"practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken
for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law
by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead
describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with
opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services
rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination
by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving
of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in
court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to
the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed
of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill."

Renato Cayetano V. Christian Monsod

FACTS: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations
of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic,
and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco
Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman
(1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his
personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and
lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the
Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice
Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative.

ISSUE: WON, respondent possess the required 10 year practice of law?

SC: YES. In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top
officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance
manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who
comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p.
11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law
as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can
be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. ( Ibid.,
p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For
aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score
national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty.
(Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for
Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United
States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by
the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting
and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international
business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt
restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they
should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation,
U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms
and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or
more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the
responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party
when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring
represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for
foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said:
"They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle
and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J.
Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine
Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager,
a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

MAURICIO ULEP V., LEGAL CLINIC

FACTS: Respondent published an advertiement with respect to the anullment and divorce, visa,
secet marriages and other legal support. According to the petitioner the advertisements above
reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the
legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements

ISSUE: whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
constitutes practice of law?

SC: Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render
any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel,
and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although
such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types
of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist
in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of
law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing
law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law.
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of
the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of
law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained.
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not
suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than
real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law,
furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That
is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be
paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice,
contract drafting and so forth.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
court.

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, responden
FACTS:respondent is the director of patent who accordingly issued a circular announcing that there
would be an examination that will be held to determine who are qualified to practice as patent
attorney.

the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in
good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that
consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good
standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their
being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and
prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases
"does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and
technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of
patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with
sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the
Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial
body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases
before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application
of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action
taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent
Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the
United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by
respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes
the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the
United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law,
Republic Act No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding
tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before
the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do
so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue.
And we have given it careful thought and consideration.
ISSUE: WON, respondent circular in admitting though examination those who are qualified to practice
is valid?

SC: NO. The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to
the practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may
practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the
Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office
and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the
practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
 done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings,
they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation
to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at
law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction,
so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy
trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144).
(Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications
for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first
place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of
technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in
accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent
Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the
existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For
instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is
contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall
not be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines before the
invention thereof by the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign
country more than one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use
or on sale in the Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor.
Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal
representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section
28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such
cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a
patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide
for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case
the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years
from the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented
invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the
patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in
the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the
patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by
him to the license, purchase or use of the patented article or working of the patented process or
machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or
if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety.
All these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for
legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA
FACTS: petitioner is a 4rth year law student who instituted numerous civil case against his neighbors
before the regional trial court. Apparently, respondent who represented his neighbors stated in the
open court that as I quote “ appear ka ng appear pumasa ka muna” which is in the tone engulfed with
anger. His imputation of asking whether he is lawyer or not is uncalled for and was used to malign the
public. respondents imputations of complainants misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with
malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases
respondent was handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words appear ka ng
appear, pumasa ka muna! were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate,
malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public.
 Complainant claims that respondents display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior,
misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the
public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold in
their dealings with society and corresponding appropriate penalty or sanctions for the said
administrative violations should be imposed on the respondent.
Respondent on his behalf defend himself that he only wanted to inform the court that petitioner
was not a lawyer. He was bothered by the fact that petitione was wearing a barong tagalog and the
judge may misled him as a lawyer.

IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro : recommended respondents suspension from the practice of
law for a period of three months for violating Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides:
A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution to annul and set aside the recommendation of the
investigating commissioner and to approve the dismissal of the case for lack of merit.

ISSUE: WON, petitioner's act in iniating case in his behalf constitute a practice of law?

SC: In this case, the Board of Governors resolution absolving respondent of any misconduct does not
contain any findings of facts or law upon which it based its ruling. Ordinarily, non-compliance with the
rule would result in the remand of the case. .
. When they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence
and procedure as those qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably
rewarded. Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions;
and when they do so, they are not considered to be in the practice of law. One does not practice law
by acting for himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself.
The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or
vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by
rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to
fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or
employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private
practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to
the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be
said to be in the practice of law.

