Professional Documents
Culture Documents
grips with
Approach-and-Landing
Accidents Reduction
Issue 1
October 2000
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE
Flight Operations Support – Customer Services Directorate
Getting to Grips with
Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
Terms of Reproduction
The statements made herein do not constitute an offer. They are expressed on the
assumptions shown and are expressed in good faith. Where the supporting grounds for these
statements are not shown the Company will be pleased to explain the basis thereof.
In the interest of aviation safety, Airbus encourages the wide use of the ALAR Briefing Notes
( in printed format or in electronic format ) as suggested in the chapter Introducing the
Briefing Notes ( Page 2 – How to Use and Implement the Briefing Notes ? ).
Use and duplication (in whole or part, in all media) of the ALAR Briefing Notes is authorized for
internal purposes of the users. Any commercial use is strictly excluded.
The users shall reproduce the copyright “ AIRBUS 2002 – All Rights Reserved ”
of the copyright owner on any duplication.
Duplications shall credit Airbus and the Flight Safety Foundation, for any reference to or use of
the contents of the ALAR Briefing Notes, that have been developed by Airbus in the frame of an
international industry task force led by the Flight Safety Foundation.
In case of translation, the translation shall not modify the intent and spirit of the original text.
In case of partial reprint, the abstract shall not alter the contents from its original context.
The ALAR Briefing Notes are provided under the expressed condition that Airbus shall have no
liability or responsibility for the use of the ALAR Briefing Notes, the correctness of the
duplication, adaptation or translation and for the updating and revision of any duplicated
version.
Foreword
The brochure Getting to Grips with Approach • Provides or suggests company’ accident-
and Landing Accidents Reduction provides an prevention-strategies and/or personal lines-of-
overview of the flying techniques and operational defense (for incident/accident prevention
aspects involved in approach-and-landing purposes and/or for correction purposes);
accidents. • Establishes a summary of operational and
training key points;
The brochure consists of a set of Approach-and-
Landing Briefing Notes. • Provides cross-reference to the associated or
related Briefing Notes; and,
Each Briefing Note: • References the relevant ICAO, U.S. FAR and
• Presents the subject using statistical data; European JAR documents.
• Emphasizes the applicable standards and best Should any deviation appears between the
practices (standard operating procedures, information provided in this brochure and that
supplementary techniques, operational published in the applicable Airplane Flight Manual
recommendations and training guidelines); (AFM), Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM),
• Discusses the factors that may lead flight crews Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) and Flight Crew
to deviate from relevant standards (for eye- Training Manual (FCTM), the latter shall prevail at
opening purposes); all times.
Airbus Industrie
Training and Flight Operations Support
Customer Services Directorate
Attention Michel TREMAUD
Operational Standards Development
1, Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, BP 33
31707 BLAGNAC Cedex – FRANCE
AI/ST-F 94A.0093/00
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Page 1
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
6.3 - Terrain Avoidance ( Pull-up ) Maneuver 8.4 - Optimum Use of Braking Devices
Table of Contents
Page 2
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
• U.S. Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) This extended scope addresses the type of events
– Joint Safety Implementation Team (JSIT) for and causal factors involved in approximately 70 %
ALAR. of total hull losses.
1.3 - Operations Golden Rules If only one lesson were to be learned from the
proposed set of Golden Rules, the following is
The operations Golden Rules defined by Airbus proposed:
Industrie assist trainees in maintaining their basic
airmanship even as they progress to integrated and Whatever the prevailing conditions, always ensure
automated aircraft models. that one pilot is controlling and monitoring the flight
path of the aircraft.
General Golden Rules:
• Automated aircraft can be flown like any 1.4 - Standard Calls
other aircraft;
Standard Calls ensure effective interaction and
• Fly, Navigate, Communicate and Manage – in communication between crewmembers and, thus,
that order; enhance flight crew situational awareness.
• Review and evaluate the available options; Initiating and completing normal checklists in a
timely manner is the most effective means of
• Match the response to the situation; preventing the omission of actions or preventing
inappropriate actions.
• Manage workload;
Explicit calls should be defined in the SOPs for the
interruption (hold) and resumption (continuation) of
• Create a shared problem model with other
a normal checklist (i.e., in case of interruption or
crewmembers by communicating; and, distraction).
• Apply recommended procedures and other
agreed actions.
Disciplined use of normal checklists should be: • Robust standard operating procedures;
• Highlighted at all stages of transition training, • Effective CRM practices; and,
line training and recurrent training; and,
• Personal lines-of-defense.
• Emphasized at the opportunity of all checks and
audits performed during line operation.
2.2 - CRM Issues in Approach-and-landing
Accidents
1.6 - Approach and Go-around Briefings
CRM issues are involved to some degree in every
To ensure mutual understanding and effective incident or accident (e.g., non-adherence to
cooperation among crewmembers and with ATC, in- procedures, interaction with automated systems).
depth approach and go-around briefings should be
conducted on each flight. The minimum content of CRM training is defined by
regulations but airlines should consider additional
The approach and go-around briefings should be CRM training to account for specific requirements,
adapted to the conditions of the flight and such as multi-cultural flight crews and/or different
concentrate on the items that are relevant for the areas of operation.
particular approach and landing (e.g., specific
approach hazards). CRM practices optimize the performance of the
entire crew (i.e., including flight crew and cabin
The approach and go-around briefings should crew, and maintenance personnel).
include the following ALAR-critical items:
• Minimum safe altitude; CRM skills contribute to:
• Terrain and man-made obstacles features; • Relieve the effects of pressures, interruptions
and distractions;
• Weather conditions;
• Provide benchmarks for timely decision-making;
• Runway condition; and,
• Other approach hazards (e.g., terrain, visual • Provide safeguards for effective error
illusions); management, thus minimizing the effects of
working errors.
• Applicable minimums (visibility or RVR, ceiling
as applicable);
• Applicable stabilization height (approach gate); 2.3 - Effective Pilot/Controller Communications
• Final approach flight path angle (and vertical Achieving effective pilot/controller communications
speed); and, requires a global approach; the importance of the
following key points should be emphasized:
• Go-around altitude and missed-approach initial
steps. • Recognition and understanding of pilots’ and
controllers’ respective working environments
and constraints;
2 - Crew Coordination
• Disciplined use of standard phraseology;
2.1 - Human Factors in Approach-and-Landing
• Strict adherence to pilot / controller
Accidents communication loop: pilot’s feedback (readback)
/ controller’s confirmation (hearback );
Addressing Human Factors issues in approach-and-
landing incidents and accidents is an effort that • Alertness to request clarification or confirmation,
must include: when in doubt;
• Defined company safety culture and policies; • Readiness to question an incorrect clearance or
an inadequate instruction;
• Related accident-prevention strategies;
− Identify – ask – decide – act; and, An altitude awareness program should encourage
the blame-free reporting of altitude deviation events
− Prioritize – plan – verify. to contribute to a better understanding of causal
factors and circumstantial factors involved in altitude
deviations.
The following safeguards should be emphasized: The following best practices should be promoted:
• Adherence to the pilot / controller • Timeliness of descent and approach
communication loop, i.e. readback / hearback preparation;
process;
• Strict adherence to SOPs for FMS setup;
• Crew cross-check and backup to ensure that
the altitude selected (i.e., on the FCU) is the • Crosscheck of all data entries by both
assigned altitude (i.e., received from ATC); crewmembers;
• Cross-checking that the assigned altitude is • Use of PFD, ND and FMS CDU to support and
above the sector minimum safe altitude (unless illustrate the descent, approach and go-around
crew is aware of the applicable minimum briefings;
vectoring altitude for the sector); • Confirmation of FMS navigation accuracy,
• Monitoring instruments and automation when before defining the use of automation for the
reaching the assigned altitude or FL; and, descent and approach (i.e., FMS modes or
selected modes);
• In VMC, applying the technique one head inside
/ one head out when approaching the cleared • Review of terrain awareness data and other
altitude or FL. approach hazards; and,
• Use of typical guidelines for descent-profile
Altitude deviations should be prevented by strict planning, monitoring and adjustment.
adherence to adequate SOPs for:
4.2 - Energy Management during Approach
• Setting the altimeter-reference on barometric
altimeters;
Inability to assess or manage the aircraft energy
level during the approach often is cited as a cause
• Selecting the assigned / cleared altitude or FL of unstabilized approaches.
on FCU; and,
Either a deficit of energy (being low and/or slow) or
• Altitude callouts. an excess of energy (being high and/or fast) may
result in approach-and-landing accidents, such as:
• Loss of vertical situational awareness; and/or, A deceleration below the final approach speed
should be accepted only in the following cases:
• Rushed and unstabilized approaches.
• GPWS/TAWS terrain avoidance maneuver;
Either situation increases the risk of approach-and- • Collision avoidance maneuver; and,
landing accidents, including those involving a CFIT.
• Wind shear recovery and escape procedure.
Nevertheless, in all three cases, the thrust levers When and how to build and maintain terrain
must be advanced to the maximum thrust (i.e., go- awareness ?
around thrust) while initiating the maneuver.
The following recommendations and guidelines
should be used to develop company strategies and
5 - Approach Hazards Awareness actions enhancing terrain awareness:
A company awareness program on approach-and- Providing flight crews with departure and approach
landing hazards should review and discuss the charts featuring terrain with color-shaded contours.
following factors that may contribute to approach-
and-landing accidents: Altimeter-setting procedures
• Flight crew fatigue;
See 3.1 – Altimeter setting – Use of radio
• Type of approach; Altimeter.
• Approach charts;
• Airport information services; Flight progress monitoring
• Airport air traffic control services; The following best practices need to be
• Airport equipment; emphasized:
Flight crews should be aware of the compounding Approach and go-around briefings should include
nature of these hazards during approach and terrain-awareness-critical items.
landing.
See 1.6 – Approach and Go-around Briefings.
5.2 - Terrain Awareness
Preparedness and commitment for go-around
Terrain awareness is defined as the combined
awareness and knowledge of: Go-around is not a frequent occurrence; SOPs
should stress the importance of being:
• Aircraft position;
• Committed for an immediate response to
• Aircraft altitude; (E)GPWS / TAWS warnings.
• Applicable minimum safe altitude (MSA); • Prepared and minded for a go-around, when
• Terrain location and features; and, warranted.
Crew coordination, cross-check and backup − monitoring by PNF of headdown cues for
effective cross-check and backup (e.g., for
The following elements of an effective cross-check calling any excessive-parameter-deviation).
and back up should be promoted to enhance terrain
awareness:
5.4 - Windshear Awareness
• Altitude calls;
Flight crew awareness and alertness are key factors
• Excessive-parameter-deviation callouts; in the successful application of wind shear
avoidance and recovery techniques.
• Task sharing and standard calls for acquisition
The following recommendations can be used for the
of visual references; and,
development of company initiatives enhancing wind
shear awareness.
• Concept of pilot monitoring to define the role of
the pilot-not-flying (PNF) in hazards conditions. Avoidance, Recognition and Recovery / Escape are
the main domains involved in effective wind shear
Awareness of other approach hazards awareness:
• Avoidance:
See 5.1 – Approach Hazards Awareness – General
and 5.3 – Visual Illusions Awareness. − Assessing conditions for a safe takeoff or
approach-and-landing, based on all
available meteorological data, visual
5.3 - Visual Illusions Awareness observations and on-board equipment;
− Delaying takeoff or approach, or diverting to
Visual illusions take place when conditions modify a more suitable airport; and,
the pilot’s perception of the environment relative to
his/her expectations. − Being prepared and committed for an
immediate response to a predictive or
Visual illusions may result in landing short, hard reactive wind shear warning.
landing or runway overrun, but may also result in
spatial disorientation and loss of control. • Recognition:
− Being alert to recognize potential or existing
The following key points need to be emphasized: wind shear conditions, based on all
available weather data, on-board equipment
• Awareness of weather factors; and monitoring of aircraft flight parameters
and flight path; and,
• Awareness of surrounding terrain and obstacles;
− Enhancing instrument scan, whenever
• Awareness and assessment of approach potential wind shear is suspected.
hazards (i.e., conditions that may cause visual
• Recovery / Escape:
illusions, such as “black hole”);
− Avoiding large thrust variations or trim
• Adherence to defined PF/PNF task sharing for changes in response to sudden airspeed
acquisition of visual references and for flying the variations;
visual segment, this includes:
− Following FD wind shear recovery and
− monitoring by PF of outside visual cues while escape guidance or applying the
transiently referring to instruments to support recommended FCOM (AOM) recovery and
and monitor the flight path during the visual escape procedure; and,
segment; and,
− Making maximum use of aircraft equipment
(e.g., flight path vector, as available).
Failure to recognize the need for and/or to execute The manual go-around technique must:
a go-around and missed-approach, when
appropriate, is a major cause of approach-and- • Minimize the initial altitude loss;
landing accidents. • Prevent an excessive pitch attitude by :
More than 70 % of approach-and-landing accidents − following FD pitch commands ( SRS orders ),
contained elements which should have been not exceeding 18-degrees pitch attitude;
recognized by the crew as improper and which
should have prompted a go-around. − considering a 25-degree pitch attitude as an
ultimate barrier from which the pilot should
Because a go-around is not a frequent occurrence, return immediately.
the importance of being go-around-prepared and
go-around-minded should be emphasized.
If any warning is activated or if any other abnormal
If the criteria for a safe continuation of the approach condition occurs:
are not met, the crew should initiate a go-around • PF must concentrate his/her attention on flying
and fly the published missed-approach. the aircraft (i.e., controlling and monitoring the
vertical flight path and lateral flight path); and,
6.2 - Flying a Manual Go-around • PNF must analyze the abnormal condition and
perform the required actions, as per applicable
A safe go-around should prioritize the elements of task sharing and ECAM and/or QRH
the following 3-Ps rule : procedures.
• Pitch :
6.3 - Terrain Avoidance ( Pull-up ) Maneuver
− Establishing and maintaining the target pitch
attitude; CFIT events account for approximately 45 % of all
approach-and-landing accidents and are the leading
• Power : cause of fatalities.
− Setting go-around thrust and checking that A typical awareness and training program for the
the required thrust is achieved; and, reduction of controlled-flight-into-terrain (CFIT)
• Performance : should:
− Confirming aircraft performance: • Educate pilots on factors that may cause CFIT;
The SOPs should define the respective decision • No flight parameter exceeds the limits
criteria for: applicable for the type of approach;
These limits also define the criteria for flight-
• Full-stop landing; or, parameters excessive-deviation callouts.
When transitioning to visual references, the pilot’s • Acquisition of visual references and decision;
perception of the runway and outside environment
should be kept constant by maintaining the: • Not descending below the MDA(H) before
reaching the visual descent/decision point
• Drift correction, to continue tracking the runway (VDP); and,
centerline (i.e., resisting the tendency to
prematurely align the aircraft with the runway • Preparedness for go-around.
centerline);
7.3 - Acquisition of Visual References
• Aiming point, to remain on the correct flight path
until the flare height (i.e., resisting the tendency
to move the aiming point closer and, thus, The transition from instrument references to visual
descend below the desired glide path / “duck- references is an important element of any type of
under”); and, instrument approach.
• Final approach speed and ground speed, to Variations exist in airline operating philosophies
maintain the aircraft energy level. about PF-PNF task sharing for:
• Acquisition of visual references;
7.2 - Flying Constant-Angle non-Precision • Conduct of landing; and,
Approaches • Conduct of go-around.
Almost 60 % of CFIT incidents and accidents occur
during step-down non-precision approaches. Task sharing for the acquisition of visual references
depends on:
The constant-angle non-precision approach • The type of approach (i.e., on the time available
technique (or CANPA) should be implemented and for the acquisition of visual references); and,
trained worldwide for preventing CFIT and other
approach-and-landing accidents. • The use of automation (i.e., on the level of
automation and redundancy).
The following aspects need to be stressed:
• Criteria for determining the type of guidance to The Airbus Industrie operating philosophy and
be used; training philosophy promote a PF-PNF task sharing,
with acquisition of visual references by:
• FMS preparation, as applicable;
• PNF, for non-precision approaches and CAT I
• Completeness of approach briefing; ILS approaches; and,
• Planning of aircraft configuration setup; • PF, for CAT II / CAT III ILS approaches.
• Descent monitoring;
• Energy management during initial approach, For CAT II / CAT III operations, the CAPT usually is
intermediate approach and final approach; the PF and only an automatic approach and landing
is considered.
• Not descending below an altitude before
reaching the associated fix;
7.4 - Flying Visual Approaches
• Determining the correct flight path angle and
vertical speed for the final descent segment; Accepting an ATC request for a visual approach or
• Commencing the descent at the exact point; requesting a visual approach should be carefully
balanced against the following decision criteria:
• Maintaining the correct flight path angle (or
vertical speed) during the final descent • Ceiling and visibility conditions;
(including the visual segment); • Darkness;
• Maintaining visual contact with runway and other • Enhanced understanding of aircraft
traffic at all times; performance and handling techniques; and,
The applicable FCOM and QRH provide: Adhering to the following operational guidelines
• Reference approach speeds; and, ensures an optimum braking during the landing roll:
Understanding factors affecting landing distance • Selecting thrust reversers as soon as possible
contributes to preventing runway overrun events. with maximum reverse thrust (this increases
safety on dry and wet runway, and is mandatory
When assessing the landing distance for a given on runway contaminated with standing water,
landing, the following factors should be accounted slush, snow or ice);
for, and combined as specified in the applicable
FCOM / QRH: • Monitoring and calling ground spoilers
extension;
• Dispatch conditions, as applicable (dispatch
under minimum equipment list [MEL] / dispatch • Monitoring and calling autobrake operation;
deviation guide [DDG] );
• Being ready to take over from autobrake,
• In-flight failures, as applicable; if required;
• Weather conditions (e.g., icing conditions/ice
accretion); • Monitoring engine operation in reverse thrust
(e.g., increasing EGT, evidence of surge);
• Wind conditions (i.e., wind component and gust,
suspected wind shear); • Monitoring airspeed indication and returning
reverse levers to the reverse idle position at the
• Airfield elevation; published indicated airspeed or when airspeed
• Runway slope (if down hill); fluctuations occur, whichever come first;
• Runway condition (nature and depth of • If required, using maximum pedal braking; and,
contaminant); and,
• Maintaining braking action until assured that the
• Use of braking devices (thrust reversers, aircraft will stop within the remaining runway
autobrake). length.
• The ATIS message is updated only if the wind Adherence to the following key points increases
direction changes by more than 30 degrees or if safety during crosswind-landing operations:
the wind velocity changes by more than 5 kt
• Understanding applicable operating factors,
over a 5-minute time period;
maximum recommended values and limitations;
• If an instantaneous wind reading is desired and
• Using recommended and published flying
requested from the ATC, the phraseology
techniques associated with crosswind landing;
“instant-wind“ should be used in the request
(some controllers may provide such instant-wind Note :
without request under shifting and/or gusting A wings-level touchdown (i.e., without any
wind conditions); decrab) may be safer than a steady-sideslip
• The IRS wind is a near-real-time wind; touchdown with an excessive bank angle;
• The FMS wind is a 30-second-average wind; • Requesting the assignment of a more favorable
and, runway, if prevailing runway conditions and
• The maximum demonstrated crosswind crosswind component are considered
generally applies to a steady wind and is not a inadequate for a safe landing;
limitation (unless otherwise stated). • Adapting the autopilot disconnect altitude to
prevailing conditions in order to have time to
Flight crews should use the most appropriate source establish manual control and trim the aircraft
of wind information, depending on the flight phase before the align/decrab phase and flare;
and intended use. • Being alert to detect changes in ATIS and tower
messages (wind direction shift, velocity and/or
gust increase); and,
8.7 - Crosswind Landing
• Being aware of small-scale local effects
Operations in crosswind conditions require strict associated with strong winds:
adherence to applicable limitations or maximum − Updrafts and downdrafts;
recommended crosswind values, operational
recommendations and handling techniques, − Vortices created by buildings, forests or
particularly when operating on wet or contaminated terrain.
runways.
Approaching the flare point with wings-level and a Approach-and-Landing Briefing Notes
crab angle, as required for drift correction, three
flare techniques are possible (depending on runway The scope, structure and suggested use of the
condition, crosswind component and company Approach-and-Landing Briefing Notes are described
SOPs): in the chapter Introducing the Briefing Notes.
• Align the aircraft with the runway centerline,
while preventing drifting sideways, by applying
into-wind aileron and opposite rudder (i.e., using
cross-controls);
• Perform a partial decrab, using the cross-
controls technique to continue tracking the
runway centerline; or,
• Maintain the crab angle, for drift correction, and
wings-level until the main landing gear
touchdown.
• Air Traffic Control - Training and Procedures; The Flight Safety Foundation is committed to a
• Airport Facilities; significant awareness campaign that will ensure
availability of this information to everyone who
• Aircraft equipment; and, participates in approach-and-landing operations, so
that all can play a part in improving safety within
• Aircraft Operations and Training. their sphere of influence.
All conclusions and recommendations were data- The cooperation and contribution of all players in the
driven and supported by factual evidence of their global aviation system are required to:
relevance to the reduction of approach-and-landing
• Enhance partnership, cooperation and
incidents and accidents.
communication between:
− operators;
Statistical Data
− air traffic control services;
Approach-and-landing accidents (defined as − state operational authorities;
accidents occurring during the initial approach, final
approach and landing) represent approximately − state navigation agencies;
55 % of total hull losses and 50 % of fatalities. − services providers;
Recommendations:
Preparedness to Go-around and Commitment
• State should mandate and operators should for Missed-Approach:
develop and implement SOPs for approach-and
-landing operations; Conclusions:
• Operators should develop SOPs that allow their Failure to recognize the need for and to execute a
practical application in normal operating missed approach when appropriate is a major
environment; cause of approach and landing accidents.
The involvement of flight crews is essential in
More than 70 % of approach-and-landing accidents
the development and evaluation of SOPs;
contained elements which should have been
recognized by the crew as improper and which
• Operators should implement routine and critical should have prompted a go-around.
evaluation of SOPs to determine the need for
change;
A true no-blame go-around policy should • The approach should be considered stabilized
alleviate the reporting and justification only if:
requirements following a go-around or diversion;
and, − The aircraft is on the correct flight path;
− Only small changes in heading and pitch are
• Training and company performance required to maintain that path;
management systems should reinforce these
policies. − The airspeed is:
! not more than V APP + 10 kt IAS; and,
Flying Stabilized Approaches: ! not less than V APP – 5 kt;
Conclusions:
Note :
Unstabilized and rushed approaches contribute to The above recommendation has been
approach and landing accidents. adapted to reflect the Airbus V APP concept.
• In cooperation with airport authorities and • Operators should develop and implement a
rescue services, implement unambiguous policy for the appropriate use of automation,
emergency procedures and common navigation and approach aids for the approach
phraseology to eliminate confusion; and, being flown.
• Develop, jointly with airport authorities and local
rescue services, emergency-training programs Use of Radio Altimeter for Terrain Awareness:
that are conducted on a regular basis.
Conclusions:
Flight crews should:
Using the radio altimeter (RA) as an effective tool
• Verify understanding of each ATC helps prevent approach and landing accidents.
communication and request clarification when
necessary; and, Recommendations:
• Accurately report the status of abnormal and • Education is needed to improve crew
emergency situations and the need for awareness of radio altimeter operation and
emergency assistance using standard benefits;
phraseology.
• Operators should state that the radio altimeter is
to be used during approach operations and
Approach Hazards - Low Visibility, Visual
specify procedures for its use; and,
Illusions and Contaminated Runway Operations:
• Operators should fit radio altimeters and
Conclusions: activate “Smart Callouts” at 2,500 feet, 1,000
feet, 500 feet, at 200 feet or the altitude set in
The risk of approach and landing accident is higher
the “DH” (decision height) window (as well as at
in operations conducted in low light and/or visibility,
50 ft, 40 ft, 30ft, 20 ft and 10 ft, as required) for
on wet or otherwise contaminated runways, and with
enhanced terrain awareness.
the presence of optical or physiological illusions.
More than 70 % of CFIT and runway Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA):
excursion/overrun events occur:
Conclusions:
• In low visibility;
Collection and analysis of in-flight parameters,
• In hilly or mountainous terrain; (FOQA) programs identify performance trends that
• On contaminated runway; and/or, can be used to improve approach and landing
safety.
• Under adverse wind conditions.
Recommendations:
The lack of acquisition or the loss of visual
references is the most common primary causal • FOQA should be implemented worldwide in
factor in approach-and-landing accidents. tandem with information sharing partnerships
such as the Global Analysis and Information
Network (GAIN), the British Airways Information
Recommendations: System (BASIS) and the Aviation Safety Action
• Flight crews should be trained in operations Partnership (ASAP);
involving adverse conditions (i.e., crosswind, • Examples of FOQA benefits (safety
runway contamination) before they are assigned improvements and cost reduction) should be
line duties; publicized widely; and,
• Flight crews should make operational use of a • A process should be developed to bring FOQA
risk-assessment checklist to identify approach and information sharing partnerships to regional
and landing hazards; and business aviation.
Appropriate procedures should be implemented
to lessen these risks; and,
− PF and PNF tasks for all phases of ground − Classroom lectures (using Briefing Notes and
and flight operations; associated Presentations); and/or,
Other actors in the global aviation system, such as: • Airbus Cockpit Philosophy; and,
• Air traffic control services; • Proceedings of:
• Navigation state agencies; − Performance and Operations Conferences;
• Operational authorities; − Human Factors Symposiums; and,
• Service providers; and, − Operational Liaison Meetings.
• Flight academies;
Aviation Regulations / Requirements:
should use the provision of the Briefing Notes to
evaluate their possible contribution to the reduction of • ICAO – Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft, Part I –
CFIT and Approach-and-Landing accidents. International Commercial Air Transport –
Aeroplanes;
• ICAO – Procedures for Air Navigation Services
Statistical Data (PANS -OPS, Doc 8168);
Statistical data quoted in the Briefing Notes originate • European Joint Aviation Requirement –
from various industry sources. JAR-OPS 1 – Commercial Air Transport
(Aeroplanes);
The following Special FSF Report provides a • U.S. FAR – Part 91 – Air Traffic and General
consolidated source of statistical data, definitions Operating Rules;
and facts about approach-and-landing accidents,
including those involving CFIT: • U.S. FAR – Part 121 – Operating Requirements:
Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations;
Flight Safety Foundation and,
• U.S. FAA – Aeronautical Information Manual
Flight Safety Digest (AIM) – Basic Flight Information and ATC
Killers in Aviation: Procedures.
FSF Task Force Presents Facts
About Approach-and-landing and Airlines’ Aircraft Operating Manuals:
Controlled-flight-into-terrain Accidents
• Several airlines’ aircraft operating manuals (AOM)
Volume 17/No 11-12 – Volume 18/No 1-2
have been used to confirm operators’ best
Nov.-Dec.98/Jan.-Feb.99 practices for non-type-related operational
matters.
