HECO Lightning Performance Analysis

Kahe-Waiau 138 kV line

Report
 HECO Lightning Performance Analysis
Kahe-Waiau 138 kV line
Report

March 2009

EPRI Project Manager

F.F. Bologna

ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE

3420 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, California 94304-1338 ▪ PO Box 10412, Palo Alto, California 94303-0813 ▪ USA
800.313.3774 ▪ 650.855.2121 ▪ askepri@epri.com ▪ www.epri.com
THIS DOCUMENT WAS PREPARED BY THE ORGANIZATION(S) NAMED BELOW AS AN ACCOUNT OF
WORK SPONSORED BY THE ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC. (EPRI).

ORGANIZATION(S) THAT PREPARED THIS DOCUMENT

Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

Engelbrecht Consulting

NOTE
For further information about EPRI, call the EPRI Customer Assistance Center at 800.313.3774 or
e-mail askepri@epri.com.

Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI, and TOGETHER…SHAPING THE FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY are
registered service marks of the Electric Power Research Institute, Inc.

Copyright © 2009 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
CITATIONS

This document was prepared by

Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
1300 West WT Harris Blvd
Charlotte, NC 28262
Principal Investigators
A. J. Phillips
F.F. Bologna
T. Shaw
Engelbrecht Consulting
Catharinadaal 84
Ede, 6715KD
The Netherlands
Principal Investigator
C. Engelbrecht
This document describes research sponsored by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI).
This publication is a corporate document that should be cited in the literature in the following manner:
HECO Lightning Performance Analysis: Kahe-Waiau 138 kV line. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2009.

iii
CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................1-1
Background ...........................................................................................................................1-1
Study Objectives ...................................................................................................................1-2

2 DESCRIPTION OF LINE STUDIED .......................................................................................2-1

Overview and Geographic Description of Transmission Line Route ................................2-1
Configuration of Structure 29 ................................................................................................2-6
Insulation Level of Structure 29.............................................................................................2-8
Tower Structure Footing Resistances .................................................................................2-12
TFlash Model ......................................................................................................................2-13

3 LIGHTNING PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS ............................................................................3-1

Lightning Performance of Transmission Line ........................................................................3-1
Shielding Failure Analysis .....................................................................................................3-1
Analysis of Induced Lightning Overvoltages .........................................................................3-7
Backflashover Analysis .........................................................................................................3-7
Overall Line Lightning Performance ....................................................................................3-10
Lightning Density in Hawaii ............................................................................................3-11

4 MITIGATION OPTIONS..........................................................................................................4-1

5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................5-1

6 REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................6-1

v
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1-1. A photograph of Structure 29 of the Kahe-Waiau 138 kV line during insulator
replacement. ......................................................................................................................1-2
Figure 2-1. Kahe Power Plant Structure 117 Double Circuit Wood (the 3 poles on the
left are part of Kahe-Waiau line) ........................................................................................2-2
Figure 2-2. Kahe-Waiau Structure 103 Double Circuit Wood ....................................................2-2
Figure 2-3. Kahe-Waiau Structure 95 Steel A-Frame ................................................................2-2
Figure 2-4. Kahe-Waiau Structure 92 Steel H-Frame ................................................................2-2
Figure 2-5. Kahe-Waiau Structure 90 Steel Lattice with grillage foundation..............................2-3
Figure 2-6. Kahe-Waiau Structure 65 Double Circuit Wood with X-Brace ................................2-3
Figure 2-7. Kahe-Waiau Structure 56 Separate Steel Poles (Kahe-Waiau pole on right).........2-3
Figure 2-8. Kahe-Waiau Structure 49 Double Circuit Wood Tangent .......................................2-3
Figure 2-9. Kahe-Waiau Structure 38 Double Circuit Wood Angle ...........................................2-4
Figure 2-10. Kahe-Waiau Structure 34 Double Circuit Wood (Kahe-Waiau splits off) ..............2-4
Figure 2-11. Kahe-Waiau Structure 30 Single Circuit Wooden Structure .................................2-4
Figure 2-12. Kahe-Waiau Structure 29 Single Circuit Wooden Structure .................................2-4
Figure 2-13. Kahe-Waiau Structure 28 Single Circuit Wooden Structure .................................2-5
Figure 2-14. Kahe-Waiau Structure 14 (Kahe-Waiau and Waiau-Koolau #2 combines as
it goes to Waiau Power Plant)............................................................................................2-5
Figure 2-15. Kahe-Waiau 138 kV Transmission Line route on topographic background.
Green areas indicate mountainous areas. Yellow circle indicates region where
structure 29 is located. .......................................................................................................2-6
Figure 2-16 An overview of the phase configuration and principal dimensions of
Structure 29 of the 138 kV Kahe-Waiau transmission line. Note: the yellow line
indicates the bonding between the insulators de-energized end hardware and the
green line the grounded connection between the shield wire and the ground
electrode. ...........................................................................................................................2-7
Figure 2-17 Structure 65 – Phase wires supported by single suspension insulator
assembly consisting of 8 insulator bells .............................................................................2-9
Figure 2-18 Structure 29 – Phase wires are secured by two insulator assemblies. The
upper insulator assembly holds the phase wires up and the lower assembly ties the
wires down preventing excessive movement of the wires..................................................2-9
Figure 2-19 Close up view of the upper and lower insulator assemblies that secure the
phase wires ......................................................................................................................2-10

vii
Figure 2-20 Lightning impulse flashover of an insulator string in series with a wood
gap[1]. ..............................................................................................................................2-11
Figure 3-1 An illustration of the Electro-Geometric Method (EGM) to determine the
effectiveness of the shield wires to protect phase conductors from direct lighting
strikes.................................................................................................................................3-2
Figure 3-2 An illustration of the Electro-Geometric Method (EGM) showing the maximum
penetration current which is the current magnitude above which strikes are not
expected to terminate on the phase conductors. ...............................................................3-3
Figure 3-3 The stroke viewer of TFlash showing shielding failures for a prospective
lightning strike current of 10 kA..........................................................................................3-4
Figure 3-4 The stroke viewer of TFlash showing that no shielding failures occur for a
prospective lightning strike current of 12.5 kA. ..................................................................3-5
Figure 3-5 The stroke viewer of TFlash showing that no shielding failures occur for a
prospective lightning strike current of 5 kA with 40 foot vegetation....................................3-6
Figure 3-6 The stroke viewer of TFlash showing lightning attaching to the phase
conductors for a prospective lightning strike current of 2.5 kA with 40 foot
vegetation. Note: A 2.5 kA lightning strike to the phase conductors would not result
in a flashover......................................................................................................................3-6
Figure 3-7 A Lightning Strike to a Transmission Line ................................................................3-8
Figure 3-8 A map of the lightning ground flash density in the contiguous United States. ........3-12

