COMPENDIUM OF

POLITICAL LAW CASES

2012-2013

Submitted by:
1st Year, Block A Students
S/Y 2013-2014
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.) Eduardo Cojangco Jr. vs. Republic of the Philippines GR No. 180705 November 27, 2012 (SIGUENZA)

2.) Atty. Philip Sigfrid Fortun et.al vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo et al GR No. 190293, March 20, 2012 (LABORDO)

3.) Magdalo para sa pagbabago vs. COMELEC GR No. 190793, June 19, 2012 (CO)

4.) Renato C. Corona vs. Senate sitting as Impeachment Court GR No. 200242, July 17, 2012 (CIRUNAY)

5.) Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz vs Commission on Audit G.R. No. 199114 ,July 16, 2013 (OLAGUER)

6.) Emilio O. Gonzales III vs. Office of the President GR No. 196231, September 04, 2012 (DUMALASA)

7.) Jose Miguel T. Arroyo vs. DOJ GR No. 199082 , September 18, 2012 (ALANIS)

8.) Hon. Barbara Ruby C. Talaga vs. COMELEC GR No. 196804, October 09, 2012 (SAN AGUSTIN)

9.) Heirs of Wilson P. Gamboa vs. Sec. Margarito Teves Et. Al. GR No. 176579, October 09, 2012 (MORATO)

10.) Lilibeth O. Ladaga vs. Maj. Gen. Reynaldo Mapagu (BASBAS)

11.) Dominador Jalosjos vs. COMELEC GR. No. 193237, October 09, 2012 (LAURIO)

12.) Hon. Abelardo Abundo Sr. vs. COMELEC GR No. 201716, January 08, 2013 (ESTEVE)

13.) Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. HRET GR. No. 199149, January 22, 2013 (BUENA)

14.) Antonio Dayao vs. COMELEC GR. No.193643, January 29, 2013 (DE LA LUNA)

15.)Silverio Tagolino vs. HRET GR.No. 202202, March 19, 2013 (SATUR)

16.) Maria Lourdes Locsin vs. HRET GR. No. 204123, March 19, 2013 (GALLENITO)

17.) Atong Paglaum Inc. vs. COMELEC GR No. 203766, April 02, 2013 (AMPARO)

18.) Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples rights alliance vs. COMELEC GR No. 204592, April 16, 2013 (ROCO)

19.) Province of Camarines Norte vs. Beatriz O. Gonzales GR No. 185740, July 23, 2013 (REYES)

20.) Romeo G. Jalosjos vs. COMELEC GR. No. 205033, June 18, 2013 (PAITA)

21.) Svetlana P. Jalosjos vs. COMELEC G.R No. 193314, June 25, 2013 (BONAFE)

22.) Regina Ongsiako Reyes vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013 (GONZAGA)
23.) Quiño Et. Al., vs. COMELEC GR No. 197466, Nov. 13, 2012 (ORBESO)

24.) Hon. Patricia Sto. Tomas et. Al. vs. Rey Salac et.al. GR No. 152642, Nov. 13, 2012 (ZAMUDIO)

25.) Douglas R. Cagas vs. COMELEC GR No.194139, Jan. 24, 2012 (ROYALES)

26.) Datu Michael Abas Kida vs. Senate GR No. 196271, Feb. 28, 2012 (DIZA)

27.) Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Sec. of Budget and Management GR No. 164987, April 24, 2012

(CASILI)

28.) China national machinery & equip. group vs. Hon. Ceasar Sta. Maria GR No. 185572 Feb. 7, 2012 (ROSALES)

29.)Phil. Coconut Prod. Fed. Inc vs. Republic of the Philippines. GR.No177857-58 Jan. 24, 2012 (COPONES)

30.)Republic of the Phils. Vs. East Silverlane Realty Dev’t corp. GR No. 186961 Feb. 20, 2012 (LANDONG)

31.) Jamar M. Kulayan et. Al. vs, Gov. AbduSakur Tan GR. No. 187298 July 3, 2012 (RESPALL)

32.) Casimira S. Dela Cruz vs. COMELEC GR No. 192221 Nov. 13, 2012 (MELITON)

33.) Wendell Barreras-Sulit vs. Atty. Paquito Ochoa GR. No. 196232 (BELARMINO)

34.) Prospero Pichay Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Exec. Sec. for Legal Affairs GR. 196425 July 24, 2013 (LAGARDE)

35.) Jelbert B. Galicto vs. H.E. Benigno Simeon Aquino III et. Al. GR. No. 193978, February 28, 2012 (VILLAFLOR)

36.) Civil Service Commission vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 176162 October 09, 2012 (YGUSGUIZA)
 EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO JR.
VS.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G. R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012

FACTS: In 1971, Republic Act No. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company
to administer the Coconut Investment Fund, which, under Section 8 thereof, was to be sourced
from a PhP 0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. Of the PhP 0.55 levy of which the
copra seller was – or ought to be – issued COCOFUND receipts, PhP 0.02 was placed at the
disposition of COCOFED, the national association of coconut producers declared by the
Philippine Coconut Administration (“PHILCOA” now “PCA”) as having the largest membership.
The declaration of martial law in September 1972 saw the issuance of several presidential
decrees purportedly designed to improve the coconut industry through the collection and use of
the coconut levy fund.

One of which is P.D. No. 276 which established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund
(CCSF)and declared the proceeds of the CCSF levy as trust fund, to be utilized to subsidize the
sale of coconut-based products, thus stabilizing the price of edible oil. Another one is P.D. No.
582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance the operation of a hybrid
coconut seed farm.

Then came P.D. No. 755 which paved the way for the implementation of the “Agreement
for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the benefit of Coconut Farmers” executed by the
PCA and that the PCA is hereby authorized to distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the bank
it acquired to the coconut farmers. The said PD further authorized PCA to utilize the CCSF and
the CIDF collections to acquire a commercial bank and deposit the CCSF levy collections in said
bank interest free, the deposit withdrawable only when the bank has attained a certain level of
sufficiency in its equity capital.

By virtue of PD 755, the PCA and Eduardo Cojuangco Jr, the Petitioner, came into an
agreement to purchase stocks of First United Bank (Now UCPB) owned by the latter equivalent
to 72.2% of the present outstanding shares of stockof the Bank utilizing the CCSF to finance the
purchase. However, the agreement states that since Cojuangco has the exclusive and personal
option to purchase the said 72.2% shares of the Bank, the PCA is to request Cojuangco to
exercise the option and transfer the option shares to PCA at the same price Cojuangco paid in
exercising the said rights. In return, Cojuangco shall receive compensation equivalent to 10% of
the 72.2% of the outstanding shares or 7.22% for making the transaction possible. In effect,
what was left for distribution to coconut farmers was only 64.98%. PCA paid for the entire
acquisition price for the 72.2% option shares.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that the said 7.22% received by Cojuangco as compensation for
the said acquisition of shares of First United Bank (Now UCPB) formed part of the ill-gotten
wealth amassed during the Marcos Regime by the Marcos Family and their cronies, including
Eduardo Cojuangco Jr.
ISSUES: Whether or not the the coconut levy funds and accordingly, the UCPB shares acquired
using the coconut levy funds, including the 7.22% shares received as compensation by the
petitioner are public funds?

HELD: Yes, the coconut levy was imposed in the State’s inherent power of taxation, thus, they
partake the nature of taxes which in general, are enforced proportional contributions from
persons and properties, exacted by the State by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of
government and for all public needs. The coconut levy fund was generated by virtue of statutory
enactments imposed on the coconut farmers requiring the payment of prescribed amounts as
provided by PD No. 276. Like other tax measures, they were not voluntary payments or
donations by the people but rather, an enforced contribution exacted on pain of penal sanctions.
The coconut levies were imposed pursuant to the laws enacted by the proper legislative
authorities of the State.

Furthermore, they were clearly imposed for a public purpose. There is absolutely no
question that they were collected to advance the government’s avowed policy of protecting the
coconut industry. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the coconut industry is one of
the great economic pillars of our nation, and coconuts and their byproducts occupy a leading
position among the country’s export. Taxation is done not merely to raise revenues to support
the government, but also to provide means for the rehabilitation and the stabilization of a
threatened industry, which is so affected with public interest as to be within the police power of
the State. Even if the money is allocated for a special purpose and raised by special means, it is
still public in character.

From the foregoing, it is held that any property acquired by means of the coconut levy
funds, such as the subject UCPB shares, should be treated as public funds or public property,
subject to the burdens and restrictions attached by law to such property.

As the coconut levy funds partake of the nature of taxes and can only be used for public
purpose, and importantly, for the purpose for which it was exacted, i.e., the development,
rehabilitation and stabilization of the coconut industry, they cannot be used to benefit––
whether directly or indirectly––private individuals, be it by way of a commission, or as the
subject Agreement interestingly words it, compensation. Consequently, Cojuangco cannot stand
to benefit by receiving, in his private capacity, 7.22% of the FUB shares without violating the
constitutional caveat that public funds can only be used for public purpose. Accordingly, the
7.22% FUB (UCPB) shares that were given to Cojuangco shall be returned to the Government, to
be used “only for the benefit of all coconut farmers and for the development of the coconut
industry.
 PHILIP SIGFRID FORTUN
VS.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012

FACTS: On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family
of Maguindanao gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians and in
response to this carnage, President Arroyo issued on November 24, 2009 Presidential
Proclamation No. 1946 declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat,
and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao.

On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1959 declaring
martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao except for
identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. On December 6, 2009, President Arroyo
submitted her report to Congress. On December 9, 2009, Congress convened in joint session to
review the validity of the President’s action. But two days later, or on December 12, 2009,
before Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1963, lifting
martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE: Whether Or Not the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1963, lifting martial law
and restoring the writ in Maguindanao, render the issues moot and academic.

HELD: Yes. The issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1963, lifting martial law and restoring
the writ in Maguindanao, rendered the issues moot and academic.

The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two
reasons. First, President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their
automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same .Under the 1987 Constitution the
President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only
sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the
suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the
situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.

The Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court
must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than
initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through
such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of
the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a
political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of
the Court.
 Second, since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully
implemented. The military did not take over the operation and control of local government units
in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao that
should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been
reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged
in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests
made in those eight days. The point is that the President intended by her action to address an
uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated province. In her judgment, the rebellion was
localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and amply armed government
presence.
 MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO
VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012

FACTS: Magdalo para sa Pagbabago filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC as a
political party based in the National Capital Region on July 2, 2009. During the pendency of the
petition for registration, COMELEC scrutinized the qualifications in reference to Article IX-C,
Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution which states that “The Commission on Elections shall
exercise the following powers and functions: “(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political
parties , organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their
platform or program of government and accredit citizen’s arms of the Commission on Elections.
Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their
goals through violence or unlawful means or refuse to uphold and adhere to this constitution
shall likewise be refused registration.” Prior to the petition for registration, The COMELEC denied
the petition for registration by Magdalo para sa Pagbabago on the grounds that “Those which
seek to achieve goals through violence or unlawful means.” As stated in the Article IX-C, Section
2 (5). But Magdalo filed a joint manifestation for accreditation showing interest to join the May
10, 2010 elections on party list representatives. But the COMELEC dismissed the Petition for
being moot and academic by citing BP 881, Section 60, Section 61 and RA 7941 Section 2,
Section 3, that registration of a political party is a requirement before accreditation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the TRO on cases filed before the members of the Magdalo would
warrant the pertition for Registration before the COMELEC, quashing the grounds under Article
IX-C, Section 2 (5).

HELD: No. The Supreme court ruled that facts of common knowledge could be a valid basis as
evidence to warrant violence and unlawful means as it was made known to the public knowledge
the capability of the members of the Magdalo manifested in the Oakwood mutiny in 2003 of
creating violence of the armed men. The TRO would not be a valid ground to quash the
presumption of violence because there was an established public knowledge on the violence
made by the members of the Magdalo in the past. The COMELEC was empowered by the
Constitution to determine and exercise its prerogative in perusing qualifications and
accreditation of a political party in reference to Article IX-C Section 2(5), BP 881, RA 7941.
Furthermore, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution Section 5 deter members of the Armed Forces
in the active service shall engage directly or indirectly in any political activity.
 RENATO C. CORONA
VS.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SITTING AS IMPEACHMENT COURT
GR No. 200242, July 17, 2012

FACTS: Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for immediate
issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction filed by the
former Chief Justice of this Court, Renato C. Corona, assailing the impeachment case initiated by
the respondent Members of the House of Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by
respondent Senate of the Philippines.
The present petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded to trial on the basis
of the complaint filed by respondent Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm
and defective for lack of probable cause; (2) did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of
the complaint which, aside from being a “hodge-podge” of multiple charges, do not constitute
allegations in law, much less ultimate facts, being all premised on suspicion and/or hearsay;
assuming arguendo that the retention of Par. 2.3 is correct, the ruling of the Impeachment Court
to retain Par. 2.3 effectively allows the introduction of evidence under Par. 2.3, as vehicle to
prove Par. 2.4 and therefore its earlier resolution was nothing more than a hollow relief, bringing
no real protection to petitioner; (3) allowed the presentation of evidence on charges of alleged
corruption and unexplained wealth which violates petitioner’s right to due process because first,
Art. II does not mention “graft and corruption” or unlawfully acquired wealth as grounds for
impeachment, and second, it is clear under Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution that “graft and
corruption” is a separate and distinct ground from “culpable violation of the Constitution” and
“betrayal of public trust”; and (4) issued the subpoena for the production of petitioner’s alleged
bank accounts as requested by the prosecution despite the same being the result of an illegal act
(“fruit of the poisonous tree”) considering that those documents submitted by the prosecution
violates the absolute confidentiality of such accounts under Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign
Currency Deposits Act) which is also penalized under Sec. 10 thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional issues raised in this case been mooted out?

HELD: The impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than
the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict
and without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the
process of screening applicants and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected
to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from among those candidates
shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted
by supervening events and his own acts. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it
ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof would be without
practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner
would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
 ROSALINDA DIMAPILIS-BALDOZ
VS
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 199114 ,July 16, 2013

FACTS: Labrador was the former Chief of the POEA’s Employment Services Regulation Division
(ESRD). On May 2, 1997, then Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing ordered his dismissal
from service as he was found to have bribed an overseas Filipino worker in order to expedite the
issuance of her overseas employment certificate. On 1999, the Sandiganbayan sentenced him.
One of those was to suffer the penalty of temporary special disqualification from public office.

Labrador applied for probation in accordance with Presidential Decree No. (PD) 968,as amended
by PD 1990(Probation Law) and was granted and cancelled the bail bond he posted for his
provisional liberty.

