Instructions !!!!

Shifting Battle Lines
Why terrorism?
Yael Shahar
Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict
Converging trends
Terrorism has three primary
target audiences:
 The enemy homefront
 The friendly homefront
 The international arena
All of which are classed as civilians
© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

Terrorism follows conventional warfare
Terrorism tends to follow conventional warfare in terms
of methods and tactics.
What differentiates the terrorist from the conventional
soldier is not his choice of weaponry or tactics, but
rather his choice of target.
While the soldier fights his enemy on the battlefield, and
chooses his targets according to their military value, the
terrorist targets the civilian population; his targets are
often chosen for purely symbolic value.

Terrorism follows conventional warfare
But the weapons and tactics are of the same
type as those employed by conventional
armies on the battlefield.
Thus, if we wish to establish what new
weapons terrorists may have at their disposal,
we should first examine recent advances in
weapons and tactics in the sphere of
conventional warfare.

Information as a weapon
Information-based weapons relocate the
strategic centre of gravity from military forces
to direct attacks on civilian targets.
Whether such weapons are ever used in actual
warfare may prove immaterial, as the very fact
of the media hype may help to draw the
attention of terrorist organizations to some of
these methods, as something likely to arouse
fear in the general populace.

Today's Menu…
 How well do IR theories explain
terrorism?
 Conditions for Terrorism - Root
causes, rational choice, and other
notions
 Terrorism as a strategy.
 Why are “Intractable Conflicts”
intractable?
Summing up…
Citizens of democracies, which are founded on

free speech coupled with accountability, are
more susceptible to media manipulation than
are dictatorships, since information provided by
the media is generally considered reliable
(even when it isn't).

A (somewhat cautious) estimation
Terrorists are dependent on success, as failure could
threaten the cohesiveness or the very existence of
the group.
This creates and environment of risk aversion where
known and proven tactics are preferred.

What Causes Terrorism
The Usual Suspects … How well do the
traditional IR theories explain terrorism?
 Realism
 Liberalism
 Institutionalism
 Constructivism

What are the necessary conditions
 A conflict. Terrorism does not accompany every conflict, but
every instance of terrorism does revolve around a conflict.
However, the conflict may be only in the mind of the terrorist!
Meaning that the conflict may not be a physical one.
 Expectations for change. Terrorism doesn't happen in
situations where there is no hope for change.
 A supportive constituency. Terrorist organizations are the
expression of a collective identity.
 An ideological argument. But, which comes first, the
ideological justification for terrorism, or the fact of terrorism?
 Institutionalization of violence. There will be some sort of
movement which propagates itself by taking in new members.

Realism and Transnational Terrorism
“…the question of what does a Realist theory of
international politics have to say about terrorists? The
answer is not a whole heck of a lot.” - John
Mearsheimer, 2002
Realism posits that states are the only actors within the
international system. Terrorists operate within the
international system, causing states to react to them and
visa versa.
Mearsheimer noted in 2002, “My theory and virtually all
Realist theories don't have much to say about
transnational actors.”
Realism and Religious Extremism
Realism is based upon power evaluations and
security.
A faith, when practiced in its entirety, is
absolutist. The faith is right; all else is wrong.
To a religious extremist, realist power
considerations most likely do not matter.

Realism's Score Card
Ideology – May or may not “short circuit”
realism.
Nationalism – Does “short circuit” realism.
Transnational Terrorism – Does “short circuit”
realism.
Religious Extremism – Does “short circuit”
realism.

Institutionalism
The motivations of the terrorist organization,
considered as a "living organism", are not
necessarily those of the individual recruit.
In fact, once an organization reaches a certain
size, the core motivations tend to diverge
dramatically.

Institutionalism
Both Ideology and the appeal to root causes
are great vehicles for recruiting, motivating,
and manipulating the organization's cadre.
But the organization as a whole will invariably
play by other rules. It is motivated by survival,
pure and simple.

Institutionalism
Organizations, like humans, are quite creative
when it comes to survival.
If one set of grievances plays out, or is
addressed in such a way as to no longer
serves as a motivator, then the organization
will face a concrete threat.
It will either have to find a new set of
grievances, accept dissolution, or mutate into
something else.
Liberalism
Democratic peace theory?
What frightens regimes like Iran and Saudi Arabia isn't
Israeli leaders like Ariel Sharon, but Israeli leaders like
Shimon Peres.
After all, Sharon made a good boogie-man with which to
scare the masses, but these regimes know that Israel
has no territorial ambitions.
(Hell, we can't manage what we've got!).