viii
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1-1 Correlation between relay actuations and lightning strikes as detected by
PacNet. ..............................................................................................................................1-1
Table 2-1 Structure Types Used in TFlash model ...................................................................2-13
Table 3-1 Summary of the shielding failure analysis. ................................................................3-4
Table 3-2 Calculated lightning current necessary to cause a backflashover on tower 29. ........3-9
Table 3-3 Lightning performance targets of various Utilities in the contiguous United
States and Canada as expressed in Outages per 100 miles per year. ............................3-11

ix
1
INTRODUCTION

Background

On the evening of December 26, 2008, Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc. (HECO) experienced a
number of transmission line disturbances that resulted in an island-wide outage. Indications are
that this event was initiated by lightning as the times of certain lightning flashes on Oahu
recorded by the new Pacific Lightning Detection Network (PacNet) coincide with the protective
relay trip times experienced by HECO for multiple transmission line disturbances. See Table
1-1. PacNet, which is part of a larger long-range lightning detection network (LLDN) currently
under development, monitors lightning activity over the central North Pacific Ocean with an
existing network of ground-based lightning detectors that have been installed on four widely
spaced Pacific islands (400-3800 km).

Table 1-1
Correlation between relay actuations and lightning strikes as detected by PacNet.

Transmission Line HECO Relay Trip Time PacNet Detects Lightning Strikes
Hawaii Standard Time (HST) (HST)
Kahe-Waiau 12/26/08 – 18:35:30 (6:35:30 p.m.) 12/26/08 - 18:35:30 (6:35:30 p.m.)
Kahe Halawa #1 12/26/08 – 18:36:22 (6:36:22 p.m.) 12/26/08 - 18:36:22 (6:36:22 p.m.)
Notes:
1) Lightning data provided by Dr. Antti Pessi of the University Hawaii Meteorology Department.
2) Lightning detection sensors are located at Unalaska (Alaska), Lihue (Kauai), Kona (Hawaii), and Kwajalein
(Marshall Islands) and in its existing stage of development provide the capability to detect, locate and record
lightning events within the boundaries of this sensor network. While the sensors detect lightning, only events that
register both detection and location are recorded by the PacNet system.

It is believed that the lightning strike detected on 12/26/08 at 18:35:30 (6:35:30 p.m.), as noted in
Table 1-1 above, was the main cause of a 3-phase fault on the Kahe-Waiau 138 kV transmission
line that triggered a chain of events that spanned several minutes and resulted in the island-wide
outage. Data retrieved from the Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, SEL-221H distance relays
placed the location of the fault at approximately 3.0 miles from the Waiau power plant. After a
systematic inspection, HECO line crews found visual evidence of a 3-phase fault at Structure 29
of the Kahe-Waiau 138 kV transmission line which is approximately 2.73 miles from the Waiau
power plant.
 Figure 1-1
A photograph of Structure 29 of the Kahe-Waiau 138 kV line during insulator replacement.

Climbing inspections of Structure 29 (see Figure 1-1 above) revealed evidence of arcing on one
of the phase conductors, “flashed over” indications on the insulators of all 3 phases, and burnt
and melted bond wires in 2 locations. Examination of the overhead shield wires, ground wire
and ground rod revealed no arcing, pitting or other evidence of a lightning strike.

Study Objectives

EPRI was tasked to perform a lightning performance study of the Kahe-Waiau 138kV
transmission line, which, as mentioned above, was the location of the 3-phase fault. The aims of
the study were to:
• Perform a technical analysis of lightning performance of the Kahe-Waiau 138 kV
transmission line, Structure 29 and adjacent structures with EPRI’s TFlash software.
• Identify the most likely mechanism by which a lightning strike would result in a 3-phase
fault.
• Identify possible mitigation options that may reduce the potential susceptibility of the
transmission line to lightning strikes.

The TFlash software is able to take into account several factors such as local geographic
conditions, e.g., vegetation and the elevation profile of the line, and produce a result in terms of
number of outages per year which can be used in the overall analysis to determine the flashover

1-2
mechanism and provide mitigation alternatives for consideration. The TFlash model was based
on design information and measured values provided by HECO.

In this report, Chapter 2 provides a description of the Kahe-Waiau 138 kV transmission line
together with an overview of the assumptions used in the lightning performance analysis.
Chapter 3 provides a discussion of the lightning density in the region, the historical performance
of the line and a comparison against lightning performance targets used by utilities on the
mainland US. Chapter 4 provides mitigation options and recommendations for consideration,
and finally Chapter 5 ends this report with a summary of the findings and conclusions derived
from this analysis effort.

1-3
2
DESCRIPTION OF LINE STUDIED

Overview and Geographic Description of Transmission Line Route

The Kahe-Waiau 138 kV transmission line is one of many transmission lines that serve as the
backbone that make up the HECO transmission grid serving the island of Oahu. This particular
transmission line is routed from the Kahe power plant to the Waiau power plant.

The line configuration varies along the line as follows:

• The line shares common structures with the Kahe-Halawa #1 transmission line (i.e., as a
double circuit transmission line) from Structures #118 to #34
• The line runs as a single circuit transmission line from Structures #34 to #14
• The line shares common structures with the Waiau-Koolau #2 transmission line (i.e., as a
double circuit transmission line) from Structures #14 to #1

Consequently, a variety of support structures are used on this line which range from wood pole
to steel lattice structures. Examples of typical structures are presented in Figure 2-1 to Figure
2-14 below. Although the focus of the study was on structure 29 and nearby structures (i.e., the
area surrounding the 3-phase fault), the images of other structures are provided as background
information.

