INDIAN PENAL CODE PROJECT

GYARSIBAI (W/O JAGANNATH)

V
THE STATE
AIR 1953 MP 61

Submitted to: Mr.Aquib Husain Submitted by: S.Anjani Kumar

(2nd year, 3rd semester)

Faculty of Law

Jamia Milia Islamia, New Delhi.

 Acknowledgement
It gives me immense pleasure and gratitude to thank my Law Of Crimes teacher,
Mr.Aquib Husain who gave me the golden opportunity to do this wonderful project
which helped me in doing a lot of research and I came to know about so many new
things. I am really thankful to him.

Secondly, I would also like to thank my parents and friends who helped me a lot in
finalizing this project within the limited time frame.

Yours sincerely,

S.Anjani Kumar

2
 CONTENTS

SERIAL PAGE
NUMBER TOPIC NUMBER
1 Facts of the case 4
2 Issues framed by the court 5
3 Decision of the court 6
4 Analysis of the decision of the court 11
5 Other major decisions related to the case 17
6 Conclusory Opinion 22
7 Bibliography 26

3
 FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant (Gyarsibai w/o Jaganath), her children, her husband Jagannath and
her sister-in-law Kaisar Bai used to reside together. There were constant quarrels
between the appellant and her sister-in-law and very often Jagannath used to slap
the appellant for picking up a quarrel with her sister-in-law Kaisar Bai. It is alleged
that one such quarrel took place on the morning of 14.8.1951 when Jagannath was
away from his home. In this quarrel Kaisar Bai asked the appellant to leave the
house. Thereupon, the appellant left the house, taking her three children aged 7
years, 5 years and 1½ years and saying that on account of her sister-in-law she
would jump into a well. Soon after, the appellant went to a well in the village and
threw herself into the well along with her three children. A few hours after, some
inhabitants of the village found Gyarasibai supporting herself on an edge of the
well and the three children dead in the well.

The appellant admitted before the Committing Magistrate as well as before the
Sessions Judge that she jumped into the well together with her children on account
of her sister-in-law Kaisar Bai's harassment.

The facts had been amply established by the prosecution evidence. From the
statement of Kaisar Bai and Narayan it was clear that on the morning of the day of
occurrence, there was a quarrel between Kaisar Bai and Gyarsibai and during this
quarrel when Kaisar Bai asked the appellant to leave the house, she left the house
with her three children, saying that she would jump into a well. Kaisar Bai also

4
admitted that sometimes Jagannath used to give two or three slaps to the appellant
for quarrelling with her. The other prosecution witnesses deposed to the recovery
of the bodies of three children and to the rescue of the appellant. There was no eye-
witness of the fact that the appellant jumped down the well herself together with
her three children.

The appellant(Gyarsibai,w/o Jagannath) was convicted by the Sessions Judge of

Shajapur of an offence under Section 302, Indian Penal Code for the murder of her
three children and also of an offence under Section 309, Penal Code, for an attempt
to commit suicide. She had been sentenced to transportation for life under Section
302 Penal Code, and to six months simple imprisonment under Section 309, Penal
Code. Both these sentences had been directed to run concurrently. She however
preferred this appeal from Jail against the convictions and sentences.

ISSUES FRAMED BY THE COURT

(1) Whether the appellant is guilty of the offence of murder (under section 302,
Indian Penal Code) of the three children and of attempted suicide (under
section 309, Indian Penal Code)?
(2) If under the given circumstances, the appellant is to be held guilty, then
under which clause of Section 300, Indian Penal Code, the act of the
appellant in jumping down into a well together with her three children is
murder?

5
 DECISION OF THE COURT

The judgement of the court was delivered by Dixit, J.This is an appeal from jail by
the appellant in which the main question for decision is whether the appellant is
guilty of the offence of murder (under section 302, Indian Penal Code) of the three
children and of attempted suicide (under section 309, Indian Penal Code). The
bench included Dixit, J and Chaturvedi, J.

