Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Contents
What is a Super power
Pakistan relations with USA
Introduction
Initial Years
The Evolving period & Ayub’s Era
The China Factor
1965 War
Sobering Experience
The birth of Nuclear factor
Taliban and Nuclear explosion
President Musharaf and 9/11
Key issues B/W PAKISTAN AND USA
Pakistan relations Soviet Union
STRTEGIC GOALS AND ROLE PERCEPTIONS
Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan
PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET THREAT
AND OPTIONS FOR PAKISTAN
Conclusion
Bibliography
Pak relations. China went to the extent of warning Pakistan that such polices were
“diametrically opposed to the interest of peace in Asia, and were also opposed to the
national interests of Pakistan. The later years saw Pakistan leaning towards China and
playing a pivotal role in breaking the Sino-US deadlock. The US, although being
appreciative of the gesture, was irked at Pakistan's g rowing relationship with communist
China. This turned out tube a policy paradox for the US. The China factor still lingers on
and casts a deep s shadow over Pak-US relations. The growing military assistance of all
types from China to Pakistan; the economic linkages manifest in the Gadara Port project,
are all indicators that Pakistan has found substitute to total dependence on the US. Thus,
the emergence of strategic ties between US and India. It is a balancing game that the US
wants to play in the region; while being wear y of the renaissance in Russia. The .growing
economic power of China and the huge market it boasts are additional factors that
impinge upon US policy makers. On the other hand, Pakistan views Chinas an emerging
super power.
Prime Minister Bhutto initially focused his attention with normalizing the domestic
Situation in the country. The major challenge for the new government came in May;
1974when India executed an underground nuclear test. This forced Pakistan to seek a
nuclear weapons program to match India's capabilities. This became a major cause for
concern forth US administration. During “Ford and later Jimmy Carter's administration,
sanctions were placed on Pakistan. Prime Minister Bhutto called elections in, March 1977
from which he gained landslide victory”. Graduating is a Front Line State — 1979 –
1988"On December 29, 1979, Jimmy Carter approved a broader covert action program
that instructed the CIA to provide military weapons and ammunition for the Afghan
anticommunist fighters, who soon became widely known as mujahedeen’’. Pakistan was
given a $3.2 billion aid package for the next six years. In this period Pakistan was a
reliable ally for US and they help Pakistan for increasing their nuclear powers.
In the period of President General Prevail Musharraf "Pakistan was moving closer
to a “failed state" case and its nuclear and missile programs were a constant concern for
policymakers in Washington". “9/11 changed the nature of US — Pakistan relations once
again The US President George Bush asked the world to make a clear choice to side with
the US with the slogan you are either with us or against us. "In the last few years, Pakistan
has captured several hundred operatives of the Al-Qaida organization. There has also
been macro economic revival of the Pakistani economy. "On the Kashmir front, however,
not much progress has been made since India has projected Pakistan as a supporter of
terrorism in Kashmir itself, an accusation vehemently denied by the Pakistanis: and has
used this time for a host of activities such as a massive crack down on the freedom
movement in IHK, erection of an electrified fence along the Line of Control and pursuing
disputed water projects, all to the peril of Pakistan. Hence the lack of enhancing or at
least safeguarding of Pakistani interests in spite of renewed relationship with the U.S is
again a cause of major concern to the Pakistanis.