2-1
 Figure 2-1. Kahe Power Plant Structure 117 Figure 2-2. Kahe-Waiau Structure 103
Double Circuit Wood (the 3 poles on the left are Double Circuit Wood
part of Kahe-Waiau line)

Figure 2-3. Kahe-Waiau Structure 95 Figure 2-4. Kahe-Waiau Structure 92

Steel A-Frame Steel H-Frame

2-2
 Figure 2-5. Kahe-Waiau Structure 90 Figure 2-6. Kahe-Waiau Structure 65
Steel Lattice with grillage foundation Double Circuit Wood with X-Brace

Figure 2-7. Kahe-Waiau Structure 56 Figure 2-8. Kahe-Waiau Structure 49

Separate Steel Poles (Kahe-Waiau pole on right) Double Circuit Wood Tangent

2-3
Figure 2-9. Kahe-Waiau Structure 38 Figure 2-10. Kahe-Waiau Structure 34
Double Circuit Wood Angle Double Circuit Wood
(Kahe-Waiau splits off)

Figure 2-12. Kahe-Waiau Structure 29

Figure 2-11. Kahe-Waiau Structure 30 Single Circuit Wooden Structure
Single Circuit Wooden Structure

2-4
 Figure 2-13. Kahe-Waiau Structure 28 Figure 2-14. Kahe-Waiau Structure 14
Single Circuit Wooden Structure (Kahe-Waiau and Waiau-Koolau #2
combines as it goes to Waiau Power Plant)

Figure 2-15 shows the Kahe-Waiau 138 kV transmission line route overlaid on a geographic
terrain map to illustrate the terrain along this route. The “green” areas are mountainous areas,
and the “white” areas are the low laying plains between the Waianae and Koolau Mountain
Ranges. The Kahe power plant is on the left of the figure and Waiau power plant on the right.
The soil conditions vary along the line route from very arid and dry to sandy.

2-5
Figure 2-15. Kahe-Waiau 138 kV Transmission Line route on topographic background. Green
areas indicate mountainous areas. Yellow circle indicates region where structure 29 is located.

Configuration of Structure 29
Based on design data, distance relay fault location information and visual evidence of a
flashover, Structure 29 of the Kahe-Waiau 138 kV transmission line has been identified as the
location of the 3-phase fault that occurred on the evening of December 26, 2008.

Structure 29 is a modified wooden H-frame structure with side support guy wires, as is shown in
Figure 2-12 above and Figure 2-16 below. The lightning protection system consists of a
3/8” Extra High Strength (EHS) steel galvanized shield wire located at the top of the wooden
transmission structure. The shield wire is connected to a 5/8” x 8’-0” copper clad steel ground
rod by a #4 soft drawn bare copper down lead.

2-6
 Figure 2-16
An overview of the phase configuration and principal dimensions of Structure 29 of the 138 kV
Kahe-Waiau transmission line. Note: the yellow line indicates the bonding between the
insulators de-energized end hardware and the green line the grounded connection between the
shield wire and the ground electrode.

2-7
The “de-energized end hardware” of the insulators is bonded together and is separate from the
shield wire ground by design. The estimated gap between the ground wire and the wire bonding
of the insulators is 12.5” (0.32 m).

The phase wires are AAC 556.5 kcmil (Dahlia). Each phase is a vertical two wire bundle with
about 19” of separation.

As can be seen in Figure 2-12 and Figure 2-15 above, Structure 29 is located in a mountainous
region. This area has poor grounding conditions (in this case, high soil resistivity) as indicated
by a high tower footing resistance.

Insulation Level of Structure 29

Overhead high voltage transmission conductors are supported by a series of tower structures.
The high voltage conductors are physically supported and connected to the tower structures by
insulators that are designed to provide both structural support and electrical insulation. These
insulator assemblies are comprised of a string of porcelain bells or disks where one end connects
to the high voltage conductor and the other end connects to the tower structure. The insulation
level or electrical strength of the insulator assembly is given by a critical flashover voltage
(CFO), which represents the voltage above which a flashover is established across the insulation.
A flashover of the line insulation, which is an electrical arc from the energized conductor to one
or more of the phases or ground wires, results in a short-circuit event.

The HECO 138 kV transmission system uses insulator assemblies comprised of 8 standard
suspension porcelain insulator bells with a designed CFO of 760 kV. However, to determine the
actual insulation level of a particular structure, other factors must also be taken into account
beyond just the designed CFO of the insulator assemblies, such as insulator configuration, wood
gap, etc. These factors may adjust the base CFO value (760 kV) up or down.

Based on the factors above, the insulation level of Structure 29 is estimated at 739 kV. An
explanation on how this value was derived is provided below.

Most of the transmission tower structures that support the Kahe-Waiau 138 kV transmission line
are fitted with a single suspension insulator assembly that supports the high voltage conductors
for each phase. The single insulator assembly is comprised of 8 standard suspension porcelain
insulator bells as shown for Structure 65 in Figure 2-17 below. The insulator configuration on
Structure 29, as shown in Figure 2-18 below, differs from the more common single suspension
design in that each phase conductor is supported by an upper and lower insulator assembly, with
each assembly comprised of 8 standard porcelain insulator bells.

2-8
 Single suspension insulator assembly Upper insulator assembly

Lower insulator assembly

Figure 2-17 Figure 2-18

Structure 65 – Phase wires supported by Structure 29 – Phase wires are secured by two
single suspension insulator assembly insulator assemblies. The upper insulator
consisting of 8 insulator bells assembly holds the phase wires up and the
lower assembly ties the wires down preventing
excessive movement of the wires

Basis for using 739 kV for CFO on Structure 29:

Upon close examination of the insulator and conductor configuration of Structure 29, we note
that each of the 3- phase conductors are comprised of two parallel conductors per phase
supported by two 8-disk insulator assemblies - an upper and a lower assembly as mentioned
above and shown in Figure 2-19 below. The de-energized end of the string of insulator
assemblies are tied together (bonded) and connected to the wood pole cross arm. The 8-disk
insulators provide the electric isolation from the electrified phase conductors on one end and the
de-energized connection to the structure on the other end.

2-9
 Figure 2-19
Close up view of the upper and lower insulator assemblies that secure the phase wires

For purposes of analyzing the insulation level on Structure 29 and determining whether and what
adjustments should be made to the base CFO voltage of 760 kV for an 8 bell insulator assembly,
two factors were considered: (1) the location of the lightning protection ground conductor from
the phase insulators (i.e., wood gap) and (2) the effects of the upper/lower insulator assembly
design (Figure 2-18 and Figure 2-19) which differs from the single suspension design (Figure
2-17).

Effects of Wood Gap:

In addition to supporting insulators and conductors, the Kahe-Waiau transmission structures also
support the lightning protection system, comprised of a shield wire attached to the top of the
structure, a “down lead” that runs along the pole, and the ground rod below that electrically ties
the shield wire to ground.