Reference Documents
The following references and data sources have been
The following reference documents have been used to used to document and analyze the operational
support and illustrate the applicable standards, factors and human factors involved in approach-and-
operational recommendations and training guidelines: landing incidents and accidents:
Term
or Definition
Abbreviation
AFS Automatic Flight System, this includes the flight director (FD), the autopilot (AP),
the autothrottle/autothrust system (A/THR) and the flight management system (FMS)
AGL Above Ground Level ( e.g., 1000 ft - height AGL, indicated by the radio altimeter or
computed by subtracting the terrain elevation from the altitude above MSL )
Term
or Definition
Abbreviation
ALTN Alternate
AP Auto Pilot
Approach Gate A point in space with a defined configuration and energy state
( one of the two components of FANS, see also FANS and CNS )
Term
or Definition
Abbreviation
Causal Factor A causal factor is an event or item judged to be directly instrumental in the causal
chain of events leading to an accident ( source: Flight safety Foundation )
Circumstantial Factor A circumstantial factor is an event or an item that was judged not to be directly in
the causal chain of events [ leading to an accident ] but could have contributed to
the accident ( source: Flight Safety Foundation )
( one of the two components of FANS, see also FANS and ATM )
CONF Configuration ( e.g., slats, flaps, roll spoilers, ground spoilers, ... )
Term
or Definition
Abbreviation
DIST Distance
FANS Future Air Navigation System ( see also CNS and ATM )
FD Flight Director
Term
or Definition
Abbreviation
FL Flight Level
ft Feet
GA Go Around
Term
or Definition
Abbreviation
GS Glide Slope
GW Gross Weight
HF High Frequency
hPa Hectopascals
IF Intermediate Fix
Term
or Definition
Abbreviation
kt Knots
LOC Localizer
m Meters
Term
or Definition
Abbreviation
Mode Type of guidance used to guide the aircraft towards a target or set of targets,
or along a vertical flight path and/or lateral flight path
"Selected modes" refers to the modes armed or engaged by the pilot on the FCU
MSL Mean Sea Level ( e.g., 1000 ft - altitude above MSL, indicated by the barometric
altimeter when set to QNH )
Navaid Navigation Aid ( e.g., NDB, VOR, VOR-DME, LOC, ILS, ... )
ND Navigation Display
Term
or Definition
Abbreviation
Next Target Any required element or combination of one or more of the following elements:
- A position,
- An altitude,
- An aircraft configuration,
- A speed,
- A power setting.
nm Nautical miles
OM Outer Marker
PF Pilot Flying
Term
or Definition
Abbreviation
The PNF is sometimes referred to as the Pilot Monitoring to enhance his/her role
in terms or monitoring, cross-check and backup
QNH Actual atmospheric pressure at sea level, based on actual atmospheric pressure at
station
Altimeter setting required to read an altitude above mean sea level ( MSL )
RA Depending on context :
- Radio Altimeter, or
Raw Data Raw navigation data : bearing and/or distance from aircraft to the tuned navaid
Reversion A mode reversion is a manual or automatic changeover from one AP mode to another
mode ( usually, a lower level of automation ) resulting from:
- a pilot action ( e.g., the selection of a lower level of automation or the
disengagement of a mode for manual reversion to the AP basic mode );
- a system built-in condition ( e.g., a guidance limit or an active flight envelope
protection ); or,
- a failure or temporary loss of the engaged mode.
Term
or Definition
Abbreviation
Stabilization Height The height above airfield elevation or the height above touchdown ( HAT ) at which
the aircraft should be stabilized for the approach to be continued
- 500 ft in VMC
Target A guidance target ( e.g., a speed, heading, altitude, vertical speed, flight path angle,
track, course, etc ) selected by the pilot on the appropriate panel (FCU, FMS CDU or
keyboard)
Term
or Definition
Abbreviation
TAWS is the term used by the European JAA and the U.S. FAA to describe
equipment meeting ICAO standards and recommendations for ground-proximity
warning system (GPWS) equipment that provides predictive terrain-hazard warnings
TERPS U.S. Standard for Terminal Instrument Approach Procedures ( FAR - Part 97 )
TO WPT Waypoint of the F-PLN flight plan considered by the FMS for immediate lateral
navigation guidance ( in case of incorrect flight plan sequencing, the TO WPT may
happen to be behind the aircraft )
Transition A mode transition is a manual or automatic changeover from one AP mode to another
mode, resulting from:
- a pilot action ( e.g., the selection of a new mode on the FCU, as appropriate for
the task or following an ATC instruction ); or,
- an automatic mode sequencing resulting from a prior mode selection involving
several mode changes in sequence ( e.g., altitude capture changeover to altitude
hold or selected heading changeover to localizer capture then to localizer tracking )
V MCL Minimum control speed in landing configuration with the critical engine inoperative
Term
or Definition
Abbreviation
V REF Reference approach speed ( also referred to as threshold reference speed or target
threshold speed )
Chapter 1
Deliberate non-adherence to 40 %
procedures
Table 1
Causal Factors related to SOPs
in Approach-and-Landing Accidents
The initial SOPs for a new aircraft model are based SOPs should identify and describe the standard
on the above objectives and on the experience tasks and duties of flight -crew for each flight phase.
gained during the development and certification flight-
test campaign and during the route-proving program. SOPs should be accomplished by recall but critical
tasks (e.g., selections of systems and changes of
After they are introduced into service, the initial aircraft configuration) should be cross-checked by
SOPs are periodically reviewed and enhanced based use of normal checklists, according to the phase of
on the feedback received from various users (i.e., in flight.
training and in line operations).
SOPs should be supplemented by information on
specific operating techniques (e.g., adverse weather
Operator’ Customized SOPs operation) or by operational recommendations for
specific types of operations (e.g., operation on wet or
Airbus Industrie’ SOPs can be adopted without contaminated runway, operation in ETOPS area
change by an operator or used as the basis for the and/or in RVSM airspace).
development of customized company’ SOPs.
SOPs should assume that all aircraft systems
Customized company SOPs usually are established operate normally and that all automatic functions are
to assure standardization across the different aircraft used normally.
fleets being operated by the airline. Note :
Deviations from the Airbus Industrie’ SOPs may be A system may be partially or totally inoperative
coordinated with Airbus Industrie, such deviations without affecting the SOPs.
usually require approval by the airline’s operational
authority. SOPs should emphasize the following aspects
frequently involved in approach-and-landing
SOPs should be simple, clear, concise and directive; accidents:
the level of expanded information should be tailored
to reflect the airline’s operating philosophy and • Task sharing;
training philosophy.
• Optimum use of automation;
Operator’s SOPs should be reviewed and
reassessed periodically based on revisions of the • Operations Golden Rules;
Airbus Industrie’s SOPs and on internal company
feedback, to identify any need for change. • Standards calls;
• Use of normal checklists; The European JAA defines the scope and contents
of SOPs in JAR-OPS 1.1045 and associated
• Approach and go-around briefings; Appendix 1.
• Altimeter setting and cross-check procedures; The scope of SOPs defined in the FAA AC 120-71 is
allocated by the JAA to the Part A and Part B of the
• Descent profile management; Operations Manual, as follows:
• Part A : General operational policies (i.e., non-
• Energy management;
type-related matters); and,
• Terrain awareness; • Part B : Aeroplane operating matters (i.e., type-
related matters).
• Approach hazards awareness;
General Principles
• Use of radio altimeter;
SOPs should contain safeguards in order to
• Elements of a stabilized approach and approach
minimize the potential for inadvertent deviation from
gates;
procedures, particularly when operating under
abnormal or emergency conditions or following
• Approach procedures and techniques for various
interruptions or distractions.
types of approaches;
Safeguards include:
• Landing and braking techniques for various types
of runway and wind conditions; and, • Triggers:
− events or actions initiating groups of actions
• Readiness and commitment to go-around
(called action-blocks);
(e.g., GPWS warning, unstabilized approach,
bounce recovery).
• Action blocks:
− groups of actions being accomplished in
In addition, SOPs should address the following
sequence as a group;
aspects:
• Action patterns:
Regulatory Definition − flightdeck panel scanning sequences or
patterns supporting the flow and sequence of
The U.S. FAA defines the scope and contents of action blocks; and,
SOPs in Advisory Circular (AC) 120-71.
• Standard calls:
The SOPs defined in AC 120-71 includes items − standard phraseology and terms used for
related to: effective intra-crew communication.
The following rules apply to any flight phase but are The Sterile Cockpit rule and the Silent Cockpit
particularly important in the high-workload phases concept often are misunderstood as referring to the
associated with approach and landing. same operating policy.
The pilot flying (PF) is responsible for controlling the When adhering to a Silent Cockpit policy, standard
vertical flight path and horizontal flight path and for calls are minimized; FCU selections, FMA changes
energy management, by either: and target confirmations on PFD and ND are not
announced loudly but included in the instruments
• Supervising the autopilot vertical guidance and scan.
lateral guidance and the autothrust operation
(i.e., awareness of modes being armed or Airbus Industrie acknowledges that variations may
engaged, and of mode changes through mode exist in airline operating policies but encourages
transitions and reversions); operators to adopt and adhere to a Standard Calls
policy, as defined in Briefing Note 1.4 – Standard
or,
Calls.
• Hand flying the aircraft, with or without flight
director (FD) guidance, and with an adapted
navigation display (e.g., ROSE or ARC mode). Use of Automation
The pilot not flying (PNF) is responsible for With higher levels of automation, flight crews are
monitoring tasks and for performing the actions offered an increasing number of options and
requested by the PF; this includes: strategies to choose for the task to be
accomplished.
• Performing the standard PNF tasks:
The company SOPs should accurately define the
− SOP actions; and, options and strategies selected by the airline for the
various flight phases and for the various types of
− Flight director and FMS mode selections and approaches.
target entries, when in manual flight;
• Monitoring the current status of the aircraft; and, Briefing Note 1.2 - Optimum Use of Automation
provides expanded information on the use of AP/FD,
• Monitoring the PF to provide effective backup as A/THR and FMS.
required (this includes both flight and ground
operation).
Scope and Use of Normal Checklists
Sterile Cockpit Rule Briefing Note 1.5 - Normal Checklists provides a
detailed overview on the scope and use of normal
Adhering to the Sterile Cockpit rule (defined in checklists.
Briefing Note 2.4 – Intra-Cockpit Communications,
Managing Interruptions and Distractions ) may be
mandated by operational authorities (e.g., U.S. FAR Training Aspects
– Part 121.542 ) or adopted per company policy.
Disciplined use of SOPs and normal checklists
Airbus Industrie encourages adherence to the Sterile should begin during the transition training course,
Cockpit rule, regardless of applicable national because habits and routines acquired during
requirements. transition training have a lasting effect.
Transition training and recurrent training provide a • Incorrect CRM techniques (e.g., absence of
unique opportunity to discuss the reasons for the cross-checking, crew coordination or effective
rules and procedures and to discuss the backup);
consequences of failing to comply with them.
• Company policies (e.g., regarding schedules,
Conversely, allowing a relaxed adherence to SOPs costs, go-around and diversion);
and/or a relaxed use of normal checklists during
• Other policies (e.g., crew duty time);
initial or recurrent simulator training may encourage
corresponding deviations during line operations. • Personal desires or constraints (e.g., schedule,
mission completion);
To ensure effective compliance with published SOPs, • Overconfidence (e.g., high time on aircraft type).
it is important to understand why pilots intentionally
or inadvertently deviate from rules or standards. These factors may be used to assess company
and/or personal exposure, and to develop
In most cases of deviation from SOPs, the procedure corresponding prevention strategies and lines -of-
that was followed in place of the published procedure defense.
seemed to be appropriate for the prevailing situation,
considering the information available at the time.
Summary of Key Points
The following factors and conditions are cited often in
discussing deviations from SOPs: SOPs should include and emphasize aspects that
• Inadequate knowledge of or failure to understand are involved frequently in approach-and-landing
the rule, procedure or action accidents.
(e.g., due to quality of wording or phrasing, rule
or procedure or action being perceived as Company policies, technical training and CRM
inappropriate); training programs, line checks and line audits
should:
• Insufficient emphasis on strict adherence to
• Promote strict adherence to SOPs; and,
SOPs during transition and recurrent training;
• Identify and address the reasons for intentional
• Insufficient vigilance (fatigue); or inadvertent deviations from SOPs.
• Distractions (e.g., due to intra-cockpit activity);
• Task saturation (i.e., absence of multi-tasking The following Briefing Notes should be reviewed
ability or task overload); along with the above general information in order to
revisit all the aspects associated with standard
• Incorrect management of priorities (e.g., lack of operating procedures:
decision-making model for time-critical
situations); • 1.2 - Optimum Use of Automation,
Three generations of flight guidance systems are Errors in using and managing the automatic flight
currently in airline service, providing different levels system and the lack of awareness of the operating
of integration and automation: modes are causal factors in more than 20 % of
approach-and-landing accidents.
− Full integration of AP/FD and A/THR • Elevator is used to control pitch attitude,
modes; airspeed, vertical speed, altitude,
flight-path-angle, vertical navigation profile or to
− Selected vertical and lateral modes; and, track a glideslope beam;
− Vertical and lateral navigation (FMS),
• Throttle/thrust levers are used to maintain a
given thrust or a given airspeed.
• A320 / A330 / A340 families:
− Full integration of AP/FD - A/THR – FMS Throughout the flight, the pilot’s objective is to fly:
modes (FMGS);
• Performance segments at constant thrust or at
− Selected vertical and lateral modes; and, idle (e.g., takeoff, climb or descent); or,
− Managed vertical and lateral navigation in all
flight phases. • Trajectory segments at constant speed
(e.g., cruise or approach).
Depending on the task to be accomplished, The FCU constitutes the main interface between the
maintaining the airspeed is assigned either to the pilot and the autoflight system for short-term
AP (elevators) or to the A/THR (throttles/thrust guidance (i.e., for immediate guidance).
levers), as shown in Table 1.
The FMS multi-purpose control and display unit
(MCDU) constitutes the main interface between the
pilot and the autoflight system for long-term
A/THR AP
guidance (i.e., for the current and subsequent flight
phases).
Throttles / On aircraft equipped with an FMS featuring both
Elevators
Thrust levers lateral and vertical navigation, two types of guidance
(modes and associated targets) are available:
Table 1
AP – A/THR Modes Integration Understanding Automated Systems
The correct level of automation often is the one the Any action on the FCU or on the FMS keyboard and
pilot feels comfortable with for the task or for the line-select keys should be confirmed by cross-
prevailing conditions, depending on his/her checking the corresponding annunciation or data on
knowledge and experience of the aircraft and the PFD and/or ND (and on the FMS CDU).
systems.
At all times, the PF and PNF should be aware of the
Reversion to hand flying and manual thrust control status of the guidance modes being armed or
actually may be the correct level of automation, engaged and of any mode change-over throughout
depending on the prevailing conditions. mode transitions and reversions.
FMS or selected guidance can be used in Enhanced reference to the above controls and
succession or in combination (e.g., FMS lateral displays promotes and increases the flight crew
guidance together with selected vertical guidance) awareness of :
as best suited for the flight phase and prevailing
• The status of the system (i.e., modes being
constraints.
armed or engaged),
The PF always retain the authority and capability to • The available guidance (i.e., for flight path and
select the most appropriate level of automation and speed control).
guidance for the task, this includes:
• Adopting a more direct level of automation by This enables the flight crew to predict and anticipate
reverting from FMS-managed guidance to the entire sequence of flight mode annunciations
selected guidance (i.e., to selected modes and throughout successive flight phases (i.e., throughout
targets); mode transitions or reversions).
• Selecting a more appropriate lateral or vertical
mode; or,
Monitor automation at all times
• Reverting to hand flying (with or without FD
guidance, with or without A/THR) for direct The use and operation of the AFS must be
control of aircraft vertical trajectory, lateral monitored at all times by:
trajectory and thrust.
• Checking and announcing the status of AP/FD
modes and A/THR mode on the FMA
Know your Available Guidance at all times (i.e., arming or engagement);
• Observing and announcing the result of any
The FCU and the FMS CDU are the prime target setting or change (on the FCU) on the
interfaces for the flight crew to communicate with related PFD and/or ND scales; and,
the aircraft systems (i.e., to arm or engage modes
and to set targets). • Supervising the resulting AP/FD guidance and
A/THR operation on the PFD and ND (pitch
The PFD and ND are the prime interfaces for the attitude and bank angle, speed and speed trend,
aircraft to communicate with the flight crew, to altitude, vertical speed, heading or track, …).
confirm that the aircraft systems have correctly
accepted the mode selections and target entries:
Be ready to take over, if required
• PFD (FMA, speed scale and altitude scale):
− guidance modes, speed and altitude targets; If doubt exists regarding the aircraft flight path or
and, speed control, no attempt at reprogramming the
automated systems should be made.
• ND :
Selected guidance or hand flying together with the
− lateral guidance ( heading or track or use of navaids raw data should be used until time
FMS flight plan). and conditions permit reprogramming the AP/FD or
FMS.
If the aircraft does not follow the intended flight path, • Insufficient understanding of mode transitions
check the AP and A/THR engagement status. and mode reversions (i.e., mode confusion);
If engaged, disconnect the AP and/or A/THR using • Inadequate task sharing and/or CRM practices
the associated instinctive disconnect push button(s), preventing the PF from monitoring the flight path
to revert to hand flying (with FD guidance or with and airspeed;
reference to raw data) and/or to manual thrust
control. (e.g., both pilots being engaged in the
management of automation or in solving an
In hand flying, the FD commands should be unanticipated situation or abnormal condition);
followed; otherwise the FD bars should be cleared
from display. • Engaging the AP with the aircraft in an out-of-trim
condition (conventional aircraft only);
AP and A/THR must not be overridden manually.
• Failure to arm the approach mode; and/or,
If AP or A/THR operation needs to be overridden
(i.e., following a runaway or hardover), immediately • Failure to set the correct final approach course.
disconnect the affected system by pressing the
associated instinctive disconnect push button.
Recommendations for Optimum Use of
Automation
Factors and Errors in Using Automation
Correct use of automated systems reduces workload
The following factors and errors can cause flying an and significantly improves the flight crew time and
incorrect flight path, which - if not recognized - can resources for responding to:
lead to an approach-and-landing accident, including
one involving CFIT: • An unanticipated change; or,
• Preoccupation with FMS programming during a • FMS navigation accuracy has been confirmed.
critical flight phase, with consequent loss of
situational awareness;
The safe and efficient use and management of AP, • Announce all changes in accordance with
A/THR and FMS are based on the following three- Standard Calls defined in SOPs;
step technique:
• Anticipate: • When changing the selected altitude on FCU,
cross-check the selected altitude indication on
− Understand system operation and results of PFD;
any action, be aware of modes being armed
During descent, ensure that selected altitude is
or engaged (seek concurrence of other
not to below the MEA or MSA (or be aware of the
crewmember, if deemed necessary);
applicable minimum-vectoring-altitude);
• Execute: During final approach, set go-around altitude on
FCU (i.e., the MDA/H or DA/H should not be set);
− Perform action on FCU or on FMS CDU; and,
• Prepare FMS for arrival before starting the
• Confirm: descent;
− Crosscheck and announce arming or An alternative arrival routing, another runway or
engagement of modes and targets selections circling approach, can be prepared on the
(on FMA, PFD and/or ND scales or FMS secondary flight plan, as anticipated;
CDU).
• In case of a routing change (e.g., DIR TO), cross-
The following rules and recommendations should be check the new TO waypoint before activating the
considered to support the implementation of this DIR TO (i.e., making sure that the intended
technique: TO waypoint is not already behind the aircraft);
• Before engaging the AP, make sure that: Caution is essential during descent in
− Modes engaged for FD guidance (check mountainous areas; ensure that the new track
FMA annunciations) are the correct modes and assigned altitude are not below the sector
for the intended flight phase and task; safe altitude;
Select the appropriate mode(s), as required; If under radar vectors, be aware of the sector
and, minimum vectoring-altitude;
− Command bars do not shows large orders; If necessary, the selected heading mode can be
if large commands are given, maintain hand used with reference to navaids raw data, while
flying to center the bars before engaging verifying the new route and/or requesting
AP; confirmation from ATC;
Engaging the AP while large commands are • Before arming the NAV mode, ensure that the
required to achieve the intended flight path correct active waypoint (i.e., TO waypoint) is
may result in the AP overshooting the displayed on the FMS CDU and ND (as
intended vertical target or lateral target; applicable);
• Before any action on FCU, check that the knob or If the displayed TO waypoint on the ND is not
push button is the correct one for the desired correct, the desired TO waypoint can be restored
function; by either:
• After each action on FCU, verify the result of this − clearing an undue intermediate waypoint; or,
action on:
− FMA (i.e., for arming or engagement of − performing a DIR TO [desired TO waypoint].
modes); and/or,
Monitor the correct interception of the FMS lateral
− PFD/ND data (i.e., for selected targets); and, flight plan;
by reference to the aircraft flight path and
airspeed response;
• In case of a late routing or runway change, • At any time, if the aircraft does not follow the
a reversion to AP selected modes and raw data is desired flight path and/or airspeed, do not
recommended; hesitate to revert to a more direct level of
automation:
Reprogramming the FMS during a critical flight
phase (e.g., in terminal area, on final approach or − revert from FMS-managed modes to selected
go-around) is not recommended, except to modes;
activate the secondary flight plan, if prepared, or
for selecting a new approach; or,
− disconnect AP and follow FD guidance (if
Priority tasks are, in that order : correct);
− horizontal and vertical flight path control; or,
− altitude and traffic awareness; and, − disengage FD, select FPV (as available) and
hand fly the aircraft, using raw data or visually
− ATC communications;
(if in VMC);
and/or,
• No attempt should be made to analyze or rectify
an anomaly by reprogramming the AFS or FMS, − disengage the A/THR and control the thrust
until the desired flight path and/or airspeed are manually.
restored;
• In case of AP uncommanded disconnection,
the second AP should be engaged immediately to Summary of key points
reduce PF’s workload (i.e., only dual or multiple
failures may affect both APs simultaneously); For optimum use of automation, the following
should be promoted:
• If cleared to exit a holding pattern on a radar
vector, the holding exit prompt should be pressed • Understanding the integration of AP/FD and
(or the holding pattern cleared) to allow the A/THR modes (i.e., pairing of modes);
correct sequencing of the FMS flight plan;
• Understanding all mode transition and reversion
• Under radar vectors, when intercepting the final sequences;
approach course in a selected heading or track
mode (i.e., not in NAV mode), flight crew should • Understanding pilot-system interfaces for:
ensure that FMS flight plan sequences normally
by checking that the TO waypoint is correct (on − Pilot-to-system communication (i.e., for
ND and FMS CDU); modes engagement and target selections);
Ensuring that FMS flight plan sequences correctly − System-to-pilot feedback (i.e., for modes and
with a correct TO waypoint is essential to re- targets cross-check);
engage the NAV mode, in case of a go-around;
• Awareness of available guidance (AP/FD and
If FMS flight plan does not sequence correctly,
A/THR status, modes armed or engaged, active
correct sequencing can be restore by either:
targets);
− performing a DIR TO [ a waypoint ahead in
the approach ] or a DIR TO INTCPT (as • Alertness to adapt the level of automation to the
available); or, task and/or circumstances, or to revert to hand
flying / manual thrust control, if required;
− clearing an undue intermediate waypoint (be
cautious not to clear the desired
TO waypoint). • Adherence to design philosophy and operating
philosophy, SOPs and Operations Golden
Rules.
If a correct TO waypoint cannot be restored, the
NAV mode should not be used for the rest of the
approach or for go-around;
Regulatory references
• ICAO – Annex 6 Operation of Aircraft, part I –
International Commercial transport –
Aeroplanes, Appendix 2, 5.14.
• ICAO – Human Factors Training Manual
(Doc 9683).
• ICAO – Human Factors Digest No 5 –
Operational Implications of Automation in
Advanced Technology Flight Decks (Circular
234).
• FAR 121-579 - Minimum altitudes for the use of
the autopilot.
Golden Rules have always guided human activities. The following factors frequently are identified as
causal factor in approach-and-landing accidents:
In early aviation days, the Golden Rules defined the
basic principles of airmanship.
% of
With the development of technology in modern Factor
Events
aircraft and with research on man-machine-interface
and crew-coordination, Golden Rules have been Inadequate decision making 74 %
broadened to encompass the principles of
interaction with automation and crew resources Omission of action or 72 %
management (CRM). inappropriate action
The operations Golden Rules defined by Airbus Inadequate CRM practice 63 %
Industrie assist trainees in maintaining their basic (crew coordination, cross-
airmanship even as they progress to integrated and check and backup)
automated aircraft models.
Insufficient horizontal or 52 %
These rules apply with little modification to all Airbus
vertical situational awareness
models.
Automated aircraft can be flown like any This rule can be summarized by the following
other aircraft. three “ know where …” situational-awareness
items:
To promote this rule, each trainee should be given − Know where you are;
the opportunity to fly the aircraft just using the stick,
rudder and throttles. − Know where you should be; and,
− Know where the terrain and obstacles are.
The use of flight director (FD), autopilot (AP),
autothrottle/autothrust (A/THR) and flight
management system (FMS) should be introduced • Communicate :
progressively, as defined by the applicable training
syllabus. Effective crew communication involves
communications between flight crewmembers
Practice of hand flying will illustrate that the pilot and communications between flight crew and
flying (PF) always retains the authority and capability cabin crew.
to adopt:
In an abnormal or emergency condition, after a
• A more direct level of automation; or revert to, stable flight path has been regained and the
abnormal or emergency condition has been
• Hand flying, directly controlling the aircraft
identified, the PF should inform the ATC of the
trajectory and energy.
prevailing condition and of his/her intentions.
Fly, Navigate, Communicate and Manage – To attract the controller’s attention, use the
following standard phraseology, as applicable:
in that order
− Pan Pan – Pan Pan – Pan Pan; or
Task sharing should be adapted to the prevailing
− Mayday – Mayday – Mayday.
situation (i.e., task sharing for hand flying or with AP
engaged, task sharing for normal operation or for
abnormal / emergency conditions, as defined in • Manage :
FCOM) and tasks should be accomplished in
accordance with the following priorities: Managing the continuation of the flight is the
next priority, this includes:
• Fly : • Managing aircraft systems (e.g., fuel
PF must concentrate on flying the aircraft management, ETOPS management, etc);
(i.e., by controlling and/or monitoring the pitch and,
attitude, bank angle, airspeed, thrust, sideslip, • Performing applicable emergency and/or
heading, ...) to capture and maintain the desired abnormal procedure(s).
targets, vertical flight path and lateral flight path.
PNF must backup the PF by monitoring flight Specific Golden Rules to assist flight crew in
parameters and by calling any excessive their decision-making and management process
deviation. are provided in the second part of this Briefing
Note.
The design of glass-cockpit aircraft fully supports Critical or irreversible actions, such as selecting an
the above four-step strategy, as summarized in engine fuel lever / master switch or a fuel isolation
Table 1. valve to OFF, should be accomplished by the PNF
but require prior confirmation by the PF
(i.e., confirmation loop).
Golden Rule Display Unit
Navigate ND The FCU and FMS CDU and keyboard are the
prime interfaces for the crew to communicate with
aircraft systems (i.e., to arm modes or engage
Communicate DCDU
modes and to set targets).
