Foreigner and former Filipino seeking the adoption of the
siblings of the latter.
Art, 184 and 185 of the Family Code
G.R. No. 95551 March 20, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA, in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial
Region, Branch 62, Angeles City and SPOUSES SAMUEL
ROBERT DYE, JR. and ROSALINA D. DYE, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and
Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
of Angeles City 1 to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due,
ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively, younger siblings of
Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr. a member of the United States Air
Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base
in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who
became a naturalized American. They have two children. Both
Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave
their consent to the adoption.
After trial, the lower court rendered its decision on September
10, 1990 granting the petition and declaring Alvin and Maricel to
be the children of the spouses Dye by adoption. 2 Respondent
Regional Trial Court disregarded the sixteen-year age gap
requirement of the law, the spouses being only fifteen years and
three months and fifteen years and nine months older than
Maricel Due, on the ground that a literal implementation of the
law would defeat the very philosophy behind adoption statutes,
namely, to promote the welfare of a child.3 The court also found
that the petitioning spouses are mentally and physically fit to
adopt, possess good moral character, sufficient financial
capability and love and affection for the intended adoptees.
The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of
law, contending that the spouses Dye are not qualified under the
law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due.
The Court finds the petition meritorious and hereby grants it.
As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is
proscribed under Article 184 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her
Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity
of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt
Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country
adoption as may be provided by law.
Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an
alien is disqualified from adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin
Due because he does not fall under any of the three
aforequoted exceptions laid down by the law. He is not a former
Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity.
1
Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although
he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives by consanguinity,
he is not married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already a
naturalized American at the time the petition was filed, thus
excluding him from the coverage of the exception. The law here
does not provide for an alien who is married to a former Filipino
citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative
by consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens
may not adopt.
On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister
for the law mandates joint adoption by husband and wife,
subject to exceptions. Article 29 of Presidential Decree No. 603
(Child and Youth Welfare Code) retained the Civil Code
provision 4 that husband and wife may jointly adopt. The Family
Code amended this rule by scrapping the optional character of
joint adoption and making it now mandatory. Article 185 of the
Family Code provides:
Art. 185. Husband and wife must adopt, except in the
following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child;
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of
the other.
None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina
Dye, for they did not petition to adopt the latter's child but her
brother and sister.
The Court has previously recognized the ineligibility of a
similarly situated alien husband with a former Filipino wife
seeking to adopt the latter's nephews and niece in the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals.5 Although the wife in said case
was qualified to adopt under Article 184, paragraph 3 (a), she
being a former Filipino who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity, she could not jointly adopt with her husband
under Article 185 because he was an alien ineligible to adopt
here in the Philippines.
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes,
which is the promotion of the welfare of children. Accordingly,
the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will
sustain rather than defeat said purpose. 6 The law must also be
applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in
view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care
and education for less fortunate children. 7 Regrettably, the
Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court's decision
favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it
cannot be modified without violating the proscription against
judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the
matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses'
petition for adoption.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City in Special
Proceeding No. 4203 (In the Matter of the Petition for Adoption
of the minors Maricel R Due and Alvin R. Due), dated
September 10, 1990 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
2

Spanish citizen seeking to adopt a Filipino citizen who is
residing in Spain. Local Civil Registrar of Manila refuses to
record the adoption. Not sure if dapat ito isama.
G.R. No. L-24006 November 25, 1967
JOSEFINA JUANA DE DIOS RAMIREZ
MARCAIDA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
LEONCIO V. AGLUBAT, in his capacity as Deputy Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, respondent-appellee.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Refusal of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila to record
an Escritura de Adopcion executed in Madrid, Spain, is now
challenged before this Court on appeal by registrant-adoptee
from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
confirmatory of such refusal.
The disputed deed of adoption had its inception, thus: Prior to
October 21, 1958, proceedings for adoption were started before
the Court of First Instance of Madrid, Spain by Maria Garnier
Garreau, then 84 years of age, adopting Josefina Juana de Dios
Ramirez Marcaida, 55 years, a citizen of the Philippines. Both
were residents of Madrid, Spain. On that date, October 21,
1958, the court granted the application for adoption and gave
the necessary judicial authority, once the judgment becomes
final, to execute the corresponding adoption document "con
arreglo al articulo 177 del Codigo Civil." The adoption document
became necessary for the reason that under Article 177 of the
Civil Code of Spain, "[a]probada definitivamente la adopcion por
el Juez, se otorgara escritura, expresando en ella las
condiciones con que se haya hecho, y se inscribira en el
Registro Civil correspondiente." In compliance, on November
29, 1958, the notarial document of adoption — which embodies
the court order of adoption — whereunder Maria Garnier
Garreau formally adopted petitioner, was executed before
Notary Public Braulio Velasco Carrasquedo of Madrid. In that
document, Maria Gernier Garreau instituted petitioner, amongst
other conditions as here unica y universal heredera de todos
sus bienes, derechos y acciones, presentes y futuros.
