UNASSIGNED BUT DISCUSSED IN CLASS

Batch 1

1. Tongco v Tiamson

2. People v Carlos

3. Barton v Leyte Asphalt

4. Uy Chico v Union Life Assurance

Batch 2

1. People v Damaso

2. People v Laquinon

3. People v Sabio

4. People v Agripa

5. People v De Joya

6. People v Devaras

7. Viacrusis v Ca

8. People v Alegado

9. Ferrer v Inchausti

10. People v Putian

11. People v Peralta

12. Fortus v Novero

13. Yao Kee v Sy-Gonzales

14. Tan v CA

15. People v Liwanag

HEARSAY EVIDENCE
Section 36, Rule 130

1) People v. Damaso
 violation of PD 1866 in connection with subversion
 The prosecution rested its case and offered its exhibits for admission. The counsel for accused-appellant interposed
his objections to the admissibility of the prosecution's evidence on grounds of its being hearsay, immaterial or
irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search warrant. On these bases, he, thereafter, manifested that he was not
presenting any evidence for the accused
 We find that there are serious flaws in the method used by the law officers in obtaining evidence against the
accused-appellant but also that the evidence as presented against him is weak to justify conviction.
 Fiscal

Q How about this Bernie Mendoza, who was the one renting the house?

A He was not around at that time, but according to Luz (Tanciangco) who mentioned the name Bernie Mendoza
(as) the one who was renting the house and at the same time claiming that it was Bernie Mendoza who owns
the said items. (TSN of October 31, 1989, p. 40)

 Clearly, the aforequoted testimonies are hearsay because the witnesses testified on matters not on their own
personal knowledge. The Solicitor General, however, argues that while the testimonies may be hearsay, the same
are admissible because of the failure of counsel for appellant to object thereto.

 It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being admitted as evidence. But, one should
not be misled into thinking that since these testimonies are admitted as evidence, they now have probative value.
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence. In People vs. Valero, We emphatically
declared that:

 The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or
evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not
give such evidence any probative value. The lack of objection may make any incompetent evidence admissible.
But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether
objected to or not has no probative value. (L-45283-84, March 19, 1982, 112 SCRA 675, emphasis supplied)

 Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant is the lessee of the house, the case against him still will
not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and
seizure proceedings

 Another factor which illustrates the weakness of the case against the accused-appellant is in the identification of the
gun which he was charged to have illegally possessed. In the amended information (supra, pp. 1-2), the gun was
described as an M-14 rifle with serial no. 1249935. Yet, the gun presented at the trial bore a different serial
number

Sec. 37, Rule 130

2) People v. Laquinon
-murder sa may river
Brgy Capt Samama Buat then took the "ante mortem" statement of Pablo Remonde. He asked him who he was to which he
answered that he was Pablo Remonde. Samama Buat asked "who shot you" and Remonde said that it was Gregorio
Laquinon. He asked Pablo Remonde whether from the gunshot wounds he suffered he would survive to which the victim
answered "I do not know"

-But the dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration since the
deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself
in extremist, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of
declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule." 1

It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made immediately after the incident and
the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused.

-NOT A DYING DECLARATION but part of RES GESTAE

 The dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration since the
deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased
believed himself in extremis, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct," which is the sole basis
for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule."
 It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made immediately after the incident
and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused.
 People v. Laquinon

135 SCRA 91 (1985)


Facts: Pablo Remonde was shot. The barrio captain found him lying on the sand at the bank of a river. Pablo’s
hands were tied on his back and he was lying face down. The barrio captain took Pablo’s ante-mortem statement
and learned that he was Pablo Remonde, he was shot by Gregorio Laquinon, and that Pablo was not sure if he
would survive the gunshot wounds he suffered. Pablo died in the hospital 3 days later. Laquinon was charged and
convicted of Murder. Laquinon argues that the statement is not a dying declaration because it was not made
under the consciousness of an impending death.

