A. ART.

246 - PARRICIDE

2. PEOPLE V. BUCSIT
G.R. 17865, March 15, 1922

DIGESTED BY: CHRISTOPHER A. SALIPIO

Contention of the State: The wife (Cipriana Bucsit) and her paramour (Placido Licudine)
have had illicit relations for some time. They conspire to do away with the husband in order
that they may marry. Poison is prepared by the man and mixed with the food of the husband
(Pastor Pagaduan). The latter unsuspectingly partakes of the poisoned morisqueta and dies
as a result. The family dog also consumes a portion of the delicacy and expires.

Defense of the Accused: The conspirators attempt to cover up the crime by means of the
paramour, Placido Lucudine, returning from the fields and reporting the death of the
husband.
Later on, both of the accused pleaded guilty.

Ruling: The woman, Cipriana Bucsit, was found guilty by the trial judge of the crime of
parricide, and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
This judgment was correct, for in her case there is present the aggravating
circumstances that the crime was committed by means of poisoning, which, however, is
compensated by the mitigating circumstance provided by article 11 of the Penal Code as
amended.
The man, Placido Licudine, was found guilty of the crime of murder, there being present
the qualifying circumstance that the accused had killed another by means of poisoning.
No circumstance to aggravate, and none to mitigate, criminal liability was found; which
leaves the penalty in the medium degree. Article 11 of the Penal Code, as amended, could not
properly be taken into consideration in this connection in view of the fact that the accused
was the assistant lieutenant of the barrio in which he lived.

3. PEOPLE v. JUMAWAN, 116 SCRA 739

DIGESTED BY: KAORI CHALLONGEN

Contention of the State: Cesario Jumawan, Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye, Manuel

Jumawan, and Francisco Jumawan guilty as principals beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder
Rodolfo Magnaye was married to Presentacion Jumawan albeit they had been living
separately from each other. The Station Commander can perhaps be excused for not accusing
Presentacion of parricide but when the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, the Provincial Fiscal perpetuated the mistake by filing an information for murder
against all the accused.
That on or about the 19th day of June 1976, in the Municipality of Sariaya, Quezon,
the above-named accused, armed with a bolo (gulukan), conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation
and treachery, taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said bolo one Rodolfo Magnaye
alias ‘Digo’, thereby indicting upon the latter a stab wound on the chest, which directly
caused his death.
 The victim and his wife had a rendezvous in the evening of June 19, 1976, in order to
discuss the fate of their marriage. While it is not known if they actually conversed, the
purpose of the rendezvous was in fact accomplished; the marriage was terminated by the
murder of the husband.
The report to the police by Presentacion that Rodolfo Magnaye had attempted to rob
the store of Sebastiana Jumawan was a crude diversionary tactic to enable Cesario and
Manuel to transfer the cadaver to another place.

Defense of the accused: Mr. Cesario Jumawan, brother-in-law of the victim, testified that
between 3:00 and 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 19 June 1976 he was at Barrio Sampaloc,
Sariaya, Quezon. He went home to Barrio Pili of the same town early in the afternoon of the
following day. He did not go anywhere else since 3:00 to 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 19
June 1976 up to and until he returned to Barrio Pili.
Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye claims that in the evening of 19 June 1976 she was
in the store of Sebastiana Jumawan together with Anabelle Jumawan and Tita Dañez when
she heard a person who wanted to enter the store. She shouted `thieves’ (`magnanakaw’). In
response to her shouts several people arrived and chased the person who wanted to enter
the store. She then went to the house of Sebastiana Jumawan where hats are being made
and where her father Francisco Jumawan was staying that night.
Mr. Manuel Jumawan, brother-in-law of the victim, testified that on 19 June 1976 he
was in his house at Barrio Pili, Sariaya, Quezon. He went to bed at about 7:00 o’clock in the
evening of 19 June 1976. He woke up at about 6:30 o’clock in the morning.
Mr. Francisco Jumawan, who is the father of his three (3) other co-accused, testified
that in the evening of 19 June 1976 at about 8:00 o’clock more or less he was alone in the
house of Sebastiana Jumawan situated near the former garage of the BLTB in Sariaya,
Quezon and that he was awakened only when his daughter Presentacion woke him up to tell
him that someone was trying to enter the store of Sebastiana Jumawan.

Ruling: Presentacion should have been accused of parricide but as it is, since her
relationship to the deceased is not alleged in the information, she, like the others, can be
convicted of murder only qualified by abuse of superior strength.
Although not alleged in the information, relationship as an aggravating circumstance
should be assigned against the appellants. True, relationship is inherent in parricide, but
Presentacion stands convicted of murder. And as to the others, the relationships of father-
in-law and brother-in-law aggravate the crime.

4. PEOPLE VS. TOMOTORGO

[G.R. No. L-47941, April 30, 1985]

DIGESTED BY: ANGELI LAUREN RIVERA

Contention of the State: The Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch IV found
Jaime Tomotorgo guilty of the crime of parricide for having killed his wife Magdalena de los
Santos and prescribed the penalty of reclusion temporal maximum.
Magdalena de los Santos, the wife of Jaime Tomotorgo, had been persistently asking
her husband to sell the conjugal home and that their family transfer to the house of her
husband's in-laws. Tomotorgo would not accede to his wife's request.
On June 23, 1977, at about seven o'clock in the morning, the accused left his home to
work on his farm Upon his return, he found his wife and his three-month old baby already
gone. He finally saw his wife carrying his infant son and bringing a bundle of clothes
some 200m away from their home. He asked and pleaded with his wife that she should
return home with their child but she adamantly refused to do so. When appellant sought to
take the child from his wife, the latter threw the baby on the grassy portion of the trail hereby
causing the latter to cry. This conduct of his wife aroused the ire of the herein accused.
Incensed with wrath and his anger beyond control, appellant picked lip a piece of wood
nearby and started hitting his wife with it until she fell to the ground complaining of severe
pains on her chest.
Realizing what he had done, the accused picked his wife in his arms and brought her
to their home. He then returned to the place where the child was thrown and he likewise
took this infant home. Soon thereafter, Magdalena de los Santos dieddespite the
efforts of her husband to alleviate her pains

Defense of the Accused: Appellant claims that the court handed him the
wrong punishment.
Appellant claims that article 49 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the proper
applicable penalty when the crime committed is different from what was intended. If the
penalty prescribed for the felony committed is higher than the offense which the accused
wanted to commit, the penalty corresponding to the later shall be imposed as the maximum
period. Appellant avers that the penalty for the felony committed by him – parricide – was
higher than that which he intended to commit – physical injuries.

Ruling: Accused is guilty of parricide.

Article 49 of the RPC does not apply to cases where more serious consequences not
intended by the offender result from his felonious act because under Art. 4 (1) of the same
code, he is liable for all the direct and natural consequences of his unlawful act. His lack of
intention to commit a grave wrong is at best mitigating.
The reference made by the accused to Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code which
prescribes graduated penalties for the corresponding physical injuries committed is entirely
misplaced and irrelevant considering that in this case the victim died very soon after she was
assaulted. The court held that the fact that the appellant intended to maltreat the victim only
or inflict physical injuries does not exempt him from liability for the resulting and more
serious crime committed

5. PEOPLE v. MALABAGO

DIGESTED BY: CHESED MUNDA

Contention of the State: After an altercation over money and appellant’s jealousy of
someone, Pedro Malabago fatally hacked and struck his wife with a bolo hitting the latter on
her face and neck. This caused the victim’s instantaneous death. Malabago was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide.

Defense of the Accused: The prosecution failed to prove the legitimate marital relation
between him and the victim

Ruling: The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the
case at parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the
deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate. However, oral
evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is not
objected to.
The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased is an admission
against his penal interest.
 6. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROSARIA V. IGNACIO
G.R. No. 107801. March 26, 1997

DIGESTED BY: HARLEY JAY MACARIO

Contention of the State: Rosaria V. Ignacio was accused of parricide for fatally hitting her
husband, Juan Ignacio, with a wooden club (palo-palo). The deceased was Rosaria's fourth
husband. Juan died after having lived with Rosaria for two (2) years and seven (7) months.
On the night of 10 February 1992, Rosaria and Juan had a heated argument which became
violent (nagrarambulan). Milagros, Rosaria’s daughter saw the incident in which both were
pulling a piece of lawanit and each tried to take possession of it. Juan ultimately released
the lawanit and turned to go for his bolo when Rosaria picked up a palo-palo and hit Juan
on the nape.