In February 2010, Anne W. Patterson (U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan) said that the
United States is committed to partnership with Pakistan and further said “Making this
commitment to Pakistan while the U.S. is still recovering from the effects of the global
recession reflects the strength of our vision. Yet we have made this commitment, because
we see the success of Pakistan, its economy, its civil society and its democratic
institutions as important for ourselves, for this region and for the world.” Between 2002–
2010, Pakistan received approximately $18 billion in military and economic aid from the
United States In February 2010, the Osama administration requested an additional $3
billion in aid, for a total of $20.7 billion. In mid-February 2010, after the capture of the
second most powerful Taliban, Abdul Hani Baradar in Pakistan by Pakistani forces, the
White House hailed the operation. Furthermore, White House Press Secretary Robert
Gibbs said that this is a "big success for our mutual efforts (Pakistan and United States)
in the region" and praised Pakistan for the capture, saying it was a sign of increased
cooperation with the US in the terror fight. In March, Richard Holbrooke, then US special
envoy to Pakistan, said that US-Pakistani relations have seen "significant improvement"
under Osama. He also said, “No government on earth has received more high-level
attention" than Pakistan
2011 was rated by the BBC as a “disastrous year" for Pakistan-U.S relations,
primarily due to three events: the Raymond Allen Davis incident, the death of Osama bin
Laden and the Sal lain side State As early as 2005, Western criticism against Pakistan
grew and many European and American political correspondents criticized Pakistan at
the public level. The London-based The Economist in fact observed: "As an American
ally, Pakistan has become an embarrassment for the United States."In January 2011, the
Raymond Allen Davis incident occurred in which Raymond Davis, an alleged private
security contractor, shot dead two Pakistani locals after they attempted to rob him. The
action sparked protests in Pakistan and threatened relations between the United States
and Pakistan, including aid flows. Pakistan prosecuted him despite US demands for
Him to be freed because he enjoys diplomatic immunity. Ultimately he was freed after the
United States made payments to the families of the slain Pakistanis, but the incident was
emblematic of the volatile nature of American-Pakistani relations. In spite of this rocky
relationship, the United States remains committed to assisting Pakistan’s new democratic
government in the areas of development, stability, and security. The CIA had long
suspected Osama Bin Laden of hiding in Pakistan India and US have also accused
Pakistan of giving safe-haven to the Taliban. Collapse of alliance and death of Osama
bin Laden Osama bin Laden, then head of the militant group al-Qaeda, was killed in
Pakistan on May 2, 2011, shortly after 1a.m. local time by a United States special forces
military unit. The operation, codenamed Operation Neptune Spear, was ordered by
United States President Barrack Obama and carried out in a US Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) operation by a team of United States Navy SEALs from the United States
Naval Special Warfare Development Group (also known as DEVGRU or informally by its
former name, SEAL Team Six) of the Joint Special Operations Command, with support
from CIA operatives on the ground. According to Obama’s administration officials, US
officials did not share information about the raid with the government of Pakistan until it
was over. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen called Pakistan’s army
chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani at about 3 a.m. local time to inform him of the Abbott bad
Operation. According to the Pakistani foreignministry, the operation was conducted
entirely by US forces. Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) officials said they were
also present at what they called a joint operation; President Asif Ali Zardari flatly denied
this. Pakistan’s foreign secretary Salman Bashir later confirmed that Pakistani military
had scrambled F-16s after they became aware of the attack but that they reached the
compound after American helicopters had left. 2012–13: American sentiment against
Pakistan Since some in the U.S. government claimed that they had caught bin Laden
without Pakistani help, numerous allegations were made that the government of Pakistan
had shielded bin Laden. Critics cited the very close proximity of bin Laden's heavily
fortified compound to the Pakistan Military Academy, that the US chose not to notify
Pakistani authorities before the operation and the double standards of Pakistan regarding
the perpetrators of the 2008Mumbai attacks.US government files, leaked by WikiLeaks,
disclosed that American diplomats had been told that Pakistani security services were
tipping off bin Laden every time US forces approached. Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI), also helped smuggle al-Qaeda militants into Afghanistan to fight NATO
troops. According to the leaked files, in December2009, the government of Tajikistan had
also told US officials that many in Pakistan were aware of bin Laden's whereabouts.CIA
chief Leon Panetta said the CIA had ruled out involving Pakistan in the operation, because
it feared that "any effort to work with the Pakistanis could jeopardize the mission. They
might alert the targets. However, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that
“cooperation with Pakistan helped lead us to bin Laden and the compound in which he
was hiding. Osama echoed her sentiments. John O. Brennan, Obama'schief
counterterrorism advisor, said that it was inconceivable that bin Laden did not have
support from within Pakistan. He further stated, "People have been referring to this as
hiding in plain sight. We are looking at how he was able to hide out there for so long."In
2012, Shakil Afridi, a doctor who had setup a fake vaccination campaign – in cooperation
with the United States in searching for Al Qaeda and bin Laden –was convicted of treason
by Pakistan, and sentenced to 33 years in prison. The United States Congress voted to
cut33 million dollars in aid to Pakistan: 1million dollars for every year that Shakil Afridi
was sentenced to prison.