The probation officer found that Labrador continued to hold the position of POEA ESRD Chief
despite him having been sentenced to suffer the penalty of temporary special disqualification
from office. The SB directed copies of the March 2, 2004 Resolution be furnished to Dimapilis-
Baldoz, as POEA Administrator, as well as to the CSC Chairman for their information. On March 9,
2004, Dimapilis-Baldoz received a copy of the said resolution and thereupon issued a
Notice/Order of Separation dated March 11, 2004 (Separation Order), relieving Labrador of his
duties.

On 2006, the COA issued a Notice of Disallowance(Notice of Disallowance) finding Dimapilis-

Baldoz, among other POEA employees, personally liable for the salaries and other benefits
unduly received by Labrador in the amount of P1,740,124.08, paid through various checks issued
from August 1999 to March 15, 2004. Baldoza sought for a reconsideration but COA affirmed it.

ISSUE: Whether or not grave abuse of discretion attended the COA’s disallowance in this case.

HELD: A.) Grave abuse of Discretion: Reckoning point of Disallowance

Section 47(2), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code provides that, a
department secretary’s decision confirming the removal of an officer under his authority is
immediately executory, even pending further remedy by the dismissed public officer. Therefore,
the order issued by then Labor Secretary Quisumbing on May 2, 1997 ordering the dismissal of
Labrador was already executory and which is the reckoning period of the Disallowance.
There was no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to COA in fixing the reckoning period of
Disallowance at May 3, 2000, since records are bereft of any showing that it had knowledge of
Labrador’s dismissal as early as May 2, 1997.

a.) Grave abuse of Discretion: Personal Liabilities of Dimapilis-Baldoz

The Court observes that Dimapilis-Baldoz’s contentions were only impressed with good faith
which removes her personal liability in this case. Two important incidents impel this conclusion:
1.) Labrador’s 201 File with the POEA was without any record of the SB case; and 2.) Dimapilis-
Baldoz was only apprised of his conviction when her office was furnished a copy of the SB’s
March 2, 2004 Resolution which ordered the revocation of Labrador’s probation.

While the COA correctly affirmed the disallowance of the salaries and benefits which Labrador
unduly received when he continued to hold office despite his conviction, the liability for refund
cannot be imposed upon Dimapilis-Baldoza because she had no knowledge or any reasonable
indication that the payment of salaries to Labrador was actually improper.

The Court also said that: ”It is well to stress that neither will it do justice to hold Dimapilis-Baldoz
personally liable simply because she possessed the final authority for the disbursements and had
direct supervision over her subordinates.”. Dimapilis-Baldoz’s personal liability deleted.
 EMILIO E. GONZALES
VS.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
G.R No. 196231, September 04, 2012

FACTS: The first case docketed as GR No. 196231 contrary with application for issuance of
temporary restraining order or status your order assail a jurisdictional ground the decision dated
March 31, 2011, rendered by the office of the President in OP- Case No, 101460 dismissing
petitioner Emelio A. Gonzales as Deputy ombudsman for the Military and other law enforcement
office upon finding guilt on the administrative charges of gross neglect of duty and grave
misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public trust, the petitioners primarily seeks to declare as
unconstitutional Sec. 8 (2) of RA 6770 otherwise known as the ombudsman act of 1989, which
gives the President the power to dismiss a deputy ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE: Whether or not the office of the president have administrative jurisdiction over the
Deputy Ombudsman and the Special prosecutor.

HELD: Yes, the president have administrative jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman and the
Special prosecutor. As provided in Section 8 of RA 6770, the above-mentioned officials may be
removed from office by the president for any of the grounds for the removal of the ombudsman,
and after due process.
 JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ET.AL.,
G.R. No. 199082, September 18, 2012

FACTS: This case is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
filed by Jose Miguel T. Arroyo (Mike Arroyo).Acting on the discovery of alleged new evidence and
the surfacing of new witnesses indicating the occurrence of massive electoral fraud and
manipulation of election results in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections, on August 2, 2011, the
Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a committee jointly with the
Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged
election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections. On August 4,
2011, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 640 naming three (3) of its
prosecutors to the Joint Committee.On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint
Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the
2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. The Joint Committee
and the Fact-Finding Team are composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. Section 2 of
the Joint Order lays down the mandate of the Joint Committee, to wit:The Fact-Finding Team, on
the other hand, was created for the purpose of gathering real, documentary, and testimonial
evidence which can be utilized in the preliminary investigation to be conducted by the Joint
Committee. Its specific duties and functions as enumerated in Section 4 of the Joint Order.
Pursuant to Section 7 of the Joint Order, on August 23, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated
its Rules of Procedure.The members of the Fact-Finding Team unanimously agreed that the
subject of the Initial Report would be the electoral fraud and manipulation of election results
allegedly committed during the May 14, 2007 elections. Thus, in its Initial Report dated October
20, 2011, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007
senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were
indeed perpetrated. On November 14, 2011, petitioner Mike Arroyo filed a Motion to Defer
Proceedings before the Joint Committee, in view of the pendency of his petition before the
Court. In an Order dated November 15, 2011, the Joint Committee denied the aforesaid motions
of petitioners.
On November 16, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated a Joint Resolution which was later
indorsed to the Comelec. On November 18, 2011, after conducting a special session, the
Comelec en banc issued a Resolution approving and adopting the Joint Resolution subject to
modifications.

ISSUES: I. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 "Creating and Constituting a Joint DOJ-
COMELEC Preliminary Investigation Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007
National Elections Electoral Fraud and Manipulation Cases" is constitutional in light of the
following:
A. The due process clause of the 1987 Constitution
B. The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution
C. The principle of separation of powers
D. The independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional body
II. Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction under the law to conduct preliminary
investigation jointly with the DOJ.
A. Whether or not due process was observed by the Joint DOJ-COMELEC Fact-Finding Team and
Preliminary Investigation Committee, and the COMELEC in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation and approval of the Joint Panel’s Resolution.

HELD: Constitutionality of Joint-Order No. 001-2011

A. Equal Protection Clause
Pursuant to law and the Comelec’s own Rules, investigations may be conducted either by the
Comelec itself through its law department or through the prosecutors of the DOJ. These varying
procedures and treatment do not, however, mean that respondents are not treated alike. Thus,
petitioners’ insistence of infringement of their constitutional right to equal protection of the law
is misplaced.
B. Due Process
There was no showing that the statements claimed to have prejudged the case against
petitioners were made by Secretary De Lima and Chairman Brillantes or were in the prejudicial
context in which petitioners claimed the statements were made. A reading of the statements
allegedly made by them reveals that they were just responding to hypothetical questions in the
event that probable cause would eventually be found by the Joint Committee.
C. Separation of powers
The Comelec is granted the power to investigate, and where appropriate, prosecute cases of
election offenses. This is necessary in ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections. On the other hand, the DOJ is mandated to administer the criminal justice system in
accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes,
prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system. It is specifically
empowered to "investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the
probation and correction system." Also, the provincial or city prosecutors and their assistants, as
well as the national and regional state prosecutors, are specifically named as the officers
authorized to conduct preliminary investigation. Recently, the Comelec, through its duly
authorized legal offices, is given the power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the
government such as the DOJ, to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses.
D. Independence of the Comelec
The court finds no impediment for the creation of a Joint Committee. While the composition of
the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is dominated by DOJ officials, it does not necessarily
follow that the Comelec is inferior. Under the Joint Order, resolutions of the Joint Committee
finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance
with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. This shows that the Comelec, though it acts jointly with
the DOJ, remains in control of the proceedings. In no way can we say that the Comelec has
thereby abdicated its independence to the executive department.

The Comelec and the DOJ themselves agreed that they would exercise their concurrent
jurisdiction jointly. Although the preliminary investigation was conducted on the basis of two
complaints – the initial report of the Fact-Finding Team and the complaint of Senator Pimentel –
both complaints were filed with the Joint Committee. Consequently, the complaints were filed
with and the preliminary investigation was conducted by only one investigative body. Thus, we
find no reason to disallow the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction jointly by those given such
authority. This is especially true in this case given the magnitude of the crimes allegedly
committed by petitioners. The joint preliminary investigation also serves to maximize the
resources and manpower of both the Comelec and the DOJ for the prompt disposition of the
cases.

Publication Requirement
In the conduct of preliminary investigation, the DOJ is governed by the Rules of Court, while the
Comelec is governed by the 1993 Comelec Rules of Procedure. There is, therefore, no need to
promulgate new Rules as may be complementary to the DOJ and Comelec Rules.
Considering that Joint Order No. 001-2011 only enables the Comelec and the DOJ to exercise
powers which are already vested in them by the Constitution and other existing laws, it need not
be published for it to be valid and effective. A close examination of the Joint Committee’s Rules
of Procedure, however, would show that its provisions affect the public. Specifically, the
following provisions of the Rules either restrict the rights of or provide remedies to the affected
parties, to wit: (1) Section 1 provides that "the Joint Committee will no longer entertain
complaints from the public as soon as the Fact-Finding Team submits its final report, except for
such complaints involving offenses mentioned in the Fact-Finding Team’s Final Report"; (2)
Section 2 states that "the Joint Committee shall not entertain a Motion to Dismiss"; and (3)
Section 5 provides that a Motion for Reconsideration may be availed of by the aggrieved parties
against the Joint Committee’s Resolution. Consequently, publication of the Rules is necessary.
 MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA
VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RODERICK A. ALCALA
G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012

FACTS: On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009, Ramon Talaga and Philip M. Castillo filed
their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) respectively for the position of Mayor of Lucena City for
May 10, 2010 national and local elections. Ramon, the official candidate of the Lakas-Kampi-
CMD, declared in his CoC that he was eligible for the office he wants to seat to.Four days later, or
on December 5, 2009, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for having already served Three
(3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena. He alleged that Ramon, despite knowing the
fact that he had been elected and had served three consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City,
still filed his CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.The
Supreme Court has new ruling of the issue on the three (3)-term limitation, respondent
acknowledges that he is now DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City
having served three terms as Mayor of Lucena City prior to the filing of his certificate of
candidacy for the 2010 elections.The COMELEC First Division issued a resolution dated April 19,
2010 that the respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City for the
May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.Ramon filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration
against the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division. On May 4, 2010, he filed an
Ex-parte

Manifestation of Withdrawal of the Pending Motion for Reconsideration. And on the same date,
Barbara Ruby, his wife, filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon, her
husband, under the same party.On May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc, declared the COMELEC
First Division’s Resolution dated April 19, 2010 final and executory.

ISSUES: Is there a validity for Barbara Ruby Talaga to substitute her husband, Ramon, as a
candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City?
Whether or not who among the contending parties should assume the contested elective
position.

HELD: Petitions lack merit. The existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non or
indispensable (vital,essential) for a valid substitution.Thus, the filing of a CoC within the period
provided by law is a mandatory requirement for any person to be considered a candidate in a
national or local election. Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code, states, “that no person shall
be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the
period fixed herein” . The declaration of Ramon’s disqualification rendered his CoC invalid,
therefore he was not a valid candidate to be properly substituted.Under Section 68, a person
who is disqualified is prohibited to continue as a candidate, but under Section 78 a person whose
CoC is cancelled or denied due course is not considered or treated as a candidate at all because
his status is that of a person who has not filed a CoC. Ramon himself specifically admitted his
ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve on December 30, 2009 in the
COMELEC. That supply to render his CoC invalid, considering that for all intents and purposes the
COMELEC’s declaration of his disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was no
candidate at all.

A non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute. Granting without any
qualification of petition the COMELEC declared Ramon disqualified and to cancel his CoC
A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy. If the
disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and
was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under
Section 77 of the Code.
THE COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from assuming the position of Mayor
of Lucena City. There was no valid candidate for her to substitute due to Ramon’s ineligibility.
Also, Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the elections in accordance with
Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. And she was not an additional candidate for the
position of Mayor of Lucena City because her filing of her CoC on May 4, 2010 was beyond the
period fixed by law. Hence, she was not, in law and in fact, a candidate.It resulted to a
permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City, and such vacancy should be filled
pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the Local Government Code which
states that “Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and
Vice-Mayor. – If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-
governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor”. CONSEQUENTLY, the
Court DISMISSES the petitions in these consolidated cases and AFFIRMS the Resolution issued on
May 20, 2011 by the COMELEC En Banc, and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF AMPARO IN FAVOR OF
LILIBETH O. LADAGA
Ladaga vs. Mapagu
(GR Nos. 189689-91, November 13, 2012)

FACTS: Petitioners’ name are included in the alleged to be a JCICC "AGILA" 3rd Quarter 2007
Order of Battle Validation Result of the Philippine Army's 1Oth Infantry Division (10th ID), which
is a list containing the names of organizations and personalities in Southern Mindanao,
particularly Davao City, supposedly connected to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
and its military arm, the New People's Army (NPA). They perceived that because of the inclusion
of their names in the Order of Battle (OB List), they become easy targets of unexplained
disappearances or extralegal killings – a real threat to their life, liberty and security.

The petitioner in G.R. No. 189689, Atty. Ladaga, first came to know of the existence of the OB
List from an undisclosed source. This was after the PowerPoint presentation made public by
Bayan Muna Party-List Representative Satur Ocampo (Representative Ocampo) during the
conclusion of the International Solidarity Mission (ISM) conducted by various organizations. In
her Affidavit she substantiated the threats against her life, liberty and security by narrating that
suspicious-looking persons have been visiting her law office during her absence, posing either as
members of the military or falsely claiming to be clients inquiring on the status of their cases.

On the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No. 189690, Atty. Librado-Trinidad, delivered a Privilege
Speech before the members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod to demand the removal of her
name from said OB List. Subsequently, the City Council ordered a formal investigation into the
existence of the alleged OB List. The Commission on Human Rights (CHR), for its part, announced
the conduct of its own investigation into the matter, having been presented a copy of the
PowerPoint presentation during its public hearing. According to her, in the course of the
performance of her duties and functions as a lawyer, as a member of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, as well as, of Bayan Muna, she has not committed any act against national security
that would justify the inclusion of her name in the said OB List. In her Affidavit, she recounted
that two suspicious-looking men on a motorcycle tailed her vehicle as she went about her day
going to different places. She also recalled that three unidentified men tried to barge into their
house.

The petitioner in G.R. No. 189691, Atty. Zarate, was informed that his name was also among
those included in the OB List. Asserting that the inclusion of his name in the OB List was due to
his advocacies as a public interest or human rights lawyer, Atty. Zarate vehemently and
categorically denied that he was fronting for, or connected with, the CPP-NPA.