Liberalism
Democratic peace theory?
But Shimon Peres and his dreams of an economic
paradise in the "New Middle East" …now that's
frightening!
The very idea of a Western-style democracy smack-dab
in the middle of the "Muddle" East is bad enough. Now
the crazy Israelis want to expand their corrupt Western
economic hegemony over the whole region!
So, what frightens our local despots isn't leaders like
Sharon; it's "Shimon Peres and Buffy the Vampire
Slayer".

Score Card for Liberalism
The continuing appeal and success of Al-
Qaida's ascendancy would seem to undermine
a key tenet of liberalism—the triumph of worthy
ideas.
A good (i.e. progressive and pro-survival) idea
should prevail over a bad one, and yet al-
Qaida's rather “successful” ideology is non-
progressive and possibly even counter-
survival.

Constructivism
Mearsheimer argued that while terrorism
cannot be explained in realist terms, state
responses to terrorism can.
However, the fact that terrorism can affect the
actions of powerful states proves that its
ideationally-motivated actions can draw these
states into its own conceptual territory—a
territory where constructivists would feel right
at home.

Constructivism
To the extent that al-Qaida is able to force
states to do things that they would not
otherwise have any interest in doing, it
achieves state-like power without any of the
traditional physical or institutional assets of
statehood.
Al-Qaida is very much a value-based,
ideological entity, the embodiment of the idea
of fundamentalist Islamic hegemony.

Huntington and “cultural peace theory”
Common governmental systems (e.g.
democracy) and economic interdependence
are the result of a much more fundamental
unifying factor: a shared culture.
Without this underlying factor, neither
democracy nor economic ties would keep the
peace.

Cultural Peace Theory thus contends that “kin cultures”
do not fight each other.
A corollary is that culturally-allied blocs of states are
likely to go to war (or at least contend) with rival blocs.
Thus, we see the West, with its liberal democratic values
and free-market economics, pitted against blocs whose
cultural norms are fundamentally different, such as the
Muslim world and the Asian bloc.

“A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of
people and the broadest level of cultural identity people
have short of that which distinguishes humans from
other species.”
Nation-states should not be seen as the only actors on
the international scene; the entire notion of the state is
actually a recent development, and may already be
approaching obsolescence.

The “clash of civilizations” is driven by the
expansionist nature of the rival cultural blocs.
In the conflict between the West and the Global
Jihad, both sides are driven by fundamentally
“globalizing” ideologies.
Thus, Huntington adds a constructivist
element—the “balance of culture”—to the
realist notion of the balance of power.
Al-Qaida as “norm entrepreneur”
Al-Qaida is the quintessential constructivist
organization. It is neither a state nor an
institution.
It seeks power primarily through non-material
means, as “an idea moving across geographic
boundaries carried by satellite television.”

Al-Qaida as “norm entrepreneur”
In fact, Al-Qaida is attempting to create something that
did not exist previously: a new social and cultural norm
for all Muslims.
Al-Qaeda's rhetoric about a global Islamic identity aims
at driving a self-fulfilling prophecy, constructing a
collective identity rather than simply reflecting it.
Al-Qaida sees itself as standing on an equal footing with
the great powers of the state system.

Does this prove anything?
To the extent that the United States is now
competing with al-Qaida head-to-head in a war
of ideas, the jihadi strategy of leveling the
playing field has succeeded.
The fact that the United States has been forced
to compete at such a disadvantage can be
explained only in purely constructivist terms.

Does this prove anything?
While Pape argues that al-Qaida's talk of ideology is
really a cover for realist territorial ambitions, it can
equally well be argued that al-Qaida's espoused “realist”
goals, such as liberating Muslim lands, are in reality just
a recruiting ploy for its true ideological struggle, a tool to
help create a new (or revitalized) concept of Muslim
identity.
Al-Qaida's decision to take the battle so far into
constructivist territory has as much to do with the
organization's worldview as it does with strategic
concerns.

Score Card for Constructivism
Al-Qaida's decision to choose the battlefield of
ideas was taken from a perceived position of
strength, not weakness
It was a repudiation of realism, not a surrender
to it.
To the extent that al-Qaida succeeds in its
aims, then, it has proven a core belief of
constructivism—that ideas can vie with
material power for international influence.
The extent to which the al-Qaida and its
offshoots can induce various countries to
oppose, or even simply to abstain from
supporting, U.S. policies, shows the power of
ideas; as the United States is the sole extant
superpower, reducing its influence in this way
is no small achievement.