Defense of the Accused: Rosaria did not deny having inflicted the fatal wounds on her
husband. According to her Juan was drunk. Armed with a bolo, he went around the wooden
bed and then faced her. Exasperated, she finally stood up, pulled his hair, got hold of a palo-
palo and hit him once on the head. The assault sent Juan hovering down the floor seriously
wounded. Rosaria went to the municipal hall and surrendered to police officer San Diego. An
appeal was made praying that she be acquitted on the basis of self-defense or, in the
alternative, that she be held guilty only of homicide rather than of parricide.

Ruling: In order for self-defense to be granted condition sine qua non is the unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. Without it, there can be no self-defense, whether
complete or incomplete, that can validly be invoked. Accused's claim of self-defense cannot
be sustained. The bolo which was allegedly in victim's possession and with which the victim
allegedly attempted to hit the accused, was never found. The existence of the bolo particularly
on the occasion alleged, is even doubtful.
Appellant’s contention that she should be charged of homicide and not of parricide
because “there was no clear evidence of marriage” between her and the victim is not tenable.
The phrase "whether legitimate or illegitimate" characterizes the relationship between the
accused and his victim who might be his father, mother, or child, but not the "spouse" who
obviously refers to either the legitimate husband or the lawful wife. Appellant swore that they
were married before a judge. Appellant's own admission that she was married to the victim
was a confirmation of the semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption that a
man and a woman so deporting themselves as husband and wife had verily entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.

People vs. Borromeo

“Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law (Son
Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216). The presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the
strongest known in law. The law presumes morality, and not immorality; marriage, and not
concubinage; legitimacy, and not bastardy. There is the presumption that persons living
together as husband and wife are married to each other.”

7. PEOPLE v. GENOSA
 DIGESTED BY: ROLLY HERIDA JR.

Contention of the State: For resolution by the Court is an Urgent Omnibus Motion filed by
Appellant Marivic Genosa y Isidro in connection with the automatic review of the September
25, 1998 "Judgment" of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City in Criminal Case No.
5016-0. The RTC found her guilty of parricide aggravated by treachery and sentenced her to
death. He killed BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard-deadly
weapon.

Defense of the Accused: Appellant alleges that the trial court grievously erred in concluding
that she had lied about the means she employed in killing her husband. On the contrary,
she had consistently claimed that she had shot her husband. Yet the trial judge simply ruled
that the cause of his death was "cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial
hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital bone.”
Appellant further alleges that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe
beatings she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the trial court failed to appreciate
her self-defense theory. She claims that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of
killing her husband was equivalent to self-defense. Furthermore, she argues that if she "did
not lie about how she killed her husband, then she did not lie about the abuse she suffered
at his hands."
Appellant prayed for exhumation of the victim’s body for purposes of re-examination. In
addition, she prayed for her examination by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists of the
Court to determine her state of mind at the time of the killing of her spouse, Ben M. Genosa.

Ruling: Allegedly, there are four characteristics of the syndrome:

(1) the woman believes that the violence was her fault;
(2) she has an inability to place the responsibility for the violence elsewhere;
(3) she fears for her life and/or her children's lives; and
(4) she has an irrational belief that the abuser is omnipresent and omniscient.
Trapped in a cycle of violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that she would
succumb to her helplessness and fail to perceive possible solutions to the problem other than
to injure or kill her batterer. She is seized by fear of an existing or impending lethal aggression
and thus would have no opportunity beforehand to deliberate on her acts and to choose a
less fatal means of eliminating her sufferings.
A defense witness, Dr. Dino Caing, testified that she had consulted him at least six (6)
times due to injuries related to domestic violence and twenty-three (23) times for severe
hypertension due to emotional stress. Even the victim's brother and mother attested to the
spouses' quarrels every now and then. The court a quo, however, simplistically ruled that
since violence had not immediately preceded the killing, self-defense could not be
appreciated.

B. ART. 247 – DEATH OR PHYSICAL INJURIES UNDER EXCEPTIONAL

CIRCUMSTANCES

1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FRANCISCO ABARCA

G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987

DIGESTED BY: JEFFREY BONAO

Facts: Appellant Francisco Abarca was sentenced to death for the complex crime of murder
with double frustrated murder.
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1984, in the City of Tacloban. Unlawfully and
feloniously attack and shot several times KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH as a consequence of which
also caused gunshot wounds to LINA AMPARADO and ARNOLD AMPARADO on the different
parts of their bodies thereby inflicting gunshot wounds which otherwise would have caused
the death of said Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado but the couple survived due to a
rapid medical response.
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had illicit
relationship. The illicit relationship apparently began while the accused was in Manila
reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations. Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife,
Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse
The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the house of a PC
soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo an M-16 rifle he went to find Koh playing mahjong.

Contention of the state: The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code defining death inflicted under exceptional circumstances, complexed with
double frustrated murder.

ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. —

Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury,
shall suffer the penalty of destierro.

If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt
from punishment.

Ruling of the Court: There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her
paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went
out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following
elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in
the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case.
The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both
of them . . . immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say
that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused
be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his
spouse in the basest act of infidelity
Thus, in case of death or serious physical injuries, considering the enormous
provocation and his righteous indignation, the accused — who would otherwise be criminally
liable for the crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or serious physical injury, as the case
may be — is punished only with destierro. This penalty is mere banishment
Article 247, or the exceptional circumstances mentioned therein, amount to an
exempting circumstance, for even where death or serious physical injuries is inflicted, the
penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to no punishment at all.
The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the physical
injuries suffered by Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado who were caught in the crossfire
as the accused-appellant shot the victim.
 The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple, Here, the
accused-appellant was not committing murder when he discharged his rifle upon the
deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder.
While it appears that before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words ("an waray
labot kagawas,"), that is not enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained
by the Amparados.

2. PEOPLE v. PUGAY

DIGESTED BY: GABRIEL CAYMO

Contention of the State: Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run
errands for Pugay and they used to sleep together. On the evening of May 19. 1982 a town
fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario Cavite. Sometime after midnight, accused Pugay
and Samson with several companions arrived drunk and they started making fun of Bayani
Miranda. Pugay after making fun of Bayani, took a can of gasoline and poured its content on
the latter. Gabbion the principal witness told Pugay not to do the deed. Then Samson set
Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. They were arrested on the same night.

Defense of the Accused: The accused stated that there was no conspiracy in the case so
that a crime of murder may be charged against them.

Ruling: No there was conspiracy. Conspiracy is determined when two or more persons agree
to commit a felony and decided to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same
quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof as to the existence of
previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient that, at the time of the commission of
the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united. Since there was no animosity
between Miranda and the accused, the main intent of the accused is to make fun of Miranda.
Since there was no conspiracy, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson
arising from different acts directed against Miranda is individual and not collective hence
each of them is only liable only for the act that was committed by him.
Pugay having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable
consequence arising from any act committed by his companions who at the same time were
making fun of the deceased he is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide whereas
Samson is guilty of Homicide.

3. PEOPLE v. BASAY, 1993

DIGESTED BY: JANICE EBANIO

Contention of the State: Teodoro Basay and Jaime Ramirez were charged with Fiscal
charged them with Multiple Murder and Frustrated Murder with Arson for having allegedly
killed the spouses Toting and their six-year old daughter, Bombie, and for having burned the
said spouses' house to conceal the crime; as a consequence of such fire, the spouses' other
daughter, Manolita, was burned to death. Another victim, Manolo Toting suffered second and
third degree burns because of the burning of the house.
Trial court acquitted accused Teodoro Basay but convicting accused Jaime Ramirez.

