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II. Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
A. Jurisdiction
Cases:
IN RE: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF HAWAII
FACTS: There are 2 parties in this case which sought the estate of Marcos. One is the Class Plaintiffs
and the other is the Republic of the Philippines (RP).
The U.S. District Court (USDC) in Hawaii rendered judgment in favor of the class of plaintiffs against
the Marcos estate for Human Rights violations by the Marcos Regime. The judgment included an
injunction restraining the estate from transferring any estate’s assets. On the other hand, the
Republic of the Philippines sought to forfeit the Marcos estate’s assets on the ground that they were
stolen by Marcos from the Phil. Gov’t and its people.
There was an earlier case (Credit Suisse Case) wherein the Swiss Asset of Marcos estate had been
frozen by the Swiss Gov’t at the request of the Republic of the Philippines. The Class plaintiffs
obtained injunction from USDC of Hawaii to hold the assets for the benefit of the class Plaintiffs. The
US CA issued a writ of mandamus and held that the injunction violated the act of state doctrine,
which preclude American courts from declaring “invalid” a foreign sovereign’s official act, that is, the
freeze order of the Swiss gov’t.
Thereafter, the Swiss government released the funds frozen in Switzerland for transfer to the
Philippine National Bank in escrow pending a determination of proper disposal by a competent court
in the Philippines. The Philippine National Bank deposited the funds in Singapore. The Philippine
Supreme Court subsequently held that the assets were forfeited to the Republic of the Philippines.
The USDC of Hawaii then made a ruling that the Philippine SC had violated “due process by any
standard” and the latters judgment was entitled to no deference. It ordered reinstatement of an
earlier settlement agreement in the District Court wherein the RP refused to approve and consent to
it.
The District Court then issued an “Order to Show Cause” against the Philippine National Bank, which
was not a party to the litigation in the district court, requiring the Bank to show why it should not be
held in contempt for violating the court’s injunction against transfer of assets by the estate.
The Philippine National Bank then filed the present petition for mandamus in the U.S.
9th Circuit Court of Appeals, seeking to restrain the District Court from enforcing its “Order to Show
Cause” and from pursuing discovery against the Bank officer.
The Bank asserted that it had transferred nearly all of the funds in issue to the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to the judgment of the Philippine Supreme Court. It contended that the entire
proceeding against it for its transfer of funds to the Republic of the Philippines violated the “act of
state” doctrine.
ISSUE: W/N USDC of Hawaii violated the act of State doctrine?
HELD: Yes. Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another,
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through
the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. (Underhill v.
Hernandez)
The District Court’s orders in issue violated this principle. In order to obtain assets from the Philippine
National Bank, or to hold the Bank in contempt for the transfer of those assets to the Republic of the
Philippines, the District court necessarily (and expressly) held invalid the forfeiture judgment of the
Philippine Supreme Court.
NOTES: Other issues raised by the Class Plaintiffs:
W/N the act of state doctrine do not apply to judicial decisions
Although the act of state doctrine is normally inapplicable to court judgments arising from private
litigation, there is no inflexible rule preventing a judgment sought by a foreign government from
qualifying as an act of state. (Liu v. Republic of China)
W/N the act of state doctrine was inapplicable because the judgment of the Philippine Supreme Court
did not concern matters within its own territory
The USCA held that, “generally, the act of state doctrine applies to official acts of foreign sovereigns
“performed within their own territory.” (Credit Suisse Case). The act of the Philippine Supreme Court
was not wholly external, however. Its judgment, which the district court declared invalid, was issued
in the Philippines and much of its force upon the Philippine National Bank arose from the fact that the
Bank is a Philippine corporation.
Because the RP’s “interest in the enforcement of its laws does not end at its borders,” the fact that the
escrow funds were deposited in Singapore does not preclude the application of the act of state doctrine.
REPUBLIC V. MARCOS
FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) brought a civil suit against its former president,
Ferdinand Marcos, and his wife Imelda (the Marcoses), asserting claims under the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and other applicable law.
The Republic alleges that the Marcoses engaged in mail fraud, wire fraud, and the transportation of
stolen property in the foreign or interstate commerce of the United States. The Republic alleges that
the acts were repeated, forming a pattern of predicate acts.
The Republic alleges that the Marcoses and the other defendants arranged for the investment in real
estate in Beverly Hills, California of $4 million fraudulently obtained by the Marcoses; that the Marcoses
arranged for the creation of two bank accounts in the name of Imelda Marcos at Lloyds Bank of
California totaling over $800,000 also fraudulently obtained by the Marcoses; and that the Marcoses
transported into Hawaii money, jewels, and other property worth over $7 million also fraudulently
obtained by them.
Before determining whether issuance of an injunction was appropriate we consider two defenses which,
if accepted, would block trial of the case: the Marcoses maintain, first, that their acts are insulated
because they were acts of state not reviewable by our courts; and second, that any adjudication of
these acts would involve the investigation of political questions beyond our courts' competence.

ISSUE: Whether the acts of state doctrine applies as a defense in this case.
HELD: No. The classification of certain acts as "acts of state" with the consequence that their validity
will be treated as beyond judicial review is a pragmatic device, not required by the nature of sovereign
authority and inconsistently applied in international law. The purpose of the device is to keep the
judiciary from embroiling the courts and the country in the affairs of the foreign nation whose acts are
challenged. Minimally viewed, the classification keeps a court from making pronouncements on matters
over which it has no power; maximally interpreted, the classification prevents the embarrassment of
a court offending a foreign government that is "extant at the time of suit."
The "continuing vitality" of the doctrine depends on "its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of
functions between the judicial and political branches of the Government on matters bearing upon
foreign relations." Consequently, there are "constitutional underpinnings" to the classification. A
court that passes on the validity of an "act of state" intrudes into the domain of the political branches.
As a practical tool for keeping the judicial branch out of the conduct of foreign affairs, the
classification of "act of state" is not a promise to the ruler of any foreign country that his conduct, if
challenged by his own country after his fall, may not become the subject of scrutiny in our courts.
No estoppel exists insulating a deposed dictator from accounting. No guarantee has been granted
that immunity may be acquired by an exchief magistrate invoking the magic words "act of state" to
cover his or her past performance.
The classification might, it may be supposed, be used to prevent judicial challenge in our courts to
many deeds of a dictator in power, at least when it is apparent that sustaining such challenge would
bring our country into a hostile confrontation with the dictator. Once deposed, the dictator will find
it difficult to deploy the defense successfully. The "balance of considerations" is shifted. A fortiori,
when a ruler's former domain has turned against him and seeks the recovery of what it claims he
has stolen, the classification has little or no applicability. The act of state doctrine is supple, flexible,
ad hoc. The doctrine is meant to facilitate the foreign relations of the United States, not to
furnish the equivalent of sovereign immunity to a deposed leader.
In the instant case the Marcoses offered no evidence whatsoever to support the classification of their
acts as acts of state. The burden of proving acts of state rested upon them. They did not even
undertake the proof. The act of state doctrine, the Executive declares, has "no bearing" on this case
as it stands. As the doctrine is a pragmatic one, we cannot exclude the possibility that, at some later
point in the development of this litigation, the Marcoses might produce evidence that would warrant
its application. On the present record, the defense does not apply.
The Marcoses maintain that the Republic's action should have been dismissed, even if the district
court had jurisdiction, on the ground of forum non conveniens. They point to the foreign character
of the plaintiff, the nature of the Republic's claims about the Marcoses' conduct in office, and the fact
that the court will be called upon to decide questions of Philippine law. The inconvenience of the
forum was argued by the Marcoses to the district court. But the court did not address the argument.
On the present record the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss the
Republic's action on forum non conveniens grounds before issuing the preliminary injunction.
In Summation. Jurisdiction to hear the Republic's claims and to enter the preliminary injunction
exists. A serious question of liability has been presented and the Republic has a fair chance of
success on the merits of its case. The Marcoses have not presented any preclusive defense. The
scope of the injunction is justified. It was imperative for the district court to preserve the status quo
lest the defendants prevent resolution of the case by putting their property beyond the reach of the
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court. Hardship to the Republic would have been great and irreparable if the district court had not
taken its prudent, amply justified action to keep the Marcoses' assets from disappearing.
B. Choice of Law
1. Application of Foreign Law
a. Judicial Notice
b. Proof of Foreign Law
c. Effects of Failure to Plead and Prove Foreign Law
Cases:
Delgado v Republic GR L-2546, January 28, 1950
Allstate Ins Co v Hague
Brief Fact Summary
Allstate (Defendant) argued that the Minnesota state courts should have applied Wisconsin laws at a
personal injury trial.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
If a state has only insignificant contact with the parties and the occurrence or transaction, application
of its law is unconstitutional.
Facts
Hague’s (Plaintiff) late husband, Ralph Hague, died of injuries suffered when a motorcycle he was
riding on as a passenger was hit from behind by an automobile in Pierce County, Wisconsin. The
drivers of both vehicles, and Hague, were Wisconsin residents. Hague worked in Red Wing,
Minnesota, and commuted to work from Wisconsin. Following the accident, Mrs. Hague (Plaintiff)
moved to Red Wing and established residence in Minnesota. She then filed suit in Minnesota District
Court against Allstate (Defendant), which had issued an automobile insurance for Mr. Hague, asking
that Minnesota law be applied so that she could “stack”� the uninsured motorist coverage on each of
her deceased husband’s three automobiles, to provide for a larger recovery. The Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed a summary judgment for Hague (Plaintiff), which held that Minnesota’s choice of law
rules required the application of Minnesota law permitting stacking. Allstate (Defendant) appealed.
Issue
If a state has only insignificant contact with the parties and the occurrence or transaction, is the
application of its law unconstitutional?
Held
(Brennan, J.) Yes. If a state has only insignificant contact with the parties and the occurrence or
transaction, application of its law is unconstitutional. For a state’s substantive law to be selected in a
constitutionally permissible manner, the state must have a significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, so that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair. In the present case, Mr. Hague was a member of Minnesota’s work force, he
commuted to work in Minnesota; and Allstate’s (Defendant) presence in Minnesota gave Minnesota an
interest in regulating the company’s insurance obligations in that they affected both a Minnesota
resident and court-appointed representative, Mrs. Hague (Plaintiff), and a long-standing member of
Minnesota’s work force, Mr. Hague. Affirmed.