If the ideational rallying cry of “cultural jihad” has in fact
been translated into material power—at least enough to
provoke the United States into undertaking actions that
would otherwise be against its own interest—then ideas
have power on a par with traditional military and
economic might.
Ideas may not fully equate to traditional power, but they
can play a major role in resource allocation and in the
determination of the uses to which power is put.

Is Terrorism Economically-driven?
The Minimum
The Minimum Linesays
Line Theory Theory
that political
violence breaks out when quality of life falls
Quality of Life
below a certain minimum line.
Uprising
Time
Expectations
© YaelLevel
Shahar, Institute for the Study ofCurrent Level
Asymmetric Conflict
The Expectation Theory says that an
The Expectation uprising
Theory
breaks out when quality of life is on the rise, but
does not rise fast enough to meet expectations.
Quality of
Life
Uprising
Time
Expectations Level Current Level
In the case of Israel and the Palestinians the
key dates to look at here are:
1. 1936-39: The Arab Revolt
2. 1987-90: The Intifada
3. 2000-05: Al-Aqsa Intifada

1.5
1936-39: The Arab Revolt

INDEX, 1931 as a base year (1)
1.45
1.4
1.35
In the Arab Revolt, the ones making the
1.3
1.25
uprising where the fedayeen, so one should
1.2
1.15
look at the state of the economy for this sector.
1.1
1.05
In 1936, daily wages in agriculture were rising,
1
0.95
but fell over the summer after the uprising had
0.9
0.85
started. Child survival and education were also
0.8
rising.1925Daily1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936
Wage in Agriculture Rural vs. Urban Prices
Child Survival Child Participation in Education

3
1987-88 Intifada
2.5
For the 1987 Intifada, we can also see that economic
as a base year (1 )
indicators
2 were rising.
1.5
1
INDEX, 1970
0.5
0
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Net Wage GNP per Capita Employment Level
1.1
2000 Al-Aqsa Intifada
For the intifada of 2000 this was true again. The crisis
INDEX, 1995 as a base year (1)
didn't1 occur in 96, when the indicators hit a low spot, but
only broke out four years later.
0.9
0.8
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Net Wage © Yael Shahar, Employment

Institute for the Study Level
of Asymmetric Conflict
Child Participation in Education Children Living above the Poverty Line
Score Card for Economy as a Root Cause?
The rising expectations theory appears to
be ahead on points!
What sort of theory is the Expectations theory?
Due to its reliance on perceptions, we would
have to classify it as a constructivist theory.

Is Terrorism driven by despair or by public opinion?
It is often stated that progress in the Peace
Process between Israel and the Palestinians
should be accompanied by a decline in support
for violence among the two populations.
We can get a rough idea of whether support for
violence in general may be itself affected by
progress in the Peace Process by
superimposing some key events in the peace
process on the a graph of the trends.

JMCC Polls
Support for Suicide Bombings
Park Hotel Bombing Aqaba
PAMutual Attacks
Support Hanbali Operation
Arafat
Sa'adeh Abu for suicide bombing
Security Fence Road Map I Road Map II Road Map IIIDays
Operation ending
Elections with of el-Sheikh
Dies
Sharm Events
Peace
Targeted
Military in PA
Process
Killings
Campaigns
& al-Arouj Jadallah
DefensiveShehade
Shield ceasefire Yassin
Shanab Penitence
Rantisi
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
A -0 1
ug 2
A -0 3
ug 4
A -0 5
ug 6
A - 02
A - 03
A - 04
A - 05
A - 06
O - 01
Fe -0 1
O - 02
Fe -0 2
O - 03
Fe -0 3
O - 04
Fe -0 4
O - 05
Fe -0 5
6
Ju - 01
Ju - 02
Ju - 03
Ju - 04
Ju - 05
Ju - 06
D - 01
D - 02
D - 03
D t- 04
D - 05
-0
A -0
A -0
A -0
n
n
b
b
ec
ec
ec
ec
ec
ug
ug
ug
pr
pr
pr
pr
pr
pr
ct
ct
ct
ct
c
A

Support for suicide bombing
Support for Intifada
Support for Continuation of Intifada R = 0.78

