Professional Documents
Culture Documents
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The Court views with grave concern the alarming incidents of illegal recruitment which demonstrate all too clearly that overseas
employment has fast developed into a major source not only of much-needed foreign exchanged but also, for the cunning and the crafty,
of easy money.
In response to a newspaper advertisement looking for a couple to work as driver and tutor cum baby sitter, petitioners Vicente and Gloria
Manalo went to Career Planners Specialists International, Inc. (CPSI), a licensed service contracting firm owned by private respondents,
the spouses Victor and Elnora Fernandez. After the requisite interview and testing, they were hired to work for a family in Saudi Arabia
for a monthly salary of US$350.00 each. According to petitioners, a placement fee of P40,000.00 was imposed as a precondition for the
processing of their papers. They paid only P30,000.00 in cash and executed a promissory note for the balance. Then they were allowed
by respondent Elnora Fernandez to sign their contract papers but did not issue a receipt for the placement fee despite demand.
Shortly before boarding their flight to Saudi Arabia, petitioners were handed their contracts. According to Gloria, she was surprised to
discover that her position had been changed to that of domestic help. However, a CPSI employee assured her that the change was only
for the purpose of facilitating her departure and did not in any way alter her employment as tutor. Incidentally, CPSI provided petitioners
with the Travel Exit Pass (TEP) of Filipino Manpower Services, Inc. (FILMAN), a duly licensed recruitment agency.
Contrary to the representation of her recruiter, Gloria was actually hired as a domestic help and not as a tutor, so that after working for
only twenty-five (25) days in Jeddah, she returned to Manila. Soon after, Vicente also resigned from his work and followed her home. He
could not stand the unbearable working conditions of his employment. However, before leaving, he had to execute a promissory note to
cover his plane fare which respondent Victor Fernandez advanced. Vicente also had to sign a quitclaim in favor of CPSI and his employer.
On 29 February 1988, petitioners sued private respondents before the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) charging
them with illegal exaction, 1 false adverstisement, 2 and violation of other pertinents laws, rules and regulations. They demanded the
refund of the amount exacted from them, plus payment of moral damages and the imposition of administrative sanctions. 3
Private respondents countered: (1) that Gloria applied as domestic help fully aware that she could not be a tutor since she did not speak
Arabic; (2) that the promissory note for P10,000.00 was required of petitioners because they were hired without paying placement fees;
(3) that it was unlikely for petitioners, who were mature, educated and experienced in overseas work, to part with P30,000.00 without
securing a receipt; (4) that Vicente executed a quitclaim in favor of CPSI duly authenticated by embassy officials in Saudi Arabia; (5) that
there was no impropriety in having the employment papers of petitioners processed by FILMAN because it was a sister company of CPSI,
and private respondents Victor and Elnora were officers in both agencies.
Private respondents prayed for the disqualification of petitioners from overseas employment, and sought to recover from them the SR
1,150 plane fare advanced by Victor for Vicente, P10,000.00 as placement fee evidenced by a promissory note, and attorney's fees.
Mainly, on the basis of the transcripts of petitioners' testimonies in the clarificatory questioning before the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor in
a related criminal case,4 the POEA issued its Order of 7 May 1990 giving more weight and credence to petitioners' version thus —
After a careful evaluation of the facts and the evidence presented, we are more inclined to give weight to complainants'
posture. Complainants' version of the case spontaneously presented in their pleadings is, to our mind, more convincing
than respondent's stand. Moreover, the manner by which complainants narrated the whole incident inspired belief in the
allegation that respondent Career is indeed guilty of illegal exaction. Thus, the actual expenses incurred by herein
complainants computed hereinbelow less the allowable fees of P3,000.00 (P1,500.00 per worker, respondent being a
service contractor) should be returned to them.
Actual Expenses —
It appearing, however, that only respondent Career Planners Specialist(s) Int'l. Inc., took part in the collection of the
aforesaid amount, the same should be solely held liable.