Held: The statement of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as a dying declaration since the deceased
was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself
in extremis, at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this
kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule. It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae
since the statement was made immediately after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient
time to concoct a charge against the accused.

de Leon: In Devaras, consciousness of impending death was inferred from the extent of the injuries. In Laquinon,
the declarant expressly said that he was not sure that we was going to die. The moral of the story is, in taking a
dying declaration, don’t ask if the declarant thinks he will die.

3) People v. Sabio
 The dying declaration of the victim which points to the accused as the one slashed and robbed him cannot be
admitted to establish the factor of robbery. The admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to
criminal prosecutions for homicide or murder as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of death.

People v. Sabio

102 SCRA 218 (1981)


Facts: Catralino Espina was found by his grandnephew in his house lying and wounded. Espina asked for the police.
When police officers arrived, they asked Espina “who slashed and robbed” him. Espina answered that it was Sabio.
His declaration was taken down and thumbmarked by him. Sabio was charged and convicted of robbery with
homicide. Sabio questions the admissibility of the declaration on the ground that it was not made under the
consciousness of an impending death because the victim had hopes of recovery for his first word to his
grandnephew was for the latter to fetch the police.

Held: Statement is admissible. The seriousness of the injury on the victim's forehead which had affected the brain
and was profusely bleeding; the victim's inability to speak unless his head was raised; the spontaneous answer of
the victim that "only Papu Sabio is responsible for my death"; and his subsequent demise from the direct effects
of the wound on his forehead, strengthen the conclusion that the victim must have known that his end was
inevitable. That death did not ensue till 3 days after the declaration was made will not alter its probative force
since it is not indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter. It is the belief in impending death and
not the rapid succession of death, that renders the dying declaration admissible. The fact that the victim told his
grandnephew to fetch the police, does not negative the victim's feeling of hopelessness of recovery but rather
emphasizes the realization that he had so little time to disclose his assailant to the authorities.

However, only homicide was proved. The evidence supportive of the charge of robbery is at best circumstantial
and does not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had carried away personality belonging to the
offended party. There was no eyewitness to the alleged robbery, nor was any part of the alleged missing objects
recovered. The consummation of the robbery cannot he inferred nor presumed from the circumstance that the
accused was seen running "with his hands inside his shirt", or that the "barro", alleged to have contained cash
amounting to about P8, was seen on the floor, open and empty, or that the things and merchandise inside the
house were in disarray. Nor can the dying declaration of the victim be admitted to establish the fact of robbery.
The admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide or
murder as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of death.

Interval of time may be taken into account where the declaration was ambiguous as to whether the declarant
believed that his death was imminent when he made the declaration.

de Leon: Could not have the statement been admissible as proof of Sabio’s guilt of robbery as a part of the res
gestae?

4) People v. Agripa
 The mere fact that evidence is admissible does not necessarily mean that it is also credible. The testimony of a
competent witness may be admissible if relevant but it is not for this reason alone believable. According to Rule
128, Sec. 3, "evidence is admissible if it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules."
 Credibility depends on the evaluation given to the evidence by the court in accordance with the guidelines
provided in Rule 133 of the Rules of Court and the doctrines laid down by this Court. As the court sees it, Jose's
statement, while admissible as part of the res gestae, is not credible evidence of his criminal liability. It is quite
obvious that he was not in full possession of his faculties when he made that statement, which, significantly, he
did not sign. We note that when the authorities came upon the wounded couple, Jose refused to let go of his dead
wife and was rolled up with her cadaver in a mat to be brought to the hospital. That was not the conduct of a
rational man. Moreover, Jose was himself suffering from four stab wounds which could have cost him his life had
he not been treated immediately. Given the condition of his mind and body at the time the statement was made,
Jose could not be expected to think clearly and to willingly make the serious and damning confession now
imputed to him.