Manage ECAM The PFD (particularly the FMA and target symbols
on speed scale and altitude scale) and ND are the
prime interfaces for the aircraft to communicate with
Table 1 the crew, to confirm that the aircraft systems have
Glass-cockpit Design Supports Golden Rules correctly accepted the flight crew’s mode selections
and target entries.
• Checking the difference between FMS DIS TO Use the correct level of automation for
and DME distance against the criteria applicable
for the flight phase (as defined in SOPs).
the task
If the required FMS navigation accuracy criteria are On highly automated and integrated aircraft, several
not achieved, revert from NAV mode to selected levels of automation are available to perform a given
heading mode with reference to navaids raw-data. task:
• FMS modes and guidance; or,
Select PF ND to ARC or ROSE mode. If no map
shift is observed, PNF may keep ND in MAP mode, • Selected modes and guidance.
with display of speed constraints and/or altitude
constraints, for enhanced horizontal and vertical The correct level of automation depends on:
situational awareness.
• The task to be performed:
The GOLDEN RULES Card Golden Rules for Abnormal and Emergency
Conditions
The GOLDEN RULES card has been developed to
promote and disseminate the operations Golden The following additional rules may assist flight crew
Rules. in their decision making when in an abnormal or
emergency condition, but also if being faced with a
The card is provided to all trainees attending a flight- condition or circumstance that is not covered by the
crew-training course at an Airbus Training Center published procedures.
(i.e., in Toulouse, Miami and Beijing).
An emergency condition requires an immediate Golden Rules constitute a set of key points for safe
action (this does not mean a rushed action) whereas operation under normal, abnormal and emergency
abnormal conditions may tolerate a delayed action. conditions.
Adhere to the defined task sharing for abnormal / Whatever the prevailing conditions, always ensure
emergency conditions to reduce workload and that one pilot is controlling and monitoring the
optimize flight crew resources. flight path of the aircraft.
Create a shared problem model with other • 1.1 - Operating Philosophy - SOPs,
crewmembers by communicating • 1.2 - Optimum Use of Automation,
Standard Calls
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AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
• Give a command (task delegation) or transfer an − ON or OFF following the name of a system is
information; either:
§ a command for the other pilot to select /
• Acknowledge a command or an information
deselect the related system; or,
transfer;
§ a response confirming the status of the
• Give a response or ask a question (feedback); system.
• Callout a change of indication (e.g., a mode
transition or reversion); or,
Specific Standard Calls
• Identify a specific event (e.g., crossing an altitude Appropriate standard calls should be defined for the
or a flight level). following events:
Standard Calls
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AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
Use of standard calls is of paramount importance for When defining standard calls, standardization and
optimum use of automation (i.e., for awareness of operational efficiency should be carefully balanced.
arming or engagement of modes by calling FMA
changes, target selections, FMS entries, …):
Summary of key points
• The standard calls should trigger immediately the
question “ what do I want to fly now ? “, and thus Standard Calls ensure effective crew interaction and
clearly indicates which: communication.
− mode the pilot wishes to arm or engage;
and/or, The Call / Command and the Response /
Acknowledgement are of equal importance to
− target the pilot wishes to set. guarantee a timely action or correction.
• Normal conditions (departure and arrival); and, • 1.5 - Use of Normal Checklists,
Within the cockpit, pilots need to use standard calls Other References
appropriate for the flightdeck and systems design.
• U.S. National Transportation Safety Board
With the exception of aircraft models with cockpit (NTSB) – Special Report NTSB-AAS-76-5 –
commonality, cockpit layouts and systems are not Special Study: Flightcrew Coordination
the same and, thus, similarities as well as Procedures in Air Carrier Instrument Landing
differences should be recognized alike. System Approach Accidents.
Standard Calls
Page 3
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
The omission of an action or an inappropriate action If the PF fails to initiate a normal checklist, the PNF
is the largest primary causal factor in approach-and- should suggest the initiation of the checklist
landing accidents. (by applying good CRM practice).
Omission of an action or inappropriate action is: Normal checklists should be called in a timely
manner during low-workload periods (conditions
• A causal factor, along with other causal factors, permitting) to prevent any rush or interruption that
in 45 % of fatal approach-and-landing accidents; could defeat the safety purpose of the normal
and, checklists.
• A factor, to some degree, in 70 % of all
approach-and-landing events. Time and workload management (i.e., availability of
other crewmember) are key factors in the initiation
and effective conduct of normal checklists.
Use of Normal Checklists
To enhance communication and understanding Transition training and recurrent training also provide
between crewmembers, the following standard rules a unique opportunity to discuss the reasons for the
and phraseology should be used at all times: rules and procedures, and to discuss the
consequences of failing to comply with them.
• The responding crew member should respond to
the challenge only after having checked or
Conversely, allowing a relaxed adherence to SOPs
corrected the required configuration;
and/or a relaxed use of normal checklists during
• If achieving the required configuration is not transition or recurrent simulator training may
possible, the responding crewmember should encourage corresponding deviations during line
announce the actual configuration; operation.
• In all cases, the challenging crewmember should
Line checks and line audits should reinforce strict
wait for a positive response (and should cross-
adherence to SOPs and Normal Checklists.
check the validity of the response, as required)
before moving to the next item; and,
• The PNF should verbalize the completion of the Factors Affecting Normal Checklists
checklist by calling “ […] checklist complete”.
To ensure effective compliance with published normal
A320/A330/A340 families feature electronic normal checklists, it is important to understand why pilots
checklists (i.e., TAKEOFF and LANDING MEMO) sometimes omit partially or completely a normal
that allow a positive identification of : checklist.
• Items being completed; and, Pilots rarely omit the performance of a normal
• Items still to be performed (blue color coding). checklist intentionally; such a deviation from SOPs
often is the result of operational circumstances that
disrupt the normal flow of cockpit duties.
Interrupting and resuming normal checklists: The following factors and conditions often are cited in
discussing the complete or partial non-performance
If the flow of a normal checklist needs to be of a normal checklist:
interrupted for any reason, the PF should announce a
formal and explicit hold such as “hold (stop) checklist • Out-of-phase time scale, whenever a factor (such
at [item] “. as tail wind or a system malfunction) modifies
the timescale of the approach or the occurrence
An explicit call such as “resume (continue) checklist of the trigger-event for the initiation of the normal
at [item] “ should be made. checklist;
• Distractions (e.g., due to intra-cockpit activities);
Upon resuming the normal checklist after an
interruption, the last known completed item should • Interruptions (e.g., due to pilot / controller
be repeated - as an overlap – to prevent another item communications);
from being omitted.
• Task saturation (i.e., inadequate multi-tasking
The SOPs, in the applicable FCOM and QRH, ability or task overload);
provide type-related information. • Incorrect management of priorities (i.e., absence
of decision-making model for time-critical
situations);
Training Aspects
• Reduced attent ion (tunnel vision) in abnormal or
high-workload conditions;
Disciplined use of SOPs and normal checklists
should begin during the transition training course, • Incorrect CRM techniques (absence of effective
because habits and routines acquired during cross-check, crew coordination and/or backup);
transition training have a recognized lasting effect.
• Overreliance on memory (overconfidence);
A thorough briefing should be conducted regardless Interactive briefings better fulfill an important purpose
of: of the briefings: to provide the PF and PNF with an
opportunity to correct each other
• How familiar the destination airport and the (e.g., confirming use of the correct and effective
approach may be; or, approach chart, confirming correct setup of navaids
for the assigned landing runway, etc).
• How often the crewmembers have flown together.
Briefings should be structured (i.e., follow the logical
This Briefing Note provides generic guidelines for sequence of the approach and landing) and concise.
conducting effective and productive briefings.
The routine and formal repetition of the same points
on each sector may become counterproductive;
Statistical Data adapting and expanding the briefing by highlighting
the special aspects of the approach or the actual
The quality of approach and go-around briefings is weather conditions and circumstances result in more
observed as a causal factor in approximately 50 % of lively and effective briefings.
approach-and-landing accident, by affecting:
In short, the briefing should attract the PNF’s
• Understanding of prevailing conditions; attention.
• Horizontal or vertical situational awareness; The briefing should therefore be conducted when the
and, workload and availability of the PNF permit an
effective briefing.
• Crew coordination.
Any aspect that may affect normal operation
(e.g., system failures, weather conditions or other
Briefing Techniques particular conditions) should be carefully evaluated
and discussed.
The importance of briefing techniques often is
underestimated, although effective briefings The briefing should help both the PF (giving the
contribute to enhance crew standardization and briefing) and the PNF (receiving and acknowledging
communication. the briefing) to understand the sequence of events
and actions, as well as the special hazards and
circumstances of the approach (i.e., by creating a
common mental model of the approach).
ATIS:
Scope of Briefings
Review and discuss the following items:
The approach and go-around briefings should cover
the following generic aspects of the approach and • Runway in use (type of approach);
landing, including a possible missed approach and a
second approach or diversion: • Expected arrival route (standard terminal arrival [
• Approach conditions (i.e., weather and runway STAR ] or radar vectors);
conditions, special hazards);
• Altimeter setting (QNH or QFE, as required),
• Lateral and vertical navigation (i.e., intended use
of automation); - For international operations, be aware of the
• Instrument approach procedure details; applicable altimeter setting unit (hectopascals
or inches- of-mercury);
• Communications;
• Non-normal procedures, as applicable; and, • Transition level (unless standard for the country
or for the airport);
• Review and discussion of approach-and-landing
hazards. • Terminal weather (discuss likely turbulence, icing
or wind shear conditions and runway condition);
These aspects are expanded and discussed in and,
details in this Briefing Note.
• Advisory messages (as applicable).
Approach Briefing
NOTAMs:
FMS pages and ND should be used to guide and
illustrate the briefing, and to confirm the various data Review and discuss enroute and terminal NOTAMs,
entries. as applicable, for possible additional hazards or
airspace restrictions.
An expanded review of the items to be covered in the
approach briefing – as practical and appropriate for
the conditions of the flight – is provided hereafter.
Review and discuss the following features of the The go-around briefing should recall briefly the
intended landing runway: following key aspects:
• The anticipated taxiways to taxi to the assigned • Missed-approach lateral navigation and vertical
gate (e.g., back-track on active runway or on profile (e.g., highlighting obstacles and terrain
parallel runway, with special emphasis on the features, as applicable); and,
possible crossing of active runways, as
applicable); • Intentions (i.e., second approach or diversion).
CAT II / CAT III ILS briefing: The approach and go-around briefings should be
adapted to the conditions of the flight and focus on
For CAT II and CAT III ILS approaches, perform the the items that are relevant for the particular approach
specific CAT II (CAT III) briefing in accordance with and landing (such as specific approach hazards).
company’ SOPs.
The approach and go-around briefing should include
the following ALAR-critical items:
Deviations from SOPs:
• Minimum safe altitude;
Any intended deviation from SOPs or from standard
calls should be discussed during the briefing. • Terrain and man-made obstacles features;
• Final approach flight path angle (and vertical • ICAO – Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft, Part I –
speed); and, International Commercial Air Transport –
Aeroplanes, Appendix 2, 5.16.
• Go-around altitude and missed-approach initial • ICAO – Procedures for Air navigation Services –
steps. Aircraft operations (PANS -OPS, Doc 8168),
Volume I – Flight Procedures (Post Amendment
No 11, applicable Nov.1/2001).
Associated Briefing Notes
• ICAO – Preparation of an Operations manual
(Doc 9376).
The following Briefing Notes should be reviewed in
association with the above information for a complete • FAR 121.315 – Cockpit Check Procedure, for
overview of the descent and approach preparation: normal and non-normal conditions.
• JAR-OPS 1.1045 and associated Appendix 1, B
• 1.1 – Operating Philosophy - SOPs, 2.1 (g).
Chapter 2
Crew Coordination
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
Errors in using and managing automatic flight The importance of briefing techniques often is
systems and/or lack of awareness of operating underestimated, although effective briefings
modes are observed as causal factors in more than contribute to enhance crew standardization and
20 % of approach-and-landing accidents and near- communication.
accidents.
The routine and formal repetition of the same points
These factors can result in flying an unintended flight on each sector may become counterproductive;
path, which - if not recognized - can cause a less- adapting and expanding the briefing by highlighting
than-desired terrain separation or a CFIT. the special aspects of the approach or the actual
weather conditions and circumstances of the day
The following common errors in handling auto flight result in more lively and effective briefings.
systems can increase the risk of approach-and-
landing accidents: The briefing should attract the attention of the PNF.
• Inadvertent selection of an incorrect mode; The briefing should help both the PF (giving the
• Failure to verify the selected mode by reference briefing) and the PNF (receiving and acknowledging
to the flight mode annunciator (FMA); the briefing) to understand the sequence of events
and actions, the safety key points, special hazards
• Failure to arm a mode when required (e.g., failure and circumstances of the approach.
to arm the localizer or approach mode, when
cleared for LOC or ILS interception); An interactive briefing fulfills two important goals of
• Failure to select a required guidance target the briefing: provide the PF and the PNF with an
(e.g., failure to set the ILS final approach course); opportunity to:
• Selection of the altitude target to any altitude Effective communication is achieved when our
below the final approach intercept altitude during mental process for interpreting the information
approach; contained in a message accommodates the
message being received.
• Preoccupation with FMS programming during a
critical flight phase, with consequent loss of
This mental process can be summarized as follows:
situational awareness; and/or,
• How do we perceive the message ?
• Failure to monitor the automation, using raw data.
• How do we reconstruct the information
contained in the message ?
The Briefing Note 1.3 - Operations Golden Rules,
addresses aspects that are considered frequent • How do we link the information to an objective
causal factors in approach and landing accidents, or an expectation ? and,
such as:
• What bias or error is introduced in this process?
• Lack of situational / positional awareness;
Crew Resource Management (CRM) researches
• Interaction with automation; highlight the importance of the context and
• Overreliance on automation; and/or, expectations in this mental process.
The following factors may affect the correct • Missing or misinterpreting an ATC instruction
understanding of communications: (i.e., possibly resulting in a traffic conflict or
runway incursion);
• High workload;
• Omitting an action and failing to detect and
• Fatigue;
correct the resulting abnormal condition or
• Non-adherence to “sterile cockpit” rule; configuration, if interrupted during a normal
checklist (e.g., altimeter setting); and/or,
• Distractions;
• Leaving uncertainties unresolved (e.g.,
• Interruptions; and/or, regarding an ATC instruction or an abnormal
• Conflicts and pressures. condition).
• Omission of call sign or use of an incorrect call The incorrect setting of the altimeter reference often
sign; is the result of one or more of the following factors:
• Use of nonstandard phraseology; and/or,
• High workload;
• Failure to listen or respond.
• Inadequate pilot/system interface;
Interruptions and distractions in the cockpit break • Deviation from normal task sharing;
the flow pattern of ongoing cockpit activities
(i.e., actions or communications), such as: • Interruptions and distractions; and/or,
• SOPs;
• Absence of effective backup between
• Normal checklists; crewmembers.
• Communications (i.e., listening, processing,
responding ); Strict adherence to defined task sharing (for normal
or abnormal/emergency conditions) and correct use
• Monitoring tasks; and/or, of normal checklists are the most effective lines-of-
• Problem solving activities. defense against altimeter setting errors.
Unless mitigated by adequate techniques in order to This highlights the need for developing
set priorities, this disruption and lapse of attention countermeasures to restore the level of
may result in: vigilance and alertness for the descent,
approach and landing;
• Not monitoring the flight path (possibly resulting
in an altitude or course deviation or a controlled • Pressure of flight schedule (e.g., making up for
flight into terrain); takeoff delay);
• 1.6 – Approach and Go-around Briefings, • FAR 121.406, 121.419, 121.421 or 121.422 -
CRM Training for pilots, flight attendants and
• 2.2 - CRM Issues in Approach and Landing aircraft dispatchers.
Accidents, • JAR-OPS 1.945, 1.955 or 1.965 - CRM
• 2.3 - Effective ATC/Crew Communications, Training.
CRM issues have been identified as circumstantial As more operators access to global international
factors in more than 70 % of approach-and-landing operation with multi-nationality crewmembers,
incidents or accidents. cross-cultural issues should become an important
part of a customized CRM training.
Because CRM practices are a key factor in
flightcrew adherence to and performance of normal The discussion of cross-cultural factors should
and non-normal procedures and in the interaction include:
with automated systems, CRM issues are involved • Understanding differences between race and
to some degree in every incident or accident. culture;
• Highlighting the importance of cultural and
General national sensitivities;
• Promoting the use of standard phraseology as a
The flight crew’s contribution to an incident or common working language.
accident often is considered to be what the flight
crew did or did not do.
Leadership
CRM concepts and techniques enhance effective
cross monitoring and backup by each crewmember. The role of the pilot-in-command (PIC) in complex
and demanding situations should be emphasized
during CRM training.
Company Culture and Policies
This includes, for example, approaches with
It should be recognized that many factors marginal weather conditions or abnormal /
associated with accidents are embedded in the emergency conditions that are beyond the scope of
global aviation- system organization. published procedures.
The captain’s role and attitude in opening the line of Flightcrews often are faced with ATC requests that
communication with the first officer and cabin crew are either:
is of prime importance for setting the flight deck
atmosphere and ensuring effective: • Not understood (e.g., being assigned an altitude
below the sector MSA, when the minimum
• Human relations (e.g., effective intra-crew vectoring altitude is not published); or,
communications);
• Challenging (e.g., being requested to fly higher
• Teamwork (e.g., allowing the authority and duty and/or faster than desired or to take a shorter
for the first officer to voice any concern as to the routing than desired).
progress of the flight and overall safety); and,
Flight crews should not accept such instructions
• Crew coordination, mutual monitoring and without requesting clarification or being sure that
backup. they can comply safely with the ATC instructions.
Fatigue, overconfidence or reluctance to change a Flight crews should “ expect the unexpected ”.
prepared plan often are the probable causes for a
lack of assertiveness (assessment of situation) and
decision-making.
The following CRM aspects may be involved in CRM practices optimize the performance of the
approach-and-landing incidents or accidents: entire crew (i.e., including flight crew and cabin
crew, and maintenance personnel).
• Spatial disorientation (i.e., physiological illusions
and/or visual illusions); CRM skills effectively:
• Overconfidence (e.g., high time on aircraft type); • Provide benchmarks for timely decision-making;
and,
• Inadequate anticipation (i.e., inability to “ stay
ahead of the aircraft “); • Provide safeguards for effective error-
management, thus minimizing the effects of
• Inadequate preparation to respond to changing working errors.
situations or to an abnormal / emergency
condition, by precise planning and use of all
available technical and human resources Associated Briefing Notes
(i.e., by “ expecting the unexpected “);
The following Briefing Notes provide expanded
• Crewmembers personal factors; and/or, information to complement the above discussion:
• Belief that actions or decisions are correct, • 2.1 - Human Factors in Approach-and-
although they deviates from the applicable Landing Accidents,
standards;
• 2.3 - Effective Crew/ATC Communications,
• Effect of fatigue and absence of
countermeasures to restore the level of
vigilance and alertness; and/or, • 2.4 - Intra-cockpit Communications –
Managing Interruptions and
• Reluctance to accept the influence of human Distractions in the Cockpit.
factors and CRM issues in approach-and-
landing incidents or accidents.
Regulatory References
Introduction Remark
Until controller / pilot data link communication Although pilot / controller communications are not
(CPDLC) comes into widespread use, air traffic limited to the issuance and acknowledgement of
control (ATC) will depend upon voice clearances, this Briefing Note refers primarily to
communications that are affected by various factors. clearances because this provides a convenient
example to illustrate most discussion topics.
Communications between controllers and pilots can
be improved by the mutual understanding of each
other’s operating environment. Pilot / Controller Responsibilities
This Approach-and-Landing Briefing Note provides The responsibilities of the pilot and controller
an overview of various factors that may affect pilot / intentionally overlap in many areas to provide
controller communications. redundancy.
Incorrect or incomplete pilot / controller The pilot / controller communication loop supports
communications is a causal or circumstantial factor the safety and redundancy of pilot / controller
in many approach-and-landing events. communications ( Figure 1 ).
ATC Clearance
Acknowledge or Transmit
Correct
Listen
Controller’s Pilot’s
Hearback Readback
Listen Transmit
Figure 1
The Pilot / Controller Communication Loop
Pilots and controllers are involved equally in the air Effective communication is achieved when our
traffic management system. mental process for interpreting the information
contained in a message accommodates the
Achieving effective radio communications involves message received.
many factors that should not be considered in
isolation. This mental process can be summarized as follows:
Many factors are closely interrelated, and more than • How do we perceive the message ?
one cause usually is involved in a breakdown of the • How do we reconstruct the information
communication loop. contained in the message ?
The following provides an overview and discussion • How do we link this information to an objective
of factors involved in effective pilot / controller or to an expectation ? and,
communications
• What bias or error is introduced in this process?
Crew resource management (CRM) researches The structure and construction of the initial and
highlight the importance of the context and subsequent message(s) should support this context
expectations in this process. Nevertheless, by:
expectations may introduce either a positive or
negative bias in the effectiveness of the • Following the chronological order of the
communication. sequence of actions;
• Grouping instructions and numbers related to
Workload, fatigue, non-adherence to the sterile each action; and,
cockpit rule, distractions, interruptions, conflicts and • Limiting the number of instructions in the
pressure are among the factors that may affect transmission.
adversely pilot / controller communications and
result in:
The intonation, the speed of transmission and the
• Incomplete communications; placement and duration of pauses may positively or
• Omission of call sign or use of an incorrect call adversely affect the correct understanding of a
sign; communication.
• What and how - altitude (i.e., climb, descend, Use of nonstandard phraseology is a major obstacle
maintain), heading (i.e., left, right) , airspeed; to voice communications.
and,
Standard phraseology is intended to be easily and
• Where - (i.e., before or at […] waypoint). quickly recognized.
Pilots and controllers expect each other to use Lack of Readback (use of “Roger“ for
standard phraseology. acknowledgement) or Incomplete Readback
Standard phraseology helps lessen the ambiguities The term Roger often is misused, thus decreasing
of spoken language and thus guarantees a common the pilot’s and the controller’s situational awareness:
understanding among speakers:
• Pilot may use Roger to acknowledge a message
• Of different native languages, or, containing numbers (instead of a formal
readback), thus preventing effective hearback
• Of the same native language but who use or
and correction by the controller; or,
understand words differently (e.g., regional
accents or dialects). • Controller may use Roger to acknowledge a
message requiring a specific answer (e.g., a
Nonstandard phraseology or the omission of key positive confirmation or correction, such as
words may change completely the meaning of the acknowledging a pilot’s statement that an
intended message, resulting in potential conflicts. altitude or speed restriction cannot be met).
The bias of expectation can lead to: Taking a Clearance or Instruction Issued to
Another Aircraft
• Transposing the numbers contained in a
clearance (e.g., an altitude or FL) to what was
This usually occurs when two aircraft with similar-
expected, based on experience or routine;
sounding call signs are on the same frequency and
• Shifting a clearance or instruction from one are likely to receive similar instructions or if the call
parameter to another (e.g., perceiving a sign is blocked by another transmission.
clearance to maintain a 280-degree heading as
a clearance to climb / descend and maintain When pilots of different aircraft with similar-
FL 280). sounding call signs omit the call sign on readback,
or when simultaneous readback are made by both
pilots, the error may go unnoticed by the pilots and
Failure to Seek Confirmation (when a message the controller.
is not understood)
Failure to Question an Incorrect or Inadequate Deviating from an ATC clearance may be required
ATC Instruction for operational reasons (e.g., performing a heading
or altitude deviation for weather avoidance, inability
Failing to question an incorrect or inadequate to meet a restriction).
instruction may cause a crew to accept an altitude
clearance below the sector MSA or a heading that Both the pilot and the controller need time to
places the aircraft near obstructions. accommodate this deviation; therefore ATC should
be notified as early as possible to obtain a timely
acknowledgement.
Blocked Transmissions
( simultaneous communications ) Flight crew
Blocked transmissions often are the result of not The standard ICAO phraseology Pan Pan – Pan
immediately releasing the push-to-talk switch after a Pan – Pan Pan or Mayday – Mayday – Mayday
communication. (i.e., depending on the criticality of the prevailing
condition) should be used to alert the controller and
An excessive pause in a message (i.e., holding the trigger an appropriate response.
push-to-talk switch while preparing the next item of
the transmission) also may result in blocking part of
the response or part of another message. Controllers
Simultaneous transmission of communications by Controllers should recognize that, when faced with
two stations (i.e., two aircraft or one aircraft and an emergency situation, the flight crew’s most
ATC) results in one of the two (or both) important needs are:
transmissions being blocked and unheard by the
other stations (or being heard as a buzzing sound or • Time;
as a squeal).
• Airspace; and,
The absence of readback (from the pilot) or the
absence of hearback acknowledgement (from the • Quiet.
controller) should be considered as an indication of
a blocked transmission and, thus, prompt a request
to repeat or confirm the information. The controller’s response to the emergency
situation could be patterned after the ASSIST
Blocked transmissions are responsible for many memory aid, proposed below:
altitude deviations, missed turnoffs and takeoffs and
landings without clearances. • Acknowledge :
The omission of an action or an inappropriate action The following causal factors, frequently observed in
is the most frequent causal factors in approach and approach-and-landing accidents, often are the result
landing accidents. of interruptions or distractions in the cockpit.
Table 1
Effects of Distractions and Interruptions
in Approach-and-Landing Accidents
Types of Interruptions and Distractions Being faced with concurrent task demands, the
natural human tendency is to perform one task to
Interruptions and distractions in the cockpit may be the detriment of another.
subtle or be momentary, but they can be disruptive
to the flight crew. Unless mitigated by adequate techniques, the
disruption and lapse of attention may result in:
Interruptions or distractions can be classified in
three main categories, as follows: • Not monitoring the flight path (possibly resulting
in an altitude or course deviation or a controlled
• Communications : flight into terrain);
− receiving the final weights while taxiing; or, • Missing or misinterpreting an ATC instruction
− a flight attendant entering the cockpit; (possibly resulting in traffic conflict or runway
incursion);
• Head-down work :
• Omitting an action and failing to detect and
− reading the approach chart; or, correct the resulting abnormal condition or
− programming the FMS; and, configuration (e.g., interruption during the
reading of a normal checklist); or,
• Responding to an abnormal condition or to
• Experiencing task overload (i.e., being “ behind
an unanticipated situation :
the aircraft ” ).
− system malfunction; or,
− Traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS)
Reducing Interruptions and Distractions
traffic advisory (TA) or resolution advisory
(RA).
Acknowledging that flight crew may have control
over some interruptions / distractions and not over
Minor disruptions (e.g., a minor equipment
some others is the first step in developing
malfunction) can turn a routine flight into a
prevention strategies and lines-of-defense.
challenging event.
Actions that may be controlled (e.g. SOP’s actions,
initiation of normal checklists, …) should be
Effect of Interruptions or Distractions scheduled during periods of less likely disruption, to
prevent interference with actions that cannot be
The primary effect of interruptions or distractions is controlled (e.g. ATC communications or flight
to break the flow of ongoing cockpit activities attendant interruptions).