We cannot likewise give credence to the Final Quitclaim signed by complainant Vicente Manalo before he left for the
Philippines and presented by respondent as defense. While its genuineness may not be in question, we believe that it has
no bearing on the issue at bar. The aforesaid Quitclaim deals more with matters concerning complainants' employment
abroad. However, the subject of the instant claim is the refund of complainants' expenses prior to their deployment to Saudi
Arabia.
On the other hand, we hold FILMAN liable for allowing its document such as the TEP to be used by other agency.
Respondent's defense that there is nothing wrong in this because FILMAN is a sister company of CAREER does not merit
consideration because such practice is not allowed under the POEA Rules and Regulations. A check with our records,
however, showed that respondent FILMAN had been put in the list of forever banned agencies effective April 5, 1989.
Anent the claim for moral damages, this Office has no jurisdiction to entertain the same.
WHEREFORE, . . . the Authority of Career Planners Specialist(s) International is hereby suspended for four (4) months or
in lieu thereof, a fine of P40,000.00 is hereby imposed for illegal exaction on two counts plus restitution of the amount of
P28,714.00 to herein complainants in both instances.
Filipino Manpower Services, Inc. is hereby meted a fine of P40,000.00 for two counts of misrepresentation. Its perpetual
disqualification from recruitment activities is hereby reiterated.
Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration and on 4 February 1991, POEA issued a resolution setting arise its earlier order
stating that —
It is worth mentioning at this point that our sole basis for holding respondent Career liable for illegal exaction was the
uncorroborated testimony of the complainants.
As we have consistently held, (the) charge of illegal exaction is a serious charge which may cause the suspension or
cancellation of the authority or license of the offending agency. Hence, it should be proven and substantiated by a clear and
convincing evidence. Mere allegation of complainant that the agency charged more than the authorized fee will not suffice
to indict the agency for illegal exaction unless the allegation is supported by other corroborative circumstantial evidence.
Thus, for lack of concrete evidence or proof to support our initial findings, we are inclined to reconsider the penalty imposed
upon respondent.
Foregoing premises, the penalty of suspension imposed upon respondent Career Planners Specialist(s) International, Inc.
pursuant to our Order dated May 7, 1990 is hereby LIFTED.
Accordingly, the alternative fine of P40,000.00 which was paid under protest by respondent is hereby ordered refunded to
them. 6
Petitioners appealed to the Secretary of Labor. On 5 July 1991, then Undersecretary of Labor Ma. Nieves Roldan-Confesor (now
Secretary of Labor) sustained the reconsideration of POEA. Her Order reads in part —
We find . . . no cogent reason or sufficient justification to reverse or modify the assailed Order.
Records reveal that the only basis for holding respondent Career Planners Specialist(s) International, Inc., liable for illegal
exaction, as held in the previous POEA Order dated May 7, 1990 was the uncorroborated testimony of the complainants.
There was no concrete evidence or proof to support the POEA Administrator's initial findings.
We take this opportunity to inform the complainants that the charge of illegal exaction is a serious charge which may cause
the suspension or cancellation of the authority or license of a recruitment agency. Therefore, said charge must be proven
and substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. A mere allegation will not suffice to find an agency liable for illegal
exaction unless said allegation is supported by other corroborative circumstantial evidence. In this connection, records show
that complainants could not narrate the specific circumstances surrounding their alleged payment of the amount of
P30,000.00. They could not even remember the specific date when said amount was paid to respondent agency. In addition,
when complainants were separately questioned as to how the money was kept bundled together prior to being handed to
respondent agency for payment, Gloria Manalo said it was wrapped in a piece of paper while Vicente Manalo said it was
placed inside an envelope. 7
On the charge of petitioners that they were given jobs (driver/domestic help) different from those advertised by private respondents, the
Undersecretary ruled that there was no misrepresentation by way of false advertisement because it was established that private
respondents also caused to be printed in the same newspaper page a second box looking for a couple driver/domestic help.