Phalanx Close-In Weapons System naval guns (US$80million). Under Coalition Support
Funds (in the Pentagon budget), Pakistan received 6 Bell 412EP utility helicopters, along
with related parts and maintenance, valued at US$235 million. On February 11, 2016, US
government has proposed US $860 million in aid for Pakistan during the 2016–17 fiscal
year, including $265 million for military hardware in addition to counterinsurgency funds.
On August 21, 2017, Donald Trump announced his new strategy for Afghan War
and accused Pakistan of providing safe heavens to terrorists. "The Pakistani people have
suffered greatly from terrorism and extremism. We recognize those contributions and
those sacrifices, but Pakistan has also sheltered the same organizations that try every
single day to kill our people", Trump said. Moreover, Trump also urged India for its role in
the war which was seen, by many in Pakistan, as an anti-Pak strategy. Trump’s speech
led to rise of Anti-American sentiments in Pakistan and protest against Trump were held
across the country. Two months later, Trump tweeted those ewes starting to develop
better relations with the Pakistani government. On January 1, 2018, Donald Trump again
criticized Pakistan, saying "they have givens nothing but lies & deceit.
(September 2002), and Khalid Mohammed (March 2003). The United States also
identified Indian crime figure Dawood Ibrahim as a"global terrorist" with links to both Al
Qaeda and Lashkar-e- Taiba.
Domestic Terrorism
Pakistan continues to suffer from this cancer at home. "In the U.S. these attacks,
often victimizing foreigners and religious minorities, are viewed as expressions of
militants' angel with President Musharraf's regime for its cooperation with the United
States".
is sincere to rid off the terrorism but 55% peoples think that US just try to dominate the
world. Most analysts contend that "Pakistan is probably the most anti-American country
in the world right now, ranging from the radical Islamists on one side tithe liberals and
Westernized elites on the other side. Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation U.S.
policy analysts consider the apparent arms race between India and Pakistan as posing
perhaps the most likely prospect for the future use of nuclear weapons. "The International
Atomic Energy Agency has implicated Pakistani companies in providing critical
technology and parts to Iran's uranium enrichment program. The history of U.S non-
proliferation efforts in Pakistan is long and well known. The sanctions regimes have only
isolated the two further apart from each other. More significantly, it has shown Pakistan
the path to self -reliance; and has given an unprecedented rise to the anti -American
sentiment. However there are persisting concern son the issue, both in Pakistan and the
U.S; concerns that can caste deep shadows on the future relationship of the two countries
when the global war on terror takes a back seat incurs. Foreign policy formulation.
Narcotics
Pakistan is a major transit country for opiates that are grown and processed in
Afghanistan. The region has in the past supplied up to 40% of heroin consumed in the
United States and has been second only to Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle as a top
source of the world's heroin. However, opium production has spiked in post –Taliban
Afghanistan and, in September 2003, “President Bush again identified Pakistan as being
among the world's major illicit drug producing or drug-transit countries. The US House
International Relations Committee Panel told Pakistan that the role of theism in the heroin
trade over the past six years had been substantial.
prevented the evolution of a stable rapprochement. First has been the Soviet Union’s
failure to appreciate Pakistan's geopolitical interests and regional threat perceptions in
the historical context of South Asian politics. The second fact orates to Pakistan’s total
commitment to Western strategic planning in the "northern tier,” its participation in the
anti-Soviet politico-military formation. Pakistan’s post-Bangladesh diplomacy
necessitated bilateralism as a pragmatic approach to balance its relations with the major
powers, but a complex variety of factors made this policy unacceptable to the Soviet
Union. The intensification of Sino-Soviet rivalry, the evolution of Indo-Soviet strategic co-
operation, and the Sino-American rapprochement resulted in immense Soviet pressures
on Pakistan to withdraw from the Sino-U.S. tangle. Pakistan's response to Soviet
initiatives directed at the formation of a political grouping on the southwest flank of China
has been discouraging, which has kept political relations minimal during the past decade.
Political developments in Afghanistan, the Soviet military intervention, and the
1981Pakistan-U.S. package deal have severely complicated Pakistan's relations with the
USSR, which reflect the traditional antagonistic role perception syndrome. This essay
attempts to examine the strategic goals and the role perceptions in Pakistan-USSR
relations with specific reference to the Afghanistan crisis.
