, but also all "the subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases, and mortgages ..." be
approved and authorized. This Honorable Court, in
its order of December 14, 1957, "for the reasons
stated" in the aforesaid motion, granted the same,
and not only approved all the sales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of all properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the late
Charles Newton Hodges, but also authorized "all
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of the properties left by the said
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. (Annex "X", Petition)
and reiterated its fundamental pose that the Testate Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges had already been factually, although not
legally, closed with the virtual declaration of Hodges and
adjudication to him, as sole universal heir of all the
properties of the estate of his wife, in the order of December
14, 1957, Annex G. Still unpersuaded, on July 18, 1967,
respondent court denied said motion for reconsideration and held
that "the court believes that there is no justification why the
order of October 12, 1966 should be considered or modified",
and, on July 19, 1967, the motion of respondent Magno "for
official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges", already referred to above, was set for hearing.
In consequence of all these developments, the present petition
was filed on August 1, 1967 (albeit petitioner had to pay another
docketing fee on August 9, 1967, since the orders in question
were issued in two separate testate estate proceedings, Nos.
1307 and 1672, in the court below).
Together with such petition, there are now pending before Us
for resolution herein, appeals from the following:
1. The order of December 19, 1964 authorizing
payment by respondent Magno of overtime pay, (pp.
221, Green Record on Appeal) together with the
subsequent orders of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-
232,id.) October 27, 1965, (pp. 227, id.) and
February 15, 1966 (pp. 455-456, id.) repeatedly
denying motions for reconsideration thereof.
2. The order of August 6, 1965 (pp. 248, id.)
requiring that deeds executed by petitioner to be
co-signed by respondent Magno, as well as the order
67 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
of October 27, 1965 (pp. 276-277) denying
reconsideration.
3. The order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 292-295, id.)
enjoining the deposit of all collections in a joint
account and the same order of February 15, 1966
mentioned in No. 1 above which included the denial
of the reconsideration of this order of October
27, 1965.
4. The order of November 3, 1965 (pp. 313-320, id.)
directing the payment of attorney's fees, fees of
the respondent administratrix, etc. and the order
of February 16, 1966 denying reconsideration
thereof.
5. The order of November 23, 1965 (pp. 334-
335, id.) allowing appellee Western Institute of
Technology to make payments to either one or both
of the administrators of the two estates as well
as the order of March 7, 1966 (p. 462, id.) denying
reconsideration.
6. The various orders hereinabove earlier
enumerated approving deeds of sale executed by
respondent Magno in favor of appellees Carles,
Catedral, Pablito, Guzman, Coronado, Barrido,
Causing, Javier, Lucero and Batisanan, (see pp. 35
to 37 of this opinion), together with the two
separate orders both dated December 2, 1966 (pp.
306-308, and pp. 308-309, Yellow Record on Appeal)
denying reconsideration of said approval.
7. The order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336,
Yellow Record on Appeal, approving similar deeds
of sale executed by respondent Magno, as those in
No. 6, in favor of appellees Pacaonsis and
Premaylon, as to which no motion for
reconsideration was filed.
8. Lastly, the order of December 2, 1966, on pp.
305-306, Yellow Record on Appeal, directing
petitioner to surrender to appellees Lucero,
Batisanan, Javier, Pablito, Barrido, Catedral,
Causing, Guzman, and Coronado, the certificates of
title covering the lands involved in the approved
sales, as to which no motion for reconsideration
was filed either.
Strictly speaking, and considering that the above orders deal
with different matters, just as they affect distinctly different
individuals or persons, as outlined by petitioner in its brief
as appellant on pp. 12-20 thereof, there are, therefore, thirty-
three (33) appeals before Us, for which reason, petitioner has
to pay also thirty-one (31) more docket fees.
It is as well perhaps to state here as elsewhere in this opinion
that in connection with these appeals, petitioner has assigned
a total of seventy-eight (LXXVIII) alleged errors, the
respective discussions and arguments under all of them covering
also the fundamental issues raised in respect to the petition
for certiorari and prohibition, thus making it feasible and more
practical for the Court to dispose of all these cases together.4
The assignments of error read thus:
I to IV
THE ORDER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS
OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G.
IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C.
ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, EXECUTED BY THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF
LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE
EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
V to VIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF
SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES,
ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND
ROSARIO ALINGASA, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR
WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS TO SELL.
IX to XII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF
OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES,
PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA,
WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, WHILE
ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
XIII to XV
68 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS
OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON
(LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA
PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104), EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED
BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE
CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY
HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XVI to XVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF
SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON
(LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA
PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) COVERING PARCELS OF LAND
FOR WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER PAID IN FULL IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS TO SELL.
XIX to XXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF
OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES
ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO
PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104)
WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
XXII to XXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS
OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES LORENZO CARLES,
JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S.
GUZMAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS
TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING
HIS LIFETIME.
XXVI to XXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED
OF SALE EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, LORENZO
CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND
SALVADOR S. GUZMAN PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SPELL
WHICH WERE CANCELLED AND RESCINDED.
XXX to XXXIV
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF
OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE LORENZO
CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND
SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE
COURT.
XXXV to XXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS
OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO
AND PURIFICACION CORONADO, EXECUTED BY THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF
LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE
EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XXXVII to XXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF
SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO
AND PURIFICACION CORONADO, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE IN
ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE ORIGINAL
CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH THEY EXECUTED WITH THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE AMOUNT OF
P10,680.00 and P4,428.90, RESPECTIVELY.
XXXIX to XL
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, OF THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT,
EXERCISED THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATOR, THE INSTANT
APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE
APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION
CORONADO.
XLI to XLIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS
OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO,
ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN,
EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL
COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS
LIFETIME.
XLIV to XLVI
69 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED
OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO,
ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN,
PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL EXECUTED BY THEM
WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, THE
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER
COMPLIED WITH.
XLVII to XLIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, OF HIS RIGHT, EXERCISED
THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATION, THE INSTANT APPELLANT,
TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE APPELLEES,
GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND
MELQUIADES BATISANAN, AND IN DETERMINING THE
RIGHTS OF THE SAID APPELLEES OVER REAL PROPERTY
WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
L
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS
OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING,
EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL
COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS
LIFETIME.
LI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF
SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING,
ALTHOUGH HE WAS IN ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED
UPON IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH HE
EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
IN THE AMOUNT OF P2,337.50.
LII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEED OF
SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING,
ALTHOUGH THE SAME WAS NOT EXECUTED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE RULES OF COURT.
LIII to LXI
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE APPELLANT,
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK TO
SURRENDER THE OWNER'S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATES OF
TITLE OVER THE RESPECTIVE LOTS COVERED BY THE DEEDS
OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
IN FAVOR OF THE OTHER APPELLEES, JOSE PABLICO,
ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, FLRENIA
BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, BELCESAR CAUSING,
ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MAXIMA BATISANAN AND GRACIANO
L. LUCERO.
LXII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RESOLVING THE MOTION OF
THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1965, WITHOUT ANY COPY THEREOF
HAVING BEEN SERVED UPON THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK.
LXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HEARING AND CONSIDERING
THE MOTION OF THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3rd, 1965, ON NOVEMBER
23, 1965, WHEN THE NOTICE FOR THE HEARING THEREOF
WAS FOR NOVEMBER 20, 1965.
LXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPELLEE,
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY A RELIEF OTHER
THAN THAT PRAYED FOR IN ITS MOTION, DATED NOVEMBER
3, 1965, IN THE ABSENCE OF A PRAYER FOR GENERAL
RELIEF CONTAINED THEREIN.
LXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE APPELLEE,
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, TO CONTINUE
PAYMENTS UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF WHICH IT HAS FAILED TO FULFILL.
LXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF
THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY OVER
THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONTRACT
70 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
TO SELL IT EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
LXVII
LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE CONTINUATION OF
PAYMENTS BY THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL EXECUTED BY IT
AND THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, TO A
PERSON OTHER THAN HIS LAWFULLY APPOINTED
ADMINISTRATOR.
LXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF
RETAINER'S FEES FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS
NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF
RETAINER'S FEES OF LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE
HODGES.
LXX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPLEMENTING THE ALLEGED
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE HEIRS OF THE SUPPOSED ESTATE
OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, AND THEIR
LAWYERS.
LXXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE
DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR
BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF RETAINER'S FEES.
LXXII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT ALL FINAL
DEEDS OF SALE EXECUTED PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO
SELL ENTERED INTO BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, DURING HIS LIFETIME, BE SIGNED JOINTLY BY
THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, AND THE APPELLANT,
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND NOT
 BY THE LATTER ONLY AS THE LAWFULLY APPOINTED
ADMINISTRATOR OF HIS ESTATE.
LXXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF
LEGAL EXPENSES FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS
NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF
LEGAL EXPENSES OF LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE
HODGES.
LXXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE
DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR
BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF LEGAL EXPENSES.
LXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF
COMPENSATION TO THE PURPORTED ADMINISTRATRIX OF
THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE
HODGES, THE INSTANT APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
WHEN THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS
THEREOF.
LXXVII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE FUNDS
OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, BE PLACED IN A JOINT ACCOUNT OF THE
APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
BANK, AND THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, WHO IS
A COMPLETE STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE.
LXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, BE GIVEN EQUAL ACCESS
TO THE RECORDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, WHEN SHE IS A
71 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
COMPLETE STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE. (Pp.
73-83, Appellant's Brief.)
To complete this rather elaborate, and unavoidably extended
narration of the factual setting of these cases, it may also be
mentioned that an attempt was made by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges
to have respondent Magno removed as administratrix, with the
proposed appointment of Benito J. Lopez in her place, and that
respondent court did actually order such proposed replacement,
but the Court declared the said order of respondent court
violative of its injunction of August 8, 1967, hence without
force and effect (see Resolution of September 8, 1972 and
February 1, 1973). Subsequently, Atty. Efrain B. Trenas, one of
the lawyers of said heirs, appeared no longer for the proposed
administrator Lopez but for the heirs themselves, and in a
motion dated October 26, 1972 informed the Court that a motion
had been filed with respondent court for the removal of
petitioner PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges
in Special Proceedings 1672, which removal motion alleged that
22.968149% of the share of C. N. Hodges had already been acquired
by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges from certain heirs of her husband.
Further, in this connection, in the answer of PCIB to the motion
of respondent Magno to have it declared in contempt for
disregarding the Court's resolution of September 8, 1972
modifying the injunction of August 8, 1967, said petitioner
annexed thereto a joint manifestation and motion, appearing to
have been filed with respondent court, informing said court that
in addition to the fact that 22% of the share of C. N. Hodges
had already been bought by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as already
stated, certain other heirs of Hodges representing 17.343750%
of his estate were joining cause with the heirs of Mrs. Hodges
as against PCIB, thereby making somewhat precarious, if not
possibly untenable, petitioners' continuation as administrator
of the Hodges estate.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUES IN THE CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION CASES
I
As to the Alleged Tardiness
of the Present Appeals
The priority question raised by respondent Magno relates to the
alleged tardiness of all the aforementioned thirty-three appeals
of PCIB. Considering, however, that these appeals revolve around
practically the same main issues and that it is admitted that
some of them have been timely taken, and, moreover, their final
results hereinbelow to be stated and explained make it of no
consequence whether or not the orders concerned have become
final by the lapsing of the respective periods to appeal them,
We do not deem it necessary to pass upon the timeliness of any
of said appeals.
II
The Propriety Here of Certiorari
Prohibition instead of Appeal
The other preliminary point of the same respondent is alleged
impropriety of the special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition in view of the existence of the remedy of appeal
which it claims is proven by the very appeals now before Us.
Such contention fails to take into account that there is a
common thread among the basic issues involved in all these
thirty-three appeals which, unless resolved in one single
proceeding, will inevitably cause the proliferation of more or
less similar or closely related incidents and consequent
eventual appeals. If for this consideration alone, and without
taking account anymore of the unnecessary additional effort,
expense and time which would be involved in as many individual
appeals as the number of such incidents, it is logical and
proper to hold, as We do hold, that the remedy of appeal is not
adequate in the present cases. In determining whether or not a
special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may be
resorted to in lieu of appeal, in instances wherein lack or
excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion is alleged,
it is not enough that the remedy of appeal exists or is possible.
It is indispensable that taking all the relevant circumstances
of the given case, appeal would better serve the interests of
justice. Obviously, the longer delay, augmented expense and
trouble and unnecessary repetition of the same work attendant
to the present multiple appeals, which, after all, deal with
practically the same basic issues that can be more expeditiously
resolved or determined in a single special civil action, make
the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, pursued by
petitioner, preferable, for purposes of resolving the common
basic issues raised in all of them, despite the conceded
availability of appeal. Besides, the settling of such common
fundamental issues would naturally minimize the areas of
conflict between the parties and render more simple the
determination of the secondary issues in each of them.
Accordingly, respondent Magno's objection to the present remedy
of certiorariand prohibition must be overruled.
We come now to the errors assigned by petitioner-appellant,
Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, (PCIB, for short) in
the petition as well as in its main brief as appellant.
III
72 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
On Whether or Not There is Still Any Part of the Testate
Estate Mrs. Hodges that may be Adjudicated to her brothers
and sisters as her estate, of which respondent Magno is the
unquestioned Administratrix in special Proceedings 1307.
In the petition, it is the position of PCIB that the respondent
and court exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion
in further recognizing after December 14, 1957 the existence of
the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and in sanctioning
purported acts of administration therein of respondent Magno.
Main ground for such posture is that by the aforequoted order
of respondent court of said date, Hodges was already allowed to
assert and exercise all his rights as universal heir of his wife
pursuant to the provisions of her will, quoted earlier, hence,
nothing else remains to be done in Special Proceedings 1307
except to formally close it. In other words, the contention of
PCIB is that in view of said order, nothing more than a formal
declaration of Hodges as sole and exclusive heir of his wife
and the consequent formal unqualified adjudication to him of
all her estate remain to be done to completely close Special
Proceedings 1307, hence respondent Magno should be considered
as having ceased to be Administratrix of the Testate Estate of
Mrs. Hodges since then.
After carefully going over the record, We feel constrained to
hold that such pose is patently untenable from whatever angle
it is examined.
To start with, We cannot find anywhere in respondent Order of
December 14, 1957 the sense being read into it by PCIB. The
tenor of said order bears no suggestion at all to such effect.