5) People v. De Joya
 It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in itself does
not mean that the declarant must recite everything that constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement,
but that his statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his
meaning in respect of such fact.
 The doctrine of completeness has also been expressed in the following terms in Prof. Wigmore's classic work: "The
application of the doctrine of completeness is here peculiar. The statement as offered must not be merely a part
of the whole as it was expressed by the declarant; it must be complete as far it goes. But it is immaterial how
much of the whole affair of the death is related, provided the statement includes all that the declarant wished or
intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption (by death or by an intruder) cuts short a statement which thus
remains clearly less than that which the dying person wished to make, the fragmentary statement is not
receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the whole might be of a very different effect from that of
the fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told
only a portion of what he might have been able to tell." The reason upon which incomplete declarations are
generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by
death or other circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified by
the statements which he was prevented from making. That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the
presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are received.
People v. de Joya

203 SCRA 343 (1991)


Facts: Eulalia Deamse was fatally wounded. Her grandson, Alvin Valencia, came home and found her wounded. He
asked his grandmother "Apo, Apo, what happened?" The deceased victim said: "Si Paqui". After uttering those
two words, she expired. It is not disputed that "Paqui" is the nickname of Pioquinto de Joya. De Joya was charged
and convicted of robbery with homicide.

Held: A dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in itself does not mean that
the declarant must recite everything that constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his
statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in
respect of such fact. The statement as offered must not be merely a part of the whole as it was expressed by the
declarant; it must be complete as far it goes. It is immaterial how much of the whole affair of the death is related,
provided the statement includes all that the declarant wished or intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption
cuts short a statement which thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person wished to make, the
fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the whole might be of a
very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the statement he wishes to make,
it is no objection that he has told only a portion of what he might have been able to tell. Since the declarant was
prevented from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified by the statements
which he was prevented from making. That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption of
truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are received.

In this case, the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete. The words "Si Paqui" do not
constitute by themselves a sensible sentence. The phrase "Si Paqui" must, moreover, be related to the question
asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" Alvin's question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to you?" The
deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The trial
court simply assumed that by uttering the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name her killer. But
Eulalia herself did not say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her communication might have been had
death not interrupted her. We are unable to regard the dying statement as a dying declaration naming the
appellant as the doer of the bloody deed.

Escolin: Justices Relova and Francisco and I disagree with this decision. Under the context, what else could have
“Si Paqui” meant other than that he was responsible for the crime?

6) People v. Devaras

 A pedicab driver and his passenger were attacked without provocation by two men who hacked them to death and
later threw their bodies over the bridge with the help of another person.
  The principal witness for the prosecution was Raul Animos, who claimed to have witnessed the killing of the two
victims.

 Ronilo said that he was barely 5 meters away from the assailants and was so shocked at what had happened that he
could barely move or say anything. Pablo Devaras also did not participate in the brutal slaying but later helped his
cousin Blademir throw Efren's body over the bridge into the river below. 3 Ronilo himself was ordered to help
throw the body of Felix and, although he initially hesitated, had to comply in the end because he was threatened
with death if he refused to obey.4

 We defer to the factual findings of the trial court, there being no showing that they were reached arbitrarily or
without basis. The evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses is better made by the judge presiding at the trial
rather than by the appellate court because of the former's opportunity to observe the deportment of the
witnesses and to ascertain therefrom whether they are narrating the truth or falsifying it.

 Moreover, the assignment of errors is in effect an admission by the appellants of their participation in the killings of
the two victims. As we see it, their appeal is only an attempt to reduce their penalties.

People v. Devaras

37 SCRA 697 (1971)


Facts: The next morning after being stabbed or 11 hours later, as the victim was about to be taken to the hospital,
a patrolman was able to get his statement as to the identity of the perpetrators. The victim was unable to sign the
statement and he died the next day.

Held: The statement was not part of the res gestae because of the lapse of considerable time between the
commission of the offense and the taking of the statement. However, the statement amounts to a dying
declaration, as it is a statement coming from a seriously wounded person even if death occurs hours or days after
it was inflicted if there be showing that it was due to the wound whose gravity did not diminish from the time he
made his declaration until the end came. There is no need for proof that the declarant state "that he has given up
the hope of life.” It is enough if. from the circumstances, it can be inferred with certainty that such must have
been his state of mind. It is sufficient that the circumstances are such as to lead inevitably to the conclusion that
the time [of such statement] the declarant did not expect to survive the injury from which he actually died. Its
admissibility is not affected by death occurring hours or days afterwards.

