e. Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 G.R. No.

75217-18
Facts:

Victor Que, convicted for two counts in violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) filed motion for reconsideration
before Supreme court, one of his defense, he argued that he issued the check (which bounced) merely as a
guarantee or a security for certain purchases which his company made.

Issue: Whether respondent-appellate court erred in not considering material facts as well as the principal element
of the crime charged.

Rule:

No. Que cannot claim that the he issued the checks in question merely to guarantee the payment of the purchases
by Powerhouse Supply, Inc. and this fact should serve to exculpate him from criminal liability for his act of issuing
the checks in question.

It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely
in the form of a deposit or a guarantee. The enactment in question does not make any distinction as to whether
the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said
obligation.

What are important are the facts that the accused had deliberately issued the checks in question to cover accounts
and that the checks were dishonored upon presentment regardless of whether or not the accused merely issued
the checks as a guarantee.

It is clear that is the intention of the framers of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 to make the mere act of issuing a
worthless check malum prohibitum and thus punishable under such law.

f. People v. Nifatan, 215 SCRA 79

Private respondent K.T. Lim was charged with violation of B.P. 22. (
-He make or draw and issue to Fatima Sasaki Philippine Trust Company Check no. 117383 in the
amount of 143000
- He knew that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
-The check was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds .
-He moved to quash the Information of the ground that the facts charged did not constitute a felony as
B.P. 22 was unconstitutional and that the check he issued was a memorandum check which was in
the nature of a promissory note, perforce, civil in nature.
-Judge Nitafan, ruling that B.P. 22 on which the Information was based was unconstitutional, issued
the questioned Order quashing the Information. Hence, the appeal.

COA: charged did not constitute a felony as B.P. 22 was unconstitutional and that the check he issued
was a memorandum check which was in the nature of a promissory note

Held:

A memorandum check is in the form of an ordinary check, with the word "memorandum", "memo" or
"mem" written across its face, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to pay the bona fide holder
absolutely, without any condition concerning its presentment. Such a check is an evidence of debt
against the drawer, and although may not be intended to be presented, has the same effect as an
ordinary check, and if passed to the third person, will be valid in his hands like any other check.

A memorandum check comes within the meaning of Sec. 185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law which
defines a check as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand. A memorandum check,
upon presentment, is generally accepted by the bank. Hence it does not matter whether the check
issued is in the nature of a memorandum as evidence of indebtedness or whether it was issued is
partial fulfillment of a pre-existing obligation, for what the law punishes is the issuance itself of a
bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless
check, whether as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even as an evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum
prohibitum.

A memorandum check may carry with it the understanding that it is not be presented at the bank but
will be redeemed by the maker himself when the loan fall due. However, with the promulgation of B.P.
22, such understanding or private arrangement may no longer prevail to exempt it from penal sanction
imposed by the law. To require that the agreement surrounding the issuance of check be first looked
into and thereafter exempt such issuance from the punitive provision of B.P. 22 on the basis of such
agreement or understanding would frustrate the very purpose for which the law was enacted — to
stem the proliferation of unfunded checks. After having effectively reduced the incidence of worthless
checks changing hands, the country will once again experience the limitless circulation of bouncing
checks in the guise of memorandum checks if such checks will be considered exempt from the
operation of B.P. 22. It is common practice in commercial transactions to require debtors to issue
checks on which creditors must rely as guarantee of payment. To determine the reasons for which
checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public
responses in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about
havoc in trade and in banking communities. (People vs. Judge Nitafan, G.R. No. 75954, October
22, 1992)

g. Lim Lao v. CA, 274 SCRA 572 , GR No. 119178

Contention of the State: Father Artelijo Palijo was investing with Premiere Investment House
through the latter’s trader, Rosemarie Lachenal. Through the course of his business with Premiere
Investment, he was issued three Traders Royal Bank checks in the amounts of P150k, P150k,
and P26k, respectively. These checks were eventually dishonored. The checks, before they were
issued to Palijo went through the normal procedure within Premiere investment, to wit; First, the
checks are required to be co-signed by Lina Lim Lao, a junior officer of Premiere Investment.
Second, the checks are then forwarded to her head office to be co-signed by one Teodulo Asprec.
Third, Asprec would then decide to whom the checks were to be ultimately issued and delivered,
in this case to Palijo. Since the checks were dishonored, Palijo sent notices of dishonor to
Premiere Investment but he sent the same to the latter’s main office in Cubao (note that Lao and
Asprec were holding office in the Binondo Branch of Premiere Investment). Premiere Investment
was only able to pay P5k and no further payment was made. Apparently, Premiere Investment
was going insolvent and was subsequently placed under receivership. Palijo filed a criminal case
against Lao and Asprec for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
Contention of the Accused: Petitioner contends that the public respondent committed a reversible
error in concluding that lack of actual knowledge of insufficiency of funds was not a defense in a
prosecution for violation of B.P. 22.
Resolution: The elements of violations against BP 22 are as follows:
1. That a person makes or draws and issues any check.
2. That the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value.
3. That the person who makes or draws and issues the check knows at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment.
4. That the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit, or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
In the present case, the fact alone that petitioner was a signatory to the checks that were
subsequently dishonored merely engenders the prima facie presumption that she knew of
the insufficiency of funds, but it does not render her automatically guilty under B.P. 22.
After a thorough review of the case at bar, the SC finds that Petitioner Lao did not have actual
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the corporate accounts at the time she affixed her
signature to the checks involved in this case, at the time the same were issued, and even at the
time the checks were subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank. The scope of Lao’s duties
and responsibilities did not encompass the funding of the corporation’s checks; her duties were
limited to the marketing department of the Binondo branch.
Further, there can be no prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds in the instant
case because no notice of dishonor was actually sent to or received by Lao. Pariljo sent the
notices of dishonor to Premiere Investment’s main branch. The main branch did not send the
notices to the Binondo branch because it deemed it futile because at that time it knows that it
does not have sufficient funds to cover the debt anyway. Notice to the main branch does not serve
as constructive notice to Lao. BP 22 is a personal crime hence notice should have been sent
to her personally if she were to be made liable.

h. Idos v. CA, G.R. No. 110782, 296 SCRA 194 (sept. 25, 1998)
FACTS: The complainant Eddie Alarilla supplied chemicals and rawhide to the accused-appellant Irma L. Idos
for use in the latters business of manufacturing leather. In 1985, he joined the accused-appellants business and
formed with her a partnership under the style Tagumpay Manufacturing, with offices in Bulacan and Cebu City.
The partnership was short lived and was terminated with each entitled to P1.8M each. Idos issued 4 postdated
checks - 1 was dishonored (for lack of funds).

STATE: Violated BP Blng 22 (Bouncing Check Law)

ACCUSED: She claimed that the check had been given upon demand of complainant in only as "assurance" of
his share in the assets of the partnership and that it was not supposed to be deposited until the stocks had been
sold.

HELD: Not guilty as the check was NOT issued for a debt but as a collateral or evidence of the other partners
share, there is no doubt that petitioners four (4) checks were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not
to cover the receipt of an actual account or credit for value as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should
not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioners
stead the potential wrongdoer, whose operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by
convicting the petitioner.

Sycip vs. CA
CRIME: VIOLATION OF B.P 22 (BOUNCING CHECKS LAW)
FACTS: Francisco T. Sycip agreed to buy, on installment, from Francel Realty Corporation (FRC), a
townhouse unit in the latter's project at Bacoor, Cavite. Upon execution of the contract to sell, Sycip, as
required, issued to FRC, forty-eight (48) postdated checks, each in the amount of P9,304.00, covering 48
monthly installments. After moving in his unit, Sycip complained to FRC regarding defects in the unit and
incomplete features of the townhouse project. FRC ignored the complaint. Dissatisfied, Sycip served on
FRC two (2) notarial notices to the effect that he was suspending his installment payments on the unit
pending compliance with the project plans and specifications, as approved by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). Sycip and 12 out of 14 unit buyers then filed a complaint with the HLURB.
The complaint was dismissed as to the defects, but FRC was ordered by the HLURB to finish all
incomplete features of its townhouse project. Sycip appealed the dismissal of the complaint as to the
alleged defects.

HELD: Under the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. No. 22), an offense is committed when the
following elements are present:

(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.

In this case, the court found that although the first element of the offense exists, the other elements
have not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the part of the issuer at the time of the
check's issuance that he did not have enough funds or credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its
presentment. B.P. No. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists
when the first and third elements of the offense are present.

