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PHILBANKING CORPORATION,
GR No. 150731, 2007-09-14 RULE 33
Facts:
In 1984, petitioner Casent Realty Development Corporation executed two
promissory notes in favor of Rare Realty Corporation (Rare Realty) involving
the amounts of PhP 300,000 (PN No. 84-04) and PhP 681,500 (PN No. 84-05).
Respondent alleged that despite demands, petitioner failed to pay the
promissory notes upon maturity such that its obligation already amounted to
PhP 5,673,303.90 as of July 15, 1993. Respondent filed on July 20, 1993 a
complaint before the Makati City RTC for the... collection of said amount
Thus, petitioner, by way of compulsory counterclaim, alleged that it made an
overpayment of approximately PhP 4 million inclusive of interest based on
Central Bank Reference Lending Rates on dates of overpayment. Petitioner
further claimed moral and exemplary damages and... attorney's fee, amounting
to PhP 4.5 million plus the costs of suit as a consequence of respondent's
insistence on collecting
The parties failed to reach an amicable settlement during the pre-trial
conference. Thereafter, respondent presented its evidence and formally offered
its exhibits. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Judgment on Demurrer to the
Evidence,[11] pointing... out that the plaintiff's failure to file a Reply to the
Answer which raised the Dacion and Confirmation Statement constituted an
admission of the genuineness and execution of said documents; and that since
the Dacion obliterated petitioner's obligation covered by... the promissory
notes, the bank had no right to collect anymore.
Respondent subsequently filed an Opposition[12] which alleged that: (1) the
grounds relied upon by petitioner in its demurrer involved its defense and not
insufficiency of evidence; (2) the Dacion and Confirmation Statement had yet
to be offered in... evidence and evaluated; and (3) since respondent failed to file
a Reply, then all the new matters alleged in the Answer were deemed
controverted.[13]
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint
through the May 12, 1999 Order,... The appellate court ruled that under the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the only issue to be resolved in a demurrer is whether
the plaintiff has shown any right to relief under the facts presented and the
law. Thus, it held that the trial court erred when it considered the Answer...
which alleged the Dacion, and that its genuineness and due execution were
not at issue. It added that the court a quo should have resolved whether the
two promissory notes were covered by the Dacion, and that since petitioner's
demurrer was granted, it... had already lost its right to present its evidence
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE
PETITIONER'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN ITS ANSWER IN RESOLVING A
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
Does respondent's failure to file a Reply and deny the Dacion and Confirmation
Statement under oath constitute a judicial admission of the genuineness and
due execution of these documents?
Should judicial admissions be considered in resolving a demurrer to
evidence? If yes, are the judicial admissions in this case sufficient to warrant
the dismissal of the complaint?
Ruling:
In Gutib v. Court of Appeals, we defined a demurrer to evidence as "an
objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence
which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or
not, to make out a case or sustain the... issue."[21]
What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to
evidence is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts and
the law. The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which
pertains to the merits of the... case, excluding technical aspects such as
capacity to sue.[22] However, the plaintiff's evidence should not be the only
basis in resolving a demurrer to evidence. The "facts" referred to in Section 8
should include all the means sanctioned by... the Rules of Court in
ascertaining matters in judicial proceedings. These include judicial
admissions, matters of judicial notice, stipulations made during the pre-trial
and trial, admissions, and presumptions, the only exclusion being the
defendant's evidence.
On appeal to the CA, respondent claimed that even though it failed to file a
Reply, all the new matters alleged in the Answer are deemed controverted
anyway, pursuant to Rule 6, Section 10:
Section 10. Reply.--A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to
deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by way of
defense in the answer and thereby join or make issue as to such new matters.
If a party does... not file such reply, all the new matters alleged in the answer
are deemed controverted.