When estimating the total insulation of the structure, the distance from the de-energized end of
the 8-bell insulators to the nearest ground (i.e., down lead) is factored into the analysis. This
distance is referred to as the wood gap. If the dielectric contribution of the wood gap is
substantial, it may result in an adjustment to the CFO of 760 kV.

2-10
The wood gap on Structure 29 is approximately 12.5” (0.32 m) from the bonded de-energized
end of the 8-bell insulator string to the down lead. The total dielectric strength is determined by
adding the dielectric contributions of the 8-bell insulator and the 12.5” wood gap which are
configured in series.

Referring to Figure 2-20 below, it can be seen that the dielectric strength contribution from a
wood gap of approximately 12.5” (0.32 m) is negligible compared to the dielectric strength
contribution of the 8-bell insulator. As such, the insulation of Structure 29 from its base CFO of
760 kV is not changed by the wood gap (i.e., location of the lightning protection ground
conductor from the phase insulators).

Figure 2-20
Lightning impulse flashover of an insulator string in series with a wood gap[1].

Effects of the Upper/Lower Insulator Assembly Design:

As further discussed below, a change in the insulation of Structure 29 from its base CFO of
760 kV is required due to its upper/lower insulator assembly design. As mentioned above, on
Structure 29, there are two insulator strings per set of parallel phase conductors. However, they
are separated in such a way that they can be considered as independent sets of insulators. In
other words, the discharge along one insulator (e.g., upper assembly) will not be influenced by
the presence of the other insulator string (e.g., lower assembly). Because they act independently,
the critical flashover (CFO) of the combined string will be lower than that of a single string.

2-11
Statistics determine that if there are “n” independent gaps with the same flashover
characteristics, the flashover probability of the combined gaps [PCombination(V)] can be expressed
in terms of the flashover probability of a single gap [Psingle(V)]
[
PCombination (V ) = 1 − 1 − Psin gle (V ) ] n

Assuming that the probability of flashover as a function of voltage is described by a normal

distribution function with a standard deviation of 5%, the CFO of two parallel insulator strings
with 8 discs is calculated as 739 kV.

Thus a reasonable and conservative assumption is to base the lightning performance calculations
for Structure 29 on a CFO of 739 kV.

Tower Structure Footing Resistances

Shortly after the 3-phase fault, the ground resistance of Structures 28, 29, and 30 were measured
by HECO as these structures have a primary impact on the lightning performance of Structure
29. The results were:
• Structure 28: 96 ohms
• Structure 29: 122 ohms
• Structure 30: between 300-400 ohms

These values were used in the TFlash model for the specific structures.

In addition, because nearby structures, e.g., Structures 13-27 and 31-33, do have a secondary
impact on the lightning analysis of Structure 29, footing resistances were also calculated for
these structures and entered into the model. (Note Structure numbering goes 13, 14, 27, 28, etc.).
Based on a ground electrode configuration consisting of a 5/8” x 8’-0” copper clad steel ground
rod and typical soil resistivity of 700 ohm-m in the mountainous regions on Oahu, a typical
tower footing resistances of 125 ohms was calculated. These values, together with the measured
values were incorporated into the TFlash model.

2-12
TFlash Model

TFlash models of the Kahe-Waiau 138 kV transmission line were created for the analysis using
drawings and PLS-CADD files provided by HECO. Structures 28, 29, and 30 were modeled in
more detail than the rest of the line to focus on the specific area of the 3-phase outage that
occurred on December 26, 2008. Table 2-1 below lists the structure types used in the TFlash
model. The conductor positions and structure elevations were taken from the PLS-CADD file.

Table 2-1
Structure Types Used in TFlash model

Structures Structure Type Used

13, 14 Single Circuit Steel Lattice

27, 31, 32, 33 Single Circuit Wood Pole

28-30 Single Circuit H-Frame

2-13
3
LIGHTNING PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

Lightning Performance of Transmission Line

An analysis was performed by EPRI to determine if the 3-phase fault on the Kahe-Waiau 138kV
transmission line was due to lightning and, if so, by which of the three mechanisms discussed
further below. A secondary objective was to obtain an initial estimate of the overall likelihood
of lightning strikes and 3-phase faults on the line and identify appropriate mitigation measures if
needed.

Lightning may cause outages (i.e., faults) on transmission lines in three ways[1]:
1. Shielding Failure: Lightning strikes may bypass (i.e., not strike) the overhead shield wires
and terminate (i.e., strike) directly on the phase conductors. If the lightning current is high
enough, this may result in a flashover (i.e., jumping over one or more insulators to the
grounding system or to another phase conductor(s)) due to the voltage buildup on the line.
The shielding failure rate is determined by considering the presence and position of the
overhead shield wires with respect to the phase conductors. For a given arrangement, the
shielding outage rate is equal to the number of strikes terminating on the phase conductor
with a sufficiently high current magnitude to result in a flashover.
2. Induced Overvoltage: Lightning strikes may also terminate (i.e., strike) in the vicinity of an
overhead line without directly striking the line, shield wire or the structure itself. If this
creates high enough voltages in the phase conductors, this could cause a flashover of the
insulation. These types of lightning-induced overvoltages are normally not problematic on
transmission lines of 115 kV and above as such designs typically have basic insulation levels
exceeding the maximum levels of overvoltage typically induced by lightning strikes (i.e.,
250-300 kV).
3. Backflashover: Lightning strikes may also terminate (i.e., strike) the overhead shield wire
or structure. If this raises the potential of the structure sufficiently high enough, this may
cause a flashover from the structure across one or more insulators to the phase conductors.

Shielding Failure Analysis

Several methods currently exist to analyze how well ground wires protect the phase conductors
of a line from direct lightning strikes and subsequent outages. The most widely used method is
the electro-geometric method (EGM) [1]. This method, or model, assumes that each conductor
and the ground plane have an attractive radius which is dependent on the prospective lightning
current. The larger the prospective lightning current, the greater the attractive radius of the
conductors.

3-1
This concept is illustrated in Figure 3-1 below for a specific magnitude of prospective lightning
current. A vertical lightning strike in the region Dc will terminate on the phase conductor, a
strike to the left of Dc will terminate on the shield wire, and a strike to the right will terminate on
the ground. Because the attractive radii increases with increasing lightning current magnitude,
the shielding effect of the overhead ground wires (i.e., the ability of the ground wire to prevent a
flashover of the current to the phase conductors) improves for increasing levels of the lightning
prospective current. In fact, there is a lightning current magnitude above which one should not
expect the lightning strike to ever terminate on the phase conductors.

