Procedure Hazop Procedure PDF

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Procedure / Activity Description HAZOP Procedure
Procedure/Activity Description: HAZOP Procedure

Revision information Description
EPE Second Issue
Objective To provide for the effective execution of Hazard and Operability

(HAZOP) studies performed in compliance with the EP HEMP
Standard [1] and Opportunity and Project Management Guide [2].
Scope This procedure should be used for all HAZOP activities associated
with EPE operations. Contractors may have their own HAZOP
procedures but these should align with the requirements in this
procedure, in particular the competency requirements for HAZOP
chair persons and the involvement of the Shell Process Engineering
Technical Authorities (TAs) in the Management of Change process.
The procedure provides specific instructions on the HAZOP process
and identifies good practice beyond that covered by the existing EP
Standards [1] and industry guidance [3] and [4].
As defined in [4] a HAZOP is a structured and systematic technique

for examining a defined system, with the objective of:
• identifying potential hazards in the system. The hazards
involved may include both those essentially relevant only to
the immediate area of the system and those with a much
wider sphere of influence, e.g. some environmental hazards;
• identifying potential operability problems with the system
and in particular identifying causes of operational
disturbances and production deviations likely to lead to
nonconforming products.
Risk domain and risk Risk Domain Risk(s):

Asset (Technical) Failure to identify potential process hazards
Integrity as part of design process or Management of
Change (MoC) process
Health Safety and Failure to ensure adequate process
Environment safeguarding systems could lead to a Major
Accident Hazard during operations.
Reputation, Any Major Accident Hazard could have a
Commercial significant effect on Shell’s reputation and
result in major financial losses
Input From Activity name / Doc No.

Activity required as part of MoC • EP64 Design, Construct,
Input to activity process for engineering and Modify and Decommission
operational changes. Also, a Facilities
potential requirement from • EP17 - Provide HSSE
incident reviews, lateral learning Support
or audit findings. • EP71 Produce Hydrocarbons
Output from Activity Output To

HAZOP Report including Sponsor - Project Manager, Asset
actions raised Leader or Activity Manager
Doc. No: Rev.no.: Date: Custodian: Authorisation: EPE expertise Page: 1 of 19

EP200712228168 1 24-10-2008 EPE-P-ED holder safety engineering
Org. Doc. No: EPE-SAFENG.PR.02 ECCN: Not subject to EAR - No US content
Printed copies are uncontrolled
Activity Responsibility Matrix
HAZOP Chairman
HAZOP Secretary
process Engineer
Process Eng TA2

HAZOP team
Co-ordinator
Co-ordinator
Independent
Close-out
members
Sponsor
HAZOP
Task definition References
Note 1 Note 2 Note 3 Note 4 Note 5

Identify need for
1 Step Instruction Task 1
HAZOP and scope
Select Chairman and

Secretary
3 Select team members CON CON CON Step Instruction Task 3
Identify drawings and

procedures
Confirm location and

arrangments
Prepare nodes for

HAZOP
Undertake and record

7 CON CON CON Step Instruction Task 7
HAZOP
Prepare draft report,

8 issue and incorporate Step Instruction Task 8
comments
Track and close-out

actions
10 Issue close-out report Step Instruction Task 10
Execute (executing); Performing a task Approve (Approving); Approve results

Contribute (contributory); Contribute to a task Receiving information
Check (controlling); Check, verify results
Doc. No: Rev.no.: Date: Custodian: Authorisation: EPE expertise Page: 2 of 19

