TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 1
Mr. Reyes is not entitled for a claim of damages.
TORTS AND DAMAGES
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY
LIM, petitioners
vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. AMAY
BISAYA, respondent.
Facts:
The cause of action before the trial court was one for
damages brought under the human relations provisions
of the New Civil Code. Roberto Reyes, more popularly
known by the screen name Amay Bisaya, alleged that at
around 6:00 oclock in the evening of 13 October 1994,
while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,
he was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta
Filart, who then approached him. Mrs. Filart invited him
to join her in a party at the hotels penthouse in
celebration of the natal day of the hotels manager, Mr.
Masakazu Tsuruoka. Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch
for him for which she replied: of course. Mr. Reyes then
went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket
of fruits which was the latters present for the celebrant
After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was
ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his
great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped
by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak
for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof. In a loud
voice and within the presence and hearing of the other
guests who were making a queue at the buffet table,
Ruby Lim told him to leave the party (huwag ka nang
kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang). ]Mr.
Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart
who was within hearing distance, however, completely
ignored him thus adding to his shame and
humiliation. Not long after, while he was still recovering
from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman
approached and asked him to step out of the hotel. For
the part of the Executive Secretary she pose the
following narrations “When Mr. Reyes went to a corner
and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and
said: alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total
nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo
at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo. She
then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show
enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began
screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened
to dump food on her”.
Issue:
Wheter or not Mr. Reyes’ right was violated and thus
entitles him for damages.
Held:
The facts disclosed that the Executive Secretary
approach Mr. Reyes to tell the latter that he has to leave
the place because the celebrant wishes that the visitors
are just his family and very close friends which the
herein petitioner does not belong to.
The humiliation and shame that the petitioner have felt is
due to his very actions of shouting after he was informed
to leave the place. The doctrine of Volenti Non Fit
Injuria is applicable in this case, such that, to the willing
person no injury was made. It was out of the invitation
of the other not the celebrant himself that the petitioner
rely upon and that it was because of his act of shouting
that made him be humiliated in the said occasion. For a
willing person and knowledgeable of the consequences
that may arise but opted to do the act no injury was
sustained as it is freely, voluntarily and willingly made.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH
Vs.
Court of Appeals
Facts:
The private respondent is twenty-two (22) years old,
single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character
and reputation duly respected in her community;
petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen
residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan
City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course
at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City.
The petitioner courted and proposed to marry her; she
accepted his love on the condition that they would get
married; they therefore agreed to get married after the
end of the school semester, which was in October of that
year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's
parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their
approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987,
the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano
Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living
with him; a week before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he
maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such
maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a
confrontation with a representative of the barangay
captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the
complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore
and; the petitioner is already married to someone living
in Bacolod City.

Issue:
Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach
of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
Held:
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21,
We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes
the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in
a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only
a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle
her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual
act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful
injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury
should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.
The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per
se is not an actionable wrong. The court held that when
a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman
to consent to his malicious desires, he commits fraud and
willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the court
found that petitioner’s deceptive promise to marry led
Marilou to surrender her virtue and womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to
marry was a deceptive ploy to have carnal knowledge
with the woman and actual damages should be paid for
the wedding preparation expenses. Petitioner even
committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the
country.
Velayo vs. C.A.
Facts: Mr. Alexander Sycip, Secretary of the Board of
Directors of the CALI, informed the creditors present
that this corporation was insolvent and had to stop
operations. He explained the memorandum agreement
executed by the CALI with the Philippine Air Lines,
Inc., on August 4, 1948, regarding the proposed sale to
the latter of the aviation equipments of the former
Mr. Alexander Sycip was assisted in the explanation by
CPA Alfredo Velayo of Washington, Sycip & Company,
Auditors of the CALI, who discussed the balance sheets
and distributed copies thereof to the creditors
The said balance sheet made mention of a C-54 plane in
the United States, the property now involved in this
suit. He was likewise assisted in his explanation by Mr.
Curtis L. Lambert, Vice President and General Manager
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 2
of the CALI, who described in greater detail the assets of
the CALI
There was a general understanding among all the
creditors present on the desirability" of consummating
the sale in favor of the Philippine Air Lines Inc.
No understanding was reached on the matter of
preference (of credits) and it was then generally agreed
that this point be further studied by a working committee
to be formed
The creditors present agreed to the formation of a
working committee to continue the discussion of the
payment of claims and preferences alleged by certain
creditors, and it was further agreed that said working
committee would supervise the preservation of the
properties of the corporation while the creditors
attempted to come to an understanding as to a fair
distribution of the assets among them
To this working committee, Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald,
Credit Manager, of the Defendant,among others was
appointed. After the creditors present saw the balance
sheet and heard the explanations of the officers of the
CALI, it was their unanimous opinion that it would be
advantageous not to present suits against this corporation
but to strive for a fair pro-rata division of its assets,
although the management of the CALI announced that in
case of non-agreement of the creditors on a pro-rata
division of the assets, it would file insolvency
proceedings (p. 70, t.s.n., October 22, 1951).
Mr. Fitzgerald did not decline the nomination to form
part of said working committee and on August 9, 1948,
the 3 members thereof discussed methods…to preserve
the assets of the CALI and to study the way of making a
fair division of all the assets among the creditors.
Atty. Sycip made an offer to Mr. D. Fitzgerald to name a
representative to oversee the preservation' of the assets
of the CALI, but Mr. Fitzgerald replied that the creditors
could rely on Col. Lambert.
… the negotiation with respect to the division of assets
of the CALI among the creditors was left pending or
under advice when on that very day of the meeting of the
working committee, August 9, 1948, which Mr.
Fitzgerald attended, Defendant effected a telegraphic
transfer of its credit against the CALI to the American
corporation Shell Oil Company, ' Inc., assigning its
credit, amounting to $79,440.00, which was
subsequently followed by a deed of assignment of credit
dated August 10, 1948, the credit amounting this time to
the sum of $85,081.29 (Exh. I).
Issue
Whether or not Shell acted in bad faith
Held:
Shell acted in bad faith.
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that “ Every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance

of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.”
It is evident that Shell, upon learning the precarious
economic situation of CALI and that will all probability,
it could not get much of its outstanding credit because of
the preferred claims of other creditors, entirely
disregarded all moral inhibitory tenets. That despite the
fact that all creditors jointly agreed that a certain set of
standard should be followed in settling the debts of
CALI to all of them, Shell committed acts contra bonus
mores to what they have agreed upon. Thus, Shell’s
action amounts to bad faith.
Albenson Enterprises Corporation vs The Court of
Appeals
G.R. No. 88694 | January 11, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to
Guaranteed Industries, Inc. at Baltao Building mild steel
plates which the latter ordered and as part of the
payment, a bouncing check was issued by one “Eugenio
Baltao”.
Petitioner, in a sincere attempt to collect the sum of
money due them, filed a criminal complaint against
private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao after the latter
refused to make good the amount of the bouncing check
despite demand. However, there was a mistake of
identity as there were two “Eugenio Baltaos” conducting
business in the same building – Eugenio S. Baltao and
his son, Eugenio Baltao III.
It was found that the signature of the check was not of
Eugenio S. Baltao and because of the alleged unjust
filing of a criminal case against him, respondent Baltao
filed a complaint for damages anchored on Articles 19,
20, and 21 of the Civil Code against petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights (Article
19) has been violated, resulting in damages under
Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law.
RULING:
No, petitioners could not be said to have violated the
principle of abuse of rights. What prompted petitioners
to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 against private respondent was their failure to collect
the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which
they honestly believed was issued to them by private
respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries
regarding the origin of the check. Private respondent,
however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken
identity at first hand. Instead, private respondent waited
in ambush and thereafter pounced on the hapless
petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing
an action for damages.
The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are
the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2)
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 3
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the
general sanction for all other provisions of law which do
not especially provide for their own sanction. Thus,
anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the
exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to
another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered
thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores,
and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which
is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good
custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done
with intent to injure.
There is no proof or showing that petitioners acted
maliciously or in bad faith in the filing of the case
against private respondent. Consequently, in the absence
of proof of fraud and bad faith committed by petitioners,
they cannot be held liable for damages.
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp., and Herbert
Hendry vs The Court of Appeals and Restituto
Tobias
G.R. No. 81262 | August 25, 1989
Facts: Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and
administrative assistant to the engineering operations
manager, discovered fictitious purchases and other
fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe Mackay
Cable and Radio Corp loss of several thousands of
pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior Eduardo
T. Ferraren and to the Executive Vice President and
General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report,
Hendry told Tobias that he was number one suspect and
ordered him one week forced leave. When Tobias
returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a
“crook” and a “swindler”, ordered him to take a lie
detector test, and to submit specimen of his handwriting,
signature and initials for police investigation. Moreover,
petitioners hired a private investigator. Private
investigation was still incomplete; the lie detector tests
yielded negative results; reports from Manila police
investigators and from the Metro Manila Police Chief
Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners
filed with the Fiscal’s Office of Manila a total of six (6)
criminal cases against private respondent Tobias, but
were dismissed.
Tobias received a notice of termination of his
employment from petitioners in January 1973, effective
December 1972. He sought employment with the
Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO); but Hendry
wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was
dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias,
then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged
unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of
petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment

in favor of private respondent, ordering petitioners to
pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual
damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as
moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as
exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00)
as attorney’s fees, and costs; hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether petitioners are liable for damages to
private respondent.
Held: Yes. The Court, after examining the record and
considering certain significant circumstances, finds that
all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they
invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for
which the latter must now be indemnified: when Hendry
told Tobias to just confess or else the company would
file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in
jail; his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos
(“You Filipinos cannot be trusted.”) as well as against
Tobias (“crook”, and “swindler”); the writing of a letter
to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by
Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six
criminal cases by petitioners against private respondent.
All these reveal that petitioners are motivated by
malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and
cause damage to private respondent. The imputation of
guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during
the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
The Court has already ruled that the right of the
employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused
with the manner in which the right is exercised and the
effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done
abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the
employee. Under the circumstances of the instant case,
the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate
manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the
right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is
AFFIRMED.
Physical Injuries or Battery
Battery is an intentional infliction of harmful or
offensive bodily contact. Bodily contact is offensive if it
offends a reasonable person's sense of dignity. It is
offensive even if the defendant's conduct is intended
only as a joke or a compliment
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 4
Battery should be distinguished from “assault” which is
an intentional conduct by one person directed at another
which places the latter in apprehension of immediate
bodily harm or offensive act. However, the evident
intent of the Code Commission is to provide for
independent civil action even for “assault
Carandang v Santiago
FACTS
Tomas Valenton, Jr. was found guilty of the crime of
frustrated homicide committed against the person of
Cesar Carandang, petitioner herein. Tomas Valenton, Jr.
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals where the
case is now pending.
Petitioner herein filed a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Manila to recover from the defendant
Tomas Valenton, Jr. and his parents, damages, both
actual and moral, for the bodily injuries received by him.
Defendants presented a motion to suspend the trial of the
civil case, pending the termination of the criminal case
in the Court of Appeals. The judge ruled that the trial of
the civil action must await the result of the criminal case
on appeal. A motion for reconsideration was submitted,
but the court denied the same; hence this petition for
certiorari.
Petitioner invokes Article 33 of the new Civil Code,
which is as follows:
“In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.”
ISSUE
Whether the term "physical injuries" used in Article
33 means physical injuries in the Revised Penal Code
only, or any physical injury or bodily injury, whether
inflicted with intent to kill or not.
HELD
It is evident that the term "physical injuries" could not
have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in
the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that
the Code Commission would have used terms in the
same article — some in their general and another in its
technical sense. In other words, the term "physical
injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not
the crime of physical injuries as defined in the Revised
Penal Code.

Concept #1: PHYSICAL INJURY = ANY BODILY
INJURY
In any case the Code Commission recommended that the
civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil
action for assault and battery in American Law, and this
recommendation must have been accepted by the
Legislature when it approved the article intact as
recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil
action for the bodily harm received by the complainant
similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the
Code Commission states, the civil action should lie
whether the offense committed is that of physical
injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide,
or even death.
Bonite v Zosa
FACTS
Florencio Bonite was hit by a truck driven by private
respondent. Bonite died on that same day. A criminal
complaint for homicide through Reckless Imprudence
was filed by the surviving heirs (petitioners) against the
respondent Abamonga. Petitioners through their counsel,
as private prosecutor, actively participated in the
prosecution of the criminal case against the accused.
After trial on the merits, the court acquitted the
accused for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioners filed an action for
recovery of damages against the same accused for the
death of Bonite.
The court a quo dismissed the complaint for
damages. In its ruling, the court held that since the
plaintiffs did not reserve the right to file and independent
civil action, and the fact that they have been represented
by a private prosecutor in the prosecution of the criminal
case, the action presently filed by the plaintiffs is already
res adjudicata. Petitioners moved for the reconsideration
of the order but the same was denied.
Hence, the filing of this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not private respondent's claim that the
specific provision applicable in the case at bar is Article
33 of the Civil Code (and not Article 29), because the
latter is not applicable to criminal offenses proceeding
from a tortious act.
HELD
Article 33 of the Civil Code cannot apply in this case for
it assumes a defamation, fraud, or physical injuries
intentionally committed. The death of the deceased in
the case at bar was alleged to be the result of criminal
negligence, i.e., not inflicted with malice. Criminal
negligence under the Revised Penal Code punishes the
negligent or reckless act, not the result thereof. The
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 5
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty. As reckless imprudence or
criminal negligence is not mentioned in Article 33, no
independent civil action for damages arising from
reckless imprudence or criminal negligence may be
instituted under said article. It is, therefore, not
applicable to the case at bar.
Concept#2: PHYSICAL INJURY must be intentionally
committed.
Corpus et. Al v Paje
FACTS
A passenger bus of the Victory Liner Transportation Co.,
Inc., driven by Felardo Paje collided with a jeep driven
by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in
physical injuries to two other persons.
An information for homicide and double serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed
against Felardo Paje. The heirs of Clemente Marcia
reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for
damages. Felardo Paje, was found guilty and convicted
of the crime charged in the information. Defendant
appealed the judgment. While defendant's appeal was
pending, Clemente Marcia's heirs instituted a separate
civil action for damages based upon the criminal act of
reckless imprudence against Felardo Paje and the
Victory Liner Transportation Co.
Defendants, praying that said defendants be
ordered to pay jointly and severally the amounts of
damages claimed by the plaintiffs. Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision in the appeal of Felardo Paje
reversing the appealed judgment and acquitting the
appellant after finding that the reckless imprudence
charged against him did not exist, and that the collision
was a case of pure accident.
ISSUE
Whether term “physical injuries” include cases where the
crime committed is reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide
HELD
The charge against Felardo Paje was for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, and not for homicide
and physical injuries. In People v. Buan, it was held that
the "offense of criminal negligence under Article 355 of
the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent as negligent act that, if intentionally done,
would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus
the negligent or careless act not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty; it does not qualify the substance
of the offense." It is, therefore, clear that the charge