Dissent
(Powell, J.) The contacts between Minnesota and this litigation are either trivial or irrelevant to the
furthering of any public policy in Minnesota.
Concurrence
(Stevens, J.) Allstate (Defendant) has failed to establish that Minnesota’s refusal to apply Wisconsin
law poses any direct or indirect threat to the sovereignty of Wisconsin. The decision of the Minnesota
courts does not frustrate the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties.
Discussion
In a lower court decision commenting on this case, the court stated that the significant contacts analysis
here “addresses the traditional concerns of due process, i.e., preventing unfairness to the parties and
promoting interstate relations.”
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v Escolin
Doctrine of Processual Presumption: The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by
the proponent thereof, otherwise, such law shall be presumed to be exactly the same as the law of the
forum.
Facts: The Hodges spouses, both Texas citizens and domiciled in the Philippines, made in their
individual wills, provisions which provide that upon their deaths, their whole estate would be inherited
by the surviving spouse and that spouse could manage and alienate the said lands, with the exception
of the Texas property, and the remainder upon the death of the surviving spouse would redound to
the brothers and sisters of the deceased surviving spouse (basta ung asawang huling namatay LOL).
Linnie Jane Hodges died first in Iloilo leaving a will executed in Texas but probated in the CFI of Iloilo
City with the widower Charles Newton Hodges appointed as Executor, pursuant to the provisions of the
will. Charles was previously appointed Special Administrato, in which capacity he filed an “urgent ex-
parte motion to allow or authorize himself to continue the business in which he was engaged and to
perform acts which he had been doing while deceased was living” which was granted by the court. As
Executor he filed another motion to approve all sales, conveyances, leases, mortgages that he had
made further and subsequent transaction which he may do in accordance with the last wishes of his
wife” which was also approved by the court. In financial statements submitted before the court, he
made statements that the estate of Linnie is 1/2 of the conjugal estate. He also allegedly renounced
his inheritance in a tax declaration in the U.S.
Subsequently, Charles also died. Magno was appointed as the admistratrix for the estate of both
spouses but later replaced by PCIB as to Charles’ estate. Charles before his death, failed to make
accounting, and also failed to acquire final adjudication of Linnie’s estate. Since there was no liquidation
of Linnie’s estate, the brothers and sisters of Linnie wanted to determine the extent of her estate that
they could inherit.
In RE Estate of Johnson
Issue: w/n Philippine Law or Texas Law shall govern (regarding Conflict of Laws)
Remanded (Texas law may be applied but must be proved)
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Held: It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it must be proven whether a renvoi will
happen or whether Texas law makes the testamentary provisions valid. In line with Texas law, which
should be proven is the law enforced during the death of Linnie and not in any other time.
Art 16 of the Civil Code provides that the law of the nationality of the decedent applies. But if we apply
Texas law, personal property is governed by the law of domicile of the decedent and real property is
governed by its situs (both of which is the Philippines). Furthermore Texas law provides no legitime.
Thus the renvoi doctrine. Philippine law provides that the Surviving Spouse, being the sole heir,gets
1/2 o the conjugal property, then 1/2 goes to the estate of the spouse. If 1/2 of the estate of the
decedent goes to the surviving spouse which is the sole heir, then Charles gets 1/4 of the whole
conjugal property. The Court said that Texas law may apply, but was not proven. The laws of a foreign
jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts, The courts of the Philippines Islands are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union.
Such laws must be proved as facts. The proponent should show the foreign law; as certified
by person holding/having custody of such law, with a certificate that such officer does have
custody over said law. v Garcia case can't be used to show what Texas law may contain, as
there's a time difference between this case and that case, thus the Texas law might have
changed in between the rulings
PCIB can't claim that the estate of Linnie is not entitled to at least 1/4 of conjugal property, they having
argued that it is so.
The SC held that the estate of Linnie inherited by her brothers and sisters could be more that just
stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper application of the principle of renvoi in
relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had
no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and
effectively renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining and
in the state of the record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position to make a final ruling,
whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and We, therefore, reserve said issues for further
proceedings and resolution in the first instance by the court o quo, as hereinabove indicated. We
reiterate, however, that pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, Our
considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her
husband could not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole
share of their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during his lifetime,
the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less
than one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as
explained earlier, have been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons
since then, for even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code
and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth
share would be her free disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of her husband
under the Civil Code.
(note: sobrang haba at sobrang daming issues, I just put the issue related to our topic in Conflict of
Laws)
FAST FACTS: Emil Johnson died in the City of Manila; however he was a naturalized American citizen.
He left a will through which he disposed an estate valued at 231,800php. However, the will was signed
by two witnesses instead of the three required by Sec. 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However,

a petition was made stating that the will was made in conformity with US Law, thus valid in the
Philippines as provided for in Section 636 in the Code of Civil Procedure. The will was later probated
and declared legal, however the testator's daughter, Ebba Ingeborg entered an appearance, claiming
that as a legitimate child she cannot be deprived of the legitime which she is entitled to as provided
by Philippine law. She moved to annul the decree of probate and put the estate into intestate
administration in order for her to claim the estate as the sole legitimate heir of her father.
FACTS: On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the
United States, died in the city of Manila, leaving a will, dated September 9, 1915, by which he disposed
of an estate, the value of which, as estimated by him, was 231,800php.
This document is an holographic instrument, being written in the testator’s own handwriting, and is
signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure - therefore the will was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law
generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not have been
proved under section 618. .
However, a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the probate
of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois,
United States of America. The will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State, hence
could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides:
Will made here by alien. – A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another
state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a
citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may
be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed
according to the laws of these Islands.
After a hearing, the document was declared to be legal, and administrators were nominated: Victor
Johnson, the deceased's brother and John T. Pickett.
Pickett declined, and Johnson was appointed sole administrator. In the will, the testator gives to his
brother Victor one hundred shares of the corporate stock in the Johnson-Pickett Rope Company; to his
father and mother in Sweden, the sum of P20,000; to his daughter Ebba Ingeborg, the sum of P5,000;
to his wife, Alejandra Ibañez, the sum of P75 per month, if she remains single; to Simeona Ibañez,
spinster, P65 per month, if she remains single. The rest of the property is left to the testator’s five
children – Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor and Alberto.
However, three months after the will had been probated, the attorneys for the petitioner, Ebba
Ingeborg Johnson, entered an appearance in her behalf and asserted that Ebba is a legitimate heir of
the testator. Thus, she cannot be deprived of the legitime to which she is entitled under the law
governing testamentary successions in these Islands. She moved to annul the decree of probate and
put the estate into intestate administration in order for her to claim the estate as the sole legitimate
heir of her father.
ISSUE: W/N the order of the probate can be set aside on the ground that the testator was not a
resident of the State of Illinois and that the will was not made in conformity with the laws of that
State? NO.
HELD:In the testimony submitted to the trial court, Johnson first came to the United States as a boy
and settled in the State of Illinois. Eventually he married one Rosalie Johnson and they would have one
daughter, the petitioner Ebba Ingeborg. Johnson remained in Illinois until he came to the Philippines
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as a soldier in the United States Army. On November 20, 1902, he went back to the US so that Rosalie
Johnson could be granted a decree of divorce in the Circuit Court of Illinois, on the ground of desertion.
In 1903 Emil Johnson would return to obtain a certificate of naturalization. Thereafter he returned to
the Philippines and would conduct his business here until his death. He had marital relations with two
women. From Alejandra Ibanez he would have three children: Mercedes, Encarnacion, and Victor. From
Simeona Ibanez he would have two children: Eleonor and Alberto.
All this being said, no evidence was adduced showing that at the time he returned to the United States,
in the autumn of 1902, he had then abandoned Illinois as the State of his permanent domicile. Further,
there is no law in force at that time by virtue of which any person of foreign nativity can become a
naturalized citizen of the Philippine Islands. Thus it was impossible for the testator, even if he
had so desired, to expatriate himself from the United States and change his political status
from a citizen of the United States to a citizen of these Islands. This being true, it is to be
presumed that he retained his citizenship in the State of Illinois along with his status as a citizen of the
United States
The Supreme Court held that the probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions,
the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards the due execution of the will. The intrinsic
validity of the provisions of this will must be determined by the law of Illinois and not of the Philippines.
Walton v Arabian American Oil Co 233 F 2nd F4 (1956)
Facts:
 Plaintiff, citizen and resident of Arkansas but temporarily in Saudi. While driving his vehicle,
a truck driven by employee of defendant hit the former’s vehicle thereby injuring him.
Defendant is incorporated in Delaware, licensed to do business in New York, and engaged in
extensive business in Saudi.
 Both plaintiff and defendant, in their complaint and answer respectively, did not prove or
offer to prove Saudi Arabian laws. The court did not take judicial notice of it.
 Under the well-established New York decisions, defendant was negligent and therefore liable
to plaintiff. The trial judge saying he would not take judicial notice of Saudi Arabian law
directed a verdict in favor of the defendant and gave judgment against plaintiff.
Issue/s:
 WON judge should take judicial notice of Saudi Arabian Law? – No
 Who has the burden of proving the foreign law? – Plaintiff
Held:
 It is well settled by the New York decisions that the substantive law applicable to an alleged
tort is the law of the place where the alleged tort occurred (in this case Saudi). At the same
time, the general federal rule is that the law of the foreign country is a fact that must be
proved. Plaintiff has the burden of proving that, but he was not able to plead and prove it.
 A judge may be said to be abusing its discretion if he takes judicial notice of foreign law not
pleaded.
Leary v Gledhill 8 NJ 260 84 A 2d 725 (1951)
Facts:
 Thomas Leary, plaintiff, and William Gledhill, the defendant, became acquainted in the
military service.
 Leary purchased $1,000 worth of stocks from Gledhill.
 Leary, upon Gledhill’s invitation, visited him in France. At a conversation in a hotel in Paris,
Gledhill told Leary that he needed about $4,000 and that he could raise about $2,000 by
asking his wife to sell the automobile in the U.S.