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO,

Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his
estate. 1Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of
Taggat Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan in 1992.
Employees of Taggat filed a criminal complaint for witholding their salaries against petitioner.
Apparently the person who tookthe case was the respondent. Upon finding probable cause,
respondent file an information before the court.
Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent,
being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat
very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case
filed by Taggat employees. 14Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of
the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to
support the complaint. 15
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while
working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent
received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February 1995, 16 another P10,000
for the months of April and May 1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month of April 1996. 18

Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved
by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation. 19
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat
for more than five years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to
Taggat. 21 Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary
investigation. 22 Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when
he performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit
respondent from hearing the criminal complaint 24 but instead complainant voluntarily executed and
filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation. 25
Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that
respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from complainant’s statement
during the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999
IBP: The IBP Board of Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years
suspension from the practice of law.
ISSUE: WON, being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240 ?
SC: The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as –
x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 51
"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer
This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services
and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by
lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of
law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working
as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were
for "Retainer’s fee." 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the
prohibition in RA 6713.
However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional
Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713
– the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees – unless the acts
involved also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which
mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a
government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA,
FACTS: respondent was charged for malicious mischief by Chief of Police of Alaminos. Apparently, he
was initially represented by counsel de officio but later he was represented by counsel de parte. On
the otherhand, the complainant was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule as prrivate prosecutor.
He was able to obtain an approval from the secretary of Justice with the condition that everytime he
will appear he will considered on official leave of absence and that he should not accept any fee.
counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor
in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court,
which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this
limitation.
The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he
(Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice
CFI: Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of
the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance
was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or
intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos,
Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict
in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private
prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this
criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil
action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.
ISSUE: WON, Atty. Fule is appearing as private prosecutor is a practice of law?
SC: He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in
private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute
private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In
other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S.
768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such
services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one
occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The
following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services
are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration
of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a
relative.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR
APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO
FACTS: Argosino together with 13 other individuals was accused for the crime of homicide in
connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan. Apparently during initiation in their fraternity, the
accused caused severe injuries to Raul that cause the death of the latter. At first they pleaded not
guilty but subsequently, they changed it to guilty. RTC accepted their plea and senteneced them for
imprisonment of 2 years and 4 days. 11 days after that, Argosino and others applied for probation
which was again granted by the court.
Less than a month, Argosino fileda motion to Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar
Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation
status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated
14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the
lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath
of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated
his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did
not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him
probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early
Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges,
and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a
scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing
victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal
case. Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his
son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but
murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse
of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of
one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday
1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They
also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning
of his son's involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son.
However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in
his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the
gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the
bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

ISSUE for 1995 and 1997: WON, Argosino be allowed to take an oath?

SC 1995: The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to
everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral
character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry on an
ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who
demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an
absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants
by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed
to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss: 7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and professional
character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past
offense: an examination into character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the
bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the
general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal
profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a
perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law
and in our legal system as we know it. 12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required
standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent)
infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul
Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-
being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and
confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a
useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon
Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior,
which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared
to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the
obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a
requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for
permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for
admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

SC 1997:
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual
and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and
efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out"
lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal
importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the
public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than
irreproachable. Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having
forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a
parent, given the circumstances in this case, to find room for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now
morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros
Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal
profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is
not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is
a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of
Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial
notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn
promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves
strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone
concerned.

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court
FACTS: ALAWI and Alauya were classmates and used to be friends before this case. Alawi work as
sales agent in E.B. Villarosa and Partnes Inc while Alauya worrk as Clerk of Cout in Sharia District
court. Apparently, Alauya purchase a house and lot through Alawi as consequence of which, the
forme was granted by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation a housing loan.
Subsequently thereafter, Alauya wrote a letter address to the President and V.P of E.B
Villarosa that he is terminating their contract/ agreement pertaining to the house and lot that he
purchased. He disclosed that Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized
acts which made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to his rights and interests. The
envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right
hand corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been
typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-
President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)
at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.;
and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith
Upon learning what Alauya did, Alawi file a complaint before this court against the former.In that
complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance
and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly
use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his
imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and
evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely
transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be appropriately
disciplined.

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he questioned the authority of Atty.
Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere
Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the
Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result
of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint
had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and ex-
officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal Family **."[4]

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious
tones,[5] Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might
comment thereon.[6] He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the
confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his
signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions
of P4,333.10 from his salary.