against Felardo Paje was not for homicide but for
reckless imprudence, that is, criminal negligence
resulting in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and
double physical injuries suffered by two other persons.
Concept#3: Reckless imprudence or criminal negligence
is different from physical injuries resulting to homicide.
Marcia v CA
MARCIA V CA and Corpus v Paje are the same cases
just with different petitioners involved.
The accident in 1956 was between Fernando Paje
(Victory Line Bus driver) and Clemente Marcia (Jeepney
driver).
The case of Laura Corpus vs. Felardo Paje is the same as
the case at bar, the only difference being the party-
plaintiffs or petitioners. The case at bar was filed by
Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap (the two who suffered
physical injury).
SC ruled the same and even pronounced costs against
petitioners and not against Paje.
CARPIO VS. VALMONTE
FACTS
Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding
coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra
engaged her services for their church wedding. On
wedding day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel where
the bride and her family were billeted. When she arrived
at Suite, several persons were already there including the
bride. Among those present was petitioner Soledad
Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress
up for the occasion.
After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of
the suite carrying the items needed for the wedding
rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors. She
proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the
reception was to be held. She paid the suppliers, gave
the meal allowance to the band, and went back to the
suite.
Upon entering the suite, Valmonte noticed the
people staring at her. It was at this juncture that
petitioner allegedly uttered the following words to
Valmonte: Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan
ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and
lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha.
Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search
Valmontes bag. It turned out that after Valmonte left
the room to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered
that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the
comfort room in a paper bag were lost. Valmonte was
allegedly bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by a
security guard throughout the evening
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 6
Later, police officers arrived and interviewed all
persons who had access to the suite and fingerprinted
them including Valmonte. During all the time Valmonte
was being interrogated by the police officers, petitioner
kept on saying the words Siya lang ang lumabas ng
kwarto. Valmontes car which was parked at the hotel
premises was also searched but the search yielded
nothing.
A few days after the incident, petitioner received a
letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of
apology which she wanted to be circulated to the
newlyweds relatives and guests to redeem her smeared
reputation as a result of petitioners imputations against
her. Petitioner did not respond to the letter. Thus,
Valmonte filed a suit for damages against Carpio.
Valmonte prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay
actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorneys fees. The RTC dismissed Valmonte complaint
for damages. . It ruled that when petitioner sought
investigation for the loss of her jewelry, she was merely
exercising her right and if damage results from a person
exercising his legal right, it is damnum absque injuria.
Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the
decision of the RTC, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent is intitled to
moral damages and actual damages.
Held: The Court ruled the respondent is intitled to
moral damages but not to actual damages.
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim
of a wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or
negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse
to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained.
Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of
equity but also universal moral precepts which are
designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience and which are meant to
serve as guides for human conduct
First of these fundamental precepts is the principle
commonly known as abuse of rights under Article 19 of
the Civil Code. It provides that Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith. To find the existence of
an abuse of right, the following elements must be
present:
(1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in
bad faith; (3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or
injuring another. When a right is exercised in a manner

which discards these norms resulting in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor
can be held accountable
One is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner
which would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or
if he would thereby offend morals or good customs.
Thus, a person should be protected only when he acts in
the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts
with prudence and good faith; but not when he acts
with negligence or abuse.
Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the
provisions of Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which
read, thus:
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals or good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach against
respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that
by her own account nobody knew that she brought such
kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. This
being the case, she had no right to attack respondent
with her innuendos which were not merely inquisitive
but outrightly accusatory. By openly accusing
respondent as the only person who went out of the
room before the loss of the jewelry in the presence of
all the guests therein, and ordering that she be
immediately bodily searched, petitioner virtually
branded respondent as the thief
True, petitioner had the right to ascertain the identity of
the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an
iota of proof that she was the one who actually stole
the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or principle
of law is impermissible.
Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a
manner which is contrary to morals and good
customs. Her firmness and resolve to find her missing
jewelry cannot justify her acts toward respondent. She
did not act with justice and good faith for apparently,
she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice
respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the
provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for
which she should be held accountable.
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 7
To be recoverable, actual damages must be duly proved
with reasonable degree of certainty and the courts
cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork.
Respondent, however, is clearly entitled to an award of
moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded
whenever the defendants wrongful act or omission is
the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury
DE ROY VS. CA
Facts: The firewall of a burned-out building owned by
petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop
occupied by the family of private respondents,
resulting in injuries to private respondents and the
death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private
respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate
their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened
wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the
foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial
Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio
M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty
of gross negligence and awarding damages to private
respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court
was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a
decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of
which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987.
On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day
period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration,
which was eventually denied by the appellate court in
the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed
their motion for reconsideration on September 24,
1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October
27, 1987.
Issue: Whether or not herein petitioners are liable for
damages.
Held: Yes. Petitioners are liable for damages.
Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the
proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for
the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if
it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.”
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument
that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to
avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to
vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners
prior negligence should be disregarded, since the

doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied
to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
Amadora vs. C.A
In April 1972, while the high school students of Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos were in the school auditorium, a
certain Pablito Daffon fired a gun. The stray bullet hit
Alfredo Amadora. Alfredo died. Daffon was convicted
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The
parents of Alfredo sued the school for damages under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code because of the school’s
negligence.
The trial court ruled in favor of Amadora. The trial
court ruled that the principal, the dean of boys, as well
as the teacher-in-charge are all civilly liable. The school
appealed as it averred that when the incident
happened, the school year has already ended.
Amadora argued that even though the semester has
already ended, his son was there in school to complete
a school requirement in his Physics subject. The Court
of Appeals ruled in favor of the school. The CA ruled
that under the last paragraph of Article 2180, only
schools of arts and trades (vocational schools) are
liable not academic schools like Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos,
an academic school, is liable under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code for the tortuous act of its students.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court also ruled that such
liability does not cease when the school year ends or
when the semester ends. Liability applies whenever the
student is in the custody of the school authorities as
long as he is under the control and influence of the
school and within its premises, whether the semester
has not yet begun or has already ended at the time of
the happening of the incident. As long as it can be
shown that the student is in the school premises in
pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the
exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege
The responsibility of the school authorities over the
student continues. Indeed, even if the student should
be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in
the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying
the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still
within the custody and subject to the discipline of the
school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 8
At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct
liability, and for the school, to avoid subsidiary liability,
is to show proof that he, the teacher, exercised the
necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained
of, and the school exercised the diligence of a bonus
pater familias.
In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was
not properly named, and there was no sufficient
evidence presented to make the said teacher-in-charge
liable. Absent the direct liability of the teachers because
of the foregoing reason, the school cannot be held
subsidiarily liable too.
Flor Vs People
An information for libel was filed before the RTC,
Branch 20, Naga City, against the petitioner and Ramos
who were then the managing editor and correspondent,
respectively, of the Bicol Forum, a local weekly
newspaper circulated in the Bicol Region. The
information reads as follows: That on or about the 18th
day up to the 24th day of August, 1986, in the Bicol
Region comprised by the Provinces of Albay,
Catanduanes, Sorsogon, Masbate, Camarines Sur, and
Camarines Norte, and the Cities of Iriga and Naga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court under R.A. No. 4363, and B.P. Blg. 129,
The above-named accused who are the news
correspondent and the managing editor, respectively, of
the local weekly newspaper Bicol Forum, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without
justifiable motive and with malicious intent of
impeaching, discrediting and destroying the honor,
integrity, good name and reputation of the complainant
as Minister of the Presidential Commission on
Government Reorganization and concurrently Governor
of the Province of Camarines Sur.
And to expose him to public hatred, ridicule and
contempt, write, edit, publish and circulate an issue of
the local weekly newspaper BICOL FORUM throughout
the Bicol Region, with banner headline and front page
news item read by the public throughout the Bicol
Region.
WON the questioned news item is libelous
the questioned news item is not libelous:
Libel - a public and malicious imputation of a
crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any
act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending

to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a
natural person or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead. Any of these imputations is
defamatory and under the general rule stated in Article
354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious.
The presumption of malice, however, does not exist in
the following instances:
1. A private communication made by any
person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral, or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith,
without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other
act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions
A public official is barred from recovering damages
in cases involving defamations. His entitlement,
however, is limited to instances when the defamatory
statement was made with actual malice that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not. New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan. St. Amant v. Thompson
Under the New York Times test, false statements
alone are not actionable; maliciousness may be shown
only through knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
of truth or falsity.
"high degree of awareness of its probable falsity."
The prosecution, in this case, utterly failed to prove that
the petitioner and Ramos entertained such awareness
Prudencio Laconsay vs. Fidel Berog
Gr. No. 188686, December 3, 2014
FACTS
The instant case arose from a vehicular accident along
Dona Soledad Street, Better Living Subdivision,
Parañaque City on April 22, 1994 which involved a blue
Harabas vehicle driven by Severo Ontuca (Ontuca) and
Fidel, 11-year-old boy. The said Harabas is registered in
the name of Felisa Laconsay (Felisa) but its possession,
however, was left with her husband, Prudencio, when
they separated in fact sometime in 1990.
Prior to April 22, 1994, Prudencio visited the Mary Help
of Christians Chapel to check the status of its
construction in Barangay Don Bosco, Better Living
Subdivision, Parañaque City. Prudencio promised the
chapel's engineer that he will bring the Harabas on
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 9
April 22, 1994 in order to be used to help clean the
area. On said date, however, Prudencio needed to go
out of town and instead requested Ontuca to drive the
Harabas in his stead.
Ontuca agreed as he has always been designated by
Prudencio to drive the Harabas in several previous
occasions.
Upon arrival at the chapel, Ontuca parked the Harabas
and proceeded to clean up the area together with a
certain Arthur Dealca.
While busy cleaning the chapel, an enraged Daniel
Bautista (Bautista) suddenly barged inside the chapel.
He held a 15-inch bolo in his hand as he angrily
demanded the ignition key of the Harabas. Fearing for
his life, Ontuca handed him the key. Bautista left them
and headed towards the Harabas. As he started the
engine, Ontuca gave chase and tried to ride the Harabas
through its front passenger seat. Bautista then sped
away from the chapel at high speed.
The Harabas headed along Doña Soledad Street where
Fidel was busy fixing his bicycle while seated in between
two (2) Toyota Corollas that were parked along a gutter.
The Harabas collided against one of the Toyota Corollas
which impact pinned Fidel severely against the other
Toyota Corolla.
Fidel saw its driver flee with a bloody face and saw
another man take over the steering wheel of the
Harabas. He saw the Harabas being driven again
towards where he was. Fidel hurriedly tried to hide his
body as fast as he could under the Toyota Corolla but to
no avail. His right leg was ran over for the second time
by the same Harabas.
Fidel, as represented by his parents, filed a complaint
for damages against Prudencio, Ontuca, Felisa and
Bautista. Prudencio and Ontuca filed an answer. Felisa
and Bautista were declared in default. RTC rendered
judgment in favor of fidel and against the defendants.
The CA on appeal rendered decision affirming the
findings of RTC.
ISSUE
Whether Prudencio is liable to fidel.
RULING
Yes, Prudencio is liable to fidel.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code reads:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
Although solidary liability is not explicitly provided in
the said provisions, the wordings of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code infer that the obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for one‘s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible. Article 2180 and Article 2194
categorically provide that the responsibility of two or
more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary.
In other words, the liability of joint tortfeasors is
solidary. Verily, under Article 2180, an employer may
be held solidarily liable for the negligent act of his
employee.
An employer-employee relationship exists between
Prudencio and Ontuca; on April 22, 1994.
The Court agrees with the CA's pronouncement that
Prudencio cannot deny being Ontuca's employer on
April 22, 1994. It is clearly evident in the records that
Ontuca was authorized by Prudencio to drive the
Harabas because he could trust him which Ontuca
confirmed.
Also, Prudencio cannot avoid liability on the basis of
the registration of Felisa's ownership over the Harabas
as it was shown he had been entrusted with it when
she left for abroad.
Prudencio's written complaint in the barangay also
contained his signature as Felisa's "authorized
representative."
He also has control of its use. The CA emphasized that
the operator of record continues to be the operator of
the vehicle in contemplation of law, as regards the
public and third person, and is responsible for the
consequences incident to the vehicle's operation, and
who should be held out as the employer of the driver.
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 10
To give effect to this policy, the actual operator and
employer shall be considered as the agent of the
operator of record
Thus, Felisa and Prudenbio, as such employers, share a
vicarious liability for the negligent use of the Harabas
for failing to establish their having exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of employee.
They are both held liable to Fidel: Felisa, as registered
owner, and Prudencio, who, without being the
registered owner, had control of the use of the vehicle.
GMA AND VIDAL V BUSTOS MD ET. AL.
petition for review under Rule 45
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in which reversed
and set aside an earlier decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 64,
an action for damages thereat commenced by the
herein respondents Jesus G. Bustos, Teodora R.
Ocampo, Victor V. Buencamino, Cesar F. Villafuerte,
Artemio T. Ordinario and Virgilio C. Basilio, all physicians
by profession and the former chairman and members,
respectively, of the Board of Medicine, against the
herein petitioners GMA Network, Inc. (formerly
Republic Broadcasting System, Inc.) and Rey Vidal.
Abello and over 200 other unsuccessful examinees in
the August1987 physicians’ licensure examinations,
filed a Petition for Mandamus before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila to compel the Professional Regulatory
Commission (PRC) and the board of medical examiners
to re-check and reevaluate the test papers. They alleged
that mistakes in the counting of the total scores and
erroneous checking of answers to test questions
vitiated the results of the examinations. Rey Vidal, a
news writer and reporter of GMA Network, Inc.,
covered the filing of thesaid petition. After securing a
copy of the petition, he drafted and narrated the news
report for theten o’clock evening news edition of GMA’s
Channel 7 Headline News
Jesus G. Bustos, et al., former chairman and members of
the Board of Medicine of thePRC which conducted the
examinations, filed a damage suit against Vidal and
GMA Network,claiming, inter alia, that the latter, in
reckless disregard for the truth, defamed them by word
of mouth and simultaneous visual presentation on
GMA’s Channel 7 of an unrelated and
oldfootage showing physicians wearing black armbands.
 TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 11