Note 1 – The Sponsor will be the Engineering Lead for the particular study/opportunity/project/change
proposal
Note 2 – Sponsor and Co-ordinator may be the same person for small, low risk HAZOPs
Note 3 – The Close-out co-ordinator may be the same person as the HAZOP Co-ordinator
Note 4 – The Chairman may perform the secretary role and record his own output for small, low risk
HAZOPs
Note 5 – The relevant Shell Process Engineering Technical Authority Level 2 (TA2) for the business
process or asset. If the HAZOP Chair is available then it may be preferable that the review and
approval of the proposed close-out actions is performed by the Chair. In practice this may not
be practical and therefore by default this role is assigned to the TA2 although the TA2 can
delegate this to the Chair.
TASKS
The key roles and responsibilities are summarised below with more detail provided in the task
descriptions
Role and Responsibility Position

Identification of need for HAZOP and allocation of suitable Sponsor
resources
Confirm the need for and scope of a HAZOP Shell Process Eng TA2
Allocation of adequate time and resources for the review and Sponsor
identification of Co-ordinator
Collation of drawings and procedures, selection, contracting Co-ordinator
and briefing Chairman and team members, organisation of
venue, provision of IT services.
Provision of suitable team members and resourcing of HAZOP Sponsor
chairman and secretary
Maintain Competent Chairman Register Safety Engineering
function
Selection of guidewords, running of HAZOP study, preparation Chairman
of session records and issue of report.
Recording team discussions Secretary
Confirmation that proposed action meets intent raised in review Shell Process Eng TA2
or Chairman (if available)
Entry of actions to action tracking system Co-ordinator
Implementation of actions Sponsor
Task 1: Identify need for HAZOP study and define scope

Accountability with Sponsor.
The HEMP Standard [1] requires HAZOPs for all new processing facilities, major modifications and
changes in operating conditions.
For new facilities HAZOPs shall be performed as key deliverables from the EP64 engineering process.
The timing and scope shall be defined in the Project HSSE Plan and shall be approved by the appropriate
Process Engineering TA2 for the project.
For existing facilities, not all modifications or changes will require a HAZOP. Competent technical
engineers involved in the change process shall determine whether a HAZOP is required and if so, the
Doc. No: Rev.no.: Date: Custodian: Authorisation: EPE expertise Page 3 of 19

proposed scope and timing of the HAZOP. The relevant Shell Process Engineering TA2 shall approve
this decision. The outcome of the assessment of the need for a HAZOP shall be documented as part of
the Management of Change process.
A list of current Shell TA2s is maintained in Facility Status Report (FSR) which can be accessed via
http://fsr.shell.com/.
Engineering or operational changes that are likely to require formal safety assessment including a
HAZOP are defined by Lees [5] which is reproduced as follows:
“(1) Any change in the equipment, temporary or permanent, which may affect the safety of the process or
safety and integrity of the plant. It does not include changes in engineering equipment which are not in
contact with the process and cannot affect the safety of the process or the safety and integrity of the
plant.
(2) Any change in process materials, services, operating conditions, or operating procedures, and
including experimental programmes, which fall outside established practice.”
HAZOPs should not be restricted to just the hydrocarbon processing systems. Systems that interface
with these systems or utility systems that could affect the performance of these systems may also need to
be subject to HAZOP.
The EP HAZOP Manual [6] provides a method on how to assess whether an engineering change will
require a HAZOP. This methodology is reproduced in Appendix 7and can be used, however any decision
on whether to HAZOP or not still needs to be approved by the Shell Process Engineering TA2.
For other types of changes Appendix 1 provides guidance on whether a HAZOP is likely to be an
appropriate tool.
The HEMP Standard [1] also requires a 5-yearly review of the HAZOPs performed for a facility to confirm
that they still accurately reflect the current situation and current understanding of the hazards.
Appendix 6 provides guidance on re-HAZOPing and HAZOP reviews.
The precise scope of any HAZOP should be defined in a clear Terms of Reference with the objectives
and deliverables of the HAZOP specified by the Sponsor.
Task 2: Select Chairman and Secretary