Asymmetries of geophysical size, military power, and political purpose sin the
Geopolitical milieu of South Asia has guided Pakistan's strategic goal formation regional
role perceptions. The structural imbalance in the security relations of South Asia and
India’s endeavors to assume a dominant security role in the region has perpetuated
Pakistan's apprehensions about Indian intentions. It has been the central-it of the Indian
threat that has dominated Pakistan's security policies, which are directed toward
achieving a reasonable level of deterrence against India's preponderant military
capabilities. The augmentation of Pakistan's defense infrastructure, which was extremely
limited at the time of independence, was perceived as prerequisite to an independent
national role in South and Southwest Asia. The resource constraints on the formation of
an indigenous and self-reliant defense infrastructure against a militarily threatening and
politically uncompromising India severely curtailed Pakistan's diplomatic options in the
early years after independence. The U.S. containment policy and the relevance of
Pakistan to the “no them-tier" concept on the southern flank of the Soviet Union offered
Pakistan inopportunity to break the siege of isolation. A complex mix of dominant elite
preferences and the centrality of the Indian threat perception influenced Pakistan's
decision to commit itself to the U.S.-sponsored security arrangements in Southeast and
West Asia. While Pakistan's participation in these alliance systems was largely motivated
by its desire to enhance its defense capabilities in the context of South Asian real politic,
it provoked Moscow's hostility as Pakistan's alignment was perceived as hostile to Soviet
security interests. The Soviet leaders considered Pakistan's concept of Muslim
nationalism and its foreign policy orientation toward pan-Islamism incompatible with their
ideological interests in the Middle East. The blending of Islamic ideology with a pro-
Western tilt in Pakistan’s foreign policy^ was suspected by the Soviets as the formation
of andante-Soviet bloc among the Muslim countries. The hostile images of Pakistan’s role
in South and Southwest Asia as the proxy of "American imperialism" highly influenced the
Soviet position on the Kashmir and Pashtoonistan issues." Lack of awareness of the
historical forces and fears of Islamic revivalism prevented the soviet leaders from
adopting a pragmatic and realistic view of the evolution of Muslim nationalism in South
Asia and of Islamic solidarity in the adjacent region of Southwest Asia. The Soviet
perception the
creationofPakistanandthetransferofpowertoitsnationailsleadershipwassimpleand
unsophisticated, largely due to the Soviet preference to link national in dependence with
socialist reconstruction. The malevolent image of the nationalist leadership as the agent
of Western imperialism was corrected in the post-Stalinist era when the doctrinal view of
newly independent countries in Asia and Africa gave way to pragmatism in the Soviet
Union’s Third World policies. Cold war rivalries and U.S. containment policy forced the
Soviet Union to revise its position on nonalignment, which reflected a decisive shift in
Soviet policies toward potentially influential nonaligned countries. India, because of its
geophysical characteristics and potential for a major security role in Asia, highly
influenced Soviet perceptions of the South Asian geopolitical milieu. An unambiguous
pro-India position on Kashmir was a deliberate attempt by the Soviet Union to pave the
way for a broad-based cooperative relationship with nonaligned India. Pakistani leaders
perceived Soviet strategic goals in South Asia and its unqualified support to India as
hostile to their legitimate aspirations in the region. In fact the Soviet plunge into
contentious Indo-Pakistani issues to gain a diplomatic edge complicated the process of
South Asian normalization because the Soviet position on Kashmir eliminated any
possibility of a settlement through the United Nations. While Pakistan benefited from its
participation in the Western alliance in terms of achieving a relatively modem, it failed.