In conformity with our law, this escritura de adopcion was, on
December 10, 1953, authenticated by Emilio S. Martinez,
Philippine Vice Consul, Philippine Embassy, Madrid, who issued
the corresponding certificate of authentication.1
The document of adoption was filed in the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila on January 15, 1959. The Registrar,
however, refused to register that document upon the ground that
under Philippine law, adoption can only be had through judicial
proceeding. And since the notarial document of adoption is not a
judicial proceeding, it is not entitled to registration.
Failing in her move to reconsider, petitioner went to the Court of
First Instance of Manila on mandamus.2 As adverted to earlier,
the mandamus petition did not prosper. The lower court in its
decision of February 28, 1964, dismissed said petition.
Petitioner's lone assignment of error reads: "The lower court
erred in declaring the 'escritura de adopcion' as authenticated
by the Philippine Vice Consul in Madrid, Spain, as not
registrable in the Philippines."
1. Act 3753 of the Philippine Legislature, entitled "An Act to
establish a civil register," in Section 1 thereof, recites that a "civil
register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in
which shall be entered," amongst others, "(g) adoptions." It
provides for local civil registrars. Complementary thereto are
Article 407 of our Civil Code which commands that "[a]cts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register;" and Article 408 of
the same Code which, in language similar, directs that "[t]he
following shall be entered in the civil register: . . . (8) adoptions; .
. ." The law is clear. The compulsory tenor of the word "shall"
leaves no alternative. It is a command.
3
2. But the Solicitor General, hewing to the line drawn by the
court below, argues that petitioner's case does not come within
the purview of Article 409 of the Civil Code, which states that:
Art. 409. In cases of legal separation, adoption, naturalization
and other judicial orders mentioned in the preceding article it
shall be the duty of the clerk of the court which issued the
decree to ascertain whether the same has been registered, and
if this has not been done, to send a copy of said decree to the
civil registry of the city or municipality where the court is
functioning.
and Section 11 of Act 3753, which reads:
Sec. 11. Duties of clerks of court to register certain decisions. —
In cases of legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption,
naturalization, and change of given or family name, or both,
upon the decree of the court becoming final, it shall be the duty
of the clerk of the court which issued the decree to ascertain
whether the same has been registered, and if this has not been
done, to have said decree recorded in the office of the civil
registrar of the municipality where the court is functioning.
It is at once apparent that the cited legal provisions refer to
adoptions effected in the Philippines. For, indeed, Article 409 of
the Civil Code and Section 10 of the Registry Law speak of
adoption which shall be registered in the municipality or city
where the court issuing the adoption decree is functioning. But,
the trial court concluded that what is registrable is only adoption
obtained through a judgment rendered by a Philippine court.
We are not persuaded to adopt the Government's theory. We
are at a loss to understand how it could be concluded that the
structure of the law did not authorize registration of foreign
adoptions. We perceive that Article 409 and Section 10
aforesaid were incorporated into the statute books merely to
give effect to our law3 which required judicial proceedings for
adoption. Limitation of registration of adoptions to those granted
by Philippine courts is a misconception which a broader view
allows us now to correct. For, if registration is to be narrowed
down to local adoptions, it is the function of Congress, not of
this Court, to spell out such limitation. We cannot carve out a
prohibition where the law does not so state. Excessive rigidity
serves no purpose. And, by Articles 407 and 408 of our Civil
Code, the disputed document of adoption is registrable.
3. No suggestion there is in the record that prejudice to State
and adoptee, or any other person for that matter, would ensue
from the adoption here involved. The validity thereof is not
under attack. At any rate, whatever may be the effect of
adoption, the rights of the State and adoptee and other persons
interested are fully safeguarded by Article 15 of our Civil Code
which, in terms explicit, provides that: "Laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even
though living abroad."
4. Private international law offers no obstacle to recognition of
foreign adoption. This rests on the principle that the status of
adoption, created by the law of a State having jurisdiction to
create it, will be given the same effect in another state as is
given by the latter state to the status of adoption when created
by its own law.4It is quite obvious then that the status of
adoption, once created under the proper foreign law, will be
recognized in this country, except where public policy or the
interests of its inhabitants forbid its enforcement and demand
the substitution of the lex fori. Indeed, implicit in Article 15 of our
Civil Code just quoted, is that the exercise of incidents to foreign
adoption "remains subject to local law." 5
It is high time for this Court to formulate a rule on the
registration of foreign adoptions. We hold that an adoption
created under the law of a foreign country is entitled to
registration in the corresponding civil register of the Philippines.