Accountability with HAZOP Co-ordinator.
The HAZOP Co-ordinator must be a senior project or discipline engineer with experience of the HAZOP
process.
The Chairman shall be selected from a list of competent personnel maintained by the safety engineering
function. Details of the current custodian of the list and the list of approved chairs can be found on the
safety eng web portal:
http://sww.shell.com/ep/epe/engineering_maintenance/safety_engineering/safety_engineering_hazop_intro.html
If a preferred HAZOP chair is not on the list of competent personnel, details of the individuals
qualifications and relevant experience should be communicated to the custodian of the list who will
assess the individual against the criteria listed in Appendix 5. Depending on the outcome of the
assessment the individual will either be approved and have their details added to the list or rejected with
feedback on the reasons.
Depending on the complexity and duration of the HAZOP the Chairman should then use his or her
preferred Secretary. This will enable the sessions to be summarised and recorded most efficiently. For
small or low risk HAZOPs the Chairman may record the output but the workload should not be allowed to
compromise the quality of the deliverables.

The Co-ordinator and Chairman should discuss a preliminary estimate of the cost, time and resources for
the HAZOP at this stage and agree full or exception reporting and the format of the final report and action
close-out process. Full reporting is the expected norm.
Exception vs Full Reporting

In general full reporting is the preferred method of performing and recording the HAZOP process.
However, reporting by exception may be acceptable for small or specialised HAZOPs provided the
Sponsor, and Chairman agree to this and it meets the study objective. If exception reporting is adopted
the HAZOP report should clearly state this was the approach followed and how it was applied. i.e. state
that all specified guidewords and deviations were considered (if that was the case) and worksheet entries
were only made for hazards that generated a significant discussion or raised an action.
Task 3: Select Team Members

Accountability with HAZOP Co-ordinator, Chairman to concur.
The Co-ordinator must discuss the composition of the team with the Chairman. Essentially the skills,
experience and number of attendees should be appropriate to the exercise. Operator involvement and an
independent process engineer should be considered essential for any HAZOP and it is the Sponsor’s
responsibility to ensure suitable personnel are provided. Other expertise or disciplines should be
represented as determined by the scope e.g. HSSE, Production Chemist, Well Engineering, Maintenance
representatives though they may not need to attend all sessions. Vendor representatives are essential to
explain the operation and control of self-contained vendor packaged equipment. The Chairman must
satisfy himself of the role and experience of all personnel proposed for the team and confirm the HAZOP
is suitably staffed for the study. More than 10 people in any session is likely to reduce efficiency and add
little to the identification of potential hazards.
For HAZOPs undertaken in a design contractor’s office the team may comprise a mix of Shell and
contractor personnel but 'doubling up' of functions should be avoided.
If the Chairman and/or Secretary are contracted for the work a contract must be in place before work
starts.
Task 4: Identify Drawings and Procedures

Accountability with HAZOP Co-ordinator.
The PFDs, P&IDS including vendor packages that comprise the design or change under review at a
suitable stage of refinement (discipline checked and frozen – commonly referred to as Rev. A) should be
available and a copy then provided for each team member. Large scale reproductions may assist
explanation. Provision of key drawings electronically may be beneficial for projection and presentation
purposes. The safeguarding philosophy should be available. Other inputs could be operating,
maintenance and safety philosophies, also Fire & Gas Cause and Effects, active fire protection, passive
fire protection, emergency shutdown and emergency depressurisation philosophies, procedures and
drawings etc.
Task 5: Confirm location and arrangements

Accountability HAZOP Co-ordinator.
A room of sufficient size and arrangements to ensure smooth running of Team sessions is essential.
An off-site venue limits the opportunities for team members to absent themselves.