Sec. 38, Rule 130

7) Viacrusis v. CA
 The admission of Mrs. Beatriz Costelo, to the effect that, although the land in dispute was physically in the possession of
her now deceased husband, Pelagio Costelo, he and she recognized Orais as the owner of said land — which was
confirmed by the public document Exhibit G — constitutes a declaration of Mr. and Mrs. Costelo adverse to their own
interest which is admissible in evidence, pursuant to section 32 of said Rule 130. Petitioners have no reason
whatsoever to object to the consideration in favor of Orais of said admission, the same having been made in 1936,
more than five (5) years before their (petitioner's) predecessor in interest, Balentin Ruizo, had entered into the picture,
when Orais and Costelo were the only parties who had any interest in the object of said admission. Pursuant to said
legal provision, such admission "may be received in evidence," not only against the party who made it "or his
successors in interest," but, also, "against third persons.

Sec. 39, Rule 130

8) People v. Alegado
-hearsay issue: on the age/birthdate of child victim as testified by her lolo
-2 counts of rape
-accused was a market watchman
-As appellant was going downstairs, he was seen by Patrolwoman Evangeline Alfaro, a member of the San Carlos City INP
assigned at Precinct No. 1, a police outpost near the main entrance of the public market
-Alfaro noticed that complainant was pale, with blood flowing to her thighs and legs, and was reeling as if feeling dizzy

-Firstly, the accused-appellant contends that the offended party's actual age at the time of the alleged incidents of rape
was not establisher with certainty, hence, it was error on the part of the trial court to convict the accused-appellant of
statutory rape as defined and penalized under paragraph 3, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

We are not persuaded. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party herself and her maternal
grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was born on September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay
evidence as claimed by the accused-appellant but rather fall under the exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under
sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Under Section 40 of the said Rule, it is provided, in part,
that:
 SEC. 40. — Family reputation or tradition regading pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to
the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. ...

The word pedigree under Section 39 of the same Rule includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these facts occurred and the names of the relatives.

In the case of Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250, 261 [1979], we stated that:

... [D]eclarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are admitted on the principle that they are natural expressions of
persons who must know the truth (See Sec. 33, Rule 130 Revised Rules of Court now Sec. 39, Rule 130 under the new
Rules). Pedigree testimony is admitted because it is the best that the nature of the case admits and because greater evil
might arise from the rejection of such proof than from its admission. (Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1420)

In the present case, the applicability of Rule 130, Section 39 of the Revised Rules on Evidence to prove the victim's age is
beyond question. The said provision contains three requisites for its admissibility, namely: (1) that there is controversy in
respect to the pedigree of any of the members of a family; (2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person
concerned existed previous to the controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition regarding
the pedigree of the person must be a member of the family of said person. All these preconditions are obtaining in the case
at bar considering that the date of birth of the rape victim is being put in issue; that the declaration of the victim's
grandfather relating to tradition (sending a child to school upon reaching the age of seven) existed long before the rape
case was filed; and that the witness testifying to the said tradition is the maternal grandfather of the rape victim.

9) Ferrer v. De Inchausti

Doctrine: Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, to be
admissible as an evidence of pedigree, need NOT be proven to have been made at the same time as the occurrence of the
events documented.

Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. – The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or
charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.