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the
title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao
term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider
himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured."[10] He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a
classmate and friend.[11] He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she
would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him;
despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property -- subject of his
supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;[12] He says Alawi somehow
got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do
so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co.,
Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment,
clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw
ISSUE: WON,
SC As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct
more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use
language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. [20] As a judicial
employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times,
and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His
radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by
his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare
that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may
only practice law before Shari'a courts.[21] While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and
one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense
that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of
"attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law
in this jurisdiction.
 Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local
legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of
"counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Tan v Sabandal
FACTS: Facts: Petitioner files a motion for reconsideration after the court allows respondent to finally
take oath and practice the law profession after considering his plea for forgiveness and showing
willingness to reform along with testimonials attesting to his good moral character among which is a
testimonial by the IBP Zamboanga. Petitioners contend that such testimonial was only signed by its
President, a counsel for the in-laws of Sabandal, without the authorization of the IBP Board members.
The court allowed the IBP to manifest testimony to certify as to the good moral character of the
respondent and asked for a comment from the RTC Judge in Zamboanga. Members of the IBP
manifested that they see no impediments as to the moral character of Sabandal while the RTC Judge
informed the court of the civil case against the respondent concerning the mortgaged land which he
secured for a free patent which turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible for acquisition for a
free patent. The civil case however was settled amicably and the respondent was not charged of any
crime. Subsequently, Tan already forgave the respondent and withdrew her opposition for the taking
of oath of office of the respondent while the other 2 petitioners leave upon the court to decide.

ISSUE: WON Sabandal should be allowed to take oath of office

RULING: The court ruled that in the development of the case, they find Sabandal to have concealed
the civil case brought against him in the course of his series of petitions to be allowed to take oath
together with the testimonies attesting to his good moral character without any mention of the pending
case against him. The court finds this as manipulative and gross dishonesty on the part of the
respondent. Although there were testimonials on his good moral characters those were made without
any knowledge of the case against him. The commission of his offense itself is devoid of honesty.
With the practice of law a matter of privilege and not as a right, they find respondent unfit to be a
member of the law profession therefore it recalled the court resolution of allowing the respondent to
take oath.

IN RE ALMACEN:
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in said civil case
but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said motion but he
failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then
appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to the
motion for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme
Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution.
This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional. He then filed
before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyer’s certificate of title as he claimed that it is
useless to continue practicing his profession when members of the high court are men who are
calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute
resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons why and that he became
“one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” He also stated “that justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb.”
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacen’s petition as the Court wanted to wait for
Almacen to ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his lawyer’s certificate though
as he now argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may be permitted “to give
reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him . . . in an open and public
hearing.” He said he preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is “the complainant,
prosecutor and Judge.” Almacen was however unapologetic.
ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed because the
Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every petition they reject otherwise
the High Court would be unable to effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the
Supreme Court is to decide “only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have
immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved.” It should be remembered that
a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court’s denial. For one thing, the facts and the
law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.
On Almacen’s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said criticisms as uncalled
for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer,
both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms
and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the
decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of
the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of all such
criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should have known that a
motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party of the time and place of trial is a
mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained by the court. He has only himself to blame and he is
the reason why his client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely.

Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn
duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this
prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those
who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus —
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and
incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge
of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct
of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without
support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right
to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has the
inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from
practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is
worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that —
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the
trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but
the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of
ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held
that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is
admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right,
but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound
judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or
incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court.

IN RE SYCIP:
FACTS: Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty.
Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta,
who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their
firms, the names of partners who had passed away.
Petitioner's argument
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name
which includes the name of a deceased partner;
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has
authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name,
of the name of a deceased partner
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a
deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
 ... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by
local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use. .
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective
deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several
days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years when
their respective deceased partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all
leading national and international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased
partners' deaths.
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional
firm's name
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has
been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of
most countries in the world
ISSUE: WON, petitioners may be allowed to used the name of their deceased partners in their firm?
SC: 1. Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into
after the death of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no
corresponding liability.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and
disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make
a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially
ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners.
2. Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than of
a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the
personal qualifications of its individual members.
3. A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association
for a particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or
business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that "the use of a nom de plume,
assumed or trade name in law practice is improper. The right to practice law is not a natural or
constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of
good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The right
does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the
exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust."
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may attain the
highest eminence without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with
their clients
4. It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a
deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice
is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no
imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a
deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our
custom, Identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at
the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their firm
names have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership
changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£

5. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased
partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by
 custom.

DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA,

FACTS: this is a disbarment case against atty magulta.
Accordingly, petitioner went to the office of the respondent to help him in his case.
Respondent, told him to file a case to which petitioner comply. Apparently, respondent told him that
the case is already been filed and he needs to wait for the progress of it. But he went back and forth
to respondent ffice to have an update. To satisfy his growing impatience respondent and petitioner
went to Prosecutors office. He then later told that the prosecutor is absent. He felt that there is
something suspicious, he went to the Prosecutor office alone and follow up his case. To his
dissapointment, his case was not filed.
Respondent deny the said allegation, accordingly, petitioner was introduced as one of the
kumpadre of his former law partners. He was instructed by the petitioner to draft demand letter
against Regwil Industries Inc. When he do so, there is no payment for the demand letter given to him.
Apparently, he was instucted to drop the demand and pursue to a complaint. When he told petitioner
that he needs to pay for acceptance fee, petitioner promise to pay in installment basis. Petitioner
initally give P25,000 as filing fee. Respondent remind him of his acceptance fee and he told him that
the money was for his acceptance fee. Respondent was asked by petitioner to on hold the filing of
complaint but later on the latter change his mind and want to pursue the case. Petitioner again remind
him of acceptance fee, but espondent told him that he needs to file the case first before he pay his
acceptance fee. Respondent refuse to do so, hence petitioner asked him to return the P25,000 he
pays. Respodent retun the said ammount through check and petitioner was able to encashed it.
IBP: s evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the
filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainants deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill
complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was to file the
Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client, the complainant. The failure of
respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and
his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional
damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the
law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by
complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds.
Thus, to impress upon the respondent the gravity of his offense, it is recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
ISSUE: WON, respondent be suspended/ disbar in the practice of law for not filing the case of the
petitioner?

SC: YES.In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession
and not a business.[11] Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.[12] The gaining of a livelihood is not a
professional but a secondary consideration.[13] Duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests
or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a
byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained without making much money.[14]

In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the receipt
issued by the law office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be
scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their professional capacity.[15] Rule
16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of
their clients and properties that may come into their possession.

Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and
are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.[16] It may be true that they have a
lien upon the clients funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their
possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and
that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these
considerations do not relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the moneys they received.
Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct.[17] In any event, they must still exert all
effort to protect their clients interest within the bounds of law.

If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries
with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public.
[18] Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee
entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former
returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.

Pedro Linsangan V. Atty. Nicomendez Tolentino

FACTS: This is a disbarment case filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan
Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of
professional services.
Accordingly, respondent through the help of a certain Fe Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his
clients[2] to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance[3] and
expeditious collection on their claims.[4] To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called
them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit[5] of James Gregorio attesting
that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize
respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of
the said calling card.[7] The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

CBD: found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating
Rule 8.02[10] and other canons[11] of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he
contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as
stated in Section 27, Rule 138[12] of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that
respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.

ISSUE:

SC:
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY
TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF
FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.[13] To allow
a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession
in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to
which every member of the bar is called.
A lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust
based on his character and conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their
services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyers name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly used
to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to
finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers,
thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass
commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession.
However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to
rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of
Labianos calling cards.

PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO HERRERA,
FACTS: Pettioner is the counsel of the private respondent in an extrajudcial foreclosure case. private
respondent owned 8 parcel of lot, he later obtained loan to the L&R Corporation and he mortgage his
properties. Upon his failure to pay his loan, an extrajudcial foreclosure happens. Since there is no end
to the lititgtion, L&R and private respondent entered into compromise agreement stating that he will
be given anoher year to redeem the property and the payment of ATTOrNEY'S fee of petitioner.
Apparently, Private respodent did not have a financial strait to redeem the prperty. According to
private respodent, petitioner offer to advance the payment of the property but in return the former
must execute a transfer of mortgage in his favor.
On the petitioners side, he state that it was the private espodent who implore him to redeem
the property and register it under his name.
When, private respondent successfully obtain another loan in bank, he learned that the
property that he wanted to redeem is already under the name of petitioner. So he filed a criminal, civil,
disbarment case gainst petitioner. Petitioner file for its dismissal.
RTC: denied the petition of the private respondent on the ground that the alteration complained is well
within the right of the petitione to protect its interest, second, there is a tansfer of mortgage executed
in favor of the petitioner, third, petitioner loose its right when it failed to redeem the property to L&
corporation.
CA: granted the petition of private respondent.
ISSUE: WON,
SC: Knowing that his client was not able to pay, he took this chance and placed his interest over his
client.
The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers
are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial notice, eluded not a few
law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his own client are not becoming
of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for money." 36
It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in spite of the fact that the practice of law is not a
commercial enterprise; but that does not furnish an excuse for plain lust for material wealth, more so
at the expense of another. Law advocacy, we reiterate, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it
births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile
pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with a
public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation.
We do not find the petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the sum of P100,000.00 reasonable. We do
not believe that it satisfies the standards set forth by the Rules. The extent of the services he had
rendered in Civil Case No. 30679, and as far as the records will yield, is not impressive to justify
payment of such a gargantuan amount. The case itself moreover did not involve complex questions of
fact or law that would have required substantial effort as to research or leg work for the petitioner to
warrant his demands. The fact that the properties subject thereof commanded quite handsome prices
in the market should not be a measure of the importance or non-importance of the case. We are not
likewise persuaded that the petitioner's stature warrants the sum claimed.