(i.e., actions or communications), this includes :
• SOPs; Adhering to the Sterile Cockpit Rule can largely
reduce interruptions and distractions.
• Normal checklists;
• Communications (i.e., listening, processing, The Sterile Cockpit Rule reflects the requirement of
responding); U.S. FAR – Part 121.542 :
• Monitoring tasks (i.e., systems monitoring, • “ No flight crewmember may engage in, nor may
PF/PNF mutual cross-check and back-up); and, any pilot in command permit any activity during
a critical phase of flight which could distract any
• Problem solving activities. flight crewmember from the performance of his
or her duties or which could interfere in any way
with the proper conduct of those duties “.
The diverted attention resulting from the interruption
/ distraction usually leaves the flight crew with the
feeling of being rushed and faced with competing /
preempting tasks.
For the purpose of this requirement, an “ activity “ The implementation of the sterile cockpit rule by
includes: cabin crew creates two challenges:
• “…, engaging in non-essential conversation • How to identify the 10,000 ft limit ?
within the cockpit and non-essential
communication between the cabin and cockpit • How to identify occurrences that warrant
crews, … “. breaking the sterile cockpit rule ?
The U.S. FAA acknowledges that it is better to Cabin crewmembers may hesitate to report
break the sterile cockpit rule than to fail to technical occurrences to the flight crew (e.g.,
communicate. because of cultural aspects, company policies or
intimidation).
To overcome this reluctance, the implementation The following lines-of-defense address the three
and interpretation of the sterile cockpit rule should families of cockpit disruptions and, thus, prevent or
be discussed during cabin crew CRM training, and minimize the interference of competing or
recalled by the captain during the pre-flight briefing. preempting tasks:
• Operations Golden Rules; and, The above lines of defense minimize the flight crew
exposure to disruptions caused by interruptions and
• Standard Calls. distractions.
Because some interruptions and distractions may Interruptions and distractions usually result from the
be subtle and insidious, the first priority is to following factors:
recognize and identify the disruption.
• Pilot / controller or intra-cockpit communications
The second priority is to re-establish situational (i.e., including flight crew / cabin crew
awareness, as follows: communications);
Regulatory references
Chapter 3
Operators with international routes are exposed to The use of QNH for operations below the transition
different standards in terms of: level / altitude eliminates the need for changing the
altimeter-setting:
• Altitude measurement (i.e., feet or meters);
• During the approach and landing; and,
• Altitude reference setting-units (i.e., hectopascal
or inch-of-mercury, QNH or QFE); and, • During the missed approach, as required.
• Environmental conditions (i.e., atmospheric
pressure changes and/or low OAT operation). When QFE is used for the approach, the altimeter
must be change to QNH for the missed-approach,
unless the missed-approach procedure is defined
This Briefing Note provides a review and discussion with reference to QFE.
of the following aspects, highlighting the lessons
learned from approach-and-landing incidents and Some operators set the altimeter to QFE in areas of
accidents: operation where the ATC and the majority of other
• Barometric-altimeter reference ( QNH or QFE ); operators use QNH. This requires adequate SOPs
for altimeter-setting and for conversion of assigned
• Use of different units for altitude measurement altitudes to heights.
(i.e., feet versus meters) and altimeter setting
(i.e., In.Hg versus hPa);
• Setting of baro-altimeter bug and radio-altimeter Altimeter-setting Units
DH;
Operators with international routes are exposed to
• Radio-altimeter callouts; and, the use of different altimeter setting units:
• Low-OAT operation. • Hectopascals ( hPa ), previously referred to as
milibars ( mb ),
Deviation from the intended vertical flight profile When in.Hg is used for altimeter setting, unusual
(caused by omission of an action or by an incorrect barometric pressures such as:
action) is frequently observed during line checks and
audits. • 28.XX in.Hg (i.e., an unusually low pressure); or,
• 30.XX in.Hg (i.e., an unusually high pressure),
The lack of situational awareness, particularly the
lack of vertical situational awareness, is a causal may go undetected when listening to the ATIS or
factor in 50 % of approach-and-landing accidents ATC, resulting in a more usual 29.XX altimeter
(this includes most accidents involving CFIT). setting being set.
A 1.00 in.Hg discrepancy in the altimeter setting In Figure 3, an actual QNH of 991 hPa was
results in a 1000-ft error in the intended (actual) mistakenly set on the altimeter as 29.91 in.Hg
altitude, as illustrated by Figure 1 ( Figure 1, (equivalent to 1012 hPa ), resulting in the actual
Figure 2 and Figure 3 assume a 2000 ft airfield altitude / height being 640 ft lower than indicated.
elevation and a 4000 ft indicated altitude).
The incorrect setting of the altimeter reference often Setting of Barometric-altimeter Bug and
is the result of one or more of the following factors: Radio-altimeter DH
• High workload;
The barometric-altimeter bug and of the radio-
• Deviation from normal task sharing; altimeter DH should be set in line with Airbus
Industrie’ SOP’s or company’ SOPs.
• Interruptions and distractions; and,
ILS CAT I RA DA RA DH
Reset of Altimeter Setting in Climb or
Descent ILS CAT II Note 2
The transition altitude / flight level can be either: ILS CAT III DA RA DH
• Fixed for the whole country ( e.g. FL 180 in the With DH Note 2
United States );
ILS CAT III TDZ altitude
• Fixed for a given airport (as indicated in the
approach chart); or,
With no DH
• Variable, depending on QNH (as indicated in the
ATIS message). Table 1
(Table based on use of QNH)
Depending on the airline’s / flight crew’s usual area
of operation, changing from fixed transition altitudes / Note 1 :
FL to variable transition altitudes / FL may result in
The RA DH may be set (e.g., at 200 ft) only for
a premature or late setting of the altimeter reference.
terrain awareness purposes. Using the RA DH
should be discussed in the approach briefing.
An altitude constraint (expressed in terms of FL in
climb or expressed in terms of altitude in descent) For all approaches - except CAT I with RA, CAT II
may advance or delay the change of the altimeter and CAT III ILS approaches - the approach
reference and cause crew confusion. MINIMUM callout is based on the barometric-
altimeter bug set at the MDA(H) or DA(H).
Flying into a low temperature area has the same ICAO PANS-OPS does not provide altitude
effect as flying into a low-pressure area; the aircraft corrections for extreme high temperatures;
is lower than the altimeter indicates. the temperature effect on the true altitude should not
be ignored when planning for a constant-angle non-
These effects are summarized and illustrated in precision approach (i.e., to maintain the required
Table 2, featuring a well-known aviation golden rule: flight path angle and/or vertical speed).
The pilot is responsible for performing this • Awareness of the altimeter setting unit in use at
correction, except when under radar control in a the destination airport;
radar vectoring area; in this case, the controller
normally is responsible for terrain clearance, • Awareness of the anticipated altimeter setting,
including accounting for the cold temperature using two independent sources for cross-check
correction. (e.g., METAR and ATIS messages);
Nevertheless, the operator and/or pilot should
• Effective PF/PNF crosscheck and backup;
confirm this responsibility with the air traffic services
of the country of operation.
• Adherence to SOPs for:
The temperature correction on altitude affects the
− reset of barometric-altimeters in climb and
following published altitudes, which therefore should
descent, for example:
be increased under low OAT operation:
! in climb : at the transition altitude; and,
• MEA, MSA;
! in descent : when cleared to an altitude;
• Transition routes altitude;
• OM crossing altitude during an ILS approach; − setting of barometric-altimeter bug and radio-
and, altimeter DH.
Altitude deviations may result in substantial loss of Altitude deviations usually result from one of the
vertical separation and/or horizontal separation, following causes:
which could cause a midair collision.
• Misunderstanding the assigned altitude;
Traffic avoidance maneuvers, if required, usually
result in injuries to passengers and crewmembers • Use of an incorrect altimeter setting;
(particularly to cabin crewmembers).
• Failure to level-off at the assigned altitude; or,
This Briefing Note provides an overview of
the factors involved in altitude deviations.
• Failure to reach or maintain the assigned
altitude (or altitude restriction) at the point or
This document can be used for stand-alone reading
time assigned by ATC.
or as the basis for the development of an airline’s
altitude awareness program.
Altitude deviations always are the result of a
breakdown in either:
Statistical Data
• the pilot / system interface :
An analysis by the U.S. FAA and by US Airways
− altimeter setting, use of autopilot, monitoring
indicates that:
of instruments and displays; or,
• Approximately 70 % of altitude deviations are
the result of a breakdown in the pilot/controller • the pilot / controller interface :
communication loop; and,
− communication loop.
• Nearly 40 % of altitude deviation events affect
the critical pair constituted by FL 100 / FL 110 Altitude deviations occur as the result of one or a
(or 10 000 ft / 11 000 ft). combination of the following conditions:
Altitude Deviations
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Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
Altitude Deviations
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AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
• Use standard phraseology for clear and • Monitor / supervise the operation of AP for
unambiguous pilot / controller and intra-cockpit correct level-off at the cleared altitude and for
communications. correct compliance with altitude or time
restrictions (constraints);
Standard phraseology is the common basis for
pilots and controllers; this common language • Plan tasks that prevent attentive listening to
allows an easier detection and correction of radio communications (such as copying the
errors. ATIS, company calls, and passengers-address
announcements) during periods of less ATC
communication.
• Use of an adapted phraseology to increase the
controller situational awareness, e.g.: • When one crewmember cannot monitor the
ATC frequency because of other duties or
− When leaving an altitude, announce: because leaving the cockpit, the other
crewmember should :
Leaving […] for […]; or,
− Acknowledge receiving the radio and
controls, as applicable;
Leaving […] and climbing / descending to
[…]; − Check the radio volume to ensure adequate
reception of ATC calls;
The call leaving … should be performed only
− Give an increased attention to listening /
when a vertical speed of 500 ft/mn has been
confirming / reading back (because of the
established and the altimeter positively shows
momentary absence of backup ); and,
the departure from the previous altitude or
FL; − Brief the other crew member when he/she
returns, highlighting any relevant new
This recommendation takes a particular information and any change in the ATC
importance when descending in a holding clearance or instructions.
pattern;
Altitude Deviations
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AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
• Leaving [...] for […] , when a 500 ft/mn vertical As indicated in Briefing Note 3.1 - Altimeter
speed has been established; and altimeter
Setting – Use of radio Altimeter, the transition
indicates departure from the previous altitude;
altitude / flight level can be either:
and,
• Fixed for the whole country ( e.g. FL 180 in the
• One to go ; United States);
One thousand to go “; or, • Fixed for a given airport (as indicated in the
approach chart); or,
[…] for […],
when within 1000 ft from the cleared altitude or • Variable as a function of QNH (as indicated in
FL. the ATIS message).
When within 1000 ft from the cleared altitude / FL or Depending on the airline’s / flight crew’s usual area
from an altitude restriction (constraint): of operation, changing from fixed transition
altitudes/FL to variable transition altitudes/FL may
result in a premature or late change of the altimeter
• PF should concentrate on instruments scanning
setting.
(one head in); and,
An altitude constraint (expressed in terms of FL in
• PNF should watch outside for traffic, if in VMC climb or expressed in terms of altitude in descent)
(one head out). may advance or delay the change of altimeter
setting and cause crew confusion.
Flight Level or Altitude Confusion In countries operating with reference to the QFE,
when below the transition altitude or FL, the
Confusion between FL 100 and FL 110 (or between readback should indicate the altimeter reference
10 000 ft / 11 000 ft) is usually the result of the (i.e., QFE).
combination of two or more of the following factors:
Altitude Deviations
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AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
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Secondary surveillance radar’s (SSR) provide The TCAS (ACAS) is an effective safeguard to
conflict alerts but no resolution advisory; accurate minimize the consequences of altitude deviations.
and clear pilot / controller communications are
essential when descending in a holding pattern. Altitude deviations can be prevented by strict
adherence to adequate SOPs, this includes:
Two separate holding patterns may be controlled by
the same controller, on the same frequency. • Setting the altimeter-reference on barometric
altimeters; and,
The following communication rules are, therefore, • Selecting the cleared altitude or FL on the FCU.
important when in a holding pattern:
• Do not take a communication intended for an
other aircraft (by confusion of similar callsigns); Associated Briefing Notes
• Prevent / minimize the risk of blocked The following Briefing Notes refer to altimeter
transmission, in case of simultaneous readback setting and altitude issues:
by two aircraft with similar callsigns or
simultaneous transmissions by the pilot and the • 1.1 - Operating Philosophy - SOPs,
controller; and,
• Announce leaving [FL or altitude] only when the • 1.3 - Operations Golden Rules,
vertical speed indicator and the altimeter reflect
the departure from the previous altitude. • 1.4 - Standard Calls,
Altitude Deviations
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AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
Regulatory references
Altitude Deviations
Page 6
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
Chapter 4
Either situation increases the risk of approach-and- • Wind forecast should be entered (as available)
landing accidents, including those involving CFIT. on the appropriate FMS page, at waypoints
close to the top-of-descent point and along the
descent profile.
Statistical Data
• Being faster or slower than the desired speed. • If descent initiation is delayed by ATC, reduce
speed as appropriate to minimize the impact on
the descent profile.
Best Practices and Guidelines
Navigation Accuracy Check:
To prevent delay in initiating the descent and to
ensure an optimum management of descent-and- • If FMS navigation accuracy does not meet the
approach profile, descent preparation and applicable criteria for terminal area navigation or
approach/go-around briefings should be completed approach, no descent should be made below
typically 10 minutes before the top-of-descent (or the MEA or below the sector MSA without prior
when within VHF communication range). confirmation of the aircraft position, using
navaids raw-data.
Concept of next target and decision gates: A callout should be performed by the PNF if a flight
parameter exceeds the criteria for one of the
Throughout the entire flight a next target should be elements of a stabilized approach, as described in
defined, in order to stay ahead of the aircraft at all Briefing Note 7.1 - Flying Stabilized Approaches.
times.
The next target should be any required combination Descent Profile Monitoring:
of one or more of the following elements:
Descent profile should be monitored, using all
• A position; available instrument and chart references:
• An altitude; • FMS vertical-deviation indication, as applicable;
• A vertical speed (as applicable); and, Wind conditions and wind changes should be
monitored closely to anticipate any reduction in
• A power setting. head wind component or increase in tail wind
component, and to adjust the flight path profile in a
If it is anticipated that one or more element(s) of the timely manner.
next target will not be met, the required corrective
action(s) should be taken without delay. The descent profile may be monitored and adjusted
based on a typical 3000 ft per 10 nm descent
During the approach and landing, the successive gradient (corrected for the prevailing head wind
next targets should constitute gates that must be component or tail wind component), while complying
met for the approach to be continued. with the required altitude and/or speed restrictions
(i.e., ensuring adequate deceleration management).
The final approach fix (FAF), the outer marker (OM)
or an equivalent fix (as applicable) should constitute The flight path vector, as available, can be used to
an assessment gate to confirm the readiness to monitor the descent profile by checking that the
proceed further; this assessment should include the remaining track-distance to touchdown (in nm) is
following: approximately equal to the FL divided by the flight-
path-angle (FPA, in degrees):
• Visibility or RVR (and ceiling, as appropriate):
Distance-to-go (nm) = FL / FPA (degrees)
! better than or equal to applicable
minimums;
Note :
• Aircraft readiness: In the above rule, the FL should be understood as
! position, altitude, configuration and energy; the FL difference (∆ FL) between the current
and, aircraft FL and the airfield FL.
• Crew readiness: Below 10 000 ft, flying at 250 kt IAS, the following
! briefing completed and agreement on guidelines may be used to confirm the descent
approach conditions. profile and ensure a smooth transition between the
various phases of the approach:
The stabilization height should constitute a decision • 9000 ft above airport elevation at 30 nm from
gate; if the required configuration and speed are not touchdown; and,
obtained or if the flight path is not stabilized when
reaching the stabilization height, an immediate go- • 3000 ft above airport elevation at 15 nm from
around should be initiated. touchdown (to account for deceleration and
slats/flaps extension).
• As a last resort, perform a 360-degree turn (as The following key points should be emphasized
practical and cleared by ATC). during transition training and line training as well as
during line checks and line audits:
Maintain close reference to instruments
throughout the turn to monitor and control the
rate of descent, bank angle and position, • Timeliness of descent and approach
to prevent: preparation;
Regulatory References
Inability to assess or manage the aircraft energy level Approximately 70 % of rushed and unstable
during the approach often is cited as a causal factor approaches involve an incorrect management of the
in unstabilized approaches. aircraft energy level, resulting in an excess or deficit
of energy, as follows:
Either a deficit of energy (being low and/or slow) or
• Being slow and/or low on approach : 40 % of
an excess of energy (being high and/or fast) may
events; or,
result in approach-and-landing accidents, such as:
• Being fast and/or high on approach: 30 % of
• Loss of control; events.
• Landing short;
Aircraft Energy Level
• Hard landing;
The level of energy of an aircraft is a function of the
• Tail strike; following primary flight parameters and of their rate of
change (trend):
• Runway excursion; and/or, • Airspeed and speed trend;
• Runway overrun. • Altitude and vertical speed (or flight path angle);
• Drag (i.e., drag caused by speed brakes,
This Briefing Note provides background information slats/flaps and/or landing gear); and,
and operational guidelines for a better understanding: • Thrust level.
• Energy management during intermediate
approach: One of the tasks of the pilot is to control and monitor
− How fast can you fly down to the FAF or the energy level of the aircraft (using all available
outer marker ? cues) in order to:
• Maintain the aircraft at the appropriate energy
• Energy management during final approach: level for the flight phase and configuration:
− Hazards associated with flying on the − flight path, speed and thrust; or,
backside of the power curve (as defined by
Figure 2). • Recover the aircraft from a low energy or high
energy situation, i.e., from:
Refer also to Briefing Note 7.2 – The Final
− being too slow and/or too low; or,
Approach Speed.
− being too fast and/or too high.
Controlling the aircraft energy level implies balancing The minimum stabilization height should be:
the airspeed, thrust (and drag) and flight path, or
• 1000 ft above airfield elevation in IMC;
transiently trading one parameter for another.
• 500 ft above airfield elevation in VMC.
Autopilot and flight director modes, aircraft
instruments, warnings and protections are designed Airlines usually require flight crews to cross the outer
to relieve or assist the flight crew in these tasks. marker (i.e., typically between 1500 ft and 2000 ft
above airfield elevation) with the aircraft configured in
the landing configuration.
Going Down and Slowing Down :
This allows time, before reaching the applicable
How Fast Can you Fly Down to the Marker? stabilization height, for:
• Stabilizing the final approach speed; and,
A study by the U.S. NTSB acknowledges that
maintaining a high airspeed down to the outer marker • Completing the landing checklist.
(OM) does not favor the capture of the glideslope
beam by the autopilot or the aircraft stabilization at
Aircraft deceleration characteristics:
the defined stabilization height.
Although deceleration characteristics largely
The study concludes that no speed restriction should
depends on the aircraft type and gross-weight, the
be imposed when within 3 nm to 4 nm before the
following typical values can be considered for a quick
OM, mainly in instrument meteorological conditions
assessment and management of the aircraft
(IMC).
deceleration capability:
Nevertheless, ATC requests for maintaining a high • Deceleration in level flight:
airspeed down to the marker (160 kt to 200 kt IAS
− with approach flaps extended:
typically) are frequent at high-density airports, to
increase the landing rate. § 10 to 15 kt-per-nm;
The purpose of the following part is to: − during extension of gear and landing flaps:
§ 20 to 30 kt-per-nm;
• Recall the definition of stabilization heights;
• Deceleration on a 3-degree glide path:
• Illustrate the aircraft deceleration characteristics
in level flight and on a 3-degree glide path; and, − with approach flaps and gear down, during
extension of landing flaps:
• Provide guidelines for assessment of the
§ 10 to 20 kt per nm.
maximum speed which, reasonably, can be
maintained down to the marker, as a function of:
Note:
− the distance from the OM to the runway A 3-degree glide path is typically equivalent to a
threshold; and, descent-gradient of 300 ft-per-nm or a 700 ft/mn
− the desired stabilization height. vertical speed, for a final approach ground speed
of 140 kt.
Decelerating on a 3-degree glide path in clean
Stabilization height: configuration usually is not possible.
The definition and criteria for a stabilized approach When capturing the glide slope with only slats
are defined in Briefing Note 7.1 - Flying Stabilized extended (i.e., with no flaps), typically 1000-ft
Approaches. and 3 nm are flown while establishing the landing
configuration and stabilizing at the target final
approach speed.
Thrust-required-to-fly curve: The right side of the power curve is the normal zone
of operation.
Figure 2 illustrates the thrust-required-to-fly curve
(also referred to as the power curve).
The thrust balance is such that, at given thrust level,
any tendency to accelerate increases the thrust-
required-to-fly and, hence, brings back the aircraft to
Thrust Required to Fly the initial airspeed.
3-degree glide slope - Landing configuration
160
Conversely, any tendency to decelerate decreases
Given gross-weight
150 Given pressure altitude the thrust-required-to-fly and, hence, brings back the
Given fligh path aircraft to the initial airspeed
140
Thrust required - in %
The difference between the available-thrust and the In addition, if the thrust is set and maintained at idle,
thrust-required-to-fly (i.e., the thrust balance): no energy is immediately available to recover from a
low speed condition or to initiate a go-around (as
• Represents the climb or acceleration capability
illustrated in Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5).
(if the available-thrust exceeds the required-
thrust); or,
• Indicates that speed and/or flight path cannot be
maintained (if the required-thrust exceeds the
available-thrust).
When flying the final approach segment with the The aircraft certification (FAR – Part 25) ensures that
thrust set and maintained at idle (approach idle), the the thrust achieved after 8 seconds (starting from
pilot should be aware of the acceleration flight/approach idle) allows a minimum climb gradient
characteristics of jet engines, as illustrated below. of 3.2 % for go-around.
100 100
Thrust ( in % of GA thrust )
Thrust ( in % GA thrust )
80 80
60 60
40 40
8 seconds (FAR 25)
20 20
Approach
idle
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Time ( seconds )
Time ( seconds )
Figure 3 Figure 4
Engine Response Scatter- Typical Certified Thrust Response -Typical
Table 1 indicates the thrust required (in % of the Figure 5 illustrates the consequences associated
TOGA thrust) during the transition from a stabilized with flying an approach with:
approach to a go-around.
• Speed below the target final approach speed
( V APP ); and/or,
Stabilized approach 20 % In case of go-around, the initial altitude loss and the
time required for recovering the initial altitude are
3-degree glide path / V APP increased if airspeed is lower than the final approach
speed and/or if thrust is not stabilized or set at idle.
20
Table 1
( in feet from go-around initiation )
10
Thrust Required during GA Initiation
V APP /
0
Altitude Loss
Thrust decreasing
-10
Table 1 and Figure 5 illustrate the importance of
being stabilized on speed and on thrust when -20
initiating a go-around. V APP –10 kt / Idle
-30
V APP / Idle
-40
-50
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Time ( seconds )
Figure 5
Effect of Initial Speed and Thrust
on Altitude Loss during Go-around
(Typical)
Regulatory References
Other References
Chapter 5
Introduction
Factor % of Events
Factors that may contribute to approach-and-
landing accidents include flight over hilly terrain,
reduced visibility, visual illusions, adverse winds, Night time 75 %
contaminated runways and/or limited approach aids.
IMC 59 %
Flight crews should be aware of the compounding
nature of these hazards during approach and Darkness or twilight 53 %
landing.
Non-precision approach or visual 53 %
approach
Statistical data
Precipitation ( rain or snow ) 50 %
Approach-and-landing is the most hazardous phase
of any flight, as illustrated by the following data: Absence of radar service 50 %
• Over the past 40 years, approach-and-landing Adverse wind (high crosswind, 33 %
accidents accounted for 55 % of total hull tail wind or wind shear)
losses.
Absence of GPWS or radio 29 %
This statistic does not show a downward trend.
altimeter
• The flight segment from the outer marker to the
Absence of letdown navaid, 21 %
runway threshold averages only 4 % of flight
approach/runway lighting or VASI
time, but accounts for 45 % of hull losses.
/ PAPI
Flight Crew
Factor % of Events
• Fatigue – reduced awareness:
− Long duty time:
Low visibility 71 %
! Long-haul operation; or,
Hilly or mountainous terrain 67 % ! Short-haul or medium-haul / multiple-
legs operation;
Table 2 • Unfamiliar airport; and/or,
CFIT Events • Unfamiliar instrument or visual approach
procedure.
• Inadequate or non-standard air traffic control • Unsecured airport (i.e., absence of airport
procedures; perimeter fences, allowing vehicles, persons or
animals to access to runway or maneuvering
• Inadequate air traffic flow management; areas);
• Mixing of IFR and VFR traffics; • No illumination of wind sock or wind “T”;
• Frequent uncontrolled VFR traffics in airport and/or,
vicinity; • Faded painting of runway and/or taxiways
• Frequency congestion / controller overload markings.
caused by high density traffic or by a single
controller operating tower and ground
frequencies; Terrain
• Absence of adequate VHF coverage in known • Trees or man-made obstacles (antennas, ...)
FIR or TMA sectors; penetrating the obstacle clearance level;
• Inadequate coordination between international • Topographical features requiring unusual
and domestic FIRs; procedures and reduced safety margins; and/or,
• Absence of or failure to use landline • Terrain features resulting in GPWS activation
communications between two close airports; during approach.
and/or,
• Absence of English language proficiency in Refer to Briefing Note 5.2 – Terrain Awareness for
ATC communications and/or use of non- expanded information.
standard phraseology.
Visual Illusions
Airport Equipment • Airport environment (black hole, ...);
• Absence of / limited / low intensity approach • Runway environment; and/or,
and runway lighting (or part of it);
• Weather conditions.
• Non-standard runway-edge lights spacing;
• Absence of ILS; Refer to Briefing Note 5.3 – Visual Illusions
Awareness for expanded information.
• ILS unusable beyond a specific point (because
of obstacles) or below a specific altitude
(because of approach over water); Visibility
• ILS without OM; • Darkness, low visibility (rain, fog, mist, haze,
• ILS without VASI/PAPI to support the visual low lighting, smoke).
segment ;
• Offset VOR/DME approach; Wind conditions
• VOR/DME with inoperative DME; • Shifting or gusty wind, crosswind or tail wind;
• VOR incorrect calibration; and/or,
• NDB known as unreliable in adverse weather • Known frequent wind shear on final approach of
conditions; specific runway under adverse weather and / or
wind conditions.
• Non-precision or circling approach with
absence of VASI / PAPI; Refer to Briefing Note 5.4 – Wind Shear
Awareness for expanded information.
• VASI/PAPI being incorrectly calibrated or
inoperative;
Associated Documents
Introduction
The absence of acquisition or the loss of visual Navigation and Altitude Deviations
references is the most common causal factor in
CFIT accidents occurring during approach-and- When referring to terrain awareness, the following
landing; this includes: definitions need to be kept in mind.
• Descending below the MDA(H) or DA(H) without
Navigation (course) deviation:
adequate visual references or with incorrect
visual references (e.g., a lighted area in the • Operation of an aircraft beyond the course
airport vicinity, a taxiway or an other runway); or, clearance issued by ATC or beyond the defined
airway system.
