Professional Documents
Culture Documents
NUWHRAIN-MPHC = 151
HIMPHLU = 169
NO UNION = 1
SPOILED = 3
SEGREGATED = 22
HELD:
FACTS
RATIO:
Right to self-organization includes right to form a union, workers'
association and labor management councils:
More often than not, the right to self-organization connotes
unionism. Workers, however, can also form and join a workers'
association as well as labor-management councils (LMC). Expressed in
the highest law of the land is the right of all workers to self-organization.
Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution states: “Section 3. The
State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized
and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
with law. Xxx [Emphasis Supplied] And Section 8, Article III of the 1987
Constitution also states: Section 8. The right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged. In relation thereto, Article 3 of the Labor Code provides: Article
3. Declaration of basic policy. The State shall afford protection to labor,
promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race or creed and regulate the relations between workers and
employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and
humane conditions of work.
As Article 246 (now 252) of the Labor Code provides, the right to
self-organization includes the right to form, join or assist labor
organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining through
representatives of their own choosing and to engage in lawful concerted
activities for the same purpose for their mutual aid and protection. This is
in line with the policy of the State to foster the free and voluntary
organization of a strong and united labor movement as well as to make
sure that workers participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights, duties and welfare.
The right to form a union or association or to self-organization
comprehends two notions, to wit: (a) the liberty or freedom, that is, the
absence of restraint which guarantees that the employee may act for
himself without being prevented by law; and (b) the power, by virtue of
which an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an
association.
In view of the revered right of every worker to self-organization,
the law expressly allows and even encourages the formation of labor
organizations. A labor organization is defined as "any union or
association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose
of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms
and conditions of employment."44 A labor organization has two broad
rights: (1) to bargain collectively and (2) to deal with the employer
concerning terms and conditions of employment. To bargain collectively
is a right given to a union once it registers itself with the DOLE. Dealing
with the employer, on the other hand, is a generic description of
interaction between employer and employees concerning grievances,
wages, work hours and other terms and conditions of employment, even
if the employees' group is not registered with the DOLE.
A union refers to any labor organization in the private sector
organized for collective bargaining and for other legitimate purpose,
while a workers' association is an organization of workers formed for the
mutual aid and protection of its members or for any legitimate purpose
other than collective bargaining.47 Many associations or groups of
employees, or even combinations of only several persons, may qualify
as a labor organization yet fall short of constituting a labor union. While
every labor union is a labor organization, not every labor organization is
a labor union. The difference is one of organization, composition and
operation.
Collective bargaining is just one of the forms of employee
participation. Despite so much interest in and the promotion of collective
bargaining, it is incorrect to say that it is the device and no other, which
secures industrial democracy. It is equally misleading to say that
collective bargaining is the end-goal of employee representation. Rather,
the real aim is employee participation in whatever form it may appear,
bargaining or no bargaining, union or no union. Any labor organization
which may or may not be a union may deal with the employer. This
explains why a workers' association or organization does not always
have to be a labor union and why employer-employee collective
interactions are not always collective bargaining.
To further strengthen employee participation, Article 255 (now
261) of the Labor Code mandates that workers shall have the right to
participate in policy and decision-making processes of the establishment
where they are employed insofar as said processes will directly affect
their rights, benefits and welfare. For this purpose, workers and
employers may form LMCs.
A cursory reading of the law demonstrates that a common
element between unionism and the formation of LMCs is the existence of
an employer-employee relationship. Where neither party is an employer
nor an employee of the other, no duty to bargain collectively would exist.
In the same manner, expressed in Article 255 (now 261) is the
requirement that such workers be employed in the establishment before
they can participate in policy and decision making processes.
In contrast, the existence of employer-employee relationship is
not mandatory in the formation of workers' association. What the law
simply requires is that the members of the workers' association, at the
very least, share the same interest. The very definition of a workers'
association speaks of "mutual aid and protection."