Defense of the Accused: TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY AS
CHARGED ON THE BASIS OF AFFIDAVIT WHICH WAS EXECUTED IN VIOLATION OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND ON THE BASIS OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND ON THE
PRESUMPTION OF GUILT.
That his so-called extra-judicial confession was executed in blatant disregard of his
constitutional right to counsel and to remain silent during custodial investigation. It is
therefore inadmissible in evidence. Without the said confession, the only piece of evidence
which seems to point to his guilt is the alleged statement of Bombie Toting. That the said
statement was "very doubtful and . . . no reasonable mind would conclude that she was
candidly truthful;" hence, her statement, besides being hearsay as it came from a person who
was not presented in court to testify, should not have been taken at "face value against any
of the accused, much less against the appellant." Besides, the appellant asserts that the
same statement was not used against his co-accused Basay who was, unlike him, acquitted
by the trial court. As to his having run away upon seeing the armed law enforcers, appellant
claims that he did so out of fear as the latter were armed.
On the other hand, it is maintained by the People, in the Appellee's Brief 27 submitted by
the Office of the Solicitor General, that the appellant executed the extra-judicial confession
voluntarily and without duress; in signing such confession, he was accompanied by a certain
Mr. Catacutan, a non-lawyer, inside the chambers of Judge Calumpang — "an environment
. . . other than vindictive and oppressive which the courts desired to guard against. As to
Bombie's statement, it is claimed that the same should be considered as a dying declaration.

RULING: Ramirez is acquitted.

1. Jaime Ramirez's sworn statement or extra-judicial confession obtained during
custodial interrogation was taken in blatant disregard of his right to counsel, to remain silent
and to be informed of such rights.
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform
him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall
be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient
means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility
of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall
be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the reason arrested, by any
person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself
or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence."
2. We harbor very serious doubts about the alleged statement given by Bombie Toting
to Sgt. Tabanao and Jaime Saguban identifying the appellant and Teodoro Basay as the
perpetrators of the heinous crime. In the first place, the trial court itself ruled that Bombie
was not a competent witness. We agree with such a conclusion, not necessarily because she
was only six (6) years old, but because her condition at the time she supposedly gave her
statement made it impossible for her to have communicated effectively. The doctor who
attended to her before she died, Dr. Edgar Cantalao, testified that when he last saw Bombie
alive, she could not talk.

The extrajudicial confession:

"PRELIMINARY — MR. JAIME RAMIREZ, you are now under investigation in connection with
the death of the couple and the burning of their house, ZOSIMO TOTING and BEATRICE
TOTING alias BETTY TOTING on March 4, 1986 at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening at sitio
Togbao, Barangay Banawe, Pamplona, Negros Oriental. You are also informed that under our
new constitution you have the right to remain silent and not to answer questions which will
incriminate you and to have a counsel of your own choice to assist you in this investigation,
do (sic) you aware of this?

ANSWER — Yes.

Q — You are also informed that whatever statement you may offer in this investigation it (sic)
might be used as evidence in your favor or against you in the future, do (sic) you aware of
this this (sic)?

A — Yes.

Q — After you have informed (sic) of your rights are you willing to proceed with this
investigation of yours even if you have no counsel of your own choice that will assist you in
this investigation?

A — Yes. I don't need any counsel in this investigation because I will just tell the truth.

1. Question — If so, please state your name, age and other personal circumstances?
Answer — Jaime Ramirez y Tano, 19 years old, single, Filipino, farmer and a resident of sitio
Palale, Barangay San Isidro, Pamplona, Negros Oriental.
xxx xxx xxx

11. Q — What more can you say?

A — No more. I proved that my statement is correct I signed this 7 March 1986 (sic), at
Pamplona, Negros Oriental.

(Sgd.) JAIME T. RAMIREZ

(TYP) JAIME T. RAMIREZ

Affiant

NOTE: ASSISTED BY:

(Sgd.) ELPEDIO B. CATACUTAN

(TYP) ELPEDIO B. CATACUTAN

Counsel of the accused

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 14th day of March 1986, at Pamplona,
Negros Oriental, Philippines.

(Sgd.) TEOPISTO L. CALUMPANG

(TYP) TEOPISTO L. GALUMPANG

Mun Trial Circuit Judge

 CERTIFICATION

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have personally examined the affiant and that I am satisfied
that he voluntarily executed and understood his affidavit.

(Sgd.) TEOPISTO L. CALUMPANG

(TYP) TEOPISTO L. CALUMPANG

4. PEOPLE v. ABEJUELA
G.R. No. L-32702, August 6, 1979

DIGESTED BY: BONNIE MACAY

Contention of the State: Juresmundo Moradas and his wife, Leticia, left their house to
attend a benefit dance. On their way, Leo Abejuela and Welinido Samson stopped them.
Juresmundo was stabbed while Leticia was able to escape. Abejuela and Samson evaded
arrest and fled to Manila. Abejuela was eventually captured and brought for trial. The trial
court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.

Defense of the Accused: Abejuela’s defense is denial and alibi. According to him, on the
night of the incident, he stayed in the dance hall and never left the place to go anywhere else.
This is corroborated by the testimonies of the defense witnesses, who saw him in the dance
hall throughout the affair.

Ruling: Denial and alibi are the weakest defenses and cannot prevail over Abejuela’s positive
identification as one of the perpetrators of the criminal deed. Alibi is always considered with
suspicion and received with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable,
but also because it is easily fabricated. Abejuela’s identity was unqualifiedly ascertained by
Leticia. Leticia was appellants neighbor for over 16 years and stood only a meter away when
she witnessed her husband being stabbed by accused-appellant. It is unlikely that Leticia
could be mistaken in identifying accused-appellant as one of the malefactors. There being no
serious doubt as to the assailants identity, proof of motive becomes unnecessary.
Furthermore, flight, as we have held firmly, is nothing less than an indication of guilt.
Leo Abejuela is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by
treachery, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION

D. ART. 249 – HOMICIDE

1. EDMUNDO ESCAMILLA y JUGO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DIGESTED BY: CHARIMAE GARCIA

Contention of the State: Around 2:00 a.m. of 01 August 1999, a brawl ensued at the comer
of Estrada and Arellano Streets, Manila. Mendol was about to ride his tricycle at this
intersection while facing Arellano Street. Petitioner, who was standing in front of his
store, shot the latter four times, hitting him once in the upper right portion of his chest. The
victim was brought to hospital and survived because of timely medical attention.
 The Assistant City Prosecutor charged the petitioner with frustrated homicide. During
trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of 3 eyewitnesses who all positively identified
him as the shooter of Mendol. The defense offered 4 witnesses and the results of the paraffin
test of petitioner.
The (RTC) held that the positive testimonies of eyewitnesses deserve far more weight
and credence than the defense of alibi. Thus, it found petitioner guilty of frustrated
homicide. Petitioner said that the prosecution witnesses did not actually see him fire the
gun. Furthermore, his paraffin test yielded a negative result.
The CA, ruling against petitioner, held that the victim’s positive and unequivocal
identification of petitioner totally destroyed his defense of alibi. In addition, it said that a
paraffin test is not a conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun and is inconsequential
when there is a positive identification of petitioner.

Defense of the Accused: Petitioner assigned as an error the application by the CA of the
rule that the positive identification of the accused has more weight than the defense of
alibi. He posits that the lower court manifestly overlooked relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, but if properly considered would justify a different conclusion.

Ruling: In order for alibi to prosper, petitioner must establish by clear and convincing
evidence that, first, he was in another place at the time of the offense; and, second, it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Petitioner, as found by both the
RTC and CA, failed to prove the presence of these two requisite conditions. Hence, he was
wrong in asserting that alibi, when corroborated by other witnesses, succeeds as a defense
over positive identification.
Petitioner proffers the alibi that he was at home, instead of showing the impossibility
of his authorship of the crime. His alibi actually bolsters the prosecution's claim that he was
the shooter, because it placed him just a few steps away from the scene of the crime. The
charge is further bolstered by the testimony of his wife, who could not say with certainty that
he was at home at 2:00a.m.- the approximate time when the victim was shot. Based on the
foregoing, it cannot be said that the lower courts overlooked any fact that could have justified
a different conclusion. Hence, the CA was correct in affirming the RTC 's Decision that
petitioner, beyond reasonable doubt, was the assailant.