The U.S. tilt toward India during the Sino-India border conflict of 1962highly disillusioned
Pakistan because obits impact on the South Asian balance of power. Meanwhile, the
emption of amino-Soviet rift, the end of the Sino-Indian entente cordiale, U.S. overtures
toward India, and Pakistan's dissatisfaction with the We stem alliance underlined the need
for basic reappraisal of Pakistan's foreign policy. Pakistan's overtures toward China and
its ageless to open a political dialogue with the Soviet Union marked the shift in its policy
from total commitment to flexible options. Being fully aware of Pakistan's disenchantment
with its We stem allies and its geopolitical limitations, the Soviet Union considerably
softened its attitude toward Pakistan in the 1960s. The Soviet policy focused on
weakening Pakistan's pro-We stem ties and on preventing its growing amity with China
by giving ambiguous indictions of a neutral position on India-Pakistan dispute. Pakistani
leaders were receptive to Soviet over turesinordertorectify lopsidedness intheirpro-
Westem policy andtoseeka Soviet role in the peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute
with India. Within the general frame work of bilateralism, General Muhammad Aye Khan
visited Moscow in April 1965 to initiate a dialogue on wide-ranging political and security
issues relating to South Asia. Pakistan's continued participation in We stem pacts, its
operation of anti-Soviet surveillance bases on its territory, and its pro-China tilt were
unacceptable to the Soviet leaders. Even Pakistan's indications of an intention to
terminate foreign bases and move out of the defense pacts did not affect a desired change
in the USSR'sSouthAsian policy. However, the Soviet leaders at least began to talk to
Pakistan on vital security issues, stressing the need for lessening tension South Asia.
Refusing to loam from the U.S. failure in promoting Indo-Pakistan detente in pursuit of its
larger strategic interests, the Soviet sought the same against the growing influence of
China in Asia. A relatively neutral position during the 1965 war and diplomatic role in the
conclusion of the Tashkent declaration between India and Pakistan eared Moscow a
unique political position in South Asia; but it did not last very long for two reasons. First,
Pakistan found Soviet policies in South Asia increasingly conditioned by Indian
sensitivities, which frustrated its desire for parity. The isolation and neutralization of
Pakistan have been the major objectives of Indian diplomacy and are central to its
endeavors toward the acknowledgment of its status as a predominant power in the region.
The recognition of India's preeminent position implies deference to India’s regional
interests by external powers. The Soviet security policy in South Asia has not only
recognized India's dominant position but has considerably enhanced its hegemonic
potential by providing massive sophisticated weaponry on very attractive terms. The
evolution of in-Soviet strategic cooperation in South and South east Asia makes it
imperative for the Soviet Union to accommodate India’s regional aspirations^. India's
relatively autonomous status and strategically better bargaining position have proved an
effective leverage in seeking total Soviet support and firm commitments on the primacy
of its regional interests. During the past decade the Soviet attitude toward Pakistan has
been considerably guided by its specialties with India that have persistently influenced
Pakistan’s relations with the Soviet Union. The second factor that has remained a
constant irritant in Pakistani relations with the Soviet Union is its entente cordiale with
China. The Sino-Soviet cold war in Asia brought "crude pressures" on countries like
Pakistan to cutoff relations with Beijing and preferably to participate in an Asian collective
security scheme aimed at containing China's influence in the Soviet hinterlands.
Pakistan's attempts to explain its growing relations with China within the frame work of its
policy of bilateralism were rebuked by the Soviet Union. Pakistan's bilateralism, especially
in its quest for balanced relationship with Beijing and Moscow, was viewed by the Soviet
leaders assign compatible with their desires to prevent China's entry into South Asian
affairs. Moreover, Pakistan's response to Soviet containment strategy against China
under the guise of regional economic cooperation was discouraging.^ Although Pakistan
desired to use its better ties with China as a leverage to obtain Soviet concessions on the
peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute, the acknowledgment of its parity with India,
the limitation of Soviet military supplies to India, and military aid for itself, it has never
considered participation in Soviet-inspired anti-China strategic moves favorable to
Pakistan's long-term security interests. Pakistan’s attempts to improve its relations with
the Soviet Union in order to obtain large-scale economic and military assistance failed
primarily because of Soviet rigidity in seeking Pakistan's neutrality and detachment from
its traditional friends and allies. Pakistani leaders have never favored Moscow-tilted
neutrality in
expectationofmilitaryaidbeneficialtotheirpoliticalandsecurityinterestsinSouthandSouthwe
stAsia. The persistent Soviet annoyance with Pakistan's China policy and the
deteriorating political situation in East Pakistan in 1970 provided the Soviets with a long-
desired opportunity to develop strategic cooperation with India, which significantly
contributed to the successful Indian intervention and dismemberment of Pakistan in
1971.Thepost-Bangladesh diplomacy of Pakistan has reflected greater awareness obits
political instability innless integrated areas and apprehensions about Soviet support to
sub national elements. Soviet policy on the issue of four nationalities and open option on
assisting secessionist forces remained unchanged in the 1970s. Soviet diplomatic
pressures on Pakistan significantly increased inane effort to compel it to follow the Indian
precedent and to sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation. The Soviet leaders
considered Pakistan's acceptance of the Brezhnev security system essential to their
flexible attitude on subregionalismandtheimprovementinbilateralrelations. Despite the
lack of congruity in perceived interests, the rate of economic cooperation between
Pakistan and the Soviet Union expanded significantly in the past decade, but it has
remained far below the critical level to overflow into political relations.