Dc

Sgw

Sph

Sg

Figure 3-1
An illustration of the Electro-Geometric Method (EGM) to determine the effectiveness of the
shield wires to protect phase conductors from direct lighting strikes.

The lightning shielding performance is primarily determined by the position of the shield wires,
the line insulation strength and the presence of nearby objects such as trees, other transmission
lines or buildings that may shield the line. The ground electrode has no influence on the
shielding performance of lines.

The essence of a shielding analysis is to calculate:

1. The minimum current that would trigger a flashover across the line insulation to the
grounding system should a lightning strike terminate on (i.e., strike) a phase conductor
(minimum critical current). It is named the critical current, Ic, and in its simplest form is
calculated from the critical lightning impulse flashover strength, CFO, and the surge
impedance of the line, Z0, by:
2 ⋅ CFO
Ic =
Z0

3-2
2. The maximum current that can possibly terminate on the phase conductor (i.e., the maximum
penetration current). This maximum current is the current magnitude above which lightning
strikes are not expected to terminate on (i.e., strike) the phase conductors. The uncovered
width Dc shown in Figure 2-16 is dependent on the level of the prospective lightning current.
As the prospective lightning current increases, the distance Dc becomes smaller. The
maximum penetration current is defined as the prospective lightning current where the
uncovered distance (Dc in Figure 3-1) becomes zero as illustrated in Figure 3-2.

A shielding failure flashover occurs if a lightning strike with a prospective current between the
minimum critical current and the maximum penetration current occurs in the uncovered width Dc
(See Figure 3-1). Perfect shielding is reached if the minimum critical current is equal or exceeds
the maximum penetration current.

Sgw

Sph

Sg

Figure 3-2
An illustration of the Electro-Geometric Method (EGM) showing the maximum penetration
current which is the current magnitude above which strikes are not expected to terminate on the
phase conductors.

The TFlash model was used for the shielding analysis as it utilizes a modified EGM that can
account for changes in geography and terrain, presence of objects near the shield wires, and
bending of the down leader. For the shielding analysis of the line sections adjacent to
Structure 29 of the Kahe-Waiau 138 kV line, the focus was on determining if a shielding failure
could result in a 3-phase flashover. For this reason, two levels of critical current were
determined: the current necessary for (a) a single-phase fault, and (b) for a 3-phase fault. These

3-3
values were then compared to the calculated maximum penetration current for the phase and
shield wire configuration of Structure 29. The results are presented in Table 3-1 below.

Table 3-1
Summary of the shielding failure analysis.

Parameter Value

1 phase fault 7.5 kA

Minimum critical lightning current
that will result in flashover
3 phase fault 176 kA

Maximum penetration current that will not be

intercepted by the shield wire (i.e., current above 10 kA
this amount will be intercepted by shield wire)

The results can be presented graphically in TFlash through the stroke viewer. Figure 3-3 shows
that shielding failure can occur for a prospective lightning current of 10 kA. These shielding
failures, however, will result only in single phase to ground flashovers as this magnitude of
current exceeds the minimum critical current associated with single phase faults but is much
lower than that required for a 3-phase fault. Figure 3-3 shows that no shielding failures occur for
prospective lightning currents of 12.5 kA, because the maximum penetration current is exceeded.

Figure 3-3
The stroke viewer of TFlash showing shielding failures for a prospective lightning strike current
of 10 kA.

3-4
 Figure 3-4
The stroke viewer of TFlash showing that no shielding failures occur for a prospective lightning
strike current of 12.5 kA.

The presence of elevated vegetation (e.g., trees) along the line changes the shielding failure
analysis as lightning strikes are attracted to the vegetation depending on the height of the
vegetation. The presence of vegetation can as a result reduce the magnitude of the lightning
strike that would attach to the phase wires; thus further reducing the risk of flashover. This is
shown in Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-6 where it can be seen that 40 foot trees next to the line
practically eliminates shielding failures. This is because the highest current that may terminate
on the phase conductors (i.e., 2.5 kA) is lower than the minimum current necessary for flashover
(i.e., 7.5 kA).

3-5
 Vegetation Vegetation

Figure 3-5
The stroke viewer of TFlash showing that no shielding failures occur for a prospective lightning
strike current of 5 kA with 40 foot vegetation.

Vegetation Vegetation

Figure 3-6
The stroke viewer of TFlash showing lightning attaching to the phase conductors for a
prospective lightning strike current of 2.5 kA with 40 foot vegetation. Note: A 2.5 kA lightning
strike to the phase conductors would not result in a flashover.

3-6
Based on the evaluation presented in this section, it is concluded that although it is possible for a
single phase shielding failure flashover to occur, it is very unlikely that a shielding failure would
result in a 3-phase flashover as experienced on the Kahe-Waiau 138 kV line during the 18:35:30
(6:35:30 p.m.) lightning event of December 26, 2008. As such, this report now turns to whether
the 3-fault may have been caused by one of the other two ways in which a 3-phase fault may
occur.

Analysis of Induced Lightning Overvoltages

The second of the three ways in which a 3-phase fault may occur are lightning-induced
overvoltages. Severe transient overvoltages can be induced on overhead power lines by
lightning strikes that terminate (i.e., strike) close to or near a transmission line but do not actually
strike the line. On distribution lines, which have lower insulation strengths, indirect lightning
strikes are responsible for the majority of the lightning related outages. However, lightning-
induced overvoltages on transmission lines are not generally considered as a main contributor to
outages for the following reasons:
1. Measurements of induced lightning strikes as well as the mathematical models indicate
that lightning-induced overvoltages across the insulators (i.e., overvoltages caused by a
lightning strike close to or near a transmission line but that do not directly terminate or
strike that line) rarely exceed 250-300 kV on unshielded lines. These induced surge
amounts are therefore not sufficient to cause flashovers on transmission lines with a basic
insulation level of 300 kV and above. In this case, the Kahe-Waiau transmission line
insulation has a calculated minimum CFO of 739kV as discussed above, which is far
higher than the 300kV upper limit for lightning-induced overvoltages.
2. Transmission lines in areas with a high lightning density are usually fitted with grounded
shield wires to prevent direct strikes to the phase conductors (as in this case). The
presence of such shield wires significantly reduces the level of induced lighting voltages
to less than 250 kV, thereby reducing the risk even further.