FRANCIS SYCIP WAS ACQUITTED IN THIS CASE

CHAPTER SEVEN: CHATTEL MORTGAGE

A. ART 319- REMOVAL, SALE OR PLEDGE OF MORTGAGED PROPERTY

CHAPTER EIGHT: ARSON AND OTHER CRIMES INVOLVING DESTRUCTIONS

• ART. 320-326-b REPEALED BY PD 1613 AND PD 1744 - AMENDING THE LAW ON ARSON

1. ARSON

2. DESTRUCTIVE ARSON

3. OTHER CASES OF ARSON

4. SPECIAL AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN ARSON

5. RA 7659

CHAPTER NINE: MALICIOUS MISCHIEF

A. ART. 327 - MALICIOUS MISCHIEF

• Caballes v. DAR, 168 SCRA 247

Nature: the case was a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an Order issued by the public
respondent Ministry of Agrarian Reform, now the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its
then Minister, the Hon. Heherson Alvarez, finding the existence of a tenancy relationship between the
herein petitioner and the private respondent and certifying the criminal case for malicious mischief filed
by the petitioner against the private respondent as not proper for trial.

Facts: In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses, private respondent Bienvenido Abajon
constructed his house on a portion of the said landholding, paying a monthly rental of P2.00 to the
owner, Andrea Millenes. The landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land,
agreeing that the produce thereof would be shared by both on a fitfy-fifty basis. From 1975-1977,
Abajon planted corn and bananas on the landholding. In 1978, he stopped planting corn but continued
to plant bananas and camote. During those four years, he paid the P2.00 rental for the lot occupied by
his house, and delivered 50% of the produce to Andrea Millenes. Sometime in March 1979, after the
property was sold, the new owners, Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, told Abajon that the poultry they
intended to build would be close to his house and pursuaded him to transfer dwelling to the opposite or
southern portion of the landholding. Abajon offered to pay the new owners rental on the land occupied
by his house, but his offer was not accepted.

Later, the new owners asked Abajon to vacate the premises, saying that they needed the property. But
Abajon refused to leave. The parties had a confrontation before the Barangay Captain of Lawaan in
Talisay, Cebu but failed to reach an agreement. All the efforts exerted by the landowners to oust Abajon
from the landholding were in vain as the latter simply refused to budge. On April 1, 1982, the
landowner, Yolanda Caballes, executed an Affidavit stating that immediately after she reprimanded
Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the property without her knowledge, the latter, with
malicious and ill intent, cut down the banana plants on the property worth about P50.00. A criminal case
for malicious mischief was filed against Abajon and which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4003.
Obviously, all the planting on the property, including that of the banana plants, had been done by
Abajon.

On September 30, 1982, upon motion of the defense in open court pursuant to PD 1038, the trial court
ordered the referral of the case to the Regional Office No. VII of the then MAR for a preliminary
determination of the relationship between the parties. As a result, the Regional Director of MAR
Regional VII, issued a certification 1 dated January 24, 1 983, stating that said Criminal Case No. 4003
was not proper for hearing on the bases of the following findings:

That herein accused is a bona-fide tenant of the land owned by the complaining witness, which is
devoted to bananas; That thin case is filed patently to harass and/or eject the tenant from his
farmholding, which act is prohibited by law; and That this arose out of or is connected with agrarian
relations. From these factual findings, the DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of Andrea Millenes,
the former owner, who had testified that she shared the produce of the land with Abajon as truer
thereof. Thus, invoking Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended, which provides that "[T]he agricultural
leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in
a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding";
and that "(I)n case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the
landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the
obligations of the agricultural lessor," the MAR ruled that 'the new owners are legally bound to respect
the tenancy, notwithstanding their claim that the portion tilled by Abajon was small, consisting merely
of three (3) meters wide and twenty (20) meters long, or a total of sixty (60) square meters.

Issues: Whether or not the accused is liable for malicious mischief.

Held: The elements of the crime of malicious mischief are: 1. The offender deliberately caused damage
to the property of another; 2. The damage caused did not constitute arson or crimes involving
destruction; 3. The damage was caused maliciously by the offender. The private respondent can not be
held criminally liable for malicious mischief in cutting the banana trees because, as an authorized
occupant or possessor of the land, and as planter of the banana trees, he owns said crops including the
fruits thereof The private respondent's possession of the land is not illegal or in bad faith because he
was snowed by the previous owners to enter and occupy the premises. In other words, the private
respondent worked the land in dispute with the consent of the previous and present owners.
Consequently, whatever the private respondent planted and cultivated on that piece of property
belonged to him and not to the landowner. Thus, an essential element of the crime of malicious
mischief, which is "damage deliberately caused to the property of another," is absent because the
private respondent merely cut down his own plantings. Decision: The assailed resolution was set aside
and the criminal case was dismissed

B. ART. 328 SPECIAL CASES OF MALICIOUS MISCHIEF (Qualified)

C. ART. 329 - OTHER MISCHIEFS

D. ART. 330 - DAMAGE AND OBSTRUCTION TO MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

E. ART 331- DESTROYING OR DAMAGING STATUES, PUBLIC MONUMENTS OR PAINTINGS

CHAPTER TEN: EXEMPTION FROM CRIMINAL LIABLITY IN CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY

A. ART. 332 - PERSONS EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY

1. CRIMES INVOLVED

2. PERSONS EXEMPTED

Title Eleven CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

CHAPTER ONE : ADULTERYY AND CONCUBINAGE ART ( 333-334)

A. ART. 333 – ADULTERY

B. ART. 334 – CONCUBINAGE

• Pilapil v. Somera, 174 SCRA 653
Facts:

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino citizen) and respondent and
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, German national, were married at Federal Republic of Germany.
They lived together in Malate, Manila and had a child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling.

The private respondent initiated divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. The local court in
Germany promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouse.

On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in Manila.

After the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed the complaint for adultery before the
prosecutor of Manila alleging that the petitioner had an affair William Chia and Jesus Chua while they
were still married.

Petitioner filed a petition with the Justice Secretary asking to set aside the cases filed against her and be
dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings.
Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution directing to move for the dismissal of the complaints
against petitioner.

COA:

Private respondent contends that being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed
suit.

Respondent also initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a
family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there
be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family,

Ruling:

The crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon
sworn written filed by the offended spouse. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes that the
marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. This
is logical consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where the
supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of
the criminal case. It is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the
action be definitely established and, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action. Thus, the divorce decree is valid not only in his country, may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned – in view of the nationality principle under the
Civil Code on the matter of civil status of persons. Private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case. The criminal case filed against
petitioner is dismissed.

CHAPTER TWO : ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS

A. ART. 336- ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS

CHAPTER THREE : SEDUCTION, CORRUPTION OF MINORS AND WHITE SLAVES TRADE

B. ART. 337- QUALIFIED SEDUCTION

1. People v. Fontanilla, 23 SCRA 1227

Mariano Fontanilla was prosecuted in the municipal court of San Fernando, La Union for
qualified seduction.

Fe Castro, a fifteen-year old virgin, was brought by her mother to the house of
Fontanilla and his wife, Magdalena Copio, sister of the Fe’s mother, to serve as a
helper. During her stay in the house of Fontanilla for about three months, Fontanilla
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her repeatedly. Aside from giving her money,
Fontanilla repeatedly promised to abandon his wife to live with her. And that he always
say "Come now let us play. I am going to separate your aunt because I love you more
than my wife."

COA: If it is true that he repeatedly promised to marry Fe Castro in order to deceive her
into submitting to his carnal designs, why did the latter allegedly consent to the
continuance of their illicit liaison even after it was evident that he would not fulfill his
promise to marry her? Anent the said marital promise, Fontanilla also claims that there
is no evidence on record supporting its veracity.

Held: Granting this to be correct, it is nevertheless settled that deceit, although an

essential element of ordinary or simple seduction, does not need to be proved or
established in a charge of qualified seduction. It is replaced by abuse of confidence.
When the offender is a public officer, a priest or minister, a servant, domestic, tutor,
teacher, or under any title is in charge of the education or keeping of the offended
woman, as in the present case, the act is punishable although fraud or deceit may not
have been used or, if employed, has not been proved. The seduction of a virgin over
twelve and under eighteen years of age, committed by any of the persons enumerated
in art. 337 "is constitutive of the crime of qualified seduction ... even though no deceit
intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge were voluntary on the part of the virgin,
because in such a case, the law takes for granted the existence of the deceit as an
integral element of the said crime and punishes it with greater severity than it does the
simple seduction ... taking into account the abuse of confidence on the part of the agent
(culprit), an abuse of confidence which implies deceit or fraud."

2. Babanto v. Zosa, 120 SCRA 834 G.R. No. L-32895, February 28, 1983
FACTS: Babanto, a policeman, brought Leonida Dagohoy, 13 years old and with low mentality, to the
ABC Hall where he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. Babanto was charged with rape but
convicted of qualified seduction.
ACCUSED: The accused-petitioner denied the rape charge.