Pakistan as its disposition of forces would require far greater defense resources than
currently available to devise a two-front strategy. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has
strengthened the geopolitical view of Soviet objectives in Pakistan, reviving old fears of
Russian domination. The Afghanistan crisis once again introduced strains in Pakistan's
relations with the Soviet Union. It is the vast divergence of security interests and perceived
roles in relation to the situation in Afghanistan that has harmed their bilateral relations.
Soviet presence, which would compel them to take a reasonable position on a political
settlement. This confrontationist approach appears to rest on false assumptions and
speculative content. First, the ideological orientation of the resistance has great potential
for mobilization, but at the same time it is responsible for divisions in the rank and file of
resistance groups. The Islamic nationalist groups have resisted interference by the
Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami in the affairs of the resistance, which they claim has played a
decisive role. ^"^ Second, there is total lack of any strategic cooperation among the
Mujahedeen, Pakistan, Muslim countries, and the West. Americans and West Europeans
are rather allergic to any Islamic liberation struggles. Common disapproval of Soviet
intervention or a common interest in seeking a Soviet withdrawal has not amounted to a
strategic consensus. Finally, Pakistan's defense potential and its vulnerable geostrategic
position between traditionally hostile India and Soviet-occupied Afghanistan impose
absolute limitations regarding its confrontational role in Afghanistan. Confrontation with
the Soviet Union would-be suicidal in the present situation. A combination of regionalist
politicians and narrow-based leftist groups has argued that the Soviet threat to Pakistan
has been exaggerated political reasons. The regionalism left is point of view perceives a
natural collusion between the military-bureaucratic elite and the Islamic fundamentalists
led by the Jamaat-i-Islami because of the irredentism interests in shaping new political
order and leaning toward the West. The regionalist leftist groups have supported the
Afghanistan revolution and have blamed the Pakistani authorities of collaborating with the
Afghan feudal and mullahs for destabilizing the 1978 revolution. The Soviet intervention
in Afghanistan from their point of view was defensive and posed no threat to Pakistan's
security. The regionalist/leftist groups have vacated neutral policy for Pakistan on the
issue of Soviet intervention d suggest some form of accommodation with the soviets as
geopolitical realism because opposition to the strategic interests of superpower would
result in self-destruction. They have argued that Pakistan has destabilized the
revolutionary process in Afghanistan by inciting rebellion and providing sanctuaries to the
Mujahedeen. Pakistan's perceived involvement in the internal affairs of Afghanistan is
considered by the regionalist/leftists as central to the Soviet intervention. From this
perspective, Soviet intervention was largely defensive against the "Pakistan-backed"
interference. These groups have opposed the Pakistani-U.S.package deal of 1981,
perceiving it as a dangerous involvement in superpower rivalry. It has been argued that
Pakistan should not risk its future security by tying itself to thus. Strategy in the Persian
Gulf. Similarly, they have warned against the higher risks of internationalizing the Afghan
issue and leading the collective condemnation of the Third World against the Soviet
Union. In my view there are basic flaws in the premises of this perspective. First, there is
a misplaced emphasis on Pakistan's role in stirring the mass revolt in Afghanistan given
the magnitude of the Afghan uprising, it would be impossible for an external power to
mobilize the masses on that scale, which the Soviet Union has found so difficult to pacify
during the past five years. Second, Pakistan has not plunged into an alliance with the
United States and has refused to grant bases, rejecting the idea of regional "strategic
consensus" against the Soviet Union. Pakistan's declared policy that it "could never
popular support in Pakistan since1982. In view of the geopolitical constraints and absolute
limitations of its defense capability, this is the only realistic option to seeking a Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan. The major political parties in Pakistan have even taken a
public stand in favor of the recognition of the Karma regime and direct talks with Karma
to resolve the Afghan crisis. Although Pakistan has sought an "integrated" settlement on
the basis of four principles—(1) withdrawal of foreign forces, (2) restoration of Afghan
independence, (3) return of refugees, and (4) self-determination for the Afghan people—
it would be "strategically irrational to oppose Moscow's legitimate national interests to this
or other areas of the world."^^ Because of inherent complexities in the Geneva process,
the discussions have become stalled on the issue of international guarantees of
nonintervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and a binding timeframe within which
the Soviet Union would withdraw its forces. For practical
Reasons, these two issues have become interlinked. The Soviets are reluctant to
announce a time table for gradual pullout unless there are international guarantees.