As mentioned above, the estimated insulation strength of the 138 kV Kahe-Waiau line is 739 kV,
which is well above the expected induced lightning overvoltages mentioned above. Therefore,
the risk for flashovers due to induced lightning overvoltages is extremely low and it is therefore
unlikely that the outage of December 26, 2008 was caused by a lightning stroke that struck near
but did not strike the transmission line itself.

As such, our analysis concludes that the December 26, 2008 3-phase outage was not caused by
either a shielding event or by lightning strikes that terminated (i.e., struck) close to or near a
transmission line. We thus turn our analysis to the third way in which a 3-phase fault may occur
– backflashovers.

Backflashover Analysis

As mentioned above, a blackflashover occurs when a lightning strike terminates (i.e., strikes) the
overhead shield wire or structure, where the potential of the structure is raised high enough to

3-7
cause a flashover (i.e., pass over) from the structure across one or more insulators to the phase
conductors.

The mechanism for a lightning backflashover can conceptually be explained by considering a

simple numerical example. With reference to Figure 3-7, consider a 50-kA lightning flash that
terminates on a transmission tower with a 40-Ω footing resistance. As a first approximation, the
potential rise of the tower can be calculated as 50 kA x 40 Ω = 2000 kV, which is also the
voltage that appears on the cross-arm end of the insulator. The difference in potential between
the cross-arm and the phase conductor (that is, 2000 kV) appears across the insulators. This can
flash over an insulator length of nearly 13 feet (4 m). This example shows that the voltage
across the insulators is directly proportional to the grounding resistance (Rg) and the lightning
discharge current (I). It thus follows that reducing the footing resistance will result in a
reduction of the insulator voltage and an improvement of the line performance.

I = 50 kA

2000 kV

2000 kV

Rg = 40 Ω

Figure 3-7
A Lightning Strike to a Transmission Line

The example presented above is, of course, an oversimplification of the backflashover process
and is provided simply to provide a conceptual description. Other aspects, such as the coupling
between the overhead shield wires, reflections of traveling waves and the dynamic response of
the ground electrode at the structure base, are also important to take into account when assessing
the performance of a particular line design. These can only be adequately assessed through
detailed modeling of the tower structure and adjacent spans as is done in EPRI’s TFlash
program.

3-8
For the backflashover analysis, a similar approach to the shielding analysis is followed. In this
case it is assumed that a lightning strike terminates on the shield wire at Structure 29. Increasing
levels of injected lightning current are then applied to determine the current magnitude needed
for (1) a single phase and (2) a 3- phase fault. These calculations were done assuming the
following tower footing resistances:
• Tower 28: 92 Ω
• Tower 29: 122 Ω (Tower where lightning strike is applied)
• Tower 30: 300 Ω

The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3-2 below. In this case, the single phase
flashovers occur on the bottom phase of Structure 29 due to the effect of coupling between the
shield wire and phase conductors. Also shown in Table 3-2 is the probability of a cloud to
ground lightning stroke exceeding the required current magnitude based on historical
measurements of lightning strokes [1].

Table 3-2
Calculated lightning current necessary to cause a backflashover on tower 29.

Tower footing Parameter Critical current Probability that this

current will be exceeded
by a lightning strike

Actual value: 122 Ω Single Phase Fault 32.5 kA 47%

Three Phase Fault 73 kA 10%

Low value: 50 Ω Single Phase Fault 65 kA 13%

Three Phase Fault 130 kA 2.4%

High Value: 300 Ω Single Phase Fault 20 kA 76%

Three Phase Fault 44 kA 29%

As shown above, the results for a 122 ohm tower footing resistance shows that 10% of the
lightning strikes (i.e., on average of one in ten lightning strikes attaching to the shield wire or
structure) would have a sufficient current magnitude to result in a 3-phase flashover on
Structure 29.

Based on the above analysis, it can therefore be concluded that the 3-phase short circuit
(flashover) on the Kahe-Waiau 138 kV line was most likely due to a backflashover event at
Structure 29. That is a lightning strike terminated (i.e., struck) the overhead shield wire or
structure, raising the potential of the structure high enough to cause a flashover from the

3-9
structure across one or more insulators to the phase conductors. There is a significant probability
that the required lightning current to cause a 3-phase fault was exceeded and neither of the other
two ways discussed above in which a 3-phase fault can occur appear likely in this situation.

As illustrated in the example provided in Figure 3-7 above, tower/structure footing resistance is
an important consideration in the design of lightning protection. Thus, two additional cases were
considered.
1. Low tower footing resistance scenario: For a tower/structure footing resistance of
50 ohms at Structure 29, Table 3-2 above shows that the probability of a 3- phase
flashover has been significantly reduced if a lightning strike terminates at Structure 29.
In this scenario, only 2.4% of the lightning strikes (i.e., one in 42 strikes attaching the
shield wire or structure) would have sufficient current to cause a 3- phase flashover.
2. High tower footing resistance scenario: Should Structure 29 have a footing resistance of
300 ohms, a lightning strike of at least 44 kA would be sufficient to cause a 3- phase
flashover. The likelihood of 3- phase flashovers is consequently much higher than for the
other case, as nearly one in three lightning strikes could result in 3- phase faults as shown
in Table 3-2 above.

Overall Line Lightning Performance

In this section, the aim is to compare the overall line lightning performance of the Kahe-Waiau
138 kV transmission line with targets of utilities in the contiguous United States and Canada.
Such comparisons are normally made on the basis of the number of outages per 100 miles per
year, which is a normalized benchmark often used by utilities in the contiguous United States
and Canada for the design and performance reviews of transmission lines.

Service records obtained from HECO show that over the last 19 years, the Kahe-Waiau 138 kV
transmission line had in total 4 outages that could be attributed to lightning. Two of these
outages were 3- phase faults and the other two were single phase faults. This is an overall outage
rate of 0.21 outages per year for the 18.8 mile long line, or 1.12 outages per 100 miles per year.

The latter value may be compared against the design targets of other utilities for the various
transmission voltage levels as presented in Table 3-3 below. It should be noted that in the data
gathered, utilities did not discriminate between single and 3- phase faults. Based on that data, it
can be concluded that the actual performance of the Kahe-Waiau 138 kV line is acceptable in
terms of the typical design targets set by utilities. The backflashover analysis shows, however,
that there are structures on this line that may be more vulnerable and susceptible to lightning
related flashovers due to high footing resistances and long spans.