On these facts the only question that arises for consideration is whether the
appellant is guilty of the offence of murder of the three children and of attempted
suicide. The learned Sessions Judge found her guilty under Section 302, Penal
Code, but he did not state under which clause of Section 300, Penal Code, the act
of the appellant in jumping down into a well together with her three children is
murder. This act of the appellant clearly falls under the 4th clause of Section
300, Penal Code, which defines murder. On the facts it is clear that the appellant
Gyarsi Bai had no intention to cause the death of any of her children and she
jumped into the well not with the intention of killing her children but with the
intention of committing suicide. That being so, Clauses 1, 2 and 3 of Section
300, Penal Code, which apply to cases in which death is caused by an act done
with the intention of causing death or causing such bodily injury as is likely to
cause the death of person or sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death cannot be applied to the present case. The only clause of Section 300. Penal
Code, which then remains for consideration is the 4th clause. This clause says:

6
“If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it
must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing
death or such injury as aforesaid.”

It will be seen from this clause that if death is caused merely by doing an act with
the knowledge that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability,
cause death, then the act is not murder as is defined in Clause 4, but is mere
culpable homicide not amounting to murder. In order that an act done with such
knowledge should constitute murder, it is essential that it should have been
committed "without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such
bodily injury". The question, therefore, is whether when the appellant jumped into
the well together with her three children, she had the knowledge that her act was so
imminently dangerous, as to cause in all probability the death of her children and
further whether if she had such knowledge her act in jumping into a well with her
children was "without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such
bodily injury as is mentioned in Clause 4 of Section 300, Penal Code. Now, it
cannot be said in the present case, with any degree of force that when the appellant
jumped into a well with her children she had not the knowledge that her act was so
imminently dangerous as to cause the death of her children. Her life might have
become unbearable owing to domestic troubles and perhaps on account of these
troubles, she decided to take her own life. On account of the discord in the house,
the appellant was subjected to severe exasperation and to a long course of conduct
causing suffering and anxiety. But when on account of all these reasons, she left
the house on the day of the occurrence saying that she would jump into a well with
her children, it cannot be said that she was in such an abnormal state of mind that
could not have any Knowledge of the nature of her act.

Every sane person - and in this case we are bound to take it that the appellant was
sane - is presumed to have some knowledge of the nature of his act. This
knowledge is not negative by any mental condition short of insanity. The act of the
appellant in jumping into a well with her children is clearly one done by the
appellant knowing that it must in all probability cause the death of her children. No

7
circumstances are to be found to come to the conclusion that the appellant had
some excuse for incurring the risk of causing the death of her children. The fact
that there were quarrels between the appellant and sister-in-law and that her life
had become unbearable on account of this family discord, cannot be regarded as a
valid justification for appellant's act of jumping into a well with her children.

The words used in Clause 4 of Section 300, Penal Code are "without any excuse
for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid". These words
indicate that the imminently dangerous act is not murder if it is done to prevent a
greater evil. If the evil can be avoided without doing the act, then there can be no
valid justification for doing the act which is so imminently dangerous that it must,
in all probability, cause death or such injury as is likely to cause death. Here there
is no material, whatsoever, to come to the conclusion that the appellant could not
have escaped the harassment at the hands of her sister-in-law except by jumping
herself into a well with her three children. Therefore it can be very well inferred
and understood that the appellant's act is clearly murder under Clause 4 of Section
300, Penal Code.

However, two cases must be brought into notice in which the question of the
offence constituted by an act of a woman deliberately jumping into a well with a
child in circumstances somewhat different to those present in this case has been
considered.

The first case is one reported in - Emperor v. Dhirajia1. In this case a village
woman left her home with her six months old baby in her arms on account of her
husband's ill-treatment; after she had gone some distance from the home, she
turned round and saw her husband pursuing her. She became panicky and jumped
down into a well nearby with the baby in her arms. The baby died, but the woman
survived. On these facts, the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court held that
an intention to cause the death of the child could not be attributed to the woman,

1
ILR (1940) All 647

8
though she must be attributed with the knowledge that such an imminently
dangerous act as jumping down the well was likely to cause the child's death.

But the learned Judges held that considering the state of panic she was in, the
culpable homicide did not amount to murder as there was an excuse for incurring
the risk of causing death. Mrs. Dhirajia was thus found guilty under Section
304, Penal Code. It is not necessary to consider whether upon the facts of that case,
the conclusion that the woman was guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to
murder was justified.

