People vs Manero

G.R. 86883-85; January 29, 1993

Facts:

The Manero brothers Norberto Jr., Edilberto and Elpidio, along with Rodrigo Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy
Lines, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño, were inside the eatery of one Reynaldo Diocades. They were
conferring with Arsenio Villamor, Jr., and his two (2) unidentified bodyguards. Plans to liquidate a
number of suspected communist sympathizers were discussed. Arsenio Villamor, Jr. scribbled on a
cigarette wrapper the following "NPA v. NPA, starring Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez, Bantil, Fred Gapate,
Rene alias Tabagac and Villaning." "Fr. Peter" is Fr. Peter Geremias, an Italian priest suspected of having
links with the communist movement; "Bantil" is Rufino Robles, a Catholic lay leader who is the
complaining witness in the Attempted Murder; Domingo Gomez is another lay leader, while the others
are simply "messengers". On the same occasion, the conspirators agreed to Edilberto Manero's proposal
that should they fail to kill Fr. Peter Geremias, another Italian priest would be killed in his stead.

Later, the Manero brothers, together with Espia and the four (4) appellants, all with assorted firearms,
proceeded to the house of "Bantil", their first intended victim, which was also in the vicinity of
Deocades' carinderia. They were met by "Bantil" who confronted them why his name was included in
the placards. Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at the forehead of "Bantil". "Bantil" was able to parry
the gun, albeit his right finger and the lower portion of his right ear were hit. Then they grappled for its
possession until "Bantil" was extricated by his wife from the fray. But, as he was running away, he was
again fired upon by Edilberto. Only his trousers were hit. "Bantil" however managed to seek refuge in
the house of a certain Domingo Gomez.

At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived on board his motorcycle. Upon entering the house of Gomez,
Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Pleñago, opened the gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and
burned the motorcycle.

Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter simply stepped
backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto fired at the head of the
priest. As Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, his hands clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted
Edilberto if that was the only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped
over the prostrate body three (3) times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually
shattered the head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road.

Issue:

W/N appellants Lines, Plenago and Bedaño are co-conspirators in the murder of Fr. Tulio Favali.

Held:

Yes. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and
decide to commit it. It is not essential that all the accused commit together each and every act
constitutive of the offense. It is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed where there is
singularity of purpose, and unity in its execution is present.

In their defense of alibi, accused brothers Severino and Rudy Lines claim that they were harvesting palay
the whole day some one kilometer away from the crime scene. Accused Roger Bedaño alleges that he
was on an errand for the church to buy lumber and nipa in M'lang, Cotabato, that morning, taking along
his wife and sick child for medical treatment and arrived in La Esperanza, Tulunan, past noontime.

Interestingly, all appellants similarly contend that it was only after they heard gunshots that they rushed
to the house of Norberto Manero, Sr., Barangay Captain of La Esperanza, where they were joined by
their fellow CHDF members and co-accused, and that it was only then that they proceeded together to
where the crime took place.

It is axiomatic that the accused interposing the defense of alibi must not only be at some other place but
that it must also be physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.

Recently, we ruled that there can be no physical impossibility even if the distance between two places is
merely two (2) hours by bus. More important, it is well-settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail
over the positive identification of the authors of the crime by the prosecution witnesses.

In the case before Us, two (2) eyewitnesses, testified that they were both inside the eatery when the
Manero brothers, together with appellants, first discussed their plan to kill some communist
sympathizers. The witnesses also testified that they still saw the appellants in the company of the
Manero brothers at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon when Rufino Robles was shot. Further, at 5:00 o'clock
that same afternoon, appellants were very much at the scene of the crime, along with the Manero
brothers, when Fr. Favali was brutally murdered. Indeed, in the face of such positive declarations that
appellants were at the locus criminis from 10:00 o'clock in the morning up to about 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, the alibi of appellants that they were somewhere else, which is negative in nature, cannot
prevail. The presence of appellants in the eatery having been positively established, all doubts that they
were not privy to the plot to liquidate alleged communist sympathizers are therefore removed. There
was direct proof to link them to the conspiracy.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to
commit it. It is not essential that all the accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the
offense. It is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed where there is singularity of purpose,
and unity in its execution is present.

The findings of the court a quo unmistakably show that there was indeed a community of design as
evidenced by the concerted acts of all the accused.
Ramirez vs CA

G.R. No. 93833; September 28, 1995

Facts:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive
to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs
awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled
from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and
other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.”

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. The trial court
granted the Motion to Quash.

The private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred
the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
declaring the trial court’s order as null and void, after subsequently denied the motion for
reconsideration by the petitioner. Hence, the instant petition

Issue:

W/N the act of recording through a tape constitute an offense?

Held:

Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use
of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court’s conclusion
that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape
recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third
persons.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same
need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly
overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated
therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by
means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the
Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law)
is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed.”

Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point
of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to
impart.” In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies
the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system
of symbols (as language signs or gestures)”

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the
latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication”
are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were
interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.
People vs Salvador

G.R. No. 10121; July 30, 1993

Facts:

Appellant Alfredo Salvador an co-accused Joey Adap, Augusto Alimurong, Jimmy Agustin and Armin
Aladdin were charged with the crime of Murder.