On the night of March 24, 1969, he together with Patrolman Apos was assigned to patrol Washington
Street from 12:00 to 6:00." While on patrol, at about 1:00 o'clock a.m., he and Apos noticed a girl and a
boy going to the public market coming from the Filipino bakery. They followed the said boy and girl to
find out those persons were. They reached up to the police station where they saw the girl sitting there
alone without the boy. The girl turned out to be Leonida Dagohoy, the complainant. They investigated
the girl — asked her name and her address. The girl however, did not answer but instead she lowered
her hand. They decided to bring Leonida to the municipal building because she is only roaming and in
order that she can be protected. While they were walking side by side, Babanto asked her again as
regards her name, residence name of her parents, but she did not answer and instead she would only
lower her hand. At this time they were within the premises of the Southern Capital Colleges with
Patrolman Apos behind them, about "five fathoms (sic) from them." While walking towards the
municipal building, they met a patrol car. In the patrol car were Patrolman Tabamo and Sgt. Bongabong
of the police force of Oroquieta City. The patrol car stopped in front of Patrolman Tabamo (sic) and they
"were conversing and I who was a bit ahead stopped with the intention to listen to what they were
conversing." Leonida proceeded to walk and he followed her. At this time Babanto was four fathoms
more or less behind Leonida. Leonida proceeded to the ABC Hall. Since the accused was not able to
overtake her, he proceeded to the municipal building. Upon reaching the municipal building Babanto
verified from the guard, a certain Saniel if a girl passed by there. Saniel told him there was none.
Patrolman Apos who arrived later asked also about the girl. He then, recorded the event in the police
blotter, after which he together with Apos went back on patrol. They never saw Leonida during, the
duration of their assignment. Babanto said that before this incident he never knew complainant
Leonida. Babanto's foregoing testimony was corroborated by Patrolman Apos. Patrolman Saniel, the
guard at that time in the municipal building and Ricardo Sambo, a detained prisoner at the municipal
building confirmed that at about 1:00 o'clock dawn of October 24, 1969, Babanto, arrived at the
municipal building and reported about a girl (Leonida) whom he arrested in the public market with
Patrolman Apos but who was able to run away.

RESOLUTION: The complaint filed alleged that the accused abused his position as policeman by having
carnal knowledge of a 13 year old girl. However, there is no allegation that the complainant was a
virgin. Though it is true that virginity is presumed if the girl is over 12 but under 18, unmarried and of
good reputation, virginity is still an essential element of the crime of qualified seduction and must be
alleged in the complaint. A conviction of the crime of qualified seduction without the allegation of
virginity would violate the petitioner’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. Petitioner is guilty of rape, consider the victim’s age, mental abnormality and deficiency.
There was also sufficient intimidation with the accused wearing his uniform.

3. Perez v. CA, 168 SCRA 236 G.R. NO. L-80838

FACTS: Perez was able to have sexual intercourse with Mendoza twice after he promised marriage to
her. As he did not make good on said promises, Mendoza filed a complaint for Consented Abduction.
The trial court found that the acts constituted seduction, and so it acquitted him on the charge of
consented abduction. Subsequent to petitioner’s acquittal, complainant Yolanda Mendoza filed another
criminal complaint against Perez, but this time is for Qualified Seduction. Perez moved to quash on the
grounds of double jeopardy.

COTA: Petitioner invokes double jeopardy to question the filing against him of an information for
Qualified Seduction after he was acquitted for Consented Abduction. In support of his argument that the
filing of the subsequent information for Qualified Seduction is barred by his acquittal in the case for
Consented Abduction, petitioner maintains that since the same evidence would support charges for
both offenses a trial and conviction for one, after he was acquitted for the other, would constitute
double jeopardy. Stated otherwise, petitioner would rely on the "same evidence" test in support of his
claim of double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether the subsequent filing of case in the form of qualified seduction after acquittal to
consented seduction constitutes double jeopardy.

HELD: No. In the case at bar, the issue posed by the petitioner relates to the identity of the two offenses
of Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction.

It is true that the two offenses for which the petitioner was charged arose from the same facts. This,
however does not preclude the filing of another information against him if from those facts. Two distinct
elements arose. As this Court stated:

A single act may be an offense against two statutes and if each statutes requires proof of an additional
fact, which the other does not, and acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the
defendant from prosecution and conviction under the other.

The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two indictments are perfectly
distinct in point of law however closely they may appear to be connected in fact.

An examination of the elements of these two crimes would show that although they may have arisen
from the same set of facts, they are not identical offenses as would make applicable the rule on double
jeopardy.

Moreover, the very nature of these two offenses would negate any Identity between them. As this Court
has stated: ... the gravamen of the offense of the abduction of a woman with her own consent, who is
still under the control of her parents or guardians is "the alarm and perturbance to the parents and
family" of the abducted person, and the infringement of the rights of the parent or guardian. But-in
cases of seduction, the gravamen of the offense is the wrong done the young woman who is seduced. ...

Thus, an acquittal for Consented Abduction will not preclude the filing of a charge for Qualified
Seduction, because the elements of the two crimes are different.

The similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction.

1. That the offended part is a virgin

2. That she must be over twelve and under 18 years of age.

Consented Abduction requires that:

1. The taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from
the offender.

2. The taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs.

Qualified Seduction requires that:

1. The crime ben committed by abuse of authority, confidence or relationship.

2. The offender has sexual intercourse with the woman.

C. ART. 338 - SIMPLE SEDUCTION

D. ART. 339 - ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS WITH THE CONSENT OF THE OFFENDED PARTY

• PEOPLEV. FAMULARCANO, 43 OG 1721

FACTS:
Famularcano, a driver at the Camp John Hay, followed Dionisia after she alighted from the
truck. She took her by the waist, held her to his breast and private parts. She resisted and was
able to extricate herself. She then walked towards the house of her friend, instead of going
home.

STATE: A complaint for acts of lasciviousness was filed against him,

ACCUSED: Famularcano claimed that he had no intention of having sexual intercourse with
her. He did the acts as revenge for what Dionisia’s father did to his wife.

ISSUE: Whether or not acts of lasciviousness has a frustrated stage.

RESOL:
The accused cannot be convicted of frustrated acts of lasciviousness for under the very terms of
the law such frustration can never take place. In cases of acts of lasciviousness, as in all cases
of crimes against chastity like adultery and rape, from the moment the offender performs all the
elements necessary for the existence of the felony, he actually attains his purpose, and from
that moment, all the essential elements of the offense have also been accomplished. Motive of
revenge is of no consequence since the essence of lewdness is in the very act itself. He was
convicted of consummated acts of lasciviousness.

E. ART. 340 - CORRUPTION OF MINORS (AS AMENDED BY BP 92)

F. ART. 341- WHITE SLAVE TRADE

G. SPECIAL LAWS:

1. Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009 (R.A. 9995)

2. Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act (R.A. 7610, as
amended)

3. Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (R.A. 9208)

4. Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (R.A. 9262)

5. Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 (R.A. 7877)

6. ANTI-MARRIAGE MATCHING (RA 10906)

CHAPTER FOUR: ABDUCTION

A. ART. 342- FORCIBLE ABDUCTION

1. Distinctions Between Forcible Abduction and Grave Coercion/Kidnapping

2. People v. Sunpongco, 163 SCRA 222 G.R. No. L-42665

June 30, 1988

Facts:

Juanita Angeles, 43 years old, single, a registered pharmacist and a rice mechant was abducted from the jeepney
by Silvestre Sunpongco, 34 years old, widower and has a 6lsix children with the aid of 3 men. That on October 23,
1964, at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, Juanita Angeles, the offended party, left her residence at Hagonoy,
Bulacan to get rice from the RCA warehouse of Dr. Lansan at Guiguinto Bulacan. She was with one Benita Fabian
and they rode a passenger jeep driven by Virgilio Gan. As they reached the south approach of Tabang Bridge,
Guiguinto Bulacan, a car overtook them and stopped right in front of their jeep, thus forcing them to stop. The car
was being driven by accused Arsenio Calayag, and the passengers were the accused Silvestre Sunpongco,
Herminigildo Sunpongco and Benjamin Gabriel. After that they brought her to Hilltop Hotel where Silvestre
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.

Contention of the State:

Silverio Sunpongco was charged with forcible abduction with rape.

Contention of the Accused:

He contented that they started courting the complainant a few weeks after the death of his first wife, and the
complainant accepted and they agreed to get married. On October 23, 1964 he went to Malolos, on previous
agreement with her, for the express purpose of eloping with her.

He also contented that he did not forcibly abduct complainant, he said. Complainant filed this case against him
because she was threatened and forced to do so by her brother.