It is to be understood, however, that the effects of such adoption
shall be governed by the laws of this country.6
Conformably to the foregoing, the lower court's decision of
February 28, 1964 dismissing the mandamus petition appealed
from, is hereby reversed; and the Local Civil Registrar of Manila
is hereby directed to register the deed of adoption (Escritura de
Adopcion) by Maria Garnier Garreau in favor of petitioner
Josefina de Dios Ramirez Marcaida.
4
No costs. So ordered. minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986;
[4]
Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987;
[5]
and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989.
[6]
Former Filipina, now a US citizen seeks adopt 3 minor children The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos,
of her brother. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552.(Domestic Adoption petitioners brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Act)
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN G.R. No. 164948 Manuel died on May 19, 1990, [7] the children were left to their
Petitioner, paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological
Present mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two
children by her second marriage and no longer communicated
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson, with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the
YNARES-SANTIAGO, time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., and being financially supported by the petitioner and her children,
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23,
Promulgated: 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, given their written consent[8] to the adoption; she is qualified to
Respondent. June 27, 2006 adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - children of her own who are already married, gainfully employed
-----x and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own
home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and
DECISION works as a restaurant server. She came back to
the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her children gave
CALLEJO, SR., J.: their written consent[9] to the adoption of the minors. Petitioners
brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income,
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors
the Rules of Court is the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in while in petitioners custody.
CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed the Decision [2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered
Case No. 2733 granting the Petition for Adoption of the in her favor, as follows:
petitioner herein.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable
The Antecedents Court that after publication and hearing, judgment be
rendered allowing the adoption of the minor children Elaine
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos
United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a by the petitioner, and ordering that the minor childrens name
resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition [3] for the adoption of follow the family name of petitioner.
5

Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under
the premises.[10]
On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) to conduct a case study as
mandated by Article 34 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, and to submit a report thereon not later than April 4,
2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the petition. [11] The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance[12] but deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to
appear in its behalf.[13] Since her petition was unopposed,
petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex parte.[14]
The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine
Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the written
consent executed by her and her siblings. [15] The petitioner
marked in evidence the Affidavit of Consent purportedly
executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Branitley,
all surnamed Landingin, and notarized by a notary public
in Guam, USA, as proof of said consent.[16]
On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II
of the DSWD, Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child Study
Report, with the following recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma
& Eugene all surnamed Ramos, eligible for adoption because of
the following reasons:
1. Minors surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily
consented to their adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata
Landingin this is in view of her inability to provide the parental
care, guidance and support they need. An Affidavit of Consent
was executed by the mother which is hereto attached.
2. The three minors subject for adoption have also
expressed their willingness to be adopted and joins the
petitioners in Guam, USA in the future. A joint Affidavit of
consent is hereto attached. The minors developed close
attachment to the petitioners and they regarded her as second
parent.
3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary
guardian who has also family to look after. As young
adolescents they really need parental love, care, guidance and
support to ensure their protection and well being.
In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended
that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and Eugene D.
Ramos be adopted by their maternal aunt Diwata
Landingin. Trial custody is hereby further recommended to be
dispensed with considering that they are close relatives and that
close attachments was already developed between the
petitioner and the 3 minors.[17]
Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as
follows:
The mother of minors came home together with her son John
Mario, this May 2002 for 3 weeks vacation. This is to enable her
appear for the personal interview concerning the adoption of her
children.
The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt
Diwata Landingin was conceived after the death of their paternal
grandmother and guardian. The paternal relatives including the
petitioner who attended the wake of their mother were very
much concerned about the well-being of the three minors. While
preparing for their adoption, they have asked a cousin who has
a family to stay with minors and act as their temporary guardian.
6
The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan
and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she
voluntarily consented. She realized that her children need
parental love, guidance and support which she could not
provide as she already has a second family & residing
in Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners & her children have
been supporting her children up to the present and truly care for
them, she believes her children will be in good hands. She also
finds petitioners in a better position to provide a secured and
bright future to her children.[18]
However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and
offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to present any documentary
evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the adoption.
On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition
for adoption, rendered a decision granting said petition. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors
Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos
be freed from all legal obligations obedience and maintenance
from their natural parents and that they be declared for all legal
intents and purposes the children of Diwata Ramos
Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with considering that
parent-children relationship has long been established between
the children and the adoptive parents. Let the surnames of the
children be changed from Dizon-Ramos to Ramos-Landingin.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar
of Tarlac, Tarlac for him to effect the corresponding
changes/amendment in the birth certificates of the above-
mentioned minors.