But it must be observed that the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court
thought that the fear of her husband and the panic into which she was thrown could
be an excuse for incurring the risk of causing death. Here there is no question of
any panic or fright of the appellant. It is, no doubt, true, as the learned Judges of
the Allahabad High Court say that in assessing what is excuse or is not excuse, we
must consider the state of mind in which the accused person was.

But in considering the question, the state of mind of a reasonable and legally sane
person must be taken into account and then it must be determined whether the risk
of causing death could have been avoided. On this test, there can be no room for
thinking in the present case that the appellant was justified in jumping into a well
with her three children merely on account of her sister-in-law's attitude towards
her.

The other decision is of the Bombay High Court in - Supadi Lukada v. Emperor2.
In that case too, a girl of about 17 years of age who was carrying her baby on her
back jumped into a well because her husband had ill-treated her and had prevented
her from returning to her parents.

The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court held that when the girl attempted to
commit suicide by jumping into a well she could not be said to have been in a
normal condition and was not, therefore, even aware of the child's presence and
that as she was not conscious of the child, there was not such knowledge as to

2
AIR 1925 Bom 310

9
make Section 300(4) applicable. The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court
found the girl guilty under Section 304A. The Bombay case is clearly
distinguishable on the facts.

In the present case when the evidence shows that the appellant left her home
saying that she would jump into a well with her three children, it cannot clearly be
held that she was not aware that her children were with her. In bringing parlance to
the present case, these two cases are not of much assistance to the appellant.

As regards the conviction of the appellant for an attempt to commit suicide,

she has been rightly convicted of that offence. When she jumped into the well,
she did so in a conscious effort to take her own life.

The appellant has been sentenced to transportation for life under Section
302, Penal Code; this is the only sentence which could legally be passed in this
case. But having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case and also to
the fact that the appellant though not legally insane was not and could not be
in a normal state of mind when she jumped into a well with her three
children, this is not a case deserving of a severe punishment. It’s therefore,
recommend to the Government to commute the sentence of transportation for
life to one of three years rigorous imprisonment. The sentence of six months'
simple imprisonment awarded to the appellant for the offence under Section
309 is appropriate.

In the result this appeal is dismissed3.

3
scconline.com

10
 ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION OF THE COURT

As already opined by the judges, it can be clearly seen that this case primarily falls
within clause 4 of section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. What needs to be clearly
inferred is the fact that there happens to be a complete and clear difference between
an intention to cause death and an intention to commit suicide.

An intention to cause death majorly falls within the first three clauses of section
300 which define murder. Thus the first 3 clauses of section 300 apply to cases in
which death is caused by an act done with the intention of causing death or causing
such bodily injury as is likely to cause the death of person or sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death4. Hence it’s clear that the first 3 clauses do
not apply or relate to the present case.

When we talk about the fourth clause, it states that: Culpable Homicide is Murder,

“ If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it
must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause

4
Criminal law, PSA Pillai

11
death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing
death or such injury as aforesaid”

It is clear that the appellant Gyarsibai had no intention to cause the death of any of
her children and she jumped into the well not with the intention of killing her
children but with the intention of committing suicide.

If death is caused merely by doing an act with the knowledge that it is so

imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, then the act is
not murder as is defined in Clause 4, but is mere culpable homicide not amounting
to murder. In order that an act done with such knowledge should constitute murder,
it is essential that it should have been committed "without any excuse for incurring
the risk of causing death or such bodily injury.”

Since it is amply established that the appellant had no intention to cause death of
her children and herself and owing to disturbances at her house and differences
with her sister in law, she decided to jump into the well along with her children
what needs to be inferred is the fact that what mitigating circumstances were taken
into consideration while delivering the judgement.

It is also quite clear from the facts that the appellant had the knowledge that her act
was so imminently dangerous, as to cause in all probability the death of her
children and knowing so she got herself into committing the act. This shows that
the appellant’s intention was not to cause the death of her children and of herself
but to merely discharge herself and her children of the burden and ill treatment of
her sister in law so as to escape from the burdensome environment at her home.