According to them, Vidal and GMANetwork made use of
the said footage to make it appear that other doctors
were supporting andsympathizing with the complaining
unsuccessful examinees, when the same actually
related toa 1982 demonstration staged by doctors and
personnel of the Philippine General Hospital(PGH)
regarding wage and economic dispute with hospital
management.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for damages,
holding that the newsreport was privileged, being but a
narration of the allegations contained in and
thecircumstances attending the filing of the Petition for
Mandamus. This was reversed bythe Court of Appeals
which, while regarding the text of the news report as a
qualifiedly privileged communication, nevertheless
held that the insertion of the unrelated 1982 PGH picket
film footage, “without the words file video,” was
evidence of malice.
ISSUES
 Whether or not the televised news report on
the filing of the Petition for Mandamus is
libelous;
 Whether or not the insertion of the old film
footage depicting the doctors and personnelof
the PGH in their 1982 demonstrations
constitutes malice to warrant the award of
damages
nothing more than the purported mistakes in paper
checking and the errors in the counting and tallying of
the scores in the August 1987 physicians licensure
examinations attributable to the then chairman and
members of the Board of Medicine.
HELD2
the insertion of the old film footage depicting
the doctors and personnel of the PGH in their 1982
demonstrations does not constitutes malice to
warrant the award of damages
the petitioners without controversion from the
respondents, there was nothing in the news report to
indicate an intent to utilize such old footages to create
another news story beyond what was reported.
the insertion of the old film footage depicting
the doctors and personnel of the PGH in their 1982
demonstrations does not constitutes malice to
warrant the award of damages
the petitioners without controversion from the
respondents, there was nothing in the news report to
indicate an intent to utilize such old footages to create
another news story beyond what was reported.
Quisaba vs.Sta. Ines
OPPRESSIVE DISMISSAL

HELD1
the televised news report on the filing of the Petition
for Mandamus is not libelous
Liability for libel attaches present the following
elements: (a) an allegation or imputation of a
discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b)
publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person
defamed; and (d) existence of malice.
Brillante v. Court of Appeals, is a term used to
indicate the fact that the offender is prompted by
personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to
duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person
defamed. Malice implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm. It is present when it is shown that the
author of the libelous or defamatory remarks made the
same with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.

In the instant case, there can be no quibbling that GREGORIO V.CA

what petitioner corporation aired in its Channel 7 in
the February 10, 1988 late evening newscast was
basically a narration of the contents of the
aforementioned petition for mandamus. This is borne by
the records of the case and was likewise the finding of
the trial court. And the narration had for its subject
ARTICLE 26
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons. The following and similar acts,

though they may notconstitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention
andother relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's
residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life
or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated
from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of
his religious beliefs, lowly station in life,place of birth,
physical defect, or other personal condition.
Respondents filed an affidavit of complaint for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 against petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio
(Gregorio), a proprietor of Alvi Marketing. Respondents
claimed that Gregorio delivered insufficiently funded
bank checks as payment for appliances Alvi Marketing
bought from Sansio. Gregorio was then indicted for
three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The MTC
issued a warrant of arrest and she was subsequently
arrested by armed operatives while visiting her family
house in Quezon City.
Gregorio filed before the MTC a Motion for
Deferment of Arraignment and Reinvestigation. She
alleged that she could not have issued the bounced
checks as she did not have a checking account with the
bank on which the checks were drawn. This was
certified by the manager of the said bank. Gregorio also
alleged that the signature on the bounced checks were
radically and patently different from her own signature.
The MTC granted the motion, and a reinvestigation was
conducted.
Subsequently, the MTC ordered the B.P. Blg. 22
cases dismissed. Gregorio filed a complaint for damages
against Respondents before the Regional Trial Court of
Albay. Part of her complaint was that as a result of her
wrongful arrest and arraignment, she suffered
helplessness, hunger and humiliation and being
distraught. Respondents meanwhile filed a Motion to
Dismiss on grounds that Gregorio’s complaint arose
from grounds of compensation arising from malicious
prosecution. RTC denied this Motion to Dismiss.
Respondents then filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
was again denied. They went to the Court of Appeals
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
presiding judge of the RTC in denying their motions to
dismiss and for reconsideration. CA rendered a Decision
granting the petition and ordering Gregorio’s damage
suit to be dismissed
ISSUE: Are respondents liable for damages to Gregorio?
HELD:
Yes. Among other reasons, the Supreme Court decided
that:
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 12
Gregorio’s rights “to personal dignity, personal
security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by
respondents when they failed to exercise the requisite
diligence in determining the identity of the person they
should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently
funded checks. . .. Because she was not able to refute the
charges against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for
three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Gregorio
was conveniently at her city residence while visiting her
family. She suffered embarrassment and humiliation
over her sudden arrest and detention and she had to
spend time, effort, and money to clear her tarnished
name and reputation, considering that she had held
several honorable positions in different organizations
and offices in the public service, particularly herbeing a
Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest. ”
COJUANGCO JR. V. CA
ARTICLE 32
Eduardo Cojuangco, a businessman and a sportsman,
was the owner of several racehorces, which he entered in
the sweepstakes races from March 6, 1986 to September
18, 1989. The said racehorses won first, second and third
places which granted Cojuangco with prizes from PCSO.
Cojuangco sent PCSO demand letters claiming the
prizes but Carracoso replied stating that he was advised
by the PCGG to withhold the prizes in the mean time.
The RTC held that PCSO and Carrascoso had no
authority to withhold the winnings since no writ of
sequestration was issued by the PCGG. The trial court
also said that Carrascoso’s initiative of not issuing the
prizes were manifestations of Bad Faith. The Court of
Appeals, however, held that Carrascoso was merely
carrying out the instructions of PCGG backed by the
intention to protect public interest. The appellate court
said that Carrascoso was in good faith since he replied to
demand letters, he released the winnings upon PCGG’s
advice nad he had no objection to the partial execution.
ISSUE:
Whether the award for damages against Carrascoso is
warranted by evidence and the law.
RULING:
The Court ruled that Carrascoso acted in
good faith. Bad faith, to be recognized by court, should
be constituted by dishonest purpose, moral obliquity,
and conscious doing of a wrong. The Court further stated
that a public official shall not be liable by way of moral
and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance
of their official duties unless there is no clear showing of
bad faith, malice and gross negligence. But Carrascoso
should still be liable under Article 32(6) which states
“rights against deprivation of property without due
process of law”. There was a violation of Cojuangco’s

constitutional right even if done in good faith since no
writ for the sequestration of his racehorse winnings.
Therefore, Cojuangco’s petition was granted and
Carrasco is obliged to pay nominal damages worth P/
50,000.00.
Polo S. Pantaleon v. American Express International,
Inc.
G.R. No. 174269, May 8, 2009
Facts:
The family of the petitioner went to Amsterdam for
vacation and joined an escorted tour of Western Europe
organized by Trafalgar Tours of Europe, Ltd. In October
of 1991. During the last day of the tour, the tour group
arrived at the Coster Diamond House 10 minutes before
9:00 A.M. and the visit in the store would end by 9:30.
Mrs. Pantaleon purchased a diamond brilliant cut, also
selected a pendant and a chain, which totalled US $13,
826, then Mr. Pantaleon presented his American Express
credit card together with his passport to pay those items.
It took 45 minutes from waiting for the approval of the
Amex Card until the Coster decided for the release of the
purchase items even without the respondent’s approval
of those. The transaction caused delay of leaving the
store for 30 minutes and cancellation of the city tour due
to lack of remaining time which made the tour mates
irritated.
The approval were transmitted to respondents
Amsterdom office at 10:19 a.m. which was 78 minutes
from the time the purchases were electronically
transmitted by the jewelry store. The Pantaleon family
proceeded to US before returning to Manila. The
petitioner used his Amex Card several times without
hassle or delay except with the 2 incidents similar to the
Amsterdam, golf equipment worth $1, 475 which took
more than 30minutes waiting for approval and children
shoes worth $87 which took 20minutes approval. March
4, 1992 after coming back to Mla, Pantaleon sent a letter
through his counsel to the respondent, demanding an
apology for the inconvenience, humiliation and
embarrassment he and his family suffered for the
respondents refusal to provide credit authorization for
the aforementioned purchases.
Issue:
Whether respondent, in connection with the transactions,
had committed breach of its obligation to petitioner.
Ruling:
Yes, the respondent had committed breach of obligation
towards petitioner. Article 1170 provides;
“Those who are in the performance of their obligations
are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who
in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable
for damages.”
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 13
To prove, both parties have testified that normal
approval time for purchases was a matter of seconds.
Both parties likewise presented evidence that the
processing and approval of plaintiff’s charge purchase at
the Coster Diamond House was way beyond the normal
approval time of a matter of seconds. A cause of delay
with culpability, and led to the injuries under Article
2217 of the Civil Code for which moral damages are
renumerative.
“Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury.”
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are proximate result
of the defendant’s wrongful act for omission.
Wherefore, the petitioner was granted with moral
damages of P500,000.00, exemplary damages of
P300,000.00, attorney’s fee of P100,000.00 and
litigation expenses of P85,000.00.
GF Equity, Inc. v. Arturo Valenzona
G.R. No. 156841, June 30, 2005
Facts:
GF Equity, represented by its Chief Financial Officer
Uytengsu, hired Valenzona as Head Coach of the Alaska
basketball team in the PBA under a contract of
employment which his duties were described. Even
before the conclusion of the contract, Valenzona had
already served GF Equity under a verbal contract by
coaching its team, Hills Brothers in the 3rd PBA
Conference of 1987. P35, 000.00 monthly salary, net of
taxes, and provide him with service vehicle and gasoline
allowance. Employment period was for 2 years
commencing on Jan 1, 1988 and ending on Dec 31,
1989, although Valenzona found the one-sidedness of
the par 3 of the contract still acceded to sign it because
he had trust and confidence to Uytengsu. Sept. 26, 1988
Valenzona was advised of the termination of his service,
which the GF Equity invoking their rights specified in
the par 3 of the contract; “If at any time during the
contract, the Coach, in the sole opinion of the
Corporation, fails to exhibit sufficient skills or
competitive ability to coach the team, the Corporation
may terminate this contract.”
Issue:
Whether the paragraph three (3) of the contract is
violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts.
Ruling:
Yes, the paragraph is violative of the principle of
mutuality of contracts. Mutuality is one of the
characteristics of a contract, its validity or performance
or compliance of which cannot be left to the will of only

one of the parties. This is enshrined in Article 1308 of
the New Civil Code, whose underlying principle is
explained in Garcia v. Rita Legarda, Inc., viz:
“The contract must bind both contracting parties; its
validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of
them.”
The ultimate purpose of the mutuality principle is thus
to nullify a contract containing a condition which makes
its fulfillment or pre-termination
dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of one
of the contracting parties. To sustain the validity of the
assailed paragraph would open the gate for arbitrary and
illegal dismissals, for void contractual stipulations would
be used as justification therefor.
The act of the petitioner in pre-termination of the
respondent was anchored in illegal ground hence
contrary to law from negligently providing legal basis,
thereby abusing the right of Valenzona to thus entitled
him for damages under Article 19; “Every person must,
in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. In relation to Article 20
of the Civil Code which provides; “Every person who,
contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage
to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.”
The respondent was awarded of actual damages in the
amount of P525,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the
amount of P60,000.00.
ORLANDO D. GARCIA, JR. v. RANIDA D.
SALVADOR and RAMON SALVADOR
G.R. No. 168512, March 20, 2007
Facts:
Ranida was a trainee in Accounting of Department
Limay Blk Handling Terminal, Inc. and Underwent a
medical examination at the Community Diagnostic
Center. Garcia, a Med. Tech. conducted the HBs Ag test
and the result indicated that Ranida was HBs Ag
reactive, signed by Garcia as examiner and the rubber
stamp signature of Castro as pathologist. Ranida’s
employment was terminated by the company for failing
the physical examination. When she informed her father
Ramon, he suffered a heart attack and confined at the
Bataan Doctors Hos., where Ranida underwent another
HBs Ag test and result indicated non-reactive. She
informed Dr. Sto. Domingo but according to the
company physician, CDC result was more reliable by
using Micro-Elisa Method. Ranida went back to CDC
for confirmatory testing and the test conducted indicated
a Negative result, further, underwent the same test at the
Bataan Doctors Hos. Using Micro-Elisa Method and the
result was non-reactive. After submitting the results to
the Hospital and Clinic Executive Officers, it was
corrected by the Med Tech of CDC, Calderon through
certification stating that Garcia interpreted a delayed
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 14
reaction as positive or reactive. Then, Ranida was
rehired by the company.
Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint for damages
against Garcia and Castro, claiming that, by reason of
erroneous interpretation of the test result, she lost her job
and suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma, sleepless
nights while Ramon was hospitalized and lost business
opportunities. The RTC dismissed the complaint for
failure of the respondents to present sufficient evidence
to prove the liability of Garcia and Castro. Ranida then
appealed to CA which reverse the findings of the trial
court.
Issue:
Whether the CA, in reversing the decision of the trial
court, correctly found petitioner liable for damages to the
respondents for issuing an incorrect HBs Ag test result.
Ruling:
Yes, the CA was correct in reversing the
decision of the trial court. Article 20. of the New Civil
Code provides:
“Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.”
For health care providers; the test of the existence of
negligence is: did the health care provider either fail to
do something which a reasonably prudent health care
provider would have done, or that he or she did
something that a reasonably prudent health care provider
would not have done; and that failure or action caused
injury to the patient? If yes, then he is guilty of
negligence.
In fine, violation of a statutory duty is
negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person the
duty to do something, his omission or non-performance
will render him liable to whoever may be injured
thereby.
Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4688, otherwise
known as The Clinical Laboratory Law, provides: “It
shall be unlawful for any person to be professionally in-
charge of a registered clinical laboratory unless he is a
licensed physician duly qualified in laboratory medicine
and authorized by the Secretary of Health, such
authorization to be renewed annually.
No license shall be granted or renewed by the Secretary
of Health for the operation and maintenance of a clinical
laboratory unless such laboratory is under the
administration, direction and supervision of an
authorized physician.”
Corollarily, Sections 9(9.1)(1), 11 and 25(25.1)(1) of the
DOH Administrative Order No. 49-B Series of 1988,
otherwise known as the Revised Rules and Regulations
Governing the Registration, Operation and Maintenance
of Clinical Laboratories in the Philippines, read:
Sec. 9. Management of the Clinical Laboratory:
9.1. Head of the Clinical Laboratory: The head is that
person who assumes technical and administrative