Petitioners separately filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with
Application for a Production Order. The RTC issued separate Writs of Amparo in each of the
three (3) cases, directing respondents to file a verified written return within seventy-two (72)
hours and setting the case for summary. However, the parties' respective Position Papers were
denied by the RTC finding no substantial evidence to show that the perceived threat to their life,
liberty and security was attributable to the unlawful act or omission of the respondents. Their
Joint Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the RTC. Hence, the petition.

ISSUES: Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that petitioner failed to adduce substantial
evidence to warrant the grant of the privilege of the writ, i.e., protection.

HELD: No. The trial court did not err in its ruling. As emphasized by Justice Brion during the
deliberations on this case, in cases of enforced disappearance, the evidence that would directly
establish a violation of the right to life, liberty and security is indubitably in the State’s
possession. The same is not equally true in cases where the amparo petitioner alleges (as in this
case) a threatened violation of his/her rights since the facts, circumstances and the link between
these that create an actual threat to his/her life are measurably within the ability of the amparo
petitioner to prove. A mere inclusion of one’s name in the OB List, without more, does not
suffice to discharge the burden to establish actual threat to one’s right to life, liberty and
security by substantial evidence.

More so, the present petitions do not involve actual cases of abduction or disappearance that
can be the basis of an investigation. Without substantial evidence of an actual threat to
petitioners' rights to life, liberty and security that consists more than just the inclusion of their
names in an OB List, an order for further investigation into, or production of, the military's Order
of Battle, would have no concrete basis.
 DOMINADOR JALOSJOS, JR.
VS
COMELEC
G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012

FACTS: Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. and Agapito Cardino were rivals in the mayoralty race in
Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections. Before election day, Cardino filed
with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code against Jalosjos, alleging
that the latter made a material misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) when he
declared that he was eligible for the position of mayor when, in fact, he was disqualified under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code for having been previously convicted by a final
judgment for a crime (robbery) involving moral turpitude. In his defense, Jalosjos admitted his
previous conviction but argued that he had been admitted to probation, which allegedly
restored him all of his political rights. Cardino rebutted Jalosjos' defense, citing a court order
revoking the grant of probation for Jalosjos' failure to comply with the terms and conditions of
the grant of probation. Shortly thereafter, on the very day of the election, the COMELEC resolved
to grant Cardino's petition and ordered the cancellation of Jalosjos' CoC. The COMELEC ruled
that the rules on succession would then apply. Subsequently, both Cardino and Jalosjos came to
the Court for redress.

ISSUES: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that Jalosjos was disqualified to run as candidate for Mayor of
Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte and then cancelled his certificate of candidacy.

HELD: No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it ruled the above-mentioned. In affirming the ruling of the Commission, the
Supreme Court held that the perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his
criminal conviction by final judgment for robbery is a material fact involving eligibility which is a
proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’ certificate
of candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all votes
for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy being void ab initio,
Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the
position of Mayor. Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of
the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a
material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public
office he/she is running for. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the
CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel
such certificate. In conclusion, the Court held that the COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’
certificate of candidacy. A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed
at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy.
 HON. ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR.,
VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA,
G.R. No. 201716 JANUARY 08, 2013

FACTS: Abundo Abelardo Sr. ran for position of Municipal Mayor in Viga, Cantanduanes in 2001,
2004, 2007 and 2010. He was proclaimed as winner in 2001 and 2007 elections. However, in
2004 elections, Jose Torres, his opponent, was proclaimed winner, Mayor of Viga, and
performed the functions of the office. Abundo protested Torres’ election and was eventually
declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest. He assumed office from May 9,
2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007. In the 2010 election, the rivalry
between Abundo and Torres again ensued. Torres filed a disqualification case against Abundo on
the basis of the three-term limit. On June 16, 2010, the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of
Abundo who defeated Torres by 219 votes. He was proclaimed mayor-elect of Viga town.

On May 21, 2010, a certain Ernesto Vega filed a quo warranto action against Abundo before the
Virac Regional Trial Court (RTC). Vega raised the same arguments in Torres’ disqualification case
against Abundo. The RTC said Abundo was ineligible to serve as mayor with a ruling that he had
served three terms in the 2001, 2004, and 2007 polls.

Both the rulings of the Comelec’s Second Division on Feb. 8, 2012 and full court on May 10, 2012
affirmed the RTC decision, prompting Abundo to elevate the issue before the SC.

Viga Vice Mayor Emeterio Tarin and first councilor Cesar Cervantes assumed the post of mayor
and vice mayor, respectively, on July 3, 2012, the same day the SC issued a temporary restraining
order stopping the implementation of the Comelec decision against Abundo.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abundo deemed to have served three-consecutive terms.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court En Banc reversed the rulings of COMELEC and the RTC.

The three-term limit rule for elective local officials; Elements. To constitute a disqualification to
run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory
provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms;
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

As provided for in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Sec. 43(b) of the Local
Government Code, the three-term limit rule constitutes a disqualification to run for an elective
local office when an official has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and has fully served those three consecutive terms.
It was held that Abundo did not serve three consecutive terms as Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes
due to an actual involuntary interruption during the 2004-2007 term. This was because he
assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served a little over one year and one
month only. Thus, the two-year period which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should
be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of
the three-term limit rule.

The Supreme Court further held that there has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the
successive terms of the official after his or her third term. An interruption usually occurs when
the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the third. Of course, the basic law
is unequivocal that a “voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be
considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected.” This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective
local official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her
third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption
which may be brought about by certain events or causes.

As a note, Abundo’s case was different from the cited Aldovino case. Here, the winning
candidate, he was the one deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his constituents. To a
certain extent, Abundo was a victim of an imperfect election system. While admittedly the Court
does not possess the mandate to remedy such imperfections, the Constitution has clothed it
with enough authority to establish a fortress against the injustices it may bring.

Thus, Abundo is eligible to run for mayoralty and ordered to immediately be reinstated.
Furthermore, the Vice-Mayor and the Councilor were asked to vacate their positions and assume
again their previous posts.
 LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO
VS.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND ELMER E. PANOTES
G.R. No. 199149, January 22, 2013

FACTS: Petitioner, Vinzons-Chato ran for District Representative of the second district of
Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2010 elections. The district comprises 7 municipalities namely
Daet, Vinzons, Basud, Mercedes, Talisay, San Vicente and San Lorenzo, with a total of 205
clustered precincts. With a total vote count of 47,822, she lost to Elmer Panotes who received
51,707. Panotes was proclaimed winner on May 12, 2010. Chato filed an electoral protest before
the HRET, assailing that there is substantial discrepancy between votes in all 160 clustered
precincts in 4 municipalities. In HRET resolution No 11-208, the tribunal directed the copying of
the picture image files of ballots relative to the protest. Petitioner, however, found no legal basis
for this resolution. She cited section 10 (d) of HRET guidelines on the Revision of Ballots that
says: When it has been shown, in a preliminary hearing set by parties or by the Tribunal, that the
integrity of the ballot and the ballot boxes used in the May 10, 2010 elections was not preserved,
as when there is proof of tampering and substitutions, the Tribunal shall direct the printing of
the picture images of the ballots of the subject precinct stored in the data storage device for the
same precinct. Petitioner further alleged that these images for revision were taken from polluted
compact flash cards. The tribunal declared that the reversal of votes out of the 20 precincts
cannot be relied upon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, as the sole judge of
electoral protests of incumbent representatives, committed grave abuse of discretion in
regarding the picture images as equivalent of the official ballots.

HELD: 1. No, the HRET cited Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence:Sec. 1. Original of an
electronic document – an electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original
document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other
means, shown to reflect the data accurately. Sec.2. Copies of the equivalent of the originals –
When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time with identical
contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same
matrix, or by the mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other
equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the original, such as the copies or duplicates
shall be regarded as the equivalent of the original. Also : Sec. 2 (3) of R.A. 9369 defines official
ballot where AES is utilized as the paper ballot, whether printed or generated by technology
applied, that faithfully captures or represents the votes cast by a voter or to be recorded in
electronic form. According to the Supreme Court, the acts complained of in these cases pertain
to the HRET’s exercise of its discretion which we find to be well within the bounds of its authority
and therefore, beyond our power to restrict or curtail
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 193643 January 29, 2013

ANTONIO D. DAYAO, ROLANDO P. RAMIREZ and ADELIO R. CAPCO, Petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LPG MARKETERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 193704

FEDERATION OF PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LPG MARKETERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

> denied complaint filed by petitioners

-antonio d dayao

-rolando p ramirez

-adelio r capco

-Federation of Philippine industries Inc.

> for cancellation of registration of:

LPGMA LPG marketer's association as sectoral organization under party-list system

Facts

>individual petitioners (dealers of diff LPG)

>FPII assoc. comprised of entities engaged in various industries in country

>LPGMA:

-non stock

-non profit

-small industry players in LPG and energy sector

-Banded together to pursue common objectives:

 -provide quality

-safety

-reasonable priced gas and oil production

>May 21 2009, LPGMA seek party-list accreditation

with: COMELEC

Thru: petition for registration

As: Sectoral Organization

Purpose: Participate in May 2010 elections

Under: RA 7941 or party-list system act

>Jan 5 2010: LPGMA was approved by the COMELEC

-after requisite publication, verification and hearing

-without opposition

>Four Months thereafter: Individual petitioner wants to cancel LPGMA's registration as party-list
organiztaion

->later joined by FPII as a complainant intervention

>Complaint was Docketed as SPP No. 10-010

-LPGMA does not represesnt marginalized sector

-because of its incorporators, officers and members are not marginalized

-they are marketers and independent re-fillers of LPG

-control 45% of National LPG retail Market

-have significant ownership interest in various LPG refilling plants

-FPII emphasized:

-Busines of Marketing and refilling reqs substantial working

capital

-it involves the purchase of LPG from importers/big oil players

-establishment of refilling plants and safety auxilliary eqs

-purchase or lease of thousands of LPG containers

-mobilization of a marketing, distribution and delivery network

 -alleged that LPGMA is a mere lobby group that espouses their own interest before the congress
and Dept. of energy

-Response: LPGMA countered that

-Sec 5(2) art. 4 of 1987 constitution- does not req. that representative must be members of the
marginalized/underrepresented sector of the society

-the ground cited by the petitioners is not one of those mentioned in sec. 6 R.A. No. 7941

-petitioners are just trying to resurrect their lost chance to oppose the petition for registration

>In its first assailed Resolution: August 5, 2010

-the COMELEC dismissed the complaint for two reasons.

-the ground for cancellation cited by the petitioners is not among the exclusive
enumeration in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941.

-the complaint is actually a belated opposition to LPGMA’s petition for registration

which has long been approved with finality on January 5, 2010.

-The ruling was reiterated in the COMELEC Resolution dated September 6, 2010

-denying the petitioners’ motions for reconsideration

Pivotal to the said resolutions are the ensuing ratiocinations of the COMELEC, viz:

>LPGMA’s registration was approved as early as 05 January 2010.

-Instead of opposing said registration or intervening therein after having been constructively
notified thereof by its publication,

-petitioners waited almost four (4) entire months before filing the instant complaint.

-The purpose of publication in these kinds of cases is similar to that of land registration cases

"to apprise the whole world that such a petition has been filed and that whoever is
minded to oppose it for good cause may do so."

-This belated filing is an unfortunate attempt to circumvent the obviously final and executory
nature of the Resolution dated 05 January 2010.

-Granting the present complaint will only reward petitioners’ inaction. (Citations omitted)

>The petitioners must be reminded that the matter has already been ruled upon.

-In the Resolution promulgated on January 5, 2010,

-this Commission (First Division) has resolved to grant the Petition for Registration of
LPGMA as a sectoral organization under the party-list system of representation.
 -the Commission (First Division) has concluded that LPGMA truly represents a
marginalized and underrepresented sector.

-With respect to the said conclusion, absent any circumstance subsequent to the
promulgation of the mentioned Resolution

- which would call for the cancellation of registration of LPGMA, the same can no longer
be disturbed by this Commission.

-To warrant a cancellation of LPGMA’s registration, there should be:

>a strong showing that there has been a change in the relevant factual matters
surrounding the Petition

>Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC,

-the petitioners implore:

-the Court to determine the correctness of the COMELEC resolutions dated August 5, 2010 and
September 6, 2010.

The Arguments of the Parties

>the Court received on March 17, 2011 from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),

-a Manifestation and Motion to Remand (In Lieu of Comment).

-According to the OSG:

>since the COMELEC failed to resolve the factual issue on the qualifications of LPGMA as
a registered party-list organization,

>the case must be remanded to the electoral body for summary hearing and reception
of evidence on the matter.

>LPGMA retorted:

-that another hearing would be a superfluity because the COMELEC has already heard and
verified LPGMA’s qualifications during the proceedings for its petition for registration.

-LPGMA asserts that the petitions should instead be dismissed as they involve factual questions
that cannot be entertained in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

>On December 26, 2012,

-LPGMA manifested to the Court that pursuant to COMELEC Resolution dated December 13,
2012,
-LPGMA passed the recent automatic review conducted by the COMELEC on the
qualifications of party-list groups.
-LPGMA was found compliant with the guidelines set by law and jurisprudence and its
accreditation was retained for purposes of the 2013 party-list elections.
 Ruling of the Court

>There was no valid justification for the dismissal of the complaint for cancellation.

>An opposition to a petition for registration is not a condition precedent to the filing of a complaint for
cancellation.

>Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 lays down the grounds and procedure for the cancellation of party-list
accreditation, viz:

-Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.

The COMELEC may:

-motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due
notice and hearing,

the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of
the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for

religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast

under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered.

>For the COMELEC to validly exercise its statutory power to cancel the registration of a party-list
group, the law imposes only two (2) conditions:

(1) due notice and hearing is afforded to the party-list group concerned; and

(2) any of the enumerated grounds for disqualification in Section 6 exists.

>Section 6 clearly does not require that an opposition to the petition for registration be previously
interposed so that a complaint for cancellation can be entertained.

Since the law does not impose such a condition, the COMELEC, notwithstanding its delegated
administrative authority to promulgate rules for the implementation of election laws, cannot read into
the law that which it does not provide. The poll body is mandated to enforce and administer election-
related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them.

>Moreover, an opposition can be reasonably expected only during the petition for registration
proceedings which involve the COMELEC’s power to register a party-list group, as distinguished from the
entirely separate power invoked by the complaint, which is the power to cancel.

>The distinctiveness of the two powers is immediately apparent from their basic definitions.

>To refuse is to decline or to turn down,

>while to cancel is to annul or remove.

Adopting such meanings within the context of Section 6, refusal of registration happens during
the inceptive stage when an organization seeks admission into the roster of COMELEC-registered party-
list organizations through a petition for registration.