3-10
 Table 3-3
Lightning performance targets of various Utilities in the contiguous United States and
Canada as expressed in Outages per 100 miles per year.

System Utilities
voltage
[kV] A B C* D* E* F G H* I
66

Should withstand 75 kA
69 10 2 to 3
Based on complaints

Customer complaints

Based on complaints
115 1 to 2 3
138 1 3 10
220
230 1 2 2 2
330
345
500 1 1 1 1
Notes: (*) These are utilities that have networks located in areas with a low GFD.

Lightning Density in Hawaii

An important parameter that influences the lightning performance of a line is the lightning
ground flash density (GFD), which is normally expressed as the number of lightning-to-ground
flashes per square kilometer (or mile) per year. As far as we could determine, there are no
detailed lightning density maps available for the island of Oahu or for the islands of Hawaii.
However, there are published records of the number of thunderdays in Hilo (10.29) and Honolulu
(7.24)[7]. The GFD can be estimated from these thunderday (Td) levels by [1]:

GFD = 0.04Td 1.25

This equation results in an average ground flash density (GFD) of approximately

0.5 flashes/km2/year for the island of Oahu.

As a comparison, the lightning ground flash densities (GFD) in various areas of the contiguous
United States are presented in Figure 3-8 below. As shown in Figure 3-8, values on the
mainland vary across a wide range with GFD values of lower than 0.1 flashes/km2/year recorded
in certain areas of the west coast to a GFD of more than 10 flashes/km2/year recorded in certain
parts of Florida (i.e., certain parts of Florida experience approximately 20 times more lightning-
to-ground strikes over a given area than in Hawaii). The figure also shows that most states in the
contiguous US also have a higher frequency (and thus higher expectation) of lightning strikes
than the 0.5 flashes/km2/year GFD estimated for Oahu.

3-11
 0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.6 3.2 6.4 8.0 10.0
Lightning Ground Flash Density (Flashes/km2/year)

Figure 3-8
A map of the lightning ground flash density in the contiguous United States.

3-12
4
MITIGATION OPTIONS

The information and analysis presented in the previous chapter show that the Kahe-Waiau
138 kV transmission line is located in an area with a relatively low incidence of lightning and
that the line performance is in accordance with design requirements as implemented on the
mainland. This line has, however, experienced a 3- phase fault as a result of a lightning
backflashover event (i.e., when a lightning strike terminates on the overhead shield wire or
structure, and the potential of the structure is raised high enough to cause a flashover from the
structure across one or more insulators to the phase conductors), indicating that there are certain
vulnerable structures along the line that could warrant mitigation measures.

While the physical evidence identifying the location of the 3-phase fault at Structure 29
concentrated our attention to Structure 29 and its adjacent structures, lightning performance
includes the whole distance of the Kahe-Waiau 138 kV transmission line. In other words there
may be structures along this transmission line other than Structure 29 that are prone to 3- phase
backflashovers. Given this, HECO should undertake a cost/benefit/risk analysis of the Kahe-
Waiau 138 kV transmission line with the goal of developing a plan to reduce the risk of 3- phase
flashovers because of backflashover events along the entire length of the Kahe-Waiau 138 kV
transmission line. In doing so, HECO should consider various factors such as, but not limited to,
(1) the lower frequency of lightning strikes as compared to most parts of the mainland, (2) areas
with high tower footing resistances, (3) existing structure design, (4) topography, (5) generation
side disturbance mitigation alternatives, (6) costs of various potential alternatives, and (7) rate
payer impacts.

Typical mitigation methods that are applied to improve the lightning performance of
transmission lines, or structures, include:
• Improving shielding angles and distances
• Improving grounding
• Adding Transmission Line Surge Arresters (TLSA)
• Increasing insulation

Shielding angle improvement requires repositioning either the shield wire or the phase wires to
increase the protection of the phase wires from lightning strikes. As shown in this report, only a
small number of lightning outages can be attributed to shielding failures, and it is highly unlikely
that a shielding failure would result in a 3- phase flashover. There is, therefore, only a small
benefit that could be gained by attempting to refine or improve the placement of HECO’s shield
wires along the Kahe-Waiau 138 KV line, especially when compared against the required effort,
time and expense that it would take to undertake any such refinements or improvements.

4-1
As stated above, we conclude that the cause of the 3-phase fault was a backflashover event. The
results of this study show that a material improvement in the performance of the Kahe-Waiau
transmission line could be achieved by lowering the tower structure footing resistances for those
towers with high resistances. It is important to follow a selective approach whereby
improvements are implemented only at “rogue” structures where the risk of backflashovers are
high. This is because a blanket approach to achieve lower tower footing resistances at each
structure will involve a substantial cost and effort, due to:
• The number of structures where additional ground electrodes would be needed: for
example, the Kahe-Waiau transmission line consists of 111 structures, each with a unique
ground electrode requirement. Assessments would have to be performed on each
structure due to the number of design, construction and location-specific variables and
variation of footing resistances that must be considered.
• Difficult terrain that may hinder access to the tower structures: The towers subject to the
worst lightning performance are probably situated in the mountainous area, as these areas
are, in general, characterized by a high soil resistivity (therefore high tower footings) and
long spans. Access and any modifications to these towers can be difficult, time
consuming and costly because of the terrain.
• Design efforts and costs of materials required: Some structures may require an extensive
(and expensive) redesign of the whole structure and ground electrode system in order to
achieve the target resistance.

In this regard, a detailed TFlash analysis may be useful to identify structures with a higher
probability of lightning flashover due to geographical conditions, lack of nearby vegetation and
long span lengths.

In cases where we anticipate that the grounding cannot be improved sufficiently due to poor
ground conditions, an analysis to determine the feasibility of using transmission line surge
arrestors (TLSA) can be performed. Because TLSAs can be expensive, it is important to obtain a
cost effective and reliable solution by tailoring the TLSA placement with respect to local
conditions. This would require that:
• The physical TLSA installation on the transmission line structures be engineered with
respect to[4]:
1. Mechanical loads and conductor movement
2. Electrical clearances, corona interferences and proper electrical connections to the
tower ground conductors.
• Towers where TLSAs are installed should be selected with a detailed coordination based
on actual ground resistance measurements. Improper coordination of TLSAs can cause
more problems or be too cost prohibitive for the benefit gained

Increased insulation (i.e., higher CFO voltage) will also increase the size of the lightning strike
needed to cause a flashover and hence reduce the lightning flashover rate. This is, however, not
considered a viable option given the design restrictions of the transmission line structure.