The declaration of heirs and distribution by the probate court
of the estate of a decedent is its most important function, and
this Court is not disposed to encourage judges of probate
proceedings to be less than definite, plain and specific in
making orders in such regard, if for no other reason than that
all parties concerned, like the heirs, the creditors, and most
of all the government, the devisees and legatees, should know
with certainty what are and when their respective rights and
obligations ensuing from the inheritance or in relation thereto
would begin or cease, as the case may be, thereby avoiding
precisely the legal complications and consequent litigations
similar to those that have developed unnecessarily in the
present cases. While it is true that in instances wherein all
the parties interested in the estate of a deceased person have
already actually distributed among themselves their respective
shares therein to the satisfaction of everyone concerned and no
rights of creditors or third parties are adversely affected, it
would naturally be almost ministerial for the court to issue
the final order of declaration and distribution, still it is
inconceivable that the special proceeding instituted for the
purpose may be considered terminated, the respective rights of
all the parties concerned be deemed definitely settled, and the
executor or administrator thereof be regarded as automatically
discharged and relieved already of all functions and
responsibilities without the corresponding definite orders of
the probate court to such effect.
Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and
unequivocal. Section 1 of Rule 90 provides:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue
made. — When the debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration, the allowance to the
widow and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to
the estate in accordance with law have been paid,
the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the
estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall
assign the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled to the same, naming them and the
proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled,
and such persons may demand and recover their
respective shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person having the same
in his possession. If there is a controversy before
the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares
to which each person is entitled under the law,
the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment
of the obligations above mentioned has been made
or provided for, unless the distributees, or any
of them give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.
These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order
that a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
may be deemed ready for final closure, (1) there should have
been issued already an order of distribution or assignment of
the estate of the decedent among or to those entitled thereto
by will or by law, but (2) such order shall not be issued until
after it is shown that the "debts, funeral expenses, expenses
of administration, allowances, taxes, etc. chargeable to the
estate" have been paid, which is but logical and proper. (3)
Besides, such an order is usually issued upon proper and
specific application for the purpose of the interested party or
parties, and not of the court.
73 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
... it is only after, and not before, the payment
of all debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax shall have been effected that the
court should make a declaration of heirs or of
such persons as are entitled by law to the residue.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 2nd ed.,
Vol. II, p. 397, citing Capistrano vs. Nadurata,
49 Phil., 726; Lopez vs. Lopez, 37 Off. Gaz.,
3091.) (JIMOGA-ON v. BELMONTE, 84 Phil. 545, 548)
(p. 86, Appellee's Brief)
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
(corresponding to Section 1, Rule 90) what brings
an intestate (or testate) proceeding to a close is
the order of distribution directing delivery of
the residue to the persons entitled thereto after
paying the indebtedness, if any, left by the
deceased. (Santiesteban vs. Santiesteban, 68 Phil.
367, 370.)
In the cases at bar, We cannot discern from the voluminous and
varied facts, pleadings and orders before Us that the above
indispensable prerequisites for the declaration of heirs and
the adjudication of the estate of Mrs. Hodges had already been
complied with when the order of December 14, 1957 was issued.
As already stated, We are not persuaded that the proceedings
leading to the issuance of said order, constituting barely of
the motion of May 27, 1957, Annex D of the petition, the order
of even date, Annex E, and the motion of December 11, 1957,
Annex H, all aforequoted, are what the law contemplates. We
cannot see in the order of December 14, 1957, so much relied
upon by the petitioner, anything more than an explicit approval
of "all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all the
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by
the Executor Charles N. Hodges" (after the death of his wife
and prior to the date of the motion), plus a general advance
authorization to enable said "Executor — to execute subsequent
sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left
the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with wishes
conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter", which,
certainly, cannot amount to the order of adjudication of the
estate of the decedent to Hodges contemplated in the law. In
fact, the motion of December 11, 1957 on which the court
predicated the order in question did not pray for any such
adjudication at all. What is more, although said motion did
allege that "herein Executor (Hodges) is not only part owner of
the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all
the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", it
significantly added that "herein Executor, as Legatee (sic),
has the right to sell, convey, lease or dispose of the properties
in the Philippines — during his lifetime", thereby indicating
that what said motion contemplated was nothing more than either
the enjoyment by Hodges of his rights under the particular
portion of the dispositions of his wife's will which were to be
operative only during his lifetime or the use of his own share
of the conjugal estate, pending the termination of the
proceedings. In other words, the authority referred to in said
motions and orders is in the nature of that contemplated either
in Section 2 of Rule 109 which permits, in appropriate cases,
advance or partial implementation of the terms of a duly
probated will before final adjudication or distribution when
the rights of third parties would not be adversely affected
thereby or in the established practice of allowing the surviving
spouse to dispose of his own share of he conjugal estate, pending
its final liquidation, when it appears that no creditors of the
conjugal partnership would be prejudiced thereby, (see the
Revised Rules of Court by Francisco, Vol. V-B, 1970 ed. p. 887)
albeit, from the tenor of said motions, We are more inclined to
believe that Hodges meant to refer to the former. In any event,
We are fully persuaded that the quoted allegations of said
motions read together cannot be construed as a repudiation of
the rights unequivocally established in the will in favor of
Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters to whatever have not been
disposed of by him up to his death.
Indeed, nowhere in the record does it appear that the trial
court subsequently acted upon the premise suggested by
petitioner. On the contrary, on November 23, 1965, when the
court resolved the motion of appellee Western Institute of
Technology by its order We have quoted earlier, it categorically
held that as of said date, November 23, 1965, "in both cases
(Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet no judicial
declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to
whomsoever are entitled thereto." In this connection, it may be
stated further against petitioner, by way of some kind of
estoppel, that in its own motion of January 8, 1965, already
quoted in full on pages 54-67 of this decision, it prayed inter
alia that the court declare that "C. N. Hodges was the sole and
exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", which it
would not have done if it were really convinced that the order
of December 14, 1957 was already the order of adjudication and
distribution of her estate. That said motion was later withdrawn
when Magno filed her own motion for determination and
adjudication of what should correspond to the brothers and
sisters of Mrs. Hodges does not alter the indubitable
implication of the prayer of the withdrawn motion.
It must be borne in mind that while it is true that Mrs. Hodges
bequeathed her whole estate to her husband and gave him what
74 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
amounts to full powers of dominion over the same during his
lifetime, she imposed at the same time the condition that
whatever should remain thereof upon his death should go to her
brothers and sisters. In effect, therefore, what was absolutely
given to Hodges was only so much of his wife's estate as he
might possibly dispose of during his lifetime; hence, even
assuming that by the allegations in his motion, he did intend
to adjudicate the whole estate to himself, as suggested by
petitioner, such unilateral act could not have affected or
diminished in any degree or manner the right of his brothers
and sisters-in-law over what would remain thereof upon his
death, for surely, no one can rightly contend that the
testamentary provision in question allowed him to so adjudicate
any part of the estate to himself as to prejudice them. In other
words, irrespective of whatever might have been Hodges'
intention in his motions, as Executor, of May 27, 1957 and
December 11, 1957, the trial court's orders granting said
motions, even in the terms in which they have been worded, could
not have had the effect of an absolute and unconditional
adjudication unto Hodges of the whole estate of his wife. None
of them could have deprived his brothers and sisters-in-law of
their rights under said will. And it may be added here that the
fact that no one appeared to oppose the motions in question may
only be attributed, firstly, to the failure of Hodges to send
notices to any of them, as admitted in the motion itself, and,
secondly, to the fact that even if they had been notified, they
could not have taken said motions to be for the final
distribution and adjudication of the estate, but merely for him
to be able, pending such final distribution and adjudication,
to either exercise during his lifetime rights of dominion over
his wife's estate in accordance with the bequest in his favor,
which, as already observed, may be allowed under the broad terms
of Section 2 of Rule 109, or make use of his own share of the
conjugal estate. In any event, We do not believe that the trial
court could have acted in the sense pretended by petitioner,
not only because of the clear language of the will but also
because none of the interested parties had been duly notified
of the motion and hearing thereof. Stated differently, if the
orders of May 27, 1957 and December 4, 1957 were really intended
to be read in the sense contended by petitioner, We would have
no hesitancy in declaring them null and void.
Petitioner cites the case of Austria vs. Ventenilla, G. R. No.
L-10018, September 19, 1956, (unreported but a partial digest
thereof appears in 99 Phil. 1069) in support of its insistence
that with the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957, the closure
of Mrs. Hodges' estate has become a mere formality, inasmuch as
said orders amounted to the order of adjudication and
distribution ordained by Section 1 of Rule 90. But the parallel
attempted to be drawn between that case and the present one does
not hold. There the trial court had in fact issued a clear,
distinct and express order of adjudication and distribution more
than twenty years before the other heirs of the deceased filed
their motion asking that the administratrix be removed, etc. As
quoted in that decision, the order of the lower court in that
respect read as follows:
En orden a la mocion de la administradora, el
juzgado la encuentra procedente bajo la condicion
de que no se hara entrega ni adjudicacion de los
bienes a los herederos antes de que estos presten
la fianza correspondiente y de acuerdo con lo
prescrito en el Art. 754 del Codigo de
Procedimientos: pues, en autos no aparece que
hayan sido nombrados comisionados de avaluo y
reclamaciones. Dicha fianza podra ser por un valor
igual al de los bienes que correspondan a cada
heredero segun el testamento. Creo que no es obice
para la terminacion del expediente el hecho de que
la administradora no ha presentado hasta ahora el
inventario de los bienes; pues, segun la ley, estan
exentos de esta formalidad os administradores que
son legatarios del residuo o remanente de los
bienes y hayan prestado fianza para responder de
las gestiones de su cargo, y aparece en el
testamento que la administradora Alejandra Austria
reune dicha condicion.
POR TODO LO EXPUESTO, el juzgado declara, 1.o: no
haber lugar a la mocion de Ramon Ventenilla y
otros; 2.o, declara asimismo que los unicos
herederos del finado Antonio Ventenilla son su
esposa Alejandra Austria, Maria Ventenilla,
hermana del testador, y Ramon Ventenilla, Maria
Ventenilla, Ramon Soriano, Eulalio Soriano, Jose
Soriano, Gabriela Ventenilla, Lorenzo Ventenilla,
Felicitas Ventenilla, Eugenio Ventenilla y speaking, the terms of his wife's will did not give him such a
Alejandra Ventenilla, en representacion de los
difuntos Juan, Tomas, Catalino y Froilan, hermanos
del testador, declarando, ademas que la heredera
Alejandra Austria tiene derecho al remanente de
todos los bienes dejados por el finado, despues de
deducir de ellos la porcion que corresponde a cada
uno de sus coherederos, conforme esta mandado en
las clausulas 8.a, 9.a, 10.a, 11.a, 12.a y 13.a
del testamento; 3.o, se aprueba el pago hecho por
la administradora de los gastos de la ultima
enfermedad y funerales del testador, de la
donacion hecha por el testador a favor de la
Escuela a Publica del Municipio de Mangatarem, y
de las misas en sufragio del alma del finado; 4.o,
que una vez prestada la fianza mencionada al
principio de este auto, se haga la entrega y
75 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
adjudicacion de los bienes, conforme se dispone en
el testamento y se acaba de declarar en este auto;
5.o, y, finalmente, que verificada la
adjudicacion, se dara por terminada la
administracion, revelandole toda responsabilidad
a la administradora, y cancelando su fianza.
ASI SE ORDENA.
Undoubtedly, after the issuance of an order of such tenor, the
closure of any proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
a deceased person cannot be but perfunctory.
In the case at bar, as already pointed out above, the two orders
relied upon by petitioner do not appear ex-facie to be of the
same tenor and nature as the order just quoted, and, what is
more, the circumstances attendant to its issuance do not suggest
that such was the intention of the court, for nothing could have
been more violative of the will of Mrs. Hodges.
Indeed, to infer from Hodges' said motions and from his
statements of accounts for the years 1958, 1959 and 1960, A
Annexes I, K and M, respectively, wherein he repeatedly claimed
that "herein executor (being) the only devisee or legatee of
the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament
already probated," there is "no (other) person interested in
the Philippines of the time and place of examining herein
account to be given notice", an intent to adjudicate unto
himself the whole of his wife's estate in an absolute manner
and without regard to the contingent interests of her brothers
and sisters, is to impute bad faith to him, an imputation which
is not legally permissible, much less warranted by the facts of
record herein. Hodges knew or ought to have known that, legally
right. Factually, there are enough circumstances extant in the
records of these cases indicating that he had no such intention
to ignore the rights of his co-heirs. In his very motions in
question, Hodges alleged, thru counsel, that the "deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants and
ascendants, except brothers and sisters and herein petitioner,
as surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent",
and even promised that "proper accounting will be had — in all
these transactions" which he had submitted for approval and
authorization by the court, thereby implying that he was aware
of his responsibilities vis-a-vis his co-heirs. As alleged by
respondent Magno in her brief as appellee:
Under date of April 14, 1959, C. N. Hodges filed
his first "Account by the Executor" of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of
 Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1958 annexed
thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined
conjugal estate earned a net income of
P328,402.62, divided evenly between him and the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he
filed an "individual income tax return" for
calendar year 1958 on the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as
having earned income of P164,201.31, exactly one-
half of the net income of his combined personal
assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)
Under date of July 21, 1960, C. N. Hodges filed
his second "Annual Statement of Account by the
Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In
the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and
the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December
31, 1959 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported
that the combined conjugal estate earned a net
income of P270,623.32, divided evenly between him
and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to
this, he filed an "individual income tax return"
for calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate
as having earned income of P135,311.66, exactly
one-half of the net income of his combined personal
assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (pp. 91-92, id.)
Under date of April 20, 1961, C. N. Hodges filed
his third "Annual Statement of Account by the
Executor for the year 1960" of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Net Worth of Mr.
C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges"
as of December 31, 1960 annexed thereto, C. N.
Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate
earned a net income of P314,857.94, divided of
Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an
"individual evenly between him and the estate
income tax return" for calendar year 1960 on the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under
oath, the said estate as having earned income of
P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net income of
his combined personal assets and that of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 92-93, id.)