 Gledhill asked Leary to help him, but did not mention anything about selling any shares of
stocks.
 Upon Leary’s return to Germany, he mailed Gledhill a check payable to order for $1,500,
without indicating in the check or in the accompanying letter what the money was for.
 They did not see or hear from each other again until the trial.
 Leary then instituted a suit against Gledhill to recover the alleged loan, testifying that the
check for $1,500 was a personal loan to Gledhill.
 Gledhill denied saying that he never borrowed money from Leary.
 Gledhill moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that Leary’s proofs were
insufficient:
o There being no promise to pay,
o No demand for repayment, and
o No pleading or proof of the law of France where the transaction occurred—wherein
the rules of law for a foreign country must be pleaded and proved as facts along
with other elements of a cause of action to enable plaintiff to recover against
defendant.
Issue/s:
 WON the plaintiff must fail in his cause of action because of the failure to produce the
applicable law of France – No
Held:
 The transaction occurred in France; the Court may take judicial knowledge that France is not
a common law, but rather a civil jurisdiction.
o It would therefore be inappropriate and contrary to elementary knowledge to
presume that the principles of common law prevail there.
 This does not mean, however, that the plaintiff must fail in his cause of action because of the
absence of any proof at trial of the applicable law in France.
o In these circumstances, any one of the three other presumptions may be indulged:
 That the law of France is the same as the law of the forum
 That the law of France, like all civilized countries, recognizes certain
fundamental principles (eg: taking of a loan creates an obligation upon the
borrower to make repayment)
 That the parties, by failing to prove the law of France, have acquiesced in
having their dispute determined by the law of the forum.
 The Court based its decision upon the presumption that the law of France, in common with
that of other civilized countries, recognizes a liability to make repayment under the facts
presented.
 This presumption has limitations, however, for in many cases, it would be difficult to
determine whether or not the question presented was of such fundamental nature as
reasonably o warrant the assumption that it would be similarly treated by the laws of all
civilized countires.
 The presumption that in the absence of proof the parties acquiesce in the application of the
law of the forum, be in statutory law or common law, does not present any such difficulties
for it may be universally applied, regardless of the nature of the controversy.
o Authorities seem to favor this.
 Thus, the rights of the parties are to be determined by the law of New Jersey which
unquestionably permits recovery on the facts proven.
Zalamea v. Court of Appeals
Facts:
 Spouses Cesar and Suthira Zalamea and their daughter purchased 3 airline tickets from the
Manila agent of Trans-World Airlines, Inc. The tickets of the spouses were purchased at a
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75% discount while their daughter paid full fare. All tickets were confirmed in Manila and
were re-confirmed in New York.
 On the date of the flight, they were wait-listed because all seats were taken.
 Eventually, Mr. Zalamea, holding his daughter’s ticket was allowed to board while the other 2
were constrained to purchase tickets from another airline.
 They filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of carriage before RTC Makati.
 RTC- ruled in their favor Granted them refund, moral damages, atty’s fees.
 CA – affirmed but no moral damages since overbooking is an accepted practice of US
airlines. So, no fraud.
Issue/s:
 WON the law of the forum applies in this case – Yes
 WON lex loci celebrationis – No
Held:
 The US law allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proven.
 Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer
service agents that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows
overbooking. Aside from that, no official publication of the Code was presented.
 Even if the claimed Code does exist, it is not applicable to the case at bar according to lex
loci contractus. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in
this case would be Phil. law.
 Jurisprudence states that overbooking amounts to bad faith entitling passengers to moral
damages. TWA is guilty of bad faith for not informing its passengers beforehand that it could
breach the contract of carriage even if the tickets are already confirmed.
 TWA is also liable for exemplary damages.
Zalamea v. Court of Appeals (other digest)
FACTS: Petitioner-spouses Zalamea and their daughter purchased 3 airline tickets from the Manila
agent of TransWorld Airlines for a flight to NY-LA. The tickets were at a discount of 75% and the
daughter was a full fare.
While in NY, they received a notice of the reconfirmation. On the appointed date, they checked in at
10am for their 11am flight but were placed on the waitlist. The daughter appeared as No.13 on the
waitlist while the two Zalameas were listed as No. 34, showing a party of two. Out of the 42 names,
the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board, including the father. The others weren’t able
to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare tickets were given first priority. The father later discovered
that he was holding his daughter’s full-fare ticket. Thos with discounted tickets were denied boarding.
Even in the next flight to LA, the mother and daughter couldn’t be accommodated because it was
fully book. They were constrained to book in another flight and purchased 2 tickets from American
Airlines at $918.
In the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage
before the RTC Makati. The RTC ordered the airline company to pay the ticket costs, as well as moral
damages and attorney’s fees.
CA: Moral damages are recoverable only where there is fraud or bad faith (in a breach of contract of
carriage). Since it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice
of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by
the Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on respondent TransWorld
Airlines. TWA was remiss in not informing petitioners that the flight was overbooked. There was no
bad faith in placing the petitioners in the waitlist along with 48 passengers.

ISSUE: W/N there was bad faith on the part of TWA, considering that TWA contends that overbooking
of flights is a common and accepted practice in the US
HELD: Yes, there was fraud or bad faith. The US law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking
has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice
of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate
may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
TWA relied solely on the statement of its customer service agent, Ms. Lather, in her deposition. Aside
from such, there is no official publication of said code presented as evidence. Respondent court’s
finding that overbooking is allowed has no basis.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations exist, the same isn’t applicable in accordance
with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket
was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the
forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold and
issued in the Philippines, the applicable law would be Philippine law.
Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not
informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have
confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Respondent TWA should have incorporated stipulations on
overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its passengers about these policies so that the
latter would be prepared for such eventuality or would have the choice to ride with another airline.
TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of giving less priority to
discounted tickets. While the petitioners had checked in at the same time, and held confirmed tickets,
yet, only one of them was allowed to board the plane ten minutes beforedeparture time because the
full-fare ticket he was holding was given priority over discounted tickets. The other two petitioners
were left behind.
The Court ordered TWA to pay the $918 worth of tickets from American Airlines, 50k moral damages,
50k exemplary damages, 50k atty’s fees and the costs of suit.
Notes: The tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines; thus, Philippine law is applicable, under the
principled of lex loci contractus.
Miciano v Brimo
FACTS: Juan Miciano, the judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased Joseph Brimo, a Turkish
national filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of Joseph, opposed it. The
court, however, approved it.
The errors which Andre assigns are:(1) The approval of scheme of partition; (2) denial of his
participation in the inheritance; (3) denial of the MR of the order approving the partition; (4) approval
of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said
1
The law then in force was the Old Civil Code of the Philippine which, among other things, provides:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount
of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
COL – March 1, 2019
business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure
not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business
to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws. His
opposition is based on the fact that the partition puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimo's
will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason
they are void as being in violation or Art.
10 of the OLD Civil Code.1
ISSUE:
1. What law should govern? Turkish but must be proven first
2. W/N Andre was properly excluded as legatee? NO
HELD:
1. The fact is that Andre did not prove that Joseph’s testamentary dispositions are not in
accordance with Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish
laws are on the matter. In the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be
the same as those of the Philippines. Andre, himself, acknowledges that said laws have not been
proven in these proceedings when he asked the court to be given an opportunity to present evidence
on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval
of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws
on the matter. The refusal to give Andre another opportunity to prove such laws does is not an
error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that Andre was granted
ample opportunity to introduce evidence, there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the court
in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the
testator was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being
contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed. Therefore, the approval
of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
2. In regard to the 1st assignment of error, which deals with the exclusion of Andre as a legatee,
inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration
that such exclusion is based on the last part of the 2nd clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship
having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality
and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine
Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my
wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this,
my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise,
I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable
to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees
must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. If this condition were legal and valid,
any legatee who fails to comply with it, as Andre who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not
respected the will of the testator, is prevented from receiving his legacy. However, said condition is
person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may
be situated.

void, being contrary to law, for Art 792 of the Old Civil Code provides that conditions contrary to
law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in
any manner whatsoever, even if the testator otherwise provides.
Said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to Art 10, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
dispositions. Said condition then is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said
will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the Andre. From all this,
the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed
upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law. All of the remaining clauses of the will with
all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses
are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from were modified and distribution of Joseph Brimo’s estate was
directed to be made in such a manner as to include Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the
scheme of partition submitted by the Miciano was approved in all other respects.
CIR v Fisher
Facts: The case relates to the determination and settlement of the estate of Walter Stevenson (born
in the Philippines , of British parents, married in the City of Manila to Beatrice, British also). Walter
instituted his wife as the sole heiress to the following real and personal property, which they acquired
while residing in the Phils:
Real Estate in Baguio:
• Shares of stock from Mindanao Mother Lode Mines
• Shares of stock Canacao Estate
• Cash and credit from Canacao Estate
• Cash, with the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China
(Only the first two are relevant to the case)
Ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the
settlement of the estate.
- Ancillary administrator submitted a preliminary estate and inheritance tax return with the
reservation of having the properties declared therein finally appraised at their values six
months after the death of Stevenson.
- Beatrice Stevenson assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to the spouses,
Douglas and Bettina Fisher, respondents herein
- Basically, the case tackles disputes regarding considerations in making deductions,
exemptions, valuation of property and the property regimes for alien spouses residing in
the Phils.
Issues: 1. W/N, in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, one-half (½) of the net
estate should be deducted therefrom as the share of tile surviving spouse in accordance with our law
on conjugal partnership and in relation to section 89 (c) of the NIRC? YES
2. W/N the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso embodied in Section 122 of the NIRC
exemption from the payment of estate and inheritance taxes on the 210,000 shares of stock in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc.? NO.
COL – March 1, 2019
3. W/N the estate is entitled to the deduction of P4,000.00 allowed by Section 861,
U.S. Internal Revenue Code in relation to section 122 of the NIRC? NO
4. W/N the real estate properties of the decedent located in Baguio City and the 210,000 shares of
stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc., were correctly appraised by the lower court? NO.
5. W/N the estate is entitled to the following deductions: P8,604.39 for judicial and administration
expenses; P2,086.52 for funeral expenses; P652.50 for real estate taxes; and P10,0,22.47
representing the amount of indebtedness allegedly incurred by the decedent during his lifetime?
YES, except indebtedness.
6. W/N the estate is entitled to the payment of interest on the amount it claims to have overpaid the
government and to be refundable to it? NO.
HELD:1. Lower court CORRECTLY DEDUCTED the half of the conjugal property in determining the
hereditary estate left by the deceased Stevenson.
The application of Art 1325 of the Old Civil Code (adheres to the dominance of the nationality law in
determining the property regime of spouses) is misplaced because it covers marriages between an
alien and a Filipino and a marriage celebrated abroad. This makes the English law applicable to the
case at bar (because again, they are both British), but it was not satisfactorily proved that the English
law states that the ownership of the property of the spouses should all vest in the husband, thus it
cannot indulge in a processual presumption on what the English law has to say on the matter.
2.Reciprocity provided by the Philippine and Californian Laws CANNOT be availed of. The reciprocity
must be total, that is, with respect to transfer or death taxes of any and every character, in the case
of the Philippine law, and to legacy, succession, or death taxes of any and every character, in the case
of the California law. Therefore, if any of the two states collects or imposes and does not exempt any
transfer, death, legacy, or succession tax of any character, the reciprocity does not work.
3. P 4,000 deduction CANNOT be allowed. the amount of $2,000.00 allowed under the Federal
Estate Tax Law is in the nature of a DEDUCTION and not of an exemption regarding which RECIPROCITY
CANNOT BE CLAIMED under the provision of Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code. Nor
is reciprocity authorized under the Federal Law.
4. For the valuation of the Baguio real estate: CIR appraisal upheld. Properties are required to
be appraised at their fair market value and the assessed value thereof shall be considered as the fair
market value only when evidence to the contrary has not been shown. Valuation made is justified by
evidence.
For the Mindanao Mother Lode shares of stocks: Respondents' claim that the shares of stock
commanded a lesser value at the Manila Stock Exchange six months after the death of Stevenson
has merit. Situs of taxation is the Philippines so it should be valued on the basis of prices prevailing
in the country.
The reservation made by the ancillary admin should be respected still, that the shares of stock shall
be valued based on the prices 6 months from the death of the decedent
5. Judicial and admin expenses : Allowable deduction, upheld by the probate court also
Funeral expenses: P86.52 additional funeral expense disallowed, lack of evidence of