• Continuing the approach after the loss of visual
references (e.g., visual references lost because
of a fast moving rainshower or fog patch). Altitude deviation:
• Deviation from the assigned altitude (or flight
level) equal to or greater than 300 ft.
This paragraph provides an overview of: − Ensure that the cleared altitude is above the
applicable minimum safe altitude; and,
• Opportunities available to enhance terrain
awareness (e.g., operations manuals, technical − Positively confirm any altitude clearance
training, navigation charts); and, below the MSA, when under radar vectoring
(or be aware of applicable minimum
• Operational recommendations and techniques vectoring altitude for the sector).
proposed to establish and maintain the desired
level of terrain awareness. • Descent profile management;
Standard operating procedures (SOPs) should • Elements of a stabilized approach and approach
emphasize the following terrain-awareness-items: gates;
• Task sharing and standard calls for effective
cross check and backup, particularly for mode • Readiness and commitment to respond to a
selections and target entries; GPWS / TAWS alert; and,
ILS CAT I RA DA RA DH
Training
ILS CAT II Note 2
Altitude Awareness Program:
ILS CAT III DA RA DH
The implementation of an altitude awareness
with DH Note 2 program by several airlines has reduced significantly
the number of altitude deviations.
ILS CAT III TDZ altitude
An altitude awareness program can be developed
no DH based on the contents of the Briefing Notes
3.1 Altimeter Setting – Use of Radio Altimeter
and 3.2 – Altitude Deviations.
Table 1
Setting of Baro Altimeter Bug and Radio Altimeter DH The altitude awareness program should emphasize
the following aspects:
Note 1 :
• Awareness of altimeter setting errors, e.g.:
The RA DH can be set (e.g., at 200 ft), for
terrain awareness purposes. In this case, the − 29.XX in.hg versus 28.XX or 30.XX in.hg;
use of the radio altimeter should be discussed or,
during the approach briefing. − 29.XX in.hg versus 9XX hPa.
For all approaches, except CAT I with RA,
CAT II and CAT III ILS approaches, • Awareness of altitude corrections for low OAT
the approach MINIMUM callout will be based on operations and awareness of pilot’s and/or
the baro-altimeter bug set at the MDA(H) or controller’s responsibility in applying these
the DA(H). corrections.
During climb, cruise and descent, flight crew should: Review and discuss the following items:
• Monitor FMS guidance and navigation accuracy;
• Runway in use (type of approach);
• Monitor instruments and navaids raw data (as
applicable); • Expected arrival route ( STAR - or radar
vectors);
• Use all available information (i.e., cockpit
displays, navaids raw data and charts); and,
• Altimeter setting (QNH or QFE, as required);
• Request confirmation or clarification from ATC if and,
any doubt exists about terrain clearance,
particularly when being radar vectored. • Transition level (unless standard for the country
or for the airport).
In hilly or mountainous areas, the briefing should • Approach transitions (fixes, holding pattern,
include the following terrain-awareness-items: altitude and speed constraints/restrictions,
required navaids setup);
• Descent profile and descent management; • Initial approach fix (IAF) and intermediate
approach fix (IF), as applicable (positions and
• Terrain features; crossing altitudes);
• Energy management (i.e., deceleration and • Final approach course (and lead-in radial);
configuration management); and, • Terrain features (location and elevation of
hazardous terrain or man-made obstacles);
• Other approach hazards (e.g., black hole).
• Approach profile view :
The flight management system (FMS) operational - Final approach fix (FAF);
pages and the ND should be used to guide and - Final descent point (if different from FAF);
illustrate the briefing, and to confirm the various
data entries. - Visual descent/decision point (VDP);
- Missed-approach point (MAP);
An expanded review of the terrain-awareness-items
to be included in the approach briefing – as practical - Typical vertical speed at expected final
and appropriate for the conditions of the flight – is approach ground speed (GS); and,
provided hereafter. - Touchdown zone elevation (TDZE).
1000 ft
• FAF altitude;
Table 2
Atmospheric Pressure and Temperature Effects
on True Altitude
Airport charts:
Monitor the correct sequencing of the flight plan at
each waypoint and the correct guidance after
Review and discuss the following terrain-
sequencing the waypoint, particularly after a flight
awareness-items using the airport charts:
plan revision or after performing a DIR TO:
• Approach and runway lighting, and other • Ensure that the direction-of-turn and the TO
expected visual references; and, waypoint are in accordance with the SID.
• Specific hazards (such as man-made obstacles, • In case of incorrect flight plan sequencing
as applicable). and/or of incorrect lateral guidance, crew should
be alert to perform a DIR TO [an appropriate
waypoint] or to revert to selected lateral
If another airport is located in the close vicinity of the
navigation.
destination airport, relevant details or procedures
should be discussed for awareness purposes.
Changes in clearances should be fully understood
before being accepted and implemented.
Use of automation:
For example, being cleared to a lower altitude
Discuss the intended use of automation for vertical should never be understood as a clearance to
and lateral navigation: descend (prematurely) below the charted sector or
segment minimum safe altitude.
• Use of FMS-managed guidance or selected
modes; and, When being radar vectored, make sure that :
• Use of precision approach, constant-angle or • The controller has clearly identified your radar
step-down non-precision approach, as required. return by stating “radar contact”;
• The controller can read obstacle clearance
Descent Management and Monitoring altitudes on his or her radar scope (awareness
of minimum vectoring altitude and responsibility
Before entering the terminal area (TMA), check the for terrain separation);
FMS navigation accuracy (using navaids raw data)
• The controller does not forget that you are on a
against the applicable criteria for terminal or
radar vector, heading toward high or rising
approach navigation.
terrain;
If the accuracy criteria for lateral FMS navigation in • The pilot / controller two-way communication
terminal area and/or for approach are not met, remain effective at all times;
revert to a selected lateral mode with ND in ROSE
or ARC mode. • You maintain your own vertical and horizontal
situational awareness; and,
If flying with IRS ONLY navigation, do not descend • You request confirmation or clarification from
below the sector MSA without positive confirmation ATC without delay and in clear terms, in case of
of the aircraft position, using navaids raw data. any doubt.
Maintaining a sterile cockpit when below 10 000 ft or During the final approach segment, the primary
below the sector minimum safe altitude (MSA), attention of PF and PNF pilots should be directed to
particularly at night or in instrument meteorological any required altitude constraint or altitude / distance
conditions (IMC). check prior to reaching the MDA(H) or DA(H).
Approach and go-around briefing The role and tasks of the PNF should be
emphasized by highlighting is role as pilot
The following terrain awareness critical items should monitoring.
be included in the approach and go-around briefing:
• Minimum safety altitudes; Awareness of other approach hazards
• Terrain and man-made obstacles features;
Pilots should receive education and training on
• Applicable approach minimums (visibility or visual illusions and spatial disorientation.
RVR, ceiling as applicable);
• Applicable stabilization height (approach gate);
Associated Briefing Notes
• Final approach descent flight path angle (and
vertical speed); and, The following Briefing Notes provide expanded
• Go-around altitude and missed-approach initial information on subjects and matters related to
steps. terrain awareness:
• 1.1 - Standard Operating Procedures.
Preparedness and commitment for go-around • 1.2 – Optimum Use of Automation.
• Being prepared and minded to go-around. • 1.6 – Approach and Go-around Briefing.
• 2.3 – Effective Crew / ATC
Pilot / controller communications Communications.
• 2.4 – Intra-Cockpit Communications –
An awareness and training program to improve pilot
/ controller communications should be developed Managing interruptions and
based on the contents of Briefing Note Distractions.
2.3 – Effective Pilot/Controller Communications. • 3.2 – Altitude deviations.
• 6.1 – Being Prepared for Go-around.
Crew coordination, cross-check and back-up
• 6.3 – Terrain-Avoidance ( GPWS Pullup )
The following terrain-awareness elements of an Maneuver
effective cross-check and back-up should be
emphasized:
Regulatory References
• Assertive challenging by PNF (i.e., maintaining
situational awareness and voicing any concern The following regulatory references are provided to
about the safe progress of the flight); assist the reader in a quick and easy reference to
the related regulatory material:
• Standard calls ( particularly, altitude calls);
• ICAO - PANS-OPS - Volume I - Part VI –
Altimeter setting procedures - Chapter 3 – Low
• Excessive-parameter-deviation callouts; and,
OAT operation - Altitude corrections.
• Task sharing and standard calls for the • FAR 91.3 – Responsibility and authority of the
acquisition of visual references. pilot in command.
• FAR 91.121 – Altimeter settings. The following Flight Safety Foundation references
can be used to further illustrate and complement the
• FAR 91.123 – Compliance with ATC clearances information contained in this Briefing Note:
and instructions.
• CFIT Education and Training Aid.
• FAR 91.155 – Basic VFR weather minimums. • CFIT Checklist – Evaluate the Risk and Take
Action.
• FAR 91.157 – Special VFR weather minimums. • ALAR Risk Awareness Tool/Checklist.
• FAR 91.175 – Takeoff and landing under IFR. • ALAR Risk Reduction Planning Guide.
• Flight Safety Digest – Killers in Aviation –
• FAR 91.185 – IFR operations: Nov.98-Feb.99.
Two-way communications failure.
command (PIC).
Introduction
Visual Illusions – Factors and Conditions Visual illusions affect perception of heights,
distances and/or intercept angles.
The following factors and conditions affect the flight
crew ability to accurately perceive the environment, Visual illusions are most critical when transitioning
resulting in visual illusions. from IMC and instrument references to VMC and
visual references.
Airport environment: Visual illusions (such as the black-hole effect) affect
• Ground texture and features; the flight crew vertical and horizontal situational
awareness, particularly during the base leg and
• Off-airport light patterns such as brightly lighted when turning final (as applicable) and during the
parking lots or streets; final approach.
• “Black hole” along the final approach flight path;
Visual illusions usually induce crew inputs
and/or,
(corrections) that cause the aircraft to deviate from
• Uphill or downhill sloping terrain before the the original and intended vertical or lateral flight
runway threshold or in the approach path path.
environment.
Visual illusions can affect the decision about when
and how fast to descend from the MDA(H).
Runway environment:
• Runway dimensions (aspect ratio); The following paragraph provides an expanded
overview of all the factors and conditions creating
• Runway uphill or downhill slope; visual illusions to discuss how each factor or
• Terrain drop-off at the approach end of the condition may affect the pilot perception of:
runway;
• The airport and runway environment;
• Approach and runway lighting; and/or,
• Runway condition (e.g., wet runway). • The terrain separation; and,
Figure 1 Figure 3
Photo - LFBO 15 R ( 3500 m x 45 m )
− A downhill slope in the approach zone 3-degree glide slope / 200 ft RA
creates an illusion of being too low (i.e.,
impression of a shallow glide path, as
shown on Figure 2), thus:
• Runway uphill or downhill slope:
! possibly inducing a correction placing
the aircraft above the intended glide − An uphill slope creates an illusion of being
path; or, too high (impression of a steep glide path);
and,
! preventing the flight crew from detecting
a too steep flight path. − A downhill slope creates an illusion of being
too low (impression of a shallow glide path).
− Bright runway-lights create the impression − Shallow fog (i.e., fog layer not exceeding
of being closer to the runway (hence on a 300 ft in thickness) results in a low
steeper glide path); obscuration but also in low horizontal
visibility:
− Low intensity lights create the impression of
being farther away (hence on a shallower ! When on top of a shallow fog layer, the
glide path); ground (or airport and runway, if flying
overhead) can be seen, but when
− A non-standard spacing of runway lights entering the fog layer the forward and
also modifies the pilot’s perception of the slant visibility usually are lost;
runway distance and glide path; and,
! Entering a fog layer also creates the
− If runway lighting is partially visible (e.g., perception of a pitch up, thus inducing a
during the downwind leg or during the base tendency to push over and place the
leg of a visual or circling approach), the aircraft below the desired glide path and
runway may appear being farther away or in a steeper-than-desired attitude;
at a different angle (i.e., the intercept angle
is perceived as smaller than actual). − In light rain or moderate rain, the runway
may also appear fuzzy because of rain halo
effect, increasing the risk of not perceiving
Runway approach aids: a vertical deviation or lateral deviation
during the visual segment.
The following runway approach-aids and conditions
may increase the crew exposure to visual illusions: The visual segment is defined as the
segment flown after full transition from
• Glide slope beam being unusable beyond a instruments to visual references;
specific point because of terrain or below a
specific altitude/height because of approach − heavy rain affects depth perception and
over water; distance perception:
− when breaking out of the overcast at both The following table provides a summary of the
ceiling and visibility minimums (DH and various factors and conditions together with their
RVR), the slant visibility may not allow sight effects on the pilot’s perception and actions:
of the farther bar(s) of the VASI/PAPI, thus
reducing the available visual clues for the
visual segment in reduced visibility; Condition Perception Action Result
− a snow-covered terrain together with a
clouds overcast create a phenomenon Narrow
called “white-out” that eliminate perception or
of terrain features (slope) and height above long runway
terrain. Being too Push Land short /
Runway or high land hard
terrain
• Crosswind: uphill slope
− In crosswind conditions, the runway lights
and environment will be angled with the Wide
aircraft heading; flight crew should maintain or
the drift correction and resist the tendency short runway
to align the aircraft heading with the runway Being too Pull Land long /
centerline. Runway or low overrun
terrain
downhill
• Runway surface condition (e.g., wet runway): slope
− A wet runway does not reflect light, thus Pitch down - - Land short /
affecting depth perception by appearing to or land hard /
be farther away. Duck under CFIT
This visual effect usually results in a late Bright Being too Push Land short /
flare and in a firm touchdown. runway close land hard
lighting (too steep)
When landing on a wet runway, peripheral
vision of runway edge lights should be used Low intensity Being farther Pull Land long /
lighting away overrun
to increase the depth perception and (too shallow)
determine the flare point.
Light rain, Being too Push Land short /
fog, haze, high land hard
mist smoke,
dust
How to Lessen the Effects of Visual • Runway approach and visual aids:
Illusions ?
− Type of approach (let-down aid restriction,
To lessen the effects of visual illusions, prevention such as glide slope unusable beyond a
strategies and lines-of-defense should be developed specific point or below a specific altitude);
and implemented based on the following
recommendations. − Type of approach lighting system; and,
Approach hazards should be assessed for each • Non-precision approach, supported by a VASI /
individual approach, during the approach and go- PAPI (as available).
around briefing, by reviewing the following elements:
On a non-precision approach, do not descend below
• Ceiling and visibility conditions; the MDA(H) before reaching the visual
descent/decision point (VDP), even if adequate
• Weather: visual references have been acquired before
− wind, turbulence; reaching the VDP.
− rain showers; and/or, To prevent going too early to visual references and
− fog or smoke patches; descending prematurely below the MDA(H), the PF
should maintain reference to instruments until
reaching the VDP. This provides further protection
• Crew experience with airport and airport
against visual illusions in hazard conditions.
environment:
− surrounding terrain; and/or, During a visual or circling approach, if the VASI /
PAPI indicates below glide slope level off or climb
− specific airport and runway hazards until the VASI/PAPI shows on-glide-path.
(obstructions, black-hole, off-airport light
patterns, …);
Resist the tendency to pitch down and “duck under”; The defined task sharing ensures a continued
this is the greatest challenge during the visual monitoring of visual and instrument references,
segment of the approach, this includes: throughout the transition to visual references and
thereafter (i.e., during a visual approach or during
• Pitching down into the approach light in an the visual segment of an instrument approach).
attempt to see the runway during a precision
approach; or, In known or anticipated hazard conditions, the PNF
should reinforce his / her monitoring of instrument
• Ducking under because of the impression of references and of flight progress, for an effective
being too high when affected by visual illusions. cross-check and back-up of the PF.
• Awareness of weather factors; • FAR 91.175 – Takeoff and landing under IFR –
Paragraph (b), Loss of visual references.
• Awareness of surrounding terrain and obstacles;
• JAR-OPS 1 – Subpart E – All Weather
Operations - 1.1430 – Aerodrome Operating
• Awareness and assessment of approach
Minima.
hazards (i.e., conditions that may result in visual
illusions, such as “black hole”);
• JAR-OPS 1 – Subpart E – All Weather
Operations - 1.435 - Terminology.
• Adherence to defined PF/PNF task sharing for
acquisition of visual references and for flying the
visual segment; this includes:
− monitoring by PF of outside visual cues while
transiently referring to instruments to support
and monitor the flight path during the visual
segment; and,
− monitoring by PNF of headdown cues for
effective cross-check and back-up (i.e., for
calling any excessive-parameter-deviation).
Flight crew awareness and alertness are key factors Wind shear is defined as a sudden change of wind
in the successful application of wind shear velocity and/or direction.
avoidance and escape / recovery techniques.
Two types wind shear can be encountered:
This Briefing Note provides an overview of
operational recommendations and training • Vertical wind shear:
guidelines for aircraft operation in forecast or − vertical variations of the horizontal wind
suspected wind shear or downburst conditions. component, resulting in turbulence that may
affect the aircraft airspeed when climbing or
descending through the wind shear layer;
Statistical Data
− vertical variations of the horizontal wind
Adverse weather (other than low visibility and component of 20 kt-per-1000 ft to
runway condition) is a circumstantial factor in nearly 30 kt-per-1000 ft are typical values, but a
40 % of approach-and-landing accidents. vertical wind shear may reach up to
10 kt-per-100 ft.
Adverse wind conditions (i.e., strong cross winds,
tailwind and wind shear) are involved in more than • Horizontal wind shear:
30 % of approach-and-landing accidents and in
15 % of events involving CFIT. − horizontal variations of the wind component
(e.g., decreasing head wind or increasing
Wind shear is the primary causal factor in 4 % of tail wind, or a shift from a head wind to a tail
th wind), may affect the aircraft in level flight or
approach-and-landing accidents and is the 9 cause
of fatalities. while climbing or descending;
− horizontal variations of wind component
These statistical data are summarized in Table 1. may reach up to 100 kt-per-nautical mile.
The following deviations should be considered as If the FD windshear guidance is not available
indications of a possible wind shear condition: (e.g., FD not available) a similar recovery technique
is recommended and published in the applicable
• Indicated airspeed variations in excess of 15 kt; FCOM.
• Ground speed variations (decreasing head wind
or increasing tail wind or shift from head wind to
tail wind); Reactive and Predictive Wind Shear
Warnings
• Vertical speed excursions of 500 ft/mn;
• Pitch attitude excursions of 5 degrees; In addition to the FD wind-shear-survival guidance,
an optional WINDSHEAR warning is available on
• Glide slope deviation of 1 dot; most aircraft models.
• Heading variations of 10 degrees;
The wind shear warning and the FD survival
• Unusual autothrottle activity or throttle levers guidance are activated only when a wind shear
position. condition is detected based on the assessment of
aircraft performance (flight parameters and
accelerations).
Wind Shear Survival Strategy
The wind shear warning and guidance therefore are
In case of wind shear encounter, a survival strategy called Reactive Wind Shear Systems, because they
needs to be adopted to minimize the altitude loss do not incorporate any forward looking and
and the associated risk of ground contact. anticipation capability.
The following describes the wind shear survival To complement the reactive wind shear systems
strategy implemented in the flight director (FD) for and provide an early warning of wind shear activity,
conventional aircraft models. the last generation of weather radars features
the capability to detect wind shear areas ahead of
The FD wind shear recovery guidance attempts to: the aircraft.
• Maintain the speed target (speed selected on
This new equipment is referred to as a Predictive
FCU + 10 kt) as long as a positive vertical
Wind Shear System.
speed is possible;
• Adjust the pitch attitude as the vertical speed Predictive wind shear systems provide typically a
decreases towards zero; one-minute advance warning.
• Maintain a slightly positive vertical speed until Predictive wind shear systems generate three levels
airspeed decreases to the boundary of the stick- of wind shear alert:
shaker (intermittent stick shaker activation);
then, • Advisory alert voice messages;
• Maintain the airspeed slightly above the stick
shaker boundary, allowing an altitude loss as • Amber caution (W/S AHEAD); or,
long as required for maintaining the stick-shaker
speed. • Red warning (W/S AHEAD).
The wind shear guidance is available at takeoff, in Colored patterns and icons are displayed on the
approach and during a go-around, when below weather radar display (ND) to indicate areas of
1000 ft RA. windshear activity.
Wind Shear Awareness The wind shear survival / escape procedure should
be trained in a full-flight simulator, using realistic
The following are opportunities to enhance: wind shear profiles recorded during actual wind
shear encounters (as illustrated by Figure 1).
• Wind shear awareness; and,
• Operational recommendations and procedures.
A wind shear awareness program should be − Crew experience with the airport
developed and implemented, based on the contents environment and the prevailing weather
of: conditions; or,
• The industry-developed Wind Shear Education • Delay the takeoff until conditions improve, as
and Training Aid; and, warranted.
Takeoff and initial climb − follow the flight director pitch orders (wind
shear survival guidance) or set the required
If wind shear conditions are suspected during pitch attitude, if FD is not available (as
takeoff, the flight crew should: recommended in the applicable FCOM).
• Use the weather radar (or the predictive wind − if the autopilot (AP) is engaged, keep the
shear system, as available) before commencing AP engaged;
the takeoff roll to ensure that the flight path is or,
clear of potential hazard areas;
follow the FD pitch orders,
• Select the maximum takeoff thrust; or,
• After triggering the go levers ( setting TOGA ), set the required pitch attitude
select the flight path vector display on the PNF (as recommended in the applicable FCOM);
ND, as available, to obtain a direct visual cue of
the climb flight path angle; and, − level the wings to maximize climb gradient,
unless a turn is required for obstacle
• Closely monitor the airspeed and speed trend clearance;
during the takeoff roll to detect any evidence of
impending wind shear. − closely monitor the airspeed, speed trend
and flight path angle (as available);
Recovery technique for wind shear encounter
during takeoff − allow airspeed to decrease to stick shaker
activation boundary (intermittent stick
If wind shear is encountered during takeoff roll or shaker activation) while monitoring speed
during initial climb, apply the following recovery trend;
techniques without delay:
(reference to stick shaker applies only to
• Before V1: conventional aircraft models)
− reject the takeoff only if unacceptable
airspeed variations occur (not exceeding − do not change the flaps and gear
the target V1) and if there is sufficient configuration until out of the wind shear
runway remaining to stop the airplane. condition;
Descent Preparation – Approach and • Select the most favorable runway, considering:
Go-around Briefing
− the location of the likely wind shear /
downburst condition; and,
An expanded review of the wind shear-awareness-
items to be covered in the approach briefing – as − the available runway approach aids.
practical and appropriate for the conditions of the
flight – is provided hereafter. • Use the weather radar (or the predictive wind
shear system, as available) during the approach
• ATIS: to ensure that the flight path is clear of potential
Review and discuss the following items: hazard areas;
− Runway in use (type of approach); • Select the flight path vector display on the PNF
ND to obtain a direct visual cue of the flight path
angle (during the approach or during the
− Expected arrival route (standard arrival –
recovery/escape maneuver).
STAR - or more direct radar vectors);
• Select less than full flaps for landing (to
− Prevailing weather;
maximize the climb-gradient capability) and
adjust the final approach speed accordingly;
− Reports of potential low level wind shear
(LLWAS warnings, TDRS data, PIREPS).
• If an ILS is available, engage the autopilot for a
more accurate approach tracking and for taking
• Use of automation: benefit of the glide slope excessive-deviation-
warning;
Discuss the intended use of automation for
vertical and lateral navigation as a function of
• Select a final approach speed based on the
the suspected or forecast wind shear conditions.
reported surface wind;
− Any predictive windshear advisory, W/S The following factors may affect the wind shear
AHEAD caution or W/S AHEAD warning; awareness and avoidance or the survival capability.
and/or,
Prevention strategies and lines-of-defense should
− A reactive WINDSHEAR warning. be developed to address these adverse factors
(as possible and practical):
• Aircraft equipment:
For respective W/S AHEAD and WINDSHEAR
procedures, refer to the applicable FCOM and QRH. − absence of reactive and/or predictive wind
shear system(s).
• Airport equipment:
Recovery technique for wind shear encounter
during approach and landing
− Absence of a low level wind shear alert
system (LLWAS) detection and warning
If wind shear is encountered during the approach or
system; and/or,
landing, the following recovery techniques should be
implemented without delay:
− Absence of a terminal Doppler radar system
• Trigger the go-around levers (or set thrust (TDRS).
levers to TOGA, as applicable) and maintain the
maximum go-around thrust; • Training :
• Follow the FD pitch orders or set the pitch
attitude target recommended in the FCOM (if − Absence of wind shear awareness program;
FD is not available); and/or,
• If the AP is engaged keep the AP engaged. − Absence of simulator training for wind shear
recovery.
As required, disconnect the AP and follow the
FD orders, or set and maintain the • Standard operating procedures:
recommended pitch attitude;
− Inadequate briefings;
• Do not change the flaps and landing gear
configuration until out of the wind shear
condition; − Inadequate monitoring of flight progress;
and/or,
• Level the wings to maximize climb gradient,
unless a turn is required for obstacle clearance; − Incorrect use of or interaction with
automation.
• Allow airspeed to decrease to stick shaker
activation boundary (intermittent stick shaker • Human Factors and CRM:
activation – conventional aircraft only) while
monitoring speed trend; − Absence of crosscheck (for excessive
parameter-deviations);
• Closely monitor the airspeed, speed trend and
flight path angle (if flight path vector is available
− Inadequate back-up (callouts); and/or,
and displayed for the PNF); and,
The following key points and recommendations The following Briefing Notes provide expanded
should be considered in the development of information on related subjects:
company strategies and initiatives enhancing wind
shear awareness. • 1.1 – Operating Philosophy – SOPs,
• 1.2 – Optimum Use of Automation,
Keypoints are grouped into the three domains
associated with wind shear awareness; Avoidance, • 1.3 - Operations Golden Rules,
Recognition and Recovery / Escape.
• 1.4 – Standard Calls,
• Avoidance • 1.6 – Approach and Go-around Briefing,
− Assess the conditions for a safe takeoff or • 5.1 – Approach Hazards Awareness,
approach-and-landing, based on all the
available meteorological data, visual • 6.1 – Being Prepared for Go-around.
observations and on-board equipment;
− Delay the takeoff or the approach, or divert
Regulatory References
to a more suitable airport; and,
− Be prepared and committed for an The following regulatory references are provided to
immediate response to a predictive wind assist the reader in a quick and easy reference to
shear advisory/caution/warning or to a the related regulatory material:
reactive wind shear warning.
• ICAO – Preparation of an Operations Manual
(Doc 9376).
• Recognition
− Be alert to recognize a potential or existing • ICAO – Windshear (Circular 186).
wind shear condition, based on all the
available weather data, on-board equipment • ICAO Annex 6 – Part I, 6.26 –
and on the monitoring of the aircraft flight Recommendation, Turbo-jet airplanes –
parameters and flight path; and, Forward-looking wind shear warning system.
− Enhance instruments scan, whenever
potential wind shear is suspected. • FAR 121.135 – Manual Requirements –
Operations Manual – Contents.