In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed,
he listed the seven brothers and sisters of Linnie
Jane as her "heirs" (see p. 2, Green ROA). The
76 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
order of the court admitting the will to probate
unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon
(see p. 14, Green ROA). Immediately, C. N. Hodges
filed a verified motion to have Roy Higdon's name
included as an heir, stating that he wanted to
straighten the records "in order (that) the heirs
of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe
they were omitted, and that they were really and
are interested in the estate of deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges".
Thus, he recognized, if in his own way, the separate identity
of his wife's estate from his own share of the conjugal
partnership up to the time of his death, more than five years
after that of his wife. He never considered the whole estate as
a single one belonging exclusively to himself. The only
conclusion one can gather from this is that he could have been
preparing the basis for the eventual transmission of his wife's
estate, or, at least, so much thereof as he would not have been
able to dispose of during his lifetime, to her brothers and
sisters in accordance with her expressed desire, as intimated
in his tax return in the United States to be more extensively
referred to anon. And assuming that he did pay the corresponding
estate and inheritance taxes in the Philippines on the basis of
his being sole heir, such payment is not necessarily
inconsistent with his recognition of the rights of his co-heirs.
Without purporting to rule definitely on the matter in these
proceedings, We might say here that We are inclined to the view
that under the peculiar provisions of his wife's will, and for
purposes of the applicable inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to
be considered as her sole heir, pending the actual transmission
of the remaining portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon
the eventuality of his death, and whatever adjustment might be
warranted should there be any such remainder then is a matter
that could well be taken care of by the internal revenue
authorities in due time.
It is to be noted that the lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who
signed the motions of May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957 and
the aforementioned statements of account was the very same one
who also subsequently signed and filed the motion of December
26, 1962 for the appointment of respondent Magno as
"Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Linnie Jane Hodges"
wherein it was alleged that "in accordance with the provisions
of the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever
real properties that may remain at the death of her husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, the said properties shall be equally
divided among their heirs." And it appearing that said attorney
was Hodges' lawyer as Executor of the estate of his wife, it
stands to reason that his understanding of the situation,
implicit in his allegations just quoted, could somehow
reflective of Hodges' own understanding thereof.
As a matter of fact, the allegations in the motion of the same
Atty. Gellada dated July 1, 1957, a "Request for Inclusion of
the Name of Roy Higdon in the Order of the Court dated July 19,
1957, etc.", reference to which is made in the above quotation
from respondent Magno's brief, are over the oath of Hodges
himself, who verified the motion. Said allegations read:
1. — That the Hon. Court issued orders dated June
29, 1957, ordering the probate of the will.
2. — That in said order of the Hon. Court, the
relatives of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges were
enumerated. However, in the petition as well as in
the testimony of Executor during the hearing, the
name Roy Higdon was mentioned, but deceased. It
was unintentionally omitted the heirs of said Roy
Higdon who are his wife Aline Higdon and son David
Higdon, all of age, and residents of Quinlan,
Texas, U.S.A.
3. — That to straighten the records, and in order
the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or
believe they were omitted, and that they were
really and are interested in the estate of deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges, it is requested of the Hon.
Court to insert the names of Aline Higdon and David
Higdon, wife and son of deceased Roy Higdon in the
said order of the Hon. Court dated June 29, 1957.
(pars. 1 to 3, Annex 2 of Magno's Answer — Record,
p. 260)
As can be seen, these italicized allegations indicate, more or
less, the real attitude of Hodges in regard to the testamentary
dispositions of his wife.
In connection with this point of Hodges' intent, We note that
there are documents, copies of which are annexed to respondent
Magno's answer, which purportedly contain Hodges' own solemn
declarations recognizing the right of his co-heirs, such as the
alleged tax return he filed with the United States Taxation
authorities, identified as Schedule M, (Annex 4 of her answer)
and his supposed affidavit of renunciation, Annex 5. In said
Schedule M, Hodges appears to have answered the pertinent
question thus:
77 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
be 2a. Had the surviving spouse the right to declare
an election between (1) the provisions made in his
or her favor by the will and (11) dower, curtesy
or a statutory interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
2d. Does the surviving spouse contemplate
renouncing the will and electing to take dower,
curtesy, or a statutory interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
3. According to the information and belief of the
person or persons filing the return, is any action
described under question 1 designed or
contemplated? ( ) Yes (X) No (Annex 4, Answer —
Record, p. 263)
and to have further stated under the item, "Description of
property interests passing to surviving spouse" the following:
None, except for purposes of administering the
Estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal
charges. It is the intention of the surviving
husband of deceased to distribute the remaining
property and interests of the deceased in their
Community Estate to the devisees and legatees
named in the will when the debts, liabilities,
taxes and expenses of administration are finally
determined and paid. (Annex 4, Answer — Record, p.
263)
In addition, in the supposed affidavit of Hodges, Annex 5, it
is stated:
I, C. N. Hodges, being duly sworn, on oath affirm
that at the time the United States Estate Tax
Return was filed in the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges on August 8, 1958, I renounced and
disclaimed any and all right to receive the rents,
emoluments and income from said estate, as shown
by the statement contained in Schedule M at page
29 of said return, a copy of which schedule is
attached to this affidavit and made a part hereof.
The purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and
confirm, and I do hereby ratify and confirm, the
declaration made in Schedule M of said return and
hereby formally disclaim and renounce any right on
my part to receive any of the said rents,
emoluments and income from the estate of my
deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This affidavit
 is made to absolve me or my estate from any
liability for the payment of income taxes on income
which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges since the death of the said Linnie Jane
Hodges on May 23, 1957. (Annex 5, Answer — Record,
p. 264)
Although it appears that said documents were not duly presented
as evidence in the court below, and We cannot, therefore, rely
on them for the purpose of the present proceedings, still, We
cannot close our eyes to their existence in the record nor fail
to note that their tenor jibes with Our conclusion discussed
above from the circumstances related to the orders of May 27
and December 14, 1957. 5 Somehow, these documents, considering
they are supposed to be copies of their originals found in the
official files of the governments of the United States and of
the Philippines, serve to lessen any possible apprehension that
Our conclusion from the other evidence of Hodges' manifest
intent vis-a-vis the rights of his co-heirs is without basis in
fact.
Verily, with such eloquent manifestations of his good intentions
towards the other heirs of his wife, We find it very hard to
believe that Hodges did ask the court and that the latter agreed
that he be declared her sole heir and that her whole estate be
adjudicated to him without so much as just annotating the
contingent interest of her brothers and sisters in what would
remain thereof upon his demise. On the contrary, it seems to us
more factual and fairer to assume that Hodges was well aware of
his position as executor of the will of his wife and, as such,
had in mind the following admonition made by the Court
in Pamittan vs. Lasam, et al., 60 Phil., 908, at pp. 913-914:
Upon the death of Bernarda in September, 1908,
said lands continued to be conjugal property in
the hands of the defendant Lasam. It is provided
in article 1418 of the Civil Code that upon the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, an
inventory shall immediately be made and this court
in construing this provision in connection with
section 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure (prior
to its amendment by Act No. 3176 of November 24,
1924) has repeatedly held that in the event of the
death of the wife, the law imposes upon the husband
the duty of liquidating the affairs of the
partnership without delay (desde luego) (Alfonso
vs. Natividad, 6 Phil., 240; Prado vs. Lagera, 7
Phil., 395; De la Rama vs. De la Rama, 7 Phil.,
745; Enriquez vs. Victoria, 10 Phil., 10; Amancio
vs. Pardo, 13 Phil., 297; Rojas vs. Singson
Tongson, 17 Phil., 476; Sochayseng vs. Trujillo,
78 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
31 Phil., 153; Molera vs. Molera, 40 Phil., 566;
Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose, 41 Phil., 713.)
In the last mentioned case this court quoted with
approval the case of Leatherwood vs. Arnold (66
Texas, 414, 416, 417), in which that court
discussed the powers of the surviving spouse in
the administration of the community property.
Attention was called to the fact that the surviving
husband, in the management of the conjugal
property after the death of the wife, was a trustee
of unique character who is liable for any fraud
committed by him with relation to the property
while he is charged with its administration. In
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, he
had wide powers (as the law stood prior to Act No.
3176) and the high degree of trust reposed in him
stands out more clearly in view of the fact that
he was the owner of a half interest in his own
right of the conjugal estate which he was charged
to administer. He could therefore no more acquire
a title by prescription against those for whom he
was administering the conjugal estate than could
a guardian against his ward or a judicial
administrator against the heirs of estate. Section
38 of Chapter III of the Code of Civil Procedure,
with relation to prescription, provides that "this
chapter shall not apply ... in the case of a
continuing and subsisting trust." The surviving
husband in the administration and liquidation of
the conjugal estate occupies the position of a
trustee of the highest order and is not permitted
by the law to hold that estate or any portion
thereof adversely to those for whose benefit the
law imposes upon him the duty of administration
and liquidation. No liquidation was ever made by
Lasam — hence, the conjugal property which came
into his possession on the death of his wife in
September, 1908, still remains conjugal property,
a continuing and subsisting trust. He should have
made a liquidation immediately (desde luego). He
cannot now be permitted to take advantage of his
own wrong. One of the conditions of title by
prescription (section 41, Code of Civil Procedure)
is possession "under a claim of title exclusive of
any other right". For a trustee to make such a
claim would be a manifest fraud.
And knowing thus his responsibilities in the premises, We are
not convinced that Hodges arrogated everything unto himself
leaving nothing at all to be inherited by his wife's brothers
and sisters.
PCIB insists, however, that to read the orders of May 27 and
December 14, 1957, not as adjudicatory, but merely as approving
past and authorizing future dispositions made by Hodges in a
wholesale and general manner, would necessarily render the said
orders void for being violative of the provisions of Rule 89
governing the manner in which such dispositions may be made and
how the authority therefor and approval thereof by the probate
court may be secured. If We sustained such a view, the result
would only be that the said orders should be declared
ineffective either way they are understood, considering We have
already seen it is legally impossible to consider them as
adjudicatory. As a matter of fact, however, what surges
immediately to the surface, relative to PCIB's observations
based on Rule 89, is that from such point of view, the supposed
irregularity would involve no more than some non-jurisdictional
technicalities of procedure, which have for their evident
fundamental purpose the protection of parties interested in the
estate, such as the heirs, its creditors, particularly the
government on account of the taxes due it; and since it is
apparent here that none of such parties are objecting to said
orders or would be prejudiced by the unobservance by the trial
court of the procedure pointed out by PCIB, We find no legal
inconvenience in nor impediment to Our giving sanction to the
blanket approval and authority contained in said orders. This
solution is definitely preferable in law and in equity, for to
view said orders in the sense suggested by PCIB would result in
the deprivation of substantive rights to the brothers and
sisters of Mrs. Hodges, whereas reading them the other way will
not cause any prejudice to anyone, and, withal, will give peace
of mind and stability of rights to the innocent parties who
relied on them in good faith, in the light of the peculiar
pertinent provisions of the will of said decedent.
Now, the inventory submitted by Hodges on May 12, 1958 referred
to the estate of his wife as consisting of "One-half of all the
items designated in the balance sheet, copy of which is hereto
attached and marked as "Annex A"." Although, regrettably, no
copy of said Annex A appears in the records before Us, We take
judicial notice, on the basis of the undisputed facts in these
cases, that the same consists of considerable real and other
personal kinds of properties. And since, according to her will,
her husband was to be the sole owner thereof during his lifetime,
with full power and authority to dispose of any of them, provided
that should there be any remainder upon his death, such
remainder would go to her brothers and sisters, and furthermore,
there is no pretension, much less any proof that Hodges had in
fact disposed of all of them, and, on the contrary, the
indications are rather to the effect that he had kept them more
79 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
or less intact, it cannot truthfully be said that, upon the
death of Hodges, there was no more estate of Mrs. Hodges to
speak of. It is Our conclusion, therefore, that properties do
exist which constitute such estate, hence Special Proceedings
1307 should not yet be closed.
Neither is there basis for holding that respondent Magno has
ceased to be the Administratrix in said proceeding. There is no
showing that she has ever been legally removed as such, the
attempt to replace her with Mr. Benito Lopez without authority
from the Court having been expressly held ineffective by Our
resolution of September 8, 1972. Parenthetically, on this last
point, PCIB itself is very emphatic in stressing that it is not
questioning said respondent's status as such administratrix.
Indeed, it is not clear that PCIB has any standing to raise any
objection thereto, considering it is a complete stranger insofar
as the estate of Mrs. Hodges is concerned.
It is the contention of PCIB, however, that as things actually
stood at the time of Hodges' death, their conjugal partnership
had not yet been liquidated and, inasmuch as the properties
composing the same were thus commingled pro indiviso and,
consequently, the properties pertaining to the estate of each
of the spouses are not yet identifiable, it is PCIB alone, as
administrator of the estate of Hodges, who should administer
everything, and all that respondent Magno can do for the time
being is to wait until the properties constituting the remaining
estate of Mrs. Hodges have been duly segregated and delivered
to her for her own administration. Seemingly, PCIB would liken
the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges to a party having a
claim of ownership to some properties included in the inventory
of an administrator of the estate of a decedent, (here that of
Hodges) and who normally has no right to take part in the
proceedings pending the establishment of his right or title;
for which as a rule it is required that an ordinary action
should be filed, since the probate court is without jurisdiction
to pass with finality on questions of title between the estate
of the deceased, on the one hand, and a third party or even an
heir claiming adversely against the estate, on the other.
We do not find such contention sufficiently persuasive. As We
see it, the situation obtaining herein cannot be compared with
the claim of a third party the basis of which is alien to the
pending probate proceedings. In the present cases what gave rise
to the claim of PCIB of exclusive ownership by the estate of
Hodges over all the properties of the Hodges spouses, including
the share of Mrs. Hodges in the community properties, were the
orders of the trial court issued in the course of the very
settlement proceedings themselves, more specifically, the
orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 so often mentioned above.
In other words, the root of the issue of title between the
parties is something that the court itself has done in the
exercise of its probate jurisdiction. And since in the ultimate
analysis, the question of whether or not all the properties
herein involved pertain exclusively to the estate of Hodges
depends on the legal meaning and effect of said orders, the
claim that respondent court has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and decide the said issue is incorrect. If it was
within the competence of the court to issue the root orders,
why should it not be within its authority to declare their true
significance and intent, to the end that the parties may know
whether or not the estate of Mrs. Hodges had already been
adjudicated by the court, upon the initiative of Hodges, in his
favor, to the exclusion of the other heirs of his wife instituted
in her will?