Task 6: Prepare nodes and programme for HAZOP

Accountability with Chairman.
The Chairman should use his experience to divide the scope into logical and manageable sections
(nodes) to conduct the review. He should consult with suitable personnel egg the process engineer to
confirm understanding of the systems. As a result of this preparation the Chairman should be able to
prepare an accurate assessment of cost and time for the review. He should then prepare an agenda and
programme to present at start of session and monitor progress against it.
Node selection and size will depend on system complexity and experience of the team in addition to other
factors. Too small a node may create minimal potential process deviations and lead to repetition in
subsequent nodes. Too extensive a node may create multiple interfaces, complex control issues and
repeated referencing of several P&IDs.
A general rule of thumb is that 4 P&IDs is the maximum that may be reviewed in a six hour day but
variations in system complexity and P&ID congestion may make this target optimistic. Conversely,
simple, well separated systems on P&IDs may make six P&IDs achievable in a day.
Appendices 2, 3 and 4 provide possible structures for Coarse, Detailed and Procedural HAZOPs. These
are not exhaustive and there are other examples in industry guidance. It is the Chairman’s responsibility
to ensure an appropriate structure is used and described in the HAZOP report.
Task 7: Undertake and record HAZOP

Accountability with Chairman.
The Chairman is responsible for the direction and recording of the sessions. At the start of the review the
Chairman should;
Introduce the team members and explain expected behaviours,

Explain the HAZOP process and recording arrangements,
Explain the HAZOP structure,
Introduce a team member who will explain the operation and key features of the systems to be
HAZOPed in some detail.
A PC based system is strongly recommended as it speeds up reporting and issuing of actions and
enables all the team members to see the full worksheet entries. Specific HAZOP software may be used
or templates in word processing may be considered appropriate. HAZOP software has the advantage of
being able to renumber actions or allocate actions to multiple parties. The possible use of voice recording
should not be excluded.
An appropriate person should introduce each node and explain the key parameters and safeguarding
arrangements. The design intent of each node should be recorded.
The Chairman will typically use a brainstorming technique to stimulate thinking into how hazardous
conditions may occur. During the brainstorming the Chairman is expected to moderate discussions
around frequency and severity and challenge the assembled specialists on the robustness of controls.
The brainstorming must give consideration to the possibility of human error.
For issues or concerns that raise actions generally only actions and action party and dates are recorded.
The actions must be recorded in sufficient detail to give complete understanding when transferred to the
action tracking system and read in isolation.

Further considerations and categorisations can be made dependent upon HAZOP requirements. The
actions raised may be categorised to assist management review / monitoring as follows:-
• Assess the hazard Consequence and Frequency for risk indication

• Assign potential criticality of action egg High, Medium, or Low
• Type of Action egg Conformance, Design Change, Procedure, etc
• Hazard category egg Safety, Health, Environment, Asset, Operability
• Milestone egg Detailed Design completion, first oil, first gas.
It is inevitable that minor corrections (egg spectacle blind shown in wrong position) or minor additions
(e.g. relief valve settings not shown) to the drawings under review will be identified during the HAZOP
study sessions. It is sufficient to list these corrections under one (only) recommended action item or by
grouping separate actions in a special worksheet. The latter approach may also be used for general
issues that would otherwise be repeated in several worksheets. One of the HAZOP team members
supplied from the Project should compile the list of drawing errors. The HAZOP team shall not spend
time redesigning the facility, egg add valves, relocate lines etc. during the HAZOP. This is the function of
the Project or Asset. If however the solution to the problem is obvious to the team, it should be stated in
the recommended action.
HAZOPs should ideally not exceed six hours per day and this is particularly relevant for larger studies
which are run over several days or weeks where team fatigue and other work priorities may accumulate.
This could cause a reduction in quality and indeed extend the overall time requirements.
Task 8: Prepare draft report, issue and incorporate comments

Accountability with Chairman for the report and with HAZOP Co-ordinator to circulate and collate
comments for Chairman.
On completion of HAZOP sessions the Secretary will prepare the first draft of the HAZOP report. The
Chairman is accountable for the contents and technical accuracy of the report. The minimum contents for
a report should be;
• Scope
• Objectives
• Team, place, date
• Action Summary describing the rationale behind critical actions
• Method
• Guidewords
• Worksheets
• Actions
• Marked up P&IDs and documents used or traceable references to them
Wherever possible, major HAZOPs should be finished with a 'Closing Meeting', in which the main
recommended actions are presented to local management and the nomination of the follow up Co-
ordinator is confirmed.
The HAZOP Sponsor must formally accept the final report from the Chairman.
Task 9: Track and close-out actions