Also what needs to be seen is the fact that when the appellant jumped into a well
with her children she had not the knowledge that her act was so imminently
dangerous as to cause the death of her children. Her life definitely become
unbearable owing to domestic troubles and perhaps on account of these troubles,

12
she decided to take her own life. It’s also clear that that on account of the discord
in the house, the appellant was subjected to severe exasperation and to a long
course of conduct causing suffering and anxiety. But when on account of all these
reasons, she left the house on the day of the occurrence saying that she would jump
into a well with her children, it cannot be said that she was in such an abnormal
state of mind that could not have any Knowledge of the nature of her act.

She was very well aware that, her act in the normal circumstances would definitely
and in all probability result in the death of her children and herself.

Talking about the clause of sanity in regards to the appellant’s condition the
honourable judges have brought about a clear inference for this matter.

Every sane person - and in this case it’s clear that that the appellant was sane - is
presumed to have some knowledge of the nature of his act5. This knowledge is not
negative by any mental condition short of insanity. The act of the appellant in
jumping into a well with her children is clearly one done by the appellant knowing
that it must in all probability cause the death of her children. There cannot be any
conclusion that the appellant had some excuse for incurring the risk of causing the
death of her children. The fact that there were quarrels between the appellant and
sister-in-law and that her life had become unbearable on account of this family
discord, cannot be regarded as a valid justification for appellant's act of jumping
into a well with her children.

The words used in Clause 4 of Section 300, Penal Code are "without any excuse
for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid". These words
indicate that the imminently dangerous act is not murder if it is done to prevent a
greater evil. If the evil can be avoided without doing the act, then there can be no
valid justification for doing the act which is so imminently dangerous that it must,

5
Criminal Law, K.D.Gaur

13
in all probability, cause death or such injury as is likely to cause death. Here there
is no material, whatsoever, to come to the conclusion that the appellant could not
have escaped the harassment at the hands of her sister-in-law except by jumping
herself into a well with her three children.

While drawing relation to the above mentioned clause, the honourable judges have
made it clear that there was no point in the appellant’s thinking or coming to a
particularity that she could have escaped the torture and ill-treatment just by
ending her life and ending her children’s life. This would mean highly irrational
and foolish on the part of the appellant who survived death on account of her fate.

The honourable judges have also thrown light on two cases while delivering the
judgement as regards and in relation to the present case. Both these cases are in
relation and parlance in regard to facts with the present case.

(1) Emperor v. Dhirajia ILR (1940) All 647

In this case a village woman left her home with her six months old baby in her
arms on account of her husband's ill treatment; after she had gone some distance
from the home, she turned round and saw her husband pursuing her. She became
panicky and jumped down into a well nearby with the baby in her arms. The baby
died, but the woman survived. On these facts, the learned Judges of the Allahabad
High Court held that an intention to cause the death of the child could not be
attributed to the woman, though she must be attributed with the knowledge that
such an imminently dangerous act as jumping down the well was likely to cause
the child's death.

14
But the learned Judges held that considering the state of panic she was in, the
culpable homicide did not amount to murder as there was an excuse for incurring
the risk of causing death6. Mrs Dhirajia was thus found guilty under Section
304, Penal Code.

The learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court thought that the fear of her
husband and the panic into which she was thrown could be an excuse for incurring
the risk of causing death.

But as in the present case, if the mental situation of the accused were to be taken
into consideration, there is no question of any panic or fright on then appellant’s
part; except for the mental element of depression which is quite a different factor.

While analysing the present case we must take into account the state of mind of a
reasonable and legally sane person and then determine whether the risk of causing
death could have been avoided. On this test, there can be no room for thinking in
the present case that the appellant was justified in jumping into a well with her
three children merely on account of her sister-in-law's attitude towards her.

Thus two opposing dimensions relating to the conviction under section 300 can be
framed. The first issue relates to the clause of intention and the second relates the
case to the clause of knowledge as under the provisions o murder.

(2) Supadi Lukada v. Emperor AIR 1925 Bom 310

In this case, a girl of about 17 years of age who was carrying her baby on her back
jumped into a well because her husband had ill-treated her and had prevented her
from returning to her parents.
6
Criminal Law, Prof.S.N.Mishra

15
The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court held that when the girl attempted to
commit suicide by jumping into a well she could not be said to have been in a
normal condition and was not, therefore, even aware of the child's presence and
that as she was not conscious of the child, there was not such knowledge as to
make Section 300(4) applicable. The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court
found the girl guilty under Section 304A.