At this point, it bears emphasis again that the main cause of
all the present problems confronting the courts and the parties
in these cases was the failure of Hodges to secure, as executor
of his wife's estate, from May, 1957 up to the time of his death
in December, 1962, a period of more than five years, the final
adjudication of her estate and the closure of the proceedings.
The record is bare of any showing that he ever exerted any
effort towards the early settlement of said estate. While, on
the one hand, there are enough indications, as already discuss
that he had intentions of leaving intact her share of the
conjugal properties so that it may pass wholly to his co-heirs
upon his death, pursuant to her will, on the other hand, by not
terminating the proceedings, his interests in his own half of
the conjugal properties remained commingled pro-indiviso with
those of his co-heirs in the other half. Obviously, such a
situation could not be conducive to ready ascertainment of the
portion of the inheritance that should appertain to his co-heirs
upon his death. Having these considerations in mind, it would
be giving a premium for such procrastination and rather unfair
to his co-heirs, if the administrator of his estate were to be
given exclusive administration of all the properties in
question, which would necessarily include the function of
promptly liquidating the conjugal partnership, thereby
identifying and segregating without unnecessary loss of time
which properties should be considered as constituting the estate
of Mrs. Hodges, the remainder of which her brothers and sisters
are supposed to inherit equally among themselves.
To be sure, an administrator is not supposed to represent the
interests of any particular party and his acts are deemed to be
objectively for the protection of the rights of everybody
concerned with the estate of the decedent, and from this point
of view, it maybe said that even if PCIB were to act alone,
there should be no fear of undue disadvantage to anyone. On the
other hand, however, it is evidently implicit in section 6 of
Rule 78 fixing the priority among those to whom letters of
80 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
administration should be granted that the criterion in the
selection of the administrator is not his impartiality alone
but, more importantly, the extent of his interest in the estate,
so much so that the one assumed to have greater interest is
preferred to another who has less. Taking both of these
considerations into account, inasmuch as, according to Hodges'
own inventory submitted by him as Executor of the estate of his
wife, practically all their properties were conjugal which means
that the spouses have equal shares therein, it is but logical
that both estates should be administered jointly by
representatives of both, pending their segregation from each
other. Particularly is such an arrangement warranted because
the actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit
groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges
from their inheritance. Besides, to allow PCIB, the
administrator of his estate, to perform now what Hodges was duty
bound to do as executor is to violate the spirit, if not the
letter, of Section 2 of Rule 78 which expressly provides that
"The executor of an executor shall not, as such, administer the
estate of the first testator." It goes without saying that this
provision refers also to the administrator of an executor like
PCIB here.
We are not unmindful of the fact that under Section 2 of Rule
73, "When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband
or wife, the community property shall be inventoried,
administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If
both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be
liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either."
Indeed, it is true that the last sentence of this provision
allows or permits the conjugal partnership of spouses who are
both deceased to be settled or liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of either, but precisely because said
sentence allows or permits that the liquidation be made in
either proceeding, it is a matter of sound judicial discretion
in which one it should be made. After all, the former rule
referring to the administrator of the husband's estate in
respect to such liquidation was done away with by Act 3176, the
pertinent provisions of which are now embodied in the rule just
cited.
Thus, it can be seen that at the time of the death of Hodges,
there was already the pending judicial settlement proceeding of
the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and, more importantly, that the
former was the executor of the latter's will who had, as such,
failed for more than five years to see to it that the same was
terminated earliest, which was not difficult to do, since from
ought that appears in the record, there were no serious
obstacles on the way, the estate not being indebted and there
being no immediate heirs other than Hodges himself. Such
dilatory or indifferent attitude could only spell possible
prejudice of his co-heirs, whose rights to inheritance depend
entirely on the existence of any remainder of Mrs. Hodges' share
in the community properties, and who are now faced with the pose
of PCIB that there is no such remainder. Had Hodges secured as
early as possible the settlement of his wife's estate, this
problem would not arisen. All things considered, We are fully
convinced that the interests of justice will be better served
by not permitting or allowing PCIB or any administrator of the
estate of Hodges exclusive administration of all the properties
in question. We are of the considered opinion and so hold that
what would be just and proper is for both administrators of the
two estates to act conjointly until after said estates have been
segregated from each other.
At this juncture, it may be stated that we are not overlooking
the fact that it is PCIB's contention that, viewed as a
substitution, the testamentary disposition in favor of Mrs.
Hodges' brothers and sisters may not be given effect. To a
certain extent, this contention is correct. Indeed, legally
speaking, Mrs. Hodges' will provides neither for a simple or
vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code nor for
a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 thereof. There
is no vulgar substitution therein because there is no provision
for either (1) predecease of the testator by the designated heir
or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the
inheritance, as required by Article 859; and neither is there a
fideicommissary substitution therein because no obligation is
imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part
thereof for anyone else. But from these premises, it is not
correct to jump to the conclusion, as PCIB does, that the
testamentary dispositions in question are therefore inoperative
and invalid.
The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it
views the said disposition exclusively in the light of
substitutions covered by the Civil Code section on that subject,
(Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it is obvious
that substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in
a will "so that he may enter into inheritance in default of the
heir originally instituted," (Article 857, id.) and, in the
present case, no such possible default is contemplated. The
brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for
Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what
Hodges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would
not dispose of from his inheritance; rather, therefore, they
are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject,
however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as
Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with
reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law. It is partially
resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her
81 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir
with absolute dominion over them6 only during his lifetime,
which means that while he could completely and absolutely
dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than
himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his
rights to what might remain upon his death would cease entirely
upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right
of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although
vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would
automatically become operative upon the occurrence of the death
of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any remainder of
her estate then.
Contrary to the view of respondent Magno, however, it was not
the usufruct alone of her estate, as contemplated in Article
869 of the Civil Code, that she bequeathed to Hodges during his
lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the same was
to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no
restriction whatsoever against his disposing or conveying the
whole or any portion thereof to anybody other than himself. The
Court sees no legal impediment to this kind of institution, in
this jurisdiction or under Philippine law, except that it cannot
apply to the legitime of Hodges as the surviving spouse,
consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that Mrs.
Hodges had no surviving ascendants nor descendants. (Arts. 872,
900, and 904, New Civil Code.)
But relative precisely to the question of how much of Mrs.
Hodges' share of the conjugal partnership properties may be
considered as her estate, the parties are in disagreement as to
how Article 16 of the Civil Code7 should be applied. On the one
hand, petitioner claims that inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges was a
resident of the Philippines at the time of her death, under said
Article 16, construed in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas
and the principle of renvoi, what should be applied here should
be the rules of succession under the Civil Code of the
Philippines, and, therefore, her estate could consist of no more
than one-fourth of the said conjugal properties, the other
fourth being, as already explained, the legitime of her husband
(Art. 900, Civil Code) which she could not have disposed of nor
burdened with any condition (Art. 872, Civil Code). On the other
hand, respondent Magno denies that Mrs. Hodges died a resident
of the Philippines, since allegedly she never changed nor
intended to change her original residence of birth in Texas,
United States of America, and contends that, anyway, regardless
of the question of her residence, she being indisputably a
citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the
distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said State
which, according to her, do not provide for any legitime, hence,
the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled to the
remainder of the whole of her share of the conjugal partnership
properties consisting of one-half thereof. Respondent Magno
further maintains that, in any event, Hodges had renounced his
rights under the will in favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly
proven by the documents touching on the point already mentioned
earlier, the genuineness and legal significance of which
petitioner seemingly questions. Besides, the parties are
disagreed as to what the pertinent laws of Texas provide. In
the interest of settling the estates herein involved soonest,
it would be best, indeed, if these conflicting claims of the
parties were determined in these proceedings. The Court regrets,
however, that it cannot do so, for the simple reason that neither
the evidence submitted by the parties in the court below nor
their discussion, in their respective briefs and memoranda
before Us, of their respective contentions on the pertinent
legal issues, of grave importance as they are, appear to Us to
be adequate enough to enable Us to render an intelligent
comprehensive and just resolution. For one thing, there is no
clear and reliable proof of what in fact the possibly applicable
laws of Texas are. 7* Then also, the genuineness of documents
relied upon by respondent Magno is disputed. And there are a
number of still other conceivable related issues which the
parties may wish to raise but which it is not proper to mention
here. In Justice, therefore, to all the parties concerned, these
and all other relevant matters should first be threshed out
fully in the trial court in the proceedings hereafter to be held
therein for the purpose of ascertaining and adjudicating and/or
distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in
accordance with her duly probated will.
To be more explicit, all that We can and do decide in connection
with the petition for certiorari and prohibition are: (1) that
regardless of which corresponding laws are applied, whether of
the Philippines or of Texas, and taking for granted either of
the respective contentions of the parties as to provisions of
the latter,8 and regardless also of whether or not it can be
proven by competent evidence that Hodges renounced his
inheritance in any degree, it is easily and definitely
discernible from the inventory submitted by Hodges himself, as
Executor of his wife's estate, that there are properties which
should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges and ought to be
disposed of or distributed among her heirs pursuant to her will
in said Special Proceedings 1307; (2) that, more specifically,
inasmuch as the question of what are the pertinent laws of Texas
applicable to the situation herein is basically one of fact,
and, considering that the sole difference in the positions of
the parties as to the effect of said laws has reference to the
supposed legitime of Hodges — it being the stand of PCIB that
Hodges had such a legitime whereas Magno claims the negative -
it is now beyond controversy for all future purposes of these
proceedings that whatever be the provisions actually of the laws
of Texas applicable hereto, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is at
least, one-fourth of the conjugal estate of the spouses; the
82 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
existence and effects of foreign laws being questions of fact,
and it being the position now of PCIB that the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, pursuant to the laws of Texas, should only be one-fourth
of the conjugal estate, such contention constitutes an admission
of fact, and consequently, it would be in estoppel in any further
proceedings in these cases to claim that said estate could be
less, irrespective of what might be proven later to be actually
the provisions of the applicable laws of Texas; (3) that Special
Proceedings 1307 for the settlement of the testate estate of
Mrs. Hodges cannot be closed at this stage and should proceed
to its logical conclusion, there having been no proper and legal
adjudication or distribution yet of the estate therein involved;
and (4) that respondent Magno remains and continues to be the
Administratrix therein. Hence, nothing in the foregoing opinion
is intended to resolve the issues which, as already stated, are
not properly before the Court now, namely, (1) whether or not
Hodges had in fact and in law waived or renounced his inheritance
from Mrs. Hodges, in whole or in part, and (2) assuming there
had been no such waiver, whether or not, by the application of
Article 16 of the Civil Code, and in the light of what might be
the applicable laws of Texas on the matter, the estate of Mrs.
Hodges is more than the one-fourth declared above. As a matter
of fact, even our finding above about the existence of
properties constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges rests largely
on a general appraisal of the size and extent of the conjugal
partnership gathered from reference made thereto by both parties
in their briefs as well as in their pleadings included in the
records on appeal, and it should accordingly yield, as to which
exactly those properties are, to the more concrete and specific
evidence which the parties are supposed to present in support
of their respective positions in regard to the foregoing main
legal and factual issues. In the interest of justice, the
parties should be allowed to present such further evidence in
relation to all these issues in a joint hearing of the two
probate proceedings herein involved. After all, the court a
quo has not yet passed squarely on these issues, and it is best
for all concerned that it should do so in the first instance.
Relative to Our holding above that the estate of Mrs. Hodges
cannot be less than the remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal
partnership properties, it may be mentioned here that during
the deliberations, the point was raised as to whether or not
said holding might be inconsistent with Our other ruling here
also that, since there is no reliable evidence as to what are
the applicable laws of Texas, U.S.A. "with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights" that
may be willed by a testator which, under Article 16 of the Civil
Code, are controlling in the instant cases, in view of the
undisputed Texan nationality of the deceased Mrs. Hodges, these
cases should be returned to the court a quo, so that the parties
may prove what said law provides, it is premature for Us to make
any specific ruling now on either the validity of the
testamentary dispositions herein involved or the amount of
inheritance to which the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges
are entitled. After nature reflection, We are of the considered
view that, at this stage and in the state of the records before
Us, the feared inconsistency is more apparent than real. Withal,
it no longer lies in the lips of petitioner PCIB to make any
claim that under the laws of Texas, the estate of Mrs. Hodges
could in any event be less than that We have fixed above.
It should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the question
of what are the laws of Texas governing the matters herein issue
is, in the first instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary
is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice
of and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between
the parties in any proceeding, with the rare exception in
instances when the said laws are already within the actual
knowledge of the court, such as when they are well and generally
known or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases
before it and none of the parties concerned do not claim
otherwise. (5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 41, 1970
ed.) In Fluemer vs. Hix, 54 Phil. 610, it was held:
It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was
executed in Elkins West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix
who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws
of West Virginia govern. To this end, there was submitted a copy
of section 3868 of Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West Virginia
Code, Annotated, by Hogg Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1960, and
as certified to by the Director of the National Library. But
this was far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a
foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The
courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American
Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of
Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the
law were not met. There was no showing that the book from which
an extract was taken was printed or published under the
authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section
300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from
the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge
of the original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia,
as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No
evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws
of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was
executed."
No evidence of the nature thus suggested by the Court may be
found in the records of the cases at bar. Quite to the contrary,
the parties herein have presented opposing versions in their
respective pleadings and memoranda regarding the matter. And
even if We took into account that in Aznar vs. Garcia, the Court
83 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
did make reference to certain provisions regarding succession
in the laws of Texas, the disparity in the material dates of
that case and the present ones would not permit Us to indulge
in the hazardous conjecture that said provisions have not been
amended or changed in the meantime.
On the other hand, in In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, We
held:
Upon the other point — as to whether the will was
executed in conformity with the statutes of the
State of Illinois — we note that it does not
affirmatively appear from the transcription of the
testimony adduced in the trial court that any
witness was examined with reference to the law of
Illinois on the subject of the execution of will.
The trial judge no doubt was satisfied that the
will was properly executed by examining section
1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, as
exhibited in volume 3 of Starr & Curtis's Annotated
Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and he may
have assumed that he could take judicial notice of
the laws of Illinois under section 275 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. If so, he was in our opinion
mistaken. That section authorizes the courts here
to take judicial notice, among other things, of
the acts of the legislative department of the
United States. These words clearly have reference
to Acts of the Congress of the United States; and
we would hesitate to hold that our courts can,
under this provision, take judicial notice of the
multifarious laws of the various American States.