2. ENGR. CARLITO PENTECOSTES, JR. v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 167766

DIGESTED BY: ELIZARAH ABELON

Contention of the State: Previously charged of attempted murder and modified into the
crime of less serious physical injury, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, with evident
premeditation and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and shoot one Rudy Baclig, inflicting upon the latter gunshot injuries. In
convicting the petitioner to a lesser offence, the CA opined that it was not established that
petitioner intended to kill Rudy when he shot him, was not followed by any other assault or
any act which would ensure his death. Considering that petitioner was driving a car, he could
have chased Rudy if he really intended to kill the latter, or run him over since Rudy went to
the rear of the car. Petitioners desistance displayed his nonchalance to cause the death of
Rudy. Moreover, Rudy only sustained a gunshot wound on the arm, which required only 10
days of medical attendance.
Defense of the Accused: Petitioner questions the conclusion of the CA when it found him
guilty of the crime of less serious physical injuries. He argues that Rudy failed to positively
identify him as the assailant, since Rudy never admitted that he was able to identify the
petitioner through his physical appearance, but only through his voice, despite the fact that
it was the first time Rudy heard petitioners voice when he allegedly shot him. He also
contented that he has an alibi during when the crime happened and during Sept 2 &4,
reported to work with a corresponding certificate and time record.

Ruling: Guilty of less physical injury. As regards petitioners defense of alibi, well settled is
the rule that alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by the victim. In the case at bar, it was established that
petitioner personally appeared before Engr. Hondrade only on September 1 and 4, 1998.
There was no showing that he could not have gone back to Cagayan, committed the crime,
and went back to Quezon City during those two days. Petitioners defense of denial and alibi
cannot prevail as against the positive, straightforward and consistent testimony of Rudy that
it was petitioner who shot him on the night of September 2, 1998.
The principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated murder is the intent on
the part of the assailant to take the life of the person attacked. Such intent must be proved
in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of
the aggressor. When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the
crime is not attempted murder but physical injuries only. Since the Medico-Legal Certificate
issued by the doctor who attended Rudy stated that the wound would only require ten (10)
days of medical attendance, and he was, in fact, discharged the following day, the crime
committed is less serious physical injuries only. The less serious physical injury suffered by
Rudy is defined under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code.

B. ART. 255 – INFANTICIDE

• WHEN MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE APPLY

1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FALLORINA

G.R. No. 137347 March 4, 2004

DIGESTED BY: MAEYAN BALAGSA

Contention of the State: At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent Jorojoro, an
eleven-year old minor, together with his playmate, Whilcon “Buddha” Rodriguez, played with
his kite on top of the roof of an abandoned carinderia beside the road.
Beside the carinderia was a basketball court, where a fourteen-year old witness Ricardo
Salvo and his three friends, were playing basketball. Ricardo heard the familiar sound of a
motorcycle coming from the main road across the basketball court. Cognizant to Ricardo of
the appellant, PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina, a PNP officer, knew that he abhorred kids playing
on the roof, since one of his friends was previously been scolded by the appellant before.
Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from the roof. When PO3
Fallorina saw them, the former stopped his motorcycle, he shouted and badmouthed at them.
After hearing the shouts of the appellant, Whilcon rushed to jump off from the roof while
Vincent was lying on his stomach on the roof flying his kite. When he heard the appellant’s
shouts, Vincent stood up and looked at the latter. As soon as Vincent turned his back, ready
to get down from the roof, suddenly, the appellant pointed the .45 caliber pistol towards the
direction of Vincent and fired a shot. Vincent fell from the roof, lying prostrate near the canal
beside the abandoned carinderia and the basketball court.
 The appellant approached Vincent and carried the latter’s hapless body in a waiting
tricycle and brought him to the Quezon City General Hospital. Vincent was pronounced dead
on arrival caused by a single gunshot wound in the head.
Fallorina was sentenced by the lower court to suffer death as a penalty of the crime of
murder, hence, this automatic review.

Defense of the accused: The appellant denied shooting Vincent. He testified that at about
1:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Macario Ortiz, a resident of Sitio San Jose, Quezon City,
asked for police assistance; Macario's brother-in-law was drunk and armed with a knife, and
was creating trouble in their house. Responding to the call, the appellant took his .45 service
revolver, cocked it, put the safety lock in place and tucked the gun at his right waistline. He
brought out his motorcycle from the garage and slowly negotiated the bumpy alley leading to
the main road. Macario, who was waiting for him at the main road, called his attention to his
revolver which was about to fall off from his waist. The appellant got distracted and brought
his motorcycle to the right side of the road, near the abandoned carinderia where he stopped.
As he stepped his right foot on the ground to keep himself from falling, the appellant lost his
balance and slipped to the right. At this point, the revolver fell to the ground near his foot
and suddenly went off. He went near the abandoned carinderia and saw Vincent sprawled to
the ground. He picked up the bloodied child, boarded him on a tricycle on queue and
instructed its driver, Boy Candaje, to bring the boy to the hospital.
The appellant rode his motorcycle and proceeded to his mother's house in Caloocan
City but did not inform her of the incident. He then called his superior officer, Major Isidro
Suyo, at the Base 103, located at Roces Avenue, Quezon City. The appellant informed Major
Suyo that he met an accident; that his gun fell and fired; and, that the bullet accidentally hit
a child. He then went to Valenzuela City to the house of his friend PO3 Angelito Lam, who
was a motorcycle unit cop. The appellant stayed there for three days. He also visited friends
during that time.
On September 29, 1998, he went to the office of Major Suyo and surrendered his .45
caliber pistol. Major Suyo accompanied and turned over the appellant to the commanding
officer at Camp Crame, Quezon City. The appellant's testimony was corroborated in pari
materia by Macario Ortiz.

Ruling: The accused committed murder under Article 248 of the RPC qualified by treachery.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim
without the slightest provocation on his part. Nonetheless, Vincent was an eleven-year-old
boy. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a
defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists. The abuse of
superior strength as alleged in the Information is already absorbed by treachery and need
not be considered as a separate aggravating circumstance.
However, the appreciation of aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position was
reversed. There is no evidence on record that the appellant took advantage of his position as
a policeman when he shot the victim.
The trial court is correct that the accused is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender. Surrender is said to be voluntary when it is done by the accused
spontaneously and made in such a manner that it shows the intent of the accused to
surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he
wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.
In this case, the appellant deliberately evaded arrest, hid in the house of PO3 Lam in
Valenzuela City, and even moved from one house to another for three days. The appellant
was a policeman who swore to obey the law. He made it difficult for his brother-officers to
arrest him and terminate their investigation. It was only after the lapse of three days that the
appellant gave himself up and surrendered his service firearm.

D. ART. 257 – UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION

1. PEOPLE v. SALUFRANIA, 159 SCRA 401

DIGESTED BY: DANAH MAY ASUNCION

Contention of the State: Filomeno Salufrania was charged with the complex crime of
parricide with intentional abortion by boxing and strangling Marciana Salurfania, his wife,
which resulted to her instantaneous death and likewise causing the death of the child while
still in its maternal womb.

Defense of the Accused: Accused pleaded not guilty.

He said that when he went home, his wife complained of stomach pain. His wife’s
condition worsened and he asked for the help of Bragais, a healer, but when they arrived,
she was already dead.
He also claims that the Trial Court erred in convicting him of complex crime of parricide
with intentional abortion. Assuming that he killed his wife, there is no evidence to show that
he had the intention to cause an abortion.

Ruling: Appellant is correct. He should not be guilty of the complex crime of Parricide with
Intentional Abortion but of complex crime of Parricide with Unintentional Abortion.
The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having
been expelled therefrom[17].
Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim
in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an abortion. Appellant must have
merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion.
It has also been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (8)
months pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily exerted upon her by
her husband accused; and (c) that, as a result of said violence, Marciana Abuyo died together
with the foetus in her womb.