incurring this additional funeral expense
- P2000 funeral expense, allowed
- Real estate taxes: Was actually allowed, shown by computations in the original text
- Indebtedness: Disallowed, the allowable deduction is only to the extent of the portion of the
indebtedness which is equivalent to the proportion that the estate in the Philippines bears to the
total estate wherever situated. No statement of the value of the estate situated outside the
Philippines, no part of the indebtedness can be allowed to be deducted. Administrator was not
able to include the gross estate of the Stevenson in the three returns submitted to the court.
6. Request to pay interest denied. In the absence of a statutory provision clearly or expressly directing
or authorizing such payment, and none has been cited by respondents, the National Government cannot
be required to pay interest
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher (1961) (other digest)
Facts:
 Walter G. Stevenson, born in the Philippines of British parents, married another British
subject, Beatrice, in Manila. He died in 1951 in California where he and his wife moved to.
 In his will, he instituted Beatrice as his sole heiress to certain real and personal properties,
among which are 210,000 shares of stocks in Mindanao Mother Lode Mines (Mines).
 Ian Murray Statt (Statt), the appointed ancillary administrator of his estate filed an estate
and inheritance tax return. He made a preliminary return to secure the waiver of the CIR on
the inheritance of the Mines shares of stock.
 In 1952, Beatrice assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to the spouses Fisher.
 Statt filed an amended estate and inheritance tax return claiming ADDITIONAL EXEMPTIONS,
one of which is the estate and inheritance tax on the Mines’ shares of stock pursuant to a
reciprocity proviso in the NIRC, hence, warranting a refund from what he initially paid. The
collector denied the claim. He then filed in the CFI of Manila for the said amount.
 CFI ruled that (a) the ½ share of Beatrice should be deducted from the net estate of Walter,
(b) the intangible personal property belonging to the estate of Walter is exempt from
inheritance tax pursuant to the reciprocity proviso in NIRC.
Issue/s:
 WON the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso in the NIRC granting exemption
from the payment of taxes for the Mines shares of stock. – NO
Held:
 Reciprocity must be total. If any of the two states collects or imposes or does not exempt
any transfer, death, legacy or succession tax of any character, the reciprocity does not work.
 In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or non-resident with properties,
there are imposed upon his estate, both an estate and an inheritance tax.
 But, under the laws of California, only inheritance tax is imposed. Also, although the Federal
Internal Revenue Code imposes an estate tax, it does not grant exemption on the basis of
reciprocity. Thus, a Filipino citizen shall always be at a disadvantage. This is not what the
legislators intended.
d. Exceptions to the Application of Foreign Law
Scrivener’s Error
Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v Ople
Facts:
COL – March 1, 2019
 Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) is a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the
Philippines executed in Manila (2) separate contracts of employment, one with private
respondent Farrales and the other with private respondent Mamasig which states:
o 5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY
 This agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended by the
mutual consent of the parties.
o 6. TERMINATION
 Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the
right to terminate this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE
notice in writing in advance one month before the intended termination or
in lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month’s
salary.
o 10. APPLICABLE LAW:
 This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of
Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the
jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under this agreement.
 Roughly 1 year and 4 months prior to the expiration of the contracts of employment, PIA
sent separate letters informing Farrales and Mamasig that they will be terminated effective
September 1, 1980.
 Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of
company benefits and bonuses, against PIA at Ministry of Labor and Employment
 PIA claims that their relationship is governed by the law of contracts under the
aforementioned paragraphs and not Labor Law
Issue/s:
 Which law should govern over the case? Which court has jurisdiction? – Philippine law and
jurisdiction
Held:
 PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which specifies, firstly,
the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for
settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement “only [in] courts
of Karachi Pakistan.
 We have already pointed out that the employee and employer relationship is much affected
with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot
be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their
relationship.
 Neither may petitioner invoke par. 10 specifying Karachi courts as the sole venue for the
settlement of disputes.
o A cursory reading of the case shows that multiple and substantive contacts between
Philippine law and Philippine courts are present.
o The contract was executed in the Philippines
o Contract was partially performed in Phil.
o Private respondents are Phil citizens and residents
o Petitioner is a foreign corporation doing business in the Phil
o Respondents are based in Phil in between their assigned flights to Middle East and
Europe
 Petitioner did not plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law it must be presumed then
that it is the same in Philippines.
Dacanay v. Florendo
Facts: A joint and reciprocal will was executed by the spouses Isabel Florendo and Tirso Dacanay
in 1940. After the death of Isabel, Tirso now seek to probate said will in CFI La Union, with the will
providing in substance that whoever of the spouses, joint testators, shall survive the other, shall

inherit all the properties of the latter, with an agreement as to how the surviving spouse shall dispose
of the properties in case of his or her demise.
The relatives of the deceased Isabel opposed the probate of said will on the ground that it is null and
void for being in violation of Art. 669 of the Civil Code: "Two or more persons cannot make a will
conjointly or in the same instrument, either for their
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person."
The court ruled on the dismissal of the probate, hence this appeal with Tirso contending that Art.
669 has been repealed by Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) which he claims provides for and
regulates the extrinsic formalities of wills, and making the issue on whether two wills should be
executed conjointly or separately a mere extrinsic formality.
Issue: W/N Art. 669 of the Civil Code was repealed by Act No. 190 (Code of CivPro).
Held: NO. The Supreme Court applied its ruling in In re: Will of Bilbao, wherein several articles of
the Civil Code regarding wills have not only been referred to but have also been applied side by side
with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provision of article 669 is not unwise and is
not against public policy. The reason for this is that when a will is made jointly or in the same
instrument, the spouse who is more aggressive, stronger in will or character and dominant is liable
to dictate the terms of the will for his or her own benefit or for that of third persons whom he or she
desires to favor. And, where the will is not only joint but reciprocal, either one of the spouses who
may happen to be unscrupulous, wicked, faithless or desperate, knowing as he or she does the terms
of the will whereby the whole property of the spouses both conjugal and paraphernal goes to the
survivor, may be tempted to kill or dispose of the other.
Considering the wisdom of the provisions of this article 669 and the fact that it has not been repealed,
at least not expressly, as well as the consideration that its provisions are not incompatible with those
of the Code of Civil Procedure on the subject of wills, said article 669 of the Civil Code is still in force.
Lastly, this article 669 has been reproduced word for word in article 818 of the New CivilCode
(Republic Act No. 386, enacted 1949). The implication is that the Philippine Legislature that passed
this Act and approved the NewCivil Code, including the members of the Code Commission who
prepared it, are of the opinion that the provisions of article 669 of the old Civil Code are not
incompatible with those of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Yao Kee, et al. v. Sy-Gonzales
Facts: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died in 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving
behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less.
Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the grant of
letters of administration in CFI of Caloocan. They alleged among others that (a) they are the children
of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Kiat died intestate; (c) they do not
recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they nominate
Aida SyGonzales for appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased.
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that:
(a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married in 1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors
are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among
them and is competent, willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat.
COL – March 1, 2019
CFI: Sy Kiat legally married to Yao Kee
CA: marriage to Yao Kee not proven
Issue: WON the marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee was proven (NO)
Held: Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved
as any other fact. To support the case of Yao Kee, the following pieces of evidence were presented:
1) Yao Kee’s testimony that she was married to Sy Kiat in 1931 in Fookien, China; that she does not
have a marriage certificate because the practice during that time was for elders to agree upon the
betrothal of their children, and in her case, her elder brother was the one who contracted or entered
into [an] agreement with the parents of her husband; that she and Sy Kiat, have been living in
FooKien, China before he went to the Philippines on several occasions; that the practice during the
time of her marriage was a written document is exchanged between the parents of the bride and
the parents of the groom, or any elder for that matter; that in China, the custom is that there is a
go- between, a sort of marriage broker who is known to both parties who would talk to the parents
of the bride-to-be; that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to-be their son
in-law, then they agree on a date as an engagement day; that during the wedding the document
would be signed by the parties but there is no solemnizing officer as is known in the Philippines;
that during the wedding day, the document is signed only by the parents of the bridegroom as well
as by the parents of the bride; that the parties themselves do not sign the document; that during
her wedding, Sy Chick, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the document with her mother; that as
to the whereabouts of that document, she and Sy Kiat were married for 46years already and the
document was left in China and she doubt if that document can still be found now; that it was left
in the possession of Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she does not know the whereabouts of that
document because of the lapse of many years and because they left it in a certain place and it was
already eaten by the termites; that after her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived immediately together
as husband and wife, and from then on, they lived together; that Sy Kiat went to the Philippines
sometime in March or April in the same year they were married; that she went to the Philippines in
1970, and then came back to China; that again she went back to the Philippines and lived with Sy
Kiat as husband and wife; that she begot her children with Sy Kiat during the several trips by Sy
Kiat made back to China.
2) the statement of the younger brother of Yao Kee that he was present at the wedding and that no
marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese govt, a document signed by the parents being sufficient.
3) Asuncion Gillego’s testimony that Sy Kiat admitted to her that he has a Chinese wife whom he
married according to Chinese custom
4) Sy Kiat’s Master Card of Registered Alien, which states that he was married in
China to Yao Kee
5) certification issued by the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China that Sy Kiat and Yao Kee were
married in China.
At most, these evidence prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. But it is not sufficient
to establish the validity of the marriage in accordance with Chinese law or custom.
To establish a valid foreign marriage, two things must be proven: (1) the existence of the foreign law
as a question of fact and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. The petitioners did