Keeping view the geo political dynamics of the Southwest Asian region and a long history
of stable control at any cost in its traditional sphere of influence, the Soviet Union will not
compromise itself-defined political and security interests in Afghanistan. The Soviet
ideologues have argued that their forces intervened to help the "democratic forces"
consolidate and secure revolutionary gains by emphasizing the legalistic aspects of an
invitation" from the “legitimate" government of Afghanistan. Although the expos it factor
egitimation attempts seems superficial, their effectiveness would be ensured by the
dialectics of power politics. Therefore, a political settlement from the Soviet point of view
must acknowledge the legitimacy of its interests in stabilizing a pro-Moscow regimen
Kabul and in ensuring the neutralization of internal and external threats. The Soviets have
persistently accused Pakistan of interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs and of waging
an undeclared war against them. Pakistan has also been accused of providing
sanctuaries to the Afghan rebels, allowing training activities for the counter
revolutionaries, and permitting the flow of weapons to the insurgents. The Soviets keep
warning Pakistan against its alleged alliance with China and the United States, which is
perceived as directed against the USSR's legitimate role in the region.Forits own part,
Pakistan has made strenuous efforts to defuse the Afghan situation and to isolate its
bilateral relations with the Soviet Union from their antagonistic interests and role
perception in Afghanistan. Pakistan has responded cautiously to the Karma-Soviet
provocations on its borders. Frequent violations of Pakistani air space and bombardments
inside its territory killing hundreds of people have not invoked a Pakistani response except
formal protest notes. While not yielding to Soviet pressure to recognize the Karma regime
and disband the political organizations of the Mujahedeen based in the bordering areas,
Pakistan has carefully avoided causing a serious rupture in its bilateral relations with the
Soviet Union. Pakistan and the Soviet Union have been able to insulate economic
cooperation from their differences about the Afghanistan crisis. Pakistani leaders have
even claimed that Pakistan enjoyed good relations with the Soviet Union with whom it has
no bilateral problem. ^"^ Pakistan has maintained a strong interest in Soviet economic
and technical assistance. The Soviet economic assistance to Pakistan has amounted
to678.95 million rubles, including 440 million rubles for the Karachi steel mill, which is the
biggest project of Pakistan-Soviet collaboration and is nearing completion. Soviet credits
have been utilized for oil exploration, power generation, and the import/manufacture of
tractors. Pakistan's finance minister visited Moscow in December1983, which resulted in
several agreements relating to construction of a 630 MW thermal power plant at Multan
at the cost of $227 million, the supply of two oil drilling rigs, construction of a prefabricated
housing plant, and establishment of a metallurgical training center at the steel mill. ^^
Pakistan plans to continue to explore Soviet interest in various projects specified in the
sixth five-year plan. The insulation of economic cooperation from mutually hostile
attitudes in the Afghanistan situation has-been the most striking element in Pakistan-
Soviet bilateral relations, which have considerably cooled off during the past five years.
The political stalemate of Afghanistan, however, might prevent Soviet commitment to
large-scale project aid. Pakistan’s relations with the Soviet Union have been largely
determined by its relations with other states. Pakistan's participation in U.S.-led security
systems and later its close relations with China considerably influenced the Soviet Union's
South Asian policies. The intensification of Sino-Soviet rivalry in Asia and the evolution
offend-Soviet strategic cooperation had a definite impact on Pakistan-Soviet relations.