SO ORDERED.[19]
The OSG appealed[20] the decision to the Court of Appeals
on December 2, 2002. In its brief[21] for the oppositor-appellant,
the OSG raised the following arguments:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF CONSENT OF THE
PROPOSED ADOPTEES BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF THE WRITTEN
CONSENT OF THE PETITIONERS CHILDREN AS REQUIRED
BY LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
FOR ADOPTION DESPITE PETITIONERS FAILURE TO
ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT THE
PROPOSED ADOPTEES.
On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision [22] reversing the
ruling of the RTC. It held that petitioner failed to adduce in
evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the childrens
natural mother. Moreover, the affidavit of consent of the
petitioners children could not also be admitted in evidence as
the same was executed in Guam, USA and was not
authenticated or acknowledged before a Philippine consular
office, and although petitioner has a job, she was not stable
enough to support the children. The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision
dated November 25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
7
63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
[23]
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration [24] on May 21, 2004,
which the CA denied in its Resolution dated August 12, 2004.[25]
Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari[26] on September 7, 2004, assigning the following
errors:
1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS
OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF WEIGHT AND
IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE
AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER-
APPELLEE IS NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT
THE THREE CHILDREN.[27]
The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the
following: (a) whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the
minors without the written consent of their biological mother,
Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of consent
purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopters children
sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether or not
petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal
concept, as stated in Malkinson v. Agrava,[28] that adoption
statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and
welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are
designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the
protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as
well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the
joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of
the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should thus be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.[29]
However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals, [30] the Court also ruled
that the liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to
adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the
law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child
arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration
is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be
understood in its proper context and perspective. The Courts
position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to
extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and
jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to approve adoption
proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the
child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the
parents over the child.[31]
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After
being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or
withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of
the following to the adoption is hereby required:
8

(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal
guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has
legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10)
years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or
over, of the adopter, if living with said adopter and the latters
souse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be
adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural
parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship
from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the
manner of the proposed adoption.[32]
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is
indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed,
the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent
must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be
terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this case,
petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos
to the adoption.
We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able
to interview Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with
her son, John Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in
the Philippines and Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is
incredible that the latter would not require Amelia Ramos to
execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her minor
children. Neither did the petitioner bother to present Amelia
Ramos as witness in support of the petition.
Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the
biological mother is no longer necessary because when Amelias
husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never came
back. The children were then left to the guidance and care of
their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal relatives, including
petitioner, who provided for the childrens financial
needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively
abandoned the children. Petitioner further contends that it was
by twist of fate that after 12 years, when the petition for adoption
was pending with the RTC that Amelia and her child by her
second marriage were on vacation in the Philippines. Pagbilao,
the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her, and during the
meeting, Amelia intimated to the social worker that she
conformed to the adoption of her three children by the petitioner.
Petitioners contention must be rejected. When she filed her
petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in
effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of
the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of
the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by
petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed
abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written
consent of their legal guardian.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of
his child without his consent, is a conduct which evinces a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties. [33]The term means
neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of
love and support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the
opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend
support and maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the
child.[34]
9
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in Q Where is your mother now?
the care of others is not such an abandonment. [35] To dispense A In Italy, sir.
with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be
shown to have existed at the time of adoption.[36] Q When did your mother left for Italy?
A After my father died, sir.
In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of
Elaine Ramos to prove her claim that Amelia Ramos had Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990?
abandoned her children. Petitioners testimony on that matter A Two years old, sir.
follows:
Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother
Q Where is the mother of these three children now? communicate with you?
A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir. A No, sir.[38]

Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker
instance where she communicated with the family? also stated the following:
A None, sir.
IV. Background of the Case:
Q How about with her children?
A None, sir. xxxx

Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?
A I do not know, sir.
Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?
A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with
another man.
Q From whom did you learn that?
A From others who came from Italy, sir.
Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her
second marriage?
A Yes, sir, she got two kids.[37]
Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under
the care and custody of their maternal grandmother. However,
she died in Nov. 2001 and an uncle, cousin of their deceased
father now serves as their guardian. The petitioner, together
with her children and other relatives abroad have been
supporting the minor children financially, even during the time
that they were still living with their natural parents. Their mother
also sends financial support but very minimal. [39]
xxxx
V. Background Information about the Minors Being
Sought for Adoption:

xxxx
Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:

10
As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her
younger siblings. She helps them in their lessons, works and
has fun with them. She also encourages openness on their
problems and concerns and provides petty counseling. In
serious problems she already consult (sic) her mother and
petitioner-aunt.[40]
xxxx
In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein
minors, Amelia recalled that they had a happy and comfortable
life. After the death of her husband, her in-laws which include
the petitioner had continued providing support for
them. However being ashamed of just depending on the support
of her husbands relatives, she decided to work abroad. Her
parents are also in need of financial help as they are undergoing
maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged their farm land
which she used in going to Italy and worked as domestic helper.
