G.R. No.
L-21809 January 31, 1966 The surviving
GIL P. POLICARPIO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
JOSE V. SALAMAT, ET AL., defendants.
VICENTE ASUNCION, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
In a duly probated last will and testament of one Damasa Crisostomo,
she gave the naked ownership of a fishpond owned by her to her sister
Teodorica de la Cruz while its usufruct to the children of her cousins
Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo. The fishpond is
situated at a barrio of Hagonoy, Bulacan.
The children of Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo
turned out to be fourteen, namely: Maria, Pio, Fructuosa, Graciano,
Vicente, Victoria, Teodora, and Juan, all surnamed Perez, Apolonio
Lorenzo, Bonifacio Lorenzo, Vicente Asuncion, Francisco Lorenzo,
Leoncio Perez and Servillano Perez. On the other hand, Teodorica de
la Cruz, the naked owner, bequeathed in her will all her rights to the
fishpond to Jose V. Salamat.
The fourteen usufructuaries leased the fishpond first to one Gil P.
Policarpio who used to give them proportionately the usufruct
corresponding to them. During the term of the lease, however, three of
the usufructuaries died, namely, Francisco Lorenzo, Leoncio M. Perez
and Servillano Perez, and so, upon their death, both the naked owner
and the remaining usufructuaries claimed the shares corresponding to
the deceased usufructuaries in the amount of P10,714.26. Because of
these conflicting claims, the lessee withheld said amount.
Subsequently, on May 31, 1962, the surviving usufructuaries leased
the fishpond to one Batas Riego de Dios who, after executing the
contract of lease, came to know of the existing conflicting claims, and
not knowing to whom of the claimants the shares of the deceased
usufructuaries should be paid, said lessee was also constrained to
withhold the corresponding part of the usufruct of the property. So on
November 15, 1962, the two lessees commenced the present action
for interpleader against both the naked owner and surviving
usufructuaries to compel them to interplead and litigate their conflicting
claims.
Defendant Jose V. Salamat avers as special defense that he is the
successor-in-interest of Teodorica de la Cruz and as such he is entitled
to the shares corresponding to the three deceased usufructuaries
inasmuch as the usufruct in their favor was automatically extinguished
by death and became merged with the naked owner.
The surviving usufructuaries, on the other hand, adhere to the theory
that since the usufructuaries were instituted simultaneously by the late
Damasa Crisostomo, the death of the three usufructuaries did not
extinguish the usufruct, hence, the surviving usufructuaries are entitled
to receive the shares corresponding to the deceased usufructuaries,
the usufruct to continue until the death of the last usufructuary.
When the case was called for hearing, the parties agreed to submit the
case for decision upon the submission of their respective memoranda
considering that the issue involved was purely legal in nature, and on
March 29, 1963, the trial court rendered decision the dispositive part of
which reads as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
defendant Jose V. Salamat entitled to the sum of P10,714.25
representing the shares of the three deceased
usufructuaries in the lease rental due from plaintiff Gil
Policarpio, ordering the latter to deliver to said defendant the
aforesaid amount; and likewise declaring said defendant
Jose V. Salamat entitled to share with the eleven
usufructuaries in the proceeds of the lease contract
executed by them with plaintiff Batas Riego de Dios,
ordering the latter to deliver to him such amount as would be
equivalent to the shares of the three deceased
usufructuaries, with the parties bearing their own costs and
expenses of litigation.
usufructuaries took the present
appeal. 1äwphï1.ñët
The important issue to be determined is whether the eleven surviving
usufructuaries of the fishpond in question are the ones entitled to the
fruits that would have corresponded to the three deceased
usufructuaries or the naked owner Jose V. Salamat.
Appellants argue that it is the surviving usufructuaries who are entitled
to receive the shares of the deceased by virtue of Article 611 of the
Civil Code which provides "A usufruct constituted in favor of several
persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished
until the death of the last survivor." On the other hand, appellee
contends that the most a usufruct can endure if constituted in favor of a
natural person is the lifetime of the usufructuary, because a usufruct is
extinguished by the death of the usufructuary unless a contrary
intention clearly appears (Article 603, Civil Code). Hence, appellee
argues, when the three usufructuaries died, their usufructuary rights
were extinguished and whatever rights they had to the fruits reverted to
the naked owner.
If the theory of appellee in the sense that the death of the three
usufructuaries has the effect of consolidating their rights with that of
the naked owner were correct, Article 611 of the Civil Code would be
superfluous, because Article 603 already provides that the death of the
usufructuary extinguishes the usufruct unless the contrary appears.
Furthermore, said theory would cause a partial extinction of the
usufruct, contrary to the provisions of Article 611 which expressly
provides that the usufruct shall not be extinguished until the death of
the last survivor. The theory of appellee cannot, therefore, be
entertained.
The well-known Spanish commentators on the counterpart of Article
611 we have copied above which implicitly provides that the share of a
usufructuary who dies in the meantime inures to the benefit of the
surviving usufructuaries, also uphold the view we here express. Thus,
the following is their comment on the matter:
Al comentar el articulo 469 (now Art. 564) hablamos, entre
formas de constitucion del usufructo, del disfrute simultaneo
y sucesivo. Ninguna duda cabe, puesto que el derecho de
acrecer es aplicable a los usufructuarios, segun el Art. 987
(now Art. 1023), sobre la no extincion del usufructo
simultaneo, hasta la muerte de la ultima persona que
sobreviva. . . .
. . . Al referirse . . . el articulo 521 (now Art. 611) al usufructo
constituido en provecho de varias personas vivas al tiempo
de su constitucion, parece referirse al usufructo simultaneo.