We agree with petitioner. Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or
defenses founded upon a written instrument and provides the manner of
denying it. It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely
provides the effect of failure to file a
Reply. Thus, where the defense in the Answer is based on an actionable
document, a Reply specifically denying it under oath must be made; otherwise,
the genuineness and due execution of the document will be deemed
admitted.[23] Since respondent... failed to deny the genuineness and due
execution of the Dacion and Confirmation Statement under oath, then these
are deemed admitted and must be considered by the court in resolving the
demurrer to evidence. We held in Philippine American General
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet Lines, Inc. that "[w]hen the due execution and
genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted because of the adverse
party's failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need
not be presented... formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted
fact."[24]
In any case, the CA found that:
From the facts of the case, the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion
en Pago were never put to issue. Genuineness merely refers to the fact that
the signatures were not falsified and/or whether there was no substantial
alteration to the document.
While due execution refers to whether the document was signed by one with
authority.[
Principles:
Ruling:
The remedy of a demurrer to evidence is applicable in the proceedings before
the NTC, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9, Part 9 of its Rules of Practice and
Procedure which provides for the suppletory application of the Rules of Court.
Rule 33[22] of the Rules of Court provides for the rule on demurrer to evidence
In other words, the issue to be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a
demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for
based on the facts and the law.
The "facts" referred to in Section 8 should include all the means sanctioned by
the Rules of Court in... ascertaining matters in judicial proceedings. These
include judicial admissions, matters of judicial notice, stipulations made
during the pre-trial and trial, admissions, and presumptions, the only
exclusion being the defendant's evidence.
In granting the demurrer to evidence in the present case, the NTC considered
both the insufficiency of the allegations in the complaint and the insufficiency
of the complainants' evidence in light of its interpretation of the provisions of
EO No. 205 and EO No. 436. The
NTC ruled that the complainants, including the petitioner, failed to prove by
substantial evidence that the respondent aired the subject advertisements
without the consent of its program providers, as required under EO No. 436.
The NTC, therefore, has issued the assailed order... upon a consideration of
the applicable laws and the evidence of the petitioner. On this score, the grant
of the demurrer suffers no infirmity.
However, the NTC further extended its consideration of the issue to the
respondent's pieces of evidence that were attached to its demurrer to evidence.
On this score, we agree with the petitioner that the NTC erred.
Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, as explained in our ruling in Casent, proscribes
the court or the tribunal from considering the defendant's evidence in the
resolution of a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence.
While an administrative agency is not strictly bound by technical rules of
procedure in the conduct of its administrative proceedings, the relaxation of
the rules should not result in violating fundamental evidentiary rules,
including due process.[25]
In the present case, the NTC proceeded against the very nature of the remedy
of demurrer to evidence when it considered the respondent's evidence,
specifically the certifications attached to the respondent's demurrer to
evidence. Despite the petitioner's... objections,[26] the NTC disregarded the
rule on demurrer by allowing the submission of the respondent's evidence
while depriving the petitioner of the opportunity to question, examine or refute
the submitted documents.[27]
That the petitioner had the chance to peruse these documents is of no
moment. In a demurrer to evidence, the respondent's evidence should not have
been considered in the first place. As the NTC opted to consider the
respondent's evidence, it should not have resolved the case... through the
remedy of demurrer but instead allowed the respondent to formally present its
evidence where the petitioner could properly raise its objections. Clearly, there
was a violation of the petitioner's due process right.
Principles:
DORIS U. SUNBANUN
vs
AURORA B. GO
CARPIO, J.
The petitioners claimed that their family has long been known in the
community to be engaged in the water supply business; they operated the
“Rovila Water Supply” from their family residence and were engaged in the
distribution of water to customers in Cebu City. The petitioners alleged that Lilia
was a former trusted employee in the family business and claimed ownership
over the family business through a corporation named “Rovila Water Supply,
Inc.” (Rovila Inc.) Upon inquiry with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the petitioners claimed that Rovila Inc. was surreptitiously formed with
the respondents as the majority stockholders.The respondents filed a first
motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over an intra–
corporate controversy however the RTC denied the motion. Petitioners amended
their complaint, with leave of court, when Lourdes and Luciano died.
They likewise argued that they moved for the dismissal of the case during
the pre–trial conference due to the petitioners’ procedural lapse in refusing to
comply with a condition precedent, which is, to substitute the heirs as plaintiffs.