Cancellation on the other hand, takes place after the fact of registration when an inquiry is done by the
COMELEC, motu propio or upon a verified complaint, on whether a registered party-list organization still
holds the qualifications imposed by law.

>Refusal is handed down to a petition for registration while cancellation is decreed on the registration
itself after the petition has been approved.

A resort to the rules of statutory construction yields a similar conclusion.

>The legal meaning of the term "and/or" between "refusal" and "cancellation" should be taken in its
ordinary significance "refusal and/or cancellation" means "refusal and cancellation" or "refusal or
cancellation". It has been held that the intention of the legislature in using the term "and/or" is that the
word "and" and the word "or" are to be used interchangeably.

>The term "and/or" means that effect shall be given to both the conjunctive "and" and the disjunctive
"or" or that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the
purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from the whole statute. The term is used to avoid a
construction which by the use of the disjunctive "or" alone will exclude the combination of several of
the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive "and" will exclude the efficacy of any one of the
alternatives standing alone.

>Hence, effect shall be given to both "refusal and cancellation" and "refusal or cancellation" according
to how Section 6 intended them to be employed. The word "and" is a conjunction used to denote a
joinder or union; it is pertinently defined as meaning "together with", "joined with", "along or together
with." The use of "and" in Section 6 was necessitated by the fact that refusal and cancellation of party-
list registration share similar grounds, manner of initiation and procedural due process requirements of
notice and hearing. With respect to the said matters, "refusal" and "cancellation" must be taken
together. The word "or", on the other hand, is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and
independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the
sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. As such, "refusal or cancellation", consistent
with their disjunctive meanings, must be taken individually to mean that they are separate instances
when the COMELEC can exercise its power to screen the qualifications of party-list organizations for
purposes of participation in the party-list system of representation.

>That this is the clear intent of the law is bolstered by the use simply of the word "or" in the first
sentence of Section 6 that "the COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested
party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition."

>Consequently, the COMELEC’s conclusion that the complaint for cancellation, filed four (4) months
after the petition was approved, is actually:

- a belated opposition, obliterates the distinction between the power to register/refuse and the
power to cancel.

>Since an opposition may only be sensibly interposed against a petition for registration, the
proceedings for which involve the COMELEC’s power to register, it is wrong to impose it as a condition
for the exercise of the COMELEC’s entirely separate power to cancel.

>As such, the absence of an opposition to a petition for registration cannot serve to bar any
interested party from questioning, through a complaint for cancellation, the qualifications of a party-list
group.

II. The accreditation of a party-list group can never attain perpetual and irrefutable conclusiveness
against the granting authority.

There is no arguing that the COMELEC Resolution dated January 5, 2010 granting LPGMA’s registration
has since become final.

Such finality, however, pertains:

 only to the Resolution itself and not to the accreditation of LPGMA as a party-list
organization.

-The said Resolution, as in any other resolution granting the registration of any other
organization desirous of party-list accreditation,
-did nothing more but to vest with LPGMA the right to participate in the party- list elections, i.e.

>File a manifestation of its intent to participate and have the same given due course by the
COMELEC;
>The right to field its nominees;
> The right to exercise all that is bestowed by our election laws to election candidates (hold
campaigns, question the canvass of election returns, etc.), and;
> The right to assume office should it obtain the required number of votes.

With respect to such matters, the COMELEC resolution was already final. LPGMA’s right
to run, as it did so run, during the 2010 party-list elections is already beyond challenge.
 SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO
VS.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ
G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013

FACTS: Richard Gomez filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) with the Commission on Elections,
seeking congressional office as Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under
the ticket of the Liberal Party. One of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla, filed a
Verified Petition, alleging that Richard, who was actually a resident of College Street, East
Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota
Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City.Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year
residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and thus
should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office he prayed that Richard’s CoC
be denied due course and/or cancelled.

The COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution granting Juntilla’s petition without any
qualification.

Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC En Banc.

As a replacement, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC together with a
Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s
official substitute candidate, for the same congressional post. In response to various letter-
requests submitted to the COMELEC’s Law Department the COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of
its administrative functions, issued, approved, the recommendation of the said department to
allow the substitution of private respondent.

During the elections, Richards, whose name remained on the ballots, garnered 101, 250 votes
while his opponents, Eufrocino Codilla, Jr. and Silverio Tagolino (petitioner), obtained 76,549 and
493 votes, respectively. In view of the aforementioned substitution, Richard’s votes were
credited in favor of private respondent and as a result, she was proclaimed the duly-elected
Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.

Petitioner filed a Petition for quo warranto before the HRET in order to oust private respondent
from her congressional seat. The HRET issued the assailed Decision which dismissed the quo
warranto petition and declared that private respondent was a qualified candidate for the
position of Leyte Representative. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET gravely abused its discretion in finding that Richard was validly
substituted by private respondent as candidate for Leyte Representative in view of the former’s
failure to meet the one year residency requirement.

HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal. In reversing the HRET ruling, the Supreme Court distinguished between a
disqualification case under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), and a petition to
deny due course to and/or cancel a CoC under Section 78. A disqualification case is hinged on
either (i) a candidate’s possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country or (ii) his
commission of an election offense under the OEC, and results in the candidate still technically
considered to have been a candidate but is ordered to discontinue such candidacy (or is
disallowed from holding public office if he has already been elected) as a sanction for
committing the election offense. On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of a CoC proceeding is premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the
material qualifications required for the elective office aspired for. Pertinently, while a
disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a candidate for all intents
and purposes, a person whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under
Section 78 is deemed not to have been a candidate at all, as his cancelled CoC is considered
void ab initio. And considering that Section 77 of the OEC requires that there be a candidate in
order for substitution to take place, as well as the precept that a person without a valid CoC is
not considered as a candidate at all, it necessarily follows that a person whose CoC has been
denied due course to and/or cancelled cannot be validly substituted. It is equally revelatory that
Section 77 enumerates the instances where substitution is permissible and noticeably, while
death, withdrawal or disqualification for any cause of an official candidate of a registered
political party are included as valid basis for substitution, material misrepresentation cases are
not included.

In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run due to his failure to comply with
the residency requirement. The confusion, however, stemmed from the use of the word
“disqualified” in the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, which was adopted by the
COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of Lucy, and even further perpetuated by the
HRET in denying the quo warranto petition.

Accordingly, the COMELEC En Banc misconstrued the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution when
it noted that Richard was only disqualified and that his CoC was not denied due course to and/or
cancelled, paving the way for the approval of Lucy’s substitution. And the HRET, in perpetuating
the COMELEC En Banc’s error although not bound by previous COMELEC pronouncements –
being the sole judge of all contests relating the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives – committed a grave abuse of discretion.
 MA. LOURDES B. LOCSIN
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET)
and MONIQUE YAZMIN MARIA Q. LAGDAMEO
G.R. No. 204123; March 19, 2013

FACTS: Private respondent won in the 2010 Automated Local and National Elections as
Representative for the First Legislative District of Makati by a winning margin of two hundred
forty two (242) votes as against the former who later filed on May 21, 2010 an election protest
before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) alleging fraud, anomalies, and
irregularities in the election results in all two hundred thirty three (233) clustered precincts of
the said district.

The revision and recount proceedings conducted on the fifty nine (59) and thirty one (31) pilot
precincts designated by the parties in their protest and counter protest respectively during the
preliminary conference showed private respondent’s increase in winning margin (242 to 265
votes) in the 25% of the subject precincts. Such winning trend did not prevent the HRET from
discontinuing the proceedings for the remaining 174 clustered precincts from January 18 to 31,
2012. During such period, Petitioner continued presenting documentary exhibits to prove her
allegation.

ON September 17, 2012, the HRET dismissed petitioner's election protest for having failed to
show a reasonable recovery of votes and affirmed the proclamation of the private respondent as
the duly elected Representative of the First Legislative District of Makati City in the said election.

On November 16, 2012, PETITIONER filed the present petition alleging that the HRET committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it inter alia dismissed
her election protest based on its alleged erroneous appreciation of her contested and claimed
ballots.

ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s
election protest.

HELD: No, The HRET did not act with grave abuse of discretion for, in fact, it applied
meticulously the existing rules and rulings on the ballot appreciation for the objected and
claimed ballots made by both parties, which resulted to the increased votes of the private
respondent instead.

The Philippine Constitution [Article VI (17)] mandates the HRET to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. As held
in Lazatin v. HRET, The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the
jurisdiction conferred to it and such grant of power is characterized by Justice Malcolm as full,
clear and complete. Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly
reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and remained as full, clear and complete as that previously
granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission. The same may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.

Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment or power. It must
be so grave and exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

IN THE CASE AT BAR, the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion for it conducted a
revision and appreciation of all the ballots from all the precincts despite the increasing winning
margin of the private respondent during the initial proceedings. Despite the winning trend and
disapproval of three of its member- representatives who voted for the dismissal of the said
protest due to lack of reasonable recovery of votes, it still continued the proceedings diligently
so as to remove the cloud of doubt surrounding private respondent’s victory. It took pains to
carefully review each contested ballot by enumerating with concrete basis and clarity the reason
for its denial or admittance.26 The results, objections, claims, admissions, and rejections of
ballots were explained sufficiently and addressed by the HRET in its Decision.
 ATONG PAGLAUM, INC
VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 203766 April 02, 2013

FACT: Before the May 2013 elections, the Supreme Court in Atong Paglaum Inc. vs. Commission
on Elections reinterpreted Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and reversed its own ruling in
Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v.
Commission on Elections (BANAT).

52 party-list groups and organizations ordered separate petitions with the Supreme Court
(SC) in an effort to reverse the resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec contended that these party-
list groups and organizations failed to represent a “marginalized and underrepresented sector,”
their nominees do not come from a “marginalized and underrepresented sector,” and/or some
of the organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent
in Congress.”

The majority outlooks that the party list system includes not only sectoral parties but also
non-sectoral parties. Hence, contrary to the Ang Bagong Bayani, the party-list system is not the
exclusive domain of sectoral representatives belonging to the “marginalized and
underrepresented sectors” but may be participated in by non-sectoral parties as well who do not
need to represent marginalized and underrepresented sector.

Status quo ante orders (SQAO) were issued in all 54 petitions which reestablished the
status quo prior to the disqualification of petitioners. But, only 41 petitions were able to obtain a
mandatory injunction, directing the Comelec to incorporate their names in the printing of official
ballots.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners are qualified to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
under the party list system.

HELD: Yes. The court adopts in this decision new parameters in the qualification of national,
regional,and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby, abandoning the rulings in the
decisions applied by the Comelec in disqualifying petitioners. thus, it remanded the case to
COMELEC so the latter can determine the status of the petitioners based on the following new
guidelines:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented”
sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-
list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in partylist
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or

lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized
and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined
political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented”
sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,”
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-
fide members of such parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.

Therefore, in the decision promulgated on April 2, 2013, the high court, through Carpio’s
ponencia, ruled in favor of the 54 petitions and remanded these petitions to the Comelec. The
party-list groups and organizations covered by the 41 petitions that obtained mandatory
injunction orders from the high court still stand a chance to make it to the 2013 party-list race
 AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE
VS.
COMELEC
GR No. 204125, April 16, 2013

FACTS: Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for
urgent issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
InjunctionA-IPRA is regional sectoral party duly registered in the COMELEC by virtue of the
Second Division’s resolution dated 13 January 2010. It participated in the May 2010 elections but
was not able to get the required number of votes to secure a seat in the House of
Representatives. On 31 May 2012, it filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the May
2013 elections.

In line with Resolution 9153, A-IPRA submitted the requirements needed to prove continuing
compliance with RA 7941 and the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling. On 10 November 2012, it received
a copy of the OMCELEC en banc resolution dated 07 November 2012 cancelling the
registration/accreditation of A-IPRA.

ISSUES: COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it ordered the automatic review by the en banc of the division resolutions
granting the petitions for registration of party-list groups through resolution 9513 despite the
Constitutional provision that the en banc can only review decisions of the division upon the filing
of a motion for reconsideration.

1. The Commission en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction when it ordered the conduct of summary hearing for all registered
party-list groups to prove their continuing compliance with the requirements of RA 7941
through the issuance of Resolution 9513
2. The Commission en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it cancelled the registration/ accreditation of A-IPRA party-list in its
resolution dated 07 November 2012.

HELD: A petition for registration as a party-list organization or group entails the exercise of quasi-
judicial function of COMELEC. Consequently, a petition for registration as a party-list group
should first be acted upon and decided by the Division of the COMELEC. This is jurisdictional. If a
motion for reconsideration is filed, then that is the only time when the COMELEC en banc can
take cognizance of the case. Otherwise, the en banc has no jurisdiction to pass upon the decision
of the division. This is a constitutional precept, which COMELEC, with its rule making power,
cannot and should not ignore, amend or suspend. Resolution 9513 then violates this
constitutional mandate; hence null and void.

1. The order in the questioned resolution to conduct a summary hearing for all registered
party list to prove continuing compliance is violative of due process and established
jurisprudence. First, the order is vague—it does not inform the parties what will happen
 during the summary evidentiary hearing, what procedural and evidentiary rules to
observe, what is the COMELEC actually looking for , what evidence to present.

Petitioner was and other party-list groups have already been scrutinized during the petition for
registration. They have ben found to have complied with the requirements of the law. Thus,
their registration can only be canceled if there is a positive showing of their non-compliance. This
can only be done through a verified petition seeking to deny due course against a registered
party-list groups manifestation of intention to participate. Resolution 9512 has expanded the
meanings of sec 4 RA 7041 and virtually compelled those already registered under the party list
system of representation to renew its registration, when the law clearly states that a party
already registered need not register anew.

3. A-IPRA’s right to notice and hearing was trampled upon by the COMELEC en banc when,
in an arbitrary, capricious and despotic and whimsical manner, unceremoniously
cancelled its registration through a mere summary hearing. While the COMELE
conducted a summary hearing to determine the petitioner’s continuing compliance, the
same failed to meet the standard required by the constitutions mandate on due process
to renege on the Second Divisions jurisdiction and warrant the cancellation of its
registration. Petitioner was never informed on what grounds its registration will be
tested.