Sin embargo, es indudable que se refiere tambien al
sucesivo, puesto que en esta especie de usufructs el
segundo usufructuario no entra en el disfrute, salvo
expresion en contrario, hasta la muerte del primero, y es
claro que al morir el ultimo llamado, se extingue el usufructo,
que es precisamente lo que ordena el presente articulo.
(Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Español, 1931, Tomo
IV, par. 486).
. . . refiriendonos al caso de muerte natural, ha de tenerse
presente que si son muchos los llamados el usufructo
simultaneamente, muerto uno, su porcian acrece a los
demas, a no ser que el testador exprese lo contrario, o se
infiriera asi del titulo en que se constituye el usufructo, para
lo cual puede verse la doctrina de la ley 33, tit. I, lib. VII del
Digesto, que habla del derecho de acrecer en el usufructo, y
el tit. IV del mismo libro, en que se proponen algunos casos
de excepcion.—El usufructo constituido en provecho de
varias personas vivas al tiempo de su constitucion, no
extinguira hasta la muerte de la ultima que sobreviviere.
Cod. Civ. art. 521. (Del Viso, Lecciones Elementales de
Derecho Civil, sexta edicion, Tomo I, p. 86.)
Si a varios usufructuarios se les lega la totalidad de una
herencia; o una misma parte de ella, se da el derecho de
 acrecer cuando una de ellos muere despues del testador,
sobreviviendo otro y otros?—Como dice la obra anotado, el
Digesto admitio, segun un texto de Paulo, la solucion
afirmativa, y Pothier reprodujo dicha doctrina.
La jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supreme español ha admitido
y sancionado tambien en la sentencia de 29 de marzo de
1905, aunque no por aplicacion del derecho de acrecer, y si
por aplicacion de la voluntad presunta del testador, que
babiendose legado el usufructo vitalicio del remanente du
sus bienes, por partes iguales, a dos hermanas, debe
entenderse que ellas, o cualquiera de las dos que
sobreviviere a la otra, habia de disfrutar dicho usufructo, no
constituyendo la separacion de partes sino una prevision del
testador, para el arreglo del usufructo total durante la vida de
los dos usufructuarios. (Colin and Capitant, Curso Elemental
del Derecho Civil, 1957, Tomo VIII, pp. 605-606)
It, therefore, appears that the Spanish commentators on the subject
are unanimous that there is accretion among usufructuaries who are
constituted at the same time when one of them dies before the end of
the usufruct. The only exception is if the usufruct is constituted in a last
will and testament and the testator makes a contrary provision. Here
there is none. On the contrary, the testatrix constituted the usufruct in
favor of the children of her three cousins with the particular injunction
that they are the only ones to enjoy the same as long as they live, from
which it can be implied that, should any of them die, the share of the
latter shall accrue to the surviving ones. These provisions of the will
are clear. They do not admit of any other interpretation.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. The eleven
surviving usufructuaries are hereby declared to be entitled to the
shares of the three deceased usufructuaries and, hence, as a corollary,
appellees Gil P. Policarpio and Batas Riego de Dios are hereby
ordered to pay to them the money withheld by them respectively
representing the shares of the deceased usufructuaries. No costs.
Policarpio v. Salamat
L-218091, Jan. 31, 1966
FACTS: In her will, a testatrix constituted a usufruct (over her
properties) in favor of the children of her three cous-ins. The will also
provided that the said children are the only ones to enjoy the same as
long as they live. Now then, if any of them subsequently dies, who will
get his share?
HELD: From the above-cited proviso in the will, it can be inferred that
the share of the heir who subsequently dies shall ACCRUE to the
surviving ones. Said proviso is clear enough, and does not admit of
any other interpretation.
MANUEL TORRES, petitioner-appellant and
LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, appellant,
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellee.
G.R. No. L-24569 26 February 1926
FACTS: On January 3,1924, the testator Thomas Rodriquez, who was
76 years of age and was in feeble health for a long time, made his will
where he made his cousin Vicente Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez
de Bueno as the only and universal heir of his properties. The probate
of the will was opposed by Margarita Lopez, cousin and nearest
relative of the deceased. The ground cited for the opposition was that
the testator lacked mental capacity, she claimed that at time of the
execution of the supposed will, the deceased was suffering from senile
dementia and was under guardianship.
enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention which the law terms
“testamentary capacity.”
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA
PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE
and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982
FACTS: J
ose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on
December 11, 1964, with only his widow, Marcelle Demoron de
Ramirez as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria
Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate.The
administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of
the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the
widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part
or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda
propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged
with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a
usufruct in favor of Wanda, the companion of the deceased.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the
grounds: (a) that the provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of
Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor
of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to
Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and
Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for
fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs
are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree,
as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a
usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda
Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the
Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of the
testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the
widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win
to give this property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the
project of partition in its order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which
Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court.
ISSUE:Whether or not the testamentary dispositions in favor of the
heirs are valid and how should the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez be
partitioned.
RULING: YES.The dispositions to the widow, Marcelle Demoron de
Ramirez as compulsory heir is valid.The Court also upheld the usufruct
in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest
title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in
favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.Hence the estate
of the deceased shall be distributed as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge
Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski
with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace
V. Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No
special pronouncement as to costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testator was mentally capacitated during

the execution of the will.

RULING: The deceased testator had mental capacity to make his will
during its execution. The Supreme Court held that at the time of the
making of the will, the testator may be of old age, may have been
physically decrepit, may have been week of intellect, have suffered a
loss of memory, had a guardian over his person and property and may
have been eccentric, but he still possessed that spark of reason and of
life, that strength of mind to form a fixed intention, and to summon his