Right to choose whether to form or join a union or workers'
association belongs to workers themselves
In the case at bench, the Court cannot sanction the opinion of
the CA that Samahan should have formed a union for purposes of
collective bargaining instead of a workers' association because the
choice belonged to it. The right to form or join a labor organization
necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising the said
right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied the exercise
of a right granted by law, so also, no one should be compelled to
exercise such a conferred right. Also inherent in the right to self-
organization is the right to choose whether to form a union for purposes
of collective bargaining or a workers' association for purposes of
providing mutual aid and protection. The right to self-organization,
however, is subject to certain limitations as provided by law. For
instance, the Labor Code specifically disallows managerial employees
from joining, assisting or forming any labor union. Meanwhile,
supervisory employees, while eligible for membership in labor
organizations, are proscribed from joining the collective bargaining unit of
the rank and file employees. Even government employees have the right
to self-organization. It is not, however, regarded as existing or available
for purposes of collective bargaining, but simply for the furtherance and
protection of their interests. Hanjin posits that the members of Samahan
have definite employers, hence, they should have formed a union
instead of a workers' association. The Court disagrees. There is no
provision in the Labor Code that states that employees with definite
employers may form, join or assist unions only.
HELD: NO, supervisors are not prohibited from forming their own union.
What the law prohibits is their membership in a labor organization of
rank-and-file employees or their joining in a federation of rank-and-file
employees that includes the very local union which they are not allowed
to directly join.
RATIO:
ALSI’s arguments: KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN already represents its
rank-and-file employees and, therefore, to allow the supervisors of those
employees to affiliate with the private respondent is tantamount to
allowing the circumvention of the principle of the separation of unions
under Article 245 of the Labor Code.
It further argues that the intent of the law is to prevent a single
labor organization from representing different classes of employees with
conflicting interests.
KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN’s arguments: Despite affiliation with a
national federation, the local union does not lose its personality which is
separate, and distinct from the national federation. [Adamson &
Adamson vs. CIR (1984)]
It maintains that Rep. Act No. 6715 contemplates the principle
laid down by this Court in the Adamson case interpreting Section 3 of
Rep. Act No. 875 (the Industrial Peace Act) on the right of a supervisor's
union to affiliate. The private respondent asserts that the legislature must
have noted the Adamson ruling then prevailing when it conceived the
reinstatement in the present Labor Code of a similar provision on the
right of supervisors to organize.
DISCUSSION:
The basis of the Adamson case is R.A. No. 875 (Industrial Peace
Act) where employees were classified into three groups, namely: 1)
managerial employees; 2) supervisors; and 3) rank-and-file employees.
Supervisors who were considered employees in relation to their
employer could join a union but not a union of rank-and-file employees.
With the enactment in 1974 of the Labor Code (Pres Decree No.
442), employees were classified into managerial and rank-and-file
employees. Neither the category of supervisors nor their right to organize
under the old statute were recognized. So that, in Bulletin Publishing
Corporation v. Sanchez (144 SCRA 628 [1986]), the Court interpreted
the superseding labor law to have removed from supervisors the right to
unionize among themselves. The Court ruled:
In the light of the factual background of this case, We are
constrained to hold that the supervisory employees of petitioner firm may
not, under the law, form a supervisors union, separate and distinct from
the existing bargaining unit (BEU), composed of the rank-and-file
employees of the Bulletin Publishing Corporation. It is evident that most
of the private respondents are considered managerial employees. Also, it
is distinctly stated in Section 11, Rule II, of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, that supervisory unions are presently no
longer recognized nor allowed to exist and operate as such. (pp. 633,
634)
In Section 11, Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
implementing Pres. Decree No. 442, the supervisory unions existing
since the effectivity of the New Code in January 1, 1975 ceased to
operate as such and the members who did not qualify as managerial
employees under this definition in Article 212 (k) therein became eligible
to form, to join or assist a rank-and-file union.
A revision of the Labor Code undertaken by the bicameral
Congress brought about the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6715 in March
1989 in which employees were reclassified into three groups, namely: (1)
the managerial employees; (2) supervisors; and (3) the rank and file
employees. Under the present law, the category of supervisory
employees is once again recognized. Hence, Art. 212 (m) states:
(m) . . . Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of
the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the
exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but
requires the use of independent judgment. . . .