Accountability with HAZOP Close-out Co-ordinator.
The HAZOP close-out co-ordinator will monitor and manage close-out of the actions raised in the
HAZOP. The co-ordinator will pass responses to appropriate parties for review or acceptance. Ideally
this involves the Chairman reviewing each action and confirming the proposed action fully meets the
intent of the original action. The Chair may not be available to perform this duty so this role defaults to
the Shell Process Eng TA2 (as shown on the activity responsibility matrix), however the TA2 can delegate
this role to the Chair, if available.

Task 10: Issue close-out report

Accountability with HAZOP Close-out Co-ordinator.
Issue a brief summary report with signed, accepted action sheets included. As well as those involved in
the change management process other recipients of HAZOP reports may include Shell process
engineers, Shell safety engineers or compliance focal points.
The HAZOP Co-ordinator is responsible for arranging that relevant correspondence up to the completion
of the HAZOP report be archived for a minimum period of five years. This includes the original study
session notes, technical correspondence (including comments on the draft report) and covering letter for
issuing the HAZOP report. The Co-ordinator should also issue the closeout report.
The Co-ordinator should provide feedback on the performance of the chairman to both the chairman and
the holder of the competency register.

Related controlling documents

Ref. Title Document No.
Other References
Ref. Title Document No.
[1] EP Standard ‘HSE Hazards and Effects EP2005-0300-ST
Management Process’
[2] Opportunity and Project Management EP-2006 5500

Guide (OPMG)
[4] Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP BS IEC 61882:

studies) – Application guide 2001
[5] Loss Prevention in the Process ISBN

Industries; Hazard Identification, 0 7506 1547 8
Assessment and Control Second
edition 1996: Frank P. Lees
[6] EP HSE Manual HAZOP EP95-0313

APPENDIX 1 - APPLICATION OF HAZOP
EXAMPLE Use HAZOP? COMMENTS
Identifying potential hazardous events and YES Various types of HAZOP are used at
operability problems on new process facilities different stages of the project [2]
Identifying latent hazardous events and YES Recommended for the HSE Case
operability problems on existing processing
facilities
Checking a process design for compliance with NO A HAZOP is only used when all
standards conventional engineering checks have
been completed
Mitigating the effects of a hazardous event in a NO The HAZOP technique is for

process design hazardous event identification, not for
analysing the consequences of the
hazardous event nor finding the
solution
Evaluating design alternatives MAYBE Consider other techniques, such as

consequence analysis and other forms
of structured analysis which are more
suitable
Routine drilling, workover and pipeline NO The technique is not very cost effective
operations for reviewing routine procedures
Non-routine drilling, workover, and pipeline YES A high level procedural HAZOP can be
operations egg SIMOPS, snubbing, hot useful in identifying potential hazards
tapping etc. and operability problems
Review of non-process systems egg NO A safety review or other forms of

construction, layout, fire and gas systems, structured analysis, quantitative risk
passive fire protection analysis, fire risk analysis, smoke
ingress analysis etc are more suitable
Change Proposals (CPs) MAYBE The answer depends on the number of

interfaces between systems – the
greater the number, the greater the
justification for a HAZOP. See
Appendix 7 for guidance
Reviewing ESD system design YES A high level review can be used to
reveal potential deficiencies