Nor do we think that any such authority can be
derived from the broader language, used in the
same section, where it is said that our courts may
take judicial notice of matters of public
knowledge "similar" to those therein enumerated.
The proper rule we think is to require proof of
the statutes of the States of the American Union
whenever their provisions are determinative of the
issues in any action litigated in the Philippine
courts.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court
may have erred in taking judicial notice of the
law of Illinois on the point in question, such
error is not now available to the petitioner,
first, because the petition does not state any
fact from which it would appear that the law of
Illinois is different from what the court found,
and, secondly, because the assignment of error and
 argument for the appellant in this court raises no
question based on such supposed error. Though the
trial court may have acted upon pure conjecture as
to the law prevailing in the State of Illinois,
its judgment could not be set aside, even upon
application made within six months under section
113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless it
should be made to appear affirmatively that the
conjecture was wrong. The petitioner, it is true,
states in general terms that the will in question
is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal
property in the State of Illinois, but this is
merely a conclusion of law. The affidavits by which
the petition is accompanied contain no reference
to the subject, and we are cited to no authority
in the appellant's brief which might tend to raise
a doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of
the trial court. It is very clear, therefore, that
this point cannot be urged as of serious moment.
It is implicit in the above ruling that when, with respect to
certain aspects of the foreign laws concerned, the parties in a
given case do not have any controversy or are more or less in
agreement, the Court may take it for granted for the purposes
of the particular case before it that the said laws are as such
virtual agreement indicates, without the need of requiring the
presentation of what otherwise would be the competent evidence
on the point. Thus, in the instant cases wherein it results from
the respective contentions of both parties that even if the
pertinent laws of Texas were known and to be applied, the amount
of the inheritance pertaining to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges is as
We have fixed above, the absence of evidence to the effect that,
actually and in fact, under said laws, it could be otherwise is
of no longer of any consequence, unless the purpose is to show
that it could be more. In other words, since PCIB, the
petitioner-appellant, concedes that upon application of Article
16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, the amount
of the estate in controversy is just as We have determined it
to be, and respondent-appellee is only claiming, on her part,
that it could be more, PCIB may not now or later pretend
differently.
To be more concrete, on pages 20-21 of its petition herein,
dated July 31, 1967, PCIB states categorically:
Inasmuch as Article 16 of the Civil Code provides
that "intestate and testamentary successions both
with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose
84 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found", while
the law of Texas (the Hodges spouses being
nationals of U.S.A., State of Texas), in its
conflicts of law rules, provides that the
domiciliary law (in this case Philippine law)
governs the testamentary dispositions and
successional rights over movables or personal
properties, while the law of the situs (in this
case also Philippine law with respect to all Hodges
properties located in the Philippines), governs
with respect to immovable properties, and applying
therefore the 'renvoi doctrine' as enunciated and
applied by this Honorable Court in the case of In
re Estate of Christensen (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan.
31, 1963), there can be no question that Philippine
law governs the testamentary dispositions
contained in the Last Will and Testament of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the
successional rights to her estate, both with
respect to movables, as well as to immovables
situated in the Philippines.
In its main brief dated February 26, 1968, PCIB asserts:
The law governing successional rights.
As recited above, there is no question that the
deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, was an American
citizen. There is also no question that she was a
national of the State of Texas, U.S.A. Again, there
is likewise no question that she had her domicile
of choice in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, as
this has already been pronounced by the above-
cited orders of the lower court, pronouncements
which are by now res adjudicata (par. [a], See.
49, Rule 39, Rules of Court; In re Estate of
Johnson, 39 Phil. 156).
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides:
"Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
 shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found."
Thus the aforecited provision of the Civil Code
points towards the national law of the deceased,
Linnie Jane Hodges, which is the law of Texas, as
governing succession "both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions ...". But the law of
Texas, in its conflicts of law rules, provides
that the domiciliary law governs the testamentary
dispositions and successional rights over movables
or personal property, while the law of the situs
governs with respect to immovable property. Such
that with respect to both movable property, as
well as immovable property situated in the
Philippines, the law of Texas points to the law of
the Philippines.
Applying, therefore, the so-called "renvoi
doctrine", as enunciated and applied by this
Honorable Court in the case of "In re Christensen"
(G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no
question that Philippine law governs the
testamentary provisions in the Last Will and
Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as
well as the successional rights to her estate,
both with respect to movables, as well as
immovables situated in the Philippines.
The subject of successional rights.
Under Philippine law, as it is under the law of
Texas, the conjugal or community property of the
spouses, Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane
Hodges, upon the death of the latter, is to be
divided into two, one-half pertaining to each of
the spouses, as his or her own property. Thus,
upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, one-half of
the conjugal partnership property immediately
pertained to Charles Newton Hodges as his own
share, and not by virtue of any successional
rights. There can be no question about this.
Again, Philippine law, or more specifically,
Article 900 of the Civil Code provides:
85 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
If the only survivor is the widow or
widower, she or he shall be entitled
to one-half of the hereditary estate
of the deceased spouse, and the
testator may freely dispose of the
other half.
If the marriage between the surviving
spouse and the testator was
solemnized in articulo mortis, and
the testator died within three months
from the time of the marriage, the
legitime of the surviving spouse as
the sole heir shall be one-third of
the hereditary estate, except when
they have been living as husband and
wife for more than five years. In the
latter case, the legitime of the
surviving spouse shall be that
specified in the preceding
paragraph.
This legitime of the surviving spouse cannot be
burdened by a fideicommisary substitution (Art.
864, Civil code), nor by any charge, condition, or
substitution (Art, 872, Civil code). It is clear,
therefore, that in addition to one-half of the
conjugal partnership property as his own conjugal
share, Charles Newton Hodges was also immediately
entitled to one-half of the half conjugal share of
the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, or one-fourth of
the entire conjugal property, as his legitime.
One-fourth of the conjugal property therefore
remains at issue.
In the summary of its arguments in its memorandum dated April
30, 1968, the following appears:
Briefly, the position advanced by the petitioner
is:
a. That the Hodges spouses were domiciled legally
in the Philippines (pp. 19-20, petition). This is
now a matter of res adjudicata (p. 20, petition).
b. That under Philippine law, Texas law, and the
renvoi doctrine, Philippine law governs the
successional rights over the properties left by
 the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges (pp.
petition).
c. That under Philippine as well as Texas law,
one-half of the Hodges properties pertains to the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges (p. 21, petition).
This is not questioned by the respondents.
d. That under Philippine law, the deceased,
Charles Newton Hodges, automatically inherited
one-half of the remaining one-half of the Hodges
properties as his legitime (p. 21, petition).
e. That the remaining 25% of the Hodges properties
was inherited by the deceased, Charles Newton
Hodges, under the will of his deceased spouse (pp.
22-23, petition). Upon the death of Charles Newton
Hodges, the substitution 'provision of the will of
the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, did not operate
because the same is void (pp. 23-25, petition).
f. That the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges,
asserted his sole ownership of the Hodges
properties and the probate court sanctioned such
assertion (pp. 25-29, petition). He in fact
assumed such ownership and such was the status of
the properties as of the time of his death (pp.
29-34, petition).
Of similar tenor are the allegations of PCIB in some of its
pleadings quoted in the earlier part of this option.
On her part, it is respondent-appellee Magno's posture that
under the laws of Texas, there is no system of legitime, hence
the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be one-half of all the conjugal
properties.
It is thus unquestionable that as far as PCIB is concerned, the
application to these cases of Article 16 of the Civil Code in
relation to the corresponding laws of Texas would result in that
the Philippine laws on succession should control. On that basis,
as We have already explained above, the estate of Mrs. Hodges
is the remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal partnership
properties, considering that We have found that there is no
legal impediment to the kind of disposition ordered by Mrs.
Hodges in her will in favor of her brothers and sisters and,
further, that the contention of PCIB that the same constitutes
an inoperative testamentary substitution is untenable. As will
be recalled, PCIB's position that there is no such estate of
86 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
20-21, Mrs. Hodges is predicated exclusively on two propositions,
namely: (1) that the provision in question in Mrs. Hodges'
testament violates the rules on substitution of heirs under the
Civil Code and (2) that, in any event, by the orders of the
trial court of May 27, and December 14, 1957, the trial court
had already finally and irrevocably adjudicated to her husband
the whole free portion of her estate to the exclusion of her
brothers and sisters, both of which poses, We have overruled.
Nowhere in its pleadings, briefs and memoranda does PCIB
maintain that the application of the laws of Texas would result
in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything under
her will. And since PCIB's representations in regard to the laws
of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which the other
parties and the Court are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB
is "not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a
position contradictory to or inconsistent with them." (5 Moran,
id, p. 65, citing Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Sta. Ana
vs. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018).
Accordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in
the further proceedings hereby ordered to be held in the court
below is how much more than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, and this would depend on (1) whether or not the
applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more, such
as, when there is no legitime provided therein, and (2) whether
or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs.
Hodges.
In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some
members of the Court that to avoid or, at least, minimize further
protracted legal controversies between the respective heirs of
the Hodges spouses, it is imperative to elucidate on the
possible consequences of dispositions made by Hodges after the
death of his wife from the mass of the unpartitioned estates
without any express indication in the pertinent documents as to
whether his intention is to dispose of part of his inheritance
from his wife or part of his own share of the conjugal estate
as well as of those made by PCIB after the death of Hodges.
After a long discussion, the consensus arrived at was as
follows: (1) any such dispositions made gratuitously in favor
of third parties, whether these be individuals, corporations or
foundations, shall be considered as intended to be of properties
constituting part of Hodges' inheritance from his wife, it
appearing from the tenor of his motions of May 27 and December
11, 1957 that in asking for general authority to make sales or
other disposals of properties under the jurisdiction of the
court, which include his own share of the conjugal estate, he
was not invoking particularly his right over his own share, but
rather his right to dispose of any part of his inheritance
pursuant to the will of his wife; (2) as regards sales, exchanges
or other remunerative transfers, the proceeds of such sales or
the properties taken in by virtue of such exchanges, shall be
considered as merely the products of "physical changes" of the
properties of her estate which the will expressly authorizes
Hodges to make, provided that whatever of said products should
remain with the estate at the time of the death of Hodges should
go to her brothers and sisters; (3) the dispositions made by
PCIB after the death of Hodges must naturally be deemed as
covering only the properties belonging to his estate considering
that being only the administrator of the estate of Hodges, PCIB
could not have disposed of properties belonging to the estate
of his wife. Neither could such dispositions be considered as
involving conjugal properties, for the simple reason that the
conjugal partnership automatically ceased when Mrs. Hodges died,
and by the peculiar provision of her will, under discussion,
the remainder of her share descended also automatically upon
the death of Hodges to her brothers and sisters, thus outside
of the scope of PCIB's administration. Accordingly, these
construction of the will of Mrs. Hodges should be adhered to by
the trial court in its final order of adjudication and
distribution and/or partition of the two estates in question.
THE APPEALS
A cursory examination of the seventy-eight assignments of error
in appellant PCIB's brief would readily reveal that all of them
are predicated mainly on the contention that inasmuch as Hodges
had already adjudicated unto himself all the properties
constituting his wife's share of the conjugal partnership,
allegedly with the sanction of the trial court per its order of
December 14, 1957, there has been, since said date, no longer
any estate of Mrs. Hodges of which appellee Magno could be
administratrix, hence the various assailed orders sanctioning
her actuations as such are not in accordance with law. Such
being the case, with the foregoing resolution holding such
posture to be untenable in fact and in law and that it is in
the best interest of justice that for the time being the two
estates should be administered conjointly by the respective
administrators of the two estates, it should follow that said
assignments of error have lost their fundamental reasons for
being. There are certain matters, however, relating peculiarly
to the respective orders in question, if commonly among some of
them, which need further clarification. For instance, some of
them authorized respondent Magno to act alone or without
concurrence of PCIB. And with respect to many of said orders,
PCIB further claims that either the matters involved were not
properly within the probate jurisdiction of the trial court or
that the procedure followed was not in accordance with the
rules. Hence, the necessity of dealing separately with the
merits of each of the appeals.
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Indeed, inasmuch as the said two estates have until now remained
commingled pro-indiviso, due to the failure of Hodges and the
lower court to liquidate the conjugal partnership, to recognize
appellee Magno as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Mrs.
Hodges which is still unsegregated from that of Hodges is not
to say, without any qualification, that she was therefore
authorized to do and perform all her acts complained of in these
appeals, sanctioned though they might have been by the trial
court. As a matter of fact, it is such commingling pro-
indiviso of the two estates that should deprive appellee of
freedom to act independently from PCIB, as administrator of the
estate of Hodges, just as, for the same reason, the latter
should not have authority to act independently from her. And
considering that the lower court failed to adhere consistently
to this basic point of view, by allowing the two administrators
to act independently of each other, in the various instances
already noted in the narration of facts above, the Court has to
look into the attendant circumstances of each of the appealed
orders to be able to determine whether any of them has to be
set aside or they may all be legally maintained notwithstanding
the failure of the court a quo to observe the pertinent
procedural technicalities, to the end only that graver injury
to the substantive rights of the parties concerned and
unnecessary and undesirable proliferation of incidents in the
subject proceedings may be forestalled. In other words, We have
to determine, whether or not, in the light of the unusual
circumstances extant in the record, there is need to be more
pragmatic and to adopt a rather unorthodox approach, so as to
cause the least disturbance in rights already being exercised
by numerous innocent third parties, even if to do so may not
appear to be strictly in accordance with the letter of the
applicable purely adjective rules.