1. Petition be given due course and that a Temporary restraining Order be issued placing A-
IPRA in its former status as a registered regional sectoral party in the party-list system of
representation
2. Issue a writ of preliminary injunction commanding COMELEC to include A-IPRA in the list
of party-list candidate in the ballot to be printed
3. Render a decision granting the petition and ordering the issuance of the Writ of Certiorari
declaring the questioned resolution NO 9513 together with the Resolution dated 07
November as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or
in excess of jurisdiction and therefore, null and void.
 ROMEO G. JALOSJOS
VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET. AL.
GR. No. 205033, June 18, 2013

FACTS: On November 16, 2001, petitioner Romeo G. Jalosjos was convicted of two (2) counts of
statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness assailed in G.R. Nos. 132875-76,
entitled “People of the Philippines v. Romeo G. Jalosjos,”. He was sentenced with the penalties of
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal for each count, respectively, which carried the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the Revised
Penal Code. On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued an order
commuting his prison term to sixteen years, three months and three days After serving his
sentence, he was issued a Certificate of Discharge From Prison on March 18, 2009. On April 26,
2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. His application was denied due
to his previous conviction. He then filed for Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters
in Zamboanga City. While this petition was still pending, he filed a Certificate of Candidacy on
October 5, 2012 with the intention of running as mayor in Zamboanga City during the upcoming
May 2013 local elections. On October 18, 2012, the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion
because of his perpetual absolute disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to
vote in any election. This was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City on October
31, 2012. Five petitions were submitted to the COMELEC requesting for the denial of due course
and/or cancellation of petitioner’s pending Certificate of Candidacy resolution, the COMELEC
then issued Resolution No. 961314 on January 15, 2013, resolving to cancel and deny due course
to the Certificate of candidacy filed by petitioner due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as
well as his failure to comply with the voter registration requirement. Jalosjos now filed a petition
for certiorari on the Commission on Elections' Resolution No. 96132 dated January 15, 2013,
ordering the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner Romeo G. Jalosjos'
certificate of candidacy (CoC) as a mayoralty candidate for Zamboanga City.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu proprio
Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing, violated petitioner’s right to due process.

HELD: No, the COMELEC merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in
cancelling petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy on the basis of his perpetual absolute
disqualification. Even without a petition, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final
judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from
running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the
disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. Hence, the petition for certiorari was
DISMISSED.
 SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS
VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET.AL.,
G.R. No. 193314 February 26, 2013

FACTS: Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) or mayor of Baliangao, Misamis
Occidental for the 10 May 2010 elections. She indicated therein her place of birth and residence
as Barangay Tugas, Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental. Private respondents filed a
petition to deny or cancel petitioner’s CoC, in which they argued that she had falsely epresented
her place of birth and residence, because she was in fact born in San Juan, Metro Manila, and
had not totally abandoned her previous domicile, Dapitan City.The evidences presented by
herein private respondents are as follows: (1) Certification from the Assessor’s Office of
Baliangao that there was no tax declaration covering any real property in the name of petitioner
located at any place in the municipality; (2) Certification from the Civil Registrar of Baliangao that
petitioner had no record of birth in the civil registry of the municipality; (3) Joint Affidavit of
three residents of Baliangao; and (4) Affidavit of Patricio D. Andilab (Andilab), official of Purok
5,Brgy. Tugas, Baliangao.

The petitioner’s contentions: (1)She had established her residence in the said barangay since
December 2008 when she purchased two parcels of land there, and that she had been staying in
the house of a certain Mrs. Lourdes Yap (Yap) while the former was overseeing the construction
of her house; (2) Error in her place of birth was committed by her secretary; (3) The Petition to
Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy remained pending as of the day of the
elections, in which petitioner garnered the highest number of votes; (4) Consequently, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed her as the duly elected municipal mayor.
The COMELEC division granted the disqualification of herein petitioner but the COMELEC en
banc denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The COMELEC ruled that (1) based on the evidence presented, petitioner never acquired
a new domicile in Baliangao, because she failed to prove her bodily presence at that place, her
intention to remain there, and her intention never to return to her domicile of origin; (2) the
Extrajudicial Partition with Simultaneous Sale was not sufficient proof that petitioner had
purchased two parcels of land, because she was never a party to the agreement, and it was quite
unusual that she never acquired a deed of sale or title to protect her interests; (3) the
application of petitioner for voter registration only proved that she had met the minimum six-
month residency requirement and nothing more; and (4) the affiants of the Sworn Statements
were all partial, because they either worked for her or were members of organizations that
received financial assistance from her. Hence, this petition

ISSUES: 1.) Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to promulgate
its 04 June 2010 and 19 August 2010 Resolutions in accordance with its own Rules of Procedure.
And; 2.)Whether petitioner complied with the one-year residency requirement for local elective
officials
HELD: No. The petitioner’s contentions are as follows: (1) She was not served an advance notice
that these Resolutions were going to be promulgated, hence, her right to due process was
violated; (2) Promulgation is the process by which a decision is published, officially announced,
made known to the public or delivered to the clerk of court for filing, coupled with notice to the
parties or their counsel. It is the delivery of a court decision to the clerk of court for filing and
publication. It is the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court. The additional
requirement imposed by the COMELEC rules of notice in advance of promulgation is not part of
the process of promulgation; and (3) What wanted and what the petitioner apparently objected
to was not the promulgation of the decision but the failure of the trial court to serve notice in
advance of the promulgation of its decision as required by the COMELEC rules. The failure to
serve such notice in advance of the promulgation may be considered a procedural lapse on the
part of the trial court which did not prejudice the rights of the parties and did not vitiate the
validity of the decision of the trial court nor of the promulgation of said decision.

In the present case, we read from the COMELEC Order that the exigencies attendant to the
holding of the country’s first automated national elections had necessitated that the COMELEC
suspend the rule on notice prior to promulgation, and that it instead direct the delivery of all
resolutions to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation. The COMELEC’s Order
did not affect the right of the parties to due process. They were still furnished a copy of the
COMELEC Decision and were able to reckon the period for perfecting an appeal. In fact,
petitioner was able to timely lodge a Petition with this Court. No. When it comes to the
qualifications for running for public office, residence is synonymous with domicile. The term
‘residence’ as so used, is synonymous with ‘domicile’ which imports not only intention to reside
in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.

Requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile by choice: (1) Residence or bodily presence in
the new locality; (2) Intention to remain there; (3) An intention to abandon the old domicile; (4)
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should
be deemed to continue.
Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption
of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same
time. Moreover, even if these requisites are established by clear and positive proof, the date of
acquisition of the domicile of choice, or the critical date, must also be established to be within at
least one year prior to the elections using the same standard of evidence.

To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of

domicile or residence implies that the landed can establish compliance with the residency
requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to
hold public office, which property requirement would be unconstitutional.The approval of the
application for registration of petitioner as voter only shows, at most, that she had met the
minimum residency requirement as a voter. This minimum requirement is different from that for
acquiring a new domicile of choice for the purpose of running for public office.
 REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES
VS
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GR. No. 207264, June 25, 2013

FACTS: Regina Ongsiako Reyes, the winning representative of the lone congressional district of
Marinduque has been disqualified due to her ineligibility to run because of the issues about her
citizenship and residence.

As evidenced with the “Manifestation with Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and
Amended List of Exhibits” consisting of, among others: (1) a copy of an article published on the
internet with an Affidavit of Identification and Authenticity of Document, providing a database
record of the Bureau of Immigration indicating that petitioner is an American citizen and a
holder of a U.S. passport; (2) a Certification of Travel Records of petitioner which indicates that
petitioner used a U.S. Passport in her various travels abroad: The COMELEC First Division found
that, contrary to the declarations that she made in her COC, petitioner is not a citizen of the
Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, namely: (1) to take an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and (2) to make a personal and sworn renunciation
of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In
addition, the COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not have the one year residency
requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 18, 2013 claiming that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has not lost such status by simply obtaining and using
an American passport. On May 14, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit. Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner was
proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 Elections.

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14,
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final and executory, considering that more than
twenty-one (21) days have elapsed from the date of promulgation with no order issued by this
Court restraining its execution. On same day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano
R. Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives. The petitioner then contended that
the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed because pursuant to
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the
“sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of the Members of
the House of Representatives.
ISSUES: 1.)Whether or not Respondent COMELEC is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is a
duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member
of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque. 2.)Whether or
not Respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it declared that Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet the
residency requirement.

HELD: Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following
reasons:
a. First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s
qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition
is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such
action.
b. Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered
a Member of the House of Representatives.

As held in Marcos v. COMELEC,21 the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is
not a member of the House of Representatives, to wit:
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed assumption of
jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections,
suffice it to say that HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a
member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no
jurisdiction over the question.

The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of
Representatives? It is clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives,
there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper
oath, and (3) assumption of
office.

Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because,
primarily, she has not yet assumed office. The term of office of a Member of the House of
Representatives begins only “at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.”
Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.

2. As to the ruling that petitioner is ineligible to run for office on the ground of citizenship,
the COMELEC First Division, discoursed as follows:
“x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for
public office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the following acts: (1)
take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-General
of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation
of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent complied with the
aforesaid requirements. Early on in the proceeding, respondent hammered on
petitioner’s lack of proof regarding her American citizenship, contending that it is
petitioner’s burden to present a case. She, however, specifically denied that she has
become either a permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the USA.

Due to petitioner’s submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation

dated February 7, 2013, however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an
American passport which she continues to use until June 30, 2012, petitioner was able to
substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to respondent to present substantial
evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do, leading to the
conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that she had availed of the
privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made
a valid sworn renunciation of her American citizenship, she remains to be an American
citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any elective public office in the
Philippines.”
 JOEL P. QUINO ET. AL.,
VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND RICTCHIE R. WAGAS
G.R No. 197466, November 13, 2012

FACTS: Petitioner Joel P. Quino and private respondent Ritchie R. Wagas both ran for the
position of Mayor of Compostela, while petitioner Antonette C. Dangoy for vice-mayor.
Petitioners Josephine F. Abing, Joy Ann P. Cabatingan, Jessa P. Cang, Wilfredo F. Calo, Homer C.
Canen, Jose L. Cagang, Alberto Cabatingan, and Francisco F. Oliverio were candidates for
municipal councillors during the May 10, 2010 elections. Results of the canvassing showed that
Quino obtained 11,719 votes as against 9,338 votes garnered by Wagas. Quino along with the
rest of petitioners who were the winning candidates for members of Snagguniang Bayan, were
proclaimed by the MBOC on May 11, 2010.

Wagas filed and Election protest and petition for annulment of proclamation in the COMELEC on
the ground that allegedly the EERs of 14 precincts are falsified and a discrepancy in Precinct No.
19 showing that more than 100 votes were cast but SOV reflected only 10 votes. Contending
that COC and proclamation are without authentic basis, Wagas prayed that the proclamation of
the winning candidates be declared null and void. The commission grants the suspension and
orders the MBOC to convene, canvass and there after proclaim the rightful winners after it has
verified and corrected the EERs.

ISSUE: Whether or not Wagas petition assailing the denial of his motion for recount and seeking
injunctive relief (GR 200505) is moot and academic.

HELD: The Special Board of Canvassers of Compostela, Cebu already proclaimed the petitioner as
the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor, vice-mayor and councillors. With this development,
the reliefs prayed for in the present petition have become moot and academic. As held in
Ocampo VS. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, there no longer exists an actual
controversy between the parties and resolving the merits of this case would no longer serve any
cheerful purpose. “It is a rule of universal application, almost that courts of justice constituted to
pass on upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are
involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And were the issues has become moot and
academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration there on would be of no
practical use or value” Gancho on VS. Sec. of Labor and Employment.
 HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, ET. AL.,
VS.
REY SALAC, ET.AL.,
GR. No. 152642, November 13, 2012

FACTS: Republic Act 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 was
enacted by Congress on June 7, 1995 to set the Government’s policies on overseas employment
and establish a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers,
their families and overseas Filipinos in distress. Section 29 and 30 of said Act ordered the DOLE
to begin deregulating within one year of its passage the recruitment and migration of overseas
workers and within 5 years phase out the regulatory functions of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA). Rey Salac et. al. filed on January 8, 2002 a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction against the DOLE Secretary, POEA Administrator and the TESDA Secretary-
General before Quezon City RTC. This was along the four other petitions questioning RA 8042.
The petition sought to nullify DOLE Department Order 10 and POEA Memorandum Circular 15;
prohibit the DOLE, POEA and TESDA from implementing said order & circular and further issuing
rules and regulations in recruitment and placement of OFWs and enjoin them to comply with the
policy of deregulation mandated under Section 29 & 30 of RA 8042. Quezon City RTC granted the
petition and ordered said government agencies to deregulate the recruitment and placement of
OFWs. The department orders, circulars and issuances that are inconsistent with the policy of
deregulation under RA 8042.

Thus, the officials of POEA, TESDA and DOLE filed the present petition to annul the RTC’s
decision. The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. and Confederated Association of
Licensed Entertainment Agencies Inc. (CALEA) intervened in the case claiming that the RTC’s
decision gravely affected them for it paralyzed the deployment abroad of OFWs and performing
artists. The Court enjoined the Q.C. RTC from enforcing its decision. In a parallel case, Asian
Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc., et. al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with application for TRO and preliminary injunction against the mentioned 3 government officials
before the Q.C. RTC to enjoin the agencies from implementing the 2002 Rules and Regulations
Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Overseas Workers and to cease from issuing
orders in violation of the policy of deregulation provided in Section 29 & 30 of RA 8042. The Q.C.
RTC granted the petition. The 3 government officials were prompted to file another action. The
Court the issued a TRO enjoining RTC to enforce its decision.The Republic, however, on Dec. 4,
2008 informed the SC that on April 10, 2007 former Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo signed into
law RA 9422 which expressly repealed Sec. 29 & 30 of RA 8042.On August 20, 2009 respondents
Salac et. al. then told the Court that they agree with the Republic’s view that the repeal of
Sections 29 & 30 of RA 8042 renders issues in their action moot & academic and as well as the
two other cases. On August 21, 1995 Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) filed
a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition to annul Sec. 6, 7, 9 and 10 of RA 8042 for being
unconstitutional. RTC Manila declared Sec. 6 unconstitutional on the ground that its definition of
illegal recruitment is vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters;
its sweeping application of the penalties failed to make any distinction as to the seriousness of
the act committed for the application of the penalty imposed and it allowed the offended parties
to file the criminal case in their place of residence would negate the general rule on venue of
criminal cases which is the place where the crime of any of its essential elements were
committed.Two other parallel cases were brought questioning the constitutionality of Section 10
of RA 8042 through a claim for death and insurance benefits and damages from Becmen & White
Falcon (recruitment and deployment agencies) for death of a daughter of who worked as a staff
nurse in Saudi Arabia. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the claim on the ground that the issuance of
benefits were already received from OWWA and to the credence given that the nurse
committed suicide. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission found Becmen and
White Falcon liable and relied that the nurse died of criminal violence and rape. Becmen and
White Falcon appealed to the Court of Appeals which found the nurse’s death not work related.
Award of actual damages was deleted but ruled that Becmen’s Corporate directors and officers
are solidarily liable with their company for its failure to investigate. On July 16, 2009 the
corporate directors and officers of Becmen filed a motion for leave to intervene and questioned
the constitutionality of Sec. 10 of RA 8042 holding the officers solidarily liable with the company
for money claims filed by the OFWs against their employers and recruitment firms. The Court
allowed the intervention and motion for reconsideration.In the PASEI case, the Q.C. RTC held
unconstitutional the last sentence of the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 10 OF RA 8042. Absence of
sufficient proof that the corporate officers and directors of the erring company had knowledge
of and allowed the illegal recruitment, making them automatically liable would violate their right
to due process of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not, Sections 29 & 30; 6, 7 & 9 and 10 of RA 8042 is unconstitutional?