supervision and control of the activities in the
laboratory.
For all categories of clinical laboratories, the head shall
be a licensed physician certified by the Philippine Board
of Pathology in either Anatomic or Clinical Pathology or
both provided that:
(1) This shall be mandatory for all categories of
free-standing clinical laboratories; all tertiary
category hospital laboratories and for all
secondary category hospital laboratories located
in areas with sufficient available pathologist.
Sec. 11. Reporting: All laboratory requests shall be
considered as consultations between the requesting
physician and pathologist of the laboratory. As such all
laboratory reports on various examinations of human
specimens shall be construed as consultation report and
shall bear the name of the pathologist or his
associate. No person in clinical laboratory shall issue a
report, orally or in writing, whole portions thereof
without a directive from the pathologist or his authorized
associate and only to the requesting physician or his
authorized representative except in emergencies when
the results may be released as authorized by the
pathologist.
Thus, the elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty,
2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate causation.
First, supervision and control barely qualifies as an
effective. Second, Garcia conducted the test without the
supervision of Castro. Last, the result was released
without the authorization of Castro. Garcia, failed to
comply with the laws and rules promulgated and issued
for the protection of public safety and interest is failure
to observe that care which a reasonably prudent health
care provider would observe. Thus, his act or omission
constitutes a breach of duty.
The CA award for damages of moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney’s fee to respondent by
the petitioners was reasonable.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
VILLANUEVA V UCPB
Hermenegildo Villanueva, father of Petitioner Hector C.
Villanueva, applied for and was granted a loan by United
Coconut Planters Bank, which at that time was managed
by one Bobby Cafe. As security therefor, Hermenegildo
Villanueva mortgaged to the bank a parcel of land
registered in his name.
In the course of a bank audit, certain fraud,
anomalies and irregularities were discovered in the
application, processing and granting of said loan
prompting UCPB to conduct further investigation on the
matter. After due inquiry, UCPB found and concluded
that petitioner, together with his father, Hermenegildo
Villanueva, Bobby Cafe (UCPB Dumaguete Branch
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 15
Manager) and a certain Reynaldo Ramos, confederated
and conspired with each other in perpetrating the fraud,
anomalies and irregularities to the detriment of the bank.
UCPB, through its counsel, filed the following
criminal complaints with the Office of the City Fiscal
(now Prosecutor)
Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, rendered a
decision therein acquitting all the accused except for
Bobby Cafe.
In view of his acquittal in the criminal cases,
Hector Villanueva filed a complaint for damages on the
ground of alleged malicious prosecution with the RTC
against UCPB. Petitioner alleged that he is a respectable
member of the community, a professional, a member of
various civic organizations, a businessman, and a
political leader; that the filing of the criminal cases
against him was done with malice which resulted in the
undue maligning, blackening x x x of his integrity,
honesty and good reputation, as well as adversely
affecting his political career and business dealings, for
which he prayed that UCPB be held liable to him for the
amount of P200,000.00 in actual damages,
P6,000,000.00 in moral damages, P2,000,000.00 in
exemplary damages, P1,000,000.00 in nominal damages,
and P800,000.00 in attorneys fees, as well as P5,000.00
charge per court appearance.
ISSUE:
Was the petitioner prosecuted out of malice?
HELD:
HE WAS NOT PROSECUTED OUT OF MALICE.
Malicious prosecution requires proof
that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to
vex and humiliate the plaintiff. The respondent bank had
neither a "bone to pick" with the petitioner nor a
"previous dealing with petitioner that could have
prompted the respondent bank to turn the tables on him."
The respondent bank filed the criminal
Complaints for violations of the General Banking Act in
its honest belief that these charges were meritorious.
There is no credible evidence to show that it was
impelled by a desire to unjustly vex, annoy and inflict
injury on the petitioner.
MAGBANUA V JUNSAY
Rosemarie Magbanua, who worked as a housemaid in
the residence of Pilar Junsay was charged as a co-
accused with the crime of Robbery by making a hole on
the lower portion of the kitchen’s door of the house of
Junsay, where the accused gained entrance and robbed
valuables. Only petitioner Rosemarie was tried. Her co-
accused, Ernesto Fernandez and a certain Gudo, remain
at large. The evidence for accused [herein petitioner

Rosemarie] more particularly the Medical Certificate
and the testimony of the attending physician as well as
the Decision of the NAPOLCOM finding the
investigatingofficers guilty has clearly establish (sic) the
fact that accused was physically maltreated by the
investigating officers in an attempt to force her to
confess her participation in the robbery. RTC acquits
Rosemarie. Rosemarie, filed with the RTC, a Complaint
for Damages against Respondent Pilar who was the
employer of petitioner Rosemarie, and respondents
Ibarra and Juanito who are members of the police force.
The Complaint, maintained that Rosemarie suffered
physical pain and mental torture due to the filing of the
false criminal charge against her. They sought moral and
exemplary damages, including attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses, as well as loss of earnings and
expenses incurred inconnection with Rosemarie’s
defense in Criminal Case No. 28 for Robbery. They
similarly prayed for payment of the expenses incurred in
the prosecution of the instant case
ISSUE:
Was there malicious prosecution of Rosemarie?
HELD:
NO. This Court has drawn the four elements that must
be shown to concur to recover damages for malicious
prosecution. Therefore, for a malicious prosecution suit
to prosper, the plaintiff must prove the following:
(1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was
himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its
commencement;
(2) the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal;
(3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without
probable cause;
(4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice -- an
improper or a sinister motive. (this element is absent in
this case)
*The gravamen of malicious
prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based on the
wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of
an action with the knowledge that the charges were false
and groundless.*
It is not disputed that the first and second elements are
present. Anent the question of whether the prosecutor
acted without probable cause in bringing the action
against petitioner Rosemarie, the court found no reason
to depart from the conclusions reached by the RTC and
the Court of Appeals that the Robbery was not without
probable cause. Lastly, there was no proof of a sinister
design on the part of the respondents to vex or humiliate
petitioner Rosemarie by instituting the criminal case
against her and her co-accused.
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 16
Respondent Pilar who was robbed of her
valuable belongings can only be expected to bring the
matter to the authorities. There can be no evil motive
that should be attributed to one, who, as victim of a
crime institutes the necessary legal proceedings. At the
risk of redundancy, we stress that the proscription
against the imposition of penalty on the right to litigate
must not be violated. Mere filing of a suit does not
render a person liable for malicious prosecution
DRILON V CA
HIGHLIGHT OF THE CASE DECISION
• Any person who seeks to establish otherwise has
the burden of proving bad faith or ill-motive.
Here, since the petitioners were of the honest
conviction that there was probable cause to hold
respondent Adaza for trial for the crime of
rebellion with murder and frustrated murder, and
since Adaza himself, through counsel, did not
allege in his complaint lack of probable cause,
we find that the petitioners cannot be held liable
for malicious prosecution.
• At the risk of being repetitious, it is evident in
this case that petitioners were not motivated by
malicious intent or by a sinister design to unduly
harass private respondent, but only by a well-
founded belief that respondent Adaza can be
held for trial for the crime alleged in the
information.
• The complaint filed by Adaza against the
petitioners does not allege facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action for malicious
prosecution.
DEFAMATION
The Revised Penal Code considers a statement
defamatory if it is an imputation of circumstance
“tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of
a natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of
the one who is dead.”
Malice may be malice in law contemplated in Article
354 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that:
“every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it is true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown.”
This is what is called malice in law which establishes a
presumption of malice.
In other words, if the imputation is defamatory, the
plaintiff or the prosecution need not prove malice on the
part of the defendant, for the law already presumes
that the defendant’s imputation is malicious. The
burden is on the side of the defendant to show good

intention and justifiable motive in order to overcome the
legal inference of malice.
LEGAL MALICE
Legal malice requires proof of an intentional act
performed without justification or excuse. Legal malice
may be inferred from one's acts, and unlike actual
malice, does not require proof of evil intent or motive. It
is also referred to as technical malice or malice in law.
ACTUAL MALICE
Actual malice is a statement made with a reckless
disregard for truth. Actual malice can be established
through circumstantial evidence. High degree of
awareness of falsity is required to constitute actual
malice.
IMPLIED MALICE
Implied malice is the mental state of ill will, spite,
wicked intention, or enmity which the law infers from or
imputes to certain acts. It is the inference or implication
from a willful and intentional act performed for the
accomplishment of a wrongful object or ulterior purpose.
GROUP LIBEL
In Newsweek, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (142 SCRA
171 [1986]) which involved an action for damages filed
by incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in
Negros Occidental who claimed to have 8,500 members
and several individual sugar planters in their own behalf
and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters
in the province of Negros Occidental. The complaint
alleged that the petitioner and the other defendants
committed libel against them by the publication of the
article “An Island of Fear” in the February 23, 1981 issue
of petitioner’s weekly news magazine Newsweek.
The article supposedly portrayed the island province of
Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big
landowners or sugarcane planters who not only exploited
the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane
workers/laborers, but also brutalized and killed them
with impunity. Complainants alleged that said article,
taken as a whole, showed a deliberate and malicious use
of falsehood, slanted presentation and/or
misrepresentation of facts intended to put them
(sugarcane planters) in bad light, expose them to public
ridicule, discredit and humiliation here in the Philippines
and abroad, and make them objects of hatred, contempt
and hostility of their agricultural workers and of the
public in general.
The Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiffs were not
sufficiently identified in the article published by the
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 17
petitioner. The Court sustained petitioner’s submission
that if libel was allegedly committed against a group,
there is actionable defamation only if the libel can be
said to reach beyond the mere collectivity to do damage
to a specific individual group member's reputation.
“A privileged communication may either be
absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged.
Absolutely privileged communications are those
which are not actionable even if the author has acted
in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art. VI,
of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of
Congress from liability for any speech or debate in
the Congress or in any Committee thereof.
Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged
communications containing defamatory imputations
are not actionable unless found to have been made
without good intention or justifiable motive. To this
genre belong “private communications” and “fair and
true report without any comments or remarks.”
Art Borjal vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 126466,
January 14, 1999)
Article 354 provides for matters (considered non-
constitutional privileged statements) which are
qualifiedly or conditionally privileged in nature. The
provision states that in the following cases, the
imputations can still be shown to be malicious by proof
of actual malice or malice in fact:
(1) A private communication made by any person to
another in the performance of any legal, moral or social
duty; and
(2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without
any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or
other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in
said proceedings, or of any other act performed by
public officers in the exercise of their functions.
FRAUD
Art. 33 ncc.
In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence
Prudential bank, petitioner vs.
intermediate appellate court, respondents

On August 8, 1962, defendant-appellant Philippine
Rayon Mills, Inc. entered into a contract with Nissho
Co., Ltd. of Japan for the importation of textile
machineries under a five-year deferred payment plan
To effect payment for said machineries, the
defendant-appellant applied for a commercial letter of
credit with the Prudential Bank and Trust Company in
favor of Nissho. By virtue of said application, the
Prudential Bank opened Letter of Credit No. DPP-63762
for $128,548.78 drawn and issued by Nissho.
Upon the arrival of the machineries, the Prudential
Bank indorsed the shipping documents to the defendant-
appellant which accepted delivery of the same.
To enable the defendant-appellant to take delivery
of the machineries, it executed, by prior arrangement
with the Prudential Bank, a trust receipt which was
signed by Anacleto R. Chi in his capacity as President
of defendant-appellant company.
Sometime in 1967, the defendant-appellant ceased
business operation.
On December 29, 1969, defendant-appellant's
factory was leased by Yupangco Cotton Mills for an
annual rental of P200,000.00.
The obligation of the defendant-appellant arising
from the letter of credit and the trust receipt remained
unpaid and unliquidated.
Repeated formal demands for the payment of the
said trust receipt yielded no result Hence, the present
action for the collection of the principal amount of
P956,384.95 was filed on October 3, 1974 against the
defendant-appellant and Anacleto R. Chi. the trial court
rendered its decision: sentencing the defendant
Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc. to pay plaintiff the sum of
P153,645.22 until fully paid.
Insofar as defendant Anacleto R. Chi is concerned,
the case is dismissed. Plaintiff is ordered to pay
defendant Anacleto R. Chi the sum of P20,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court. In urging the said court
to reverse or modify the decision, petitioner alleged in its
Brief that the trial court erred in disregarding its right to
reimbursement from the private respondents for the
entire unpaid balance of the imported machines, the total
amount of which was paid to the Nissho Company Ltd.
In its decision, public respondent sustained the
trial court in all respects.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having
been denied by the public respondent in its
Resolution of 11 June 1986, 6 petitioner filed the
instant petition with the supreme court.
ISSUE
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 18
Whether Philippine Rayon is liable on the basis of the
trust receipt
HELD
The trial court and the public respondent erred in
disregarding the trust receipt and in not holding that
Philippine Rayon was liable thereon. private respondents
"not only have presumably put said machinery to good
use and have profited by its operation and/or disposition
that defendants already sold the machinery covered by
the trust receipt to Yupangco Cotton Mills," and that "as
trustees of the property covered by the trust receipt.
notwithstanding demands therefor; defendants have
fraudulently misapplied or converted to their own use
any money realized from the lease, sale, and other
disposition of said machinery.“
Under Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law,
the failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of
the sale of goods, documents or instruments covered by
a trust receipt to the extent of the amount owing to the
entruster or as appear in the trust receipt or to return said
goods, documents or instruments if they were not sold or
disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust
receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa, punishable
under the provisions of Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of
the Revised Penal Code. Under Article 33 of the Civil
Code, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party in cases of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries. Estafa falls under fraud. since that violation of a
trust receipt constitutes fraud under Article 33 of the
Civil Code, petitioner was acting well within its rights in
filing an independent civil action to enforce the civil
liability arising therefrom against Philippine Rayon.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED.
The appealed Decision of 10 March 1986 of the public
respondent are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
another is hereby entered:
1. Declaring private respondent Philippine Rayon Mills,
Inc. liable on the twelve drafts in question and on the
trust and ordering it to pay petitioner:
(a) the amounts due thereon in the total sum of
P956,384.95 as of 15 September 1974, with interest
thereon at six percent (6%) per annum from 16
September 1974 until it is fully paid, less whatever may
have been applied thereto by virtue of foreclosure of
mortgages, if any;
(b) a sum equal to ten percent (10%) of the aforesaid
amount as attorney's fees.
Costs against private respondents.
MORAL DAMAGES