The rationale for the amendment is the government's recognition
of the right of supervisors to organize with the qualification that they shall
not join or assist in the organization of rank-and-file employees. The
reason behind the Industrial Peace Act provision on the same subject
matter has been adopted in the present statute. The interests of
supervisors on the one hand, and the rank-and-file employees on the
other, are separate and distinct. The functions of supervisors,
being recommendatory in nature, are more identified with the interests of
the employer. The performance of those functions may, thus, run counter
to the interests of the rank-and-file.
This intent of the law is made clear in the deliberations of the
legislators on the Senate Bill 530 now enacted as Rep. Act No. 6715.
The definition of managerial employees was limited to those
having authority to hire and fire while those who only recommend
effectively the hiring or firing or transfers of personnel would be
considered as closer to rank-and-file employees. The exclusion,
therefore, of middle level executives from the category of managers
brought about a third classification, the supervisory employees. These
supervisory employees are allowed to form their own union but they are
not allowed to join the rank-and-file union because of conflict of interest
(Journal of the Senate, First Regular Session, 1987, 1988, Volume 3,
p. 2245).
In terms of classification, however, while they are more closely
identified with the rank-and-file they are still not allowed to join the union
of rank-and-file employees. The peculiar role of supervisors is such that
while they are not managers, when they recommend action
implementing management policy or ask for the discipline or dismissal of
subordinates, they identify with the interests of the employer and may act
contrary to the interests of the rank-and-file.
The Court agrees with ALSI’s contention that a conflict of interest
may arise in the areas of discipline, collective bargaining and strikes.
Members of the supervisory union might refuse to carry out disciplinary
measures against their co-member rank-and-file employees. And also, in
the event of a strike, the national federation might influence the
supervisors’ union to conduct a sympathy strike on the sole basis of
affiliation.
The Court construes Article 245 to mean that, as in Section 3 of
the Industrial Peace Act, supervisors shall not be given an occasion to
bargain together with the rank-and-file against the interests of the
employer regarding terms and conditions of work.
The Court emphasizes that the limitation is not confined to a
case of supervisors wanting to join a rank-and-file local union. The
prohibition extends to a supervisors' local union applying for membership
in a national federation the members of which include local unions of
rank-and-file employees. The intent of the law is clear especially where,
as in the case at bar, the supervisors will be co-mingling with those
employees whom they directly supervise in their own bargaining unit.
There is no question about this intendment of the law. There is,
however, in the present case, no violation of such a guarantee to the
employee. Supervisors are not prohibited from forming their own union.
What the law prohibits is their membership in a labor organization of
rank-and-file employees (Art. 245, Labor Code) or their joining a national
federation of rank-and-file employees that includes the very local union
which they are not allowed to directly join.
NOTE: Before this case was resolved, ALSI caved in to the
pressure and was no longer interested to pursue this case. SC just said
the employer is free to grant whatever concession it wishes to give to its
employees unilaterally or through negotiations. However, the resolutions
issued by DOLE were still struck down.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The private
respondent is disqualified from affiliating with a national federation of
labor organizations which includes the petitioner's rank-and-file
employees.
FACTS:
On October 16, 1997, the Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union
(THEU) – Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization
(PTGWO), Local Chapter No. 776, a legitimate labor organization said to
represent majority of the rank- and-file employees of Tagaytay Highlands
International Golf Club Incorporated (THIGCI), filed a petition for
certification election before the DOLE Mediation- Arbitration Unit,
Regional Branch No. IV.
THIGCI, in its Comment, opposed THEU’s petition for
certification election on the ground that the list of union members
submitted by it was defective and fatally flawed as it included the names
and signatures of supervisors, resigned, terminated and absent without
leave (AWOL) employees, as well as employees of The Country Club,
Inc., a corporation distinct and separate from THIGCI; and that out of the
192 signatories to the petition, only 71 were actual rank-and-file
employees of THIGCI. THIGCI thus submitted a list of the names of its
71 actual rank-and-file employees to the petition for certification election.
And it therein incorporated a tabulation showing the number of
signatories to said petition whose membership in the union was being
questioned as disqualified and the reasons for disqualification.
THEU asserted that it complied with all the requirements for valid
affiliation and inclusion in the roster of legitimate labor organizations
pursuant to DOLE Department Order No. 9, series of 1997, on account
of which it was duly granted a Certification of Affiliation by DOLE on
October 10, 1997; and that Section 5, Rule V of said Department Order
provides that the legitimacy of its registration cannot be subject to
collateral attack, and for as long as there is no final order of cancellation,
it continues to enjoy the rights accorded to a legitimate organization.