− Avoid large thrust variations or trim changes • FAR 121.357 – Airborne weather radar
in response to sudden airspeed variations; equipment requirements.
− Follow the FD wind shear recovery/escape • FAR 121.358 – Low-altitude wind shear system
pitch-guidance or apply the recommended equipment requirements.
FCOM recovery/escape procedure; and,
• FAR 121.360 – Ground proximity warning –
− Make maximum use of aircraft equipment, glide slope deviation alerting system.
such as the flight path vector (as available).
• FAR 121.424 (b).(1) – Pilots: Initial, transition,
and upgrade flight training – Wind shear
maneuvers.
Fax: +1 703-605-6900,
Chapter 6
Failure to recognize the need for and to execute a More than 70 % of approach-and-landing accidents
go-around and missed-approach when appropriate is contain elements which should have been recognized
a major cause of approach-and-landing accidents. by the crew as improper and which should have
prompted a go-around.
Because a go-around is not a frequent occurrence,
the importance of being go-around-prepared and Inadequate assertiveness and/or decision-making are
being go-around-minded must be emphasized. causal factors in 75 % of events
The chain of events resulting in a go-around often Strict adherence to the defined PF/PNF task sharing
starts at the top-of-descent; this Briefing Note is the most important factor to conduct a safe
therefore provides an overview of operational go-around; this includes task sharing for:
recommendations starting from the descent
preparation and approach briefing. • Hand flying or flying with AP engaged; and/or,
• Normal operation or abnormal / emergency
conditions.
The go-around part of the approach briefing should • Using speed brakes;
recall the following key aspects:
• Target stabilization point, e.g.; • Extending the landing gear, if the use of speed
brakes is not sufficient; and,
− 3000 ft above airfield elevation;
− 15 nautical mile from touchdown; and, • As a last resort, perform a 360-degree turn (as
practical and cleared by ATC).
− clean maneuvering speed (green dot speed);
If the desired descent flight path cannot be recovered,
• Go-around standard call (e.g., a loud and clear
ATC should be notified for timely coordination.
Go Around / Flaps call);
• PF / PNF task sharing (i.e., flow of respective Refer to Briefing Notes for expanded information:
actions, including desired guidance – mode
engagement – speed target, go-around altitude, • 4.1 - Descent Profile Management ; and,
deviations callout); and,
• Missed-approach vertical and lateral navigation • 4.2 - Energy Management during Approach.
(including speed and altitude restrictions).
Summary of key points • FAR 91.175 – Takeoff and landing under IFR –
requirement for immediate go-around in case of
Because a go-around is not a frequent occurrence, loss of visual references when below MDA(H) or
the importance of being go-around-prepared and DA(H) during a non-precision or CAT I ILS
go-around-minded should be emphasized. approach.
If the criteria for a safe continuation of the approach • FAR 91.189 – Category II and III operations:
are not met, the crew should be General operating rules – requirement for
go-around-committed, initiate a go-around and fly immediate go-around in case of loss of visual
the published missed-approach. references when below DA(H) during a CAT II or
CAT III ILS approach.
Regulatory references
Introduction Recommendations
If the conditions for a safe approach and landing are • Monitoring vertical speed and radio altitude;
not met, the flight crew should be
go-around-committed; initiate a go-around and fly • Monitoring pitch attitude, bank angle, speed and
the missed-approach procedure as published speed trend, and calling any parameter
(i.e., following the published vertical profile and lateral excessive-deviation;
navigation or as directed by ATC).
• Monitoring thrust;
This Briefing Note provides an overview of the flying
techniques and procedures recommended for • SOP actions and normal checklists;
the safe conduct of a manual go-around.
• Actions on FCU or FMS CDU, when in manual As a result of these three nose up effects:
flight; and,
• The pitch attitude and pitch rate increase; and,
• Abnormal or emergency checklists (ECAM
actions and/or QRH procedures ). • The nose up pitch-force required to maintain
the target pitch attitude, decreases until a nose
down pitch force is required to prevent from
Understanding the flight dynamics reaching an excessive pitch attitude.
of the go- around:
To maintain the desired pitch attitude target (and
Note :
prevent exceeding this target), the PF must therefore:
The following overview and discussion mainly apply to
conventional aircraft models. Nevertheless, • Release the backward (nose up) input on the
the basic principles of flight and pitching effects control column (side stick);
need to be understood by pilots operating aircraft
models with fly-by-wire controls and protections. • Apply progressively an increasing forward (nose
down) input on the control column (side stick), as
During rotation for takeoff, the aircraft is the thrust increases; and,
pre-trimmed and the thrust is already set.
• Re-trim the aircraft (nose down), as necessary.
The initiation of a go-around involves a very dynamic
(on conventional aircraft models only).
sequence of actions and changes
(i.e., thrust increase, configuration change) affecting
the pitch balance. The PF should simp ly fly the aircraft while closely
monitoring the PFD.
These effects are amplified:
• At low gross-weight, low altitude and low outside If the pitch is not positively controlled,
air temperature (hence, at high thrust-to-weight the pitch attitude continues to increase until a
ratio); and/or, significant speed loss occurs, despite the go-around
thrust.
• With all-engines-operative, as compared to a
one-engine-inoperative go-around.
Flying a manual go-around maneuver:
When initiating a go-around at DA(H), the PF is To conduct a safe go-around, the flight crew should
expected to minimize the altitude loss. prioritize the elements of the following 3-Ps rule:
The operational recommendations and task sharing • Do not allow the pitch attitude to exceed
for the safe conduct of a manual go-around can be an ultimate value (e.g. 25 degrees ), because
expanded as follows: a significant speed loss would occur;
− continue monitoring the flight parameters and Strict adherence to the defined PF / PNF task
call any excessive parameter deviation : sharing and to crew resources management
principles should be emphasized for;
§ “ speed “, if airspeed decreases below V
• Monitoring of flight and callout of any flight
APP – 5 kt;
parameter excessive -deviation; or,
§ “ speed trend “, if negative; • Management of any warning or other unexpected
occurrences.
§ “ pitch “, if pitch attitude exceeds
20 degrees;
If a warning is activated or if any other abnormal
condition occurs during the go-around,
§ “ bank “, if bank angle exceeds
the PF must concentrate his/her attention on flying
15 degrees ( 30 degrees if the missed-
the aircraft (i.e., vertical flight path and lateral flight
approach procedure requires a turn );
path).
and/or,
The manual go-around technique must:
§ “ thrust “, if a significant thrust loss is
observed. • Minimize the initial altitude loss;
§ wings level and no roll rate; • 6.1 - Being Prepared for Go-around,
Regulatory References
Figure 1
Excessive Deviation Callouts in Go-around
Introduction
• Ensure that flight crews attain proficiency in the GPWS not installed 30 %
execution of the approach procedures and
techniques recommended for their aircraft type;
Table 1
• Provide pilots with an adequate understanding of GPWS Factors in CFIT Events
the capability and limitations of the GPWS and
EGPWS / TAWS installed on their aircraft; and, ( Circa 1996 )
Figure 1 shows that 70 % of CFIT events could have The CFIT prevention-training program recommended
been avoided by: hereafter further supports these objectives.
The recommended program consists of: • The capability should be provided to insert an
"electronic mountain" from the instructor panel at
• A classroom briefing or a self-briefing session
a selected point ahead of the aircraft's present
based on the contents of:
position, on its projected flight path.
− the Airbus Industrie CFIT Education and
Training Aid; Nevertheless, inserting an electronic mountain at
an airport that does not feature such terrain may
− the relevant Approach-and-Landing Briefing result in the trainee dismissing the (E)GPWS /
TAWS warning (assuming a spurious warning),
Notes and presentations;
thus resulting in negative training.
− the description and operations of the
applicable model of GPWS and EGPWS / The slope and height of the mountain should be
TAWS ( FCOM and QRH ). tailored to the particular aircraft performance
capability at a representative weight
(e.g. maximum landing weight), so that maximum
• The Airbus Industrie CFIT video program,
performance is required to avoid impact.
illustrating the terrain escape maneuver
techniques applicable to conventional aircraft and
protected aircraft, respectively. The slope of the mountain should therefore be
adjustable up to at least 17 °, depending on the
climb gradients that can be achieved in the
• Exercises to be incorporated in simulator training
escape maneuver.
sessions during transition training and/or
recurrent training.
• To prevent negative training, the simulator must
Three typical exercises are described hereafter. realistically represent handling qualities and
performance as the speed reduces to stick-
• Additional briefing material to point out the risk shaker speed (or minimum speed, as applicable).
of CFIT during step-down non-precision
approaches and the advantages of using
a constant-angle stabilized profile. Simulator Exercises
All (E)GPWS / TAWS modes should be
Briefing Note 7.2 – Flying Constant-Angle Non- demonstrated.
Precision Approach provides expanded
information on the benefits associated with The objective should be to gain an understanding
constant-angle non-precision approaches. of the parameters and limitations of the (E)GPWS /
TAWS installed on the aircraft type.
Simulator Requirements for CFIT Prevention These exercises can be performed in either a fixed-
base simulator (FBS) or a full-flight simulator (FFS).
Training
The following scenarios, to be performed in the FFS,
• Terrain should be included in the database in the are designed to introduce CFIT awareness and to
vicinity of the airports selected for training. demonstrate and practice the correct response to
(E)GPWS / TAWS warnings.
The terrain database should extend over an area
of 25-30 NM radius centered on the airfield These scenarios may be modified in accordance with
reference point. the individual airline's training requirements or
operating environment.
This simulator visual system should be able to
display the terrain features.
Continue maneuver at maximum performance until Ensure proper crew coordination, with PNF calling
mountain is cleared ( Figure 2 ). radio altitudes and trend (e.g. "300 ft decreasing...").
The duration of the maneuver should be long enough Continue maneuver at maximum performance until
for the pilot to demonstrate proficiency at maintaining terrain is cleared ( Figure 2 ); the maneuver should
the maximum climb performance. be long enough for the pilot to demonstrate
proficiency at maintaining the maximum climb
Repeat the exercise, as needed, until crew performance.
proficiency is achieved.
Repeat the exercise, as needed, up to proficiency.
Debriefing:
Debriefing:
Review the exercise, as appropriate.
Review the exercise, as appropriate.
This scenario should be included in the LOFT session The following key points should be highlighted when
that is normally programmed at the end of the discussing CFIT awareness and response to a
transition course, and also during recurrent training (E)GPWS / TAWS warning:
LOFT sessions.
• Horizontal situational awareness and vertical
situational awareness must be maintained at all
Objectives: times ( Figure 1 and Figure 2 );
• Preventive actions must be (ideally) taken before
To maintain crew awareness of the CFIT hazard, and (E)GPWS / TAWS warning;
to confirm crew proficiency in responding to
a (E)GPWS / TAWS warning. • Response by PF must be immediate ( Figure 2 );
• PNF must monitor and call the radio altitude and
its trend throughout the terrain avoidance
Briefing: maneuver;
None. • Pull-up maneuver must be continued at
maximum climb performance until warning has
ceased and terrain is cleared, as indicated by a
Initial conditions: steadily increasing radio-altimeter reading
( Figure 2 ).
Establish either clean configuration or initial-approach
configuration and the associated maneuvering speed,
at maximum landing weight, in level flight or Associated Briefing Notes
descending.
The following Briefing Notes should be reviewed
along with the above information to complete
Procedure: the CFIT awareness and training program:
Clear the aircraft to descend to an altitude below • 1.1 - Operating Philosophy - SOPs,
the MSA or provide radar vectors towards high
ground. • 1.2 - Optimum Use of Automation,
If flight crew take corrective action before any • 2.3 - Effective Crew/ATC Communications,
(E)GPWS / TAWS warning (as expected),
an "electronic mountain" can be inserted at a later • 3.1 - Altimeter Setting – Use of Radio
stage in the session at an appropriate time. Altimeter,
Verify the crew response to (E)GPWS / TAWS, and • 3.2 - Altitude deviations,
the crew coordination during the avoidance
maneuver. • 5.2 - Terrain Awareness,
Regulatory References
Appendices - Figures
Figure 1
CFIT – An Encounter Avoided
Quito – Equador – March 92
Figure 2
CFIT – An Encounter Avoided
Quito – Equador – March 92
Crew response to RA Alert Light and GPWS Warning
Figure 3
Response to GPWS Warning
Conventional Aircraft Models
Figure 4
Response to GPWS Warning
Fly-by-wire Protected Aircraft Models
Figure 5
Response to GPWS Warning
( Typical Profiles )
QIT 115.3
VOR-DME
QUITO, ECUADOR
MARISCAL SUCRE INTL
QMS 115.0
VOR-DME
D 16.0 QIT
Pull-up initiated
Projected impact 13,200 ft
Figure 1
CFIT – An Encounter Avoided
Quito – Equador – March 92
Drawing adapted from “ Flight Into Terrain And the Ground Proximity Warning System “ by Don Bateman
200 kt
Terrain along track 4000 ft/mn
Altitude ( ft MSL )
Terrain if full procedure turn to right 17 degree pitch
Maximum thrust 17 000
Flight path
16 000
MK II GPWS warning 16 DME QMS
Terrain-Terrain ( 28 DME QIT )
Pull up ! Pull up ! 15 000
14 000
13 000
150 Radial QMS
( outbound )
2500 ft RA 2500 ft RA
12 000
Light Light
150 ft RA
11 000
10 000
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Figure 2
CFIT – An Encounter Avoided
Quito – Equador – March 92
Drawing adapted from “ Flight Into Terrain And the Ground Proximity Warning System “ by Don Bateman
Simultaneously :
Figure 3
Response to GPWS Warning – Conventional Aircraft Models
Simultaneously :
− AP ........................................................................... OFF
− PITCH .............................................................. PULL UP
Pull up to full back stick and maintain
Figure 4
Response to GPWS Warning – Fly-by-wire Protected Aircraft Models
5000
Max Landing Weight
4000 V LS + 5 kt
Sea Level
Stick shaker pitch attitude
3000
2000
3-degree / second
1000
up to 20-degree pitch attitude
0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
Distance ( m )
5000
Max Landing Weight
4000 V LS + 5 kt
Sea Level
3000
2000
Pull up to full back stick
1000
0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
Distance ( m )
Figure 5
Response to GPWS Warning
( Typical Profiles )
After touchdown for a planned touch-and-go, Bouncing at landing usually is the result of one or
the aircraft must be reconfigured to a takeoff a combination of the following factors:
configuration:
• Loss of visual references;
• Flaps reset to a takeoff configuration;
• Excessive sink rate;
• Pitch trim reset within the takeoff trim setting • Late flare initiation;
range;
• Incorrect flare technique;
• Rudder trim reset (as applicable); and, • Excessive airspeed; and/or,
• Throttle/thrust levers standup, as required (for • Power-on touchdown (preventing the automatic
symmetrical engine acceleration). extension of ground spoilers, as applicable).
Performing a planned touch-and-go is a dynamic and Recovery from a light bounce (5 ft or less):
demanding maneuver in terms of task sharing:
In case of a light bounced, the following typical
• The PF (trainee) is responsible for: recovery technique can be applied:
− Tracking the runway centerline; • Maintain or regain a normal landing pitch attitude
(do not increase pitch attitude as this could
− Advancing the throttle levers slightly above cause a tailstrike);
idle.
• The PNF (instructor) is responsible for: • Continue the landing;
− Reconfiguring the aircraft for takeoff; • Use power as required to soften the second
touchdown; and,
− Resetting systems, as required;
• Be aware of the increased landing distance.
− Monitoring engine parameters and flight modes
annunciations;
Recovery from a high bounce (more than 5 ft):
− Performing the takeoff callouts;
In case of a more severe bounce, do not attempt to
− Deciding to abort the takeoff, if required; and, land, as the remaining runway length might not be
sufficient to stop the aircraft.
− Ensuring back-up of PF during rotation and
initial climb. The following generic go-around technique can be
applied:
Perform ing a rejected landing (i.e., a non-anticipated • Maintain or regain a normal landing pitch attitude;
and non-prepared event) further amplifies the
importance for the PF and PNF to strictly adhere to • Initiate a go-around by triggering go-around
the defined task sharing and to concentrate on their levers/switches and advancing throttle levers to
respective tasks. the go-around thrust position;
• Maintain the landing flaps configuration or set the Commitment for Go-around
required flaps configuration, as set forth in the
applicable FCOM; If a rejected landing is initiated, the flight crew must
be committed to proceed with the go-around
• Be ready for a possible second touchdown; maneuver and not retard the throttle levers in an
ultimate decision to complete the landing.
• Be alert to apply forward force on control column
(side stick) and reset the pitch trim nose down Reversing a go-around decision usually is observed
as engines spool up (conventional aircraft models when the decision to reject the landing and to initiate
only); a go-around is taken by the first officer (as PF) but is
overridden by the captain.
• When safely established in the go-around and no
risk of further touchdown exists (i.e., with a Runway overruns, impact with obstructions and major
steady positive rate of climb), follow normal go- aircraft damage (or post impact fire) often are the
around procedures; and, consequences of reversing an already initiated
rejected landing.
• Reengage automation, as desired, to reduce
workload.
Summary of Key Points
Chapter 7
Approach Techniques
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
Introduction
Note :
Factor % of Events
Flying stabilized approaches complying with the
stabilization criteria and approach gates defined
Off-runway touchdown,
hereafter, does not preclude flying a Delayed Flaps
Approach (also called a Decelerated Approach) as Tail strike, 75 %
dictated by ATC requirements.
Runway excursion or overrun
Statistical Data
CFIT -- %
Continuing an unstabilized approach is a causal
factor in 40 % of all approach-and-landing accidents. Loss of control -- %
The following approach gates and minimum An approach is considered stabilized only if all the
stabilization heights are recommended to achieve following conditions are achieved before or when
timely stabilized approaches: reaching the applicable stabilization height:
IMC 1000 ft The aircraft is on the correct lateral and vertical flight
path
VMC 500 ft
(based on navaids guidance or visual references)
Table 4
Note :
Non-normal conditions requiring deviation from the
above elements of a stabilized approach should be
briefed formally.
For visual and circling approaches: For all types of constant-angle approaches:
Table 5
Vertical Greater than – 1000 ft/mn
Speed
Excessive flight parameter deviation
callouts criteria Note :
When reaching the applicable stabilization height and If the approach requires more than
below, a callout should be performed by the PNF if – 1000 ft/mn
any flight parameter exceeds the limits provided in vertical speed
Table 6 and Table 7. (e.g., for GS capture from above),
PF and PNF should discuss the
(*): required vertical speed
( ** ) :
Refer to the applicable SOPs for applicable pitch Bank Greater than 7 degrees
attitude limits. Angle
( *** ) :
Monitoring the ground speed provides an awareness Ground Lower than V APP - 10 kt
of a possible impending wind shear. Speed
( *** )
Maintaining the ground speed above V APP – 10 kt
provides an energy margin, in readiness for the
sudden head wind to tail wind shift usually
associated with wind shear.
Table 6
Maintaining a minimum ground speed is performed
automatically when flying in managed-speed on
fly-by-wire aircraft models.
For LOC-only and ILS approaches: In addition, a stabilized approach provides the
following benefits:
• More time and attention are available for the
Parameter Callout Criteria monitoring of ATC communications, weather
conditions, systems operation;
• Short outbound leg or short down-wind leg • Full approach flown at idle down to touchdown,
(e.g., in case of unidentified traffic in the area); because of excessive airspeed and/or altitude
early in the approach;
• Late takeover from automation (e.g., in case of
AP failing to capture the GS, usually due to crew • Steep approach (i.e., above desired flight path
failure to arm the approach mode); with excessive vertical speed up to
– 2200 ft/mn, flight path angle up to
• Premature or late descent due to absence of 15 % gradient / 9-degree slope);
positive FAF identification;
Steep approaches appear to be twice as frequent
as shallow approaches;
• Insufficient awareness of wind conditions:
Company’s Prevention Strategies and To provide the time availability and attention required
Personal Lines-of-defense for an effective monitoring and back-up, the following
should be avoided:
Company’s prevention strategies and personal lines-
of-defense to reduce the number of unstabilized • Late briefings;
approaches should: • Unnecessary radio calls (e.g., company calls);
• Identify and minimize the factors involved; • Unnecessary actions (e.g., use of ACARS); and,
• Provide recommendations for the early detection • Non-pertinent intra-cockpit conversations (i.e.,
and correction of unstabilized approaches. breaking the sterile-cockpit rule).
An agreed strategy should be defined for the • The timely use of speed brakes or the early
management of the descent, deceleration and extension of landing gear to correct
stabilisation (i.e., following the concepts of next an excessive altitude or an excessive airspeed;
targets and approach gate); • Extending the outbound leg or downwind leg.
This strategy will constitute a common objective
and reference for the PF and PNF.
An immediate go-around must be performed if: Throughout the entire flight a next target should be
• The approach is not stabilized when reaching the defined to stay ahead of the aircraft at all times.
minimum stabilization height; or,
The defined next target should be any required
• Any flight parameter exceeds the related combination of:
excessive-deviation criteria (other than • A position;
transiently) when below the minimum
stabilization height. • An altitude;
Regulatory references
• ICAO – Annex 6 – Operations of Aircraft, Part I –
International Commercial Air transport –
Aeroplanes, Appendix 2, 5.18, 5.19.
• ICAO – Procedures for Air navigation services –
Aircraft Operations (PANS -OPS, Doc 8168),
Volume I – Flight Procedures (particularly, Part IX
- Chapter 1 - Stabilized Approach – Parameters,
Elements of a Stabilized Approach and Go-
around Policy).
• ICAO – Preparation of an Operations Manual
(Doc 9376).
• FAA Document 8430.6A – Air Carrier Operation
Inspector Handbook – Chapter 7 – paragraph
951.d.(4).(f): procedures for altitude and vertical
speed monitoring.
• FAA Document 8400.10, stating that a sink rate
of greater than approximately 1000 ft/mn is
unacceptable below 1000 ft above airfield
elevation.
Other References
Planning and conducting a non-precision approach Almost 60 % of CFIT incidents and accidents occur
(NPA) is certainly the most challenging and during step-down non-precision approaches.
demanding part of a flight, this includes:
The constant-angle non-precision approach
• Decision making on strategies and options;
(CANPA) technique, described in this Briefing Note,
should be implemented and trained worldwide for
• Effective task-sharing; preventing CFIT and other approach-and-landing
accidents.
• Crew coordination (monitoring and callouts);
and,
Defining Non-Precision Approaches
• CFIT awareness (response to GPWS or
EGPWS / TAWS warning). A non-precision approach is an instrument approach
that does not incorporate vertical guidance
Various types of NPAs (also called non-ILS (i.e., not using a glide slope beam).
approaches) share common features but also
involve specific techniques, depending on the The navaid being used is therefore primarily used
navaid being used or on the strategy being adopted for lateral guidance.
for:
• Lateral and vertical guidance; Non-precision instrument approaches include the
use of the following navaids:
• Descending from the final approach fix (FAF)
down to the minimum descent altitude(height) • NDB, VOR, LOC-only, VOR-DME, LOC-DME,
MDA(H); and, LOC BCK CRS.
Note 1:
• Making the decision before or when reaching
the MDA(H). The LDA (LOC-type Directional Aid), SDF
(Simplified Directional Facility) and Circling
This Briefing Note describes the features common approaches share most of the features and
to all types of non-precision approaches and procedures applicable to other non-precision
the specific features of each individual type of approaches.
approach.
Note 2:
This Briefing Note highlights the technique of GPS approaches performed in overlay to a
constant-angle (constant-slope) non-precision conventional non-precision approach and
approach, as opposed to the traditional step-down RNAV/RNP approaches, with or without GPS
technique. PRIMARY, also share most of the strategies and
procedures described in this Briefing Note.
Figure 2
Visual Descent Point ( VDP ) Concept
Decision
✠
Limit
or,
FAF ( or FDF ) MAP
A non-precision approach may be conducted using Continuing the approach below the MDA(H) is
either: permitted only if at least one of the visual references
is distinctly visible and identifiable by the PF (refer to
• Lateral navigation guidance, with monitoring of
raw data; Briefing Note 7.3 - Acquisition of Visual
References).
or,
• Raw data only; The landing following a non-precision approach is
a visual and manual landing.
or,
• Raw data supported by the use of the flight path
vector (as available). Standard Operating Procedures
• Define the approach strategy for vertical • Confirm the timing from the FAF to the MAP (or
guidance: to the VDP) or confirm the DME distance
defining the VDP and/or MAP;
− Use of altitude hold and vertical speed
mode; • Confirm the navaids set-up (frequencies,
courses, and identification);
or,
• Compute the expected ground speed;
− Use of FMS vertical navigation mode, down
to the FAF (or beyond, as applicable, in • Confirm the published vertical speed for the final
accordance with the FCOM); descent segment or compute the target vertical
speed, based on the published approach glide
• Insert the desired runway, type of approach and path and anticipated ground speed; and,
STAR (from the database) in the FMS flight
• Confirm the use of the FD or of the flight path
plan;
vector (as applicable).
• Enter the descent and surface winds on the
appropriate FMS page, as applicable;
During Descent:
• Enter the landing configuration and wind
correction on the appropriate FMS page, as • Check FMS navigation accuracy:
applicable;
− Check that the FMS bearing/distance to a
• If the use of the vertical navigation mode is tuned VOR-DME and the RMI (ND) raw
authorized after the FAF, enter the MDA(H) on data agree within the criteria defined in the
the appropriate FMS page; SOPs and confirm strategies for lateral and
vertical guidance (i.e., FMS or selected
• Set-up navaids (identify, as required); and,
guidance).
• Plan the descent for reaching the IAF at the
prescribed altitude and planned airspeed.
Before reaching the IAF / Holding fix:
• Confirm the arrival minimum safe altitude − Check the FMS navigation accuracy level
(MSA); (e.g., R/I or HIGH or […], depending on the
FMS type and standard);
• Review the approach procedure (fixes, altitude
constraints and speed restrictions, required − Check ND for correct flight plan and for
navaids, etc); correct TO WPT;
• Review the approach vertical profile (step-down − Confirm the FMS NAV mode engagement
altitudes) and MDA (H); on FMA; and,
• Set/check the MDA (H) on the baro altimeter • Adjust the descent rate for reaching the IAF at
bug; the charted/prescribed altitude and planned
• Review the expected visual references airspeed;
(approach and runway lighting); • Establish the desired configuration and speed:
• Review the missed-approach procedure; − Clean configuration or slats extended; and,
• Adjust the weather radar gain and tilt, as − For a LOC or LOC- DME approach, set the
applicable, for optimum use of radar capability final approach course on the ILS course
(for weather avoidance and/or enhanced selector and arm the localizer mode,
horizontal situational awareness).
Different procedures may apply depending
on whether the desired ILS-DME is in the
FMS database or not.
Upon reaching the IAF or Holding fix:
• If FMS lateral navigation mode will be used
• Check and confirm the correct sequencing
beyond the IAF or holding fix, keep both NDs in
of the FMS flight plan:
MAP mode;
− The TO WPT should be the FAF;
• If selected heading or localizer mode will be
used to capture and track the final approach − If a TO WPT other than the FAF is
course: displayed on the ND, perform a DIR TO
[FAF].