APPENDIX 2 - COARSE HAZOP GUIDEWORDS
DEVIATION CAUSES PROMPTING LIST

HAZARD Loss of Containment Minimise Leak Sources
- less equipment, vessel, valves, instruments
Minimise Leak Causes
- equipment rating
- material selection
- corrosion; embrittlement, stagnant conditions
- erosion; high velocity regions
- over pressure; full flow relief/thermal relief
- chemical reaction
- dropped object
- small bore pipework
- vibration; fatigue
- flow slugging; surge
- blockage; hydrate, sand, wax
- seal selection
- cycling; pressure, temperature
Minimise Leak Quantity
- less inventory
- emergency shutdown/isolation
- lower operating pressure
- lower operating level
- emergency blowdown
- emergency draining
Leak Accumulation
- leak containment; flooring, bunding
- leak dispersion; drainage, ventilation
Ignition Electrical
- tripping philosophy
- hazardous area/zoning
Hot Surfaces
- exhausts
- furnaces
Fire/Explosion Effects separation of hazards from:
- the public
HAZARD Fire/Explosion Effects - employees

- control rooms and emergency equipment
- other inventories
- fire and gas detection
- passive fire protection
- active fire protection
- fire pressure relief valves
- fire boundaries/segregation
- equipment layout within the area
- degree of confinement
- explosion over pressure protection
Escape Evacuation and - means of escape/escape ways
Rescue
- provision/location of temporary refuge
- means of evacuation
Harmful Substances - safe substitutes
- smoke effects
- H 2 S or other toxic materials
- explosives
- radioactive materials
- chemicals
- carcinogens
- asphyxiates
- narcotic vapours
OPERABILITY Restart - black start
DIFFICULTY
- after equipment, trains or total shutdown
- over-rides
Shutdown - manual
- auto
- blowdown; auto, manual
- draining
- flushing HC free
- winterisation
- interaction with other facilities/pipelines
Normal Running - routine checks
- sampling

- instrumentation; local, central control room

Past Experience - testing, pressure/leak/trip
OPERABILITY Past Experience - control valves; wear, bypass
DIFFICULTY
- trip frequency ; process, fire and gas
- equipment/manning level consistent with
operating philosophy
- heavy lift requirements
- equipment access requirements
- any other issue
Production Targets - sparing philosophy
- plant interconnections
- capacity turndown
- composition change
- abnormal operating modes
- product nomination
- nuisance trip frequency
- plant uptime
- knock-on effects on other upstream /
downstream facilities
ENVIRONMENTAL Discharges to Air - cold venting
EFFECTS
- flaring
- turbine/engine exhausts
- energy conservation
Discharges To Sea - Process discharges:
oil
H2S
additives
produced water
back produced water
drains
- recovery/recycle
Discharges To Land And - Spill management:
Water Courses
Categorise as: major:
minor:
continuous:


ENVIRONMENTAL Environmental Impact - Feasibility stage analysis and report
EFFECTS Assessment
RISK PROFILE AND Extreme Environment - wind
ALARP
- wave
- current; scouring
- ice
- earthquake
- settlement
Transport - helicopter
- fixed wing aircraft
- boat
- road
Collision - shipping
- aircraft
- dropped object
- trawl board
- anchor chain
Hydrocarbon - see HAZARD deviation above
Occupational - see HAZARD deviation above

APPENDIX 3 - DETAILED HAZOP GUIDEWORDS
GUIDEWORD PROPERTY POSSIBLE CAUSES

NO Flow Wrong routing, blockage (debris, hydrate, sand), slip blind left in, faulty
non-return valve, burst pipe, control valve, isolation valve, pump or vessel
failure.
MORE Flow More than 1 pump operating, reduced delivery head, increased suction
pressure, lower downstream pressure, other routes, exchanger tube leaks,
greater density, gas break through, valve malfunction.
Pressure Surge, relief, leakage from an HP connection (lines and flanges), thermal,
rate of pressurising lines, blockage downstream.
Level Surge, blocked outlet, control valve failure (see also More Flow)
Temperature Fouled cooler, cooling water failure, failed exchanger tubes, external fire.
Viscosity Change of material, specification or temperature.
LESS Flow Partial blockage, vessel or valves failing, leaks, loss of pump efficiency.
Pressure Generation of vacuum by pump of drain out of vessels, condensation from
vapour or gas dissolving in a liquid. Blocked pump or compressor suction.
Level Leaks, control valve failure, upstream upset, blockage
Temperature Freezing, loss of pressure (Joule Thompson effect), loss of heating, failed
exchanger tubes.
Viscosity Change of material, specification, or pressure.
REVERSE Flow As for NO FLOW, plus emergency venting, 2-way flow.