I. Pertinent Civil Code provisions:
CHAPTER 3
OTHER KINDS OF DAMAGES
Art. 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in
order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or
exemplary damages, may be adjudicated. The
assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is
left to the discretion of the court, according to the
circumstances of each case.
SECTION 1. - Moral Damages
Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act for omission.
Art. 2218. In the adjudication of moral damages, the
sentimental value of property, real or personal, may be
considered.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309 (Article 309: Any
person who shows disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully
interferes with a funeral shall be liable to the family of
the deceased for damages, material and moral.);
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 19
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or
abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also
recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and
sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this
article, in the order named.
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal
ground for awarding moral damages if the court should
find that, under the circumstances, such damages are
justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
II. Purpose (source: https://batasnatin.com/law-
library/civil-law/torts-and-damages/2388-
what-are-the-kinds-of-damages.html)
Awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain
means, diversion or amusement that will alleviate the
moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of
defendants culpable action. (Robleza v. CA, 174 SCRA
354)
III. Manner of Determination (source:
https://batasnatin.com/law-library/civil-
law/torts-and-damages/2388-what-are-the-
kinds-of-damages.html)
No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary. The assessment
is left to the discretion of the court according to the
circumstances of each case. However, there must be
proof that the defendant caused physical suffering etc.
(Compania Maritima v. Allied Free Worker’s Union,
G.R. No. L-31379, Aug. 29, 1988). GR: Factual basis
must be alleged. Aside from the need for the claimant to
satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of
the damages, it is also necessary to prove its causal
relation to the defendant’s act (Raagas v. Trava, G.R.
No. L-20081, Feb. 27,1968; People v. Manero, G.R.
Nos. 86883-85, Jan. 29, 1993).
Exception: Criminal cases. Moral damages may be
awarded to the victim in criminal proceedings in such
amount as the court deems just without need for
pleading or proof of the basis thereof (People v. Paredes,
July 30, 1998).
Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon
a. FACTS:
In the evening of January 13, 1991, at around past 10:00
p.m., Ray Castillon, after eating supper at Honas
Restaurant and imbibing a bottle of beer, they traversed
the highway towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon
reaching Brgy. Sto. Rosario, they figured in an accident

with a Tamaraw jeepney, owned by petitioner Nelen
Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot, which was
traveling on the same direction but made a sudden left
turn. The incident resulted in the instantaneous death of
Ray and injuries to Sergio.
On June 29, 1993, after a full-blown trial, the court a quo
rendered a decision in favor of herein private
respondents but reduced petitioners liability by 20% in
view of the contributory negligence of Ray. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendants, directing the
latter, jointly and severally, to pay the former the
following:
1. The sum of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE
THOUSAND AND NINETY-ONE (P 633,091) PESOS,
representing loss of support, death indemnity, funeral
and related expenses, moral damages and attorney’s
fees…
b. ISSUE:
Whether the Honorable Trial Court’s award of moral
damages should be disallowed absent any evidence of
bad faith or ill-motive
c. RULING:
No because moral damages are not awarded to punish
the accused but to compensate for the mental anguish,
serious anxiety, and moral shock suffered by the victim
or his family as the proximate result of the wrongful act
and they are recoverable where a criminal offense results
in physical injuries which culminate in the death of the
victim. Incapable of exact pecuniary estimation, the
assessment of such damages is left to the discretion of
the court.
ART. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by
a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand
pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition:
xxx
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants
and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of
the deceased.
However, the amount has been gradually increased
through the years. At present, prevailing jurisprudence
fixes the amount at P50,000.00.
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 20
Paragraph 3 of the same provision also serves as the
basis for the award of moral damages in quasi-delict.
The reason for the grant of moral damages has been
explained, thus:
The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration,
within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante;
and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted. The intensity of the pain experienced by the
relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of
affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with
the wealth or means of the offender.
PRIME WHITE CEMENT CORP. vs. IAC
a. FACTS
Plaintiff Alejandro Te, a member of the BOD of Prime
White Cement Corp, entered into dealership contract
with the said corporation. Said contract of exclusive
dealership provides that the corporation shall sell and
supply to respondent Te 20,000 bags of white cement
per month, for five years starting September, 1970, at the
fixed price of P9.70 per bag.
The lower court ruled in favor of Te, with award of
moral damages.
b. ISSUES:
1. Is the contract valid?
2. Is the winning party entitled to moral damages?
c. RULING:
As to the first issue, no it is not valid because the
contract was not fair and reasonable.
As to the second issue, the winning party, the
corporation Prime White Cement Corp. is not entitled to
moral damages because it does not feel any physical,
mental, or emotional anguish.
The SC ruled in favor of the defendant corporation,
citing Section 32 of the Corporation Code which states:
Sec. 32. Dealings of directors, trustees or officers with
the corporation. - A contract of the corporation with one
or more of its directors or trustees or officers is
voidable, at the option of such corporation, unless all
the following conditions are present:
1. That the presence of such director or trustee in
the board meeting in which the contract was approved
was not necessary to constitute a quorum for such
meeting;

2. That the vote of such director or trustee was not
necessary for the approval of the contract;
3. That the contract is fair and reasonable under
the circumstances; and
4. That in the case of an officer, the contract with
the officer has been previously authorized by the Board
of Directors.
Where any of the first two conditions set forth in the
preceding paragraph is absent, in the case of a contract
with a director or trustee, such contract may be ratified
by the vote of the stockholders representing at least two-
thirds (2/3) of the outstanding capital stock or of two-
thirds (2/3) of the members in a meeting called for the
purpose: Provided, That full disclosure of the adverse
interest of the directors or trustees involved is made at
such meeting: Provided, however, That the contract is
fair and reasonable under the circumstances.
Hence, contract with Te was voidable because it is not
fair to tie the hands of a corporation in a five-year
contract of exclusive dealership with a fix price per bag
of cement considering that the price of cement is
fluctuating and is even expected to rise in the coming
years. Hence, the contract was not valid and Te does not
have any legal claim against the corporation.
As to the second issue, the result of this action, which
has been proven to be without legal basis, is that
petitioner corporation's reputation and goodwill have
been prejudiced. However, there can be no award for
moral damages under Article 2217 and succeeding
articles on Section 1 of Chapter 3 of Title XVIII of the
Civil Code in favor of a corporation.
J Marketing Corp vs Sia Jr. 258 SCRA 580
a. FACTS
(Petitioner) J. Marketing Corporation, a company
engaged in the business of appliances and motorcycles,
received on April 24, 1983 from Kawasaki Motors
(Phils.) a brand new Kawasaki motorcycle, color Blue,
Mode HD-11 (1985) with Engine No. G7E-04848 and
Chassis No. KG-805535. Upon receipt, petitioners
representative placed motorcycle in the bodega of YKS
Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Tacloban City. However, on April
20, 1987, (Petitioner) found out that the motorcycle unit
was missing in the bodega and the loss immediately
reported to the police authorities specifically to the
Headquarters Constabulary Highway Patrol District No.
8, Tacloban City. Subsequently, (petitioner) tried to trace
the lost motor cycle to one Felicidad Sia, Jr., herein
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 21
(private respondent), who bought a motorcycle from one
Renato Pelande, Jr. on May 25, 1987. Allegedly,
petitioners representative went to the house of the
private respondent and examined the chassis and motor
numbers of the motorcycle in his (private respondent)
possession, and found out that the chassis and motor
numbers of the motorcycle in private respondents
possession have been tampered to jibe with the chassis
and motor numbers of the motorcycle unit previously
purchased by Renato Pelande, Jr. from petitioner. When
petitioners representative confronted private respondent
at the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group office anent
the questionable motorcycle, private respondent refused
to return the said motorcycle to petitioner and instead
told petitioners representative to file a case in court.
Hence, on September 24, 1987, petitioner filed a
complaint for replevin with damages against private
respondent Felicidad C. Sia, Jr. before the Regional Trial
Court of Tacloban City, Branch 8.
On April 14, 1988, private respondent Felicidad C. Sia
Jr. filed a third party complaint against Renato Pelante
Jr. from whom he purchased his motorcycle. Said third
party defendant was subsequently declared as in default.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision
dismissing petitioners complaint but awarded damages
and attorneys fees to private respondent. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the decision of the court a quo.
b. ISSUE
Whether the award of moral damages is proper
c. RULING
No because the plaintiff were of the honest belief that
they were exercising their right in instituting the replevin
case.
A persons right to litigate should not be penalized by
holding him liable for damages. This is especially true
when the filing of the case is to enforce what he believes
to be his rightful claim against another although found to
be erroneous. In this case, petitioner precisely instituted
the replevin case against private respondent based on the
latters own challenge to the former that if they really had
a right on the motorcycle, then they should institute the
necessary case in court. When petitioner did sue private
respondent and filed a third party complaint against the
person from whom private respondent claims to have
brought the motorcycle, it cannot be said that the
institution of the replevin suit was tainted with gross and
evident bad faith or was done maliciously to harass,
embarrass, annoy or ridicule private respondent.

Moreover, the adverse result of an action dismissal of
petitioners complaint does not per se make an act
unlawful and subject the actor to the payment of moral
damages. It is not a sound public policy to place a
premium on the right to litigate. No damages can be
charged on those who may exercise such precious right
in good faith, even if done erroneously.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
I. Excerpts from the Civil Code:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are
imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a
part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct
from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court
may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in
a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner.
Art. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a
matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they
should be adjudicated.
Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages
need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
before the court may consider the question of whether or
not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case
liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no
proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated
damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the
court may consider the question of granting exemplary
in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must
show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for
liquidated damages.
Art. 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages
are renounced in advance shall be null and void.
II. Nature
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 22
The imposition of exemplary damages is by way of
example to deter others from committing similar acts or
for correction for the public good is warranted
Also known as “punitive” or “vindictive” damages,
exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve
as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a
vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of
the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty
of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but
not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there
is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the
award is to account for injury to feelings and for the
sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person
as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and
wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be
compensation for the hurt caused by the highly
reprehensible conduct of the defendant — associated
with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness,
malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression,
insult or fraud or gross fraud — that intensifies the
injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are
often used to refer to those species of damages that may
be awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are
intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and
others like him from similar conduct in the future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages,
therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, but also where the
circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible
or outrageous conduct of the offender.
Mahinay vs Velasquez
a. FACTS
According to Olipio Machete, overseer of respondent,
petitioner uttered the following malicious and insulting
statement against respondent: Your master, a candidate
for Congressman, Ben Velasquez, is a land grabber.
Machete informed respondent of what petitioner said
about him. This impelled respondent to file a complaint
for damages against petitioner, claiming that his
utterances besmirched his and his familys reputation and
caused him anxiety, mental anguish and sleepless nights.
As no amicable settlement could be reached by the
parties, trial on the merits ensued. The trial court
eventually ruled in favor of respondent on the basis of
the sole testimony of Machete and awarded to
respondent moral damages in the amount of P100,000
and exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000. No
other evidence was adduced by either party.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that
the trial court order lacked factual basis. The Court of
Appeals, however, modified the award, as follows:
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATION that the
award for moral and exemplary damages is hereby
reduced to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively…
b. ISSUE
Whether it was proper to award moral and exemplary
damages to respondent despite his failure to take the
witness stand
c. RULING
No.
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must
be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental
anguish, fright and the like.[5] While respondent alleged
in his complaint that he suffered mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to
prove them during the trial, because he did not take the
witness stand. He should have testified on the mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and other
emotional and mental suffering he purportedly suffered
to sustain his claim for moral damages. Mere allegations
do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and
convincing proof.
The testimony of Machete was not enough evidence of
the moral damages that the respondent supposedly
suffered. Machete may have clearly testified on the
specific words uttered by petitioner against respondent
but he could not have testified on the wounded feelings
respondent allegedly went through by reason of
petitioners slanderous remark.
Neither is respondent entitled to exemplary damages. If
the court has no proof or evidence upon which the claim
for moral damages could be based, such indemnity could
not be outrightly awarded. The same holds true with
respect to the award of exemplary damages where it
must be shown that the party acted in a wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner. Furthermore, this
specie of damages is allowed only in addition to moral
damages such that no exemplary damages can be
awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear
right to moral damages.
CASE NO. 5: Yutuk vs Manila Electric Company
a. FACTS
Sometime in December 1954 appellee, a lawyer by
profession, occupied the premises located at No. 1, Bay
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 23
View Drive, Tambo, Parañaque, Rizal, then recently
vacated by one Paul Harrigan. The electric services
installed thereat, instead of being disconnected — as was
usually done by appellant in similar situations — were
retained upon her request, for obvious reasons of
convenience. The electric meter in said premises was
installed on an outside wall.
In the morning of October 13, 1955, Eliseo Jaime, a
meter inspector of appellant, visited the residence of
appellee. He then asked for a chair from one of
appellee’s maids, stood upon such chair, and
disconnected the meter of the appellee, without
informing the latter or her maids. As the electric service
in the premises was thus cut off, and the lights therein
went out, Emerenciana Miranda, one of appellee's maids,
peeped through a window and saw Jaime standing on a
chair in front of the meter. When she asked him what
had happened to their lights, Jaime replied that he had
disconnected them, and then knocked at the door anew.
When the same was opened, from the mezzanine where
appellee was, she saw Jaime holding what to her
appeared to be electrical parts; on a stool near the door
she saw a round piece of crystal, and scattered on the
pavement other parts of the electric meter. When she
asked Jaime what the trouble was, the latter, instead of
giving a responsive answer, asked her why she was
paying only 50% of her electric bills. It turned out that
prior to that day appellee had suspected that her electric
meter was registering exorbitant consumption and had
imparted such suspicion to appellant's collectors. So
when she heard Jaime's reply, she mistakenly thought
that the latter had come in connection with her
complaint, and for this reason thanked him for having
come and at last discovered that the electric meter in the
premises was defective. To this, however, Jaime replied
that the electric meter was not defective but that she was
instead stealing electric current by using a "jumper".
Appellee indignantly denied the charge and told him to
stop insulting her, especially because she was sick.
Jaime, however, disregarded her remonstrances and told
her that he would return the "jumper" and would fix it so
that, if she had been paying plenty theretofore, she
would pay much more thereafter, as a sort of punishment
for her being a thief. Because of this violent incident
appellee suffered a relapse.
When the same meter was tested by the Public Service
Commission on October 20, 1955, it was found that
there was nothing wrong with it.
On February 11, 1956, that is, almost a month after the
commencement of the present action and four months
since the alleged discovery of the "jumper" mentioned
heretofore, appellant filed a criminal complaint for theft