In her Order of 9 October 1991, then Undersecretary Ma. Nieves Roldan-Confesor denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 8
In the present recourse, petitioners claim that public respondent POEA committed a fatal jurisdictional error when it resolved private
respondents' motion for reconsideration in violation of Rule V, Book VI of the 1985 POEA Rules and Regulations directing the transmittal
of motions for reconsideration to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for determination. Consequently, for want of legal
competence to act on said motion, the Order of 4 February 1991, as well as the subsequent orders of public respondent Undersecretary
of Labor dated 5 July 1991 and 9 October 1991, is null and void.
To allow a litigant to assume a different posture when he comes before the court and challenge the position he had accepted
at the administrative level, would be to sanction a procedure whereby the court — which is supposed
to review administrative determinations — would not review, but determine and decide for the first time, a question not
raised at the administrative forum. This cannot be permitted, for the same reason that underlies the requirement of prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies to give administrative authorities the prior opportunity to decide controversies within
its competence, and in much the same way that, on the judicial level, issues not raised in the lower court cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.
The alleged procedural lapse by respondent POEA was raised by petitioners only before Us, notwithstanding that such ground was
already existing when they appealed to the Secretary of Labor. Ironically, petitioners now question the jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Labor over the appeal which they themselves elevated to that office. When petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration with the
Undersecretary of Labor, this procedural issue was not even mentioned. Clearly, it would be the height of unfairness and inequity if We
now allow petitioners to backtrack after getting an unfavorable verdict from public respondents whose authority they themselves involved.
In Tijam v.Sibonghanoy 10 We said: ". . . we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse . . . ."
The 1985 POEA Rules and Regulations 11 is divided into eight (8) Books. Book VI, cited by petitioners, is entitled "Adjudication Rules".
The procedure outlined therein relates to the original and exclusive jurisdiction exercised by POEA through its Adjudication Department
"to hear and decide all cases involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of a law or contact involving Filipino workers
for overseas employment," involving "[v]iolation of the terms and conditions of employment . . . . [d]isputes relating to the implementation
and interpretation of employment contracts . . . [m]oney claims of workers against their employers and/or their duly authorized agents in
the Philippines or vice versa . . . . [c]laims for death, disability and other benefits arising out of employment . . . . and . . . . [v]iolations of
our non-compliance with any compromise agreement entered into by and between the parties in an overseas employment contract."
On the other hand, Book II entitled "Licensing and Regulations" of the 1985 POEA Rules and Regulations, notably Rule VI cited by private
respondents, refers particularly to the procedure for suspension, cancellation and revocation of Authority or License 12 through the POEA
Licensing and Regulation Office (LRO).
The controversy in the present case centers on the liability of private respondents for illegal exaction, false advertisement and violation
of pertinent laws and rules on recruitment of overseas workers and the resulting imposition of penalty of suspension of the Authority of
respondent CPSI. Quite plainly, We are not concerned here with employer-employee relations, the procedure of which is outlined in Book
VI; rather, with the suspension or revocation of Authority embodied in Book II.
Evidently, no jurisdictional error was accordingly committed because in cases affecting suspension, revocation or cancellation of Authority,
the POEA has authority under Sec. 18, Rule VI, Book II, to resolve motions for reconsideration which may thereafter be appealed to the
Secretary of Labor. Section 18, provides: "A motion for reconsideration of an order o suspension (issued by POEA) or an appeal to the
Minister (now Secretary of Labor) from an order cancelling a license or authority may be entertained only when filed with the LRO within
ten (10) working days from the service of the order or decision" (parenthesis supplied).
Petitioners also argue that public respondents gravely abused their discretion when they violated petitioners' right to administrative due
process by requiring clear and convincing evidence to establish the charge illegal exaction. This point is well taken. There was grave
abuse of discretion.
In the administrative proceedings for cancellation, revocation or suspension of Authority or License, no rule requires that testimonies of
complainants be corroborated by documentary evidence, if the charge of unlawful exaction is substantially proven. All administrative
determinations require only substantial proof and not clear and convincing evidence as erroneously contended by pubic respondents.