When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3
children to the care & custody of her mother-in-law who returned
home for good, however she died on November 2000.
While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from
Tarlac. They became live-in partners since 1995 and have a son
John Mario who is now 2 years old. The three of them are
considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed that Mr. Tayag is
planning to file an annulment of his marriage and his wife is
amenable to it. He is providing his legitimate family regular
support.
Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-
P15,000 a month through her parents who share minimal
amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic) children. The
petitioner and other paternal relatives are continuously providing
support for most of the needs & education of minors up to
present.[41]
Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to
abandon her children, or to permanently sever their mother-child
relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the country by
financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not
surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of
rearing the children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for, as
claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for
serious personal problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send
financial support to the children, though in minimal amounts as
compared to what her affluent in-laws provide.
Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the
minors herein will have the effect of severing all legal ties
between the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and
that the same shall then be vested on the adopter. [42] It would
thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration
were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to
deprive a person of parental authority over his/her
children. More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has
emotionally abandoned the children, and that the latter will not
miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an adopting
parent.[43] Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes
precedence in adoption.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the
Court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the
duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only
and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and
until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or
purposes for which such document is offered, the same is
merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight. Mere
identification of documents and the markings thereof as exhibits
11
do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless
formally offered.[44]
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos Report and of the
Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children;
the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove. The joint
written consent of petitioners children [45] was notarized
on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the
Rules of Court in the same way as a document notarized in this
country it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103,
[46]
which states:
Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and
authenticated in a foreign country shall be considered authentic
if the acknowledgment and authentication are made in
accordance with the following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an
ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, charg d
affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic
of the Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he
is accredited, or (2) a notary public or officer duly authorized by
law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is done.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the
person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to
him, and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be under his official seal, if he is by law required
to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In case
the acknowledgment is made before a notary public or an officer
mentioned in subdivision (2) of the preceding paragraph, the
certificate of the notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an ambassador,
minister, secretary of legation, charg de affaires, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines,
acting within the country or place to which he is accredited. The
officer making the authentication shall certify under his official
seal that the person who took the acknowledgment was at the
time duly authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly
exercising the functions of the office by virtue of which he
assumed to act, and that as such he had authority under the law
to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the
place where the acknowledgment was taken, and that his
signature and seal, if any, are genuine.
As the alleged written consent of petitioners legitimate children
did not comply with the afore-cited law, the same can at best be
treated by the Rules as a private document whose authenticity
must be proved either by anyone who saw the document
executed or written; or by evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the makers.[47]
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by
petitioner to authenticate the written consent of her legitimate
children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner
was not stable enough to support the children and is only relying
on the financial backing, support and commitment of her
children and her siblings.[48] Petitioner contradicts this by
claiming that she is financially capable as she has worked
in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a house, and currently earns
$5.15 an hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00 a month. Her
children and siblings have likewise committed themselves to
provide financial backing should the need arise. The OSG,
again in its comment, banks on the statement in the Home
Study Report that petitioner has limited income. Accordingly, it
appears that she will rely on the financial backing of her children
and siblings in order to support the minor adoptees. The law,
however, states that it is the adopter who should be in a position
to provide support in keeping with the means of the family.
12
 While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of
Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest intentions for her nieces and nephew, there are legal infirmities
of the child, it follows that the financial capacity of prospective that militate against reversing the ruling of the CA.In any case,
parents should also petitioner is not prevented from filing a new petition for adoption
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter of the herein minors.
should be in a position to support the would-be adopted child or
children, in keeping with the means of the family. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

According to the Adoption Home Study Report [49] forwarded by

the Department of Public Health & Social Services of the
Government of Guam to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer
supporting her legitimate children, as the latter are already
adults, have individual lives and families. At the time of the filing
of the petition, petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a part-
time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of
around $1,000 a month. Petitioners main intention in adopting
the children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a
house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same is
still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the limited
income might be a hindrance to the adoption proceedings.

Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner

will be able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing
the three children in the US. She only has a part-time job, and
she is rather of age. While petitioner claims that she has the
financial support and backing of her children and siblings, the
OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the adoptees
is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal
relation between the former and the latter. Moreover, the
records do not prove nor support petitioners allegation that her
siblings and her children are financially able and that they are
willing to support the minors herein. The Court, therefore, again
sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.