of electricity against appellee in the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal.
After dismissal of appellant's complaint for theft, or
more specifically, on January 17, 1957, appellee, with
leave of court, filed a supplemental complaint for the
recovery of the additional amount of P200,000.00 as
moral damages and for whatever other amount the court
may deem just, as exemplary damages.
b. ISSUE
Whether appellee is entitled for moral and exemplary
damages on account of the dismissal of the charge of
theft against here and if yes, as to what amount
c. RULING
Yes, appellee is entitled of up to P25,000 and P10,000
moral and exemplary damages, respectively.
Moral damages, under the New Civil Code, include,
inter alia, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation (Art. 2217). While these moral damages are
incapable of pecuniary estimation, they are made
recoverable, in the amount determined by the court,
provided they are the proximate result of the defendant's
wrongful act or omission. As most of these damages
affect the aggrieved party's moral feeling and personal
pride, "these should be weighed in the determination of
the indemnity" (Layda vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No.
L-4487, January 29, 1952).
On the other hand, aside from moral, temperate and
other damages, exemplary damages are imposed by way
of example or correction for the public good (New Civil
code Art. 2229). Of course, for one to recover exemplary
damages, he must first show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages (Id. Art.
2234).
In the case, appellant's own answer to the supplemental
complaint alleges that it was only after the plaintiff had
refused in bad faith to settle her obligation that the
defendant was forced to protect its interests by charging
the plaintiff with theft of electric current before the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 24-25). It
is a fact, however, that to protect its rights, appellant
could have filed but did not file any civil suit to recover
the value of the electric current allegedly consumed by
appellee but not registered in the electric meter installed
in her premises; instead it resorted to a criminal charge,
which can only mean that it chose to brandish this
weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay — a clear
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 24
perversion of the function of criminal processes and of
courts of justice.
The dismissal of the complaint for theft, filed by
appellant, does not, by itself, show that the latter's act
was wrongful as to make it liable for moral and
exemplary damages. We have heretofore held that the
law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the
right to litigate; that such right is so precious that moral
damages may not be charged on those who exercise it
erroneously, (Barreto v. Arevalo et al., 52 O.G. p. 5818),
but in the light of the facts established by the evidence in
this case, there appears to be not the slightest doubt that
Jaime's acts, subsequently approved inferentially, but
nonetheless clearly, by appellant — in spite of the
manifest regularity and suspicious character of Jaime's
behavior — and the appellant's own acts were wrongful
and reckless. On the other hand, that they directly
resulted in appellee suffering mental anguish, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock and social humiliation, is too obvious to need any
demonstration or comment.
Fuellas vs Cadano
a. FACTS
For serious physical injuries sustained by Pepito Cadano,
son of plaintiff-appellee Elpidio Cadano, two separate
actions were instituted, Civil Case No. 583, filed on
October 1, 1954, for damages against Agapito Fuellas,
father of the minor Rico Fuellas, who caused the
injuries, and Criminal Case No. 1765, against Rico
Fuellas, filed on November 11, 1954, for serious
physical injuries. They were tried jointly. On May 18,
1956, a judgment of conviction in the criminal case was
rendered, finding Rico Fuellas guilty of the offense
charged.
Petitioner posits that since the act of his son was made
with deliberate intent, he cannot be made liable for
damages under article 2176 of the Civil Code, since the
same article deals only with injuries caused by
negligence or lack of intent.
Neither can he be made liable under Article 101 of the
RPC because it only covers minors above 9 years old
who acted without discernment. Since his son was
convicted and deemed acted with discernment, Article
101 does not cover his case.
The lower court awarded to the plaintiff, among others,
moral and exemplary damages in the amounts of P
6,000, and P2,000, respectively.
b. ISSUE

Whether award for moral and exemplary damages was
proper
c. RULING
Yes.
It is true that under Art. 101 of the Revised Penal Code,
a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by
his son only if the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under
9 years of age, or over 9 but under 15 years of age, who
acts without discernment, unless it appears that there is
no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son
who commits the act under any of those conditions is by
law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12,
subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised Penal Code). The idea
is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach
certain civil liability to the person who has the
delinquent minor under his legal authority or control.
But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not
exempt from criminal liability, for which reason the
Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents
should he stand convicted. In that case, resort should be
had to the general law which is our Civil Code.
The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180,
the pertinent portion of which provides: "The father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company." To hold that this provision
does not apply to the instant case because it only covers
obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not
obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would
result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her
son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused
with criminal intent. Verily, the void apparently exists in
the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular
provision of our Civil Code, as may be gleaned from
some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or
identical cases.
NPC vs Heirs of Noble Casionan
a. FACTS
Respondents are the parents of Noble Casionan, 19 years
old at the time of the incident that claimed his life on
June 27, 1995. He would have turned 20 years of age on
November 9 of that year. Noble was originally from
Cervantes, Ilocos Sur. He worked as a pocket miner in
Dalicno, Ampucao, Itogon, Benguet.
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 25
A trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon, existed in Dalicno and
this trail was regularly used by members of the
community. Sometime in the 1970s, petitioner NPC
installed high-tension electrical transmission lines of 69
kilovolts (KV) traversing the trail. Eventually, some of
the transmission lines sagged and dangled reducing their
distance from the ground to only about eight to ten feet.
This posed a great threat to passersby who were exposed
to the danger of electrocution especially during the wet
season.
On June 27, 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner,
Melchor Jimenez, were at Dalicno. They cut two
bamboo poles for their pocket mining. One was 18 to 19
feet long and the other was 14 feet long. Each man
carried one pole horizontally on his shoulder: Noble
carried the shorter pole while Melchor carried the longer
pole. Noble walked ahead as both passed through the
trail underneath the NPC high tension transmission lines
on their way to their work place.
As Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve,
the tip of the bamboo pole he was carrying touched one
of the dangling high tension wires. Melchor, who was
walking behind him, narrated that he heard a buzzing
sound when the tip of Nobles pole touched the wire for
only about one or two seconds. Thereafter, he saw Noble
fall to the ground. Melchor rushed to Noble and shook
him but the latter was already dead.
b. ISSUE
Whether the award of exemplary damages was excessive
for want of factual basis
c. RULING
No.
In quasi delicts, exemplary damages are awarded where
the offender was guilty of gross negligence. Gross
negligence has been defined to be the want or absence of
even slight care or diligence as to amount to a reckless
disregard of the safety of person or property. It evinces a
thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting
any effort to avoid them.
In the case, Petitioner demonstrated its disregard for the
safety of the members of the community of Dalicno who
used the trail regularly when it failed to address the
sagging high tension wires despite numerous previous
requests and warnings. It only exerted efforts to rectify
the danger it posed after a death from electrocution
already occurred. Gross negligence was thus apparent,
warranting the award of exemplary damages.

The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting
to happen. As established during trial, the lines were
sagging around 8 to 10 feet in violation of the required
distance of 18 to 20 feet. If the transmission lines were
properly maintained by petitioner, the bamboo pole
carried by Noble would not have touched the wires. He
would not have been electrocuted.
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC.vs.IAC
G.R. No. L-65295
10 March 1987
Facts
At about 1:30 in the morning of 15 November 1975
private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way
home from a meeting with his boss. Dionisio had taken
"a shot or two" of liquor.
Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just
crossed an intersection not far from his home when his
car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed.
He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he
saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away
from his car.
The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name
of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"),
was parked on the right hand side of the street (i.e., on
the right hand side of a person facing in the same
direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding),
facing the oncoming traffic.
The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the
street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the
street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic.
There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning"
reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front
or rear.
The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven
home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular
driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in
view of work scheduled to be carried out early the
following morning.
Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by
swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car
smashed into the dump truck.
As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some
physical injuries including some permanent facial
scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold
bridge dentures.
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 26
Dionisio commenced an action for damages claiming
that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the
negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the
dump truck.
Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that
the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own
recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident,
while under the influence of liquor, without his
headlights on and without a curfew pass.
Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due
rare in the selection and supervision of the dump truck
driver.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio
and against Phoenix and Carbonel.
Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate
Appellate Court. That court affirmed the decision of the
trial court but modified the award of damages
Issues
1.) Whether private respondent Dionisio's negligence
may be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of
the accident rather than the earlier negligence of
Carbonel.
2.) Whether Carbonel’s employer, Phoenix, may be
held liable for negligence.
Held
The Court held that private respondent Dionisio's
negl i gence was "onl y cont ri but ory, " t hat t he
"immediate and proximate cause" of the injury
remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that
consequently respondent Dionisio may recover
damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts.
The truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive
and static condition" was rather an indispensable and
efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck
and the private respondent's car would in an probability
not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked
askew without any warning lights or reflector devices.
The improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable
risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna
Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver
must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's
negligence, although later in point of time
than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to
the accident, was not an efficient intervening or
independent cause.
Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a
presumption of negligence on the part of his employer
Phoenix in supervising its
employees properly and adequately.

The respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly
in our opinion, that Phoenix was not able to overcome
this presumption of negligence.
The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck
driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever
there was work to be done early the following morning,
when coupled with the failure to show
any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner
in which the dump truck is parked when away from
company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in
vigilando on the part of Phoenix.
SALVOSA vs. IAC
G.R. No. 70458
05 October 1988
Facts
Baguio Colleges Foundation is an academic institution
and also an institution of arts and trade. Within its
premises is the BCF Reserve Officers Training Corps
(ROTC) Unit, which is under the control of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines.
The ROTC Unit is provided by the BCF an office and an
armory located at the basement of its main building.
Jimmy B. Abon is the duly appointed armorer of the
BCF ROTC Unit. As armorer, Abon received his
appointment from the AFP. Not being an employee of
the BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP, as
well as orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the
Commandant of the BCF ROTC Unit. a commerce
student of the BCF.
Abon was also a commerce student of bcf.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking
space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a
student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed
firearm which the former took from the armory of the
ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro
died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and
convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military
Commission No. 30, AFP.
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for
damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto C.
Ungos (ROTC Commandant), Benjamin Salvosa
(President and Chairman of the Board of BCF), Jesus
Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF), Libertad D.
Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and
Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges
Foundation Inc. as party defendants.
After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision
sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin
Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc., jointly
and severally, to pay private respondents, as heirs of
Napoleon Castro.
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 27
On appeal by petitioners, the respondent Court
affirmed with modification the decision of the Trial
Court. The modification consisted in reducing the
award for loss of earning capacity of the deceased
and increasing the indemnity for the death of
Napoleon Castro.
Issue
Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity liable
with Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of
Jimmy B. Abon.
Held
The Court ruled that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be
considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or
in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180
of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B.
Abon for damages resulting from his acts.
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades are liable for "damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in
their custody." The rationale of such liability is that so
long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher,
the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as
to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the
[student]." Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 —
'so long as (the
students) remain in their custody means the protective
and supervisory custody that the school and its heads
and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as
long as they are at attendance in the school, including
recess time."
The record shows that before the shooting incident,
Roberto B. Ungos ROTC Unit Commandant, AFP, had
instructed Jimmy B. Abon "not to leave the office and
[to keep the armory] well guarded."
Apart from negating a finding that Jimmy B. Abon was
under the custody of the school when he committed the
act for which the petitioners are sought to be held liable,
this circumstance shows that Jimmy B. Abon was
supposed to be working in the armory with definite
instructions from his superior, the ROTC Commandant,
when he shot Napoleon Castro.