not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. Accordingly,
in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as
ours. Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is known in the
Philippines when her alleged marriage to Sy Kiat was celebrated, it follows that her marriage to Sy
Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Status of children: children with Yao Kee and Gillego are acknowledged natural children
Bank of America v. American Realty Corporation
Facts: Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international banking institution duly licensed to do
business in the Philippines, organized under the laws of the State of California. American Realty
(ARC) is a domestic corporation. Bank of America International Limited (BAIL) is a limited liability
company organized and existing under the laws of England.
BANTSA and BAIL granted three multimillion USD loans to 1. Liberian Transport 2. El Challenger
and 3. Eshley Compania (herein referred to as borrowers). All are existing under the laws of
Panama, and are foreign affiliates of ARC.
BANTSA and the borrowers signed restructuring agreements due to the default. As additional
security, ARC, as 3rd party mortgagor, executed 2 real estate mortgages over land parcels in San
Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. Eventually, the borrowers defaulted in the restructured loans, prompting
BANTSA to file civil actions before foreign courts for the collection, in the following courts:
a. In England, against Liberian Transport, Eshley Compania, El Challenger, Espriona Shipping,
Eddie Navigation, Eduardo Katipunan Litonjua and
Aurelio Katipunan Litonjua in 1992
b. In England, against El Challenger, Espriona Shipping, Eduardo & Aurelio
Litonjua
c. In Hongkong, SC of HKG High Court, against same parties as A
d. In Hongkong, SC of HKG High Court, against Eshley, El Challenger, Espriona Shipping, Pacific
Navigator, Eddie Navigation Corporation,
Litonjua Chartering, Eduardo Katipunan
Bottom line: 2 cases in England, 2 cases in Hongkong
In the cases before foreign courts, ARC as the 3rd party mortgagor wasn’t impleaded as party-
defendant. Also in 1992, BANTSA filed an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage before the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan. After publication and due notice, the
mortgaged real properties were sold, with Integrated Credit & Corporation Services (ICCS) as the
highest bidder for 24m.
ARC then filed before the Pasig RTC an action for damages for BANTSA’s act of extrajudicially
foreclosing the mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection
of the principal loan. BANTSA alleged that the rule prohibiting the mortgagee from foreclosing the
mortgage after an ordinary suit for collection has been filed is not applicable here, because: 1) ARC is
a 3rd party mortgagor and not a party in the principal restructuring agreements, and not made as a
defendant in HKG and England 2) There is no civil suit for sum of money filed in the Philippines since
they were filed in HKG and England, so such decisions which may be rendered are not enforceable
unless there is a separate action and 3) Under English Law, which is the governing law under the
principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by filing civil actions for sums
of money.
COL – March 1, 2019
ARC filed a motion for suspension of the redemption period because it cannot exercise the right without
waiving its contentions in the case that the foreclosure of the mortgage on its properties is legally
improper and therefore invalid.
RTC granted the motion for suspension. RD of Meycauyan received the order. After a month, ICCS
consolidated its ownership over the real properties, resulting in the issuance of TCT in its name. ICCS
then sold them to Stateland Investment Corporation for 39m, and TCTs were issued to its name.
The Pasig RTC rendered a decision in favor of ARC. CA affirmed.
Issue: W/N BANTSA’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the recovery of
the loan before the foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure
Held:
SC does not agree with BANTSA that there are two requisites (ordinary civil action for collection filed,
and subsequently a final judgment be correspondingly rendered) and that absent such, he mortgagee-
creditor is deemed not to have waived the remedy. SC upholds Bachrach, that in the absence of express
statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the debtor either a personal action for
debt, or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either but not both.
In our jurisdiction, the remedies are alternative and not cumulative. ARC constited real estate
mortgages, and it subjected itself to the liabilities of a 3rd party mortgagor. The mere act of filing an
ordinary action for collection operates as a waiver of the mortgagee-creditor’s remedy to foreclose
the mortgage. BANTSA is deemed to have elected a remedy, as a result of which a waiver of the
other necessarily must arise.
No final judgment in the collection suit is required for the rule on waiver to apply.
BANTSA alleged that under English Law, the mortgagee doesn’t lose its security interest by simply
filing civil actions for sums of money. This is untenable. Philippine law should apply. There is no
judicial notice of any foreign law. Any foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact.
When the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of
the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected is the principle embedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the
splitting up of a single cause of action. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its
application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice
is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
2nd issue: ARC is entitled to the actual and compensatory damages, because it was a violation of
ARC’s rights as 3rd party mortgagor.
Lorenzo v Posadas
Type of Action/Appeal – Appeal from decision of Court of First Instance Zamboanga which
dismissed both plaintiff Pablo Lorenzo’s complaint and defendant Juan Posadas’ Jr. (in his capacity as
Collector of Internal Revenue) counterclaim.

Facts – Plaintiff Pablo Lorenzo (in his capacity as trustee of deceased Thomas Hanley’s estate)
brought action in Court of First Instance Zamboanga on 4 October 1932 for refund of PhP2,052.74
that he paid as inheritance tax on Hanley’s estate and for the collection of interest thereon at 6% per
annum computed from 15 September 1932 (when the aforesaid tax was paid under protest), against
defendant Juan Posadas, Jr., then Collector of Internal Revenue.
During Lorenzo’s incumbency as trustee, Collector of Internal Revenue Posadas alleged that Thomas
left on his death an estate consisting of real properties at PhP27,920 and personal properties at
PhP1,465.
(Allowing deduction of P480.81, assessed against the estate an inheritance tax in the amount of
P1,434.24 which, together with the penalties for delinquency in payment consisting of 1% monthly
interest from 1 July 1931 to the date of payment and a surcharge of 25% on the tax, amounted to
P2,052.74.)
On 15 March 1932, Posadas filed a motion in pending testamentary proceedings before the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga (Special Proceedings No. 302), where he asked that the trustee and
plaintiff Pablo Lorenzo be ordered to pay the Government the sum of P2,052.74. Defendant’s motion
was granted and on 15 September 1932, the plaintiff paid that amount under protest. Lorenzo also
notified Posadas at the same time that unless the amount was promptly refunded, a suit would be
brought for its recovery. The defendant overruled the plaintiff's protest and refused to refund the tax
paid or any part of it.
The defendant set up a counterclaim for P1,191.27 alleged to be interest due on the tax in question
and which was not included in the original assessment.
Issued and Held by the Supreme Court –
The following questions were raised in the appeal,
(1) When does estate (also known as inheritance) tax accrue and when must it be satisfied?
The Court held that accrual of estate tax is distinct from the obligation to pay it. Estate tax was also
defined as “an excise or privilege tax imposed on the right to succeed to, receive, or take property by
or under a will or the intestacy law, or deed, grant, or gift, to become operative at or after death.”
It held that as per Article 657 of 1889 Spanish Civil Code that “rights to the succession of a person
are transmitted from the moment of his death." "In other words", said Arellano, C. J., ". . . the heirs
succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the
heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death.” Thus, estate tax accrued on Thomas
Hanley’s death on 27 May 1922.
(2) Should estate tax be computed on the basis of the value of the estate at the time of the testator's
death, or on its value ten years later?
Pablo Lorenzo contended that inheritance (estate) tax should be based on the estate’s value in 1932
or 10 years after Thomas Hanley’s death, for as far as real properties are concerned, the estate did
not and could not legally pass to the instituted heir Matthew Hanley until after expiration of ten years
from death of testator Thomas Hanley on 22 May 1922.
The Court held that the right of the State to an inheritance tax accrues at the moment of death, and
hence is ordinarily measured as to any beneficiary by the value at that time of such property as
passes to him. Subsequent appreciation or depreciation is immaterial.
“If death is the generating source from which the power of the state to impose inheritance taxes its
being and if, upon the death of the decedent, succession takes place and the right of the state to tax
vests instantly, the tax should be measured by the value of the estate as it stood at the time of the
decedent's death, regardless of any subsequent contingency affecting value or any subsequent
increase or decrease in value.”
(3) In determining net value of the estate subject to tax, is it proper to deduct the compensation due
to trustees?
The Court held that Lorenzo is entitled to fair compensation for his services, but it does mean that his
compensation may lawfully be deducted in arriving at the net value of the estate subject to tax.
COL – March 1, 2019
There is no Philippine statute which requires trustees' commissions to be deducted in determining net
value of the estate subject to inheritance tax.
(4) What law governs the case at bar? Should the provisions of Act No. 3606 favorable to the
taxpayer be given retroactive effect? Has there been delinquency in the payment of the estate tax? If
so, should the additional interest claimed by the defendant in his appeal be paid by the estate?
The Court stated that inheritance taxation is governed by the statute in force at the time of decedent’s
death. However, a tax statute may be made retroactive in its operation. But legislative intent that a
tax statute should operate retroactively should be perfectly clear. Since Act No. 3606 itself contains no
provisions indicating legislative intent to give retroactive effect, no such effect can be given by the
court.
Verdict – The Supreme Court MODIFIED the CFI Zamboanga’s judgment, with costs against plaintiff
Pablo Lorenzo in both instances. It held that since he has already paid PhP2,052.74, only PhP1,581.69
is legally due from the estate. However, the Court held that Lorenzo is only liable for PhP1,191.27, the
amount stated in defendant’s counterclaim.
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v Sherman
FACTS: A complaint for collection of a sum of money was filed by petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation (BANK) against private respondents Jack Robert Sherman and Deodato Reloj,
before the RTC QC.
It appears that sometime in 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd. (COMPANY), a company
incorporated in Singapore applied with, and was granted by, the Singapore branch of petitioner BANK
an overdraft facility in the maximum amount of Singapore dollars 200,000.00 (which amount was
subsequently increased to Singapore dollars 375,000.00) with interest at 3% over petitioner BANK
prime rate, payable monthly, on amounts due under said overdraft facility; as a security for the
repayment by the COMPANY of sums advanced by petitioner BANK to it through the aforesaid overdraft
facility, on October 7, 1982, both private respondents and a certain Robin de Clive Lowe, all of whom
were directors of the COMPANY at such time, executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in favor of
petitioner BANK whereby private respondents and Lowe agreed to pay, jointly and severally, on
demand all sums owed by the COMPANY to petitioner BANK under the aforestated overdraft facility.
(IMPT) The Joint and Several Guarantee provides that: This guarantee and all rights, obligations and
liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts of Singapore
shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee.
The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, petitioner BANK demanded payment of the obligation
from private respondents, conformably with the provisions of the Joint and Several Guarantee.
Inasmuch as the private respondents still failed to pay, petitioner BANK filed the above-mentioned
complaint.
On December 14,1984, private respondents filed a MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
SM and persons of the defendants. Acting on the motion, the trial court issued an order denying the
MTD ruling that there is nothing in the Guarantee which says that the courts of Singapore shall have
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the courts of other countries or nations and that jurisdiction over the
persons of defendants is acquired by service of summons and copy of the complaint on them. There
has been a valid service of summons on both defendants and in fact the same is admitted when said
defendants filed a 'Motion for Extension of Time to File Responsive Pleading on December 5, 1984.
MR was filed thereafter but still got denied.
 COL – March 1, 2019
2. Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
Private respondents then filed before CA a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or 3. Choice of Law Theories
prayer for a restraining order. CA rendered a decision granting the injunction. a. Traditional Approach
Vested rights theory
ISSUE: W/N Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit. (YES) Local Law Theory
Cavers principles of preference
HELD: While it is true that "the transaction took place in Singaporean setting" and that the Joint and b. Modern Approaches
Place of the most significant relationship
Several Guarantee contains a choice-of-forum clause, the very essence of due process dictates that
Interest Analysis
the stipulation that "[t]his guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall
Comparative Impairment
be construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic
Functional Analysis
of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes
Choice Influencing Considerations
arising under this guarantee" be liberally construed. One basic principle underlies all rules of
jurisdiction in International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable
Cases:
basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in personam. To be
reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend traditional
Gray v. Gray 87 NH 82, 174 AH 508 (1934)
notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Facts:
Indeed, as pointed-out by petitioner BANK at the outset, the instant case presents a very odd
 Gray filed an action in New Hampshire
situation. In the ordinary habits of life, anyone would be disinclined to litigate before a foreign
o Action is for damages arising out of personal injuries
tribunal, with more reason as a defendant. However, in this case, private respondents are Philippine
o Alleged to have been caused by her husband while driving from their home in New
residents (a fact which was not disputed by them) who would rather face a complaint against them Hampshire to Maine where the accident happened.
before a foreign court and in the process incur considerable expenses, not to mention inconvenience,  In Maine: spouses are barred from maintaining an action against each other.
than to have a Philippine court try and resolve the case. The defense of private respondents that the o No such prohibition exists in New Hampshire.
complaint should have been filed in Singapore is based merely on technicality. Issue/s:
 WON Mrs. Gray can sue Mr. Gray – NO
The parties did not thereby stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the Held:
rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in question operate to divest Philippine courts of  Rule: conflict between the lex loci and the lex fori – lex loci governs, as regards the legal
jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the light of a State to exercise effect and the incident of acts
authority over persons and things within its boundaries subject to certain exceptions. Thus, a State o Therefore: whatever would be a defense to this action if it had been brought in
does not assume jurisdiction over travelling sovereigns, ambassadors and diplomatic representatives Maine is a defense here (New Hampshire), EXCEPT IF: the cause of action had
of other States, and foreign military units stationed in or marching through State territory with the arisen in this (New Hampshire) state.
permission of the latter's authorities. This authority, which finds its source in the concept of  Mrs. Gray’s argument:
sovereignty, is exclusive within and throughout the domain of the State. A State is competent to o only reason a recovery could not be had in Maine is the spousal relation between
take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts and agencies assume jurisdiction over her and Mr. Gray
all kinds of cases brought before them. o Since they are residents of New Hampshire, where no such prohibition exists, she
could sue in New Hampshire.
As regards the issue on improper venue, petitioner BANK avers that the objection to improper venue  Is Mrs. Gray’s argument correct? NO
has been waived. However, We agree with the ruling of the respondent Court that: While in the main, o Her argument fails to distinguish between status and the incidents which local
the motion to dismiss fails to categorically use with exactitude the words 'improper venue' it can be law attaches to the status.
perceived from the general thrust and context of the motion that what is meant is improper venue,  Status of parties: husband and wife, which they brought into Maine.
 Incidents of the status: those prescribed by law of the place where
The use of the word 'jurisdiction' was merely an attempt to copy-cat the same word employed in the
transactions take place (e.g. applied in torts)
guarantee agreement but conveys the concept of venue. At any rate, this issue is now of no moment
o It should be observed that much of the plaintiff’s argument is based upon the
because We hold that venue here was properly laid for the same reasons discussed above.
assertion that inability to recover in Maine is merely because suits between husband
and wife are forbidden (hence the resort to a jurisdiction where such suits are
The respondent Court likewise ruled that: “In a conflict problem, a court will simply refuse to entertain allowed)
the case if it is not authorized by law to exercise jurisdiction. And even if it is so authorized, it may  BUT: examination of Maine law shows that there is not only a prohibition of
still refuse to entertain the case by applying the principle of forum non conveniens “.However, whether suit, but that acts complained of do not give rise to any cause of
a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the principle of forum non conveniens depends action.
largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court  Rules and conduct have no force to regulate acts done outside the jurisdiction which made
Thus, the respondent Court should not have relied on such principle. the rules, save as their operation is enforced by control over parties found within the
jurisdiction.