Resolution:
Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of forcible abduction. The elements of
forcible abduction are (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation;
(2) that the abduction is against her will and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs.

On the other hand article 335 of the same Code defines the crime of rape and provides for its penalty. The
elements of rape pertinent to this case are: (1,) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that
such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation.

Silvestre Sunpongco would insist that he and complainant were sweethearts who agreed to elope on that fateful
day in October, This defense however is belied by the manner in which the so-called "elopement" was carried out.
Juanita Angeles' version that the abduction was carried out against her will is borne out by the testimonies of
witnesses presented by the prosecution as well as by two of the accused-appellants, Arsenio Calayag and
Herminigildo Sunpongco. These two admitted during the trial having seen the complainant resisting as she was
forced to board the car. The decision of the trial court is affirmed.

3. People v. Jose, 37 SCRA 450 GR L-28232

FACTS:

On June 26, 1967, four (4) principal-accused Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., alias “Boy”, Eduardo
Aquino Alias “Eddie” and Rogelio Cañal; together with Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon and Jessie Guion
as accomplices, conspired together, confederated with and mutually helped one another, then and there,
to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design to forcibly abduct Magdalena “Maggie” de la Riva,
25 years old and single, a movie actress by profession at the time of the incident, where the four principal
accused, by means of force and intimidation using a deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the
complainant against her will, and brought her to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, and hence committed
the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape.

COA:

That nothing happened in Swanky Hotel except a strip-tease exhibition which the complainant
agreed to do for them for fee of P1,000.00,

Appellants Jose, Aquino and Cañal deny having had anything to do with the abduction of Miss De
la Riva. They point to Pineda (who entered a plea of guilty) as the sole author thereof, but they generously
contend that even as to him the act was purged at any taint of criminality by the complainant's subsequent
consent to perform a striptease show for a fee, a circumstance which, it is claimed, negated the existence
of the element of lewd design.

RESOLUTION:

While the first act of rape was being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had already been
consummated, so that each of the three succeeding crimes of the same nature cannot legally be
considered as still connected with the abduction. In other words, they should be detached from, and
considered independently of, that of forcible abduction, and therefore, the former can no longer be
complexed with the latter.

As regards therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes
committed, the latter is definitely the more serious crime. Hence, pursuant to Article 48, the penalty
prescribed shall be imposed in the maximum period. Consequently, the accused should suffer the
extreme penalty of death. No need to consider aggravating circumstances for the same would not alter
the nature of the penalty imposed.

*** The evidence is clear and overwhelming that all the appellants participated in the forcible abduction.
Miss De la Riva declared on the witness stand, as well as in her sworn statements, that they helped one
another in dragging her into the car against her will; that she did not know them personally; that while
inside the car, Jose and Aquino, between whom she was seated, toyed with her body, the former forcing
his lips on hers, and the latter touching her thighs and raising her skirt; that meaningful and knowing
glances were in the meanwhile being exchanged among the four; and that all of them later took turns in
ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel. This testimony, whose evidentiary weight has not in the least been
overthrown by the defense, more than suffices to establish the crimes charged in the amended complaint.
In the light thereof, appellants' protestation that they were not motivated by lewd designs must be
rejected as absolutely without factual basis.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: appellants Jaime G. Jose, Basilio
Pineda, Jr., and Edgardo P. Aquino are pronounced guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape, and each and every one of them is likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes of rape. As a
consequence thereof, each of them is hereby sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all of them shall,
jointly and severally, indemnify the complainant of the sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a
total of 40,000.00; and each shall pay one-fourth (1/4) of the costs.

4. People v. Alburo, 184 SCRA 655

Contention of the State:
Ronilo Alburo is guilty of forcible abduction with rape and is sentenced to reclusion perpertua.
Evelyn Cantina was already dismissed from classes and Priscilla and Aniceta accompanied her in walking
towards Colon Street in Cebu. A passenger jeepney arrived and stopped, Ronilo Alburo invited the three
girls to board his jeepney and Evelyn declined but Alburo insisted and they accepted. Cantina sat infront
and Zaldy and Dionisio were already seated at the back. Alburo stopped at a red traffic lifht and at this
time Priscilla and Aniceta disembarked and as Evelyn was about to do the same Alburo threatened to
raise her skirt if she insisted and her two friends tried pulling her out. The jeepney sped away.

Contention of the Accused:

  The lower court erred in giving credit to the claim of the prosecution that the alleged
offended victim Evelyn Cantina was forcibly raped by the accused-appellant Ronilo Alburo.

Resolution
Appellant had taken Evelyn away against her will, with lewd designs, subsequently forced her to
submit to his lust and rendering her unconscious in the process, thereby justifying his conviction for the
complex crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape under Article 48 in relation to Articles 335 and 342 of
the Revised Penal Code, with which he has herein been charged.

5. People v. Godines, 196 SCRA 765

FACTS:
Esther Ancajas, the private complainant, testified as follows: In the evening of March 17, 1988,
she was sleeping in the house of one Alejandro Vilaksi at Sitio Sincamas, Sta. Cruz, San Pascual,
Masbate. She was awakened by a commotion emanating from an adjacent room occupied by
Vilaksi and his wife Milagros. She lit a kerosone lamp to ascertain what was going on.
Thereafter, she saw the defendants-appellants talking to the couple. Godines eventually hacked
Milagros. Moreno stood by the window to serve as a lookout person. The couple's son Vicente
ran away from the house after seeing Godines hack Milagros. Godines got some money from the
couple. Thereafter, the appellants prepared to leave the house. In the meantime, Ancajas tried to
escape from the house with her small child. The appellants, however, saw her and grabbed her.
The two men dragged Ancajas and the child out of the house and forcibly brought them to a
nearby vacant lot with tall grasses, about 600 meters away from the Vilaksi residence. Both men
were apparently armed; Godines had a pistol and Moreno had a knife. They threatened to kill
Ancajas if she resisted their advances. As they were dragging her to the vacant lot, they fondled
her private parts. Upon their arrival at the vacant lot, the appellants took turns in having carnal
knowledge of Ancajas. Godines did it first. While one was raping the girl, the other was holding
on to the child. All the while, the appellants threatened to kill Ancajas if she put up any
resistance. Ancajas tried to resist but the appellants simply overpowered her. After the appellants
had finished satisfying their carnal desires, they threatened her anew with death because they
suspected that Ancajas recognized them. Ancajas knew who they were but for fear of losing her
life, she denied knowing any of them. Thus, the appellants warned her not to report the incident
to the authorities if she valued her life. Ancajas took refuge in the house of a neighbor, Elpidio
Aballe. She fell unconscious there. She eventually regained her consciousness after which she
narrated to Aballe the ordeal she went through. Ancajas later informed her parents and the
authorities about the incident.
HELD:
As to the crime committed by the appellants, the trial court correctly held that forcible abduction
is absorbed in the crime of rape if the main objective of the appellant is to rape the victim.
The appellants are charged of conspiring and confederating with each other in the commission of
the offense charged. No doubt the evidence show the appellants through force and intimidation
and conspiring with each other successfully raped the victim by taking turns in raping her while
the other held the child of the victim and threatened her against resisting. Obviously two (2)
rapes were committed by the appellants. In a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.

B. ART. 343- CONSENTED ABDUCTION

• Pilapil vs. lbay-Somera, infra. GR No. 800116

FACTS: Erich Geiling, a German, was able to obtain a decree of divorce in Germany against his wife
Imelda Pilapil, a Filipina. Five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed 2 complaints
for adultery against Pilapil, alleging that, while still married to said respondent, she "had an affair with a
certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983".

ACCUSED: She challenged the complaint on the ground that the complainant, her husband, does not
qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his
filing the criminal complaint.

HELD: The crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except
upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement. Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the
offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses
do not apply to adultery and concubinage.

It necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at
the time of the filing of the criminal action. Lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to
dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

Hence, with reference to adultery cases, the status of the complainant vis-à-vis the accused must be
determined as of the time the complaint was filed. The person who initiates the adultery case must be
an offended spouse, and by this is meant that HE IS STILL MARRIED to the accused spouse, at the time of
the filing of the complaint.
The divorce obtained by Geiling and its legal effects may be recognized in the Phils. In view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. (Aliens of Filipino spouses may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Phils. if they are valid according to their
national law._

Being no longer the husband of Pilapil, Geiling had no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit.

C. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY WHERE AGE AND REPUTATION OF THE VICTIM ARE IMMATERIAL

CHAPTER FIVE PROVISIONS RELATIVE TO THE PRECEDING CHAPTERS OF TITLE ELEVEN

A. ART. 344 - PROSECUTION OF THE CRIMES OF ADULTERY, CONCUBINAGE, SEDUCTION, ABDUCTION,

RAPE AND ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS

• Pilapil v. lbay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (repeated)

B. ART. 345 - CIVIL LIABILITY OF PERSONS GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

Title Twelve CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS

CHAPTER ONE: SIMULATION OF BIRTHS AND USURPTION OF CIVIL STATUS

A. ART. 347 - SIMULATION OF BIRTHS, SUBSTITUTION OF ONE CHILD FOR ANOTHER, CONCEALMENT OR
ABANDONMENT OF A LEGITIMATE CHILD

D. PEOPLE V. SANGALANG, 74 OG 5977

FACTS: The Sangalang spouses together with Gloria and Bienvenido were charged of the crime of
simulation of birth. The information alleged that a child was furnished by Gloria to the Sangalangs.
Accused Bienvenido registered the birth of said child in the local civil registrar by supplying to said office
the necessary information required so that a birth certificate would be issued. He named the Sangalangs
as the child’s parents. A birth certificate was hence issued. Information did not contain any specific
allegation as to what the spouses did, except that they had conspired with Gloria and Bienvenido.

ISSUE: Whether the act of registration is a requirement to commit the crime of simulation of birth

HELD: In the crime of simulation of births, it must be shown that the “pretending parents” have
registered or caused in the registration of the child as their own with the Registry of Births, or that in
doing so they were motivated by a desire to cause the loss of any trace as to the child’s true filiation to
his prejudice. In the instant case, SC found no evidence to support the finding of Trial Court that the
registration was effected by the Sangalangs.

b. ART. 348 - USURPATION OF CIVIL STATUS

CHAPTER TWO: I LLEGAL MARRIAGE
A. ART. 349 – BIGAMY

• People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 103

Facts: Herein accused under the name Proceso Rosima contracted a marriage to one
Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu while he is still married to Maria
Gorrea. Yet again, the accused now under the name of Proceso Aragon contracted another a
canonical marriage with Maria Faicol.

This was put into possibility because the accused was then a traveling sales man. When Maria
Gorrea died, and seeing that the coast was dear in Cebu, Aragon brought Faicol to Cebu from
Iloilo, where she became a teacher-nurse. Maria Faicol however, suffered injuries to her eyes
because of physical maltreatment brought to her by Aragon. Due to the injuries she was sent to
Iloilo to undergo treatment, in her absence the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain
Jesusa C. Maglasang.

He then categorically denied in the court his marriage to Maria Faicol but affirmed his marriage to
Maglasang.

The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act
No. 3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab
initio, defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the
dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial
declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the instance of the latter.
COS: Bigamy

COA; second marriage was void ab initio

Held: Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in
America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within the
contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would or should have been
inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation already adverted
to.

It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage
with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was
entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting
this marriage can not prosper.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-
appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted
the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.
 B. ART. 350 - MARRIAGE CONTRACTED AGAINST PROVISIONS OF LAWS

C. ART. 351 - PREMATURE MARRIAGES

• Republic Act No. 10655 repealed Article 351 of the RPC

D. ART. 352- PERFORMANCE OF ILLEGAL MARRIAGES

TITLE THIRTEEN : CRIMES AGAINST HONOR

A. ART. 353 LIBEL

CHAPTER ONE: LIBEL

SECTION ONE- DEFINITIONS, FORMS, AND PUNISHMENTS OF THE CRIME

1. 2 TYPES OF MALICE
2. ART. 354 REQUIREMENT FOR PUBLICITY
3. R.A. 4200-THE ANTI-WIRE TAPPING ACT
4. Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112

Gaanan vs. IAC The case: This is a petition for certiorari for an interpretation of RA 4200 or Anti-
wiretapping Act

Contention of the State: Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebonoffered to
withdraw the complaint for direct assault they filed against Laconico after demanding P8,000 from
him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested by
Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was
subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan
listened to the telephone conversation without complainant''s consent, complainant charged
Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).

The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 4200. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. The
Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the communication
between the complainant and Laconico was private in nature therefore was covered by RA 4200; and that
the petitioner overheard such communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant;
and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone
conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act
No. 4200.
Issue: WON extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its
use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications
between the two parties using a telephone line.

Contention of Accused-appellants: The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones

are not included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they
belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that
in 1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in the Senate,
telephones and extension telephones were already widely used instruments, probably the most
popularly known communication device.

Resolution: No. Our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as
government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather
evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the
telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with
the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that
an extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements

There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused
Atty. Laconico was "private" made between one person and another as distinguished from words
between a speaker and a public; the affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that
a caller by merely using a telephone line can force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene,
criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be the word of the caller against the listener's. Such
that ". An unwary citizen who happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of a
crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act
4200 of using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the would be
criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such mischievous results.

Telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly known"
listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices
contemplated by law. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.

What the law refers to is a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. An extension
telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices
enumerated in Section 1 of RA 4200 . There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap
or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the
spoken words.

The court also ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if instead of repeating the
message he held out his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and that there is no distinction
between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use an extension telephone for the same
purpose.

Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused.
Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in
the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including an
extension telephone as ruled in PP vs. Purisima.
Wherefore, the petition is granted, decision of the IAC is annulled and set aside and petitioner is
acquitted for the crime of violating RA 4200
 5. Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA 590

G.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995

STATE: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that
the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted
and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and
personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made
by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes.”

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.

The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence the instant
petition.

ACCUSED: She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. In relation to this, petitioner
avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise
the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.Finally, petitioner argues that R.A. 4200
penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently,
her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act.

RESOLUTION:

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use
of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court’s conclusion
that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape
recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third
persons.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same
need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere
(in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the
conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed.”

Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point
of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to
impart.” In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies
the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system
of symbols (as language signs or gestures)”

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the
latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication”
are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were
interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill

B. ART. 355 - LIBEL BY MEANS OF WRITINGS OR SIMILAR MEANS

C. ART. 356 THREATENING TO PUBLISH AND OFFER TO PREVENT SUCH

PUBLICATION FOR A COMPENSATION

D. CASES:

1. Malit v. People, 114 SCRA 348

FACTS:

That on or about the 17th day of January, 1980 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused without any justifiable cause,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously vex and annoy one Corazon I. Macaspac,
by then and there uttering the following remarks directly addressed to the latter: I DOUBT HOW
DID YOU BECOME A DOCTOR to her great annoyance, vexation and disgust.

COA:

The facts charged do not constitute an offense.

RESOLUTION:

Where the libelous or slanderous words published in the course of judicial proceedings are
connected with, or relevant, pertinent or material to, the cause in hand or subject of inquiry, the
same may be considered privileged communication and the counsel, parties, or witnesses therein
are exempt from liability. It is, thus, clear that utterances made in the course of judicial or
administrative proceedings belong to the class of communications that are absolutely privileged.
Stated otherwise, the privilege is granted in aid and for the advantage of the administration of
justice.

2. Mercado v. CFI, 116 SCRA 93

Petitioner was charged with libel for imputing to Mrs. Virginia Mercado acts constituting enrichment thru
corrupt practices. The offensive telegram which contained the allegations was addressed to the Secretary
of the Department of Public Works and Communications purportedly in line with President Marcos' appeal
to the public to give information on undesirable employees in the government service to achieve the
objectives of the New Society.

Thus: "[Secretary David Consunji Department of Public Works and [Communications] Manila In line
with President Marcos appeal to give information on undesirable employees in the government service
to achieve the objectives of the New Society request that investigation image of the activities of Mrs.
Virginia Mercado of Public Service Commission as we have reason to believe that she has enriched
herself thru corrupt practices considering that she has properties and spending above what her salary
can afford with the husband jobless stop If investigation confirms this we trust you take necessary
action stop In case you need further details wire me at 101 Mariano Cuenco Quezon City and I will give
further details stop Expecting prompt action on this matter. Rafael Mercado]"

He filed an MTD on the ground of the telegram being privileged communication. After the same was
denied, a MTQ, alleging that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, was filed but when the same
again met with a denial, the present action was instituted to annul the aforesaid orders. Respondents, in
their Comment, stressed there was absence of any privilege, there being malice and bad faith, petitioner
having been motivated by vengeance and ill-will in making the said communication as established by his
previous conduct vis-a-vis the private respondent: the filing of several complaints, both administrative
and criminal aimed to malign her good character and reputation which were subsequently dismissed or
closed for lack of merit and/or insufficiency of evidence.

Contention of the Accused: The telegram is protected by privileged communication. Mercado invoke the
doctrine laid down in US vs Bustos that, the free speech and free press guarantees of the Constitution
constitute a bar to prosecutions for libel arising from a communication addressed to a superior
complaining against the conduct of a subordinate, is impressed with significance.