− Set the PF ND to ARC mode or ROSE
mode: Note :
The PNF may keep the ND in MAP mode Ensuring the correct sequencing of the FMS
for situational awareness (i.e., with display flight plan is essential to be able
of speed and altitude constraints). to re-engage the NAV mode in case of
go-around,
• Select the holding EXIT prompt; in order to allow • Set landing flaps;
the correct sequencing of the FMS flight plan. • Set and establish the final approach speed;
• Set the GA altitude (if the GA altitude is the
Leaving the holding pattern: same as the FAF crossing altitude, set the GA
altitude only after initiating the final descent);
• If FMS lateral navigation mode is not used, use
the selected heading mode (or the track mode - • Perform the LANDING checklist;
as available) to intercept the final approach
course, as follows: • If use of FMS vertical navigation is not
authorized beyond the FAF, deselect the FMS
− For an NDB approach, set the final vertical navigation mode by selecting the altitude
approach course on the ILS course selector, hold or the vertical speed mode, as required;
this will set the ILS course pointer on the ND
and provide a course reference, • If V/S mode will be used after the FAF, set the
published or computed vertical speed and
− For a VOR or VOR-DME approach, set the course; and/or,
final approach course on the VOR course
selector but do not arm the VOR mode, • If flight path vector (FPV, as available) will be
used after the FAF set the published or
Capture and track the VOR course using computed flight path angle (FPA) and track.
the selected heading or track mode.
Approaching the FAF or the Final Descent Fix At MDA(H) / reaching the VDP :
(FDF)
• If adequate visual references are acquired :
Typically 0.3 nm to 0.2 nm before reaching the FAF
/ FDF (i.e., to begin the descent at the FAF / FDF, − Disconnect the AP and continue the
on an accurate profile): approach visually (the autothrottle/autothrust
should remain engaged in speed mode
• Engage the V/S mode and check V/S mode down to the retard point, as applicable).
engagement on FMA;
• If adequate visual references are not acquired :
• Set the published (or computed) vertical speed,
as a function of the ground speed; − Initiate a go-around; and,
− Overfly the MAP to ensure adequate
• Select FPV (as applicable); obstacle clearance and fly the published
missed-approach procedure (or follow ATC
• Start timing (as required); and, instructions).
• Inaccurate tracking of final approach course • Beginning the final descent at the exact final
when using the selected heading (or track) descent fix;
mode;
• Maintaining the correct flight path angle (and or
• Late aircraft configuration; vertical speed) during the final descent
segment;
• Final approach speed not stabilized at FAF;
• Acquiring and announcing visual references;
• Failure to account for prevailing head wind
component when computing the vertical speed • Calling the decision to land or go-around;
target for the final constant-angle descent
segment; • Not descending below the MDA(H) before
reaching the VDP;
• Incorrect identification of FAF (or final descent
fix); • Being prepared and minded to go-around.
Some variations exist in airline operating − This operating philosophy usually is referred
philosophies about task sharing for: to as Shared approach or Monitored
approach or Delegated handling approach.
• Acquisition of visual references;
• Conduct of landing; and,
Statistical data
• Conduct of go-around.
The lack of acquisition adequate visual references
Two operating philosophies are commonly used for or the loss of visual references is a frequent causal
task sharing during approach: factor in approach-and-landing accident; this
includes:
• PF-PNF task sharing:
• Descending below the MDA(H) or DA(H) without
− The task sharing for the acquisition of visual adequate visual references or having acquired
references depends on: incorrect visual references (e.g., a lighted area
! the type of approach (i.e., on the time in the airport vicinity, a taxiway or an other
available for the acquisition of visual runway);
references); and,
• Continuing the approach after the loss of visual
! the use of automation (i.e., on the level
references (e.g., because of a fast moving
of automation and redundancy);
rainshower or fog patch).
− The Airbus Industrie operating philosophy
and training philosophy promote a PF-PNF
task sharing with acquisition of visual CFIT awareness
references by:
During the final descent, PF and PNF should
! PNF, for non-precision and CAT I ILS
monitor the vertical flight path and lateral flight path,
approaches; and,
and should not descend below the charted minimum
! PF, for CAT II / CAT III ILS approaches. safe altitude before reaching the next descent fix
(i.e., a DME distance, locator or other reference).
For CAT II / CAT III operations, the
CAPT usually is the PF and only an
In IMC or at night, PF should respond immediately
automatic approach and landing is
to any GPWS warning or EGPWS / TAWS warning.
considered.
Defining Visual References When using external references, the available visual
cues must allow the pilot to assess the pitch attitude
When a low visibility approach is anticipated, and bank angle, the lateral position and heading, the
the approach briefing should include a thorough horizontal flight path (track) and vertical flight path
review of the approach light system (ALS) using the (flight path angle).
instrument approach chart and the airport chart.
After adequate visual references have been
Depending on the type of approach and prevailing acquired, to allow descending below the MDA(H) or
ceiling and visibility conditions, the lighting below the DA(H), the different elements of the
element(s) expected to be available at the first approach light system provide visual cues for:
visual contact should be discussed. • Assessing the aircraft position, drift angle and
distance to the touchdown zone; and,
Continuing the approach below the MDA(H) or
DA(H) is permitted only if at least one of the
• Perceiving any rate of change during the final
following visual references is distinctly visible and
phase of the approach.
identifiable (as detailed in the operator’s applicable
regulation):
• The approach light system (ALS): Acquisition of Visual References
− e.g., sequenced flashing lights, steady
The task sharing for acquisition of visual references
runway alignment lights, 1000 ft or 500 ft
and for monitoring the flight path and aircraft
cross bars;
systems varies depending on :
• The [runway] threshold; • The type of approach (i.e., criticality of time
available for acquiring the visual references);
The threshold markings; or, and,
The threshold lights;
• The level of automation being used :
• The runway end identification lights ( REIL );
− hand flying ( using FD );
• The visual approach slope indicator ( VASI or or,
PAPI );
− AP engaged (i.e. AP monitoring - single AP or
dual AP approach).
• The touchdown zone;
The touchdown zone markings; The formal announcement of visual references
The touchdown zone lights; or, should be limited to the runway or runway/airport
environment (although announcing the view of the
• The runway; ground may be considered).
The PF is engaged directly in either: In CAT III weather conditions, automatic landing
usually is mandatory.
• Hand-flying the airplane and following the FD
orders while monitoring instruments and navaids Consequently, the terms “visual references” do not
raw data, have the same meaning for CAT II and CAT III
or, approaches.
• Supervising the autopilot operation, being ready For CAT II approaches, having visual references
to take over if required. means being able to see to land (i.e., being able to
land manually).
The PNF therefore is responsible for progressively
acquiring and announcing the visual references For CAT III approaches, having visual references
while monitoring the flight progress and backing-up means being able to see to verify the aircraft
the PF. position.
The PNF scans alternatively inside and outside, The U.S. FAR 91.189 and the European JAR-OPS
announces flight-parameter deviations and 1.430 account for this interpretation in defining the
announces: minimum visual cues that must be available at the
DA(RA DH).
• “Visual“ (or whatever visual reference is in
sight), if adequate visual references are For CAT III with No DH, no visual cue is specified
available; or, but it is a recommended practice for the PF to look
• “One hundred above” then “Minimum“ (if no for visual references before touchdown; these visual
radio-altimeter autocallout is available), if cues are later used for monitoring the AP guidance
adequate visual references are not available. during the rollout phase.
CAT II / CAT III ILS approaches : The PNF must maintain instrument references
throughout the approach and landing (or go-around)
CAT II / CAT III ILS approaches are flown making to:
use of the automatic landing system. • Monitor the flight path and the instruments; and,
CAT II automatic approaches can be followed by • Be ready to call any flight-parameter excessive-
a manual landing (although the standard operating deviation or warning.
procedure is to use the autoland capability).
This task sharing can be summarized as follows: This sequence of actions and callouts usually
include the following:
• Regardless of who was the PF for the sector,
the F/O is always the PF for the approach; For the CAPT:
• The CAPT is PNF and monitors the approach • If visual references are acquired before or at
and the acquisition of the visual references; DA(H):
• When reaching the DA(H) or before, depending − Call Landing; and,
on the operator’s policy for CAT II / CAT III:
− Takeover controls (i.e., control wheel / side
− The F/O – PF calls Minimum; stick and throttle/thrust levers) and call I have
control or My controls, as per company
− If visual references are acquired, the CAPT SOPs;
calls Landing, takes over the controls
(i.e., flight controls and throttle levers) and • If visual references are not acquired at DA(H):
conduct the landing;
− Call Go-around, monitor and backup the F/O
− If visual references are not acquired, the during the go-around initiation and missed-
CAPT calls Go-around and the F/O initiates approach.
the go-around and flies the missed-approach.
For the F/O:
Whatever the decision, Landing or Go-around, • If CAPT calls Landing:
the F/O maintains instrument references for
the complete approach and landing (or go-around − Call You have control or Your controls, as per
and missed-approach). company’s SOPs;
− Continue monitoring instrument references;
Depending on the F/O experience, the above roles
can be reversed.
• If CAPT calls Go-around:
This task sharing eliminates the transition from − Initiate immediately the go-around and fly the
instrument flying to visual flying (and, in case of a missed-approach;
go-around, from semi-visual references back to
instrument flying) but involves a changeover of • If CAPT does not make any call or does not
controls at a late stage in the approach. takeover controls and throttle levers
(possible subtle incapacitation):
Depending on the airline’s operating philosophy, this
concept is applicable to: − Call “Go-around/Flaps” and initiate an
immediate go-around.
• CAT II / CAT III approaches only (for all other
approaches the PF is also the pilot-landing); or, The change of controls at a late stage of the
• All types of approaches (except automatic approach requires precise callouts and action
landings where the Captain resumes control gestures to prevent any misunderstanding and/or
earlier, typically from 1000 ft RA to 200 ft RA). delayed action.
Applicable callouts and actions should be recalled Low below glide path:
by the flight crew during the CAT II / CAT III briefing.
A shallow approach with high thrust, when being too
low, may result in a floating flare and a long landing.
Standard Operating Procedures
The crew should maintain level flight until the
The importance of task sharing and standards correct flight path is established.
callouts during the final phase of the approach
should be emphasized.
Lateral offset :
Standard calls for confirming the acquisition of
visual references vary from airline to airline. Determine an aiming point on the extended runway
centerline, approximately half the distance to
Visual or [acquired visual reference] usually is used the touchdown point and aim towards this point
if adequate visual references are available and if the while maintaining the correct glide path, airspeed
aircraft is correctly aligned and on the approach and thrust.
glide path, otherwise the callout Visual or [acquired
visual reference] is followed by an assessment of To prevent overshooting the runway centerline,
the lateral deviation or vertical deviation (offset). anticipate the alignment by beginning the final turn
shortly before crossing the extended inner runway
The PF (CAPT) determines whether the lateral edge line.
deviation or vertical deviation (offset position) can
be safely corrected and announces Continue (or
Landing) or Go-around. Loss Of Visual References below MDA(H)
or DA(H)
Recovery from Offset Position If loss of adequate visual references occurs when
below the MDA(H) or DA(H), an immediate go-
Recovery from a lateral deviation or vertical around must be initiated.
deviation (offset position) when going visual requires
careful control of the pitch attitude, bank angle and The U.S. FAR 91.175 and 121.189 state that each
power with reference to instruments to prevent crew pilot […] shall immediately execute an
spatial disorientation by visual illusions. appropriate missed-approach procedure […]
whenever [the conditions for operating below the
The PNF is responsible for monitoring authorized MDA [or DH] are not met.
the instruments and for calling any excessive
parameter-deviation from established criteria.
Summary of key points
Vertical deviation : During non-precision approaches and CAT I ILS
approaches, both the PF and PNF must acquire
High above glide path: the same – and correct – visual references.
The use of a high sink rate with low thrust, when During CAT II / CAT III ILS approaches and all
being too high, may result in landing short of the shared approaches, the F/O must remain headdown
runway or in a hard landing. to monitor flight instruments during the complete
approach and landing (and go-around).
The crew should establish the correct flight path, not
exceeding the maximum permissible sink rate
(usually 1000 ft/mn).
The following Briefing Notes can be reviewed to • U.S. National Transportation Safety Board
amplify and complement the above information: (NTSB) – Special Report NTSB-AAS-76-5 –
Special Study: Flight Crew Coordination
• 1.1 - Operating Philosophy - SOPs, Procedure in Air Carrier Instrument Landing
• 1.2 - Optimum Use of Automation, System Approach Accidents.
Regulatory references
• ICAO – Annex 6 – Operations of Aircraft - Part I
– International Commercial Air Transport –
Aeroplanes, 4.2.7, 4.4.1.
Accepting an ATC request for a visual approach or Visual Approaches account for:
requesting a visual an approach should be evaluated
• 30 % of all approach-and-landing accidents;
carefully against the following decision criteria:
• 40 % of fatal accidents.
• Ceiling and visibility conditions;
Visual approaches at night present a greater risk
• Darkness (or twilight);
exposure because of fewer visual cues and
a greater potential for visual illusions and spatial
• Weather activity:
disorientation.
− wind, turbulence;
Hazards associated with visual approaches and When selecting or accepting a visual approach
landings at night must be fully understood. at night, flight crew should be aware of
the surrounding terrain features and man-made
A visual approach at night should be considered only obstacles.
if:
In darkness, an unlighted hillside between a lighted
• Weather is suitable for flight under VFR; area and the runway threshold may prevent the flight
crew from correctly perceiving the rising terrain.
• A visual pattern or a published VISUAL approach
chart is available and used;
Objective:
• A pattern altitude is defined; and,
The objective of a visual approach is to conduct an
• Flight crew is familiar with airport hazards and approach:
obstructions (this includes the availability of
active NOTAMs). • Using visual references;
At night, when an instrument approach is available • Being stabilized by 500 ft above airfield elevation
(particularly an ILS approach) an instrument (or per company SOPs):
approach should be preferred to a visual approach, to
reduce the risk of accidents caused by visual - on a nominal 3-degree glide path;
illusions.
- in the landing configuration;
Visual illusions (e.g., black-hole effect) affect the
flight crew vertical and horizontal situational - at the final approach speed; and,
awareness, particularly during the base leg and when
turning final. - with aircraft and crew ready for landing.
If a precision approach is not available, selecting an If the aircraft is not stabilized at 500 ft above airfield
approach supported by a VASI or PAPI elevation or if the approach becomes unstable when
(as available) should be the preferred option. below 500 ft above airfield elevation, a go-around
must be initiated.
Visual approaches should be performed with During the final phase of the approach, it is
reference to either: recommended to disconnect the autopilot, clear the
• A published VISUAL approach chart for the flight director bars, keep the autothrottle/autothrust
intended runway; or, engaged in speed mode (at pilot’s discretion) and
select the flight path vector symbol (as available).
• The visual approach circuit pattern (altitude,
configuration and speed schedule) published in
the FCOM or QRH.
The FMS may be used to build the teardrop outbound Resist the tendency to fly a continuous closing-in
leg or the downwind leg, for enhanced horizontal turn towards the runway threshold.
situational awareness. Nevertheless, this should be
planned and prepared when setting Before turning final (depending on the distance to the
the FMS before reaching the top-of-descent. runway threshold), extend landing flaps and begin
reducing speed to the final approach speed.
As applicable, setup navaids for the instrument
approach associated with the landing runway Estimate the glide path angle to the runway threshold
(for monitoring and in case of loss of visual based on available visual cues
references). (e.g., VASI) or navaids data (ILS glide slope or
altitude/distance from touchdown zone, based on a
Brief (or rebrief) the key points of the visual approach typical 300-ft/nautical mile glide path).
and rebrief also the key points of the associated
instrument approach.
Note : GS deviation and VASI information are
Review and discuss the published missed-approach reliable only when within 30 degree from
procedure (if different from the IFR missed approach the final approach course.
procedure).
Do not exceed 30-degree bank angle when tuning
Extend slats and fly at the corresponding final.
maneuvering speed.
Anticipate the crosswind effect (as applicable) in
Barometric-altimeter bug and radio-altimeter DH may order to complete the turn being correctly established
be set (as per company’s SOPs) for enhanced terrain on the extended runway centerline with the required
awareness. drift correction.
In order to be lined-up on the final approach course Aim at being fully aligned (i.e., with wings level) and
and stabilized at 500 ft above airfield elevation, stabilized at the final approach speed by 500 ft above
intercept the final approach course at typically 3 nm airfield elevation (or per company SOPs).
from the runway threshold (time the outbound leg or
downwind leg accordingly, as a function of the Monitor ground speed variations (for windshear
prevailing airspeed and wind component). awareness) and perform altitude callouts and
excessive-parameter-deviation callouts as for an
Maintain typically 1500 ft above airfield elevation instrument approach.
(or the charted altitude) until starting the final descent
segment or turning base leg. Maintain visual scanning toward the aiming point
(typically, 1000 ft from the runway threshold) to avoid
Configure the aircraft as per the SOPs or circuit any tendency to inadvertently descend (“duck-under”)
pattern, typically aiming at turning base leg with below the final approach glide path (use the GS
approach flaps, landing gear down and ground deviation index or the VASI / PAPI, as available, for
spoilers armed. crosscheck).
The following factors often are involved in rushed and The following observations are typical of rushed or
unstabilized visual approaches: unstabilized visual approaches:
• Pressure of flight schedule (adopting shortcuts in
• Steep approach (i.e., high and fast, with
an attempt to make up for delay);
excessive rate of descent);
• Crew-induced or ATC-induced circumstances • Shallow approach (i.e., below desired glide path);
resulting in insufficient time or distance to plan
• GPWS activation :
and execute the approach;
- Mode 1 : SINK RATE;
• Excessive altitude or airspeed (i.e., inadequate
- Mode 2A : TERRAIN (less than full flaps);
energy management) early in the approach;
- Mode 2B : TERRAIN (full flaps);
• Too short downwind leg (circuit pattern), too short
outbound leg (teardrop pattern) or too close • Final-approach-course interception too close to
interception (direct base leg interception); the runway threshold because of an insufficient
outbound teardrop leg or downwind leg;
• Lack of awareness of tail wind and/or crosswind
• Laterally unstable final approach due to lack of
component or failure to account for prevailing
crosswind awareness and correction;
wind component;
• Excessive bank angle and maneuvering to
• Incorrect anticipation of aircraft deceleration capture the extended runway centerline
characteristics in level flight or on a 3-degree (overshoot) or to perform a side-step maneuver;
glide path;
• Unstabilized approach with late or no go-around
decision; and,
• Failure to recognize deviations or to remember
the excessive-parameter-deviation criteria; • Inadvertently descending below (“ducking-under”)
the 3-degree glide path.
• Belief that the aircraft will be stabilized at the
stabilization height or shortly thereafter;
Summary of Key Points
• PNF excessive confidence in the PF in achieving
a timely stabilization or reluctance to challenge The following key points should be discussed during
the PF; flight crews training for enhancing safe visual
approaches:
• PF and PNF excessive reliance on each other to
call excessive deviations or to call for • Assessing the company or personal exposure
a go-around; (i.e., operating environment);
• Visual illusions (e.g., black hole, runway slope, • Developing company prevention strategies and
off-airport light patterns such as brightly lighted personal lines-of-defense;
parking lots or streets);
• Weighing the time saved against the possible
• Inadvertent (unconscious) modification of the risk;
aircraft trajectory to maintain a constant
perception of visual references; and, • Awareness of and accounting for all weather
factors;
• Loss of ground, airport or runway vi sual
references, with both PF and PNF looking • Awareness of surrounding terrain and obstacles;
outside to reacquire visual references.
Regulatory References
• ICAO – Annex 4 – Chapter 12 – Visual Approach
Charts.
• FAA – AC 60-A – Pilot’s Spatial Disorientation.
• FAA – AIM – Pilot/Controller Glossary.
• FAR 91.175 – Takeoff and landing under IFR –
Loss of visual references.
• JAR-OPS 1 – Subpart E – 1.435 (a) (8) – Visual
approach.
Chapter 8
Landing Techniques
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
Runway excursions and overruns account for • Steady or gusting crosswind or tail wind
typically 20 % of all approach-and-landing component.
accidents.
Runway excursion or overrun events also have
been experienced with good weather and dry
Event % of Events runway conditions.
Runway excursion 8%
Factors Involved in Runway Excursions
Runway overrun 12 % Runway excursions often are the result of the
following operational factors and circumstances:
Table 1
Runway Excursions and Overruns Weather factors:
• Runway condition (wet or contaminated by
Landing overruns represent 80 % of all observed standing water, slush, snow or ice);
runway overrun events (i.e., including runway
overruns following a rejected takeoff). • Wind shear;
The following operational factors and circumstances • Long flare ( allowing the aircraft to float to bleed
are observed as recurring patterns, alone or in an excess-speed uses three times more runway
combination, in runway-overrun events: than decelerating on the ground );
• Late braking (or late takeover from autobrake • Define criteria and callouts for stabilized
system, when required); and, approach and define minimum stabilization
heights (approach gates) depending on weather
• Reduced braking efficiency while assuring conditions (i.e., IMC versus VMC);
directional control in crosswind conditions.
• Define task sharing and standard calls for final
approach and rollout phases; and,
Systems factors:
• Loss of pedal braking; or, • Incorporate a crew callout for runway length
remaining (e.g., xyz ft(m) runway remaining or
• Antiskid malfunction resulting in aquaplaning (as xyw ft(m) to go), in low visibility conditions,
evidenced by extensive spots on all affected based on:
tires). − runway-lighting color change;
− runway-distance-remaining markers (as
Prevention Strategies and Lines-of-Defense available); and/or,
− other available visual cues (such as runway
The following prevention strategies and lines-of- or taxiway intersections).
defense should be implemented to address the
factors involved in runway excursions and overruns:
Performance data:
Policies:
• Publish landing distances for various:
• Define policy and procedures to promote the − type of braking (i.e., pedal braking or
readiness and commitment to go-around if the autobrake); and,
conditions for a safe landing are not achieved.
− runway conditions; and,
(i.e., discouraging any attempt to rescue what is
likely to be an hazardous landing); • Provide flight crews with landing distance
corrections for runways featuring
• Define policy to ensure that inoperative brakes − downhill slope; and/or,
(“cold brakes”) are reported in the aircraft
logbook and accounted for in accordance with − high elevation.
the MEL;
Crew techniques:
• Define policy and procedures for rejected
landing (i.e., bounce recovery); • Publish procedures and provide training for
crosswind landing technique (i.e., crabbed
• Define policy and procedures prohibiting landing approach with wings-level);
beyond the published touchdown point (zone);
and, • Publish procedures and provide training for
decrab technique, depending on crosswind
• Define policy encouraging a firm touchdown component and runway condition (i.e., complete
when operating on a runway contaminated with decrab, partial decrab or absence of decrab);
standing water or slush.
• Publish procedures for optimum use of
autobrake system and thrust reversers on
contaminated runway;
• Rule applied for the combination of speed • Use of A/THR in SPD mode; or,
corrections.
• Autoland.
The final approach speed V APP can be determined Factors Affecting the Final Approach Speed
based on V REF or V LS, as follows:
The following speed corrections should are not be
V APP = V REF + Corrections added, only the highest speed correction should be
considered (unless otherwise stated in the
The speed corrections on V REF account for: applicable FCOM and QRH):
• Aircraft configuration ( CONF CORR ): • Wind correction;
− landing with less than full flaps; or, • Speed correction for ice accretion;
• Speed correction for the use of the A/THR in
− abnormal configuration; SPD mode or for autoland;
On some aircraft models, the WIND CORR can be When using the A/THR in SPD mode during the
entered on the appropriate FMS page. final approach, a 5-kt speed correction on V REF
should be added to account for the accuracy of the
autothrottle/autothrust system in maintaining the
Flaps configuration:
final approach target speed.
When several flap configurations are certified for
This speed correction ensures that a speed equal to
landing, the reference threshold speed (for the
or greater than V REF ( V LS ) is maintained at all
selected configuration) is defined as:
times down to 50 ft over the runway threshold.
V REF full flaps + ∆V REF.
CAT II / CAT III autoland:
In calm-wind conditions, in light-and-variable wind
conditions and in light turbulence conditions, For CAT II approaches using the A/THR in SPD
V REF + 5 kt is a typical target threshold speed. mode, CAT III approaches and autoland
approaches (regardless of weather conditions),
the 5-kt speed correction on V REF is required by
Abnormal configuration: certification.
System malfunctions (such as the loss of one
hydraulic system or the jamming of either slats or Ice accretion:
flaps) require a speed correction to restore:
• The stall margin (e.g., loss or jamming of slats When severe icing conditions are encountered,
and/or flaps); or, a 5-kt or 10-kt speed correction must be considered
to account for the accretion of ice on the unheated
• The controllability / maneuverability (e.g., loss of surfaces of the aircraft.
part of roll spoilers, V MCL limitation if
applicable).
Downburst / Windshear:
The speed corrections provided in the FCOM and
QRH take into account all the consequential effects Downburst / windshear conditions may be
associated with the primary malfunction anticipated based on;
(i.e. no combination of speed corrections is • Pilot’s reports from preceding aircraft;
required, unless otherwise stated and explained).
• Alerts issued by the airport low level windshear
The following rules are used to combine alert system (LLWAS); or,
the different types of speed corrections: • Data from a terminal Doppler weather radar
• When two malfunctions affect the stall margin, (TDWR).
both speed corrections are added;
When downburst / windshear conditions are
• When two malfunctions affect the controllability / anticipated the landing should be delayed or the
maneuverability , only the higher speed aircraft should divert to the destination alternate
correction is considered; airport.
• When one malfunction affects the stall margin
and the other one affects the controllability / If delayed landing or diversion is possible, a speed
maneuverability, then only the higher speed correction (usually up to 15 kt to 20 kt, based on the
correction is considered. anticipated windshear) is recommended.
These rules are provided herein for enhanced Landing with less than full flaps is recommended
understanding purposes only. to maximize the climb gradient capability; the final
approach speed should be adjusted accordingly.
Microbursts or other types of wind shear usually are The CONF CORR and WIND CORR are combined
characterized by a significant increase of the head according to the following rules (or as directed by
wind component preceding a sudden shift to a tail FCOM and QRH):
wind component.
• If the CONF CORR is equal to or greater than
When wind shear is anticipated the ground speed 20 kt, no WIND CORR is applied;
should be monitored closely for enhanced wind
shear awareness. • If the CONF CORR is lower than 20 kt, then the
CONF CORR + WIND CORR is limited to
To ensure an adequate energy margin, a minimum 20 kt.
ground speed should be maintained at all times.
The 5-kt speed correction for the use of
This minimum-ground-speed technique (known as autothrottle/autothrust and the 5-kt or 10-kt speed
GS mini) is implemented as follows: correction for ice accretion (as applicable) may be
disregarded if the other speed corrections exceed
• Conventional aircraft models: 5 kt.
− By adjusting manually the thrust to maintain
The above strategies allow distributing and
the GS not below V APP – 10 kt;
balancing the safety margins between the landing
speed and the landing distance.