CHAPTER TWO

PHYSICAL INJURIES

A. ART. 262- MUTILATION

1. GLORIA AGUIRRE v. SEC. OF DOJ

DIGESTED BY: FAYE MENDOZA

Contention of the State: Laureano (Larry) Aguirre was adopted from an orphanage by Pedro
Aguirre and Lourdes Aguirre at the age of 3. Developmental milestones were noted to be
delayed. Psychological evaluation revealed mild to moderate mental retardation. At the age
of 24, Pedro Aguirre (Larry’s guardian) wanted to have him sterilized and approached Dr
Agatep to perform the procedure (vasectomy). Dr Pascual conducted tests on Larry to
ascertain whether he could validly give his consent to the operation. The findings concluded
that the responsibility of making the decision may be given to his parent or guardian. Dr
Agatep gave Larry a vasectomy with consent of Pedro Aguirre. Petitioner Gloria Aguirre
(common law sister) charged Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and his father, Pedro Aguirre for
mutilation. Gloria Aguirre contended that the bilateral vasectomy conducted on petitioner's
brother, Larry Aguirre, caused the perpetual destruction of Larry's reproductive organs of
generation or conception and that it was performed intentionally and deliberately to deprive
Larry forever of his reproductive organ and his capacity to procreate, thus, it amounted to
mutilation

Defense of the Accused: Accused denied that the prospected, scouted, facilitated, solicited
and/or procured any false statement mutilated or abused Laureano Aguirre. They further
contends that his common law brother went through a vasectomy procedure but that does
not amount to mutilation. Dr. Agatep contends that the complainant has no legal personality
to file a case since she is only a common law sister of Larry who has a legal guardian in the
person of Pedro Aguirre. He further contends that Vasectomy does not in any way equate to
castration and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered an organ in the context of law
and medicine.

Ruling of the Supreme Court: The accused are not liable for the crime of mutilation.
The elements of mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal
Code to be
1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation; and
2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the
offended party of some essential organ for reproduction.
According to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of
mutilation as defined and penalized, i.e., "[t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way
deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his physical
self." Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, would want this Court to make a ruling that bilateral
vasectomy constitutes the crime of mutilation. This we cannot do, for such an interpretation
would be contrary to the intentions of the framers of our penal code.
In the male sterilization procedure of vasectomy, the tubular passage, called the vas
deferens, through which the sperm (cells) are transported from the testicle to the urethra
where they combine with the seminal fluid to form the ejaculant, is divided and the cut ends
merely tied.57 That part, which is cut, that is, the vas deferens, is merely a passageway that
is part of the duct system of the male reproductive organs. The vas deferens is not an organ.
Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of reproduction, such procedure does
not deprive him, "either totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction."

F. ART. 266-A

1. PEOPLE v. JUVY D. AMARELA AND JUNARD G. RACHO

JANUARY 17, 2018, G.R. No. 225642-43

DIGESTED BY: DANAH ASUNCION

CONTENTION OF THE STATE: The accused, through force, had carnal knowledge of [AAA]
against her will immediately after boxing her legs and after grappling her.
 [AAA] was watching a beauty contest at a basketball court. She had the urge to urinate
and went to the comfort room but was not able to reach it because Amarela was already
waiting for her along the way. She was pulled inside a day care center. She felt numb after
Amarela punched her in the abdomen and boxed her upper thigh. There was carnal
knowledge and she shouted for help when 3 men came and so, Amarela fled.
The three persons brought her to the hut but they had bad intentions with her. She
fled and hid in a neighboring house. When she saw that the persons were no longer around,
she proceeded on her way home. She went to the house of Dumandan who brought her to
the Racho residence. Neneng Racho asked her son [Racho] to bring her to her aunt’s house
instead.
[AAA] said that Racho brought her to a shanty against her will where she was told to
lie down. She was boxed in her abdomen and there was carnal knowledge. [AAA] then went
home alone after Racho consummated the act.

DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED: Amarela denied. His alibi was that he was drinking with his
friend and the latter brought him to the house of his elder brother. He did not know what
happened next because he slept and woke up the next morning.
Racho also denied raping her. On the accusation of rape, he said that he could not
have done that because his hand is impaired while showing a long scar on his left arm. He
offered a Medical Certificate of the incident. His testimony was also supported by her mother.
He went home immediately right after he left with AAA. He left AAA by herself because he did
not want to bring AAA to her house which was in another town.

RULING: After a careful review of the records and a closer scrutiny of AAA's testimony,
reasonable doubt lingers as we are not fully convinced that AAA was telling the truth. The
following circumstances, particularly, would cast doubt as to the credibility of her testimony:
(1) the version of AAA's story appearing in her affidavit-complaint differs materially from her
testimony in court; (2) AAA could not have easily identified Amarela because the crime scene
was dark and she only saw him for the first time; (3) her testimony lacks material details on
how she was brought under the stage against her will; and (4) the medical findings do not
corroborate physical injuries and are inconclusive of any signs of forced entry.
First, AAA narrates that she was on her way to the comfort room, isolated from the
crowd at the beauty contest and made it easy for Amarela to grab her without anyone
noticing. Meanwhile, her affidavit-complaint would indicate that Amarela pulled AAA away
from the beauty contest stage to the day care center
Second, we also find it dubious how AAA was able to identify Amarela considering that
the whole incident allegedly happened in a dark place. In fact, she had testified that the place
was not illuminated and that she did not see Amarela's face. The identity of the offender, like
the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Third, her claim that she was forcibly brought under a makeshift stage, stripped naked,
and then raped seems unrealistic and beyond human experience. From what AAA said,
Amarela was able to undress himself and AAA, and place himself on top of her while under
a 2- feet high makeshift stage. It is physically impossible for two human beings to move freely
under a stage, much more when the other person is trying to resist sexual advances.
Moreover, AAA failed to mention how exactly Amarela pulled her to the makeshift stage
without any sign of struggle or resistance. If indeed she was being held against her will, AAA
could have easily called for help or simply run away.
Fourth, the challenge to AAA's credibility is further supported by the medical findings
of the medico-legal officer. The medico-legal certificate dated 12 February 2009 would reflect
that AAA had no pertinent physical findings/or physical injuries.
 . When we rely on the testimony of the private complainant in rape cases, we require
that her testimony be entirely credible, trustworthy, and realistic. For when certain parts
would seem unbelievable, especially when it concerns one of the elements of the crime, the
victim's testimony as a whole does not pass the test of credibility. We find it odd that AAA
was not brought to the police right after she arrived at Dumandan's house to seek help.
In the end, what needs to be stressed here is that a conviction in a criminal case must
be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt or moral certainty that the accused is guilty.
The prosecution in this case miserably failed to present a clear story of what transpired.
Accused-appellants Juvy D. Amarela and Junard G. Racho are ACQUITTED of the
charge of rape on the ground of reasonable doubt.

2. PEOPLE v. ORITA

DIGESTED BY: MARC JONAS DELA CRUZ

Contention of the State: CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito," was charged with the crime of
frustrated rape. Cristina Abayan, the victim, arrived at her boarding house early in the
morning. Shortly after knocking at the door, Lito held her and poked a “balisong” to her neck
dragged her upstairs. At the victim’s room, Lito pushed her to the wall, he undressed himself
and force the victim to undressed herself while pointing the “balisong” at her. He made her
hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. At said position, Lito can’t fully penetrate her since
she kept moving. Instead, Lito lay down and commanded her to mount him and there he
thrusted against the victim’s pudendum. However, only a small part of his penis was inserted
to her vagina, at this point, the victim escaped. Lito was positively identified since he was a
frequent visitor of another boarder.

Defense of the Accused: His conviction for frustrated rape isn’t proper since as alleged in
the findings of the medico-legal of the victim, there was no broken hymen since there was no
full penetration.

Ruling: In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim
he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the
offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he
has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated.
In a long line of cases, we have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape,
perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is
sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if
there is no penetration of the female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559 People v. Rabadan
et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States v. Garcia: 9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of execution was
performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts.
He was found guilty of the crime of rape.

3. PEOPLE v. MANGALINO

DIGESTED BY: RUTH TONGDO

Contention of the State: The trial court convicted the accused of statutory rape under
Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint signed by the father of the
victim, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lied with and having carnal knowledge of the
undersigned complainant’s daughter, a minor, 6 years of age and against her will and
consent.