HELD: Petition dismissed. Qualified privilege communication may be lost by proof of malice. The
prosecution should be given the opportunity of proving malice in view of petitioner's conduct towards
private respondent which casts doubt on his good faith.

3. Agbayani v. Sayo, 89 SCRA 699

FACTS
This case is about the venue of a criminal action for written defamation. Mahinan filed with the
fiscal's office at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya a complaint for written defamation against Agbayani,
Bautista, Pascual and Dugay.

Board of Trustees of the GSIS in its Resolution No. 373 considered Mahinan as resigned from the
service as of the close of business hours on that date. Mahinan appealed to the Civil Service
Commission which later directed the GSIS Board of Trustees to reinstate him "to his former position,
or at the discretion of the proper official and in the interest of the service, he may be assigned to
another station or branch without demotion in rank, salary and privileges". So, Mahinan is back in the
service (pp. 2-3, Memorandum of Mahinan, pp. 200-1, Rollo).

provincial fiscal of Nueva Vizcaya filed in the Court of First Instance of that province an information
for libel charging Agbayani, Bautista, Pascual and Dugay with having maliciously made defamatory
imputations against Mahinan on or about February 17, 1976 in Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya (Criminal
Case No. 509).

Quoted in the information were the affidavits of Pascual and Bautista signed at Cauayan, Isabela on
October 6, 1975; Bautista's undated letter asking for Mahinan's dismissal, and Agbayani's "unusual
incident report" of October 3, 1975 subscribed and sworn to before a Manila notary and enclosing
documentary evidence to support his charges of malversation and falsification against Mahinan and
praying for the latter's separation from the service.

COA
The four accused filed a motion to quash. They contended that the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Vizcaya has no jurisdiction over the offense charged because Mahinan was a public officer holding
office at Cauayan, Isabela

HELD
Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for written
defamations is the province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the
place where the same was written, printed or composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the
public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.
Applying the foregoing rules to this case, we hold that the proper venue of Mahinan's criminal action
for written defamation against the petitioners is the Court of First Instance of Isabela, since as a
GSIS branch manager, he was a public official stationed at Cauayan, Isabela and the alleged libel
was committed when he was (as he still) in the public service. The preliminary investigation of the
complaint should have been conducted by the provincial fiscal of Isabela, or by the municipal judge
of ILAGAN, the provincial capital, or by the Court of First Instance of the same province.

4. Newsweek v. IAC, 142 SCRA 171

FACTS:
on March 5, 1981, private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in Negros
Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual sugar planters, filed Civil Case No.
15812 in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province of
Negros Occidental, against petitioner and two of petitioners' non-resident correspondents/reporters
Fred Bruning and Barry Came. The complaint alleged that petitioner and the other defendants
committed libel against them by the publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in the February 23,
1981 issue of petitioner's weekly news magazine Newsweek. The article supposedly portrayed the island
province of Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners or sugarcane planters who not
only exploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers/laborers, but also brutalized and
killed them with imprunity. Complainants therein alleged that said article, taken as a whole, showed a
deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts
intended to put them (sugarcane planters) in bad light, expose them to public ridicule, discredit and
humiliation here in the Philippines and abroad, and make them objects of hatred, contempt and hostility
of their agricultural workers and of the public in general. They prayed that defendants be ordered to pay
them PlM as actual and compensatory damages, and such amounts for moral, exemplary and corrective
damages as the court may determine, plus expenses of litigation, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

COA:

petitioner argues that private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action because the
complaint made no allegation that anything contained in the article complained of regarding sugarcane
planters referred specifically to any one of the private respondents; that libel can be committed only
against individual reputation; and that in cases where libel is claimed to have been directed at a group,
there is actionable defamation only if the libel can be said to reach beyond the mere collectivity to do
damage to a specific, individual group member's reputation.
ISSUE:
Whether there is threatening to publish and offer to prevent such publication for a compensation.

HELD:

In the case of Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr. (16 SCRA 807) this Court ruled that "in order to maintain a libel suit,
it is essential that the victim be identifiable (People vs. Monton, L-16772, November 30, 1962), although
it is not necessary that he be named (19 A.L.R. 116)." In an earlier case, this Court declared that" ...
defamatory matter which does not reveal the Identity of the person upon whom the imputation is cast,
affords no ground of action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel could have Identified the
personality of the individual defamed." (Kunkle vs. Cablenews-American and Lyons 42 Phil. 760).

It is evident from the above ruling that where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group
or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every
individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can
prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action
separately, if need be.

On the other hand, petitioner would do well to heed the admonition of the President to media that
they should check the sources of their information to ensure the publication of the truth. Freedom
of the press, like all freedoms, should be exercised with responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is reversed and the complaint in
Civil Case No. 15812 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental is dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.

5. Lacsa v. IAC, 161 SCRA 427

G.R. No. 74907 May 23, 1988

FACTS:
Lacsa, a Certified Public Accountant, offered his services pro bono to serve as auditor of
the Philippine Columbian Association. Lacsa accessed the personal folder of Marquez, then-
President of the Association. He found out that Marquez was a “mere associate” of the association
so he questioned Marquez’s qualification to hold the presidency, when only proprietary members
can be voted to that position.
Thus, he wrote a letter to the BoD (21 December 1978) wherein he impugned the status
of Marquez as president and proprietary member. He contended that the issuance of a proprietary
membership to Marquez, w/o the authority of the Association’s BoD, was erroneous. He also
wrote a letter (2 January 1979) to Marquez, asking the latter to relinquish the presidency, and
referring to the latter as a “de facto president”. The grounds he cited for such a request were the
same as the ones he gave in his letter to the BoD.
 He also caused the publication, in a newsletter circulated to the members of the
Association, an item entitled “Doubts as to the Legitimacy of the Incumbent President”. Marquez
instituted separate criminal and civil actions against Lacsa, claiming to have been “maligned,
defamed, and exposed to public ridicule” by the latter’s actions.The CFI of Manila found Lacsa
guilty of Libel, and this judgment was later affirmed by the IAC. Thus, this petition to SC.

CONTENTION OF LACSA:
The petitioner insists that the term "de facto president," which he used to describe the
private complainant, is not libelous per se. The petitioner asserts that even assuming that the said
term is indeed libelous, the letter and newsletter in which it appeared nevertheless constitute
privileged communication and cannot give rise to a libel conviction. Besides, he claims that the
letter and newsletter which caused the present discord were written by him pursuant to his moral,
social, and legal responsibility as a member of the Philippine Columbian Association. These being
so, the petitioner argues, he should be exonerated from the criminal charge.

RESOLUTION:
Considering that there are two classes of membership in the Philippine Columbian
Association — associate and proprietary — and it is only those of the latter who are qualified to
be voted as president of the association, the act of the petitioner in branding complainant Marquez
as a mere de facto president and insinuating imperfection in the latter's status as a proprietary
member, most certainly exposed Marquez to public contempt and ridicule. No amount of subtlety
designed to camouflage the ill-effect of the petitioner's misdeed would erase the impression
already created in the minds of the readers of the libelous materials. The Solicitor General is
correct in stating that calling Marquez a de facto president "is equivalent to saying that he is a
pretender, a fraud, and impostor and he is arrogating unto himself certain powers, rights, and
privileges to which he is not entitled. Thus, Lacsa is guilty of libel.

6. Soriano v. IAC, 167 SCRA 222

Facts:

Tantuico, the then Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) filed an Information for libel against
Soriano and six others in connection with press releases and articles imputing to Tantuico the tampering
by COA personnel of election returns in the May 14, 1984 Batasan elections at his residence in Tacloban
City and in the COA Regional Office in Palo, Leyte. It was alleged that Tantuico sought to assure the
victory of certain candidates in the said Batasan elections.

Soriano’s criminal liability was based on an article published on June 1, 1984 in “The Guardian” wherein
an article captioned "IMPEACH TANTUICO CASE LOOMS", of which he is the editor.

Contention of the accused:

The petitioner contended that the court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged because under
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the libel case should have been filed at Quezon City where
Tantuico holds office and where the publication house of the "Guardian" is located. (yan lang talaga
nahanap kong sinabi niya sa full case)

Resolution:

Local jurisprudence follow the “multiple publication” rule – that each and every publication of the same
libel suit constitutes a separate offense, and warrants a separate cause of action for filing a libel suit.
However, the publication requirement set forth by RPC360 refers to the “publication” (the official
circulating organ) and not the “press release”. In harmonizing RPC360 with the “multiple publication”
rule, the “press release” is not the document to be examined. Since the official publication is produced
in QC and was not proven to have been produced/copied in Leyte or elsewhere, the trial should have
been handled by a QC court.

7. Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel, 167 SCRA 255

Facts:

On 3 July 1986, 21 persons (Atty. Dimatimpos Mindalano, Atty. Mangorsi A. Mindalano, Shiek
EdresMindalano, Sultan Guinar Mindalano, Farouk Calipa Mindalano, Sultan Mahadi Mindalano, Sultan
KhalidMindalano, Sultan Ma-Amor Mindalano, Dr. Taher Mindalano, Datu Maguidala Mindalano,
SobaidaMagumpara Vda. De Mindalano, Raisha Mindalano Mandangan, Atty. Kimal M. Salacop, Datu
Kamar M.Mindalano, Mayor Raslani Mindalano, Vice-Mayor Alidadi A. Mindalano, Eng. Rashdi A.
Mindalano,Mrs.Paisha Mindalano Aguam, Datu Azis Mindalano Aguam, Mrs. Moomina Mindalano
Omar, DatuAminola Mindalano Omar), claiming to be the nearest relatives of the late Amir Mindalano,
suing on their own behalf and on behalf of the entire Mindalano clan of Mindanao, filed a Complaint for
damages (CivilCase 81-86) before Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City charging the
Bulletin PublishingCorp. represented by its President, Martin Isidro and its Publisher, Apolonio batalla,
Ben F. Rodriguez,Fred J. Reyes, Jamil Maidan Flores, et. al. with libel. The Mindalanos' action was
anchored on a featurearticle written by Flores entitled "A Changing of the Guard," which appeared in
the 22 June 1986 issue ofPhilippine Panorama, a publication of Bulletin Publishing Corporation. In
particular, exception was takento the following excerpt: "The division of Lanao into Sur and Norte in
1959 only emphasized the feudalnature of Maranaw politics. Talk of Lanao politics and you find yourself
confined to a small circle of theAlonto, Dimaporo, Dimakuta, Dianalan, Lucman families and a few more.
These are big, royal families. Ifyou are a Maranaw with aspirations for political leadership, you better be
a certified bona fide member ofone or several of these clans. xxx About the only time that one who was
not of any royal house became aleader of consequence in the province was during the American era
when the late Amir Mindalano held some sway.

That was because Mindalano had the advantage of having lived with an American family and was
therefore fluent and literate in English. But as soon as the datus woke up to the blessings of the
transplanted American public school system, as soon as they could speak and read and write in English,
political leadership again became virtually their exclusive domain. There must be some irony in that."
They alleged that, contrary to the article, the Mindalanos "belong to no less than 4 of the 16 Royal
Houses of Lanao del Sur," that the statement that the late Amir Mindalano, grand patriarch of the
Mindalano clan, had lived with an American family, a statement which, they alleged, apart from being
absolutely false, "has a distinct repugnant connotation in Maranao society." Contending finally that
Bulletin, et. al. had with maliceinflicted "so much damage upon the social standing of the plaintiffs" as to
"irreparably injure" the Mindalano name and reputation, and thus interposed a claim for the award of
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses, all in the aggregate amount of
P2,350,000.00.

Contention of the Accused:

Reacting to the complaint, Bulletin, et. al. filed on 6 August 1986 a Motion to Dismiss urging that (a)
venue had been improperly laid, (b) the complaint failed to state a cause of action, and (c) the
complainants lacked the capacity to bring the suit. In an Order dated 30 October 1986, however, Judge
Edilberto Noel (PresidingJudge of Branch VIII of the Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region with
station in Marawi City) deniedthe Motion to Dismiss and directed Bulletin, et. al. to file their answer to
the complaint. Bulletin, et. al.filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether the Bulletin’s article, which did not include the late Amir Mindalano as a member of a roy

alclan, be considered defamatory.

Held:

It is axiomatic in actions for damages for libel that the published work alleged to contain
libelousmaterial must be examined and viewed as a whole. In its entirety, the subject article "A
Changing of theGuard" is in essence a popular essay on the general nature and character of Mindanao
politics and therecent emergence of a new political leader in the province of Lanao del Sur. The essay is
not focused on thelate Amir Mindalano nor his family. Save in the excerpts complained about, the name
of the Mindalanofamily or clan is not mentioned or alluded to in the essay. The identification of Amir
Mindalano is thusmerely illustrative or incidental in the course of the development of the theme of the
article. The languageutilized by the article in general and the above excerpts in particular appears simply
declaratory orexpository in character, matter-of-fact and unemotional in tone and tenor. No derogatory
or derisiveimplications or nuances appear detectable at all, however closely one may scrutinize the
above excerpts.

8. MVRS Publications v. Islamic Daawah Council, G.R.

No. 135306, Jan 23, 2003

FACTS:
a. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., a local federation of more than seventy (70)
Muslim religious organizations, and individual Muslims (Linzag, Arcilla, de Guzman, da Silva,
Junio) filed in the RTC a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf
of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS Publications, Inc., arising from an article
published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid. The article reads:
"ALAM BA NINYO?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim?
Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na
sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at
sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na
tinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'."
b. Islamic Da’Wah: the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; not only
published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage
the Muslims and Islam,; that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the
Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim world
c. MVRS Publications, Inc.,: the article did not mention respondents as the object of the article
and therefore were not entitled to damages; and, that the article was merely an expression of
belief or opinion and was published without malice nor intention to cause damage
d. RTC: dismissed the complaint; persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically
identified
e. CA: reversed RTC decision. The defamation was directed to all adherents of the Islamic faith.
The suit for damages was a "class suit" and that ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious status as a Muslim umbrella organization gave it the requisite
personality to sue and protect the interests of all Muslims.

ISSUES:
1. WON Islamic Da’Wah has a cause of action for libel.
2. WON in the alternative, the action can be considered as one is for intentional tort and not
libel.
3. WON this is a valid class suit.

HELD:
1. NO, there is no cause of action for libel.
Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words
of general abuse however ill-natured, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an
action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the
language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified
or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular
member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action without at all impairing the
equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of the press.

2. Regarding the argument that the present case is an intentional tortious act causing mental
distress and not an action for libel. Invoking Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire where the U.S. SC
held that profanity, intended merely to incite hostility, have no social value and do not enjoy
protection; and Beauharnais v. Illinois where it was also ruled that hate speech against a group
(based on religion, ethnicity, etc.) may validly be prohibited.
 NO. "Emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature; it is a civil action filed by an individual
to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character.
There was no particular individual identified in the disputed article of Bulgar. Here, it is
relational harm — which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form of
defamation; as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm — which includes injuries to
individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress.

3. NO, it is not a valid class suit.

9. Santos v. CA, 203 SCRA

110 G.R. No. L-45031
October 21, 1991
Facts

Petitioner Nanerico Santos, a columnist of the then Manila Daily Bulletin, wrote and published in his
weekly column an article that quoted verbatim from an unverified complaint by Rosario Sandejas and
her daughters charging CMS Stock Brokerage Inc., particularly its board chairman and controlling
stockholder Carlos Sison and its president-general manager Luis Sison, of engaging in fraudulent
practices in the stock market.

On the very day that the news item appeared, Carlos Sison sought a meeting with petitioner Santos so
that he could submit to the columnist his reply which he wanted published . They met in the evening
where petitioner promised Sison that he would have the reply published, however, it was not published
so Carlos Sison called petitioner to tell him not to publish the reply anymore as it would only rekindle
the talks. Sison also informed petitioner that he would be sued for libel, to which statement petitioner
retorted: "Well, sue me for libel."

About a week later when Carlos Sison chanced upon petitioner, he asked Sison: "When will you sue
me?" Petitioner received his answer when the appropriate complaint for libel was lodged against him
by Carlos and Luis Sison. Santos was charged together with 5 others who are also from the Manila Daily
Bulletin. A few weeks later, Santos' weekly column was stopped, ostensibly to cut down on overhead
expenses brought about by the adoption of the floating rate in foreign exchange .

The lower court dismissed the case against all the accused, with the exception of petitioner Nanerico D.
Santos.

Contention of the State

The article in question is not a privileged communication. At the time the complaint filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission was published in the column of the accused there was as yet no
proceeding at which both parties had an opportunity to be present and to be heard.

Contention of Santos

Petitioner now insists that the published article is privileged, being a fair and true report of a judicial
proceeding, without comments or remarks, and therefore not punishable.

Ruling
It is plainly evident from a reading of the published article itself that it is but a faithful reproduction of a
pleading filed before a quasi-judicial body. There are no embellishments, wild imputations, distortions
or defamatory comments calculated to damage the reputation of the offended parties and expose them
to public contempt.

The controversial publication being a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding and made without
malice, we find the author entitled to the protection and immunity of the rule on privileged matters
under Article 354 (2). It follows that he cannot be held criminally liable for libel.

