VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, Petitioner, v. CITY OF CEBU, T.C. (TITO) decision of the RTC declaring the Ordinance No.
declaring the Ordinance No. 1664 valid.
SAYSON AND RICARDO HAPITAN,Respondents.
FACTS:
On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted
Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize
any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in the
Traffic Code of Cebu City.
On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban,Sr.) and his son Atty. Bienvenido
Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban,Jr.) brought suit in the RTC against the City of
Cebu, then represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cebu City and its Presiding Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osme, and the
chairman and operatives or officers of the City Traffic Operations Management
(CITOM),seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for
being in violation of due process and for being contrary to law, and damages.
Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked his car
in a paying parking area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain records and
documents from his office and after less than 10 minutes, he had found his car being
immobilized by a steel clamp. His car was impounded for three days, and was
informed at the office of the CITOM that he had first to pay P4,200.00 as a fine to
the City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car but such imposition the fine
was without any court hearing and without due process of law. He was also
compelled to payP1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00 for the clamping andP1,000.00 for
the violation) without any court hearing and final judgment;
That on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very secluded place where there
was no sign prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized by CITOM operative
and that he was compelled to pay the total sum ofP1,400.00 for the release of his car
without a court hearing and a final judgment rendered by a court of justice.
On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the City
of Cebu, demanded the delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of
theTraffic Code of Cebu City, and damages.
He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had left his car occupying a
portion of the sidewalk and the street outside the gate of his house to make way for
the vehicle of theanayexterminator, upon returning outside, his car was towed by the
group even if it was not obstructing the flow of traffic.
The cases were consolidated. The RTC rendered its decision declaring Ordinance
No. 1664 as null and void
The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the
Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration the Jabans and
Legaspi came to the Court via separate petitions for review on certiorari. The appeals
were consolidated.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 1664 is valid and constitutional.
HELD: The Court of Appeals decision is sustained.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Tests for a valid ordinance
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005the Court restates
the tests of a valid ordinance thusly:
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive;(3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must
not be unreasonable.
As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the
ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was
passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e.,
involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations
under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness
and reason, and its consistency with public policy).
InMetropolitan Manila Development Authorityv. Bel-Air Village Association,Inc.,
G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000the Court cogently observed that police power is
lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or
body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature,
however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well
as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once
delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on
them by the national lawmaking body. (emphasis supplied)
In the present case, delegated police power was exercised by the LGU of the City of
Cebu.
The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the
legislative power to enact traffic rules and regulations was expressly done through
Section 458 of the LGC, and also generally by virtue of the General Welfare Clause
embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with
utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of
the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as
its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the
respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those
forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be
adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic
validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and
property.
Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of law,
the contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny
review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality
by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well
as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public
policy.
The subject of Ordinance No. 1664 is to ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in
all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times".
To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable
way to enforce the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors
would evade liability by simply driving away. DENIED.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION
G.R. No. L-139465 January 18, 2000
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
Facts:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The Department of Justice received a request from the Department of Foreign
Affairs for the extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury
Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said
extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the
technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found
having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all
the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time
to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on the following grounds:
1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the
evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether
the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069 Philippine
Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied
with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is
not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the
information in the documents.
3. The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection
with an extradition request, as Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on
law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.
Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding
Judge Lantion favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the
requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings. Thus, this petition is
now at bar.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine
Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
Discussions:
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted
with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international
law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be
done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable
and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts.
The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Ruling/s:
No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by
a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve
preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the
government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of
binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law
incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001
FACTS: Sectio n 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing
the Crime ofPlunder) as amended b y R.A. No. 7659 substantially
provides that any p ublic officer who amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt orc r i m i n a l a c t s i n
the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty
m i l l i o n p e s o s (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada,being prosecuted under the said Act,
assailed its constitutionality, arguing inter alia, that it abolishes the
element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code;and as such, a violatio n o f the fund amental rights o f the accused
to d ue p rocess and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080
is a malum prohibitum.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in se which requires
proof of criminal intent. Moreover, the legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659
that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a mala in se. The predicate
crimes in the case of plunder involve acts which are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, and are committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally” b y
the o ffend er, alleging his guilty kno wled ge. Thus, the crime o f
p lund er is a malum in se.
Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA
470 (2007)
Facts
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest
were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was
upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the
extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by
the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting
the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent
judge subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby
undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and
will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will
further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will
be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its
own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition
proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or
if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they
further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real
and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused
flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and
that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent
judge. Hence, this instant petition.
Issue
WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail.
Ruling
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

Ratio Decidendi

Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a
right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed
under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a
harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of
America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch
42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April
2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition
proceedings, the same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took
cognizance of the following trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;

(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;

(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and

(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to

the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from
the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.