Therefore, the Med-Arbiter should, pursuant to Article 257 of the Labor
Code and Section 11, Rule XI of DOLE Department Order No. 09,
automatically order the conduct of a certification election.
On January 28, 1998, DOLE Med-Arbiter Anastacio Bactin
ordered the holding of a certification election.
THIGCI appealed to the Office of the DOLE Secretary which, by
Resolution of June 4, 1998, set aside the said Med-Arbiter’s Order and
accordingly dismissed the petition for certification election on the ground
that there is a "clear absence of community or mutuality of interests," it
finding that THEU sought to represent two separate bargaining units
(supervisory employees and rank-and- file employees) as well as
employees of two separate and distinct corporate entities.
Upon Motion for Reconsideration by THEU, DOLE
Undersecretary Rosalinda Dimalipis-Baldoz, by authority of the DOLE
Secretary, issued DOLE Resolution of November 12, 1998 setting aside
the June 4, 1998 Resolution dismissing the petition for certification
election. She held that since THEU is a local chapter, the twenty percent
(20%) membership requirement is not necessary for it to acquire
legitimate status, hence, "the alleged retraction and withdrawal of
support by 45 of the 70 remaining rank-and-file members . . . cannot
negate the legitimacy it has already acquired before the petition".
THIGCI’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the DOLE
Undersecretary hence it filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
The CA denied THIGCI’s Petition for Certiorari and affirmed the
DOLE Resolution dated November 12, 1998. It held that while a petition
for certification election is an exception to the innocent bystander rule,
hence, the employer may pray for the dismissal of such petition on the
basis of lack of mutuality of interests of the members of the union as well
as lack of employer-employee relationship and petitioner failed to adduce
substantial evidence to support its allegations.
SC RULING: NO. Petition is DENIED, and the records of the case are
remanded to the office of origin.
While above-quoted Article 245 expressly prohibits supervisory
employees from joining a rank-and-file union, it does not provide what
would be the effect if a rank-and-file union counts supervisory employees
among its members, or vice-versa.
Citing Toyota which held that "a labor organization composed of
both rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no labor organization at
all," and the subsequent case of Progressive Development Corp. – Pizza
Hut v. Ledesma20 which held that:
"The Labor Code requires that in organized and unorganized
establishments, a petition for certification election must be filed by a
legitimate labor organization. The acquisition of rights by any union or
labor organization, particularly the right to file a petition for certification
election, first and foremost, depends on whether or not the labor
organization has attained the status of a legitimate labor organization.
In the case before us, the Med-Arbiter summarily disregarded
the petitioner’s prayer that the former look into the legitimacy of the
respondent Union by a sweeping declaration that the union was in the
possession of a charter certificate so that ‘for all intents and purposes,
Sumasaklaw sa Manggagawa sa Pizza Hut (was) a legitimate
organization,’"21 (Underscoring and emphasis supplied).
We also do not agree with the ruling of the respondent
Secretary of Labor that the infirmity in the membership of the
respondent union ca n b e re m e d ie d in "the pre - election
conference thru the exclusion inclusion proceedings wherein those
employees who are occupying rank-and-file positions will be excluded
from the list of eligible voters."
After a certificate of registration is issued to a union, its legal
personality cannot be subject to collateral attack. It may be questioned
only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with
Section 5 of Rule V, Book IV of the "Rules to Implement the Labor Code"
(Implementing Rules) which section reads:
Sec. 5. Effect of registration. The labor organization or workers’
association shall be deemed registered and vested with legal personality
on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Such legal
personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be
questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance
with these Rules. (Emphasis supplied)
The inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is not among
the grounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances
enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of above-quoted Article
239 of the Labor Code.
THEU, having been validly issued a certificate of registration,
should be considered to have already acquired juridical personality which
may not be assailed collaterally.
As for petitioner’s allegation that some of the signatures in the
petition for certification election were obtained through fraud, false
statement and misrepresentation, the proper procedure is, as reflected
above, for it to file a petition for cancellation of the certificate of
registration, and not to intervene in a petition for certification election.