ELENITA LEDESMA SILVA v.
ESTHER PERALTA
FACTS OF THE CASE:
At the outbreak of the war in 1941, the defendant
Esther Peralta abandoned her studies as a student
nurse at the Zamboanga General Hospital. In June of
1942, she resided with her sister, Mrs. Pedro Pia, in
Maco, Tagum, Mabini Davao. Saturnino Silva, then
an American citizen and an officer of the United
States Army and married to one Prescilla Isabel of
Australia, had been ordered sent to the Philippines
during the enemy occupation to help unite the
guerrillas in their fight for freedom.
Some time during the year 1944, Florence, a younger
sister of the defendant was accused of having
collaborated with the enemy, and for this she was
arrested, and, accompanied by Esther, brought to
Anibongan and later to the getieral headquarters at
Magugpo for investigation.
It was during said investigation that Silva first met
Esther.
Florence was exonerated of the charges made against
her and went to live with the spouses Mr. and Mrs.
Camilo Doctolero at Tipas, Magugpo, Davao.
Silva started to frequent the house of the Doctoleros,
and soon professed love for Esther.
Having been made to believe that he was single, she
accepted his marriage proposal; and the two were
married oh January 14, 1945 by one Father Cote on
the occasion of a house blessing.
No documents of marriage were prepared nor
executed, allegedly because there-were no available
printed forms for the purpose. Hence, the lovers lived
together as husband and wife.
From the "marriage", a child, named Saturnino Silva,
Jr., was. born.
On May 8, 1945, Silva sustained serious wounds in
the battle of Ising, for which reason, he was
transferred to Leyte, and later to the United States, for
medical treatment.
While in the States, he divorced Priscilla Isabel.
and later, on May 9, 1948, contracted marriage with
plaintiff Elenita Ledesma Silva.
Upon his return to the Philippines, appellee Esther
Peralta demanded support for their child, and, upon
his refusal, instituted a suit for support in the Court of
First Instance of Manila. Thereupon, the present
action was filed against Esther, and another suit
against her was instituted in Cotabato.
the lower court awarded damages to the defendant
appellee, stating in its decision;
"El Juzgado estima en P15,000.00, (Moral Damage)
los darios que la demandada ha sufridi por haber
perdido el puesto en la Davao Council, y por los
sufrimientos moral que aquella ha sufrido, la suma de
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 28
P15,000.00, mas la adicional de P5,000.00 por
honorarios de abogado.“
This award is contested by appellants on the ground
that defendant appellee's resignation from the Girl
Scouts Davao Council was voluntary.
ISSUE:
Whether Esther Peralta is entitled to damages
because of Saturnino’s affair and abandonment.
No great effort is needed to discern that Esther Peralta
would never have agreed to live maritally with appellant
Silva nor beget a child by him had not Silva concealed
that he was already married;
and in that case appellee Peralta would not have been
compelled to relinquish her employment to attend to the
litigation filed to obtain for the child the support that
Silva refused.
Wherefore, Esther's loss of employment is ultimately a
result of Silva's deception and she should be indemnified
therefor. It is well to note in this connection, that' Silva's
act in hiding from the appellee that he could not legally
marry her, because he already had an Australian wife,
was not mere negligence, but actual fraud (dolo)
practiced upon the appellee.
Consequently, he should stand liable for any and all
damages arising therefrom.
This is a liability that flaws even from Articles 1902 and
1107 (par. 2) of 1889 (Arts. 2176 and 2202 of the New
Code).
"Art. 1902. Any person who by an act or omission
causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall
be liable for the damage so done."
"Art. 1107. In case of fraud (dolo) the debtor shall be
liable for all losses and damages which clearly arise
from the failure to fulfill the obligation."
In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is
modified and defendant appellee Esther Peralta is
enjoined from representing herself, directly or indirectly
to be the wife of appellant Saturnino R. Silva;
and appellant Saturnino R. Silva is in turn ordered to pay
Esther Peralta the amount of P30,000.00 by way of
pecuniary and moral damages, plus P5,000.00 as
attorneys' fees.
No costs.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs.
SOTERO REMOQUILLO, in his own behalf and as
guardian of the minors MANUEL, BENJAMIN,
NESTOR, MILAGROS, CORAZON, CLEMENTE
and AURORA, all surnamed MAGNO, SALUD
MAGNO, and the COURT OF APPEALS (Second
Division), Respondents.
On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-
story house of Antonio Peñaloza, his stepbrother, to
repair a “media agua” said to be in a leaking condition.
Standing on said “media agua”, Magno received
from his son thru that window a 3’ X 6’ galvanized iron
sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned around and in
doing so the lower end of the iron sheet came into
contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric
Company, causing his death by electrocution
The electric wire in question was an exposed,
uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles on the
street and carrying a charge of 3,600 volts.
It was installed there some two years before
Peñaloza’s house was constructed.
The record shows that during the construction of said
house a similar incident took place, although fortunate]y
with much less tragic consequences.
His widow and children fled suit to recover
damages from the company. After hearing, the trial court
rendered judgment in their favor.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals
At any rate, as revealed by the ocular inspection of
the premises ordered by the trial court, the distance from
the electric wire to the edge of the ‘media agua’ on
which the deceased was making repairs was only 30
inches or 2 1/2 feet.
Regulations of the City of Manila required that all wires
be kept three feet from the building
Appellant points out, nevertheless, that even
assuming that the distance, within the meaning of the
city regulations, should be measured from the edge of
the ‘media agua’, the fact that in the case of the house
involved herein such distance was actually less than 3
feet was due to the fault of the owner of said house,
because the city authorities gave him a permit to
construct a ‘media agua’ only one meter or 39 1/2 inches
wide, but instead he built one having a width of 65 3/4
inches, 17 3/8 inches more than the width permitted by
the authorities, thereby reducing the distance to the
electric wire to less than the prescribed minimum of 3
feet.
ISSUE
SHOULD MERALCO BE HELD LIABLE FOR
THE DEATH OF MAGNO?
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 29
FACTS
No because MERALCO was not negligent; or
assuming it was negligent, Magno’s act is the proximate
cause of his death.
The Supreme Court agreed to the contention of
Petitioner Company that the death of Magno was
primarily caused by his own negligence and in some
measure by the too close proximity of the “media agua”.
The principal and proximate cause of the
electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a
remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of
Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized
iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking
back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its
contacting said iron sheet, considering the latter’s length
of 6 feet.
The presence of the wires in question quite close to
the house or its “media agua” was always a source of
danger considering their high voltage and uninsulated as
they were, but the claim of the company and the reasons
given by it for not insulating said wires were unrefuted.
In Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light
Company, 16 Phil., 8, the electric company was found
negligent in leaving scattered on its premises
fulminating caps which Taylor, a 15- year old boy found
and carried home. In the course of experimenting with
said fulminating caps, he opened one of them, held it out
with his hands while another boy applied a lighted match
to it, causing it to explode and injure one of his eyes
eventually causing blindness in said eye. Said this
Tribunal in denying recovery for the injury:
“so that while it may be true that these injuries
would not have been incurred but for the negligent act of
the Defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises, nevertheless Plaintiff’s own act was the
proximate and principal cause of the accident which
inflicted the injury.”
“A prior and remote cause cannot be made the
basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more
than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion.
‘If no danger existed in the condition except because
of the independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the circumstances
which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause.”

CELEBES JAPAN FOOD V. SUSAN YERMO ET.
AL.
G.R NO. 175855 || OCTOBER 2, 2009
Nominal Damages
Petitioner contracted with Penta Manpower and Allied
Resources to provide manpower services for the former's
business, with the latter recruiting people to work for the
former, people who included respondents. Respondents
were refused entrance by the guards manning the gate as
they were already terminated from work based on a
memorandum issued by Romero, petitioner's office
manager. The memorandum was posted in the
guardhouse.
Respondents filed with the Labor Arbiter a
Complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims,
damages and attorney's fees against petitioner and Penta
Manpower, alleging that they were dismissed without
just and valid cause and due process. After proceedings,
the LA found respondents' dismissal to be illega and
proceeded to compute respondents' money claims.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). Respondents filed their
motion for reconsideration, which the NLRC denied in a
Resolution. Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA.
The CA then proceeded to decide the case by
agreeing with the LAs finding that respondents were
petitioner's employees. However, the CA found that
respondents' dismissal was for an authorized cause, as
petitioner asserted that the absence or termination of
their work was caused by a cessation of its operation as a
consequence of prolonged lack of adequate supply for
high-quality fresh tuna. Although respondents were
dismissed for an authorized cause, the CA found that
petitioner did not comply with the statutory requirement
of due process; thus, it ordered petitioner to pay each of
the respondents nominal damages in the amount of
P50,000.00.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA GROSSLY ERRED
AND/OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
BY REFUSING TO MODIFY AND/OR REDUCE
THE AWARD OF NOMINAL DAMAGES FROM
P50,000.00 TO P5,000.00 PER EMPLOYEE
TERMINATED
Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right
of the plaintiff that has been violated or invaded by the
defendant may be vindicated or recognized, and not for
the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him. Considering the circumstances in this
case, we find no error committed by the CA in fixing the
award of nominal damages in the amount of P50,000.00
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 30
for each respondent as indemnity for the violation of the
latters statutory rights.
Where an employee was terminated for cause, but the
employer failed to comply with the notice requirement,
the employee is entitled to the payment of nominal
damages pursuant to ruling in Agabon v. NLRC.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V RODRIGO
MANGAHAS
G.R NO. 118777 || JULY 28, 1999
ACTUAL DAMAGES ON BURIAL OF VICTIM
With respect to the actual damages incurred by the
relatives of the deceased, the court previously settled
that:
“Of the expenses allegedly incurred, the Court
can only give credence to those supported by receipt and
which appear to have been genuinely incurred in
connection with the death, wake, or burial of the victim.
Thus, the Court cannot take account of receipts showing
expenses incurred before the date of slaying of the
victim; those incurred after a considerable lapse of time
from the burial of the victim and which do not have any
relation to the death, wake, or burial of the victim; those
incurred for purely aesthetic or social purposes, such as
the lining of the tomb of the victim.”
The other expenses relating to the 9th day, 40th day and
1st year death anniversaries are NOT INCLUDED AS
ACTUAL DAMAGES.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V RODRIGO
MANGAHAS
G.R NO. 118777 || JULY 28, 1999
AGE OF CLAIMANT IS MATERIAL IN
DAMAGES
In the case of Zamboanga Trans Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, the parents of the respondent were killed in a
vehicular mishap involving the petitoner. The trial court
ruled in awarding of ₱16,000.00 actual damages for the
death of respondent's parents. The Supreme Court ruled
that the age of the claimant is material in the
determination of the amount of moral damages due to
the plaintiff. As ruled in the case:
“We consider the judgment of the Court of
Appeals in respect to the matter of damages to be more
in accordance with the facts, except perhaps, as to the
item of moral damages, considering the tender age of the
above-named respondent child, and We would have
upheld the same had private respondent appealed from
the decision of the trial court. Indeed, the Court of

Appeals properly interpreted the P16,000 awarded by the
trial court as including not only damages for the
deceased couple but also the other items of recoverable
damages, like compensatory or actual, etc. Thus viewed,
the amounts awarded by the trial court cannot be
considered excessive.”
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ANTONIO
SANCHEZ
G.R NO. 121039 || JANUARY 25, 1999
LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY NEEDS
UNBIASED PROOF
In People v Sanchez, where the acused was found guilty
of murder, the court ruled that the 1 million claim for
loss of earning capacity does not form part of the
damages claimed for lack of proof. As ruled in the case:
“The P50,000.00 award as actual damages should be
deemed as indemnity for the untimely demise of the
victims. We have held that only expenses supported by
receipts and which appear to have been actually
expended in connection with the death of the victims
may be allowed. No proof was presented to sustain the
award of actual damages.
Similarly, we can not award damages for loss of earning
capacity. All that was presented in evidence was the
testimony of the common law wife, Adelina Pealosa,
that Nelson earned P1,000,000.00 a year. We have held
that for lost income due to death, there must be unbiased
proof of the deceaseds average income. Self-serving,
hence unreliable statement, is not enough.”
HIGHLIGHT:
FORMULA FOR LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY
The following formula should therefore be used:
Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy x [Gross
Annual Income - Necessary Living Expenses]
The first factor, i.e., life expectancy is computed
by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 — age at death])
adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality
or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of
Mortality.
CARIAGA V. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO.
G.R. No. L-11037 || December 29, 1960
INTEREST RATE OF DAMAGES
(interest at the legal rate from the filing of the
complaint
In Edgardo Cariaga et al. v. Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company (G.R. No. L-11037, December 29, 1960),
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 31
involved a victim who was a student studying medicine.
The negligence of the bus driver caused physical injuries
to the student, and as a result, he became virtually
invalid physically and mentally.
The Supreme Court sustained the award of
compensatory damages WITH LEGAL INTEREST
FROM THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT explaining
that the income which the student could earn if he should
finish the medical course and pass the corresponding
board examinations must be deemed to be within the
same category as the actual damages for medical
expenses and the like because they could have
reasonably been foreseen by the parties at the time he
boarded the bus owned and operated by the respondent
bus company.
The Court further explained:
“At that time he was already a fourth-year student in
medicine in a reputable university. While his scholastic
record may not be first rate, it is, nevertheless, sufficient
to justify the assumption that he could have finished the
course and would have passed the board test in due time.
As regards the income that he could possibly earn as a
medical practitioner, it appears that, according to Dr.
Amado Doria, a witness for the LTB, the amount of
P300.00 could easily be expected as the minimum
monthly income of Edgardo had he finished his studies.”
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
LAMBERT V HEIRS OF RAY CASTILLON
FACTS:
The general rule is that drivers of vehicles who
bumped the rear of another vehicle are presumed
negligent. But in this case Rey is an exception. Also
applied here is the rule oncontributory negligence where
the damages to be awarded are mitigated.
The incident started when Rey went to his
brother and borrowed the latter'smotorcycle. He then
invited his friend Rolly to roam around the city. Rey
drove the motorcycle without a protective helmet with
Rolly as backrider. Around past 1p.m. after eating
supper at a restaurant and imbibing one or two bottles of
beer, Rey and Rolly traversed the highway going back to
his brother's home at highspeed.
Upon reaching a barangay, they were tailgating
a Tamaraw jeepney owned by Nita and driven by Gardo.
When the jeepney was approaching the side road with
Rey and Rolly following closely behind, Gardo slightly
veered to the right causing Rey to instinctively veer to
the left. But at this moment Gardo suddenly turned
sharply to the left towards the side of the road.