Facts:
Plaintiffs Rafael and Maria Angeline filed a complaint praying for the declaration that their mother, Rosa Matilde, had the
right to succeed from the inheritance left by Isabel Gonzalez in the same capacity as of the latter’s other four children.
Plaintiffs mainly allege that Rosa Matilde is a legitimate child of Isabel Gonzalez from his first husband, and being that they
are Rosa’s legitimate children and surviving heirs; they are entitled to receive her share in the inheritance. Defendants’
answer admits that Isabel Gonzalez and his first husband were survived by a child named Ramon but denied that Rosa
Matilde was a daughter of that marriage. The day book of Ramon which he kept during his lifetime was presented to show
that a child named Rosa Matilde “born of unknown parents” was baptized and delivered to his mother Isabel as evidenced
by a baptismal certificate. Defendant Joaquin also stated that Ramon has once assured him that Rosa Matilde was not his
sister but only a mere protégée and that her true name was Rosa Matilde Robles as evidenced by a birth certificate he took
from the parochial church. After due trial, the court ruled for the defendants.
Issue:
Whether defendant’s testimony may be used to prove Rosa Matilde’s lack of filiation to Isabel Gonzalez.
Ruling: YES.
In view of the fact that Ramon Martinez Viademonte is now dead, the testimony of Joaquin Jose de Inchausti referring to
the said deceased is admissible, for they are members of the same family, in accordance with the provisions of section 281
of Act No. 190, and consequently, the conclusion is that Rosa Matilde is the same Rosa Matilde Robles which is mentioned
in Exhibit 6 and because she was born in 1852, in no manner could her be legitimate daughter of Ramon Viademonte and
Isabel Gonzalez whose marriage was dissolved in 1836 by the death of the husband.
Legitimate filiation presupposes the existence of marriage contracted by the presumed parents in accordance with law,
and therefore a person cannot be declared to be a legitimate daughter of her mother, without presuming at the same time
that she was born in the marriage of this mother with the presumed father, who, in his lifetime, and without his consent,
could not have been considered as father of a child that was not conceived by his own wife, because the mere fact of
having used his surname after his death, without his assent or consent, does not constitute a proof of filiation of parternity.

Sec. 42, Rule 130

10) People v. Putian
-homicide at dance hall
-Mis Occ
-murder or homicide? of Panimdim
-The peculiarity of this case is that no eyewitness was presented to testify on the assault which resulted in the victim's
death
-The prosecution presented only two witnesses: (1) The doctor who treated the victim at the hospital and who testified on
the nature of his wound and the cause of his death (Exh. A) and (2) the policeman who arrested the accused and seized
from him the dagger allegedly used in the stabbing (Exh. B) and who took down the victim's ante-mortem statement
Identifying "Guirmo" Putian as his assailant (Exh. C).

On the other hand, the accused did not testify in his own behalf. The defense presented only one witness. He testified that
appellant Putian was in the dance hall when the victim was stabbed outside that hall.

-Patrolman Yap wrote on a piece of paper the victim's declaration that it was Putian who stabbed him

-Yap explained that Panimdim mentioned only a person named Guirmo and that he, Yap, was the one who added the
surname Putian in the statement Exhibit C. He clarified that he wrote that surname because he knew of no other person
called Guirmo in that locality except Guirmo Putian, an alleged gambler

-The trial court, in convicting Putian, regarded Panimdim's ante-mortem statement as part of the res gestae. Obviously, it
did not give to that statement the probative value of a dying declaration because the declarant at the time he made the
statement was not under a consciousness of an impending death (See see. 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court; People vs. Saliling,
L-27974, February 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 427).

-Appellant Putian challenges the trial court's ruling that Panimdim's ante-mortem statement was part of the res gestae as
envisaged in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 36. Part of the res gestae.— Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately
prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as a part of the res gestae.
So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received
as a part of the res gestae.

The res gestae rule embraces (a) spontaneous exclamations and (b) verbal acts (5 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court,
1970 Ed., p. 362). The trial court admitted Panimdim's statement as a spontaneous statement made after the commission
of a felony (People vs. Talledo and Timbreza, 85 Phil. 533).

Appellant Putian contends that Panimdim's statement was not spontaneous because it was "made several hours after the
incident".

-SC: PART OF RES GESTAE

The res gestae rule embraces

(a) spontaneous exclamations and
(b) verbal acts (5 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 362). The trial court admitted Panimdim's
statement as a spontaneous statement made after the commission of a felony (People vs. Talledo and Timbreza, 85 Phil.
533).

-Panimdim's statement was given sometime after the stabbing while he was undergoing treatment at a medical clinic. He
had no time to concoct a falsehood or to fabricate a malicious charge against Putian (See People vs. Ner. L-25504, July 31,
1969, 28 SCRA 1151, 1161-2). No motive has been shown as to why he would frame up Putian.
 11) People v. Peralta
--mother was strangled by father witnessed by their child
-The prosecution witnesses were Dr. Wilfredo Galan, the medical officer who performed the autopsy on Rosita Peralta; 3
Atanacia Ramos, her mother; 4 and Judge Juan B. Paaño, Jr., who took Rosita's sworn statement. 5 The defense presented
the accused himself 6 and his daughter Siony.