WHEREFORE, the conviction of petitioner Nanerico D. Santos is SET ASIDE and he is hereby ACQUITTED
of the crime of libel. No costs.

10. Sazon v. CA, 255 SCRA

692 G.R. No. 120715 March
29, 1996
FACTS:
Private complainant and the petitioner ran in the election held by PML-Parang Bagong Lipunan
Community Association, Inc. (PML-BLCA), an association of homeowners of PML Homes. The petitioner
was elected as a director and president of the homeowners' association.
Unable to accept defeat, the private complainant contested the said election. Private complainant
also wrote his co-homeowners explaining to them his election protest and urging them not to recognize
the petitioner and the other members who won in the election.
A phrase "Sazon (petitioner), nasaan ang pondo ng simbahan?" was seen boldly written on the
walls near the entrance gate of the subdivision. Thinking that only private complainant was responsible,
petitioner Sazon wrote in an issue of PML-Homemakers, in which he is the editor, an article against the
complainant using words such as "mandurugas," "mag-ingat sa panlilinlang," "matagal na tayong
niloloko," "may kasamang pagyayabang," "ang ating pobreng super kulit," "patuloy na kabulastugan,"
"mastermind sa paninirang puri," etc. to describe him.

ISSUE:
Whether the questioned article written by the petitioner is libelous.

HELD:
Petitioner concedes the existence of the third (it must be given publicity)and fourth (the victim
must be identifiable) requisites of Art. 353 in the case at bench. Accordingly, only the first and second
elements need to be discussed herein.

First requisite: It must be defamatory.

Test to determine the defamatory character of words:
…A charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand
that the person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient
to impeach their honesty, virtue, or reputation, or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule…
This test was satisfied in the case at bench. Branding private complainant Reyes "mandurugas,"
et al, most certainly exposed him to public contempt and ridicule. No amount of sophistical explanation
on the part of petitioner can hide, much less erase, the negative impression already created in the minds
of the readers of the libelous material towards private complainant.

Second requisite:It must be malicious.

The general rule laid down in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides that:
Art. 354 Requirement of publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. . . .
Prescinding from this provision, when the imputation is defamatory, as in this case, the
prosecution need not prove malice on the part of the defendant (malice in fact), for the law already
presumes that the defendant's imputation is malicious (malice in law). The burden is on the side of the
defendant to show good intention and justifiable motive in order to overcome the legal inference of
malice. Unfortunately, petitioner miserably failed to discharge this burden in the case before us.

Furthermore, the questioned article cannot come under the protective mantle of privileged
communication because the rule on privilege impose that such complaints should be addressed solely to
some official having jurisdiction to inquire into the charges.In the instant case, none of the homeowners
for whom the newsletter was published was vested with the power of supervision over the private
complainant or the authority to investigate the charges made against the latter. Another rule is that rule
is that defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts of public officers which are related to
the discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel if the defendant proves the truth of the
imputation. A perusal of the petitioner's article reveals that it has no reference whatsoever to the
performance of private complainant's position as a public relations consultant in the Department of Trade
and Industry.

11.Vasquez v. CA, G.R. No. 118971, Sept. 15, 1999 G.R. No. 118971; 15 September
1999
Topic: Libel

Facts:

- Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area. He and some families from the area went to see then
National Housing Authority (NHA) regarding their complaint against their Barangay Chairman, Jaime
Olmedo. After their meeting, he and his companions were interviewed by newspaper reporters.
- The next day, the following news article appeared in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Mass. The article mentions
that these people are asking for help since their land was stolen from them by the Olmedo, who had
connections with the NHA.
- Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against Vasquez alleging that Vasquez’
statements cast aspersions on him and damaged his reputation.
- RTC found him guilty of libel. CA affirmed.

Issue: Whether Vasquez is liable for liable even if he was not the one to publish the article.

Held:

NO. In denouncing the barangay chairman in this case, petitioner and the other residents of the Tondo Foreshore Area
were not only acting in their self-interest but engaging in the performance of a civic duty to see to it that public duty is
discharged faithfully and well by those on whom such duty is incumbent. The recognition of this right and duty of every
citizen in a democracy is inconsistent with any requirement placing on him the burden of proving that he acted with
good motives and for justifiable ends.

For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless
the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. This is the gist of the ruling in the landmark case of New
York Times v. Sullivan, which this Court has cited with approval in several of its own decisions. This is the rule of actual
malice. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that
petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.

12.GMA Network Inc. v. Bustos, G.R. No. 146848, Oct. 17,

2006
FACTS: A libel complaint was filed against GMA NETWORK, INC and newscaster, Rey Vidal. The
issue started from the Petition for Mandamus filed by the unsuccessful examinees of the
physician’s licensure examinations before the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC and the board of
medical examiners to re-check and reevaluate the test papers. As alleged, mistakes in the counting
of the total scores and erroneous checking of answers to test questions vitiated the results of the
examinations.
As news writer and reporter of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. assigned to gather news from
courts, among other beats, its co-petitioner Rey Vidal covered the filing of the mandamus
petition. After securing a copy of the petition, Vidal composed and narrated the news coverage
for the ten o'clock evening news edition of GMA's Channel 7 Headline News, quoting thereof the
allegations of the unsuccessful examiners that the gross, massive, haphazard, whimsical and
capricious checking that must have been going on for years should now be stopped once and for
all. Simultaneous with the news, was an old video footage showing physicians wearing black
armbands.

CONTENTION OF BUSTOS: claimed that the said report was false, malicious and one-sided. Vidal
and GMA Network, Inc., in reckless disregard for the truth, defamed them by word of mouth and
simultaneous visual presentation on GMA Network, Inc.'s Channel 7. They added that, the showing
of the unrelated old footage was done purposely so as to make a forceful impact on their audience
making it appear that other doctors were supporting and sympathizing with the complaining
unsuccessful examinees.

Contention of GMA NETWORK: defendants denied any wrongdoing, maintaining that their
February 10, 1988 late evening telecast on the filing of the mandamus petition was contextually a
concise and objective narration of a matter of public concern. They also alleged that the press
freedom guarantee covered the telecast in question, undertaken as it was to inform, without
malice, the viewing public on the conduct of public officials. And vis-à-vis the particular allegation
on the film footages of the PGH demonstration, defendants tagged such footages as "neutral."
Pressing the point, defendants hastened to add that the footages were accompanied, when
shown, by an appropriate voiceover, thus negating the idea conjured by the plaintiffs to create an
effect beyond an obligation to report.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the said news report was within the ambit of privileged communication.
2. Whether the said narration of the news reporter and the use of video footage were libelous.

HELD:
1. Yes. The disputed news report consists merely of a summary of the allegations in the said
Petition for Mandamus filed by the medical examinees making the same fall within the protected
ambit of privileged communication. GMA and Vidal cannot be held liable for damages claimed by
respondents for simply bringing to fore information on subjects of public concern.

Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified. Absolutely privileged matters are not actionable
regardless of the existence of malice in fact. In absolutely privileged communications, the mala or
bona fides of the author is of no moment as the occasion provides an absolute bar to the action.
On the other hand, in qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications, the freedom from
liability for an otherwise defamatory utterance is conditioned on the absence of express malice or
malice in fact. The second kind of privilege, in fine, renders the writer or author susceptible to a
suit or finding of libel provided the prosecution established the presence of bad faith or malice in
fact. To this genre belongs "private communications" and "fair and true report without any
comments or remarks" falling under and described as exceptions in Article 354 of the Revised
Penal Code.

However, the enumeration under the aforecited Article 354 is not an exclusive list of conditional
privilege communications as the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the speech and of the
press has expanded the privilege to include fair commentaries on matters of public interest. The
news telecast in question clearly falls under the second kind of privileged matter.

2. No, the statement in the news report falls within the ambit of privileged communication. For,
although every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, the presumption does not
exist in matters considered privileged.

Furthermore, neither the insertion of the file video constitute malice on the part of the
petitioners. Contrary to the CA's findings, the identifying character-generated words "file video"
appeared to have been superimposed on screen, doubtless to disabuse the minds of televiewers
of the idea that a particular footage is current. In the words of the trial court, the phrase "file
video" was "indicated on screen purposely to prevent misrepresentation so as not to confuse the
viewing public." The trial court added the observation that "the use of file footage in TV news
reporting is a standard practice." the absence of the accompanying character-generated words
"file video" would not nevertheless, change the legal situation insofar as the privileged nature of
the audio-video publication complained of is concerned. In view of the state of things, the video
footage was not libel in disguise; standing without accompanying sounds or voices, it was
meaningless, or, at least, conveyed nothing derogatory in nature.