Incidentally, it may be mentioned, at this point, that it was
principally on account of the confusion that might result later
from PCIB's continuing to administer all the community
properties, notwithstanding the certainty of the existence of
the separate estate of Mrs. Hodges, and to enable both estates
to function in the meantime with a relative degree of
regularity, that the Court ordered in the resolution of
September 8, 1972 the modification of the injunction issued
pursuant to the resolutions of August 8, October 4 and December
6, 1967, by virtue of which respondent Magno was completely
barred from any participation in the administration of the
properties herein involved. In the September 8 resolution, We
ordered that, pending this decision, Special Proceedings 1307
and 1672 should proceed jointly and that the respective
administrators therein "act conjointly — none of them to act
singly and independently of each other for any purpose." Upon
mature deliberation, We felt that to allow PCIB to continue
managing or administering all the said properties to the
exclusion of the administratrix of Mrs. Hodges' estate might
place the heirs of Hodges at an unduly advantageous position
which could result in considerable, if not irreparable, damage
or injury to the other parties concerned. It is indeed to be
regretted that apparently, up to this date, more than a year
after said resolution, the same has not been given due regard,
as may be gleaned from the fact that recently, respondent Magno
has filed in these proceedings a motion to declare PCIB in
contempt for alleged failure to abide therewith, notwithstanding
that its repeated motions for reconsideration thereof have all
been denied soon after they were filed.9
Going back to the appeals, it is perhaps best to begin first
with what appears to Our mind to be the simplest, and then
proceed to the more complicated ones in that order, without
regard to the numerical sequence of the assignments of error in
appellant's brief or to the order of the discussion thereof by
counsel.
Assignments of error
LXXII, LXXVII and LXXVIII.
These assignments of error relate to (1) the order of the trial
court of August 6, 1965 providing that "the deeds of sale
(therein referred to involving properties in the name of Hodges)
should be signed jointly by the PCIB, as Administrator of
Testate Estate of C.N. Hodges, and Avelina A. Magno, as
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and
to this effect, the PCIB should take the necessary steps so that
Administratrix Avelina A. Magno could sign the deeds of sale,"
(p. 248, Green Rec. on Appeal) (2) the order of October 27, 1965
denying the motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order,
(pp. 276-277, id.) (3) the other order also dated October 27,
1965 enjoining inter alia, that "(a) all cash collections should
be deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and estate of C. N. Hodges, (b) that whatever cash
collections (that) had been deposited in the account of either
of the estates should be withdrawn and since then (sic)
deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and the estate of C. N. Hodges; ... (d) (that)
Administratrix Magno — allow the PCIB to inspect whatever
records, documents and papers she may have in her possession,
in the same manner that Administrator PCIB is also directed to
allow Administratrix Magno to inspect whatever records,
documents and papers it may have in its possession" and "(e)
that the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall
have access to all records of the transactions of both estates
for the protection of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; and in
like manner, the accountant or any authorized representative of
the estate of C. N. Hodges shall have access to the records of
transactions of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the protection
of the estate of C. N. Hodges", (pp. 292-295, id.) and (4) the
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order of February 15, 1966, denying, among others, the motion
for reconsideration of the order of October 27, 1965 last
referred to. (pp. 455-456, id.)
As may be readily seen, the thrust of all these four impugned
orders is in line with the Court's above-mentioned resolution
of September 8, 1972 modifying the injunction previously issued
on August 8, 1967, and, more importantly, with what We have said
the trial court should have always done pending the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership of the Hodges spouses. In fact, as
already stated, that is the arrangement We are ordering, by this
decision, to be followed. Stated differently, since the
questioned orders provide for joint action by the two
administrators, and that is precisely what We are holding out
to have been done and should be done until the two estates are
separated from each other, the said orders must be affirmed.
Accordingly the foregoing assignments of error must be, as they
are hereby overruled.
numbers
Assignments of error Numbers LXVIII
to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI.
The orders complained of under these assignments of error
commonly deal with expenditures made by appellee Magno, as
Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges, in connection with
her administration thereof, albeit additionally, assignments of
error Numbers LXIX to LXXI put into question the payment of
attorneys fees provided for in the contract for the purpose, as
constituting, in effect, premature advances to the heirs of Mrs.
Hodges.
More specifically, assignment Number LXXIII refers to
reimbursement of overtime pay paid to six employees of the court
and three other persons for services in copying the court
records to enable the lawyers of the administration to be fully
informed of all the incidents in the proceedings. The
reimbursement was approved as proper legal expenses of
administration per the order of December 19, 1964, (pp. 221-
222, id.) and repeated motions for reconsideration thereof were
denied by the orders of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-232, id.)
October 27, 1965, (p. 277, id.) and February 15, 1966. (pp. 455-
456, id.) On the other hand, Assignments Numbers LXVIII to LXXI,
LXXIV and LXXV question the trial court's order of November 3,
1965 approving the agreement of June 6, 1964 between
Administratrix Magno and James L. Sullivan, attorney-in-fact of
the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as Parties of the First Part, and
Attorneys Raul Manglapus and Rizal R. Quimpo, as Parties of the
Second Part, regarding attorneys fees for said counsel who had
agreed "to prosecute and defend their interests (of the Parties
of the First Part) in certain cases now pending litigation in
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo —, more specifically in
Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 —" (pp. 126-129, id.) and
directing Administratrix Magno "to issue and sign whatever check
or checks maybe needed to implement the approval of the
agreement annexed to the motion" as well as the "administrator
of the estate of C. N. Hodges — to countersign the said check
or checks as the case maybe." (pp. 313-320, id.),
reconsideration of which order of approval was denied in the
order of February 16, 1966, (p. 456, id.) Assignment Number
LXXVI imputes error to the lower court's order of October 27,
1965, already referred to above, insofar as it orders that "PCIB
should counter sign the check in the amount of P250 in favor of
Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her compensation as
administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges only." (p. 294, id.)
Main contention again of appellant PCIB in regard to these eight
assigned errors is that there is no such estate as the estate
of Mrs. Hodges for which the questioned expenditures were made,
hence what were authorized were in effect expenditures from the
estate of Hodges. As We have already demonstrated in Our
resolution above of the petition for certiorari and
prohibition, this posture is incorrect. Indeed, in whichever
way the remaining issues between the parties in these cases are
ultimately resolved, 10 the final result will surely be that
there are properties constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges of
which Magno is the current administratrix. It follows,
therefore, that said appellee had the right, as such
administratrix, to hire the persons whom she paid overtime pay
and to be paid for her own services as administratrix. That she
has not yet collected and is not collecting amounts as
substantial as that paid to or due appellant PCIB is to her
credit.
Of course, she is also entitled to the services of counsel and
to that end had the authority to enter into contracts for
attorney's fees in the manner she had done in the agreement of
June 6, 1964. And as regards to the reasonableness of the amount
therein stipulated, We see no reason to disturb the discretion
exercised by the probate court in determining the same. We have
gone over the agreement, and considering the obvious size of
the estate in question and the nature of the issues between the
parties as well as the professional standing of counsel, We
cannot say that the fees agreed upon require the exercise by
the Court of its inherent power to reduce it.
PCIB insists, however, that said agreement of June 6, 1964 is
not for legal services to the estate but to the heirs of Mrs.
Hodges, or, at most, to both of them, and such being the case,
any payment under it, insofar as counsels' services would
redound to the benefit of the heirs, would be in the nature of
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advances to such heirs and a premature distribution of the
estate. Again, We hold that such posture cannot prevail.
Upon the premise We have found plausible that there is an
existing estate of Mrs. Hodges, it results that juridically and
factually the interests involved in her estate are distinct and
different from those involved in her estate of Hodges and vice
versa. Insofar as the matters related exclusively to the estate
of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB, as administrator of the estate of Hodges,
is a complete stranger and it is without personality to question
the actuations of the administratrix thereof regarding matters
not affecting the estate of Hodges. Actually, considering the
obviously considerable size of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, We
see no possible cause for apprehension that when the two estates
are segregated from each other, the amount of attorney's fees
stipulated in the agreement in question will prejudice any
portion that would correspond to Hodges' estate.
And as regards the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges who ought to be
the ones who should have a say on the attorney's fees and other
expenses of administration assailed by PCIB, suffice it to say
that they appear to have been duly represented in the agreement
itself by their attorney-in-fact, James L. Sullivan and have
not otherwise interposed any objection to any of the expenses
incurred by Magno questioned by PCIB in these appeals. As a
matter of fact, as ordered by the trial court, all the expenses
in question, including the attorney's fees, may be paid without
awaiting the determination and segregation of the estate of Mrs.
Hodges.
Withal, the weightiest consideration in connection with the
point under discussion is that at this stage of the controversy
among the parties herein, the vital issue refers to the
existence or non-existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. In this
respect, the interest of respondent Magno, as the appointed
administratrix of the said estate, is to maintain that it
exists, which is naturally common and identical with and
inseparable from the interest of the brothers and sisters of
Mrs. Hodges. Thus, it should not be wondered why both Magno and
these heirs have seemingly agreed to retain but one counsel. In
fact, such an arrangement should be more convenient and
economical to both. The possibility of conflict of interest
between Magno and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges would be, at this
stage, quite remote and, in any event, rather insubstantial.
Besides, should any substantial conflict of interest between
them arise in the future, the same would be a matter that the
probate court can very well take care of in the course of the
independent proceedings in Case No. 1307 after the corresponding
segregation of the two subject estates. We cannot perceive any
cogent reason why, at this stage, the estate and the heirs of
Mrs. Hodges cannot be represented by a common counsel.
Now, as to whether or not the portion of the fees in question
that should correspond to the heirs constitutes premature
partial distribution of the estate of Mrs. Hodges is also a
matter in which neither PCIB nor the heirs of Hodges have any
interest. In any event, since, as far as the records show, the
estate has no creditors and the corresponding estate and
inheritance taxes, except those of the brothers and sisters of
Mrs. Hodges, have already been paid, 11 no prejudice can caused
to anyone by the comparatively small amount of attorney's fees
in question. And in this connection, it may be added that,
although strictly speaking, the attorney's fees of the counsel
of an administrator is in the first instance his personal
responsibility, reimbursable later on by the estate, in the
final analysis, when, as in the situation on hand, the attorney-
in-fact of the heirs has given his conformity thereto, it would
be idle effort to inquire whether or not the sanction given to
said fees by the probate court is proper.
For the foregoing reasons, Assignments of Error LXVIII to LXXI
and LXXIII to LXXVI should be as they are hereby overruled.
Assignments of error I to
XIII to XV, XXII to XXV,
to XXX VI, XLI to XLIII and L.
These assignments of error deal with the approval by the trial
court of various deeds of sale of real properties registered in
the name of Hodges but executed by appellee Magno, as
Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges, purportedly in
implementation of corresponding supposed written "Contracts to
Sell" previously executed by Hodges during the interim between
May 23, 1957, when his wife died, and December 25, 1962, the
day he died. As stated on pp. 118-120 of appellant's main brief,
"These are: the, contract to sell between the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Pepito G. Iyulores executed on
February 5, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased,
Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellant Esperidion Partisala,
executed on April 20, 1960; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Winifredo C.
Espada, executed on April 18, 1960; the contract to sell between
the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Rosario
Alingasa, executed on August 25, 1958; the contract to sell
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee,
Lorenzo Carles, executed on June 17, 1958; the contract to sell
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee,
Salvador S. Guzman, executed on September 13, 1960; the contract
to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the
appellee, Florenia Barrido, executed on February 21, 1958; the
contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges,
and the appellee, Purificacion Coronado, executed on August 14,
1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton
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Hodges, and the appellee, Graciano Lucero, executed on November
27, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Ariteo Thomas Jamir, executed
on May 26, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased,
Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Melquiades Batisanan,
executed on June 9, 1959; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Belcezar
Causing, executed on February 10, 1959 and the contract to sell
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee,
Adelfa Premaylon, executed on October 31, 1959, re Title No.
13815."
Relative to these sales, it is the position of appellant PCIB
that, inasmuch as pursuant to the will of Mrs. Hodges, her
husband was to have dominion over all her estate during his
lifetime, it was as absolute owner of the properties
respectively covered by said sales that he executed the
aforementioned contracts to sell, and consequently, upon his
death, the implementation of said contracts may be undertaken
only by the administrator of his estate and not by the
administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. Basically, the same
IV, theory is invoked with particular reference to five other sales,
XXXV in which the respective "contracts to sell" in favor of these
appellees were executed by Hodges before the death of his wife,
namely, those in favor of appellee Santiago Pacaonsis, Alfredo
Catedral, Jose Pablico, Western Institute of Technology and
Adelfa Premaylon.
Anent those deeds of sale based on promises or contracts to sell
executed by Hodges after the death of his wife, those enumerated
in the quotation in the immediately preceding paragraph, it is
quite obvious that PCIB's contention cannot be sustained. As
already explained earlier, 11* all proceeds of remunerative
transfers or dispositions made by Hodges after the death of his
wife should be deemed as continuing to be parts of her estate
and, therefore, subject to the terms of her will in favor of
her brothers and sisters, in the sense that should there be no
showing that such proceeds, whether in cash or property have
been subsequently conveyed or assigned subsequently by Hodges
to any third party by acts inter vivos with the result that they
could not thereby belong to him anymore at the time of his
death, they automatically became part of the inheritance of said
brothers and sisters. The deeds here in question involve
transactions which are exactly of this nature. Consequently,
the payments made by the appellees should be considered as
payments to the estate of Mrs. Hodges which is to be distributed
and partitioned among her heirs specified in the will.
The five deeds of sale predicated on contracts to sell executed
Hodges during the lifetime of his wife, present a different
situation. At first blush, it would appear that as to them,
PCIB's position has some degree of plausibility. Considering,
however, that the adoption of PCIB's theory would necessarily
have tremendous repercussions and would bring about considerable
disturbance of property rights that have somehow accrued already
in favor of innocent third parties, the five purchasers
aforenamed, the Court is inclined to take a pragmatic and
practical view of the legal situation involving them by
overlooking the possible technicalities in the way, the non-
observance of which would not, after all, detract materially
from what should substantially correspond to each and all of
the parties concerned.
To start with, these contracts can hardly be ignored. Bona
fide third parties are involved; as much as possible, they
should not be made to suffer any prejudice on account of judicial
controversies not of their own making. What is more, the
transactions they rely on were submitted by them to the probate
court for approval, and from already known and recorded
actuations of said court then, they had reason to believe that
it had authority to act on their motions, since appellee Magno
had, from time to time prior to their transactions with her,
been allowed to act in her capacity as administratrix of one of
the subject estates either alone or conjointly with PCIB. All
the sales in question were executed by Magno in 1966 already,
but before that, the court had previously authorized or
otherwise sanctioned expressly many of her act as administratrix
involving expenditures from the estate made by her either
conjointly with or independently from PCIB, as Administrator of
the Estate of Hodges. Thus, it may be said that said buyers-
appellees merely followed precedents in previous orders of the
court. Accordingly, unless the impugned orders approving those
sales indubitably suffer from some clearly fatal infirmity the
Court would rather affirm them.