HELD: RA 8042 is a police power measure intended to regulate the recruitment & deployment of
OFWs. It aims to curb if not eliminate the injustices and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs
seeking to work abroad. The rule is settled that every statute had in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. The Court cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the laws enacted by
the Legislative Department. Hence, in the absence of a clear and unmistakable case that the
statute is unconstitutional, the Court must uphold its validity. The first two cases (GR 152642 and
152710) are dismissed for being moot and academic. GR 167590 (DOLE, POEA and TESDA
officials vs. PASEI), RTC’s decision was set aside and declared valid and constitutional Sections 6,
7 & 9 of RA 8042. Section 10, last sentence of 2nd paragraph of RA 8042 was also held valid and
constitutional. However, the Court reconsidered and set aside the decision that officers of
Becmen Services Exporter and Promotion were solidarily liable to the parents of the nurse who
died for lack of a finding that such intervenors had a part in the act or omission imputed to the
corporation.
 DOUGLAS R. CAGAS
VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND CLAUDE P. BAUTISTA
G.R No. 194139, January 24, 2012

FACTS: Petitioner Douglas R. Cagas was proclaimed the winner for the gubernatorial race for the
province of Davao del Sur. Respondent Claude P. Bautista, his rival, filed an electoral protest
alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules and
resolutions. The protest was raffled to the COMELEC First Division.

In his affirmative defense, Cagas argued that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on
time and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions
complained of. The COMELEC First Division denied the special affirmative defences. Thus, Cagas
prayed that the matter be certified to the COMELEC En Banc. Bautista countered that the
assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. The
COMELEC First Division issued an order denying Cagas’ motion for reconsideration, prompting
him to file a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review on certiorari an
interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC

HELD: Petition was DENIED. Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on
the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, it limits such power
to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an
interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no
power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a
Division of the COMELEC.

There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative
defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First
Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal
the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC En Banc along with the other
errors committed by the Division upon the merits.

It is true that there may be an exception to the general rule, which is when an interlocutory
order of a Division of the COMELEC was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion, as the Court conceded in Kho v. Commission on Elections. However, the said
case has no application herein because the COMELEC First Division had the competence to
determine the lack of detailed specifications of the acts or omissions complained of as required
by Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether such lack called for the
outright dismissal of the protest.
 DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA
VS.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 196271, February 28, 2012

FACTS: Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were
enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM
and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended
the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November
26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday
of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the
next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun
preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various
regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the
next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local
elections of the country. In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court,
the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

ISSUES: 1.) Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the
ARMM elections]? 2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-
days rule under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution? 3. Is the grant [to the
President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?

HELD: [The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No.
10153 in toto.] 1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections. While
the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local
elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional
Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought
to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the
provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second
Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections. In this case, the ARMM elections,
although called “regional” elections, should be included among the elections to be synchronized
as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution. Thus, it is clear
from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections,
including the ARMM elections. 2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-
readings-on-separate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The
general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they
must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the
President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the
following manner: The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of
printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2]
qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days
before it is finally approved. In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate
enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections.
Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted both the House and the
Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement. 3. YES, the grant
[to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional [During the oral
arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve the
problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization
in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in
office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2)
hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those
elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to
appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized
elections assume office.] 3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the
terms of office of the incumbent ARMM officials We rule out the [hold over] option since it
violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states: Section 8. The term of
office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases
ours] Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-
year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a
holdover. xxx. If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated
by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for
the new term. This view – like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm
because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would
effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly
can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term
and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of
appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment
power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally
infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken. Even assuming that holdover is
constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article
VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as
an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot
apply where such contrary intent is evident. Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly
clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054
by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the
discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. 3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections
is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no authority to order special elections. The
power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held
on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local
officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or
officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or
fill in the details in the execution of that power. Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM
elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date – May 13,
2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local
elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative
wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the other elections. After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor
the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the
COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the
legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to
declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised
in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a
contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what
Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers. Thus, in the same way
that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term
cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the
Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call
for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the
cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution. 3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the
President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid. The above considerations
leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the
President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to
Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself,
however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity. At the outset, the
power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the
exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be
clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution, which states: Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
[emphasis ours] This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can
appoint. These are: First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public
ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel
or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution; Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint; and Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone. Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No.
10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear
constitutional basis. If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to
appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that
the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be “elective and representative of the constituent
political units.” This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the
assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective. After fully examining the
issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes
very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and
representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way
amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of
governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office
of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly
elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.” This power is far
different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the
assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections. [T]he legal reality is that
RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for
synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail.
And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its
unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an
interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
 LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP) ET.AL,
VS.
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, ET. AL.,
G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012

FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the
constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for
2004 (GAA of 2004)The Petitioner, Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), is a group of
lawyers who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic
or social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and,
therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and
congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress
to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in
receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects; the Members of Congress in
effect intrude into an executive function. In other words, they cannot directly spend the funds,
the appropriation for which was made by them. In their individual capacities, the Members of
Congress cannot “virtually tell or dictate upon the Executive Department how to spend
taxpayer’s money. Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to
legislation. “It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction, and
therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance. By allowing the
Members of Congress to receive direct allotment from the fund, to propose and identify projects
to be funded and to perform the actual spending of the fund, the implementation of the PDAF
provision becomes legally infirm and constitutionally repugnant.
ISSUES: Whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in
this case; and Whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress
is unconstitutional and illegal.
HELD: In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional
statute, as citizens and taxpayers. According to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation and
release of funds to the Members of Congress and the authority given to them to propose and
select projects is the core of the law’s flawed execution resulting in a serious constitutional
transgression involving the expenditure of public funds. The sufficient interest preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is established. Thus,
in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement
of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.

Anent locus standi, “the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement.[18] The gist of the question of standing is whether a party
alleges “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public
interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the
consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.The Court
rules in the negative.

To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and
unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of
proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because “to invalidate
[a law] based on baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that
passed it but also of the executive which approved it.”

The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing
that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually
spend them according to their sole discretion. Not even a documentation of the disbursement
of funds by the DBM in favor of the Members of Congress was presented by the petitioner to
convince the Court to probe into the truth of their claims. As applied to this case, the petition is
seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter
spend funds out of PDAF. Although the possibility of this unscrupulous practice cannot be
entirely discounted, surmises and conjectures are not sufficient bases for the Court to strike
down the practice for being offensive to the Constitution.

The Court sees no need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said
case. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
 CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT CORP.
VS.
HON. CESAR D. STA MARIA, ET.AL.,
G.R. No. 185572: February 7, 2012

FACTS: China National Machinery and Equipment Corp (Group)[CNMEG] entered into a contract
with North Luzon Railways Corporation for the construction of a railway line from Manila to San
Fernando, La Union (The Northrail Project). The Chinese government, designating the EXIM Bank
as lender, agreed to finance the project making the Department of Finance as the borrower.
Herein, respondents then filed a complaint forannulment of the contract alleging that the
Contract Agreement and the Loan Agreement is void for being contrary to the Constitution, the
Government Procurement Reform Act, the Government Auditing Code and the Administrative
Code. CNMEG then filed a motion to dismiss arguing that it was immune from suit because it was
an agent of the Chinese Government and that the project was a product of an executive
agreement.

ISSUE: Whether or not CNMEG is immune from suit acting jureimperii and the contract is an
executive agreement.

HELD: CNMEG is not immune from suit because it is engaged in a proprietary activity as
evidenced by the MOU and the loan agreement. It also failed to adduce evidence that it immune
from suit under Chinese Law. Furthermore, it failed to present certifications from the DFA which
would have granted it diplomatic immunity if it was indeed a state agency. Moreover, the
contracts entered into by the CNMEG and Northrail is clearly not a product of an executive
agreement since CNMEG is neither a government or a government agency making the contract
an ordinary commercial contract.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS.
EAST SILVERLANE REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 186961, February 20, 2012

FACTS: The Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, RTC, an application for land
registration, covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9039 of Cagayan Cadastre situated in El
Salvador, Misamis Oriental and with an area of 9,794 square meters. The Respondent purchased
the portion of the subject property consisting of 4,708 square meters (Area A) from Francisca
Oco pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 27, 1990 and the remaining portion
consisting of 5,086 square meters (Area B) from Rosario U. Tan Lim, Nemesia Tan and Mariano
U. Tan pursuant to a Deed of Partial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 11, 1991. It
was claimed that the Respondent’s predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious,
continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property since June 12, 1945.

After hearing the merits of the case, the RTC issued on August 27, 2004 a Decision granting the
Respondent’s petition for the registration of the land. On appeal by the Petitioner, the
Court of Appeals (C.A.) affirmed the RTC’s August 27, 2004 Decision. In its July 31, 2008 decision,
the C.A. found no merit in the Petitioner’s appeal. In this petition, the Supreme Court is urged to
review and set aside the July 31, 2008 Decision and February 20, 2009 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in C.A-G.R CV No. 00143.

ISSUE: Whether the Respondent has proven itself entitled to the benefits of Public Land Act
(PLA) and PD No. 1529 on confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

HELD: Wherefore, premises considered the instant petition is GRANTED. The July 31, 2008
Decision and February 20, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00143 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Respondent’s application for registration of title over Lot 9039
of Cagayan Cadastre is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

The Supreme Court’s review of the records of this case reveals that the evidence submitted by
the Respondent to prove compliance with the possession required either under Section 14 (1) or
Section 14 (2) of Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529) and also of Section 48 (b) and Section
48 (c), Chapter VIII, Section 4, of the Public Land Act. Further stated, it was not established by the
required quantum of evidence that the Respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property for that prescribed
statutory period.
 JAMAR KULAYAN, ET AL.
VS.
GOV. ABDUSAKUR TAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF SULU, ET AL.
G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012

FACTS: Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were
kidnapped in the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. They were Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and
Marie Jean Lacaba. The three were inspecting a water sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial
Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management
Committee was then formed to investigate the kidnapping incident. The committee was under
the leadership of Gov. Abdusakur Mahail Tan.

Gov. Tan issued Proclamation No. 1 Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the
province of Sulu. The proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said
declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act of 2007 (RA
9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991(RA 7160), which
bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-
made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law
enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. Tan also called upon the PNP
and the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general
search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety.

Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires, and thus null and
void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President
sole Authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the
Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

ISSUE: Whether or not the governor can exercise the calling out power of the president.

HELD: Section 1 Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power that is granted to the
President and no one else. Gov. Tan is not granted with the power to call upon the armed forces
at his own bidding. In issuing the proclamation, Gov. Tan exceeded his authority when he
declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian
Emergency Force. The calling-out powers under the Constitution is exclusive to the President.
And exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not
be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
 CASIMIRA S. DELA CRUZ
VS.
COMELEC AND JOHN LOYD M. PACETE
GR No. 192221, November 13, 2012.

FACTS: Petitioner filed her COC as V-Mayor of Bugasong, Antique for May, 2010 Election. Prior to
that, petitioner was elected member of SB in 2001,204 and 2007 elections. Subsequently, Aurelio
N. Dela Cruz (Aurelio) also filed his COC as Vice-Mayor.

Petitioner filed a petition to declare Aurelio as nuisance candidate. The COMELEC declared
Aurelio as nuisance but his name was not deleted in the Official Sample Ballot. As such,
petitioner also filed an Urgent Motion directing the deletion of Aurelio‘s name as Official
Candidate. Further, in the event that his name cannot be deleted, an order directing all votes cast
in favor of him be credited in her favor in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 dated
May 07, 2001.

The En Banc issued Resolution No. 8844 that votes for disqualified candidates are considered
stray votes if voted upon.

During the May 2010 Election, Aurelio‘s name was still included. During the canvassing by the
MBOC, petitioner insisted that votes cast in favor of Aurelio be credited in her favor. MBOC
refused which resulted to winning of respondent Pacete by margin of 39 votes. Votes garnered
by Aurelio to tallied to 532 votes.

Petitioner filed her protest with the RTC praying that votes cast for Aurelio be in her favor ad
annulling the proclamation of respondent. Petitioner contended that Resolution No. 8844
violated her constitutional right to equal protection laws as there is no substantial difference
between the previous manual and automated elections for non-observance of Resolution No.
4116 particularly on the votes cast for nuisance candidate with the same name to a bonafide
candidate.

Respondent contended that COMELEC maintains a presumption of validity with respect to

supervisory or regulatory authority in the conduct of elections. On the constitutionality of
Resolution, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that there was a clear breach on the
Constitution. Petitioner merely invokes a violation of the equal protection and due process
without basis.
COMELEC contended that there is a substantial distinction between manual and automated
election as Resolution 4116 will no longer apply. COMELEC asserts that there is no violation of
the right to due process for public office is not a property right and no one has vested right to
any public office.
ISSUE: Whether COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 8844?

Held: Yes. Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification cases and not to petitions to
cancel or deny due course to COC such as nuisance candidate. A person disqualified is merely
prohibited to continue as a candidate and the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied
due course is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he never filed a COC. They have different
applications.

Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before May 2010 elections. The Court held
that Resolution No. 4116 where votes for nuisance candidate declared in a final judgment where
he has the same surname with a bonafie candidate be not considered stray but be credited in
favor of a legitimate candidate. A petition to cancel is different from a petition to disqualify.

Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent with the rule well-
ensconced in our jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election contests especially
appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. Indeed, as our electoral
experience had demonstrated, such infirmities and delays in the delisting of nuisance candidates
from both the Certified List of Candidates and Official Ballots only made possible the very evil
sought to be prevented by the exclusion of nuisance candidates during elections.

Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for, accordingly
GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution No. 8844 dated May 1, 2010 insofar as it orders that the votes
cast for candidates listed therein, who were declared nuisance candidates and whose certificates
of candidacy have been either cancelled or set aside, be considered stray, is hereby declared
NULL and VOID.
 PROSPERO PICHAY JR.,
VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 196425, 24 July 2012

FACTS: President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued EO no. 13 abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for legal affairs
(ODESLA), more particularly to its newly established investigative and adjudicatory Division (IAD).
Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave
misconduct against petitioner Prospero Pichay, Jr., chairman of the Board of trustees of the Local
Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of shares of
stocks of Express Savings Bank, Inc. In response pichay filed a motion to dismiss Ex Abudante Ad
Cautilam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge of grave misconduct
is already pending before the office of the ombudsman. Although that no other remedy available
to him, petitioner has resolved to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether or not executive order no. 13 is constitutional for encroaching upon the powers
of the ombudsman

HELD: Yes, EO no. 13 is constitutional. Section 31 of EO no. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the president the continuing authority to rearrange the
offices under him to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. The office of the president must,
in order to remain effective and efficient, be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the
president in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. Clearly, the
abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the
ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the president under his continuing delegated
legislative authority to reorganize his own office. Since both of these offices belong to the office
of the president. The reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring the
functions to the IAD-ODESLA is allowable under Section 31(1) of EO no. 292. It was also held that
IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman. The Supreme
Court noted that the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman is to investigate and prosecute
cases refer to criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases.
 JELBERT B. GALICTO
VS.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, ET., AL.
G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012

FACTS: His Excellency Benigno Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 7 ordering a moratorium on
the increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary adjustments under
EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period set by the president
himself and a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of
Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010. Herein petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order stating that
the President acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess in jurisdiction in issuing
the order. Petitioner further avers that as an employee of the PhilHelath, he is directly affected
by the implementation of the said order. On the other hand, herein respondents aver that herein
petitioner lacks locus standi. That he is not authorized to represent PhilHelath for failure to
attach a resolution of the board authorizing him to question the validity of the order in behalf of
PhilHealth. And, that there was a defect in the Jurat of the petition.

ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not Jelbert B. Galicto is a proper party to the case at bar. 2.) Whether or
not the case is mooted by subsequent events. 3.) Whether or not the petitioner availed the
proper remedy to the case at bar.

HELD: The petition is untenable. The court posits that herein petitioner is not a proper party to
the case. Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in
a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. As a general rule, a party is allowed to “raise a
constitutional question” when (1) he can show that he will personally suffer some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action. In the case at bar, herein petitioner failed to prove a material and personal interest in the
issue. Such material and personal interest must not be speculative and a mere expectancy as
shown in the case at bar. Moreover, the court states that Certiorari is not the proper remedy in
the case at bar. What should have been availed of by herein petitioner is Declaratory Relief
under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court filed with the Regional Trial Court. The writ of Certiorari
cannot prevail as a valid remedy because it only pertains to any tribunal, board officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions which has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, where no appeal, plain or adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of the law. Furthermore, it has been held that the case has been mooted since the suspension
on the allowances and bonuses lapsed and that R.A 10149 was enacted, granting the President
the authority to perform the questioned act. Thus, moot on its face and presents no further
controversy to be resolved. Ergo, the petition was dismissed.
 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
VS.
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 176162, October 9, 2012

FACTS: Respondents Dante G. Guevarra (Guevarra) and Augustus F. Cezar (Cezar) were the
Officer-in-Charge/President and the Vice President for Administration, respectively, of the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP) in 2005. On September 27, 2005, petitioner
Honesto L. Cueva (Cueva), then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an administrative case against
Guevarra and Cezar for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of official documents,
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, being notoriously undesirable, and for
violating Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713. Cueva charged Guevarra with falsification of a
public document, specifically the Application for Bond of Accountable Officials and Employees of
the Republic of the Philippines, in which the latter denied the existence of his pending criminal
and administrative cases. As the head of the school, Guevarra was required to be bonded in
order to be able to engage in financial transactions on behalf of PUP. In his Application for Bond
of Accountable Officials and Employees of the Republic of the Philippines (General Form No. 58-
A), he answered Question No. 11 in this wise:
11. Do you have any criminal or administrative records? – NO. If so, state briefly the
nature thereof – NO. This was despite the undisputed fact that, at that time, both Guevarra and
Cezar admittedly had 17 pending cases for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 before the
Sandiganbayan. Cezar, knowing fully well that both he and Guevarra had existing cases before
the Sandiganbayan, endorsed and recommended the approval of the application. The
respondents explained that they believed “criminal or administrative records” to mean final
conviction in a criminal or administrative case. Thus, because their cases had not yet been
decided by the Sandiganbayan, they asserted that Guevarra responded to Question No. 11 in
General Form No. 58-A correctly and in good faith. On March 24, 2006, the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) issued Resolution No. 060521 formally charging Guevarra with Dishonesty and
Cezar with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service after a prima facie finding that
they had committed acts punishable under the Civil Service Law and Rules. Subsequently, the
respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Declare Absence of Prima
Facie Case praying that the case be suspended immediately and that the CSC declare a complete
absence of a prima facie case against them. Cueva, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Ex- Parte
Motion for the Issuance of Preventive Suspension and an Omnibus Motion seeking the issuance
of an order of preventive suspension against Guevarra and Cezar and the inclusion of the
following offenses in the formal charge against them: Grave Misconduct, Falsification of Official
Document, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, Being Notoriously
Undesirable, and Violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713. In Resolution No. 061141, dated June
30, 2006, the CSC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents for being a
nonresponsive pleading, akin to a motion to dismiss, which was a prohibited pleading under
Section 16 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Commission. It also
denied Cueva’s motion to include additional charges against the respondents. The CSC, however,
placed Guevarra under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days, believing it to be necessary
because, as the officer-in-charge of PUP, he was in a position to unduly influence possible
witnesses against him. Aggrieved, Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the CA essentially questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC over the
administrative complaint filed against them by Cueva. On December 29, 2006, the CA rendered
its Decision granting the petition and nullifying and setting aside the questioned resolutions of
the CSC for having been rendered without jurisdiction. According to the CA, Section 47, Chapter
7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987), the
second paragraph of which states that heads of agencies and instrumentalities “shall have
jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction,” bestows upon the Board of Regents the jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against respondents Guevarra and
Cezar. In addition, the CA noted that the CSC erred in recognizing the complaint filed by Cueva,
reasoning out that the latter should have exhausted all administrative remedies by first bringing
his grievances to the attention of the PUP Board of Regents. Hence, these petitions.

ISSUE: In G.R. No. 176162, petitioner CSC raises the sole issue of: Whether or not the Civil
Service Commission has original concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases falling under
the jurisdiction of heads of agencies. The same issue is among those raised by petitioner Cueva
in G.R. No. 178845. The Court agrees that the only question which must be addressed in this
case is whether the CSC has jurisdiction over administrative cases filed directly with it against
officials of a chartered state university.

HELD: The petitions are meritorious. Both CSC and Cueva contend that because the CSC is the
central personnel agency of the government, it has been expressly granted by Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 292 the authority to assume original jurisdiction over complaints directly filed with it.
The CSC explains that under the said law, it has appellate jurisdiction over all administrative
disciplinary proceedings and original jurisdiction over complaints against government officials
and employees filed before it by private citizens. Accordingly, the CSC has concurrent original
jurisdiction, together with the PUP Board of Regents, over the administrative case against
Guevarra and Cezar and it can take cognizance of a case filed directly with it, despite the fact
that the Board of Regents is the disciplining authority of university employees. Respondents
Guevarra and Cezar, on the other hand, fully adopted the position of the CA in its questioned
decision and propounded the additional argument that the passage of R.A. No. 8292 has
effectively removed from the CSC the authority to hear and decide on cases filed directly with it.
CSC has jurisdiction over cases filed directly with it, regardless of who initiated the
complaint. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the power to
appoint and discipline its officials and employees and to hear and decide administrative cases
instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal. Section 2(1), Article IX(B) of the 1987
Constitution defines the scope of the civil service: The civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters. By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341,
PUP became a chartered state university, thereby making it a government-owned or controlled
corporation with an original charter whose employees are part of the Civil Service and are
subject to the provisions of E.O. No. 292. The parties in these cases do not deny that Guevarra
and Cezar are government employees and part of the Civil Service. The controversy, however,
stems from the interpretation of the disciplinary jurisdiction of the CSC as specified in Section 47,
Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292:
SECTION 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.—(1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more
than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission
by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and
decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to
conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission
with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.
(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary
action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in
case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days’ salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is
appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally
to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is
removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary
concerned.
While in its assailed decision, the CA conceded that paragraph one of the same provisions
above quoted allows the filing of a complaint directly with the CSC, it makes a distinction
between a complaint filed by a private citizen and that of an employee under the jurisdiction of
the disciplining authority involved. The CA resolved that because Cueva was then the Dean of the
College of Law and the Chief Legal Counsel of PUP when he filed the complaint with the CSC, he
was under the authority of the PUP Board of Regents. Thus, it is the Board of Regents which had
exclusive jurisdiction over the administrative case he initiated against Guevarra and Cezar. The
Court finds it unable to sustain the reading of the CA. The issue is not novel. The understanding
by the CA of Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 which states that “a
complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government
official or employee” is that the CSC can only take cognizance of a case filed directly before it if
the complaint was made by a private citizen. The Court is not unaware of the use of the words
“private citizen” in the subject provision and the plain meaning rule of statutory construction
which requires that when the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly
what it says. The Court, however, finds that a simplistic interpretation is not in keeping with the
intention of the statute and
prevailing jurisprudence. It is a well-established rule that laws should be given a reasonable
interpretation so as not to defeat the very purpose for which they were passed. As such, “a
literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results.” In Secretary
of Justice v. Koruga, the Court emphasized this principle and cautioned us on the overzealous
application of the plain meaning rule:
The general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that in the absence
of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary, and common
usage meaning. However, a literal interpretation of a statute is to be rejected if it will operate
unjustly, lead to absurd results, or contract the evident meaning of the statute taken as a whole.
After all, statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative
intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an
absurd conclusion. Indeed, courts are not to give words meanings that would lead to absurd or
unreasonable consequences.
A literal interpretation of E.O. 292 would mean that only private citizens can file a
complaint directly with the CSC. For administrative cases instituted by government employees
against their fellow public servants, the CSC would only have appellate jurisdiction over those.
Such a plain reading of the subject provision of E.O. 202 would effectively divest CSC of its
original jurisdiction, albeit shared, provided by law. Moreover, it is clearly unreasonable as it
would be tantamount to disenfranchising government employees by removing from them an
alternative course of action against erring public officials. There is no cogent reason to
differentiate between a complaint filed by a private citizen and one filed by a member of the civil
service, especially in light of Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the same
E.O. No. 292 which confers upon the CSC the power to “hear and decide administrative cases
instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal” without any qualification. In the case of
Camacho v. Gloria, the Court stated that “under E.O. No. 292, a complaint against a state
university official may be filed with either the university’s Board of Regents or directly with the
Civil Service Commission.”It is important to note that the Court did not interpret the
Administrative Code as limiting such authority to exclude complaints filed directly with it by a
member of the civil service. Moreover, as early as in the case of Hilario v. Civil Service
Commission, the Court interpreted Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No.
292 as allowing the direct filing with the CSC by a public official of a complaint against a fellow
government employee. In the said case, Quezon City Vice-Mayor Charito Planas directly filed
with the CSC a complaint for usurpation, grave misconduct, being notoriously undesirable, gross
insubordination, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against the City Legal
Officer of Quezon City. The CSC issued a resolution ruling that the respondent official should not
be allowed to continue holding the position of legal officer. In a petition to the Supreme Court,
the official in question asserted that the City Mayor was the only one who could remove him
from office directly and not the CSC. The Court upheld the decision of the CSC, citing the same
provision of the Administrative Code:
Although respondent Planas is a public official, there is nothing under the law to prevent
her from filing a complaint directly with the CSC against petitioner. Thus, when the CSC
determined that petitioner was no longer entitled to hold the position of City Legal Officer, it was
acting within its authority under the Administrative Code to hear and decide complaints filed
before it. It has been argued that Hilario is not squarely in point. While it is true that the
circumstances present in the two cases are not identical, a careful reading of Hilario reveals that
petitioner therein questioned the authority of the CSC to hear the disciplinary case filed against
him, alleging that the CSC’s jurisdiction was only appellate in nature. Hence, the reference to the
abovequoted passage in Hilario is very appropriate in this case as respondents herein pose a
similar query before us. It cannot be overemphasized that the identity of the complainant is
immaterial to the acquisition of jurisdiction over an administrative case by the CSC. The law is
quite clear that the CSC may hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases brought directly
before it or it may deputize any department or agency to conduct an investigation.
 CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board of Regents over administrative
cases.
The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (the Uniform Rules)
explicitly allows the CSC to hear and decide administrative cases directly brought before it:
Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. – The Civil Service Commission
shall hear and decide administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on
appeal, including contested appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its offices
and of the agencies attached to it.
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission
shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers
and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and
efficiency of such officers and employees.
The CA construed the phrase “the Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority
to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil
service” to mean that the CSC could only step in after the relevant disciplinary authority, in this
case the Board of Regents of PUP, had investigated and decided on the charges against the
respondents. Regrettably, the CA failed to take into consideration the succeeding section of the
same rules which undeniably granted original concurrent jurisdiction to the CSC and belied its
suggestion that the CSC could only take cognizance of cases on appeal:
Section 7. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies. – Heads of Departments, agencies,
provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities shall have original concurrent
jurisdiction, with the Commission, over their respective officers and employees.
It was also argued that although Section 4 of the Uniform Rules is silent as to who can file
a complaint directly with the CSC, it cannot be construed to authorize one who is not a private
citizen to file a complaint directly with the CSC. This is because a rule issued by a government
agency pursuant to its law-making power cannot modify, reduce or enlarge the scope of the law
which it seeks to implement. Following the earlier disquisition, it can be said that the Uniform
Rules does not contradict the Administrative Code. Rather, the former simply provides a
reasonable interpretation of the latter. Such action is perfectly within the authority of the CSC,
pursuant to Section 12(2), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292, which gives it the
power to “prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the
provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws.” Another view has been propounded
that the original jurisdiction of the CSC has been further limited by Section 5 of the Uniform
Rules, such that the CSC can only take cognizance of complaints filed directly with it which: (1)
are brought against personnel of the CSC central office, (2) are against third level officials who
are not presidential appointees, (3) are against officials and employees, but are not acted upon
by the agencies themselves, or (4) otherwise require direct or immediate action in the interest of
justice:
Section 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper. – The Civil Service
Commission Proper shall have jurisdiction over the following cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Decisions of the Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for review;
 2. Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other
instrumentalities, imposing penalties exceeding thirty days suspension or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary brought before it on appeal;
3. Complaints brought against Civil Service Commission Proper personnel;
4. Complaints against third level officials who are not presidential appointees;
5. Complaints against Civil Service officials and employees which are not acted upon by
the agencies and such other complaints requiring direct or immediate action, in the
Interest of justice;
6. Requests for transfer of venue of hearing on cases being heard by Civil Service Regional
Offices;
7. Appeals from the Order of Preventive Suspension; and
8. Such other actions or requests involving issues arising out of or in connection with the
foregoing enumerations.
It is the Court’s position that the Uniform Rules did not supplant the law which provided
the CSC with original jurisdiction. While the Uniform Rules may have so provided, the Court
invites attention to the cases of Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso and Civil Service Commission
v. Sojor, to be further discussed in the course of this decision, both of which buttressed the
pronouncement that the Board of Regents shares its authority to discipline erring school officials
and employees with the CSC. It can be presumed that, at the time of their promulgation, the
members of this Court, in Alfonso and Sojor, were fully aware of all the existing laws and
applicable rules and regulations pertaining to the jurisdiction of the CSC, including the Uniform
Rules. In fact, Sojor specifically cited the Uniform Rules in support of its ruling allowing the CSC to
take cognizance of an administrative case filed directly with it against the president of a state
university. As the Court, in the two cases, did not consider Section 5 of the Uniform Rules as a
limitation to the original concurrent jurisdiction of the CSC, it can be stated that Section 5 is
merely implementary. It is merely directory and not restrictive of the CSC’s powers. The CSC
itself is of this view as it has vigorously asserted its jurisdiction over this case through this
petition. The case of Alfonso is on all fours with the case at bench. The case involved a complaint
filed before the CSC against a PUP employee by two employees of the same university. The CA
was then faced with the identical issue of whether it was the CSC or the PUP Board of Regents
which had jurisdiction over the administrative case filed against the said PUP employee. The CA
similarly ruled that the CSC could take cognizance of an administrative case if the decisions of
secretaries or heads of agencies, instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities were
appealed to it or if a private citizen directly filed with the CSC a complaint against a government
official or employee. Because the complainants in the said case were PUP employees and not
private citizens, the CA held that the CSC had no jurisdiction to hear the administrative case. It
further posited that even assuming the CSC had the authority to do so; immediate resort to the
CSC violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the complaint should have
been first lodged with the PUP Board of Regents to allow them the opportunity to decide on the
matter. This Court, however, reversed the said decision and declared the following:
Admittedly, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided by
government departments, agencies and instrumentalities. However, a complaint may be filed
directly with the CSC, and the Commission has the authority to hear and decide the case,
although it may opt to deputize a department or an agency to conduct the investigation.
 We are not unmindful of certain special laws that allow the creation of disciplinary
committees and governing bodies in different branches, subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities of the government to hear and decide administrative complaints against their
respective officers and employees. Be that as it may, we cannot interpret the creation of such
bodies nor the passage of laws such as – R.A. Nos. 8292 and 4670 allowing for the creation of
such disciplinary bodies – as having divested the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and
discipline government employees, including those in the academe. To hold otherwise would not
only negate the very purpose for which the CSC was established, i.e. to instill professionalism,
integrity, and accountability in our civil service, but would also impliedly amend the Constitution
itself.
But it is not only for this reason that Alfonso’s argument must fail. Equally significant is
the fact that he had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the CSC when he filed his
counter-affidavit and his motion for reconsideration and requested for a change of venue, not
from the CSC to the BOR of PUP, but
from the CSC-Central Office to the CSC-NCR. It was only when his motion was denied that he
suddenly had a change of heart and raised the question of proper jurisdiction. This cannot be
allowed because it would violate the doctrine of res judicata, a legal principle that is applicable
to administrative cases as well. At the very least, respondent’s active participation in the
proceedings by seeking affirmative relief before the CSC already bars him from impugning the
Commission’s authority under the principle of estoppel by laches.
In this case, the complaint-affidavits were filed by two PUP employees. These complaints
were not lodged before the disciplinary tribunal of PUP, but were instead filed before the CSC,
with averments detailing respondent’s alleged violation of civil service laws, rules and
regulations. After a fact-finding investigation, the Commission found that a prima facie case
existed against Alfonso, prompting the Commission to file a formal charge against the latter.
Verily, since the complaints were filed directly with the CSC, and the CSC has opted to assume
jurisdiction over the complaint, the CSC’s exercise of jurisdiction shall be to the exclusion of
other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. To repeat, it may, however, choose to deputize
any department or agency or official or group of officials such as the BOR of PUP to conduct the
investigation, or to delegate the investigation to the proper regional office. But the same is
merely permissive and not mandatory upon the Commission.
It has been opined that Alfonso does not apply to the case at bar because respondent
therein submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the CSC when he filed his counter-affidavit before
it, thereby preventing him from later questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC. Such circumstance
is said to be totally absent in this case. The records speak otherwise. As in Alfonso, respondents
herein submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the CSC when they filed their Joint Counter-
Affidavit. It was only when their Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Declare Absence of
Prima Facie Case was denied by the CSC that they thought to put in issue the jurisdiction of the
CSC before the CA, clearly a desperate attempt to evade prosecution by the CSC. As in Alfonso,
respondents are also estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the CSC. Based on all of the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the CSC may take
cognizance of an administrative case filed directly with it against an official or employee of a
chartered state college or university. This is regardless of whether the complainant is a private
citizen or a member of the civil service and such original jurisdiction is shared with the Board of
Regents of the school.