4-2
Longer insulation lengths would require fundamental changes to the existing structural design
and line profile to ensure that all electrical clearances are maintained:
• In the structures: On some structures, such as Structure 29, where the phase conductor
passes through a “window”, there is no possibility to increase insulation distances, as the
conductor is already placed optimally within the window. The structure would have to be
completely re-engineered.
• On the right-of-way: Longer insulator strings could encroach on midspan clearances,
necessitating a review of the line profiling to determine the need for taller support
structures or a re-tensioning of the line. In both these cases, a review of the mechanical
forces on the support structures would be required.

Given the above, it can be concluded that the required effort, time and expense associated with
implementing longer insulation distances by far outweigh the benefit obtained.

Based on the above considerations, the following approach to reduce the risk for 3-phase
backflashovers is suggested:
1. Measure tower footing resistances: The tower footing resistances of the whole Kahe-
Waiau transmission line should be measured to identify structures with high footing
resistances. Because this line is fitted with shield wires, it is recommended that a Zed
Meter[5] (or similar device) be utilized for this task. The Zed Meter measures the high-
frequency impedance of the towers without the need to disconnect the shield wires.
2. Develop a plan to improve the grounding at towers along the Kahe-Waiau transmission
line with high tower footing resistances with the goal of reaching the target value
determined through a detailed lightning performance and cost/benefit analysis. The
highest priority for grounding improvement should be given to those structures with the
highest tower footing resistances as determined in Step 1 above. A number of methods
can be used to improve grounding where the suitability of each design can be determined
as part of the detailed lightning performance and cost/benefit analysis described above.
For example:
• Ground Rods: In soft deep soil, more ground rods can be used. Positioning of the
ground rods can be optimized using the EPRI Grounding Guide Software.
• Counterpoise: For shallow soil with a second layer of rock, ground rods are not
practical. Here multiple short sections of counterpoise can be used.
• Combination of ground rods and counterpoise: A combination of ground rods and
counterpoise can also be used if the counterpoise lengths are kept to less than
100 feet.
3. In some cases it will not be possible to significantly improve the tower footing resistances
due to poor (high resistivity) soil conditions. In such cases, the installation of
transmission line surge arresters (TLSA) may be considered. To accomplish this, an
analysis should be performed as part of the detailed lightning performance and
cost/benefit analysis described above to determine the feasibility of such arresters in these
cases, especially considering the potential structural modifications and/or designs that
may be required and their optimal placement.

4-3
While these measures would improve lightning performance, other disturbance mitigation
options such as generation excitation upgrades, etc., must be properly evaluated into a broader
plan to improve system reliability. To the extent that improvements to the line become part of
the larger reliability improvement plan, we recommend that HECO undertake a cost/benefit
analysis that considers various factors that will result in a timely and prudent course of action to
improve transmission lightning performance.

4-4
5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

EPRI was tasked to perform a lightning performance study of the Kahe-Waiau 138kV
transmission line. As part of the study, Structure 29 and its adjacent structures were modeled
using EPRI’s TFlash software model. This model also took into account local geographic
conditions such as vegetation and the elevation profile of the line. The aim was to:
• Perform a technical analysis of lightning performance of the Kahe-Waiau 138 kV
transmission line, Structure 29 and adjacent structures with EPRI’s TFlash software.
• Identify the most likely mechanism by which a lightning strike would result in a 3-phase
fault.
• Identify possible mitigation options that may reduce the potential susceptibility of the
transmission line to lightning strikes.

The detailed analysis of Structure 29 and the nearby structures show that neither a shielding
failure nor an induced flashover was likely to have caused the 3-phase lightning fault. Instead,
the 3-phase fault was most likely due to a lightning strike to the shield wire of 73 kA or greater,
resulting in a backflashover across the insulation to all three phases of the transmission line at or
near Structure 29. In order to reduce the probability of such a 3-phase flashover in the future, we
recommend that HECO undertake a cost/benefit/risk analysis of the Kahe-Waiau 138 kV
transmission line. In doing so, HECO should consider various factors such as, but not limited to,
(1) the lower frequency of lightning strikes in Hawaii as compared to most parts of the mainland,
(2) areas with high tower footing resistances, (3) existing structure design, (4) topography, (5)
generation side disturbance mitigation alternatives, (6) costs of various potential alternatives
including an improvement of the structure resistance at selected towers, and (7) rate payer
impacts.

One approach for determining the appropriate target footing resistance value for the Kahe-Waiau
138kV line is to consider setting a target annual average lightning outage rate and then apply the
TFlash model to determine a reasonable target footing resistance. If, in certain regions along the
Kahe-Waiau transmission line it is impractical to achieve the required target footing resistance,
i.e., due to high local soil resistivity, the results can be fed back into the TFlash model to
determine the potential application of TLSA technology.

5-1
The Kahe-Waiau 138 kV experienced two documented 3-phase faults attributed to lightning
since the line was installed in 1961, 48 years ago. This performance is in accordance with
typical design targets used on the mainland. However, the analysis presented in this report
indicates that there may be rogue structures where 3-phase flashover events due to backflashover
may be likely to occur. In order to reduce the risk for a 3-phase lightning flashover, the
tower/structure footing resistances of these rogue structures can be reduced by the addition /
augmentation of ground electrodes or/and the application of TLSA.

5-2
6
REFERENCES

[1] Chapter 6 of the EPRI AC Transmission Line Reference Book – 200 kV and Above,
Third Edition. EPRI Palo Alto, CA: 2005. 1011974.

[2] Guide for Transmission Line Grounding: A Roadmap for Design, Testing, and
Remediation: Part 1—Theory Book. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2007. 1013900

[3] Guide for Transmission Line Grounding: A Roadmap for Design, Testing, and
Remediation: Part 1—Practical Guidelines. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2008. 1018198

[4] Guide for Application of Transmission Line Surge Arresters. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2008.
1015907.

[5] The EPRI Zed-Meter: A New Technique to Evaluate Transmission Line Grounds. EPRI
Palo Alto, CA: 2004. 1008734.

[6] Hileman, Andrew. R.: Insulation coordination for Power Systems, Book CRC press,
1999.

[7] Climate tables for Hilo and Honolulu on http://WWW.Climates.com

[8] Whitehead J. T., “Lightning performance of TVA’s 500 kV and 161 kV Transmission
Lines”, IEEE Trans. On Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. PAS-102, No3, March
1983.

6-1
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