Defense of the Accused: The accused argued that the bruises in the complainant’s
vestibular mucosa may have been self-inflicted. The complainant, who was constantly
running for playing ‘takbuhan” might have bumped her pelvis against a chair, which
explained the absence of confusions in the labia. Also, considering the place, the time (broad
daylight), and the presence of so many people within the immediate vicinity where the alleged
crime was commited, the accused could not have sexually abused the complainant.

Ruling: The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape as provided in Article 335, paragraph
3 of the Revised Penal Code is the carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age.
Marichelle, a little over 6 years of age at the the time, was raped. Beyond that, proof of
intimidation or force use on her, or lack of it, is immaterial. The NBI Medico Legal officer who
testified for the people, concluded that rape could have been perpetrated. He certified the
existence of indications of recent genital trauma. The government doctor further discounted
the probability of an accident, such as bumping the edge of a chair, or violent contact with a
blunt object, as there was no contusion of the labia.
The penile-vaginal contact without penetration was due to the one-centimeter diameter
opening of Marichelle’s hymen. The victim, being of tender age, the penetration could go only
as deep as the labia. In any case, the Court has consistently held that for rape to be
committed, full penetration is not required. It is enough that there is proof of entrance of
male organ within the labia or pudendum of the female organ. Indeed, even the slightest
penetration is sufficient to consummate the crime of rape.
The alleged inconsistencies refer to minor details and do not all touch upon the basic
aspects of the who, the how, and the when of the crime committed. Minor discrepancies in
the testimonies are but natural, and even enhance the credibility of the witnesses because
these discrepancies indicate that the responses given were honest and unrehearsed. In
appreciation of the testimony of the victim, due regard must be accorded to her age.
Rape can be committed even in places where people congregate: in parks, along the
road side, within the school premises, and even inside a house where there are other
occupants. The apartment of the accused was no exception. Lust is no respecter of time or
place.
Therefore, the appealed decision is affirmed with the modification in the amount of
damages.

4. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ABELARDO BALBUENA and JUANITO

TORRES
129 SCRA 10

DIGESTED BY: RABERT LORENZO

Contention of the State: Elvira Politan, 20 years old, a criminology student, accepted
invitation to join the drinking party in Abelardo Balbuena’s billiard hall. She was
accompanied by his longtime friend, Juanito Torres. After Elvira consumed had a glass of
gin, she felt dizzy and took a rest on a bench. Balbuena and Torres laid her down on the
billiard table, undressed her and removed her parts and spread her legs. Balbuena went on
top of the billiard table while Torres held her hands down and succeeded in having sex with
her. He then went down the billiard table and Torres took his turn.
Two months later, she told her mother about what happened and the following day,
they when to the police and reported the incident. She was examined by a medical doctor of
the FBI and there was no sign of extra genital physical injury and that she could have sex
with a man on or about the date alleged.
The Court of First Instance of Rizal convicted the accused Balbuena and Torres of Rate,
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and pay the costs of suit.

Defense of the Accused: They contended they delay in reporting of the crime to proper
authorities. They also contended that there is absence of injury based from the report of the
medical doctor of FBI and the complainant is an incredible witness.

Ruling: The judgment of conviction by the Court of First Instance of Rizal is affirmed.
The delay in reporting the incident was reasonable. It is not easy for a Filipinay to easily
decide whether to come out in the open where public contempt and ridicule would result in
the prosecution of the case. The innate modesty of Filipinas and their inherent, reluctance
to be exposed to the rigors of a trial scandalizing the family name. she was slos fearful
because of the thread made by Abelardo that they would kill her family especially so that she
resided near the house of Juanito and Abelardo.
The absence of injury can be explained because it was a month after the incident that
she was examined. There was also no torn dress or underwear because she was wearing
pants and brief. Elvira is a tomboy and so she is sexually attracted to females that to males.
She would not willingly submit herself to have sex with a male. Evidence clearly show that
accused employed force in consummating the offense.

5. PEOPLE v. CASTRO

Perfect penetration, rupture, or laceration NOT essential

DIGESTED BY: JOHN FELIX RATUITA

Contention of the State: Delfin Castro y Lozada, was charged for statutory rape defined
under Art. 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
While playing with a neighbor sometime on 4 October 1986, the victim was pulled by the
accused inside a bathroom, prevented from going out, and made to stand on the toilet bowl.
Accused is a first cousin of Diana Rose's mother. Kuya Delfin, as Diana Rose referred to the
accused, then put up her clothes, took off her panty, made her lean on the wall and, despite
her efforts to pull away he inserted his private part into her causing pain. Then she was told
by the accused to go home. At home, she refused to have her private part washed by her
Auntie Alice because it was hurting and painful. Medical testimony confirmed swelling on the
victim’s private parts caused by forced contact but no laceration of the hymen.

Defense of the Accused: There is no rape because:

(1) the hymen of the victim was not lacerated.
(2) the victim was allegedly standing while the crime was being committed.
(3) the victim is still a virgin.

Ruling: (1) Perfect penetration, rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina are not
essential for the offense of consummated rape.
Usually, the average adult's hymen measures 2.8 to 3 centimeters in diameter, making
it compatible with, or easily penetrable by an average size penis. The victim being of tender
age, the penetration of the male organ could go only as deep as the labia. In any case, for
rape to be committed, full penetration is not required. It is enough that there is proof of
entrance of the male organ within the labia or pudendum of the female organ. Even the
slightest penetration is sufficient to consummate the crime of rape.
(2) Sexual intercourse in a standing position, while perhaps uncomfortable, is not
improbable. Her account that she was made to stand on the toilet bowl made it easy for the
accused to do the act as she was too small and their private parts would not align unless she
was elevated to a higher position. The suggestion of the defense counsel that a finger could
have been used is absurd. For if it were only a finger there would have been no need to let
Diana stand on the toilet bowl.
(3) Entry, to the least extent, of the labia or lips of the female organ is sufficient to
constitute rape. Diana's remaining a virgin does not negate rape.

6. PEOPLE v. ATENTO

DIGESTED BY: KARA KARYS CUTI

Contention of the State: The complainant is Glenda Aringo, who was sixteen years old at
the time of the alleged offense. She is the neighbor of Cesar Atento, the herein accused-
appellant. Her claim is that Atento raped her five separate times, the first sometime in April
1986. She says that on that first occasion she went to Atento's store to buy bread. Her parents
were at work and Atento was alone in his house except for his three-year old daughter. Glenda
claims Atento cajoled her into coming inside the house and then took her downstairs, where
he succeeded in deflowering her. Afterwards, he gave her P5.00. Glenda speaks of four other
times when he raped her. It was later (presumably because her hymen had healed) that she
felt tickled by his manhood and described the act of coitus as "masarap.". The girl says she
never told anybody about Atento's attacks on her because he had threatened her life. But
she could not conceal her condition for long and after five months had to admit she was
pregnant. She revealed the accused-appellant as the father of the foetus in her womb. The
child was delivered on December 27, 1987, and christened Hubert Buendia Aringo.

Defense: Atento denies the charge against him, saying it was pure harassment concocted by
a relative of the girl who wanted to eject him from the land where his house was erected.
Insisting that Glenda was a girl of loose morals, he says he had twice seen her in sexual
congress with a man and that she had once offered her body to his thirteen-year-old son for
a fee of P5.00.