the petitioner purportedly assumed redemption rights over the disputed properties (but in reality,
acquired absolute ownership thereof). By virtue of such a subsequent agreement, the lands had
ceased to be properties which are "the object of any litigation." Parenthetically, the Court states that a
writ of possession is improper to eject another from possession unless sought in connection with: (1)
a land registration proceeding; (2) an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) in a
judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has
intervened; and (4) in execution sales. 52 It is noteworthy that in this case, the petitioner moved for
the issuance of the writ pursuant to the deed of sale between him and the private respondent and not
the judgment on compromise. (He was, as we said, issued a writ of execution on the compromise
agreement but as we likewise observed, he did not have the same enforced. The sale agreement
between the parties, it should be noted, superseded the compromise.) The writ does not lie in such a
case. His remedy is specific performance.
At any rate, the transfer, so we hold, is not subject to the injunction of Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
But like all voidable contracts, it is open to annulment on the ground of mistake, fraud, or undue
influence, 53 which is in turn subject to the right of innocent purchasers for value. 54
For this reason, we invalidate the transfer in question specifically for undue influence as earlier
detailed. While the respondent Herrera has not specifically prayed for invalidation, this is the clear
tenor of his petition for annulment in the Appellate Court. It appearing, however, that the properties
have been conveyed to third persons whom we presume to be innocent purchasers for value, the
petitioner, Atty. Paterno Canlas, must be held liable, by way of actual damages, for such a loss of
properties.
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning Atty.
Canlas monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his hability
for payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich said
respondent at the expense of his lawyer. The parties must then set off their obligations against the
other. To obviate debate as the actual amounts owing by one to the other, we hold Francisco Herrera,
the private respondent, liable to Atty. Paterno Canlas, the petitioner, in the sum of P654,000.00
representing the redemption price of the properties, 55 in addition to the sum of P20,000. 00 as and
for attomey's fees. We order Atty. Canlas, in turn, to pay the respondent Herrera the amount of
P1,000,000.00, the sum he earned from the resale thereof, 56 such that he shall, after proper
adjustments, be indebted to his client in the sum of P326,000.00 as and for damages. Were we to
allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the necessary
sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they are
allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus
specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are
more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the
classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the
Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise
transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this
Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office,
for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of
the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of
evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or
quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the
Supreme Court.

PRACTICE OF LAW
CAYETANO V. MONSOD- Comelec chairman
ULEP V THE LEGAL CLINIC- advertisement
PLA V AGRAVA-issuance of circular for examination of those who are wualified to practice in patent
law
CRUZ V CABRERA- 4rth year law student ( private practice)
SANTIAGO V SAGUCIO- consultancy and retairner
PEOPLE V VILLANUEVA- appearance of private prosecutor Fule

PRACTICE OF LAW AS PRIVELEGE

IN RE: ARGOSINO -} Taking an oath
iN RE: ARGOSINO-}hazing case
ALAWI V ALAUYA- using the word attorney
TAN V SABANDAL-taking an oath opposed by other
IN RE: ALMACEN- return of Atty's certificate

PRACTICE OF LAW IS A PROFFESION NOT BUSINES

IN RE : SICYP- using the name of deceased partner
BURBE V ATTY. MAGUITA- Atty's fee
LINSANGAN V. ATTY. TOLENTINO-solicitaion of client
CANLAS V. CA- counsel v client