That on or about October 14, 1984, in the Municipality of Gen. Trias, Province of Cavite, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforesaid accused, conspiring together, acting jointly
and assisting one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault and attack Orlando Grepo with the use of a piece of
wood commonly known as "dos por dos", hallow (sic) block, fist and foot blows causing the victim to
suffer injuries on his head and other parts of his body, resulting to his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of Orlando Grepo.

Records disclose that at around 9:30 in the evening of October 14, 1984, prosecution witness Joel Duran
was walking with Alberto Villablanca on their way home when they saw from a distance of about six
meters, Orlando Grepo being mauled by five persons. Through the light of the electric lamp post and the
vehicles passing by, Joel recognized these assailants as Joey Adap, Alfredo Salvador, Jimmy Agustin,
Augusto Alimurong and Armin Aladdin.

Joel and Alberto shouted for help and upon seeing them, the assailants ran away. Councilor Leonardo
Gozo, who responded to Joel's shouts for help, assisted Joel and Alberto in bringing Orlando to the
hospital in Pinagkatipunan.

Orlando was brought to the Medicare Community Hospital in Gen. Trias where Dr. Charito Maldos Gozo
attended to him. Dr. Gozo found him to be a "walking patient" but aside from his bruises and
contusions, Orlando was complaining of a headache.

After two weeks, Grepo was brought to the clinic of Dr. Jocelyn Tirol Dignos in Rosario, Cavite. Grepo
was perspiring a lot and had cold, clammy skin specially on his left extremities. He had rolling eyeballs
and was in an unconcious shock-like state.

According to Dr. Dignos, upon learning of the mauling incident, they diagnosed Grepo's ailment as
"meningo encephalitis secondary to trauma". Moreover, they learned that Dr. Apostol of Gen. Trias,
Cavite had given Grepo two grams of chloro ampenicol per day and therefore, if the ailment was really
typhoid. Grepo's fever would have then subsided. They would have conducted more tests but since
Grepo had become bluish and had difficulty in breathing, they decide to have him transferred to the
Manila Medical Center where the victim finally expired.

Issue:

W/N appellant Alfredo Salvador is guilty of the crime of murder?

Held:

No. One other aspect of the crime which the defense, even in the instant appeal, has failed to argue in
favor of appellant is the fact that the appellant had been charged with and convicted of, the crime of
murder for the killing of Orlando Grepo. Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides that to be liable for
murder, an accused must be proven to have committed the killing of another person under the
attendant circumstances specified therein. Of these circumstances, the information alleges treachery
and evident premeditation to qualify the killing to murder.

It is unfortunate that the trial court failed to discuss the presence or absence of these qualifying
circumstances. However, from the evidence on record, treachery cannot be appreciated. Sole
eyewitness Joel Duran testified that while he and Alberto Villablanca were walking along Prinza Street,
they saw Grepo being mauled by five persons. While Duran may have witnessed the incident in
progress, he did not testify as to how it began. As the Court held in People vs. Tiozon, treachery cannot
be considered where the lone witness did not see the commencement of the assault. The importance of
such testimony cannot be overemphasized considering that treachery cannot be presumed nor
established from mere suppositions.

In the same manner, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing to murder in the
absence of direct evidenct of the planning and preparation to kill or when the plan was conceived . Thus,
in the absence of any qualifying circumstance, the crime committed is homicide under Art 249 of the
Revised Penal Code and not murder.

As to aggravating circumstances, the information alleges nighttime and abuse of superior strength. To
be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, there must be a convincing showing that the accused
had purposely sought nighttime in order to facilitate the commission of the crime or to prevent its
discovery or to evade the culprit's capture. There is, however, no proof at all, much more a convincing
one, to warrant appreciation of nighttime as an aggravating circumstance.

Abuse of superior strength, a qualifying circumstance in murder, was alleged in the information as an
aggravating circumstance only. ** Mere numerical superiority does not always mean abuse of
superiority to qualify the killing to murder.

Appellant is liable for the crime even if he had not intended to kill Orlando Grepo. This is because he
participated in the concerted effort of mauling the victim, which was proven beyond reasonable doubt,
in furtherance of a common design to inflict physical harm on Grepo. But where the attack commenced,
the fact there are four assailants would constitute abuse of superiority. Thus, the homicide committed in
this case is attended by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superiority as five persons mauled the
unarmed and defenseless victim Orlando Grepo.

Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended."
The essential requisites of Art. 4 are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed, and (b) that the
wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony
committed by the offender. All these requisites are present in this case. The intentional felony was the
mauling of Grepo and, in the case of appellant, his dropping of the hollow block on the fallen and
hapless victim. The latter's death had been the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony as
shown by the evidence provided by the doctors who testified for the prosecution.

Under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. In view of the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which is not offset by any
mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period. Parenthetically, the lower
court erroneously imposed the penalty of "life imprisonment" for murder. The proper penalty for
murder under Art. 248 is reclusion perpetua and not "life imprisonment." The need to apply the correct
penalty is dictated by the fact that in appropriate cases, a penalty under the Revised Penal Code carries
with it accessory penalties.