13

Historical Note on Prohibition. Art. 335 NCC
G.R. No. L-28195 June 10, 1971
RE ADOPTION OF THE MINORS FRANCIS, ALEX, MARIA
TERESA, JOSEPH, GREG and GERMAN, all surnamed
MILLENDEZ, SINFOROSA T. MILLENDEZ, petitioner-
appellant.
Celso B. Jamora petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, 1st Assistant
Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Trial Attorney Diosdado
Saavedra for oppositor-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental in Sp. Proc. No. 337, denying the petition of
Sinforosa T. Vda. de Millendez for the adoption of her
grandchildren, by reason of her disqualification under Article 335
of the New Civil Code.
On 15 February 1967, Sinforosa T. Vda. de Millendez petitioned
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for adoption of
minors Francis Millendez, Alex Millendez, Maria Teresa
Millendez, Joseph Millendez, Greg Millendez and German
Millendez. It was alleged in the petition that the minors were the
children of her only son, Bobby Millendez, who had abandoned
them for over three years; that petitioner's said son had been
with bad company and did not have the welfare and future of the
children at heart; that her said son in fact was disinherited by his
father (petitioner's deceased husband) in his will, 1 which will was
duly probated by the court on 1 February 1965; that petitioner
cherished and loved the minors as her own children and the
adoption was prompted by her sincere desire to promote their
welfare; that the minors' natural mother, Hannah A. Millendez
had consented to the petition; and that petitioner was financially
capable of making the adoption. The petition was published,
and heard by the court.
In its order of 10 July 1967, the court denied the petition. It was
ruled that while the adoption would benefit the minors, the same
can not be granted on account of the express prohibition of
Article 335 of the new Civil Code. Petitioner, having a child —
Bobby Millendez, the father of the minors — she is disqualified
under the law to adopt anybody. At any rate, the court pointed
out, the purpose of the minors' mother and grandmother can still
be achieved by the latter's executing a will, or having Bobby
Millendez declared a spendthrift.
Petitioner thus appealed to this Court, contending that the
circumstances of this case warrant a liberal interpretation of
Article 335 of the new Civil Code.
The Civil Code expressly provides:
ART. 335. The following cannot adopt:
(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children, or natural children by legal fiction;
xxx xxx xxx
There can be no question, in view of the explicit provision of the
law, that petitioner-appellant having already a legitimate child,
Bobby Millendez, is disqualified to adopt anyone. In urging the
removal of this case from the legal prohibition, however,
appellant points to the facts that her son has been prodigal and
has not provided her with filial love and respect; that he was
even disinherited by her husband, his own father, for having
attempted on the latter's life that her said son, Bobby Millendez,
had allegedly consented to the proposed adoption of his own
children by herein appellant; that it is appellant's love for her
grandchildren and her fear that Bobby Millendez would just
14
dissipate whatever properties he might inherit from her, leaving
nothing to the said children, that prompted this petition for
adoption. It is, therefore, maintained it with the foregoing facts, it
would be precisely in pursuance of the purpose of adoption
statutes — which is the promotion of the welfare of the children
— the present petition for adoption should be granted.
Adoption, as a privilege granted by law, can be exercised by any
person of age and in full possession of his civil rights. 2 It is,
however, from certain persons enumerated in Article 335 of the
Civil Code, among whom are those who have children of their
own whether the children are legitimate or illegitimate. And the
provision being clear and explicit, had to be enforced although
its suspension or waiver would have worked to the benefit or
well-being of the child proposed to be adopted. Thus, in one
case, where after the child was taken from his natural parents
the adopting couple begot children of their own, a petition
subsequently filed to make formal the adoption of the child was
denied, on the ground that the adopters were already
disqualified because of the presence of their own children. 3 It is
for the same reason that the petition of a step-father to adopt his
wife's child had by a previous marriage was refused, because
there were already children of that second marriage. 4 For, while
it is true that the intendment of adoption statutes is the
promotion of the welfare of the children, such that the modern
trend is to encourage adoptions5 by persons who can provide
them with proper care and education, 6 adoption may be allowed
only where it is possible without doing violence to the terms of
the
statute.7
It is of no significance in this case that appellant's child has
consented to the adoption, or that such child has become
wayward and led a dishonorable life. Article 335 of the Civil
Code creates a disqualification on the adopter himself, not on
the child, that there is nothing about the behaviour of the latter
short of his losing the status of a child (if there is any such
means in the law) that would remove the disqualification
prescribed in the article.