The Soviet attempts to wean Pakistan away from the Sino-American influence have been
perceived as a part of its neutralization strategy. Pakistan's endeavors to balance its
relations with the Soviet Union under the framework of bilateralism have met with little
success. The mutual perceptions of adversary roles have sharpened with the
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and effective
Mujahedeen resistance with the in flux of over 3 million refugees have significantly
destabilized Pakistan’s geopolitical environment. The perception of a Soviet threat on its
western borders, in addition to the traditional dangers from India, and fears of Indo-Soviet
collusion have severely constrained Pakistan's strategic options. Identical perceptions of
the Soviet threat tithe region and some convergence of security interests between
Pakistan and the United States have revived the latter's interest in Pakistan's integrity.
Although the U.S.economic assistance and military sales program has filled serious gaps
in Pakistan’s defense posture, it remains far below the required level of capability to
establish credible deterrence against the Sovie tUnion. Moreover, Pakistani leaders
recognize the limitations of security relationship with the United States under the
1959bilateraldefense agreement. U.S. commitments are perceived as fuzzy, uncertain,
and subject to American domestic political compulsions and changes in its global strategic
priorities. By itself, Pakistan seriously lacks the required combination of diplomatic,
political, and strategic forces to confront the Soviets in Afghanistan. Recognizing the
severe limitations of its geostrategic system and the realism of Soviet power, Pakistan
has attempted to defuse tensioning Afghanistan and maintain an on adversary
relationship with the Soviet Union. Pakistani leaders have carefully avoided antagonizing
the Soviets. While remaining uncompromising on the issue of recognizing the Karma
regime, Pakistan has pursued political options for the solution of the Afghanistan crisis.
There is general consensus among all influential groups in Pakistan for the withdrawal of
Soviet forces, the restoration of Afghanistan's sovereign and non aligned status, and the
extension of economic assistance to the refugues.However, different approaches have
been advocated on how to get the Soviets out of Afghanistan and on how to restore the
country's independence, leading to their partition of refugees. Frequent violations of
Pakistan's air space, the bombing of border areas, and the concentration of Karmal-Soviet
forces along strategic points have caused considerable alarm in Islamabad. Soviet
communications to Pakistan have been hostile, alleging its complicity in the freedom
struggle of the Afghan Mujahedeen. They have frequently leveled charges of operating
training camps, providing sanctuaries, and facilitating arms supplies to the anti-Karma
forces. The Soviet threat posture has caused a total revision of Pakistan's strategic
outlook, introducing uncertainties in bilateral relations.
Conclusion
After reviewing the relationship between Pakistan and the US during different
phases one reaches the conclusion that relations between them have always been
marked by convergence and divergence of national interests, resulting in a cycle of
friendship and friction. The US gained more during the times of convergence of interests
but periods of divergence outweighed the former. Although, Pakistan earned the title of
‘most allied ally’ of US, it is also the most sanctioned country in the world. By making
complete dependence on US, Pakistan gained less as it was not given the required
support by the US when needed. The US left Pakistan high and dry not only during the
1965 War but also during the 1971 War, which led to the disintegration of the country. In
fact, US later imposed severe penalties, embargoes and sanctions on Pakistan. This
unholy practice of sanctions was repeated in 1979 owing to nuclear related suspicions
and again in 1990 after the successful culmination of Afghan War in which Pakistan
played a key role in defeating erstwhile USSR. Moreover, it is also observed that the
Patron-Client relationship that started in 1950s with the admission of Pakistanis in SEATO
and CENTO transformed from dependent client to an ‘Estranged Client’. Despite this,
both scathe nations maintained a cooperative relationship like Pakistan army served
American interests in Somalia under the umbrella of UN. Nevertheless, Pakistan as a
client asserted comparatively more freedom and opposed the patron in certain cases like
Taliban in Afghanistan, Kashmir issue and nuclear program. This paved the way for
further transformation in patron-client relationship between US and Pakistan in years to
come especially under the Trump Administration in the context of the growing India-US
and Pakistan-China strategic alliances. In the War on Terror Pakistan destroyed their
economy, trade and the defense capabilities. Pakistan wants a good relationship and
become a reliable ally for the US government in War against Terrorism. Pakistan plays a
vital role in the stability of Afghanistan. From vendetta oriented political leaderships and
dictatorial regimes Pakistan is moving slowly and surely towards sustainable democracy
and political stability. From a military centric concept of security Pakistan has realized the
importance of a broader concept of security with the emphasis on economic and internal
stability. These are paradigm shifts and the nation needs both time and space, internally
and externally, to absorb these and steer the course to progress and prosperity.
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