To be quite precise, the elements relating to- knowledge of the act causing death
and intention to cause death were both absent in this case. Therefore, the learned
judges felt appropriate in bringing this case under section 304A of the Indian Penal
Code (causing death by negligence).

But in the present case when the evidence shows that the appellant left her home
saying that she would jump into a well with her three children, it cannot clearly be
held that she was not aware that her children were with her.

Though these cases are much in relation to the present case, but still they do not
hold good in regard to the decision to this particular case. The peculiar
circumstances of this particular case are in contrast to the facts and decisions of the
previous and later decisions.

Thus, finally we arrive at a point wherein we see that the honourable judges in this
case delivered the following decision framing two prime issues:

(1) The appellant was convicted for an attempt to commit suicide. There is no
point in arguing over this particular issue, because as per the facts and
circumstances of the case, when she jumped into the well, she did so in a
conscious effort to take her own life and this indicates her intention of
committing suicide and thus ending her life.

16
Thus she is rightly convicted under section 309 of the Indian Penal Code and this
conviction holds appropriate.

(2) The appellant was sentenced to transportation for life under Section
302, Penal Code by the session’s court. This is the only sentence which
could legally be passed in this case. But having regard to the fact and
circumstances of the case and also to the fact that the appellant though not
legally insane was not and could not be in a normal state of mind when she
jumped into a well with her three children, this is not a case deserving of a
severe punishment. Therefore, the Government was recommended to
commute the sentence of transportation for life to one of three years rigorous
imprisonment.

Hence it can be very well established from the facts, circumstances as well as the
judgement that the appellant was not a legally insane person. But at the same time
the honourable judges made it a point to explain that she was also not in a normal
state of mind when she jumped into the well along with her three children.

Thus two opposing interests need to be taken into consideration here. The first one
relates to the legal sanity of the appellant and the second one relates to the
abnormal mind setup carried by the appellant during the act. The judges thus
converted the sentence of transportation for life to one of three years rigorous
imprisonment.

OTHER MAJOR DECISIONS RELATED TO THE CASE

(1) State of Madhya Pradesh v Ram Prasad7

The accused Ram Prasad and his wife Raji had a quarrel. Villagers were called to
mediate, but no avail. At that time, the accused poured kerosene oil over the
accused and set her on fire. She suffered extensive burn injuries and died as a
result of the injuries.

The Supreme Court held that though generally clause 4 of section 300 is invoked
where there is no intention to cause the death of any particular person, the clause
7
AIR 1968 SC 881

17
may on its terms be used in those cases where there is such callousness towards the
result, and the risk taken is such that it may be stated that the person knows that the
act is likely to cause death.

When the accused poured kerosene and set fire to his wife, he must have known
that the act would result in her death. As he had no reason for incurring such risk,
the offence was held fall within clause 4 of section 300 and would be culpable
homicide amounting to murder.

(2) Jagtar Singh v State of Punjab8

A sudden quarrel on a spur of moment arose out of a trivial reason on a chance

meeting between the accused and the victim. The accused caused a single blow by
knife in the chest of the victim resulting in his death.

On these facts it was held that the intention to cause death or causing particular
injury could not be imputed to the accused. Therefore, mere knowledge on the part
of the accused that he was likely to cause injury which was likely to cause death
could be inferred. The accused was held guilty u/s 300, clause 4 of the IPC.

(3) Thangaiya v State of Tamil Nadu9

The Supreme Court categorically ruled that clause 4 of section 300 would be
applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the possibility of death of a
person approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the
offender must be of the highest degree of probability.

(4) Sehaj Ram v State of Haryana10

8
1983 Cr L.J. 852 SC
9
2005 9 SCC 650
10
AIR 1983 SC 614

18
A constable, who was armed with a 303 rifle, fired several shots at another
constable, as result of which he died on the spot. It was held that having regard to
the fact that the accused had used a dangerous weapon like a rifle (being a
constable he must have known that it was a dangerous weapon) and having regard
to the fact that he had fired five shots, one of which was hit after the victim was hit
by a bullet and collapsed on the ground, it is impossible to accept the contention
that the appellant had not done the act with the intention of causing his death.