PART OF Composition Passing through isolations, leaking exchanger tubes, wrong feed material.
change Phase change, out of specification.
AS WELL AS Contamination H2S, mercury, radioactive nuclides, wax, sand, oxygen in water.
OTHER THAN Relief Relief valve, bursting disc, location of discharge, bellows type, fire.
Sampling Type, cooling of, response time.

Corrosion and Material specifications, fluid velocities, baffles, pipe-guides, hangers,
Erosion anchors, external attack, sulphide/chloride stress corrosion, zinc
embrittlement.
Service Cooling Water, instrument air, steam, nitrogen or inert gas; power to
Failures machines, control circuits and computers.
Maintenance Isolation, drainage, purging, cleaning, drying, access, incorrect installation
of equipment, hydrotest, lifting.
Static Electrical grounding, low conducting liquids, insulated conductors.
Outside Fire, weather, environmental change, impact flood, etc.
conditions
Operation Start up, shut down (normal, emergency), maloperation, pigging, layout,
different modes.
Layout Ergonomics issues, (raised once per unit)

APPENDIX 4 - PROCEDURAL HAZOP GUIDEWORDS
GUIDEWORD POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION (not exhaustive)
No Not done, not achieved
More Speed, often, activities, consumed, rotation, force
Less Speed, often, activities, consumed, utilities, rotation, force
Reverse Order, result, movement (oscillation)
Part of Attempted, achieved
As well as Activities (including external)
Other than Wrong method, order, result
Time Sooner than, later than, sufficient
Variation Information available/presented to the operator

APPENDIX 5 - CHAIRMAN COMPETENCY
In order to be satisfied that the proposed Review Chairman/ Leader/ Facilitator has the required competency
the following factors will be considered:
• Professional qualifications, training and experience

Candidates should have a recognised professional qualification in a relevant field egg
Process or Chemical Engineering and been assessed on a suitable training course. This
may be a Shell Group course or one run by a professional institution. This needs to be
supplemented by at least 5 years relevant experience in a design or operations role.
• Previous relevant reviews performed
Experience in small hazard identification exercises should be obtained before being
considered for larger, higher risk exercises.
Numbers and types
Complexity of facilities / operations
Potential risk from facilities / operations
Duration of reviews
In longer reviews the interpersonal skills of the Chairman become more relevant and
feedback in this area should be sought before instigating a long review.
• Period since last review performed
• Quality of reports and feedback from team members

APPENDIX 6 – GUIDANCE ON RE-HAZOP AND HAZOP REVIEW
The critical questions to answer before deciding on the re-HAZOP of an existing facility are:
• How complete is the existing site HAZOP documentation?
• Is there a good understanding of the effect of recent changes to hardware, throughput and
composition, legislation, technology, and standards?
• Have any incidents or near misses identified a lack of understanding of the safeguarding
arrangements?
• Are the HP/LP interfaces and hazardous/non-hazardous separation robust?
• Do the existing PEFS, mass balance and P&IDs accurately reflect the process, packaged units and
utilities?
• Have organisational changes introduced changes to manning and procedures?
• Have there been so many incremental developments that the overview of potential hazards on the
facility has been lost?
When undertaking a HAZOP review it is necessary to consider:

• Was the original scope well defined and the breadth, depth and interfaces appropriate?
• How well documented was the design intent and supporting documentation?
• Was the study led by a Chairman from the list of competent Chairmen and did an independent
process engineer provide challenge to the design intent?
• Were the right disciplines, specialists and vendors involved?
• Have the causes of any recent incidents identified potential failure mechanisms which were not
previously considered?
• Has the close-out of actions and supporting engineering work been robustly demonstrated?