• Fly-by-wire aircraft models:
− By selecting managed speed. Note :
Speed configuration corrections for autoland are not
When and How To Combine Speed discussed in this Briefing Note because in case of
Increments and Corrections ? system malfunction requiring a CONF CORR,
autoland usually is not permitted.
The different speed corrections are added or not in
order to equally distribute the safety margins related
to the following objectives: Summary of key points
• Stall margin; The data and rules provided in the FCOM and QRH
allow achieving a balanced distribution of safety
• Controllability / maneuverability; and, margins between:
Regulatory References
The actual landing distance is affected by various All Airbus aircraft models are certified for landing
operational factors; thus reducing the regulatory operation on runways not exceeding a mean downhill
margins, this includes: slope of 2%.
• Airfield elevation or low QNH condition The applicable operational regulation (JAR-OPS)
(i.e., increased ground speed); requires to account for the runway slope only when
• Runway profile (i.e., downhill slope); the downhill slope exceeds 2%.
• Runway condition (i.e., nature and depth of Therefore, the landing distance tables published in
contaminant; wet runway or runway the FCOM and QRH are applicable without correction
contaminated by standing water, slush, snow or within the certified envelope.
ice);
• Wind conditions (e.g., tailwind component); The following information is provided for enhanced
understanding only.
• Type of braking used (i.e., pedal braking or
autobrake, use of thrust reversers); The runway profile (i.e., downhill slope) affects the
• Anti-skid failure; landing distance without autobrake.
• Incremental addition of all speed corrections on A 1 % downhill slope increases the landing distance
the final approach speed; without autobrake by 2 % (factor 1.02).
• Deviation from the final approach speed;
When autobrake is used, the selected deceleration
• Landing techniques (i.e., height and speed at rate is achieved regardless of the runway slope.
threshold, thrust reduction and flare technique);
• Deviations from SOPs (e.g., failure to arm ground
spoilers); Runway conditions:
• MEL conditions (i.e., thrust reversers, brake unit, Runway contamination increases the rolling drag
anti-skid or ground spoilers inoperative); and, (i.e., the displacement drag) and the aerodynamic
• In-flight system malfunctions resulting in an drag (i.e., the impingement drag) but also decreases
increased final approach speed, or affecting the the braking efficiency.
lift-dumping or braking capability.
The following landing distance factors are typical on a
contaminated runway:
These factors are discussed hereafter and illustrated
in Figure 4.
Briefing Note 8.5 - Landing on Contaminated Runway At given gross weight ( GW ), any increment of or
provides expanded and illustrated information for deviation from V APP results in a corresponding
operation on runway contaminated with standing increase of energy ( ∆E ) such that:
water, slush, snow or ice.
∆E ( in % ) = 2 x ∆ VAPP ( in % )
Wind conditions:
The landing distance LD being a direct function of the
In accordance with certification requirements and energy E, the corresponding increase in landing
operational regulations, the published landing distance ( ∆LD ) can be expressed also as:
distance factors account for:
• 50 % of the head wind component; and,
∆LD ( in % ) = 2 x ∆ VAPP ( in % )
• 150 % of the tail wind component.
Note :
In pilot’s terms :
In case of gusting crosswind, a tailwind component
may exist but is not reported. This condition may be • a 10 % increase in final approach speed;
undetected and therefore be not accounted for. results in,
• a 20 % increase in landing distance.
Type of braking:
For example, a 5 % increase (excess) of the final Delaying the derotation (i.e., the nose landing gear
approach speed increases the landing distance by: touchdown) maintains a higher lift on main landing
gears for longer, resulting in less load on the main
landing gears and, hence, in less braking efficiency.
• 10 %, if a normal flare and touchdown is
performed (i.e., deceleration on the ground); This also delays the spin-up signal from the nose-
or, wheels; this signal is required for the optimum
operation of the anti-skid system.
• 30 %, if a long flare is performed
(i.e., deceleration while airborne).
MEL conditions:
Performing a power-on touchdown in an attempt to When operating under the provision of the MEL
lessen an excessive rate-of-descent or to smooth out for an item affecting the landing speed, the lift-
the touchdown results in: dumping or the braking capability, the applicable
landing speed correction and landing distance factor
• A long flare; and, must be accounted for.
• The inhibition of the automatic extension of
ground-spoilers.
Systems malfunctions:
This increases the risk of bouncing upon touchdown
and of a subsequent hard landing. System malfunctions, such as an hydraulic system
low pres sure, may result in multiple effects on the
landing speed and landing distance, such as:
Ground spoiler not armed:
• Landing speed correction due to slats or flaps
Failure to arm the ground spoilers (usually in inoperative (i.e., restoring the stall margin);
conjunction with thrust reversers being inoperative) is
frequently a causal factor in runway overruns. • Landing speed correction due to loss of roll
spoilers (i.e., restoring the maneuverability);
The ground spoilers extend automatically when
reverse thrust is selected (regardless of whether the • Landing distance factor due to loss of ground
ground spoilers are armed or not); this design feature spoilers (i.e., loss of lift dumping capability); and,
must not be relied upon for extension of ground
spoilers. Ground spoilers must be armed per SOPs. • Landing distance factor due to loss of normal
braking system (i.e., reduced braking capability).
Failure to arm the ground spoilers results in a typical
landing distance factor of 1.3 (1.4 if thrust reversers The FCOM and QRH provide the applicable final
are inoperative). approach speed corrections and landing distance
factors for all malfunctions (including their
The automatic extension of ground spoilers should be consequential effects).
monitored and announced by calling Ground Spoilers
or No Spoilers.
The landing distance factors provided in the FCOM When assessing the landing distance, the following
and QRH take into account all the consequential factors should be accounted for and combined, as
effects associated with the primary malfunction. specified in the applicable FCOM / QRH:
• A reduced lift-dumping or braking capability (e.g., • Runway slope (i.e., if down hill);
because of a failure affecting ground spoilers,
anti-skid or brakes). • Runway condition (i.e., nature and depth of
contaminant); and,
Briefing Note 8.2 - The Final Approach Speed
provides the rules used for the combination of landing • Use of braking devices (e.g., thrust reversers,
speed corrections. autobrake).
Reference
( no reverse )
1000 ft elevation
10 kt tail wind
V Approach + 10 kt
100 ft at threshold
Long flare
No ground spoilers
Wet runway
Compacted snow
Icy runway
Regulatory References
To ensure an optimum use of braking devices, The following braking devices are used to
the following aspects must be understood: decelerate the aircraft and bring it to a complete
stop:
• Design and operation of each braking device
(i.e., ground spoilers, brakes and thrust • Ground spoilers;
reversers);
• Wheel brakes (including anti-skid and autobrake
• Distribution of stopping forces during landing systems); and,
roll;
• Thrust reverser system.
• Type of braking required to achieve a desired
stopping distance;
Ground spoilers:
• Factors affecting the optimum use of braking
devices; and, Ground spoilers deploy automatically upon main
landing gear touchdown (if armed) or upon selection
• Applicable operational guidelines. of the thrust reversers.
Slowed or delayed braking action was a causal • Lift dumping, which increases the load on the
factor in 45 % of these events. wheels and increases the wheel-brakes
efficiency.
Landing overruns represent 80 % of all observed
overrun events (i.e., including runway overruns
following a rejected takeoff).
130 % Drag
Increase from
Ground Spoilers
Figure 1
Maximizing Weight-on-Wheels and Aerodynamic Drag
Wheel brakes:
•
80
Aircraft speed;
70
locked wheel); 50
•
40
Runway condition (i.e., nature and depth of
30
contaminant);
20
surface); 0
0 5 8 10 15 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
• The load applied on the wheel (i.e., the friction Free rolling wheel
Slip Ratio ( % )
Locked wheel
Anti-skid systems are designed to maintain the With anti-skid operative, full pedal braking results in
wheel skidding factor (also called the slip ratio) a deceleration rate of 8 knots-per-second to
close to the point providing the maximum friction 10 knots-per-second on a dry runway.
force, approximately 10 % on a scale going from
0 % (free rolling) to 100 % (locked wheel), as
illustrated by Figure 2.
Autobrake System:
Understanding a Typical Landing Roll The resulting total stopping force ( red curve ) is the
combined effect of:
Figure 3 illustrates a typical landing roll and shows • Aerodynamic drag ( green curve );
the contribution of the different deceleration forces
to the total stopping force, as a function of • Reverse thrust ( blue curve ); and,
decelerating airspeed (i.e., from touchdown speed
to taxi speed). • Rolling drag ( purple curve ).
The ground spoilers are armed and the autobrake During the initial landing roll, the total stopping force
system is selected with the LOW mode (i.e., for time already exceeds the autobrake demand.
delayed brake application).
Autobrake activation is, thus, inhibited:
The autobrake demand in LOW mode (typically a • as long as the total stopping force exceeds the
3 knots-per-second constant deceleration-rate) is autobrake demand; or,
equivalent, at given gross weight, to a constant
stopping force ( pink dotted line ). • until the autobrake time delay has elapsed.
At touchdown, the ground spoilers automatically As airspeed decreases, the total stopping force
extend and the thrust reversers are selected with decreases because of a corresponding decrease in:
the maximum reverse thrust. • aerodynamic drag; and,
• reverse thrust (i.e., decreasing reverse
efficiency).
Typical Decelerating Forces during Landing Roll When the total stopping force becomes
lower than the autobrake demand (or when
the autobrake time delay has elapsed)
Stopping Force the wheel brakes begin contributing to the
Autobrake LOW Mode
total deceleration and stopping force.
Total Stopping Force
How do Ground Spoilers, Thrust Reversers Figure 4 provides the following information:
and Brakes Contribute to Stop the Aircraft? • For a given braking mode (i.e., pedal braking or
autobrake mode):
Figure 4 illustrates the respective contributions of
the different braking devices to the total stopping − Achieved stopping distance ( landing roll );
energy, as a function of the achieved or desired
stopping distance. • For a desired or required stopping distance:
− Required type of braking (e.g., pedal
braking or autobrake mode).
60
Autobrake LOW
50 ( typically 3 kt/s ) Aerodynamic Drag
30
20
Figure 4
The following factors often are involved in runway Strict adherence to the following operational
excursions (i.e., aircraft veering off the runway or standards and guidelines ensures optimum braking
taxiway), or in runway overruns: during the landing roll:
Regulatory References
Factors associated with landing on a wet runway or A runway is considered damp “when the surface is
on a runway contaminated with standing water, not dry, but when the moisture on the surface does
slush, snow or ice should be assessed carefully not give a shiny appearance”.
before beginning the approach.
Wet runway:
This Briefing Note provides an overview and
discussion of operational factors involved in A runway is considered to be wet “when the surface
planning and conducting a landing on a wet or is covered with water, or equivalent, not exceeding
contaminated runway. 3 mm - or when there is sufficient moisture on the
runway surface to cause it to appear reflective
(shiny) - but without significant areas of standing
Statistical Data water”.
The presence of fluid contaminant (i.e., standing Main-wheels and nose-wheels equally can be
water, slush or loose snow) or hard contaminant affected by hydroplaning, thus affecting the braking
(i.e., compacted snow or ice) on the runway performance and the effectiveness of the nose-
adversely affects the braking performance (stopping wheel-steering.
force) by:
Hydroplaning always occurs in some degree when
• Reducing the friction force between the tires and operating on a fluid-contaminated runway.
the runway surface.
The reduction of friction force depends on the The potential for severe hydroplaning directly
following factors: depends on the following factors:
− tire tread condition (wear) and inflation • Absence of runway surface roughness and
pressure; drainage (e.g., transverse saw-cut grooves);
− type of runway surface; and, • Thickness and nature (e.g., water or slush)
of the fluid contaminant layer;
− anti-skid system performance.
• Tire inflation pressure;
• Creating a fluid layer between the tires and • Ground speed; and,
the runway surface, thus reducing the contact
area and creating a risk of hydroplaning • Antiskid operation (e.g., locked-wheel case).
(i.e., complete loss of contact and friction
between the tires and the runway surface). A minimum hydroplaning speed can be defined for
each aircraft type and runway contaminant.
Fluid contaminants (such as standing water, slush
or loose snow) also positively contribute to the Hydroplaning may occur at touchdown, preventing
stopping force at landing by: the wheels from spinning and from sending the
wheel-rotation-signal to various aircraft systems.
• Resisting to the wheels forward movement, thus
causing a displacement drag; Performing a firm touchdown can prevent
hydroplaning at touchdown and ensure rotation of
• Creating a spray pattern that strikes the landing main-landing-gear wheels.
gears and airframe, thus causing an
impingement drag.
Directional control:
Certification regulations require the spray
pattern to be diverted away from engine air On contaminated runway, directional control should
inlets to prevent affecting engine performance. be maintained using rudder pedals (do not use
nose-wheel-steering tiller until aircraft has slowed
The braking action is the net effect of the above down to taxi speed).
stopping forces (as illustrated by Figure 1 and
Figure 2). On wet or contaminated runway, use of nose-wheel-
steering above taxi speed may result in
hydroplaning of nose-wheels, hence in loss of nose-
Hydroplaning (aquaplaning): wheels cornering force and, thus, in loss of
directional control.
Hydroplaning occurs when the tire cannot squeeze
any more of the fluid contaminant layer between its If differential braking is necessary, pedal braking
tread and the runway surface; the tire lifts from the should be applied on the required side and be
runway surface and surfs the wave of water. completely released on the opposite side, to regain
tire cornering.
Briefing Note 8.7 - Crosswind Landing provides Understanding Stopping Forces during
expanded information on directional control under Landing Roll
crosswind conditions.
• The use of full pedal braking beginning at • Braking and rolling drag, including the
touchdown; and, displacement drag ( red curve ).
• Wind component:
− Typically, + 10 % per 5 kt tailwind component; Aerodynamic Drag
Autobrake Demand
Figure 1
60
Aerodynamic Drag
50
40
Maximum Reverse Thrust
30
20
10
Braking and Rolling Drag
0
1000 2000 3000 4000
Figure 2
ter
ter
Ice
w
t
We
Dr
•
no
slu
slu
wa
wa
in
in
in
te
1/4
1/2
1/4
1/2
ac
and,
Runway condition
• Runway condition (i.e., contribution of
Figure 3 contaminant to the deceleration rate).
( Typical )
Effect of Thrust Reverser
ow
sn
landing on dry runway with full pedal braking and no
te r
te r
ed
sh
sh
wa
wa
s lu
s lu
ct
reverse ).
pa
in
in
in
in
m
t
y
We
1 /4
1 /2
1 /4
1 /2
Ic e
Co
Dr
0
For each runway condition, the following landing
Landing Distance Reduction (%)
On dry or wet runway, the effect of thrust reverser • Aiming for the touchdown zone;
on landing distance depends on the selected
autobrake mode (i.e., selected deceleration rate) • Performing a firm touchdown (to prevent
and associated time-delay (e.g., medium autobrake hydroplaning and ensure rotation of main
mode without time delay versus low autobrake landing gear wheels);
mode with time delay), as illustrated by Figure 1 • Using maximum reverse thrust as soon as
and Figure 4. possible after touchdown (because thrust
reverser efficiency is higher at high speed);
• Confirm the extension of ground spoilers;
Operational Guidelines
• Monitoring the operation of autobrake (on
The operational guidelines provide in Briefing Note contaminated runway, the selected deceleration
rate may not be achieved, therefore the light
8.4 - Optimum Use of Braking Devices, for
indicating that the selected deceleration rate is
operation on dry runway, are fully applicable when achieved may not illuminate);
operating on a wet runway or on a runway
contaminated with standing water, slush, snow or • Lowering the nose landing gear without undue
ice. delay to:
The following operational recommendations need to − increase the weight-on-wheels and, thus,
be emphasized: increase the braking efficiency; and,
• Diversion to an airport with better runway − activate systems associated with nose
conditions and/or less crosswind component, landing gear switches (e.g., anti-skid
when actual conditions significantly differ from reference speed);
forecast conditions or in case of system • As required, or when taking over from
malfunction; autobrake, applying brakes normally with a
• Anticipating asymmetry effects that would steady pressure;
prevent efficient braking or directional control • Using rudder pedals and differential braking, as
(e.g., crosswind, single-thrust-reverser required, for directional control (i.e., not using
operation); the nose-wheel-steering tiller);
• Avoiding landing on a contaminated runway • If differential braking is necessary, applying
without antiskid or with a single thrust reverser. pedal braking on the required side and releasing
• For inoperative items affecting the braking or lift completely the pedal action on the opposite
dumping capability, referring to the applicable: side; and,
− FCOM and QRH, for in-flight malfunctions, • After reaching taxi speed, using nose-wheel-
or, steering with care.
Regulatory references
Several sources of wind information are available to Wind direction and velocity are sampled every
the flight crew: second.
• ATC (i.e., METAR, ATIS and tower winds); and, The wind profile is averaged over the last
• Aircraft systems (i.e. IRS and FMS winds). 2-minute period to provide the ATIS or tower-
reported average-wind.
Each wind information must be understood for
appropriate use during various flight phases. The average wind is available to the controller on
a display terminal ( some control towers, however,
can also provide instantaneous indications of wind
Statistical Data direction and velocity ).
Adverse wind conditions (i.e., tail wind component, The wind profile is also observed over the last
high crosswind component, wind gustiness or low 10-minute period, the maximum ( peak ) wind value
level wind shear) are involved in more than 30 % recorded during this period defines the gust value.
of landing incidents and accidents.
ICAO considers that the wind is gusty only if the
Because wind sensors often are distant from 10-minute peak value exceeds the 2-minute
the touchdown zone, wind conditions at touchdown average-wind by 10 kt or more, however gust values
frequently differ from conditions reported by ATC. lower than 10 kt often are provided by airport
weather services.
Recommendations for measuring and reporting • A 2-minute average wind of 15kt; and,
wind information are defined by the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and: • A 10-minute gust of 10 kt (i.e., a 25 kt peak wind
velocity during the 10-minute period).
• Relayed to the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO); Note:
The ATIS and tower winds are referenced to the
• Implemented by the member states’ National magnetic north (unless all airport directions are
Weather Services (NWS);
referenced to the true north, for example in regions
with large magnetic variation).
• Through the local Airport Weather Services
(AWS).
20
If the wind peak value is observed during the last
2-minute period, the gust becomes part of the Average
Wind 15
average wind, as illustrated by Figure 2.
10
Wind ( kt )
5
25
0
Average
Wind 20 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
15 Minutes
5 Figure 3
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Maximum Demonstrated Crosswind
Minutes The maximum demonstrated crosswind, published
in the Performance section of the approved
Wind 20 kt Gusting 25 kt ( * )
Airplane Flight Manual (AFM), is the maximum
crosswind component that has been encountered
Figure 2 and documented during certification flight tests or
subsequently.
( * ) : or no reference to gust if the 5-kt gust is not The wind value is recorded during a period
accounted for. bracketing the touchdown time ( typically from
100 ft above airfield elevation down to taxi speed ).
For some aircraft models, if a significant gust could Factors Affecting Crosswind Capability
be recorded during this period, a demonstrated gust
value is also published in the AFM and FCOM. The following factors, runway conditions or
configurations affect the crosswind capability:
The maximum demonstrated crosswind:
• Runway condition (i.e., nature and depth of
• Is not an operating limitation; contaminant);
• Does not necessarily reflect the aircraft • Systems malfunctions (e.g., rudder jam); or,
maximum crosswind capability; and,
• MEL conditions (e.g. nose wheel steering
• Generally applies to a steady wind. inoperative).
• Roll control authority; and, Depending on the wind source, different time delays
are applied for smoothing (i.e., averaging) the wind
value.
• Wheel-cornering capability.
The wind information on the ND is refreshed The IRS wind is computed and transmitted to the
typically 10 times per second. aircraft electronic flight instrument system (EFIS) for
display on the navigation display (ND) typically
10 times per second.
(Typical display)
The FMS wind cannot be considered as
an instantaneous wind but, nevertheless, the FMS
wind is:
IRS Wind • A more recent wind information than the ATIS or
tower average wind; and,
The IRS wind is assessed geometrically using the
triangle consisting of the true air speed (TAS) • The wind prevailing along the aircraft flight path
vector, ground speed (GS) vector and wind vector. (aft of the aircraft).
− velocity: GS from IRS; The ATIS message is updated only if the wind
− direction: magnetic track from IRS. direction changes by more than 30-degree or if the
wind velocity changes by more than 5-kt over
a 5-minute time period.
Regulatory References
Crosswind Landings
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AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
Note 2 :
Runway covered with slush.
Note 3 :
Runway covered with dry snow.
Note 4 :
Runway covered with standing water, with risk of
hydroplaning, or with wet snow.
Note 5 :
Runway with high risk of hydroplaning.
Crosswind Landings
Page 2
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
Airframe manufacturers consider the following factors • Bank angle at a given crab angle or crab angle at
when recommending a wings-level or a steady-side- a given bank angle:
slip approach :
− The graph provides the bank angle / crab
angle relationship required to correct the drift
• Aircraft geometry (i.e., pitch attitude and bank
and track the runway centerline at the final
angle limits for preventing tail strike, engine
approach speed ( V APP ) in a steady -side-slip
nacelle contact or wingtip contact);
condition.
• Ailerons (roll) and rudder (yaw) authority; and, Positive crab angles reflect normal drift
corrections and sideslip conditions (i.e., with
• Crosswind component. the aircraft pointing into wind).
Negative crab angles result from an excessive
rudder correction (i.e., aircraft pointing away
Flare Technique from wind direction) and require a more-than-
desired bank angle to maintain a steady-
Approaching the flare point with wings-level and with sideslip.
a crab angle, as required for drift correction, three
flare techniques are possible (depending on runway
condition, crosswind component and company • Aircraft geometry limitation :
SOPs): − This limitation reflects the maximum pitch
attitude and/or bank angle that can be
• Align the aircraft with the runway centerline, while achieved without incurring a tail strike or
preventing drifting sideways, by applying into- scrapping the engine nacelle, the flaps or
wind aileron and opposite rudder (cross-controls); the wingtip (as applicable).
• Perform a partial decrab, using the cross-controls • Ailerons / rudder authority :
technique to continue tracking the runway
centerline; or, − This limitation reflects the aircraft maximum
capability to maintain a steady -sideslip under
• Maintain the crab angle, for drift correction, until crosswind conditions.
main-landing-gear touchdown.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 assume that the approach is
stabilized and that the flare is performed at a normal
Understanding Crosswind Landing height and with a normal pitch rate.
Limitations
These figures may not be available and published for
The following discussion of flight dynamics can all aircraft types and models, but all aircraft are
provide an increased understanding of the various subject to the same basic laws of flight dynamics
crosswind landing techniques (i.e., final approach, that these figures reflect.
flare and align phases):
Geometry limits usually are not a concern in high
Crosswind landing capability – Design factors crosswinds as the roll and rudder authority is
reached before any aircraft-to-ground contact occurs.
Figures 2 and Figure 3 illustrate the limitations
involved in crosswind landing (for a given steady This assumes achieving a steady sideslip without
crosswind component). overcontrol (i.e., without excessive rudder and roll
inputs) during the decrab / align phase.
Crosswind Landings
Page 3
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
16
14
12
10
4
X
0 Degree Bank-Angle
2 2 Degree
0 AX 4 Degree
-2 6 Degree
-4 8 Degree
-6 10 Degree
-8 12 Degree
-10
-12
-14
115 120 130 140 150 160
V APP
Indicated Airspeed (kt)
Figure 2
16
10 0 Degree Bank-Angle
2 Degree
8
4 Degree
6
Crab Angle (Degree)
6 Degree
4 C X
8 Degree
2
10 Degree
0 AX XD
12 Degree
-2
-4
-6
-8
-10
-12
-14
115 120 130 140 150 160
V APP
Indicated Airspeed (kt)
Figure 3
Crosswind Landings
Page 4
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
Figure 2 shows that with a 10 kt steady crosswind Operational recommendations and handling
component: techniques
• Achieving a steady sideslip landing (i.e., with
zero crab angle) requires only a 3-degree Figure 2 and Figure 3 shows that:
into-wing bank angle ( point A plotted on the
• With low crosswind ( typically up to 15 kt to 20
graph ); or,
kt crosswind component ), a safe crosswind
landing (i.e., flare and touchdown) can be
• Achieving a wings level touchdown (i.e., with no
performed with either:
decrab) only requires a 4-degree to 5-degree crab
angle at touchdown ( point B ). − A steady-sideslip (i.e., no crab angle); or,
− Wings-level, with no decrab prior to
A steady-sideslip landing can be performed safely
touchdown.
(i.e., while retaining significant margins relative to
geometry or roll / rudder limits).
• With higher crosswind ( typically above 15 kt to
20 kt crosswind component ), a safe crosswind
Figure 3 shows that with a 30 kt steady crosswind
landing requires:
component:
− a crabbed-approach; and,
• Achieving a steady-sideslip landing (i.e., with
zero crab angle) requires nearly a 9-degree into- − a partial decrab prior to touchdown, using
wind bank angle, placing the aircraft closer to its a combination of bank angle and crab angle
geometry and roll /r udder limits ( point A on the (achieved by applying cross-controls).
graph ); or,
On most Airbus models, this requires touching
down with:
• Achieving a wings-level touchdown (i.e., with no
decrab) would result in a 13-degree crab angle at − 5 degrees of crab angle; and,
touchdown, potentially resulting in landing gear
− 5 degrees of bank angle.
damage ( point B ).
Crosswind Landings
Page 5
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
− Tire-cornering forces. 80
70
60
Force ( % )
Braking Force
50
Cornering Force
40
30
20
10
0
0 5 8 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Free rolling wheel
Slip Ratio ( % )
Crosswind Landings
Page 6
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
Transient effects such as the distortion of the tire Effect of Fuselage and Fin Side Force
thread ( caused by any yawing movement of the
wheel ) or the activation of the anti-skid system As the aircraft touches down, the side force created
affect the tire-cornering and wheel-braking forces ( by the crosswind component on the fuselage and fin
in both magnitude and direction ) and, thus, affect tends to make the aircraft skid sideways (downwind)
the overall balance of friction forces. off the centerline, as illustrated by Figure 6.
When touching down with some crab angle on a dry • A stopping force aligned along the aircraft
runway, the aircraft automatically realigns with the direction of travel (runway centerline); and,
direction of travel down the runway. • A side force, perpendicular to the runway
centerline, which further increases the tendency
On a contaminated runway, the aircraft tends to to skid sideways.
travel along the runway centerline with the existing
crab angle.
Crosswind
component
Figure 6
Directional Control during Crosswind Landing
Crosswind Landings
Page 7
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
The thrust reverser effect decreases with decreasing Maintaining / Regaining Directional Control
airspeed.
The higher the wheel/tire braking force, the lower the
As airspeed decreases, the rudder efficiency tire-cornering force; therefore, if the aircraft tends to
decreases and is further affected by the airflow skid sideways, releasing the brakes
disruption created in the wake of the engine reverse (i.e., by taking over from the autobrake) increases the
flow, possibly resulting in difficulties to maintain tire-cornering and contributes to maintaining or
directional control. regaining directional control.
Crosswind Landings
Page 8
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE Getting to Grips with
Flight Operations Support Approach-and-Landing Accidents Reduction
Crosswind Landings
Page 9