-Siony, the daughter, had earlier implicated her father in the sworn statement she made at the preliminary investigation of
the case. 11 She now appeared to testify on his behalf. She swore on the stand that she did see someone strangling her
mother in the morning in question but insisted that she could not identify that person. 12 In effect, she said that the culprit
was not her father, thus contradicting her earlier assertion that she saw him strangling her mother.

After the defense had rested, the prosecution presented Judge Paaño as rebuttal witness. He affirmed the regularity of the
preliminary investigation he conducted and declared that Siony's narration of the strangulation of her mother by the
accused was completely voluntary.

-There is another important point. The statement she made to her grandmother when she rushed to inform her of her
father's attack on her mother was part of the res gestae under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This section
provides:

Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with
respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

Res gestae means the "thing done." As held in People v. Sanchez, 16 it refers to those exclamations and statements made
by either the participants, victims or spectators to a crime immediately before, during or immediately after the commission
of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a
false statement.

There are three requisites for the admission of evidence as constituting part of the res gestae, to wit: 1) that the principal
act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and 3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances. 17

-The well-known rule is that retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with considerable disfavor by the
courts. 21 In the case before us, Siony testified during the preliminary examination conducted by Judge Paaño that the
appellant choked her mother to death. Her subsequent retraction was an afterthought and has no probative value at all.

-There is no need to rule on the appellant's extrajudicial confession as it was not submitted in evidence by the prosecution.
Evidence not formally offered or whose purpose has not been specified is not supposed to be considered by the court.

Sec. 44, Rule 130

12) Fortus v. Novero
-marriage not duly proven which then affects the right
- this Court held that a baptismal administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the
child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate that concern the
relationship of the person baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order that their truth may be admitted, must
indispensably be shown by proof recognized by law.

-settlement of intestate estate were commenced by Rosario Novero who claimed to be an illegitimate child of the deceased
Victorino Fortus (Ciriaca's grandson), born on April 4, 1922 out of Victorino's alleged illicit relations with Patricia Novero.

-oppositors were half-siblings of the deceased

-The above assignment of errors make it obvious that the only issue involved in this appeal is one of fact: whether or not Fermin
Fortus and Jacoba Aguil were legally married. Indeed, at page 8 (last paragraph) of their brief the Fortuses openly admit that "the
sole question in this case" is "whether petitioners' mother, Jacoba Aguil, was legally married to Fermin Fortus".

-The testimony of David de Jesus, Jr. of the Division of Archives, National Library, Manila, who identified Exhibit "5" clearly
established that there existed no records of such marriage. This statement was corroborated by Clemente Barbosa, a clerk in the
office of the Municipal Treasurer of Rosario, Batangas that there were no records of such marriage from 1902 to 1922 of the
Municipality of Rosario, Batangas. So that the conclusion is now inevitable that when the pre-war records were burned as per
Exhibit "7", the imaginary record of marriage of Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil could not have been included, as it never existed at
all.

The testimony of Jacoba Aguil which is purely self-serving and which was contradicted by a sincere witness, Felicidad Blay, cannot
serve as a basis to establish the celebration of the marriage in question. Neither could said marriage be established by the
contradicting statements of Clemente Fortus and Pio Fortus. Both claimed to have seen the marriage contract. Clemente Fortus said
that it was written in Tagalog while Pio said it was written in Spanish.
-Disregarding the principle of primary or best and secondary evidence, still the Court believes that the other testimonial evidence as
well as documentary evidence adduced do not establish their claim.

-The deposition of Victoriana Guerro was presented. Victoriana Guerro was a relative of Jacoba Aguil and she could not be expected
to be unbiased. Her description of the celebration of marriage between Fermin and Jacoba was contrary to the existing procedure
prescribed by the then existing marriage law.

-On this score that Court believes that the witnesses for the Fortuses brothers and sisters and the Fortuses themselves made a story
which was of their own concoction. In the light of these findings and observations the Court was of the considered opinion that
Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil were not legally married.