The respondents also argued that the grounds invoked in their motion to dismiss
were timely raised, pursuant to Section 2, paragraphs g and i, Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court. Specifically, the nature and purposes of the pre–trial include,
among others, the dismissal of the action, should a valid ground therefor be
found to exist; and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of
the action.
The RTC denied the respondents’ motion to dismiss. It ruled that, save for
the grounds for dismissal which may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
a motion to dismiss based on the grounds invoked by the respondents may only
be filed within the time for, but before, the filing of their answer to the amended
complaint.
Thus, even granting that the defenses invoked by the respondents are
meritorious, their motion was filed out of time as it was filed only after the
conclusion of the pre–trial conference. Furthermore, the rule on substitution of
parties only applies when the parties to the case die, which is not what happened
in the present case. The RTC likewise denied the respondents’ motion for
reconsideration. The CA granted the petition and ruled that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion as the petitioners filed the complaint and the amended
complaint as attorneys–in–fact of their parents. As such, they are not the real
parties in interest and cannot bring an action in their own names; thus, the
complaint should be dismissed pursuant to the Court’s ruling in Casimiro v.
Roque and Gonzales.
Both the RTC and the CA found that the motion to dismiss was only filed
after the filing of the answer and after the pre–trial had been concluded. Because
there was no motion to dismiss before the filing of the answer, the respondents
should then have at least raised these grounds as affirmative defenses in their
answer. The RTC’s assailed orders did not touch on this particular issue but the
CA ruled that the respondents did, while the petitioners insist that the
respondents did not. In the present petition, the petitioners reiterate that there
was a blatant non–observance of the rules when the respondents did not amend
their answer to invoke the grounds for dismissal which were raised only during
the pre–trial and, subsequently, in the subject motion to dismiss.
Our examination of the records shows that the CA had no basis in its
finding that the respondents alleged the grounds as affirmative defenses in their
answer. The respondents merely stated in their petition for certiorari that they
alleged the subject grounds in their answer. However, nowhere in the petition
did they support this allegation; they did not even attach a copy of their answer
to the petition. It is basic that the respondents had the duty to prove by
substantial evidence their positive assertions. Considering that the petition for
certiorari is an original and not an appellate action, the CA had no records of
the RTC’s proceedings upon which the CA could refer to in order to validate the
respondents’ claim. Clearly, other than the respondents’ bare allegations, the
CA had no basis to rule, without proof, that the respondents alleged the grounds
for dismissal as affirmative defenses in the answer. The respondents, as the
parties with the burden of proving that they timely raised their grounds for
dismissal, could have at least attached a copy of their answer to the petition.
This simple task they failed to do.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the 30
September 2003 Decision and the 18 March 2004 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67836.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment on the pleadings is proper in this case
HELD:
In this case, we find that the trial court erred in rendering judgment on
the pleadings because the pleadings filed by the parties generated
ostensible issues that necessitate the presentation of evidence.
Respondents’ action for declaration of nullity of Free Patent No. 495269 and
the titles derived therefrom is based on their claim that the lot titled in the
name of petitioners, is a portion of a bigger tract of land previously titled in the
name of their (respondents) predecessors-in-interest.
It is clear from the foregoing that the pleadings filed in the instant case
generated the following issues: (1) whether respondents’ TCT No. 257152 is
valid; (2) whether Lot 89 is covered by TCT No. 257152; and (3) whether
petitioners are purchasers in good faith. This is clearly not a proper case for
judgment on the pleadings considering that the Answers tendered factual
issues. The trial court rendered a summary judgment on March 21, 2003 and
not a judgment on the pleadings.
2. Mercator:
- contended that "on February 16, 1982, plaintiffs executed a Mortgage in
favor of defendant Mercator for and in consideration of certain loans and other
forms of credit accommodations given by mercator, amounting to P844,625,
and those that mortgagee may extend to the plaintiff mortgagors.
- since petitioners and Embassy Farms signed the promissory note as co-
makers, aside from the Continuing Suretyship and the succeeding promissory
notes restructuring the loan, then petitioners are jointly and severally liable
with Embassy Farms.