It is quite apparent from the record that the properties covered
by said sales are equivalent only to a fraction of what should
constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges, even if it is assumed that
the same would finally be held to be only one-fourth of the
conjugal properties of the spouses as of the time of her death
or, to be more exact, one-half of her estate as per the inventory
submitted by Hodges as executor, on May 12, 1958. In none of
its numerous, varied and voluminous pleadings, motions and
manifestations has PCIB claimed any possibility otherwise. Such
being the case, to avoid any conflict with the heirs of Hodges,
the said properties covered by the questioned deeds of sale
executed by appellee Magno may be treated as among those
corresponding to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, which would have
been actually under her control and administration had Hodges
complied with his duty to liquidate the conjugal partnership.
Viewing the situation in that manner, the only ones who could
stand to be prejudiced by the appealed orders referred to in
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the assignment of errors under discussion and who could,
therefore, have the requisite interest to question them would
be only the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, definitely not PCIB.
It is of no moment in what capacity Hodges made the "contracts
to sell' after the death of his wife. Even if he had acted as
executor of the will of his wife, he did not have to submit
those contracts to the court nor follow the provisions of the
rules, (Sections 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 of Rule 89 quoted by
appellant on pp. 125 to 127 of its brief) for the simple reason
that by the very orders, much relied upon by appellant for other
purposes, of May 27, 1957 and December 14, 1957, Hodges was
"allowed or authorized" by the trial court "to continue the
business in which he was engaged and to perform acts which he
had been doing while the deceased was living", (Order of May
27) which according to the motion on which the court acted was
"of buying and selling personal and real properties", and "to
execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of
the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in
consonance with the wishes conveyed in the last will and
testament of the latter." (Order of December 14) In other words,
if Hodges acted then as executor, it can be said that he had
authority to do so by virtue of these blanket orders, and PCIB
does not question the legality of such grant of authority; on
the contrary, it is relying on the terms of the order itself
for its main contention in these cases. On the other hand, if,
as PCIB contends, he acted as heir-adjudicatee, the authority
given to him by the aforementioned orders would still suffice.
As can be seen, therefore, it is of no moment whether the
"contracts to sell" upon which the deeds in question were based
were executed by Hodges before or after the death of his wife.
In a word, We hold, for the reasons already stated, that the
properties covered by the deeds being assailed pertain or should
be deemed as pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges; hence,
any supposed irregularity attending the actuations of the trial
court may be invoked only by her heirs, not by PCIB, and since
the said heirs are not objecting, and the defects pointed out
not being strictly jurisdictional in nature, all things
considered, particularly the unnecessary disturbance of rights
already created in favor of innocent third parties, it is best
that the impugned orders are not disturbed.
In view of these considerations, We do not find sufficient merit
in the assignments of error under discussion.
Assignments of error V to VIII,
XVI to XVIII, XXVI to XXIX, XXXVII
to XXXVIII, XLIV to XLVI and LI.
All these assignments of error commonly deal with alleged non-
fulfillment by the respective vendees, appellees herein, of the
terms and conditions embodied in the deeds of sale referred to
in the assignments of error just discussed. It is claimed that
some of them never made full payments in accordance with the
respective contracts to sell, while in the cases of the others,
like Lorenzo Carles, Jose Pablico, Alfredo Catedral and Salvador
S. Guzman, the contracts with them had already been unilaterally
cancelled by PCIB pursuant to automatic rescission clauses
contained in them, in view of the failure of said buyers to pay
arrearages long overdue. But PCIB's posture is again premised
on its assumption that the properties covered by the deeds in
question could not pertain to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. We have
already held above that, it being evident that a considerable
portion of the conjugal properties, much more than the
properties covered by said deeds, would inevitably constitute
the estate of Mrs. Hodges, to avoid unnecessary legal
complications, it can be assumed that said properties form part
of such estate. From this point of view, it is apparent again
that the questions, whether or not it was proper for appellee
Magno to have disregarded the cancellations made by PCIB,
thereby reviving the rights of the respective buyers-appellees,
and, whether or not the rules governing new dispositions of
properties of the estate were strictly followed, may not be
raised by PCIB but only by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as the
persons designated to inherit the same, or perhaps the
government because of the still unpaid inheritance taxes. But,
again, since there is no pretense that any objections were
raised by said parties or that they would necessarily be
prejudiced, the contentions of PCIB under the instant
assignments of error hardly merit any consideration.
Assignments of error IX to XII,
to XXI, XXX to XXIV, XXXIX to
XLVII to XLIX, LII and LIII to LXI.
PCIB raises under these assignments of error two issues which
according to it are fundamental, namely: (1) that in approving
the deeds executed by Magno pursuant to contracts to sell
already cancelled by it in the performance of its functions as
administrator of the estate of Hodges, the trial court deprived
the said estate of the right to invoke such cancellations it
(PCIB) had made and (2) that in so acting, the court "arrogated
unto itself, while acting as a probate court, the power to
determine the contending claims of third parties against the
estate of Hodges over real property," since it has in effect
determined whether or not all the terms and conditions of the
respective contracts to sell executed by Hodges in favor of the
buyers-appellees concerned were complied with by the latter.
What is worse, in the view of PCIB, is that the court has taken
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the word of the appellee Magno, "a total stranger to his estate
as determinative of the issue".
Actually, contrary to the stand of PCIB, it is this last point
regarding appellee Magno's having agreed to ignore the
cancellations made by PCIB and allowed the buyers-appellees to
consummate the sales in their favor that is decisive. Since We
have already held that the properties covered by the contracts
in question should be deemed to be portions of the estate of
Mrs. Hodges and not that of Hodges, it is PCIB that is a complete
stranger in these incidents. Considering, therefore, that the
estate of Mrs. Hodges and her heirs who are the real parties in
interest having the right to oppose the consummation of the
impugned sales are not objecting, and that they are the ones
who are precisely urging that said sales be sanctioned, the
assignments of error under discussion have no basis and must
accordingly be as they are hereby overruled.
With particular reference to assignments LIII to LXI, assailing
the orders of the trial court requiring PCIB to surrender the
respective owner's duplicate certificates of title over the
properties covered by the sales in question and otherwise
directing the Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel said
certificates and to issue new transfer certificates of title in
favor of the buyers-appellees, suffice it to say that in the
light of the above discussion, the trial court was within its
rights to so require and direct, PCIB having refused to give
way, by withholding said owners' duplicate certificates, of the
corresponding registration of the transfers duly and legally
approved by the court.
XIX Assignments of error LXII to LXVII
XL,
All these assignments of error commonly deal with the appeal
against orders favoring appellee Western Institute of
Technology. As will be recalled, said institute is one of the
buyers of real property covered by a contract to sell executed
by Hodges prior to the death of his wife. As of October, 1965,
it was in arrears in the total amount of P92,691.00 in the
payment of its installments on account of its purchase, hence
it received under date of October 4, 1965 and October 20, 1965,
letters of collection, separately and respectively, from PCIB
and appellee Magno, in their respective capacities as
administrators of the distinct estates of the Hodges spouses,
albeit, while in the case of PCIB it made known that "no other
arrangement can be accepted except by paying all your past due
account", on the other hand, Magno merely said she would
"appreciate very much if you can make some remittance to bring
this account up-to-date and to reduce the amount of the
obligation." (See pp. 295-311, Green R. on A.) On November 3,
1965, the Institute filed a motion which, after alleging that
it was ready and willing to pay P20,000 on account of its overdue
installments but uncertain whether it should pay PCIB or Magno,
it prayed that it be "allowed to deposit the aforesaid amount
with the court pending resolution of the conflicting claims of
the administrators." Acting on this motion, on November 23,
1965, the trial court issued an order, already quoted in the
narration of facts in this opinion, holding that payment to both
or either of the two administrators is "proper and legal", and
so "movant — can pay to both estates or either of them",
considering that "in both cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and
1672) there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor
distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto."
The arguments under the instant assignments of error revolve
around said order. From the procedural standpoint, it is claimed
that PCIB was not served with a copy of the Institute's motion,
that said motion was heard, considered and resolved on November
23, 1965, whereas the date set for its hearing was November 20,
1965, and that what the order grants is different from what is
prayed for in the motion. As to the substantive aspect, it is
contended that the matter treated in the motion is beyond the
jurisdiction of the probate court and that the order authorized
payment to a person other than the administrator of the estate
of Hodges with whom the Institute had contracted.
The procedural points urged by appellant deserve scant
consideration. We must assume, absent any clear proof to the
contrary, that the lower court had acted regularly by seeing to
it that appellant was duly notified. On the other hand, there
is nothing irregular in the court's having resolved the motion
three days after the date set for hearing the same. Moreover,
the record reveals that appellants' motion for reconsideration
wherein it raised the same points was denied by the trial court
on March 7, 1966 (p. 462, Green R. on A.) Withal, We are not
convinced that the relief granted is not within the general
intent of the Institute's motion.
Insofar as the substantive issues are concerned, all that need
be said at this point is that they are mere reiterations of
contentions We have already resolved above adversely to
appellants' position. Incidentally, We may add, perhaps, to
erase all doubts as to the propriety of not disturbing the lower
court's orders sanctioning the sales questioned in all these
appeal s by PCIB, that it is only when one of the parties to a
contract to convey property executed by a deceased person raises
substantial objections to its being implemented by the executor
or administrator of the decedent's estate that Section 8 of Rule
89 may not apply and, consequently, the matter has, to be taken
up in a separate action outside of the probate court; but where,
as in the cases of the sales herein involved, the interested
parties are in agreement that the conveyance be made, it is
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properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court to give
its sanction thereto pursuant to the provisions of the rule just
mentioned. And with respect to the supposed automatic rescission
clauses contained in the contracts to sell executed by Hodges
in favor of herein appellees, the effect of said clauses depend
on the true nature of the said contracts, despite the
nomenclature appearing therein, which is not controlling, for
if they amount to actual contracts of sale instead of being mere
unilateral accepted "promises to sell", (Art. 1479, Civil Code
of the Philippines, 2nd paragraph) thepactum commissorium or
the automatic rescission provision would not operate, as a
matter of public policy, unless there has been a previous
notarial or judicial demand by the seller (10 Manresa 263, 2nd
ed.) neither of which have been shown to have been made in
connection with the transactions herein involved.
Consequently, We find no merit in the assignments of error
Number LXII to LXVII.
S U M M A R Y
Considering the fact that this decision is unusually extensive
and that the issues herein taken up and resolved are rather
numerous and varied, what with appellant making seventy-eight
assignments of error affecting no less than thirty separate
orders of the court a quo, if only to facilitate proper
understanding of the import and extent of our rulings herein
contained, it is perhaps desirable that a brief restatement of
the whole situation be made together with our conclusions in
regard to its various factual and legal aspects. .
The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles
Newton Hodges as well as that of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges,
who predeceased him by about five years and a half. In their
respective wills which were executed on different occasions,
each one of them provided mutually as follows: "I give, devise
and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder (after
funeral and administration expenses, taxes and debts) of my
estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located,
to my beloved (spouse) to have and to hold unto (him/her) —
during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject to the condition
that upon the death of whoever of them survived the other, the
remainder of what he or she would inherit from the other is
"give(n), devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to the brothers and
sisters of the latter.
Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on
May 27, Hodges was appointed special administrator of her
estate, and in a separate order of the same date, he was "allowed
or authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged,
(buying and selling personal and real properties) and to perform
acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living."
Subsequently, on December 14, 1957, after Mrs. Hodges' will had
been probated and Hodges had been appointed and had qualified
as Executor thereof, upon his motion in which he asserted that
he was "not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal,
but also, the successor to all the properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", the trial court ordered that "for
the reasons stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957, which
the Court considers well taken, ... all the sales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles Newton
Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is further
authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in the last
will and testament of the latter."
Annually thereafter, Hodges submitted to the court the
corresponding statements of account of his administration, with
the particularity that in all his motions, he always made it
point to urge the that "no person interested in the Philippines
of the time and place of examining the herein accounts be given
notice as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased in accordance with the last will and testament already
probated by the Honorable Court." All said accounts approved as
prayed for.
Nothing else appears to have been done either by the court a
quo or Hodges until December 25, 1962. Importantly to be the
provision in the will of Mrs. Hodges that her share of the
conjugal partnership was to be inherited by her husband "to have
and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural
lifetime" and that "at the death of my said husband, I give,
devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located,
to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and
share alike", which provision naturally made it imperative that
the conjugal partnership be promptly liquidated, in order that
the "rest, residue and remainder" of his wife's share thereof,
as of the time of Hodges' own death, may be readily known and
identified, no such liquidation was ever undertaken. The record
gives no indication of the reason for such omission, although
relatedly, it appears therein:
1. That in his annual statement submitted to the
court of the net worth of C. N. Hodges and the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, Hodges repeatedly
and consistently reported the combined income of
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the conjugal partnership and then merely divided
the same equally between himself and the estate of
the deceased wife, and, more importantly, he also,
as consistently, filed corresponding separate
income tax returns for each calendar year for each
resulting half of such combined income, thus
reporting that the estate of Mrs. Hodges had its
own income distinct from his own.
2. That when the court a quo happened to
inadvertently omit in its order probating the will
of Mrs. Hodges, the name of one of her brothers,
Roy Higdon then already deceased, Hodges lost no
time in asking for the proper correction "in order
that the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think
or believe they were omitted, and that they were
really interested in the estate of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges".
3. That in his aforementioned motion of December
11, 1957, he expressly stated that "deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants or
ascendants except brothers and sisters and herein
petitioner as the surviving spouse, to inherit the
properties of the decedent", thereby indicating
that he was not excluding his wife's brothers and
sisters from the inheritance.
4. That Hodges allegedly made statements and
manifestations to the United States inheritance
tax authorities indicating that he had renounced
his inheritance from his wife in favor of her other
heirs, which attitude he is supposed to have
reiterated or ratified in an alleged affidavit
subscribed and sworn to here in the Philippines
and in which he even purportedly stated that his
reason for so disclaiming and renouncing his
rights under his wife's will was to "absolve (him)
or (his) estate from any liability for the payment
of income taxes on income which has accrued to the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", his wife, since her
death.