The reason for the prohibition to adopt under Article 335 (1) of
the Civil Code is not difficult to find. Not only would the adoption
introduce a foreign conflicting element into the family unit, but it
would, in the present case, result in the reduction of the legitime
of the son to the benefit of the prospective adoptees, who are
not forced heirs of the would-be adopter, thereby producing an
indirect disinheritance in a manner not authorized by law 8, i.e.,
by a testament expressly stating the legal cause for the
disinheritance. Not only this, but the adoption would make the
disinheritance of the son permanent and irrevocable, contrary to
the policy of the law that "a subsequent reconciliation between
the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the
right to disinherit and renders, ineffectual any disinheritance that
may have been made."9 This same policy inspires Article 1033,
that permits an unworthy heir to succeed if the de cujus should
condone the unworthiness in writing. The consent of the son to
the adoption of his own children by his mother is likewise
ineffective to circumvent the statutory bar, as by Article 905, of
the Civil Code, every renunciation of a future legitime is void,
and of no effect.
Appellant's claim that no disqualification attaches to her having
one legitimate child because Article 335 speaks of "children", is
equally devoid of merit. The use of the word "children" in the law
does not mean that an adopter must have more than one
legitimate, legitimated or illegitimate child before the
disqualification to adopt shall attach. No such intention can be
discerned from the provision. The use of the word "children",
instead of "child", appears more to have been called for by
grammatical correctness than anything else, to complement the
plural subject "those".
WHEREFORE, finding no error in order appealed from, the
dismissal of the petition is affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.
15

Alien and former Filipina, now a US citizen seeks to adopt the
latter’s younger brother. Inter-Country Adoption Act.
G.R. No. 94147 June 8, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial
Region, Branch 69, Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A.
CLOUSE and EVELYN A. CLOUSE, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
R.M. Blanco for private respondents.
PUNO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Special
Proceeding No. RTC-140-I, entitled, "In the Matter of the Adoption of
the Minor named Solomon Joseph Alcala", raising a pure question of
law.
The sole issue for determination concerns the right of private
respondents spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are
aliens to adopt under Philippine Law.
There is no controversy as to the facts.
On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, private respondents spouses Clouse
sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger
brother of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. In an Order issued on
March 12, 1990, the petition was set for hearing on April 18, 1990.
The said Order was published in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province of Zambales and City of Olongapo for three (3)
consecutive weeks.
The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin A.
Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States of America. He
married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On
August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United
States of America in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, and
financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.
Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present,
Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and
custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the
adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the
adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the
Home and Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the
petition for adoption.
Finding that private respondents have all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications provided by law and that the adoption will
redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor, respondent
judge rendered a decision on June 20, 1990, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition for adoption filed by
Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse and decrees that the
said minor be considered as their child by adoption. To this effect, the
Court gives the minor the rights and duties as the legitimate child of
the petitioners. Henceforth, he shall be known as SOLOMON ALCALA
CLOUSE.
The Court dissolves parental authority bestowed upon his natural
parents and vests parental authority to the herein petitioners and
makes him their legal heir. Pursuant to Article 36 of P.D. 603 as
amended, the decree of adoption shall be effective as of the date
when the petition was filed. In accordance with Article 53 of the same
decree, let this decree of adoption be recorded in the corresponding
government agency, particularly the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of Merida, Leyte where the minor was born. The said office of the
Local Civil Registrar is hereby directed to issue an amended
certificate of live birth to the minor adopted by the petitioners.
16
Let copies of this decision be furnished (sic) the petitioners, DSWD,
Zambales Branch, Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Merida, Leyte.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed to us
for relief, contending:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
ADOPTION OF ALVIN AND EVELYN CLOUSE, BECAUSE THEY
ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.
We rule for petitioner.
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209,
otherwise known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private
respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting
Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly
enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino
spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly
with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino
children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may
be provided by law.
There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is
not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the
exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is
not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United
States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is
neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his
spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse
jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February
21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a
Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was
naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear
to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She
was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger
brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in
her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint
adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a
condition that must be read along together with Article 184.3
The historical evolution of this provision is clear. Presidential Decree
603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code), provides that husband and
wife "may" jointly adopt.4 Executive Order No. 91 issued on December
17, 1986 amended said provision of P.D. 603. It demands that both
husband and wife "shall" jointly adopt if one of them is an alien. 5 It
was so crafted to protect Filipino children who are put up for adoption.
The Family Code reiterated the rule by requiring that husband and
wife "must" jointly adopt, except in the cases mentioned before. Under
the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is
mandatory.6 This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. 7 As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
between the spouses.8
In a distinctly similar case, we held:
As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had
thus made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when
one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses
were of the same nationality.
The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185
thereof expresses the necessity for a joint adoption by the spouses
except in only two instances —
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the
parental authority, can aptly find governance.
Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse
adopts the legitimate child of the other, jointly parental authority shall
be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code.9
Article 185 is all too clear and categorical and there is no room for its
interpretation. There is only room for application.10
17
We are not unaware that the modern trend is to encourage adoption
and every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that
objective.11 Adoption is geared more towards the promotion of the
welfare of the child and enhancement of his opportunities for a useful
and happy life.12 It is not the bureaucratic technicalities but the interest
of the child that should be the principal criterion in adoption
cases.13 Executive Order 209 likewise upholds that the interest and
welfare of the child to be adopted should be the paramount
consideration. These considerations notwithstanding, the records of
the case do not evince any fact as would justify us in allowing the
adoption of the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, by private respondents
who are aliens.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the lower
court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
US Citizen and former Filipino, now a naturalized US citizen
seeking to adopt the latter’s nephew and niece. Arts. 184 – 186
of the Family Code.
G.R. No. 100835 October 26, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the SPOUSES
JAMES ANTHONY HUGHES and LENITA MABUNAY
HUGHES, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Westremundo y. De Guzman for private respondents.
VITUG, J.:
James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United
States of America, married Lenita Mabunay Hughes, a Filipino
Citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that
country. On 29 June 1990, the spouses jointly filed a petition
with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 60, to
adopt Ma. Cecilia, Neil and Maria, all surnamed Mabunay, minor
niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been living with the
couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, as well
as their parents, gave consent to the adoption.
On 29 November 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered a
decision granting the petition. a petition for Review
on Certiorari was filed with this Court, assailing the trial court's
decision. This Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals
which, on 09 July 1991, affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the present petition. The petitioner assigned a lone error
on the part of the respondent court, thus —
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
FOR ADOPTION OF SPOUSES JAMES ANTHONY HUGHES
AND LENITA MABUNAY HUGHES BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT
QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.
It is clear that James Anthony Hughes is not qualified to adopt.
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family
Code of the Philippines," is explicit.
Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt :
(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval
of the final accounts rendered upon the termination of their
guardianship relation;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude;
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her
Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
jointly with his or her Filipino spouse a relative by consanguinity
of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt
Filipino children in accordance with the rules in inter-country
adoption as may be provided by law.
While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt
under any of the exceptional cases enumerated in paragraph (3)
of the aforequoted article, Lenita, however, can qualify pursuant
to paragraph (3)(a). The problem in her case lies, instead, with
Article 185 of Executive Order No. 209, expressing as follows:
18
Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child;
or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the
other.
Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a
joint adoption by the husband and the wife, a condition that
must be read along together with Article 184.
The old law on adoption, Presidential Decree No. 603 (The
Child and Youth Welfare Code), exactly adopted that found in
then Article 336 of the Civil Code. Article 29, Section B, Chapter
I, Title II, of the said decree provided :
Art. 29. Husband and wife may jointly adopt. In such case,
parental authority shall be exercised as if the child were their
own by nature.
Observe that the law then in force used the word "may" under
which regime, a joint adoption by the spouses was apparently
not made obligatory. The provision was later amended, however
by Executive Order No. 91, dated 17 December 1986, of
President Corazon C. Aquino. The new Article 29 expressed,
thus —
Art. 29. Husband and wife may jointly adopt. In such case,
parental authority shall be exercised as if the child were their
own by nature.
If one of the spouses is an alien, both husband and wife shall
jointly adopt. Otherwise, the adoption shall not be allowed.
As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No.
603, had thus made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly
adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when
both spouses were of the same nationality.
The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article
185 thereof now expresses the necessity for joint adoption by
the spouses except in only two instances —
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the
other.
It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the
subject of parental authority, can aptly find governance.
Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one
spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint parental
authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with
this Code.
The respondent court, in affirming the grant of adoption by the
lower court, has theorized that James Anthony should merely be
considered a "nominal or formal party" in the proceedings. This
view of the appellate court cannot be sustained. Adoption
creates a status that is closely assimilated to legitimate paternity
and filiation with corresponding rights and duties that
necessarily flow from adoption, such as, but not necessarily
confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use of surname of
the adopter by the adopted, as well as support and successional
rights. These are matters that obviously cannot be considered
inconsequential to the parties.
We are not unmindful of the possible benefits, particularly in this
instance, that an adoption can bring not so much for the
prospective adopting parents as for the adopted children
themselves. We also realize that in proceedings of this nature,
paramount consideration is given to the physical, moral, social
and intellectual welfare of the adopted for whom the law on
adoption has in the first place been designed. When, however,
the law is clear and no other choice is given, 1 we must obey its
full mandate.
Even then, we find it difficult to conclude this opinion without
having to call the attention of the appropriate agencies
concerned to the urgency of addressing the issue on inter-
country adoption, a matter that evidently is likewise espoused
by the Family Code (Article 184, last paragraph, Family Code).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the
respondent court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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