-Exhibit "2" is not an evidence of legitimacy much less of marriage between Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil. It is a baptismal
certificate and it does not serve as proof of relationship of or filiation of the child baptized. "The record of baptism as a general rule,
in all documents, attest to the fact which give rise to its issue, and the date thereof, to wit, the fact of the administration of the
sacrament on the date stated, but not the truth of the statements therein made as to the parentage of the child baptized."

Facts: Ciriaca Angelo was the owner of the parcel of land. She had only one child, Crisanta Ilagan. Crisanta predeceased her mother.
Crisanta was married to Fermin Fortus. They had an only son, the Victorino Fortus. Ciriaca died intestate. The property therefore
passed on to Victorino Fortus. However, Victorino never caused the OCT to be cancelled and to have another issued in his name.
Ciriaca’s estate was therefore not yet closed.

Victorino Fortus and Julia Fortus were husband and wife but were childless. Upon Victorino's death, Julia executed an affidavit of
extra-judicial summary settlement of Ciriaca’s estate and had it registered. Rosario Novero, claiming to be an illegitimate child of
Victorino with Patricia Novero, initiated proceedings for summary settlement of Ciriaca’s estate. Julia opposed, along with the
Fortuses, who claim to be Victorino’s half-brother and sisters. They claim to be the legitimate children of Fermin Fortus with Jacoba
Aguil.

The Fortuses did not present the marriage contract or certificate of their alleged parents, but sought to present secondary evidence.
The SC found the testimonial evidence the Fortuses presented to lay the basis for introduction of secondary evidence were
inconsistent, incredible and insufficient to establish than an original marriage contract was indeed executed. However, the Fortuses
presented baptismal certificates of some of them to prove the marriage of their parents. Note that they must prove marriage
because otherwise, they would be illegitimate relatives of Victorino which would disqualify them from inheriting from him.

Held: The record of baptism attests to the fact of the administration of the sacrament on the date stated therein, but not the truth
of the statements therein made as to the parentage of the child baptized. Neither are the baptismal certificates public documents
or public writings, because the parochial records of baptisms are not public or official records, as they are not kept by public officers,
and are not proof of relationship or filiation of the child baptized.

Furthermore, though the Fortuses invoke that since for the past 30 years their parents had deported themselves in public as
husband and wife and had been living under the same roof, the legal presumption is that they had entered into a lawful marriage.
This presumption, however, is only applicable where there is no clear and concrete evidence showing otherwise. In this case,
however, there is a certificate from the Division of Archives to the effect that 'no copy of the marriage record of spouses Fermin
Fortus and Jacoba Aguil supposed to have been solemnized in the year 1902 and 1905 in the Municipality of Rosario, Batangas had
been received by said office for file', and this certification is further strengthened by the affirmation of Clemente Barbosa, a clerk in
the office of the municipal treasurer of Rosario, Batangas, that there was no record of such marriage supposedly contracted
between the spouses Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil from 1902 and 1922 of the Municipality of Rosario, Batangas. At most, the
baptismal certificates were only a prima facie proof which oppositor Julia Fortus had overcome by satisfactory evidence to the
effect that Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil were never married and hence all of their children are not legitimate brothers or half
brothers and therefore have no right to inherit from Victorino Fortus.

Sec. 46, Rule 130

13) Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales
--Sy Kiat was a male Chinese national who dead leaving real and personal properties here in the Philippines

-Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law and custom was conclusively
proven. To buttress this argument they rely on the following testimonial and documentary evidence.

-These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the same do not suffice
to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law or custom.

-On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a court of
justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact"

-Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven,
namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing
evidence

-Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section 25, thus:
 SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may
be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.

The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence
of a written foreign law [Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and
Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471 (1935).]

In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage.
The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only
because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter.
For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law
or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

Sec. 47, Rule 130

14) Tan v. CA
-Doctrine: Inability to testify should proceed from a grave cause, almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old
and has lost the power of speech. Absent a showing that the witness is dead, outside the Philippines, or unable to testify,
their prior testimony is inadmissible. Mere refusal to testify is does not amount to inability to testify. The party could have
urged to court to have these witnesses summoned, arrested, and punished for contempt in case of refusal to obey the
summons.