Support for Intifada
Support for Continuation of the Intifada R = 0.66

Support for Suicide bombings
© Yael
Support for Suicide Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric
bombings R = 0.87Conflict
Support for Suicide bombings
Support for Suicide bombings R = 0.81

Is Terrorism Public-Opinion Driven?
There is a clear correlation between number of attacks
and their severity, as measured by the number of
fatalities and support for violence, with a correlation
coefficient between 0.66 and 0.87.
Perhaps most significantly, the highest correlation was
seen between support for suicide bombings and actual
suicide bombings—0.81 to 0.87.
This would support the hypothesis that there is a strong
correlation between number of terrorist attacks in Israel
and the level of Palestinian support for violence against
Israel.
Is Terrorism Public-Opinion Driven?
Support for suicide attacks was highest during the
period of frequent attacks leading up to the Park Hotel
bombing in March 2002.
Support for suicide attacks rose markedly from
December 2001 to March 2002, peaking at 72% and
staying constant until June 2001.
This corresponded to a particularly intensive wave of
suicide attacks against Israeli civilians. A survey
conducted later that month showed support for suicide
attacks at 60%.
A (somewhat cautious) estimation
The practical and strategic assessments likely to
be carried out by the terrorist make it probably
that conventional explosives will remain
weapons of choice for most terrorist groups.
The exceptions are groups motivated by
apocalyptic beliefs and have cult-like
characteristics.
The global jihad fits into this category.
Introduction to “Conflict Memetics”
Asymmetric (or “fourth generation”) conflict
does not normally lead to conventional victory.
Both sides retain their ability to continue the
fight.
These conflicts are easy to get into, but hard to
get out of. Some do get resolved—eventually.
Others seem to go on forever.
Why?
Ripeness / Readiness Theory
Conflict de-escalation and fruitful negotiation
depend on two principal conditions:
 “Mutually Hurting Stalemate” (MHS)
• Catastrophes (real or possible) contribute to “ripeness”.
• Perception is more important than “reality”.
• An “effective” stalemate is one that poses unacceptable
costs/risks to both sides.
• Adaptation to stalemate prevents “ripeness”.
 Optimism about satisfactory conflict resolution
• As conflict draws on, this gets harder—but not impossible.
What prevents ripeness/readiness?

Memetics: an evolutionary view of mental
constructs
Memes—ideas, beliefs, habits of thought,
etc.— “succeed” by persisting, spreading, and
intensifying.
“Explicit” memes are declared openly and
propagated knowingly/deliberately.
“Implicit” memes are propagated based upon
the behavior they cause, usually without intent
or even awareness of their existence.
“Memeplexes”
Memes often travel in groups: groups of
associated memes referred to as meme
complexes, or “memeplexes”.
Some components of a memeplex typically
serve as “guardian memes”, promoting the
memeplex's propagation, maintaining its
integrity, etc.
Religions, ideologies, nationalisms, and so on
are all memeplexes.
Guardian memes: a Jewish example
“You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart,
with all your soul, and with all your resources. And these
things which I command you today shall be on your
heart. Teach them diligently to your children, and speak
of them while you sit at home, while you walk on your
way, when you lie down and when you rise up. Bind
them as a sign on your arm, let them be Totafot between
your eyes. Write them on the doorposts of your house
and on your gates.”
“...so that you will remember, and perform all My
commandments, and be holy to your God.”

Guardian memes
Religions have been subject to schism, fanaticism, and
other risks since before recorded history began.
As a result, religions developed “immune systems” to
protect themselves from harmful or overly rapid change.
Long-term survival requires the ability to adapt while
maintaining integrity, to retain enthusiasm without
succumbing (too much) to extremism.

Guardian memes
Religions are generally very successful memeplexes:
they can maintain their integrity for thousands of years.
This helps explain the intractability of religious conflicts:
what is considered truly holy cannot be easily conceded,
and doesn't “just fade away”.
(In this respect, it's important to note that the Northern
Ireland conflict is/was sectarian, not religious!)