There is no point in arguing that the intention was merely to frighten him or to
cause him Grievous Hurt. The case fell under clause 4 of section 300, IPC.

(5) Minai w/o Hudika v Emperor11

In this case, a woman administered a fatal dose of dhatura in her husband’s food
with a motive to get rid of her husband. It was ruled that she had committed
murder and hence she was guilty under section 300, clause 4 of the IPC.

ILLUSTRATIONS

(1) The accused cut the deceased woman with a sword several times, and when she
had fallen down exhausted, surrounded her with hay and set her on fire in spite
of protests by relatives of the deceased woman. She sustained several burn
injuries and died the next day. The accused pleaded that he did all this for the
purpose of exorcising a devil which was believed to have possessed the woman
and that while he was doing this; he was under the divine influence.

It was held hat such a defence was not permitted by law and the accused was
guilty of murder under section 300, clause 4 of the Indian Penal Code.

(2) Four accused persons were all armed with heavy sticks. They beat the
deceased who was defenceless an armless. They inflicted several blows
11
AIR 1938 Nag. 318

19
 completely smashing the skull due to which he died. All four accused were
held guilty of murder under clause 4, section 300 of the IPC.

(6) Emperor v Dwarka Poonja12

The accused jumped into a well to escape and avoid the police. The evidence
showed that he came out of the well on his own accord. There was no evidence to
show that he had jumped into the well to commit suicide. Therefore the court
quashed his conviction under section 309(attempt to commit suicide) and set him
free.

(7) Kavita v State of Tamil Nadu13

When PW-1(prosecution witness) went to answer the call of nature, he saw the
appellant jumping into a well situated nearby and when he ran to the well and
looked down, he saw the appellant struggling for life and a male child’s body
floating on the water. He went to the village and called three other, PW-2, PW-3
and one Meera to the pace of occurrence. Three men went down the well and
brought out the appellant. When questioned by them she replied that she was not
able to withstand the daily torture at the hands of her husband and decided to bring
an end to her life. The male child’s body was brought out of the well.

There was no witness who had seen the appellant throwing her children into the
well. There was no evidence on record showing that the accused jumped into the
well after throwing her children therein.

The versions of PW-1 were ruled inconsistent.

The alleged extra judicial confession was not proved satisfactorily.

12
1912 14 Bom LR 146
13
AIR 1998 SC 2473

20
The reason for delay in conducting the post-mortem the next day was not available
on record.

The doctor who performed the post mortem was also unclear as to how the body of
the male child was able to float instantly while the body of the female child was
fully sunk in the water.

Testimony of the witness that he saw the body of the male child floating when he
looked into the well immediately after the accused jumped therein to commit
suicide was contradictory to the prosecution’s contention and against the principle
of buoyancy of human body.

Guilt of the accused was held not to have been proved beyond doubt and therefore
her conviction under sections 300 and 309, IPC was set aside.

Though the following judgement doesn’t hold relative relevance in regard to the
present case, yet it becomes inevitable for us to cite it, as it happens to be landmark
decision in the sphere of section 309 and in relevance to the provisions of suicide.

(8) Gian Kaur v State of Punjab14

In this case it was held that section 309 of the IPC providing for imposition of
punishment for attempt to commit suicide is not violative of Article 14 of the
constitution. Right to die is not included in the right to life under article 21. Thus
right to live with human dignity cannot be construed to include within its ambit the
right to terminate natural life, at least before commencement of natural process of
certain death.

14
1996 Cr LJ 549 A.P.

21
Therefore it can’t be said that section 309 is violative either of article 14 or article
21 of the constitution.

ILLUSTRATIONS

(1) ‘A’ in a state of drunkenness jumps in a well in an obvious attempt to

commit suicide. ‘A’ would be liable for an offence under this section
because it appears that he was voluntarily drunk and he has not gone to sleep
under the influence of drink that he was about what he attempted to do.
(2) A university student leader declared for self-immolation. He got logs piled
up in front of the main gate of the university and sprinkled kerosene oil over
it. Thereafter he climbed over the pile of wood. He was caught by police just
after striking a match to light the fire. He was found guilty of attempt to
commit suicide.