o In the great majority of cases, complaints of conduct are adjusted in the jurisdiction
where the conduct took place. It is desirable that the remedy be the same,
wherever the action is brought.
Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co. vs Carroll Supreme Court of Alabama
Facts:
 Carroll, resident of Alabama, brakeman employed by defendants, an Alabama corporation. This
corporation. Defendant operated a railroad from Tennesee. Through Alabama to Mississippi.
The contract of employment was entered into in Alabama.
 Carroll, injured in Mississipi because of his negligent act to spot a defective link between two
freight cars, which defendants employees were duty bound to inspect.
 Under Mississippi Carroll can’t recover against his employer because the negligence was caused
by the act of a fellow servant.
 Under Alabama law: absolute liability was imposed on the company for the injuries suffered
by employees in the course of their employment.
 Carroll brought suit in Alabama.
Issue:
 WON Carroll can claim liabilities under the Alabama law?
Held:
 Plaintiff has shown no cause of action under common law (in Alabama and Mississippi)
o Cause of action is determined by the law of the state in such time and place where
the facts existed. In this case, Mississipi laws give no recovery to negligence of a co-
worker.
 Subject to some jurisdictions actions to the qualification that the infliction of the injuries would
also support an action in the state (where the action is brought) had they been received within
the state.
 No authority supports the proposition that casualty that transpired in Alabama, and even if
consequence transpired and manifested somewhere else, recovery can be had in Alabama.
o When the facts are in Alabama and liability is fixed in Alabama, such can be enforced
in another state if its enactments or policies are not opposed to such but this is not
the case here.
 It is admitted that no injury was sustained as the train passed Alabama.
 The fact which created the right to sue, the injury without action happened in Mississippi.
 Section 2590 (the law that would subject the defendant to pay damages and which plaintiff
relies on) had no efficacy beyond the lines of Alabama. It cannot be enforced if the facts and
liability occur in another state. It states: “When a personal injury is received in Alabama by a
servant & employee..”
 Argument: the fact that the plaintiff sustained the injuries, he was in discharge of duties and
his contract was entered into In Alabama(An Alabama contract), also he was a citizen of
Alabama and defendant Alabama corporation (but this is of NO importance).
o No bearing on the primary question of existence of cause of action. No need to
determine plaintiff’s citizen or domicile
 Duties and liabilities of the parties do not spring from the contract.
 Sec 2590 is not about contractual relations but of employee-employer relationship.
 Case remanded for refusing to instruct the jury to find for the defendant.
Auten v. Auten
Facts:
 The Autens were married in England in 1917 and lived there until 1931. Mr. Auten deserted
his wife and children and moved to New York.
 Mrs. Auten went to New York where a separation agreement was executed. Under the
Agreement, Mr. Auten had to pay 50pounds a month through a New York trustees for Mrs.
COL – March 1, 2019
Auten and his children support, with a condition that Mrs. Auten shall not bring any action
relating to their Separation.
 Mr. Auten failed to pay, hence Mrs. Auten filed a case in England, but it never went to trial.
Hence, the case was brought to New York.
 Mr. Auten argued that because of wife’s institution of action, she violated the contract. Hence,
his obligation was extinguished.
 Lower Court, applying New York law, found for Mr. Auten.
Issue/s: WON the New York or English law will apply in this case?
Held:
 No, the English law must be applied in this case.
 The place where the agreement was made and where the trustee, to whom the moneys were
in the first instance to be paid, had his office in England.
 It compels the conclusion that it is the English Law which must be applied to determine the
impact and effect to be given the wife’s institution of the separation suit.
 Under the “center of gravity” or the “grouping of contacts” theory of the COL, the courts,
instead of regarding the conclusive the parties intention or the place of making or the
performance, lay emphasis rather upon the law of the place “which has the most significant
contacts with the matter in dispute”.
 Since the law of England must be applied, and since at the very least, an issue exists as the
WON the courts of that country treat the commencement of a separation action as a
repudiation of an earlier-made separation agreement, summary judgment should not have
been granted. JUDGMENT REVERSED.
Haag v. Barnes
Facts:
 An illegitimate child was born to Norman Barnes, an Illinois lawyer, and Dorothy Haag, then
a New York legal secretary.
 Before giving birth, she moved to California to live with her sister.
 Haag traveled to Chicago prior to her child’s birth, where Barnes promised to shoulder the
hospital expenses.
 They entered into a support agreement in Chicago providing that Barnes would pay
$275/mo until the child is 16 years old in exchange for release from any other
obligation.
o The agreement contained a choice-of-law clause in favor of Illinois, which
upheld such agreements if the sum was at least $800.
 New York law does not give any binding effect to any agreements made by parents of an
illegitimate child, unless the same is judicially approved.
 Haag and the child went to New York and filed the support action. Barnes invokes the choice-
of-law agreement to bar the proceeding.
Issue/s: WON Illinois as the choice-of-law should have jurisdiction over the case.
Held: YES.
 The agreement states that it “shall in all respects be interpreted, construed and governed by
the laws of the State of Illinois”, and it was also drawn and signed by the complainant in
Illinois.
 The traditional conflicts rule would, without doubt, treat these factors as conclusive and
result in applying Illinois law.
 The parties’ intention and place of making of the contract are to be given heavy weigh in
determining which jurisdiction “has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute.”
o When these important factors are taken together with others of the “significant
contacts” in the case, they likewise point to Illinois law.