Regarding the alleged withdrawal of union members from
participating in the certification election, this Court’s following ruling is
instructive:
"‘The best forum for determining whether there were indeed
retractions from some of the laborers is in thecertification election itself
wherein the workers can freely express their choice in a secret ballot.’
Suffice it to say that the will of the rank-and-file employees should in
every possible instance be determined by secret ballot rather than by
administrative or quasi-judicial inquiry. Such representation and
certification election cases are not to be taken as contentious litigations
for suits but as mere investigations of a non-adversary, fact-finding
character as to which of the competing unions represents the genuine
choice of the workers to be their sole and exclusive collective bargaining
representative with their employer."
As for the lack of mutuality of interest argument of petitioner, it,
at all events, does not lie given, as found by the court a quo, its failure to
present substantial evidence that the assailed employees are actually
occupying supervisory positions.
While petitioner submitted a list of its employees with their
corresponding job titles and ranks, there is nothing mentioned about the
supervisors’ respective duties, powers and prerogatives that would show
that they can effectively recommend managerial actions which require
the use of independent judgment.
As this Court put it in Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v.
Secretary of Labor:
Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description
of subject employees x x x the mere fact that an employee is designated
manager does not necessarily make him one. Otherwise, there would be
an absurd situation where one can be given the title just to be deprived
of the right to be a member of a union. In the case of National Steel
Corporation vs. Laguesma (G. R. No. 103743, January 29, 1996), it was
stressed that:
What is essential is the nature of the employee’s function and
not the nomenclature or title given to the job which determines whether
the employee has rank-and-file or managerial status or whether he is a
supervisory employee.
RATIO:
A perusal of the records reveals that respondent is registered
with the BLR as a local or chapter of PDMP. The applicable
Implementing Rules (Department Order No. 9) enunciates a two-fold
procedure for the creation of a chapter or a local. The first involves the
affiliation of an independent union with a federation or national union or
industry union. The second, finding application in the instant petition,
involves the direct creation of a local or a chapter through the process of
chartering. The Implementing Rules stipulate that a local or chapter may
be directly created by a federation or national union.
Petitioner insists that Section 3 of the Implementing Rules, as
amended by Department Order No. 9, violated Article 234 of the Labor
Code when it provided for less stringent requirements for the creation of
a chapter or local. Article 234 of the Labor Code provides that an
independent labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon its
registration with the BLR: xxx 3) The names of all its members
comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the
bargaining unit where it seeks to operate; xxx
It is emphasized that the foregoing pertains to the registration of
an independent labor organization, association or group of unions or
workers.
DOCTRINES:
The Labor Code and its implementing rules do not require that
the number of members appearing on the documents in question should
completely dovetail. For as long as the documents and signatures are
shown to be genuine and regular and the constitution and by-laws
democratically ratified, the union is deemed to have complied with
registration requirements.
Labor laws are liberally construed in favor of labor especially if
doing so would affirm its constitutionally guaranteed right to self-
organization.
The right of any person to join an organization also includes the
right to leave that organization and join another one.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the union made fatal misrepresentation in its
application for union registration
(2) Whether or not dual unionism is a ground for canceling a
union’s registration.
HELD: (1) NO. Petitioner has no evidence of the alleged
misrepresentation. The discrepancies alone cannot be taken as
indication that PIGLAS misrepresented the information contained in
these documents. Charges of fraud and misrepresentation should be
clearly established by evidence and surrounding circumstances because
once it is proved, the labor union acquires none of the rights accorded to
registered organizations.
The discrepancies can be explained. While it appears that in the
minutes of the December 10, 2003 organizational meeting, only 90
employees responded to the roll call at the beginning, it cannot be
assumed that such number could not grow to 128 as reflected on the
signature sheet for attendance. The meeting lasted 12 hours from
11:00am to 11:00pm. There is no evidence that the meeting hall was
locked up to exclude late attendees. As to the fact that only 127
members ratified the union’s constitution and by-laws when 128 signed
the attendance sheet, it cannot be assumed that all those who attended
approved of such. Any member had the right to hold out and refrain from
ratifying those documents or to simply ignore the process. The Labor
Code and its implementing rules do not require that the number of
members appearing on the documents in question should completely
dovetail. For as long as the documents and signatures are shown to be
genuine and regular and the constitution and by-laws democratically
ratified, the union is deemed to have complied with registration
requirements.