Gaoiran not applicable

In its decision, the CA relied heavily on Gaoiran v. Alcala to support its judgment that it is
the Board of Regents, and not the CSC, which has jurisdiction over the administrative complaint
filed against the respondents. A thorough study of the said case, however, reveals that it is
irrelevant to the issues discussed in the case at bench. Gaoiran speaks of a complaint filed
against a high school teacher of a state-supervised school by another employee of the same
school. The complaint was referred to the Legal Affairs Service of the Commission on Higher
Education (LAS-CHED). After a fact-finding investigation established the existence of a prima
facie case against the teacher, the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Director of LAS-CHED
issued a formal charge for Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, together with the Order of Preventive Suspension. The newly-appointed Director of LAS-
CHED, however, dismissed the administrative complaint on the ground that the letter-complaint
was not made under oath. Unaware of this previous resolution, the Chairman of the CHED issued
another resolution finding petitioner therein guilty of the charges against him and dismissing him
from the service. The trial court upheld the resolution of the director of LASCHED but on appeal,
this was reversed by the CA, affirming the decision of the CHED chairman removing petitioner
from service. One of the issues raised therein before this Court was whether the CA erred in
disregarding the fact that the complaint was not made under oath as required by the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292. In the said case, the Court concurred with the findings of
the CA that it was the formal charge issued by the LAS-CHED which constituted the complaint,
and because the same was initiated by the appropriate disciplining authority, it need not be
subscribed and sworn to and CHED acquired jurisdiction over the case. The Court further
affirmed the authority of the heads of agencies to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against their officers and employees. It bears stressing, at this point, that
there is nothing in the case that remotely implies that this Court meant to place upon the Board
of Regent exclusive jurisdiction over administrative cases filed against their employees. In fact,
following the ruling in Gaoiran, it can be argued that it was CSC Resolution No. 060521 which
formally charged respondents that
constituted the complaint, and since the complaint was initiated by the CSC itself as the
disciplining authority, the CSC properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.

R.A. No. 8292 is not in conflict with E.O. No. 292.

In addition, the respondents argue that R.A. No. 8292, which granted to the board of
regents or board of trustees disciplinary authority over school employees and officials of
chartered state colleges and universities, should prevail over the provisions of E.O. No. 292.39
They anchor their assertion that the Board of Regents has exclusive jurisdiction over
administrative cases on Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292, to wit:
Section 4. Powers and duties of Governing Boards. – The governing board shall have the
following specific powers and duties in addition to its general powers of administration and the
exercise of all the powers granted to the board of directors of a corporation under Section 36 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the Philippines;
(h) to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative officials and
employees subject to the provisions of the revised compensation and classification system and
other pertinent budget and compensation laws governing hours of service, and such other duties
and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them, at its discretion, leaves of absence under
such regulations as it may promulgate, any provisions of existing law to the contrary
notwithstanding; and to remove them for cause in accordance with the requirements of due
process of law.

The respondents are mistaken.

Basic is the principle in statutory construction that interpreting and harmonizing laws is
the best method of interpretation in order to form a uniform, complete, coherent, and
intelligible system of jurisprudence, in accordance with the legal maxim interpretare et
concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus. Simply because a later statute relates
to a similar subject matter as that of an earlier statute does not result in an implied repeal of the
latter. A perusal of the abovequoted provision clearly reveals that the same does not indicate
any intention to remove employees and officials of state universities and colleges from the ambit
of the CSC. What it merely states is that the governing board of a school has the authority to
discipline and remove faculty members and administrative officials and employees for cause. It
neither supersedes nor conflicts with E.O. No. 292 which allows the CSC to hear and decide
administrative cases filed directly with it or on appeal.
In addition to the previously cited case of Alfonso, the case of The Civil Service
Commission v. Sojor is likewise instructive. In the said case, this Court ruled that the CSC validly
took cognizance of the administrative complaints directly filed with it concerning violations of
civil service rules committed by a university president. This Court acknowledged that the board
of regents of a state university has the sole power of administration over a university, in
accordance with its charter and R.A. No. 8292. With regard to the disciplining and removal of its
employees and officials, however, such authority is not exclusive to it because all members of
the civil service fall under the jurisdiction of the CSC:
Verily, the BOR of NORSU has the sole power of administration over the university. But
this power is not exclusive in the matter of disciplining and removing its employees and officials.
Although the BOR of NORSU is given the specific power under R.A. No. 9299 to discipline
its employees and officials, there is no showing that such power is exclusive. When the law
bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific
matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another
body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent
jurisdiction over the matter.
All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless otherwise
provided by law. Being a non-career civil servant does not remove respondent from the ambit of
the CSC. Career or non-career, a civil service official or employee is within the jurisdiction of the
CSC.
 It has been pointed out that the case of Sojor is not applicable to the case at bar because
the distinction between a complaint filed by a private citizen and one filed by a government
employee was not taken into consideration in the said case. The dissent fails to consider that
Sojor is cited in the ponencia to support the ruling that R.A. No. 8292 is not in conflict with E.O.
No. 292 and to counter respondents’ flawed argument that the passage of R.A. No. 8292 granted
the Board of Regents exclusive jurisdiction over administrative cases against school employees
and officials of chartered state colleges and universities. Also noteworthy is the fact that the
complainants before the CSC in Sojor were faculty members of a state university and were, thus,
government employees. Nevertheless, despite this, the Court allowed the CSC to assert
jurisdiction over the administrative case, proclaiming that the power of the Board of Regents to
discipline its officials and employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with the CSC.
The case of University of the Philippines v. Regino was also cited to bolster the claim that
original jurisdiction over disciplinary cases against government officials is vested upon the
department secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities, whereas the CSC only enjoys appellate jurisdiction over such cases. The
interpretation therein of the Administrative Code supposedly renders effectual the provisions of
R.A. No. 8292 and does not “deprive the governing body of the power to discipline its own
officials and employees and render inutile the legal provisions on disciplinary measures which
may be taken by it.”The Court respectfully disagrees. Regino is obviously inapplicable to this case
because there, the school employee had already been found guilty and dismissed by the Board
of Regents of the University of the Philippines. Therefore, the issue put forth before this Court
was whether the CSC had appellate jurisdiction over cases against university employees,
considering
the university charter which gives it academic freedom allegedly encompassing institutional
autonomy. In contrast, no administrative case was filed before the Board of Regents of PUP
because the case was filed directly with the CSC and so, the question here is whether the CSC
has original concurrent jurisdiction over disciplinary cases. Rationally, the quoted portions in
Regino find no application to the case at bench because those statements were made to uphold
the CSC’s appellate jurisdiction which was being contested by petitioner therein. At the risk of
being repetitive, it is hereby stressed that the authority of the CSC to hear cases on appeal has
already been established in this case. What is in question here is its original jurisdiction over
administrative cases.
A different interpretation of the Administrative Code was suggested in order to
harmonize the provisions of R.A. No. 8292 and E.O. 292. By allowing only a private citizen to file a
complaint directly with the CSC, the CSC maintains its power to review on appeal decisions of the
Board of Regents while at the same time the governing board is not deprived of its power to
discipline its officials and employees.To begin with, there is no incongruity between R.A. No.
8292 and E.O. No. 292, as previously explained in Sojor. Moreover, the Court fails to see how a
complaint filed by a private citizen is any different from one filed by a government employee. If
the grant to the CSC of concurrent original jurisdiction over administrative cases filed by private
citizens against public officials would not deprive the governing bodies of the power to discipline
their own officials and employees and would not be violative of R.A. No. 8292, it is inconceivable
that a similar case filed by a government employee would do so. Such a distinction between
cases filed by private citizens and those by civil servants is simply illogical and unreasonable. To
accede to such a mistaken interpretation of the Administrative Code would be a great disservice
to our developing jurisprudence. It is therefore apparent that despite the enactment of R.A. No.
8292 giving the board of regents or board of trustees of a state school the authority to discipline
its employees, the CSC still retains jurisdiction over the school and its employees and has
concurrent original jurisdiction, together with the board of regents of a state university, over
administrative cases against state university officials and employees.
Finally, with regard to the concern that the CSC may be overwhelmed by the increase in
number of cases filed before it which would result from our ruling, it behooves us to allay such
worries by highlighting two important facts. Firstly, it should be emphasized that the CSC has
original concurrent jurisdiction shared with the governing body in question, in this case, the
Board of Regents of PUP. This means that if the Board of Regents first takes cognizance of the
complaint, then it shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the CSC.52 Thus, not all
administrative cases will fall directly under the CSC. Secondly, Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A,
Title I, Book V of the Administrative Co.de affords the CSC the option of whether to decide the
case or to deputize some other department, agency or official to conduct an investigation into
the matter, thereby considerably easing the burden placed upon the esc.

Having thus concluded, the Court sees no need to discuss the other issues raised in the
petitions.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The December 29, 2006 Decision of the Court
of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Resolution Nos. 060521 and 061141 dated March
24, 2006 and June 30, 2006, respectively, of the Civil Service Commission are REINSTATED. SO
ORDERED.