 Among these other Illinois contacts are the following:
o Both parties are designated in the agreement as being “of Chicago, Illinois,” and
the defendant’s place of business is and always has been in Illinois;
o The child was born in Illinois;
o The persons designated to act as agents for the principals (except for a third
alternate) are Illinois residents, also the attorneys of both parties who drew the
agreement; and
o All contributions for support have been, and still are made from Chicago.
Babcock v. Jackson
Facts:
 Georgia Babock and her friends, Mr and Mrs Jackson are all residents of NY who left for a
weekend trip to Canada
 Mr. Jackson lost control of the car and Babock was badly injured so she filed a case against
him in NY after
 NY doesn’t have a guest statute but Ontario Canada has a statute rendering the
driver/vehicle owner NOT liable for injuries unless it operated in the business of carrying
passengers for compensation
 Jackson moved to dismiss since the law that governs the place of accident governs
Issue/s:
 Shall the law of the place of the tort invariably govern the availability of relief or shall the
applicable choice of law rule be considered?
Held:
 NY has greater and more direct concern, Ontario has minimal interest
 Injuries sustained by NY guest as a result of negligence of NY host in vehicle licensed in NY
 NY has a policy of requiring tort-feasor to compensate his guest for injuries
 NY is where the parties resided, where their guest-host relationship arose and where the trip
began and was to end
 Although the rightness/wrongness of defendants conduct depends upon the place where it
happened, the rights and liabilities of the parties stem from their guest-host relationship
 Where the issue involves standards of conduct, law of the place of the tort governs but the
dispositions of other issues (in this case, being able to claim relief) must turn to the
jurisdiction which has greatest interest w/c is NY in this case
 Application of NY law advanced the policy reflected in that law, while failure to apply Ontario
law did not impair the policy behind that law (which was to prevent fraudulent assertion of
claims against insurance companies)
Dissenting
Opinion of
Judge Van
Voorhis
 There is no overriding public policy which justifies the change in the established rule
 This case makes substantial changes in the law of torts
4. Enforcement of Judgment
III. Characterization
A. Single aspect method
1. Subject matter Characterization
2. Substance procedure Characterization
Statute of Frauds
Statutes of Limitations and borrowing statutes
B. Depecage
COL – March 1, 2019
Cases:
Gibbs v. Govt of PI
Facts:
 Allison Gibbs is the husband of Eva Johnson Gibbs .
o They are both citizen and are domiciled in California
 During their marriage, they acquired three parcels of land in Manila, which formed part of
their conjugal partnership.
 Eva died and Allison was named as administrator. Allison then filed an ex parte petition.
Allison claims that under the law of California the community property of spouses, who are
citizens of California, upon death of the wife previous o the husband, belongs absolutely to
the husband without administration.
o The court issued a decree proclaiming Allison as the absolute owner of the lands in
accordance with Art. 1401 of California Civil Code.
 Allison presented the said decree to the Register of Deeds (RoD) of Manila demanding that a
TCT be issued to him.
o RoD declined since the inheritance tax was not yet paid
 Allison filed with CFI of Manila requiring RoD to issue the titles to him without paying the
inheritance tax.
 After the CFI affirmed the denial of RoD, the case went to the SC which remanded it to the
CFI for the presentation of the pertinent law of California in force at the time of death of Eva.
Issue/s:
 WON the California Civil Code or the Philippine Admin Code (basis for rejection of RoD)
should apply – Philippine law
Held:
 Article 10 Civil Code of Phil (?) applies only when the deceased was vested with a
descendible interest in property within the jurisdiction of the Philippines.
 In Clarke v. Clarke, it was held that it is a principle firmly established that to the law of the
state in which the land is situated we must look for the rules which govern its descent,
alienation, and transfer.
 Such principle is stated in Art. 10 of our Civil Code: “…real property to the laws of the
country which it is situated.”
 Under 5 Cal. Jur., 478: “In accord with the rule that real property is subject to the lex rei
sitae, the respective rights of husband and wife in such property, in the absence of an
antenuptial contract, are determined by the law of the place where the property is situated,
irrespective of the domicile of the parties.”
o Mrs. Gibbs property must be determined by lex rei sitae
 Under Philippine law Art. 1407 of the Civil Code it provides:
o All the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence
of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
 Art. 1426 states:
o Upon dissolution of the conjugal partnership and after inventory and liquidation, the
net remainder of the partnership property shall be divided share and share alike
between husband and wife, or their respective heirs.
 Therefore, under Philippine law, the wife is vested with a descendible interest. That interest
was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance. The case then falls within the transfers
requiring the payment of inheritance tax.
Grant v. Mcauliffe
Facts:
 Plaintiffs are all residents of California

 They were injured after their car collided with another car which was driven by Pullen (also
Californian)
 Pullen died
 This happened in Arizona
 Plaintiffs brought a suit against Pullen’s estate with McAuliffe as administrator
 Trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on Arizona law where a tort
action, which has not been commenced before the death of the tortfeasor, must be abated
 Meantime, in Cali law such actions/suits survive the death of the tortfeasor and can be
maintained against the administrator
Issue/s:
 WON the law of the forum applies in this case – Yaze
Held:
 We have concluded that survival of causes of action should be governed by the law of the
forum
 Survival is not an essential part of the cause of action itself but relates to the procedures
available for the enforcement of the legal claim of damages.
 As this is a settlement of an estate, this is a purely local proceeding.
 All of the parties are resident’s of this state, and the estate is found in this state so it is just
right that the matter be governed by the laws of this state and kebs to Arizona law
 The order granting defendant’s motion to abate is reversed
Marie v. Garrison
Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime co.,
Cadalin vs. POEA Administrator
GENERAL RULE: A foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum.
EXCEPTION: When the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute," the country of the forum will
apply the foreign statute of limitations.
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: The court of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious
to the forum's public policy.
Facts:
 In 1984, Bienvenido Cadalin, et. al., instituted a class suit with the POEA for money claims
arising from their recruitment by Asia International Builders Corporation (AIBC), a domestic
corporation, and employment by Brown and Root International Inc. (BRII), a foreign
coporation based in Texas.
 The petitioners sought the payment for the unexpired portion of their employment contracts,
as well as unpaid benefits. They also sought for the suspension of license of AIBC and BRII,
and the imposition of penalties due to prohibited practices.
 In the state of Bahrain where some of the complainants were deployed, Amiri Decree No. 23
was issued which provides the terms and conditions of employment of workers. Such Decree
gives 1 year as prescription to institute claims arising from. their employment.
Issue/s:
 WON the 1 yr prescriptive period in the Amiri Decree applies – No
Held:
COL – March 1, 2019
 There was dispute as to which prescriptive period will apply: (1) 10 years as provided by the
Civil Code, (2) 3 years as provided by the Labor Code and (3) 1 year as provided by the
Amiri Decree.
 As a general rule, foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters
such as service of process, joinder and appeal are governed by the laws of the forum – even
if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.
 A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of laws for it may be viewed as
either procedural or substantive depending on the characterization given.
 The characterization becomes irrelevant however if the country of the forum has a borrowing
statute which directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign state of limitations to
pending claims based on foreign law.
In the Philippines, Sec. 48 of the Code of CivPro is treated as a borrowing statute. However, this cannot
be enforced as this would contravene the public policy on protection to labor, based on our Constitution
Haumschild v Continental Casualty
Facts:
 11/17/56: Haumschild and Gleason were married in Lincoln county, Wisconsin (their
domicile)
 12/19/56: Haumschild was injured while riding in a motor truck driven by Gleason in
California due to her husband’s negligence.
 Haumschild filed an action (in Wisconsin) against Gleason and Continental Casualty
Insurance Company to recover damages.
 3/10/58: marriage was annulled
 Gleason moved to dismiss case on the ground that under California law, spouses are immune
from suit.
Issue/s:
 WON California law should apply in this case?
Held:
 The law of the place of the wrong will govern as to substantive tort law, but the law of the
domicile will govern as to capacity to sue. (California law governs the accident, but Wisconsin
law governs the spouses’ incapacity to sue one another)
 The law of the domicile is the one that ought to be applied in determining any issue of
incapacity to sue based upon family relationship.
o This ruling overturned six prior cases
Chose this ruling based on public policy, acknowledging the trend away from the rule of the Restatement
of Conflict of Laws.
IV. Renvoi
CASES:
Aznar v. Christensen-Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749 (31 January 1963)
Facts:
 Edward Christensen was a California national who, at the time of his death, was domiciled in
the PH.
 Executor of Christensen’s estate, in the final account and project of partition, ratified the
payment of P3,600 to oppositor-appellant Maria Helen Christensen married to Eduardo
Garcia. This was done in accordance with the will of Christensen
 Executor also proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to the decedent’s
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen, married to Bernard Daney. This was also in accordance
with Christensen’s will.

 Helen filed an opposition to the project of partition alleging that it deprived her of her
legitime as acknowledged natural child of the decedent.
 Legal ground of her opposition: distribution should be governed by PH laws
Issue/s:
 (1) Which law should apply in this case? – Law of California
 (2) What is the law in California regarding the disposition of personal property? – PH Law
Held:
 (1) Art. 16 of the Civil code governs the validity of the testamentary dispositions. But to
apply Art. 16, there is need to determine the meaning of the term “national law” as used
therein.
 In this case, there is no American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in
the US as each state has its own private law that is enforceable within the state. So “national
law” in this case means the private law of the state of California
 (2) On this point, Executor raises the doctrine of Estate of McDaniel and In re Kaufman that
says that a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner that he
desires. On the other hand, oppositor cites Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California that states
that “If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile”
(basically, according to California Law, PH law should apply)
 SC stated that the Kaufman doctrine is internal law of California (making it applicable to
citizens within California’s jurisdiction) and Art. 946 is its conflicts of law provision (applicable
to Californians living in other jurisdictions).
 SC ruled that Art. 946 should apply because that is the Californian law applicable to this
case.
 The court of domicile cannot and should not refer the case back to the California, as such
action would leave the issue incapable of determination, because the case would then be
tossed back and forth between the states
Bellis v. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678 (6 June 1967)
Facts:
 Amos Bellis is a citizen and resident of Texas.
 With his first wife (Mary Mallen), he had five legitimate children (but one died, so four
surviving legitimate children).
 With his second wife (Violet Kennedy), he had three legitimate children.
 Additionally, he had three illegitimate children.
 Bellis made a will in the Philippines, stating that his estate should be distributed as follows:
o $40K to his first wife
o $40K each to his illegitimate children
o The remainder will go to his 7 legitimate children
 Bellis died in Texas, and his will was probated in the CFI of Manila. The executor (People’s
Bank and Trust Co.) divided the estate in accordance with the will.
 The illegitimate children opposed the partition saying that they were deprived of their
legitimes as compulsory heirs; but the CFI, relying on Art. 16 of the Civil Code, followed the
national law of the decedent (Texas law) which did not provide for legitimes.
Issue:
 What law should apply? (Philippine law or Texas law?) – Texas law
Held:
 The doctrine of renvoi does not apply in this case. The doctrine usually applies when the
decedent is a national of one country and domiciled in another. But in this case, the decedent
is a national and is also domiciled in Texas.
 In this case, the illegitimate children contend that the decedent had two wills (one in Texas,
and one in the Philippines). They maintain that it was the intention of the decedent that the
Philippine will be governed by Philippine laws, and the Texas will be governed by Texas laws.
COL – March 1, 2019
This argument must fail. It has been held that a provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect
that his properties be distributed in accordance with Philippine laws and not his national law,
is illegal and void (Miciano v. Brimo).
 The Civil Code provides that capacity to succeed, the order of succession, and the amount of
successional rights are to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
 Since it is admitted that Amos Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas, Texas laws should
govern. Under Texas laws, there are no forced heirs or legitimes, thus, the Philippine laws on
legitimes cannot be applied.
Annesley Davidson v. Annesley 95 LJ Ch 404 (1926)
Facts:
 Testatrix is a British subject who died in France (1924) domiciled according to English law
but NOT according to French Law, since she never complied with Art. 13 of French Civil
Code—which are steps to be taken for the acquisition of French domicile.
 In 1919, she made in France a will in English Form. The will gives the estate to her daughter,
Ms. Annesley, included as well are the statements that she had no intention to abandon her
domicile of origin, England.
 1921, testator made a codicil in France in English Form as well.
Issue/s:
 Whether or not the domicile of the testatrix at the time of her death was French or English—
(a) for purposes of English Law (b) For purposes of French law. If it were governed by French
law, the testator can only dispose of 1/3 of her personal property, however, she disposed all
of her personal propertyl in the will.
Held:
 The question of the testator’s domicile is answered by ascertaining whether she abandoned
her English domicile and had acquired of French domicile of choice in accordance with
requirements of English law-factum of residence + animus manendi.
 Considering the test, the testatrix domicile at the time of her death is FRENCH.
However, what French law does govern?
 According to French municipal law, the law applicable in the case of a foreigner
NOT legally domiciled in France is the LAW OF THE PERSON’S NATIONALITY—IN
THIS CASE BRITISH.
 BUT, the law of that nationality, British, refers back to French law (confusing? I know!) law of
the docimile.
 QUESTION: Will French law accept the reference back, or renvoi, and apply the municipal
law? There are 2 views--distribute movables in English municipal law or accept and distribute
pursuant to French law—FRENCH LAW!
 According to French law, the courts, administering the movable property of a deceased
foreigner who, according to the law of his country is domiciled in France, and whose property
must, according to law, be applied with the law of the country of his domicile which is French
municipal law—even though deceased has not complied with Art. 13 (prescribes steps in
acquiring French domicile)
 Pursuant to French law, only 1/3 of testatrix personal property maybe disposed.
NOTES: This is a case of DOUBLE RENVOI, if single revoi then English law will apply, but since its
cooler and more inception-like double, so French law (parle a ma main! merde! salope! bite!)
University of Chicago v Dater 277 Mich 653, 270 NW 175 (1936)
Facts:
 Spouses George and Nellie Dater and Spouses John and Clara Price, residents of Benton
Harbor, Michigan, obtained a loan from the University of Chicago for $75,000, which was
secured by George and John’s property in Chicago.