Ruling: Glenda's description of the act of coitus as pleasurable would have destroyed the
whole case against Atento but for one singular significant fact. The girl is a mental retardate
as per the testimony of Ascendo Belmonte, a clinical psychologist at Don Susano Rodriguez
Memorial Mental Hospital, stating that the victim, who was born on June 18, 1970, is INTER
ALIA with an intellectual capacity between the ages of nine (9) and twelve (12) years. As such,
her intellectual functioning is within the mentally defective level. Her fund of information is
inadequate, her judgment is unsound, her thinking and working capacity is poor. She is
unable to distinguish essential from non-essential details. Her vocabulary is limited. Her
capacity for her perceptual processes is unsatisfactory. She lacks the capacity for abstracting
and synthesizing concepts.
Benita Aringo, Glenda's mother, testified that her daughter reached only third grade and did
not like to continue studying, preferring to play with children younger than she, even when
she was already pregnant. After delivering her child, she would often leave its care to Benita,
and play marbles with the children rather than feed her baby. Another relative, Caridad
Aringo, testified that Glenda had the mentality of a 12-year old and was fond of rubber bands
and playing cards.
 The Court finds this to be the reason why, while a rape victim with normal intelligence,
would have said that the attack on her caused her much physical pain and mental agony,
Glenda naively declared that Atento's sexual organ in hers gave her much pleasure.
It is worth observing that Glenda's child was born on December, nine months after her
rape in April, and that, according to the trial judge, there was a remarkable resemblance
between Atento and the boy.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Art. 335. When and
how rape committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances: (1.) By using force or
intimidation;(2.) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious and (3.) When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though
neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs
shall be present.
Atento is guilty of rape upon Glenda under paragraph 2, because the girl was deprived
of reason. Alternatively, he is liable under paragraph 3, because his victim had the mentality
of a girl less than twelve years old at the time she was raped.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED as modified where the civil
indemnity, which is increased from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00, we agree with the sentence
imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the obligation to acknowledge and support
Hubert Buendia Aringo as his own spurious child, and to pay the costs.

(In coming to his conclusion, Judge Gregorio A. Consulta declared:

. . . Given the low I.Q. of Glenda, it is impossible to believe that she could have
fabricated her charges against the accused. She lacks the gift of articulation and
inventiveness. She could not even explain with ease the meaning of rape, a term which
she learned in the community. Even with intensive coaching, assuming that happened,
on the witness stand where she was alone, it would show with her testimony falling
into irretrievable pieces. But that did not happen. She proceeded, though with much
difficulty, with childlike innocence. A smart and perspicacious person would hesitate
to describe to the Court her sexual experiences as "tickling" and "masarap" for that
would only elicit disdain and laughter. Only a simple-minded artless child would do it.
And Glenda falls within the level of a 9-12-year-old child. And Glenda was telling the
truth!
There is no doubt that when she submitted herself to the accused later for
subsequent intercourses, she was dominated more by fear and ignorance than by
reason.

In any event, whether under paragraph 2 or under paragraph 3 of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, the accused-appellant deserves to be punished for the rape of Glenda
Azingo.)

7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PRIMO CAMPUHAN

DIGESTED BY: PRECIOUS PATAWEG

Contention of the State: Campuhan was found guilty of Statutory Rape and was sentenced
to death. On April 25 1995, while the Mother of 4 year old Chrystel Pamintuan was on the
first floor of the house preparing for a milo chocolate drinks for her children, She heard her
daughter screaming “Ayo’ko, Ayo’ko”. She immediately run upstairs, there she saw Primo
Campuhan his brother’s helper inside her children’s bedroom kneeling before Chrystel whose
pajamas were already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees. Horrified, she
cursed the accused and boxed him several times, Campuhan evaded her blows and pulled
up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside when she tried to block his path. Corazon called for
help and the accused was apprehended. Physical examination of Chrystel yielded negative.
No evident of extra genital physical injury, her hymen was intact, and its orifice is 0.5 in
diameter.

Defense of the Accused: Campuhan denied the allegations and asserted that Corazon
harbored ill will against him for refusing to do some errands for her. That the accused and
Chrystel were in truth in a playing mood. And that Chrystel was in his back when she
suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to fall. It was at that moment that Corazon
saw them. Corazon accused him of raping her child and slapped him. And that he further
asserted that the absence of external signs of physical injuries or of penetration on the private
parts of the victim bolsters his innocence.

Ruling of the Court: The conviction of the accused was relied heavily on the statement of
Chrystel. When asked if the accused touched her organ. Chrystel answered in affirmative.
But when asked if his penis penetrated her organ. Chrystel answered NO. The testimony
would be able to easily determine whether there is penetration. However, it is improper and
unfair to attach to the reply of a 4 year old whose vocabulary is yet as underdeveloped. The
possibility that accused’s organ having breached the victims organ is belied by the child’s
own assertion that she resisted by putting her legs close together. Consequently she did not
feel any intense pain but just “felt happy” about what the accused did to her. Thus she just
shouted “ayoko! Ayoko!” not “Aray ko”.
In cases where penetration was not fully established, the court relied heavily on the
victim’s testimony whether she felt pain or in the medico legal. In the present case, none was
shown. It is necessary to carefully ascertain whether the penis of the accused in reality
entered the labial threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude that the rape was
consummated. Failing in this thin line that separates attempted from consummated will
disappear.
Therefore, the sentence of Campuhan is MODIFIED to ATTEMPTED RAPE.
8. PEOPLE v. GALLO
315 SCRA 462

DIGESTED BY: RANDALL CHALMAS

Contention of the State: The Regional Trial Court, Branch 68, of Binangonan, Rizal,
charged Romeo Gallo y Igloso of qualified rape after finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime. Romeo Gallo y Igloso with lewd designs and by means of force or
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with a 13-year-old girl, Marites Gallo y Segovia.

Defense of the Accused: On 24 August 1999, accused-appellant filed a Motion to Re-open

Case (with Leave of Court) seeking a modification of the death sentence to reclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant proffers that the reduction sought by him would be in line with the new
Court rulings which annunciate that the seven attendant circumstances introduced in
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances that
must be pleaded in the indictment in order to warrant the imposition of the penalty. The
above indictment has not specifically alleged that accused-appellant is the victim’s father;
accordingly, accused-appellant’s relationship to the victim, although proven during the trial,
cannot be considered to be a qualifying circumstance.
Ruling: By operation of law, appellant is rightfully entitled to the beneficial application of
Medina. Accordingly, the Office of the Solicitor General hereby joins appellant’s prayer for
reduction of his sentence from death to reclusion perpetua. The Court agrees with the Office
of the Solicitor General. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law or the Constitution
shall form part of the legal system of the land. Medina, which has the force and effect of law,
forms part of our penal statutes and assumes retroactive effect, being as it is, favorable to an
accused who is not a habitual criminal, and notwithstanding that final sentence has already
been pronounced against him.

9. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAUL BERANA y GUEVARRA

DIGESTED BY: RHENZ TOLDING

Contention of the State: On June 2, 1994, 14-year old Maria Elena Jarcia was sleeping
when she was awakened by her brother-in-law, herein accused Berana. The accused
proceeded to committed sexual intercourse two times against the victim. The trial court
found the accused guilty of rape with a penalty of death under RA 7659 When the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree.

Defense of the Accused: Prosecution failed to adduce clear and positive proof of the
qualifying circumstance of relationship between accused-appellant and complainant. It
should be noted that the relationship between accused-appellant and the complainant
qualifies the crime from rape punishable by reclusion perpetua to rape punishable by death
under Republic Act No. 7659.

Ruling: Considering that the relationship of accused-appellant to complainant qualifies the

crime of rape punishable by reclusion perpetua to rape punishable by death, it is but proper
that a more stringent proof of relationship between the offender and the offended party must
be established by the prosecution. Corollarily, a clearer proof of relationship between the
complainant and the spouse of accused-appellant must be presented. The relationship of
accused-appellant and the complainant is not adequately substantiated since it is merely
based on testimony of the complainant, her mother’s testimony and the accused-appellant’s
use of the words, "mama at papa" in his letters. Needless to say, the evidence presented are
not sufficient to dispel doubts about the true relationship of accused-appellant and the
complainant, to the benefit of which the accused is entitled. Where the life of an accused-
appellant hangs in the balance, a more exacting proof must be adduced.

10. PEOPLE v. SABREDO

DIGESTED BY: JOSAIN LIMMAYOG

Contention of the State: Convicted for the complex crime of forcible abduction w/ rape.
Appellant (A), the uncle of complainant (C) stayed in C’s family for almost one year. C went
to the well to take a bath then A grabbed and pointed a knife at her, forced her to board
a truck to Cebu until they made their way to Masbate. They stayed at the house of A’s sister
where C tried to escape but was caught and then severely mauled by A. Suspecting that his
sister would report to the police, they transferred to his nephew’s house, and A introduced C
as his wife since his nephew never met her. A then sexually assaulted C with the presence
of a deadly weapon, after it, he inserted his 3 fingers in her vaginal orifice and cruelly
pinched it. They went to A’s another sister’s house where her sister noticed C’s weakness
and offered her medicine. A boiled some water and when asked by her sister what it was for,
A told that it will be poured to C to finish her off. Her sister stopped him. Her sister then
accompanied C to the police station. A was arrested.