On said date, December 25, 1962, Hodges died. The very next day,
upon motion of herein respondent and appellee, Avelina A. Magno,
she was appointed by the trial court as Administratrix of the
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings
No. 1307 and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles
Newton Hodges, "in the latter case, because the last will of
said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron
safe and that the real and personal properties of both spouses
may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless Special
Administratrix is appointed," (Order of December 26, 1962, p.
27, Yellow R. on A.) although, soon enough, on December 29,
1962, a certain Harold K. Davies was appointed as her Co-Special
Administrator, and when Special Proceedings No. 1672, Testate
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, was opened, Joe Hodges, as next
of kin of the deceased, was in due time appointed as Co-
Administrator of said estate together with Atty. Fernando P.
Mirasol, to replace Magno and Davies, only to be in turn replaced
eventually by petitioner PCIB alone.
At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have been
proceeding jointly, with each administrator acting together with
the other, under a sort of modus operandi. PCIB used to secure
at the beginning the conformity to and signature of Magno in
transactions it wanted to enter into and submitted the same to
the court for approval as their joint acts. So did Magno do
likewise. Somehow, however, differences seem to have arisen,
for which reason, each of them began acting later on separately
and independently of each other, with apparent sanction of the
trial court. Thus, PCIB had its own lawyers whom it contracted
and paid handsomely, conducted the business of the estate
independently of Magno and otherwise acted as if all the
properties appearing in the name of Charles Newton Hodges
belonged solely and only to his estate, to the exclusion of the
brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, without considering whether
or not in fact any of said properties corresponded to the portion
of the conjugal partnership pertaining to the estate of Mrs.
Hodges. On the other hand, Magno made her own expenditures,
hired her own lawyers, on the premise that there is such an
estate of Mrs. Hodges, and dealth with some of the properties,
appearing in the name of Hodges, on the assumption that they
actually correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. All of these
independent and separate actuations of the two administrators
were invariably approved by the trial court upon submission.
Eventually, the differences reached a point wherein Magno, who
was more cognizant than anyone else about the ins and outs of
the businesses and properties of the deceased spouses because
of her long and intimate association with them, made it
difficult for PCIB to perform normally its functions as
administrator separately from her. Thus, legal complications
arose and the present judicial controversies came about.
Predicating its position on the tenor of the orders of May 27
and December 14, 1957 as well as the approval by the court a
quo of the annual statements of account of Hodges, PCIB holds
to the view that the estate of Mrs. Hodges has already been in
effect closed with the virtual adjudication in the mentioned
orders of her whole estate to Hodges, and that, therefore, Magno
had already ceased since then to have any estate to administer
and the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges have no interests
95 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
whatsoever in the estate left by Hodges. Mainly upon such
theory, PCIB has come to this Court with a petition
for certiorari and prohibition praying that the lower court's
orders allowing respondent Magno to continue acting as
administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges in Special
Proceedings 1307 in the manner she has been doing, as detailed
earlier above, be set aside. Additionally, PCIB maintains that
the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will instituting her brothers and
sisters in the manner therein specified is in the nature of a
testamentary substitution, but inasmuch as the purported
substitution is not, in its view, in accordance with the
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, it is ineffective and
may not be enforced. It is further contended that, in any event,
inasmuch as the Hodges spouses were both residents of the
Philippines, following the decision of this Court in Aznar vs.
Garcia, or the case of Christensen, 7 SCRA 95, the estate left
by Mrs. Hodges could not be more than one-half of her share of
the conjugal partnership, notwithstanding the fact that she was
citizen of Texas, U.S.A., in accordance with Article 16 in
relation to Articles 900 and 872 of the Civil Code. Initially,
We issued a preliminary injunction against Magno and allowed
PCIB to act alone.
At the same time PCIB has appealed several separate orders of
the trial court approving individual acts of appellee Magno in
her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges,
such as, hiring of lawyers for specified fees and incurring
expenses of administration for different purposes and executing
deeds of sale in favor of her co-appellees covering properties
which are still registered in the name of Hodges, purportedly
pursuant to corresponding "contracts to sell" executed by
Hodges. The said orders are being questioned on jurisdictional
and procedural grounds directly or indirectly predicated on the
principal theory of appellant that all the properties of the
two estates belong already to the estate of Hodges exclusively.
On the other hand, respondent-appellee Magno denies that the
trial court's orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 were meant
to be finally adjudicatory of the hereditary rights of Hodges
and contends that they were no more than the court's general
sanction of past and future acts of Hodges as executor of the
will of his wife in due course of administration. As to the
point regarding substitution, her position is that what was
given by Mrs. Hodges to her husband under the provision in
question was a lifetime usufruct of her share of the conjugal
partnership, with the naked ownership passing directly to her
brothers and sisters. Anent the application of Article 16 of
the Civil Code, she claims that the applicable law to the will
of Mrs. Hodges is that of Texas under which, she alleges, there
is no system of legitime, hence, the estate of Mrs. Hodges
cannot be less than her share or one-half of the conjugal
partnership properties. She further maintains that, in any
event, Hodges had as a matter of fact and of law renounced his
inheritance from his wife and, therefore, her whole estate
passed directly to her brothers and sisters effective at the
latest upon the death of Hodges.
In this decision, for the reasons discussed above, and upon the
issues just summarized, We overrule PCIB's contention that the
orders of May 27, 1957 and December 14, 1957 amount to an
adjudication to Hodges of the estate of his wife, and We
recognize the present existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges,
as consisting of properties, which, while registered in that
name of Hodges, do actually correspond to the remainder of the
share of Mrs. Hodges in the conjugal partnership, it appearing
that pursuant to the pertinent provisions of her will, any
portion of said share still existing and undisposed of by her
husband at the time of his death should go to her brothers and
sisters share and share alike. Factually, We find that the
proven circumstances relevant to the said orders do not warrant
the conclusion that the court intended to make thereby such
alleged final adjudication. Legally, We hold that the tenor of
said orders furnish no basis for such a conclusion, and what is
more, at the time said orders were issued, the proceedings had
not yet reached the point when a final distribution and
adjudication could be made. Moreover, the interested parties
were not duly notified that such disposition of the estate would
be done. At best, therefore, said orders merely allowed Hodges
to dispose of portions of his inheritance in advance of final
adjudication, which is implicitly permitted under Section 2 of
Rule 109, there being no possible prejudice to third parties,
inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges had no creditors and all pertinent taxes
have been paid.
More specifically, We hold that, on the basis of circumstances
presently extant in the record, and on the assumption that
Hodges' purported renunciation should not be upheld, the estate
of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters consists
of one-fourth of the community estate of the spouses at the time
of her death, minus whatever Hodges had gratuitously disposed
of therefrom during the period from, May 23, 1957, when she
died, to December 25, 1962, when he died provided, that with
regard to remunerative dispositions made by him during the same
period, the proceeds thereof, whether in cash or property,
should be deemed as continuing to be part of his wife's estate,
unless it can be shown that he had subsequently disposed of
them gratuitously.
At this juncture, it may be reiterated that the question of what
are the pertinent laws of Texas and what would be the estate of
Mrs. Hodges under them is basically one of fact, and considering
the respective positions of the parties in regard to said
96 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
factual issue, it can already be deemed as settled for the
purposes of these cases that, indeed, the free portion of said
estate that could possibly descend to her brothers and sisters
by virtue of her will may not be less than one-fourth of the
conjugal estate, it appearing that the difference in the stands
of the parties has reference solely to the legitime of Hodges,
PCIB being of the view that under the laws of Texas, there is
such a legitime of one-fourth of said conjugal estate and Magno
contending, on the other hand, that there is none. In other
words, hereafter, whatever might ultimately appear, at the
subsequent proceedings, to be actually the laws of Texas on the
matter would no longer be of any consequence, since PCIB would
anyway be in estoppel already to claim that the estate of Mrs.
Hodges should be less than as contended by it now, for admissions
by a party related to the effects of foreign laws, which have
to be proven in our courts like any other controverted fact,
create estoppel.
In the process, We overrule PCIB's contention that the provision
in Mrs. Hodges' will in favor of her brothers and sisters
constitutes ineffective hereditary substitutions. But neither
are We sustaining, on the other hand, Magno's pose that it gave
Hodges only a lifetime usufruct. We hold that by said provision,
Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted her brothers and sisters
as co-heirs with her husband, with the condition, however, that
the latter would have complete rights of dominion over the whole
estate during his lifetime and what would go to the former would
be only the remainder thereof at the time of Hodges' death. In
other words, whereas they are not to inherit only in case of
default of Hodges, on the other hand, Hodges was not obliged to
preserve anything for them. Clearly then, the essential elements
of testamentary substitution are absent; the provision in
question is a simple case of conditional simultaneous
institution of heirs, whereby the institution of Hodges is
subject to a partial resolutory condition the operative
contingency of which is coincidental with that of the suspensive
condition of the institution of his brothers and sisters-in-
law, which manner of institution is not prohibited by law.
We also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited
by her brothers and sisters could be more than just stated, but
this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper application of
the principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil
Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges
had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not
it can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively renounced
his inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances presently
obtaining and in the state of the record of these cases, as of
now, the Court is not in a position to make a final ruling,
whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and We,
therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and
resolution in the first instance by the court a quo, as
hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending such
further proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, Our
considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under
the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could not have
anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to
himself her whole share of their conjugal partnership, albeit
he could have disposed any part thereof during his lifetime,
the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the
uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of
the conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her
death, minus what, as explained earlier, have
been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of
third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as
contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code and
applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones
ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be her free
disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of
her husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code.
The foregoing considerations leave the Court with no alternative
than to conclude that in predicating its orders on the
assumption, albeit unexpressed therein, that there is an estate
of Mrs. Hodges to be distributed among her brothers and sisters
and that respondent Magno is the legal administratrix thereof,
the trial court acted correctly and within its jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the petition for certiorari and prohibition has to
be denied. The Court feels however, that pending the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership and the determination of the
specific properties constituting her estate, the two
administrators should act conjointly as ordered in the Court's
resolution of September 8, 1972 and as further clarified in the
dispositive portion of its decision.
Anent the appeals from the orders of the lower court sanctioning
payment by appellee Magno, as administratrix, of expenses of
administration and attorney's fees, it is obvious that, with
Our holding that there is such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, and
for the reasons stated in the body of this opinion, the said
orders should be affirmed. This We do on the assumption We find
justified by the evidence of record, and seemingly agreed to by
appellant PCIB, that the size and value of the properties that
should correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges far exceed the
total of the attorney's fees and administration expenses in
question.
With respect to the appeals from the orders approving
transactions made by appellee Magno, as administratrix, covering
properties registered in the name of Hodges, the details of
which are related earlier above, a distinction must be made
between those predicated on contracts to sell executed by Hodges
97 | P a g e W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n – C O N F L I C T O F L A W S
before the death of his wife, on the one hand, and those premised
on contracts to sell entered into by him after her death. As
regards the latter, We hold that inasmuch as the payments made
by appellees constitute proceeds of sales of properties
belonging to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as may be implied from
the tenor of the motions of May 27 and December 14, 1957, said
payments continue to pertain to said estate, pursuant to her
intent obviously reflected in the relevant provisions of her
will, on the assumption that the size and value of the properties
to correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges would exceed the
total value of all the properties covered by the impugned deeds
of sale, for which reason, said properties may be deemed as
pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. And there being no
showing that thus viewing the situation, there would be
prejudice to anyone, including the government, the Court also
holds that, disregarding procedural technicalities in favor of
a pragmatic and practical approach as discussed above, the
assailed orders should be affirmed. Being a stranger to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB has no personality to raise the
procedural and jurisdictional issues raised by it. And inasmuch
as it does not appear that any of the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges
or the government has objected to any of the orders under appeal,
even as to these parties, there exists no reason for said orders
to be set aside.
DISPOSITIVE PART
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby
rendered DISMISSING the petition in G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-
27896, and AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the other
thirty-one numbers hereunder ordered to be added after payment
of the corresponding docket fees, all the orders of the trial
court under appeal enumerated in detail on pages 35 to 37 and
80 to 82 of this decision; the existence of the Testate Estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respondent-appellee Avelina A.
Magno, as administratrix thereof is recognized, and it is
declared that, until final judgment is ultimately rendered
regarding (1) the manner of applying Article 16 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines to the situation obtaining in these
cases and (2) the factual and legal issue of whether or not
Charles Newton Hodges had effectively and legally renounced his
inheritance under the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, the said
estate consists of one-fourth of the community properties of
the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife on
May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had already
gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said
date until his death, provided, first, that with respect to
remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue
to be part of the wife's estate, unless subsequently disposed
of gratuitously to third parties by the husband, and second,
that should the purported renunciation be declared legally
effective, no deductions whatsoever are to be made from said
estate; in consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8,
1967, as amended on October 4 and December 6, 1967, is lifted,
and the resolution of September 8, 1972, directing that
petitioner-appellant PCIB, as Administrator of the Testate
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1672,
and respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of
the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings
1307, should act thenceforth always conjointly, never
independently from each other, as such administrators, is
reiterated, and the same is made part of this judgment and shall
continue in force, pending the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of the deceased spouses and the determination and
segregation from each other of their respective estates,
provided, that upon the finality of this judgment, the trial
court should immediately proceed to the partition of the
presently combined estates of the spouses, to the end that the
one-half share thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly and
clearly identified; thereafter, the trial court should forthwith
segregate the remainder of the one-fourth herein adjudged to be
her estate and cause the same to be turned over or delivered to
respondent for her exclusive administration in Special
Proceedings 1307, while the other one-fourth shall remain under
the joint administration of said respondent and petitioner under
a joint proceedings in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672,
whereas the half unquestionably pertaining to Hodges shall be
administered by petitioner exclusively in Special Proceedings
1672, without prejudice to the resolution by the trial court of
the pending motions for its removal as administrator12; and this
arrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of
the two issues of renvoi and renunciation hereby reserved for
further hearing and determination, and the corresponding
complete segregation and partition of the two estates in the
proportions that may result from the said resolution.

Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a
quo are directed to adhere henceforth, in all their actuations
in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the views passed and
ruled upon by the Court in the foregoing opinion.

Appellant PCIB is ordered to pay, within five (5) days from

notice hereof, thirty-one additional appeal docket fees, but
this decision shall nevertheless become final as to each of the
parties herein after fifteen (15) days from the respective
notices to them hereof in accordance with the rules.

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