The discrepancy in the list of members (showing only 100
members) and the signature and attendance sheets (showing 127 or 128
members) submitted is immaterial. A comparison of the documents
shows that except for six members, the names found in the list are also
in the attendance and signature sheets. PIGLAS more than complied
with the 20% requirement since only 50 employees out of 250
employees in the bargaining unit were required to unionize.
Labor laws are liberally construed in favor of labor especially if
doing so would affirm its constitutionally guaranteed right to self-
organization. PIGLAS union’s supporting documents reveal the
unmistakable yearning of petitioner company’s rank and file employees
to organize. This yearning should not be frustrated by inconsequential
technicalities.
(2) NO. The right of any person to join an organization also
includes the right to leave that organization and join another one. HHE
union ceased to exist, its certificate of registration being already
cancelled. Thus, the petition is denied.
EAGLE RIDGE GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and EAGLE RIDGE EMPLOYEES UNION (ER EU) G.R No. 178989,
March 18, 2010 VELASCO, JR., J:
DOCTRINE: We have in precedent cases said that the employees'
withdrawal from a labor union made before the filing of the petition for
certification election is presumed voluntary, while withdrawal after the
filing of such petition is considered to be involuntary and does not affect
the same. Now then, if a withdrawal from union membership done after a
petition for certification election has been filed does not vitiate such
petition, is it not but logical to assume that such withdrawal cannot work
to nullify the registration of the union?
FACTS:
ISSUES:
Was it proper to appreciate the votes of the dismissed
employees? YES
Whether or not petitioner had the burden of proof that YEU
committed fraud and misrepresentation?
HELD:
Even the new rule has explicitly stated that without a final
judgment declaring the legality of dismissal, dismissed employees are
eligible or qualified voters. Thus,
Rule IX Conduct of Certification Election - Section 5.
Qualification of voters; inclusion-exclusion. - . . . An employee who has
been dismissed from work but has contested the legality of the dismissal
in a forum of appropriate jurisdiction at the time of the issuance of the
order for the conduct of a certification election shall be considered a
qualified voter, unless his/her dismissal was declared valid in a final
judgment at the time of the conduct of the certification election.
Thus, we find no reversible error on the part of the DOLE Acting
Secretary and the Court of Appeals in ordering the appreciation of the
votes of the dismissed employees.
Finally, we need not resolve the other issues for being moot. The
68 votes of the newly regularized rank-and-file employees, even if
counted in favor of "No Union," will not materially alter the result. There
would still be 208 votes in favor of respondent and 18921 votes in favor
of "No Union."
We also note that the certification election is already a fait
accompli, and clearly petitioner's rank-and-file employees had chosen
respondent as their bargaining representative.
As correctly held by the Court of Appeal, the cancellation of
union registration at the employers instance, while permitted, must be
approached with caution and strict scrutiny in order that the right to
belong to a legitimate labor organization and to enjoy the privileges
appurtenant to such membership will not be denied to the employees.As
the applicant for cancellation, the petitioner naturally had the burden to
present proof sufficient to warrant the cancellation.The petitioner was
thus expected to satisfactorily establish that YEU committed
misrepresentations, false statements or fraud in connection with the
election of its officers, or with the minutes of the election of officers, or in
the list of votes, as expressly required in Art. 239, (c),Labor Code.But, as
the respondent BLR Director has found and determined, the petitioner
simply failed to discharge its burden.
YTPI, being the one which filed the petition for the revocation of
YEUs registration, had the burden of proving that YEU committed fraud
and misrepresentation.YTPI had the burden of proving the truthfulness of
its accusations that YEU fraudulently failed to remove Pinedas signature
from the organizational documents and that YEU fraudulently
misrepresented that it conducted an election of officers.
The petition is denied.
DOCTRINE: It does not appear in Article 234 (b) of the Labor Code that
the attendees in the organizational meeting must comprise 20% of the
employees in the bargaining unit. It is only under Article 234 (c) that
requires the names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent
(20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to
operate. Clearly, the 20% minimum requirement pertains to the
employees’ membership in the union and not to the list of workers who
participated in the organizational meeting.