Defense of the Accused: A insists that his sexual relations with C was consensual. He
claimed that they were lovers and had been engaging to sexual intimacies for 3 months before
going to Masbate when C allegedly mentioned that she is not her father’s daughter. A
admitted mauling C but this was because she confided that she was really her niece. He also
admitted pinching C’s vagina but only to punish her for deceiving him about their kinship.
That the court erred in charging him w/ the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape

Ruling: A sweetheart defense should be supported by some evidence e.g love letters, notes,
pictures which in this case are not present. W/ regards the conviction, the elements of
forcible abduction are:
1.) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of age, civil status or
reputation;
2.) the abduction is against her will;
3.) the abduction is w/ lewd designs.
Evidence shows that the C was forcibly taken at knifepoint from Cebu and through
threats and intimidation brought to various towns in Masbate where A passed her off as his
wife.
That A was moved by lewd designs was shown by A’s having carnal knowledge against
C’s will on his nephews house. But the Court is not convinced to convict A with the
complex crime of forcible abduction w/ rape because while the forcible taking has been
sufficiently alleged in the information, lewd designs were not. The elements of the 2
complexed crimes should be separately alleged. In this case, rape absorbs forcible abduction
therefore, A should be convicted of simple rape only.

11. PEOPLE v. ROMEO ARILLAS

DIGESTED BY: GIEAR ESTILLORE

Contention of the State: Amor O. Arillas accused her father, Romeo Arillas y Montoya, of
raping her on two occasions when she was barely 16 years old.
She was alone with her father in their house when the crime happened. Her father undressed
her and forced her to lie down. Her gallant resistance proved futile. He was able to take her
maidenhood. Appellant threatened Amor so she kept silent. The crime was repeated on the
following year. But she finally found the courage to report the incident to their barangay
captain.
The lower court sentenced him to death penalty.

Defense of the Accused: Romeo Arillas interposed the defense of denial and alibi that he
was repairing an irrigation pump. He claimed that the charges against him were due to the
anger of her brothers and sisters and parents-in-law with him.

Ruling: The victim was under eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the offense
and the offender was her father, these circumstances should be considered as special
qualifying circumstances as they change the nature of simple rape by punishing the offender
with the penalty of death. For a crime to be elevated in its qualified form, the circumstance
that qualifies it should be alleged in the information. If the qualifying aggravating
circumstance is not alleged but proved, it shall only be, considered as an aggravating
circumstance since the latter may be proven even if not alleged. It follows that in such cases,
the accused cannot be convicted of the crime in its qualified form. It is fundamental that
every element of an offense must be alleged in the complaint or information. The purpose of
the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. Thus, we ruled that it is a
denial of the right of an accused to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him,
and consequently, a denial of due process if he is convicted of a crime in its qualified form
notwithstanding the fact that the information, on which he was arraigned, charges him only
of the crime in its simple form by not specifying the circumstance that qualifies the crime.
The information in these cases alleged that the victim is the daughter of the appellant
but it did not allege that the victim is under eighteen (18) years old.
The appellant was only charged with simple rape and its penalty is reclusion perpetua.

12. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EXEQUIEL MAHINAY

G.R. No. 139609, November 24, 2003

DIGESTED BY: RICKY JAMES ROSALEJOS

Contention of the State: The Office of the Solicitor General contends that the trial court
found the testimony of Leny (the rape victim) worthy of belief. High respect is given to the
factual findings of the trial court unless it is shown that certain facts of value have been
plainly overlooked which, if considered, would affect the result of the case; no such facts were
shown to have been overlooked in this case.

Defense of the Accused: He asserts that in the crime of rape, the testimony of the offended
party is ordinarily most vital and must be received with greatest caution. The victim’s
testimony must be credible and must bear the stamp of truth and candor. He contends that
in this case, the testimony of the private complainant is incredible, besides being
inconsistent. He argues that it is incredible that the private complainant was able to narrate
before the trial court the lurid details of her deflowerization despite her testimony on cross-
examination that she lost consciousness when the appellant raped her. He insists that the
claim of the private complainant, that she shouted for thirty minutes without anybody
hearing her and rushing to her succor is, likewise, incredible. Another concoction is her claim
that she was raped by the appellant for four hours. Leny could not have known that she was
raped for four hours since, as testified to by her, she regained consciousness only when she
was already in their house. Moreover, on direct examination, she testified that the appellant
gave her P300 after she was raped, only to contradict herself, on cross-examination, when
she testified that she was given the amount before she was raped. Because she was
unconscious at the time, she could not have known that the appellant gave her P300. The
appellant contends that the trial court should have acquitted him instead of finding him
guilty of the crime charged.

Ruling: The trial court found the testimony of Leny positive, straightforward and credible,
and deserving of full probative weight. The legal aphorism is that the findings of the trial
court, its calibration and assessment of the testimonial evidence of the witnesses, and its
conclusion based on its findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not
conclusive effect. This is because of the trial courts unique advantage of observing at close
range the conduct, demeanor and deportment of the witnesses as they testify. An exception
to this rule is when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts
and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case.
The Court has reviewed the records and found no basis to deviate from the findings of the
trial court, that the appellant in fact raped Leny.

13. PEOPLE v. QUINANOLA, 1999

DIGESTED BY: ARABELLE MORALES

Contention of the State: The trial court ruled that the accused (Quiñanola & Escuardro)
were liable for the crime of frustrated rape "with an eye to extending to the two accused the
benefit of the principle that in case of doubt criminal justice naturally leans in favor of the
milder form of penalty" 16 but that, because of the existence of "at least six (6) aggravating
circumstances, not offset by any mitigating circumstance," the accused should each be meted
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The following are the six aggravating circumstances:
(1) Use of deadly weapons to terrorize and intimidate the victim; (2) Two persons
committed the crime; (3) One of the offenders was a member of the Philippine National Police;
(4) Fraud or disguise because appellant Quiñanola pretended that he was a member of the
New People's Army to instill fear in the victim; (5) Commissions of the crime at nighttime, and
(6) Resort to ignominy in the commission of the crime by stripping the victim of her pants
and panty and sending her home in that "humiliating and distressing condition."

Defense of the Accused: The trial court, in convicting the appellants of frustrated rape,
ruled that there was no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended
party and that (a) the victim admitted that she did not spread her legs; and (b) the medico-
legal officers findings showed that the victim did not sustain any extragenital injuries and
her hymenal orifice was so small that an erect average-size penis would not have completely
penetrated it without causing laceration.
That the Court erred in disregarding the inconsistencies of the prosecution witnesses
which is thoroughly considered could have altered the decision in favor of the accused.
The the Court erred in failing to give weight to the testimonies of the policemen which
were uncontroverted and with presumption of regularity in the performance of duties.

Ruling: Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of
his victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential
elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the
offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the
felony is consummated. In a long line of cases (People vs. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People vs.
Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People vs. Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 666;
People vs. Amores, G.R. No. L-32996, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 505). We have set the
uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any
penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of
the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to
warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female
organ (People vs. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559, People vs. Rabadan, et al., 53 Phil. 694; Unites States
vs. Garcia, 9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely
commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature,
elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it
is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.
Each appellant is liable for two counts of consummated rape on account of a clear
conspiracy between them shown by their obvious concerted efforts to perpetrate, one after
the other, the crime. Each of them therefore is responsible not only for the rape committed
personally by him but also for the rape committed by the other as well. 49
 Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659
when rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two persons, the crime is
punishable by reclusion perpetuata to death. Even while the information has failed to allege
the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the rape, appellants can, nonetheless, be
held accountable under that provision since the information has likewise averred that the
accused, referring to the two appellants, have conspiratorially committed the crime.