CONCLUSORY OPINION

I humbly agree with the ratio decindi of the honourable judges in this case. The
appellant was rightly convicted by the judges in the case. Since this was a
judgement pronounced by the judges on an appeal by the convict from the jail, we
see that the appellant was already serving a term of imprisonment as according to
the decision of the Sessions judge. Thus she was praying for relief through an
appeal from the jail itself.

As we deeply analyse the facts and circumstances of the case, we see that the
issues broadly fall into 2 aspects which are- conviction under section 302 and
conviction under section 309 of the Indian Penal Code.

The honourable judges in their decision made it a point to make sure they were
exact in mentioning the appropriate clause under which the act fell; i.e. clause 4 of
section 300.

The second part of the decision relating to ‘an attempt to commit suicide’ is
appropriate and exact; as according to the facts the appellant had a definite
intention and knowledge to put an end to her life owing to the disturbances at her

22
house. But as the death was not caused she was convicted for half murder, i.e. an
attempt to commit suicide.

Coming to the point of the decision of the Sessions judge, we see that the judge did
convict the appellant for murder under section 302 but did not mention the clause/s
under section 300 for such conviction. This means that there was to be a varied
opinion in regard to the ‘intention and knowledge’ of the appellant during the
commission of the crime. This might have been one of the factors that led the
appellant to file an appeal before the honourable judges.

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GYARSIBAI v THE STATE

While pronouncing the decision, both the benches, i.e. Sessions judge at Shajapur
as well as the present bench reserved their respective opinion in delivering
pronouncements with varying degree of punishments with regard to the provision
of murder. But they had a common saying in relation to the fact of an attempt to
murder.

In my opinion, the present bench clearly showed and highlighted the demarcated
distinctions between the first 3 clauses and the fourth clause of section 300.

It’s clear that there is a difference in the pronouncement of judgments in relation to

the provision of ‘intention’ as against the pronouncement of the provision of the
‘knowledge’ element.

While the sessions judge delivered the decision for transportation for life taking
into consideration the entire section of 300(not mentioning the particular clause),
the present bench reserved its opinion in changing the conviction to that of a
rigorous imprisonment of three years.

In my opinion, the current bench was correct in convicting the appellant under
section 300 clause 4 of the IPC. It also reduced the punishment from transportation
for life to three year rigorous imprisonment. It is because of the fact that the facts
of the case were lacking the element of intention to cause death and hence clearly
highlighted the element of ‘knowledge’ of the imminently dangerous act resulting
in death.

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GYARSIBAI v THE STATE

Last but not the least, the following conclusions can be easily inferred from the
facts of the case:
(1) The appellant was not a legally insane person during the commission of the
act. Also, she was not in a normal state of mind as she was extremely
stressed and depressed owing to the ill treatment by her sister in law and the
peculiar conditions at her house.
(2) Also, she never had the intention to cause death of her children or of herself.
According to the facts and the circumstances, as opined by the judges, she
just wanted to put an end to the difficulties faced by her.
(3) But at the same time, she did have the knowledge that her act was
imminently dangerous and in probability would result in the death of her
children.
(4) Since the element of ‘intention’ was lacking , the honourable judges felt it
correct to reduce the term of imprisonment by convicting the appellant(also
owing to her mental and abnormal) under section 300 clause 4 of the IPC,
which talks about the element of ‘knowledge ‘in relation to the act of
murder.
(5) As for the act of ‘attempting to commit suicide’, the conviction under
section 309 was upheld by the current bench. The facts were clear in
indicating the relation between the circumstances and the conviction.

Henceforth on a note of conclusion, I humbly submit that I completely agree

with the decision of the honourable judges. All the relevant provisions and
clauses of the Penal Code have been completely adhered to by the judges in
delivering the judgment.

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GYARSIBAI v THE STATE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acts Referred

Indian Penal Code, 1860

Books Referred

Criminal Law, PSA Pillai, Lexis Nexis.

Criminal Law, Prof. S.N.Mishra.
Criminal Law, K.D. Gaur.

Websites Referred

www.manupatra.com
www.legalservicesindia.com
www.scconline.com
www.indiankanoon.com

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