 In Chicago, the plaintiff prepared the trust deed and promissory notes, which were drawn up
between the Daters and the Prices, as first parties, and the Chicago Title & Trust Company,
as trustee. These notes were payable in Chicago and at such place and time as the legal
holder might appoint.
 The trust mortgage and notes were sent by mail to the Benton Harbor State Bank for the
signature of the parties. The parties signed the papers in Benton Harbor, Michigan and
mailed them back to the plaintiff’s agent in Chicago, where the trust deed was recorded.
Consequently, the loan was made and a check was issued payable to the Daters and the
Prices and cashed in Chicago.
 John Price died, consequently, Clara became the actual and recorded owner of at least ½ of
the property.
 Foreclosure proceedings were instituted on the property and its subsequent chancery sale, in
Chicago. However, a collection suit was filed in Michigan before the foreclosure suit was
completed in Chicago.
 Judgment was rendered in favor of the University of Chicago against George Dater. However,
plaintiff has no cause of action against Clara Price, because she has no capacity to enter into
an obligation in Michigan; hence, this appeal.
Issue:
 WON Clara Price has capacity to enter into an obligation in Michigan, and thus liable to pay
the plaintiff?
Held:
 Clara Price has no capacity to enter into an obligation in Michigan and thus she in not liable
to pay the plaintiff.
 The law of Chicago, Illinois applies because the plaintiff signed the notes and completed the
same in the said State. The notes were only sent to Michigan for the signature of the
defendant and her co-executors. After signing the notes, the same were returned to Chicago.
Manual delivery was completed in Chicago. There was no agreement that the mortgagee
(Univ. of Chicago) will make the loan prior to delivery.
 In Burr v. Beckler, the wife, a resident of Illinois but was temporarily in Florida, executed a
note and trust deed in Florida and mailed them to her husband in Chicago. The court held
that the delivery of the note and trust deed by the wife was completed in Florida, hence, the
law of that state governed her capacity to contract. She was not competent to enter into a
contract under Florida law, hence, her note and trust deed were void. This case applies
squarely in the case at bar.
 Since the law of Chicago, Illinois applies, under which the capacity of Clara Price is governed
by the law of Michigan. Under the law of Michigan, a married woman cannot bind her
separate estate through personal engagement for the benefit of others.
Notes:
By accepting renvoi, Michigan protected the interest of a Michigan wife, especially since Illinois
disclaimed any desire in applying its law. It promoted uniformity of results.
PFAU v Trent Aluminum 55 NJ 511 (1970)
Facts:
 Plaintiff, Steven Pfau, a domiciliary of Connecticut, was a student at Parsons College in Iowa,
and the defendant, Bruce Trent, a domiciliary of New Jersey, was a student at the same college.
 After Easter vacation, Trent agreed to drive the plaintiff to Columbia, Missouri, in the
automobile registered in New Jersey in the name of the Trent Aluminum Company, a New
Jersey corporation owned by Bruce's father. Bruce was using the car with the owner-
corporation's consent. The vehicle was insured in New Jersey by a New Jersey carrier.
 Shortly after leaving Parsons on April 22, 1966, and while still in Iowa, Bruce failed to negotiate
a curve and the car he was operating collided with an oncoming vehicle driven by Joseph Davis.
Mr. Davis and his wife and child, who were Iowa domiciliaries, causing injuries to Pfau.
COL – March 1, 2019
 Iowa has a guest statute which provides that a host-driver is not liable to his passenger-guest
for ordinary negligence
Issue:
 Whether the Iowa guest statute is applicable to this action?
Held:
 this case, however, we are faced with a more complex situation since plaintiff is a domiciliary
of Connecticut. Thus, we must consider the law of both New Jersey and Connecticut.
 Connecticut long ago repealed its guest statute and now permits guest-passengers to recover
from their host-drivers for ordinary negligence. There is no doubt that if this plaintiff-guest
had been injured in a Connecticut accident by a Connecticut host-driver, there would be no
bar to recover for ordinary negligence if suit were brought in that state.
 It would appear that Connecticut's substantive law allowing a guest to recover for his host's
ordinary negligence would give it a significant interest in having that law applied to this case.
 Defendants contend that plaintiff should not be allowed to recover when he could not do so in
either Iowa where the accident occurred or in Connecticut where he is domiciled. We cannot
agree for two reasons. First, it is not definite that plaintiff would be unable to recover in either
of those states. More importantly, however, we see no reason for applying Connecticut's
choice-of-law rule. To do so would frustrate the very goals of governmental-interest analysis.
Connecticut's choice-of-law rule does not identify that state's interest in the matter. Lex loci
delicti was born in an effort to achieve simplicity and uniformity, and does not relate to a
state's interest in having its law applied to given issues in a tort case.
 To conclude, since Iowa has no interest in this litigation, and since the substantive laws of
Connecticut and New Jersey are the same, this case presents a false conflict and the
Connecticut plaintiff should have the right to maintain an action for ordinary negligence in our
courts (New Jersey). In this situation principles of comity, and perhaps the equal protection
and privileges and immunities clauses of the Constitution, dictate that we should afford the
Connecticut plaintiff the same protection a New Jersey plaintiff would be given.
In the Matter of the Testate Estate of Edward E. Christensen, G.R. No. L-16749 (31 January
1963)
Facts:
 Edward Christensen was a California national who, at the time of his death, was domiciled in
the PH.
 Executor of Christensen’s estate, in the final account and project of partition, ratified the
payment of P3,600 to oppositor-appellant Maria Helen Christensen married to Eduardo
Garcia. This was done in accordance with the will of Christensen
 Executor also proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to the decedent’s
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen, married to Bernard Daney. This was also in accordance
with Christensen’s will.
 Helen filed an opposition to the project of partition alleging that it deprived her of her
legitime as acknowledged natural child of the decedent.
 Legal ground of her opposition: distribution should be governed by PH laws
Issue: W/N Philippine law should ultimately be applied? YES
Held: Edward was a US Citizen and domiciled in the Philippines at the time of his death.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and
another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its
conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in Kaufman, is its internal law. If the law on
succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended
and appropriate sphere, the principle cited in Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the
State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California
but in other jurisdictions.
The national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California
Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the
testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back
the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, which is the
Philippines in the case at bar.
The Philippine court therefore must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the
state of the decedent. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case
returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on
succession provides.
RENVOI DOCTRINE
A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the
conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is
renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of
renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the
whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to
the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum.
Residence Domicile
Requires bodily presence of an Requires bodily presence in that place
inhabitant in a given place and also an intention to make it one’s
domicle
Llorente v. CA, G.R. No. 124371 (23 November 2000)
Facts: Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy. During his term of duty, Lorenzo
and Paula Llorente were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Camarines Sur.
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the
conjugal home in Camarines Sur. Afterwards, Lorenzo was naturalized as an American Citizen. Upon
the end of the World War II, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the US Navy, to visit his wife
COL – March 1, 2019
and he visited the Philippines. He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was “living in” and
having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. Paula gave birth to a boy
registered as “Crisologo Llorente,” with the birth certificate stating that the child was not legitimate
and the line for the father’s name was left blank.
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, the couple drew a written agreement to
the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s
salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2)
they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make
a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4)
Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault
and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and
Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized.
Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California
and was issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. The divorce decree became final afterwards.
Lorenzo returned to the Philippines and married Alicia Llorente in Manila. Apparently, Alicia had no
knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose
the marriage or cohabitation. Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. Their 25 year
union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.
Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia
and their three children. Lorenzo filed with the RTC Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and
allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special
Administratrix of his estate. RTC admitted the will to probate. Before the proceedings could be
terminated, Lorenzo died.
Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her
favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property
were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in favor of
Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. Alicia
filed in the testate proceeding a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. RTC gave due
course to Paula's petition. RTC held that the divorce decree was and void and inapplicable in the
Philippines and therefore the second marriage with Alicia was also void. CA affirmed RTC's decision.
Issues: Whether Lorenzo’s first marriage has been validly dissolved through a divorce decree, which
capacitated him to remarry Alicia.
Held: YES. The fact that Lorenzo became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1)
his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly
established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law. True,
foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the CA did not admit the foreign law. The CA and
the RTC called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was “referred back” to the law of the
decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
 COL – March 1, 2019
While the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath
it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that “American law follows the ‘domiciliary
theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.

First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil
Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the US. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens
and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which
the decedent was a resident. Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is
called for or required by New York State law.

The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as
duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the
factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.

Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept
of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law.

Once proven that the person who initiated the divorce was no longer a Filipino citizen when he
obtained the divorce from his spouse, the spouse will lose her right to inherit from him.

Divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned
in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

The divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction
as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the
decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly
shown in the will he executed. Since he was a foreigner, he is not covered by our laws on “family
rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.”

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by
foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the
formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.