APPENDIX 7-- ENGINEERING MODIFICATIONS : ASSESSMENT OF REQUIREMENT FOR A HAZOP
Change Proposal Details:
Assessment of the need to Assessment by:

HAZOP change proposal: (name and position)
Technical Authority Technical Authority

endorsement or comments (name and position)
Parameter No Change Change Within Potential for Change Outside

Normal/design operating range Normal/design operating range
(a) (b) (c)
Temperature
Pressure
Flowrate
Level
Composition (toxicity/corrosion)
Solids/Foreign Material
Others
Reliability/Availability**
Failure Mode**
INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE

1) Assess the change proposal to determine the effect it will have on the key process parameters.
2) Tick an entry in column (a), (b) or (c) for each parameter.
Note: Should a change in the parameters marked with ** occur as a consequence of the proposed modification, then place an entry in column (b).
INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
1) If there are entries in (c) the change proposal requires a HAZOP
2) If there are no entries in column (c ) and more than 5 entries in column (b) the change proposal requires a HAZOP
3) If there are no entries in column (c ) and less than 5 entries in column (b) a HAZOP may not be needed. In this case a safety review may be more
appropriate


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Procedure / Activity Description HAZOP Procedure

Procedure/Activity Description: HAZOP Procedure

Objective To provide for the effective execution of Hazard and Operability

As defined in [4] a HAZOP is a structured and systematic technique

Risk domain and risk Risk Domain Risk(s):

Input From Activity name / Doc No.

Output from Activity Output To

Doc. No: Rev.no.: Date: Custodian: Authorisation: EPE expertise Page: 1 of 19

Activity Responsibility Matrix

Process Eng TA2

Note 1 Note 2 Note 3 Note 4 Note 5

Select Chairman and

3 Select team members CON CON CON Step Instruction Task 3

Identify drawings and

Confirm location and

Prepare nodes for

Undertake and record

Prepare draft report,

Track and close-out

10 Issue close-out report Step Instruction Task 10

Execute (executing); Performing a task Approve (Approving); Approve results

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Role and Responsibility Position

Task 1: Identify need for HAZOP study and define scope

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Appendix 6 provides guidance on re-HAZOPing and HAZOP reviews.

Task 2: Select Chairman and Secretary

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Exception vs Full Reporting

Task 3: Select Team Members

Task 4: Identify Drawings and Procedures

Task 5: Confirm location and arrangements

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Task 6: Prepare nodes and programme for HAZOP

Task 7: Undertake and record HAZOP

Introduce the team members and explain expected behaviours,

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• Assess the hazard Consequence and Frequency for risk indication

Task 8: Prepare draft report, issue and incorporate comments

Task 9: Track and close-out actions

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Task 10: Issue close-out report

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Related controlling documents

[2] Opportunity and Project Management EP-2006 5500

[4] Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP BS IEC 61882:

[5] Loss Prevention in the Process ISBN

[6] EP HSE Manual HAZOP EP95-0313

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APPENDIX 1 - APPLICATION OF HAZOP

EXAMPLE Use HAZOP? COMMENTS

Mitigating the effects of a hazardous event in a NO The HAZOP technique is for

Evaluating design alternatives MAYBE Consider other techniques, such as

Review of non-process systems egg NO A safety review or other forms of

Change Proposals (CPs) MAYBE The answer depends on the number of

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APPENDIX 2 - COARSE HAZOP GUIDEWORDS

DEVIATION CAUSES PROMPTING LIST

HAZARD Fire/Explosion Effects - employees

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- instrumentation; local, central control room