-establishing a children-to-father, illegitimate relationship between petitioners and the principal respondent Francisco Tan,
and to compel the latter to support petitioners.

-petitioner children thru their mother

-mother, Celestina Daldo subscribed before the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Manila to an affidavit categorically
stating that respondent Francisco Tan, defendant in Civil Case 26909, "is not the father of my said minor children named
Carmelita and Rodolfo (herein petitioners) but another person whose name I cannot divulge"; and that she prepared said
affidavit precisely "to record what is true and to correct what misinterpretation may arise in the future".

-one year and eight months after Civil Case 26909 was dismissed — petitioners, this time thru their maternal grandfather
Servillano Daldo as guardian ad litem, commenced the present action before the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court (Civil
Case 00855) for acknowledgment and support, involving the same parties, cause of action and subject matter.

-1. Threshold question is the admissibility of Exhibits H and I, testimony of petitioners' witnesses in the former case.
Petitioners balk at the ruling denying admissibility.

The controlling statute is Section 37, Rule 123 of the 1940 Rules of Court, now Section 41, Rule 130, viz:

SEC. 41. Testimony at a former trial. — The testimony of a witness deceased or out of the Philippines, or unable to testify,
given in a former case between the same parties, relating to the same matter, the adverse party having had an opportunity
to cross-examine him, may be given in evidence.

Concededly, the witnesses at the former trial were subpoenaed by the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court a number of
times. These witnesses did not appear to testify.

But are their testimonies in the former trial within the coverage of the rule of admissibility set forth in Section 41, Rule 130?
These witnesses are not dead. They are not outside of the Philippines. Can they be categorized as witnesses of the class
unable to testify? The Court of Appeals, construing this term, held that "subsequent failure or refusal to appear thereat
[second trial] or hostility since testifying at the first trial does not amount to inability to testify, but such inability
proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech.
(Griffith vs. Sauls, 77 Tex 630, 14 S.W. 230, 231; section 37 of Rule 123, Rules of Court)."

Here, the witnesses in question were available. Only, they refused to testify. No other person that prevented them from
testifying, is cited. Certainly, they do not come within the legal purview of those unable to testify

15) People v. Liwanag

--accused guilty of Anti-Subversion Act
-HUKBALAHAP, later on the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB)
-On being cross-examined by the court, however, the appellant admitted membership in the Hukbalahap, and later in the
HMB, from 1948 to 1960, and did not take advantage of the amnesty offered in 1948. 12
-On the fore is his claim that he was deprived of his fundamental right to confront the witnesses against him when the trial
court granted the motion of the Fiscal that the testimony of the witnesses presented during the preliminary investigation
be adopted and made part of the evidence for the prosecution.

-The appellant further claims that he had been charged with rebellion ad subversion based upon the same overt act, and
since he had already been convicted of rebellion, he cannot now be prosecuted for subversion. MISPLACED

-elements for the different charges are different and based on established facts i.e. that he contitnued to hold different
positions and different capacities at different times

====
People v. Liwanag
73 SCRA 473 (1976)

Facts: The prosecution moved that the testimony of the witnesses presented during the preliminary investigation of this
case be adopted as part of the evidence in chief of the prosecution. The trial court granted the motion subject to the
condition that the witnesses be further cross-examined by counsel for the accused. At the trial, the witnesses for the
prosecution who testified at the preliminary investigation were recalled and were again cross-examined by counsel for the
appellant.

Held: The testimony sought to be made part of the evidence in chief are not ex-parte affidavits, but testimony of witnesses
taken down by question and answer during the preliminary investigation in the presence of the accused and his counsel
who subjected the said witnesses to a rigid and close cross-examination. The inclusion of said testimony was made subject
to the right of the defendant to further cross-examine the witnesses whose testimony are sought to be reproduced and,
pursuant to said order, the witnesses were recalled to the stand during the trial and again examined in the presence of the
appellant. Upon the facts, there was no curtailment of the constitutional right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to
face.