- Due to their failure to pay the obligation, the foreclosure and subsequent sale
of the mortgaged properties are valid.
4. After pre-trial, Mercator moved for summary judgment on the ground that
except as to the amount of damages as petitioners had admitted the existence
of the promissory note, the continuing suretyship agreement and the
subsequent promissory notes restructuring the loan, hence, there is no
genuine issue regarding their liability. All transacations were valid.
6. RTC granted the motion for summary judgement and dismissed the
complaint:
- the liability of the signatories thereto are solidary in view of the phrase
"jointly and severally."
- On the promissory note the signatures of Eduardo B. Evangelista, Epifania C.
Evangelista and another signature of Eduardo B. Evangelista below the words
Embassy Farms, Inc. It is crystal clear then that the plaintiffs-spouses signed
the promissory note NOT only as officers of Embassy Farms but in their
personal capacity.
- Plaintiffs by affixing their signatures thereon in a dual capacity have bound
themselves as solidary debtor(s) with Embassy Farms, Inc. to payMercator
- That the principal contract of loan is void for lack of consideration, in the
light of the foregoing is untenable. MFR denied.
issue: WON they are not personally liable, Embassy Farms only
held: No
SC SAYS: Courts can interpret a contract only if there is doubt in its letter.25
But, an examination of the promissory note shows no such ambiguity.
Besides, assuming arguendo that there is an ambiguity, Section 17 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law states, viz:
SECTION 17. Construction where instrument is ambiguous. – Where the
language of the instrument is ambiguous or there are omissions therein, the
following rules of construction apply:
(g) Where an instrument containing the word "I promise to pay" is signed by two
or more persons, they are deemed to be jointly and severally liable thereon.
5. as to the argument that: the promissory note does not convey their true
intent in executing the document.
SC SAYS: NO. Even if petitioners intended to sign the note merely as officers
of Embassy Farms, still they executed a continuing suretyship agreement. A
surety is one who is solidarily liable with the principal. Petitioners cannot
claim that they did not personally receive any consideration for the contract for
well-entrenched is the rule that the consideration necessary to support a
surety obligation need not pass directly to the surety, a consideration moving
to the principal alone being sufficient. A surety is bound by the same
consideration that makes the contract effective between the principal parties
thereto.
Doctrine: A summary judgment is apt when the essential facts of the case are
uncontested or the parties do not raise any genuine issue of fact.
Facts:
Spouses Yu, doing business as Tuanson Trading and Tuanson Builders
Corporation, borrowed various sums totaling P75m from Far East Bank and
Trust Company (FEBTC). For collateral, they executed real estate mortgages
over several of their properties including certain lands located in Legazpi City
owned by Tuanson Trading.
Unable to pay their loans, the Sps Yu and Tuanson Builders requested a
loan restructuring, which the bank, now merged BPI, granted. By this time,
the Sps Yu loan balance stood at P 33.4m The restructured loan used the
same collaterals with the exception of TCT 40247 that secured a loan of P1.6m
On October 2003, the Sps Yu filed their new complaint before the RTC
against BPI for recovery of alleged excessive penalty charges, attorney’s
fees, foreclosure expenses that the bank caused to be incorporated in the
price of the auctioned properties.
BPI further admitted its bid of P45m for all the auctioned properties. BPI
also admitted that Magnacraft submitted the highest and winning bid of
P45.5m. The sheriff turned over this amount to BPI. According to BPI, it in
turn remitted to the Clerk of Court the P400k difference between its bid price
and that
of Magnacrafts. Although the proceeds of the sale exceeded the P39m stated in
the notice of sale by P6m, the bid amount increased because it now included
litigation expenses and attorneys fees as well as interests and penalties
as recomputed.
BPI admitted that it also pushed through with the second auction for the
sale of a lot in Pili, Camarines Sur that secured a remaining debt of P5.5m BPI
made the lone bid of P1.7m
First. The bank imposed excessive penalty charges and interests: over P5
million in penalty charges computed at 36% per annum compared to the 12%
per annum that the Court fixed in jurisprudence. In addition, BPI collected a
14% yearly interest on the principal, bringing the combined penalty charges
and interest to 50% of the principal per annum.