Thus the motorcycle sliced into the side of the jeepney
throwing Rey forward so that his forehead hit the angle
bar on the left front door of the jeepney even as the
motorcycle shot forward and the jeepney veered back to
the right and sped away. The incident resulted in the
instantaneous death of Rey and injuries to Rolly. The
heirs of Rey thus, led an action for damages against Nita
the jeepney owner for the death of Rey and damages to
the motorcycle. After trial the lower court rendered
judgment in favor of the heirs of Rey fnding that Nita's
driver was negligent and that such negligence was the
proximate cause of the damages for which Nita is liable.
But the court reduced liability by 20% percent in view of
the contributory negligence of Rey.
ISSUE: Whether the award of moral damages was
proper.
HELD: The award was proper.
The indemnity for death caused by a quasi-delict
used to be pegged at P3,000.00 based on Article 2206 of
the Civil Code. However, the amount has been gradually
increased through the years. At present, prevailing
jurisprudence fixes the amount at P50,000.00. While it is
true that there can be no exact or uniform rule for
measuring the value of human life and the measure of
damages cannot be arrived at by a precise mathematical
calculation, we hold that the trial courts award of moral
damages of P50,000.00 for the death of Ray Castillon is
in accord with the prevailing jurisprudence.
MAHINAY V VELASQUES
The instant case arose from the alleged defamatory
remarks of petitioner Iglecerio Mahinay against
respondent Gabino A. Velasquez, Jr. According to
Olipio Machete, petitioner uttered the following
malicious and insulting statement against respondent:
Your master, a candidate for Congressman, Ben
Velasquez, is a land grabber. Machete informed
respondent of what petitioner said about him. This
impelled respondent to file a complaint for damages
against petitioner, claiming that his utterances
besmirched his and his familys reputation and caused
him anxiety, mental anguish and sleepless nights.
As no amicable settlement could be reached by the
parties, trial on the merits ensued. The trial court
eventually ruled in favor of respondent on the basis of
the sole testimony of Machete and awarded to
respondent moral damages in the amount of P100,000
and exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000. No
other evidence was adduced by either party.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that
the trial court order lacked factual basis. The Court of
Appeals, however, modified the award, as follows:
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 32
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATION that
the award for moral and exemplary damages is hereby
reduced to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively, the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and this
appeal DISMISSED.
Whether awarding moral and exemplary damages to
respondent is proper.
Awarding of damages is not proper.
In order that moral damages may be awarded,
there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering,
mental anguish, fright and the like. While respondent
alleged in his complaint that he suffered mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock, he
failed to prove them during the trial. Indeed,
respondent should have taken the witness stand and
should have testified on the mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and other emotional and
mental suffering he purportedly suffered to sustain his
claim for moral damages. Mere allegations do not
suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and
convincing proof.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for
damages against herein petitioner is hereby
DISMISSED.
YUTUK V MANILA ELECTRIC CO
Exemplary damages
It is not disputed that appellee, a lawyer by profession,
occupied the premises located at Rizal, then recently
vacated by one Paul Harrigan. The electric services
installed there at, instead of being disconnected as was
usually done by appellant in similar situations were
retained upon her request, for obvious reasons of
convenience. The electric meter in said premises was
installed on an outside wall.
Meralco's inspector Jaime went to Yutuk’s
house and told the maid that he wanted to enter the
premises to check the electric meter. Yutuk told
inspector Jaime that meter was outside. Later, the
electricity was cut off and when Yutuk asked him what
the trouble was, inspector Jaime replied with a question
asking why she was only paying 50% of her electric
consumption. So when she heard Jaime's reply, she
mistakenly thought that the latter had come in
connection with her complaint, and for this reason
thanked him for having come and at last discovered that
the electric meter in the premises was defective. To this,
however, Jaime replied that the electric meter was not
defective but that she was instead stealing electric
current by using a "jumper". Petitioner then filed slander
against Meralco inspector.

Whether or not appellant is liable in damages to appellee
SC agrees with the trial court that appellant should be
made to pay damages to appellee, but SC is of the
opinion that the sum of P250,000.00 granted as moral
damages is exorbitant. Considering appellee's personal
circumstances and reputation, the mental anguish she
suffered by reason of the false imputation made against
her which resulted in besmirched reputation, ridicule and
humiliation, we are of the opinion that appellee is
entitled to the sum of P25,000.00 as moral damages, to
the further sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and to the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
FUELLA V. CADANO
Exemplary damages
Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-
appellant Agapito Fuellas, were both 13 years old and
classmates at St. Mary’s High School, Dansalan City.
While Pepito was studying his lessons in the classroom,
Rico took the pencil of one Ernesto Cabanok and
surreptitiously placed it inside the pocket of Pepito.
When Ernesto asked Rico to return the pencil, it was
Pepito who returned the same, an act which angered
Rico, who held the neck of Pepito and pushed him to the
floor. Villamira, a teacher, separated Rico and Pepito
and told them to go home. Rico went ahead, with Pepito
following. When Pepito had just gone down of the
schoolhouse, he was met by Rico, still in an angry mood.
Angelito Aba, a classmate, told the two to shake hands.
Pepito extended his hand to Rico, but the latter instead
held the former by the neck and with his leg, placed
Pepito out of balance and pushed him to the ground.
Pepito fell on his right side with his right arm under his
body, whereupon, Rico rode on his left side. While Rico
was in such position, Pepito suddenly cried out “My arm
is broken.” Rico then got up and went away. Pepito was
helped by others to go home. That same evening Pepito
was brought to the Lanao General Hospital for treatment
and the results of the x-ray revealed that there was a
complete fracture of the radius and ulna of the right
forearm which necessitated plaster casting. As a result, a
civil case for damages was filed against Agapito Fuellas,
father of the minor Rico.
Whether or not Agapito Fuellas may be held liable for
damages for the deliberate criminal act of his minor son.
YES. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company. This civil liability of
the father or the mother, as the case may be, is a
necessary consequence of the parental authority they
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 33
exercise over them and the only way by which they can
relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage. Since children and wards
do not yet have the capacity to govern themselves, the
law imposes upon the parents and guardians the duty of
exercising special vigilance over the acts of their
children and wards in order that damages to third
persons due to the ignorance, lack of foresight or
discernment of such children and wards may be avoided.
If the parents and guardians fail to comply with this
duty, they should suffer the consequences of their
abandonment or negligence by repairing the damage
caused”.
Temperate Damages
Art. 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are
more than nominal but less than compensatory damages,
may be recovered when the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot,
from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty.
Art. 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable
under the circumstances.
These damages are awarded for pecuniary loss, in an
amount that, from the nature of the case, cannot
be proved with certainty.
REQUISITES
(1) Actual existence of pecuniary loss.
(2) The nature and circumstances of the loss prevents
proof of the exact amount.
(3) They are more than nominal and less than
compensatory.
(4) Causal connection between the loss and the
defendant’s act or omission.
(5) Amount must be reasonable. In cases where the
resulting injury might be continuing and possible
future complications directly arising from the
injury, while certain
to occur are difficult to predict, temperate damages
can and should be awarded on top of actual or
compensatory damages; in such cases there is no
incompatibility between actual and temperate
damages as they cover two distinct phases
[Ramos v. CA, supra].

Temperate damages are incompatible with nominal
damages hence, cannot be granted concurrently
[Citytrust Bank v. IAC (1994)].
NOMINAL DAMAGES
Vindicating or recognizing the injured party’s
right to a property that has been violated or
invaded.
Temperate damages are included within the context of
compensatory damages. [Tan v.OMC Carriers,].
The SC awarded temperate damages in lieu of actual
damages for loss of earning capacity where
earning capacity is plainly established but no
evidence was presented to support the allegation
of the injured party’s actual income [Pleno v.
CA, G.R. No. 56505 (1988).
Courts are authorized to award temperate
damages even in cases where the amount of
pecuniary loss could have been proven with
certainty, if no such adequate proof was
presented. The allowance of temperate damages
when actual damages were not adequately
proven is ultimately a rule drawn from equity,
the principle affording relief to those definitely
injured who are unable to prove how definite the
injury [Republic v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 148246
(2007)].
FACTORS IN DETERMINING AMOUNT
The SC awarded temperate damages where from
the nature of the case, definite proof of
pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the
court is convinced that the plaintiff suffered
some pecuniary loss. [De Guzman v. Tumolva,
G.R. No. 188072 (2011)].
WHERE NO RECEIPTS WERE
PROVIDED
Where the amount of actual damages cannot be
determined because no receipts were presented
to prove the same but it is shown that the heirs
are entitled thereto, temperate damages may be
awarded, fixed at P25,000.00. Considering that
funeral expenses were obviously incurred by the
victim’s heirs, an award of P25,000.00 as
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 34
temperate damages is proper [People v.
Surongon (2007)].
Liquidated Damages
Art. 2226. Liquidated damages are those
agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to
be paid in case of breach thereof.
Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether
intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall
be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or
unconscionable.
It differs from a penal clause in that in the
latter case the amount agreed to be
paid may bear no relation to the
probable damages resulting from the
breach. Basically, a penalty is “ad
terrorem,” while liquidated damages are
“ad reparationem.”
REQUISITES AND CHARACTERISTICS
(1) Liquidated damages must be validly
stipulated.
(2) There is no need to prove the amount of
actual damages.
(3) Breach of the principal contract must be
proved.
RULES GOVERNING BREACH OF CONTRACT
Art. 2228. When the breach of the contract
committed by the defendant is not the
one contemplated by the parties in
agreeing upon the liquidated damages,
the law shall determine the measure of
damages, and not the stipulation.
Kinds of Attorneys Fees
1. Ordinary – reasonable compensation paid
to a lawyer by this client for the legal
services he has rendered to the latter.
2. Extraordinary – awarded by the court to the
successful litigant to be paid by the
losing party as indemnity for damages
(Aquino v. Casabar, G.R. No. 191470,

January 26, 2015). They are actual
damages due to the plaintiff.
Payable not only to the lawyer but to the
client,
unless they have agreed that the award
shall pertain to the lawyer as additional
compensation or as part thereof
(Benedicto v. Villaflores, G.R. No. 185020,
October 6, 2010).
Recovery of attorney’s fees as actual
damages (1991,1994, 2002 BAR)
GR: Attorney’s fees cannot be recovered as
actual damages.
XPNs:
1. Stipulation between parties;
2. Recovery of Wages of household helpers,
laborers and skilled workers;
3. Actions for Indemnity under workmen's
compensation and employer liability
laws;
4. Legal Support actions;
5. Separate civil action to recover civil liability
arising from crime;
6. Malicious prosecution;
7. Clearly Unfounded civil action or
proceeding against plaintiff;
8. When Double judicial costs are awarded;
9. When Exemplary damages are awarded;
10. Defendant acted in gross & evident bad
faith in Refusing to satisfy plaintiff's just &
demandable claim; and
11. When defendant's act or omission
Compelled plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or incur expenses to protect his
interest(Art. 2208)
NOTE: If not pleaded and prayed for in the
complaint, attorney’s fees are barred
(Tin Po v. Bautista, G.R. No. L55514,
March 17,1981).
Furthermore, moral damages and attorney’s
fees cannot be consolidated for they
are different in nature and each must
be separately determined (Philippine
Veterans Bank v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130439,
October 26, 1999).
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 35
Attorneys’ fees is not available when the
defendantemployer is not guilty of bad
faith (Dalusong v. Eagle Clark Shipping
Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 204233,
September 3, 2014).
Contingency fee contract
One which stipulates that the lawyer will be
paid for
his legal services only if the suit or litigation
ends
favorably to the client. (2006, 2014 Bar)
Champertous contract
Is one where the lawyer stipulates with his
client in
the prosecution of the case that he will bear
all the
expenses for the recovery of things or
property
being claimed by the client, and the latter
agrees to
pay the former a portion of the thing or
property
recovered as compensation. (2014 Bar)
Retaining Lien - right of the attorney to retain
the funds, documents, and papers of his client
which have lawfully come into his possession
until his lawful fees and disbursements have
been paid and to apply such funds to the
satisfaction thereof. (1996, 2004 Bar)
Charging Lien - right which the attorney has
upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in
pursuance of said judgments, which he
has secured in litigation of his client.
PEOPLE VS JUGUETA
Gr no. 202124 April 5, 2016
SUMMARY OF DAMAGES:
I. For those crimes like, Murder, Parricide,
Serious Intentional Mutilation,
Infanticide, and other crimes involving
death of a victim where the penalty
consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but
reduced to reclusion perpetua because
of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not
consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
ii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, other than the above-
mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
2.2 Where the crime committed was not
consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but
reduced to reclusion perpetua because
of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 36
1.2 Where the crime committed was not
consummated but merely attempted:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, other than the above-
mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
2.2 Where the crime committed was not
consummated, but merely attempted:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code where death,
injuries, or sexual abuse results, the civil
indemnity, moral damages and
exemplary damages will depend on the
penalty, extent of violence and sexual
abuse; and the number of victims where
the penalty consists of indivisible
penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but
reduced to reclusion perpetua because
of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, other than the above-
mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
The above Rules apply to every victim who
dies as a result of the crime committed.
In other complex crimes where death
does not result, like in Forcible
Abduction with Rape, the civil

indemnity, moral and exemplary
damages depend on the prescribed
penalty and the penalty imposed, as
the case may be.
IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery
with Homicide, Robbery with Rape,
Robbery with Intentional Mutilation,
Robbery with Arson, Rape with
Homicide, Kidnapping with Murder,
Carnapping with Homicide or
Carnapping with Rape, Highway
Robbery with Homicide, Qualified Piracy,
Arson with Homicide, Hazing with Death,
Rape, Sodomy or Mutilation and other
crimes with death, injuries, and sexual
abuse as the composite crimes, where
the penalty consists of indivisible
penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but
reduced to reclusion perpetua because
of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the
amount of damages is the same as the
above if the penalty imposed is Death
but reduced to reclusion
perpetua although death did not occur.
1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal
wounds and could have died if not for a
timely medical intervention, the
following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
1.3 For the victims who suffered non-
mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 37
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, other than the above-
mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the
amount of damages is the same as the
above if the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua.
2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal
wounds and could have died if not for a
timely medical intervention, the
following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.3 For the victims who suffered non-
mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
In Robbery with Physical Injuries, the amount
of damages shall likewise be dependent
on the nature/severity of the wounds
sustained, whether fatal or non-fatal.
The above Rules do not apply if in the crime
of Robbery with Homicide, the robber/s
or perpetrator/s are themselves killed or
injured in the incident.
Where the component crime is rape, the
above Rules shall likewise apply, and
that for every additional rape
committed, whether against the same
victim or other victims, the victims shall
be entitled to the same damages unless
the other crimes of rape are treated as
separate crimes, in which case, the
damages awarded to simple
rape/qualified rape shall apply.
V. In other crimes that result in the death of a
victim and the penalty consists of
divisible penalties, i.e., Homicide, Death
under Tumultuous Affray, Infanticide to
 TORTS AND DAMAGES - FINALS 38

conceal the dishonour of the

offender, Reckless Imprudence Resulting
to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion
and Unintentional Abortion, etc.:
1.1 Where the crime was consummated:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
C. For the victims who suffered non-
mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not
consummated, except those crimes
where there are no stages, i.e., Reckless
Imprudence and Death under
tumultuous affray:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱30,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱30,000.00
VII. In all of the above instances, when no
documentary evidence of burial or
funeral expenses is presented in court,
the amount of ₱50,000.00 as temperate
damages shall be awarded.

b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱20,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱20,000.00

If an aggravating circumstance was proven

during the trial, even if not alleged in the
Information, in addition to the above
mentioned amounts as civil indemnity
and moral damages, the amount of
₱50,000.00 exemplary damages for
consummated; ₱30,000.00 for frustrated;
and ₱20,000.00 for attempted, shall be
awarded.

VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the

imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua and death occurs in the
course of the rebellion, the heirs of those
who died are entitled to the following:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal

wounds in the course of the rebellion
and could have died if not for a timely
medical intervention, the following shall
be awarded:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00