Clear and convincing proof is ". . . more than mere preponderance, but not to extent of such certainty as is required beyond reasonable
doubt as in criminal cases . . ." 13 while substantial evidence ". . . consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat
less than a preponderance . . . ." 14 Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, We find proof beyond reasonable doubt at the
highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence, and substantial evidence, in that order.
That the administrative determination of facts may result in the suspension or revocation of the authority of CPSI does not require a higher
degree of proof. The proceedings are administrative, and the consequent imposition of suspension/revocation of Authority/License does
not make the proceedings criminal. Moreover, the sanctions are administrative and, accordingly, their infliction does not give rise to double
jeopardy when a criminal action is instituted for the same act.
Thus We held in Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Factoran, Jr. 15 —
. . . it is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence, or negatively stated, it is sufficient that
findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence. Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an
administrative finding of fact, and substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion (Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 642; Police Commission v. Lood,
127 SCRA 762 [1984].
The POEA, after assessing the evidence of both parties, found that private respondents collected from petitioners P30,000.00 as
placement fees; consequently, it ruled that there was illegal exaction. Surprisingly, without altering its findings of fact, POEA reconsidered
its order. It held that uncorroborated testimonies were not enough to conclude that illegal exaction was committed, particularly so that this
might result in the suspension or revocation of respondents' authority to engage in recruitment activities. The premise that testimonies of
petitioners should be supported by some other form of evidence is, to say the least, fallacious. In Castillo v. Court of Appeals, 16 where
the appellate court reversed the findings of fact of the trial court by requiring a higher degree of proof, We held —
. . . we find no strong and cogent reason which justifies the appellate court's deviation from the findings and conclusions of
the trial court. As pointed out in Hernandez v. Intermediate Appellate Court (189 SCRA 758 [1990]), in agrarian cases, all
that is required is mere substantial evidence. Hence, the agrarian court's findings of fact which went beyond the minimum
evidentiary support demanded by law, that is, supported by substantial evidence, are final and conclusive and cannot be
reversed by the appellate tribunal.
The seeming discrepancy in the statements of the witnesses (one saying the money was wrapped in paper, the other, that the money
was in an envelope; neither testified on the specific date of the exaction), refers only to minor details. Perhaps it would be different if the
variance refers to essential points, e.g., whether the amount of P30,000.00 was actually paid by petitioners to private respondents.
Consequently, whether the money was wrapped in paper, or placed in an envelope, or unwrapped or whether the parties could not recall
when there payment was effected is unimportant. After all, the money could have been wrapped in paper and placed in the envelope, or
placed in the envelope without being wrapped, or wrapped with use of an unpasted envelope that appeared to be the envelope itself. In
either case, petitioners, could have viewed them differently; but the difference is ultimately inconsequential. The crucial point to consider
is that the petitioners categorically and unequivocally testified that respondents collected from them the amount of P30,000.00 as their
placement fees and that they paid the amount demanded. In this regard, it may be worth to emphasize that only substantial evidence,
not necessarily clear and convincing evidence, is required. Moreover, when confronted with conflicting assertions, the rule that "as
between a positive and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally
held to prevail . . . ." 17 applies.
But even on the supposition that there was no payment of P30,000.00, it cannot be denied that private respondents required petitioners
to execute a promissory note for P10,000.00 purportedly because petitioners were hired without paying placement fees. The mere
charging of P10,000.00, standing alone, is enough to hold private respondents answerable for illegal exaction because the allowable
amount to be collected per contract worker according to respondent POEA was only P1,500.00, or P3,000.00 for both petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged Orders of respondent Undersecretary of Labor dated 5 July 1991 and 9 October
1991, as well as the Resolution of respondent POEA dated 4 February 1991, having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction are SET ASIDE, and the original Order of respondent POEA dated 7 May 1990 is ordered REINSTATED
and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.