Second. BPI also imposed a charge of P4m in attorney’s fees, the
equivalent of 10% of the principal, interest, and penalty charges.
Third. BPI did not provide documents to support its claim for foreclosure
expenses of P446k and cost of publication of P518k.
As an alternative to their three causes of action, the Yus claimed that BPI
was in estoppel to claim more than the amount stated in its published notices.
Consequently, it must turn over the excess bid of P6m
After pre-trial, the Yus moved for summary judgment, pointing out
that based on the answer, the common exhibits of the parties, and the answer
to the written interrogatories to the sheriff, no genuine issues of fact exist in
the case. The Yus waived their claim for moral damages so the RTC can
dispose of the case through a summary judgment
Still, the RTC held that it needed to receive evidence for the resolution of
the issues of (1) whether or not the foreclosure and publication expenses were
justified; (2) whether or not the foreclosure of the lot in Pili, Camarines Sur,
was valid given that the proceeds of the foreclosure of the properties in Legazpi
City sufficiently covered the debt; and (3) whether or not BPI was entitled to its
counterclaim for attorneys fees, moral damages, and exemplary damages.
The Yus moved for partial reconsideration. They argued that, since BPI
did not mark in evidence any document in support of the foreclosure expenses
it claimed, it may be assumed that the bank had no evidence to prove such
expenses. The Yus also pointed out that BPI did not dispute the fact that the
proceeds of the sale of the properties in Legazpi City fully satisfied the debt.
Thus, the court could already resolve without trial the issue of whether or not
the foreclosure of the Pili property was valid.
1. Deleting the penalty charges imposed by BPI for non-compliance with the
Truth in Lending Act;
2. Reducing the attorneys fees to 1% of the principal and interest;
3. Upholding the reasonableness of the foreclosure expenses and cost of
publication, both with interests;
4. Reiterating the turnover by the Clerk of Court to the Yus of the excess in the
bid price;
5. Deleting the Yus claim for moral damages they having waived it;
6.
Denying the Yus claim for attorneys fees for lack of basis; and
7. Dismissing
BPIs counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages and forattorneys fees for
lack of merit considering that summary judgment has been rendered in favor
of the Yus.
BPI appealed to the CA. CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue: 1) Whether or not the case presented no genuine issues of fact such
as to warrant a summary judgment by the RTC – Yes (MAIN ISSUE)
2) Where summary judgment is proper, whether or not the RTC and the CA a)
correctly deleted the penalty charges because of BPIs alleged failure to comply
with the Truth in Lending Act; b) correctly reduced the attorneys fees to 1% of
the judgment debt; and c) properly dismissed BPIs counterclaims for moral
and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.
Held: A summary judgment is apt when the essential facts of the case are
uncontested or the parties do not raise any genuine issue of fact.
In this case, the Court explained that to resolve the issue of the excessive
charges allegedly incorporated into the auction bid price, the RTC simply had
to look at a) the pleadings of the parties; b) the loan agreements, the
promissory note, and the real estate mortgages between them; c) the
foreclosure and bidding documents; and d) the admissions and other
disclosures between the parties during pre-trial. Since the parties
admitted not only the existence, authenticity, and genuine execution of
these documents but also what they stated, the trial court did not need
to hold a trial for the reception of the evidence of the parties.
BPI contends that a summary judgment was not proper given the
following issues that the parties raised: 1) whether or not the loan agreements
between them were valid and enforceable; 2) whether or not the Yus have a
cause of action against BPI; 3) whether or not the Yus are proper parties in
interest; 4) whether or not the Yus are estopped from questioning the
foreclosure proceeding after entering into a compromise agreement with
Magnacraft; 5) whether or not the penalty charges and fees and expenses of
litigation and publication are excessive; and 6) whether or not BPI violated the
Truth in Lending Act.
But, the Supreme Court held that these are issues that could be
readily resolved based on the facts established by the pleadings and the
admissions of the parties. Indeed, BPI has failed to name any document or
item of fact that it would have wanted to adduce at the trial of the case. A trial
would have been such a great waste of time and resources.