They all hate us
anyway
An implicit conflict meme:
“They All Hate Us Anyway”
What will people
think?
Security
and other Violence
drivers
Media
Coverage
Confirmation
Bias
“They Only Understand Violence”
This is a two-host mutually reinforcing
meme.
 If the other side understands only violence, then
we must behave violently in order to communicate.
 Since the other side communicates with us only by
violence, that must be all they understand!
Can you make peace with someone who

understands only violence? So much for
optimism! © Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict
“Takfir”
The “Takfir” meme was originally part of
Islam's immune system, intended to enforce
observance and orthodoxy.
It has been adapted by al Qaeda and its allies
as a facilitator of extremism: those who don't
toe the line our way are infidels.
This works, but at a cost!
Memes that are useful and seem successful at
first may not be viable long-term.
“Deterrence”
“Deterrence” is the charming failure of asymmetric
conflict. Everybody loves it, even though it doesn't really
work.
 Paradoxically, “Deterrence” is reinforced by its own
failures: “They attacked us again? We need more
deterrence!”
 In low-intensity conflict, “Deterrence” requires frequent
violent acts in order to (re-)establish itself.
 To the (dubious) extent that it does work, “Deterrence”
can make stalemate less “mutually hurting”—and thus
delay “ripeness” for conflict resolution.

Implications
Conflict-promoting memes are (mostly) able
survivors—extremely hard to eliminate.
Understanding what they are and how they
work may help temper their impact.
Can we identify/create/promote counter-conflict
memes that are as viable as conflict memes?

Terrorism as Strategy:
Is Terrorism the Peacock's Tail?
An institutional/evolutionary view
 We tend to look at terror organizations primarily in terms
of their goals and grievances. However, to understand
them properly, we need to change our viewpoint to an
institutional one.
 Why? Because a terror organization is, first and
foremost, an organization. History has shown that terror
organizations that do not devote attention to their own
survival do not, in fact, survive.
 This is analogous to biological evolution, where
“success” doesn't necessarily mean being the fastest,
smartest, or “best” but only producing viable offspring.
The peacock with the showiest tail “wins”, as long as he
can fly a little.
Terrorism as Strategy:
Is Terrorism the Peacock's Tail?
An institutional/evolutionary view
 The terror organizations that persist for any length
of time are the ones that have managed to keep
themselves going. The others may make a splash,
but they don’t last long.
 Just as changing climate changes the selection
pressures on biological evolution, the changing
political and technological climate changes the
dangers and opportunities for organizations.

What are the dangers for terror
organizations?
They can “die” in several ways:
 Total defeat due to overwhelming force – the Sri
Lanka model. Difficult and costly for Western
democracies to carry out. Defense:
decentralization and remote locations.
 Decapitation – the Sendero Luminoso/PKK model.
When this can be accomplished, it’s cheap and
effective. Defense: don’t rely on a unitary,
hierarchical leadership.
 Irrelevance – the ETA model. Defence: make your
demands high. Basing on something like a religion
helps as well: religions don't easily obsolesce.
What are the dangers for terror
organizations?
They can “die” in several ways:
 Negotiation – the IRA model. Defence: Cosmic
demands, enough violence to keep the audience
from “going soft” on you.
 Victory. Perhaps the most frightening thing for a
terror organization is to achieve its (ostensible)
goals! Defense: keep the goals so cosmic that full
victory is virtually impossible, while using tactical
victories (i.e. successful attacks) to maintain the
appearance of success.
Implications for Counter-Terrorism
Before we try to end terror campaigns by resolving
grievances or getting rid of “root causes”, we need to
understand that even if “root causes” were crucial in
spawning terror groups, their resolution will not
necessarily end terrorism.
The successful terror organization will do everything
possible to preserve the conditions that lead to the
grievances that keep it going.
Example: Whenever roadblocks are opened in the West
Bank, terror organizations always make sure to mount
attacks; the roadblocks are one of their greatest assets.
Implications for Counter-Terrorism
Decapitation can be effective, particularly with
single-leader groups. For groups with more
“networked” leadership, decapitation may be
impossible – or may be possible, but requiring
that quite a lot of “heads” be “cut off”.
Negotiation/irrelevance – that is, working on
traditional “problem resolution” – may work in
some cases; but the successful terror
organization will fight hard against victory.


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Shifting Battle Lines

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

Citizens of democracies, which are founded on

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

below a certain minimum line.

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

1936-39: The Arab Revolt

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

Net Wage © Yael Shahar, Employment

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

Support for Continuation of Intifada R = 0.78

Support for Continuation of the Intifada R = 0.66

Support for Suicide bombings R = 0.81

What prevents ripeness/readiness?

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

Can you make peace with someone who

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

© Yael Shahar, Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict

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