Hence, the appropriate penalty prescribed by law for the crime of homicide in the case at bar is the
maximum period of reclusion temporal which is 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years.
US vs. Ah Chong

G.R. No. L-5272; March 19, 1910

Facts:

The accused, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook in Fort Mckinley and was sharing the house with the
deceased, Pascual Gualberto, who was employed as a house boy. The door of the room they were
occupying was not furnished with a permanent lock, and as a measure of security, they fasten the door
by propping a chair against it. One evening, Ah Chong was suddenly awakened by someone trying to
force open the door of their room. The deceased and the accused had an understanding that when
either returned late at night, he should knock at the door and acquaint his companion with his identity.
Ah Chong sat up in bed and called out twice, “Who is there?” but heard no answer. The room was quite
dark, and as there had been recent robberies in Fort McKinley, fearing that the intruder was a robber or
a thief, he leaped to his feet and called out. “If you enter the room, I will kill you.” Suddenly, he was
struck by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. Believing that he was being
attacked, he seized a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow and wildly struck and fatally
wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roommate, Pascual.

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant can be held criminally responsible

Held:

No. By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act for which he would be exempt from
criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but would constitute the crime of homicide
or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts .

The rule is that one is not criminally liable if he acted without malice (criminal intent), negligence, and
imprudence. In the present case, the accused acted in good faith, without malice or criminal intent, in
the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense.

The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. The act itself does
not make man guilty unless his intention was so. The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent,
without which it cannot exist.

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows
the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from
criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron
Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." If one has
reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing, if without fault or
carelessness he does believe them, he is legally guiltless of the homicide.
People vs Guillen

G.R. No. L-1477; January 18, 1950

Facts:

During the 1946 Presidential Elections, Guillen voted for the opposing candidate of Manuel Roxas.
According to the accused, he was disappointed with the latter for failing to redeem and fulfill promises
made by President Roxas during the elections. Consequently, the accused determined to assassinate the
President and found the opportunity to do so on the night of March 10, 1947 when the President
attended a popular meeting by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila. Guillen first
intended to use a revolver to accomplish his goal but he had previously lost his licensed firearm, so he
thought of using two hand grenades which were given to him by an American soldier in exchange for
two bottles of whisky. The accused stood on the chair he had been sitting on and hurled the grenade at
the President when the latter had just closed his speech. A general who was on the platform saw the
smoking grenade and kicked it away from the platform towards an open space where he thought the
grenade was likely to do the least harm. The grenade exploded in the middle of a group of persons
standing close to the platform and grenade fragments seriously injured Simeon Varela, who died the
next day due to the mortal wounds caused, and several other persons. Guillen was arrested and he
readily admitted his responsibility.

The accused Julio Guillen, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
multiple frustrated murder after his attempt to assassinate the President of the Philippines, Manuel
Roxas on March 10, 1947.

Issue:

W/N a mistake in the blow, inflicted with malice, exempts one from criminal liability

Held:

No. The SC affirmed the decision of the CFI, stating that the facts do not support the contention of
counsel that the appellant is guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to the death
of Simeon Varela and of less physical injuries in regard to other said victims. In throwing said hand
grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the Court stated that the appellant acted with
malice, and was therefore liable for all consequences of his wrongful act, for in accordance with Article 4
of the RPC, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended. The act cannot be classified as criminal negligence
because such requires that the injury incurred be unintentional as the incident of an act performed
without malice.

The Court finds that a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with the idea of reckless
imprudence. A mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence.
People vs Oanis

G.R. No. L-47722; July 27, 1943

Facts:

Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received
from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo
Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly
called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men. The same instruction was given to the
chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector.

Upon arrival at the place where Irene could be found, Oanis approached and asked Brigada Mallare
where Irene's room was. Brigada indicated the room and said that Irene was sleeping with her
paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping
with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their
.32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and
looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the
entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious
criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.

According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked
Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the
whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room.

Issue:

W/N Oanis and Galanta can be held responsible for Tecson's death.

Held:

Yes. Appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The
person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his
identity without hazard to themselves, and could even affect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort
to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed.

Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to
secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he
escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm, yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in
treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be
effected otherwise. The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or
unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to
any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention." A peace officer cannot claim exemption from
criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and
not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being
simply the incident of another act performed without malice.

There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the
offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or
offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present — appellants have
acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is
not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or
to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through
impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of
such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and
without making any previous inquiry as to his identity.
People vs Intod

G.R. No. 103119; October 21, 1992

Facts:

Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in
Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with
Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land
dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also
be killed.

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis
Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's
bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out,
however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and
his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.

Issue:

W/N the crime committed is an impossible crime

Held:

Yes. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime. Thus, legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where: 1) the motive, desire and
expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; 2) there is intention to perform the physical act;
3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and 4) the consequence resulting from the
intended act does not amount to a crime.

The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts
his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket
empty.

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would
be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to
accomplish his end.