Rizal Cement Co. Inc. v.

Villareal

G.R. No. L- 30272

February 28,1985.

FACTS: Respondents are applicants for the registration of 2 agricultural lands located
in Rizal. They presented testimonial and documentary evidence appearing that the
property applied for, designated as Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-147662, have a total
area of 26,015 sq.m.; that these lots originally belonged to one Maria Certeza; that upon
her death, the property was involved in a litigation between her grandchildren and
Gonzalo Certeza and that the lots were given by the latter to former Justice de Joya as
the latter's attorney's fees; that the lots were then sold by de Joya to Filomeno Sta. Ana
who, in turn sold the same to spouses Victoriano Cervo and Ignacia Guillermo in 1939;
that sometime in November 1955, the said spouses sold the said lots to the herein
applicants as shown by a duly notarized deed of sale. The spouses Cervo declared the
property for taxation purposes in the name of the wife, Ignacia Guillermo, and paid for
the realty taxes due thereon; that prior to the sale, the spouses Cervo had the two
parcels surveyed first in 1950 and then in 1955. On the other hand, oppositor, (now
petitioner) Rizal Cement Company, claims to be the owner of the subject lots, having
bought the same from Maria Certeza, and to have been in continuous and adverse
possession of the property since 1911. To substantiate its claim, Rizal Cement Co.
submitted documentary evidence.

After trial, the CFI denied the application for registration of respondents and ordered the
issuance of a decree of registration in the name of Rizal Cement Co, after finality of said
decision. Respondents appealed to the CA, which reversed and set aside the CFI’s
decision in favour of the respondents. The CA denied Rizal’s MR, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the respondents had been in actual possession of the land in question.

HELD: YES. As to who had been in actual possession of the land in question, the CA
gave credence to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents applicants. The right to
possess flows from ownership. No person will suffer adverse possession by another of
what belongs to him. Were the Rizal Cement Co. the rightful owner of the land in
question, it would not have allowed the tenants to cultivate the land and give the
owner's share to appellants and/or their predecessors. Possession is acquired by the
material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right or by the fact it is subject to the
action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring
such right. Petitioner's evidence, consisting of tax receipts, tax declaration and survey
plan are not conclusive and indisputable basis of one's ownership of the property in
question. Assessment alone is of little value as proof of title. Mere tax declaration does
not vest ownership of the property upon the declarant. Settled is the rule that neither tax
receipts nor declaration of ownership for taxation purposes alone constitutes sufficient
evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty. They must be supported by
other effective proofs. Neither can the survey plan or technical descriptions prepared at
the instance of the party concerned be considered in his favor, the same being self-
serving.

DOCTRINE: Neither tax receipts nor declaration of ownership for taxation purposes
alone constitutes sufficient evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty. They
must be supported by other effective proofs. Neither can the survey plan or technical
descriptions prepared at the instance of the party concerned be considered in his
favour, the same being self-serving.

Wong v. Carpio

G.R. No. 50264

October 21, 1991, 203 SCRA 118

FACTS: William Giger sold a parcel of land through a pacto de recto sale to Manuel
Mercado. Mercado only began to harvest the coconut fruits but he never placed anyone
over the land to watch it. Neither did he reside in the land nor was there any hut
constructed thereon to show possession. Thereafter, Ignacio Wong inspected the land
to see if whether there was anyone claiming the land. After finding there was none, he
bought the land from Giger. He placed workers on the land, constructed a farmhouse,
and fenced the boundaries. He couldn't register the sale due to some technicalities.

ISSUE: Whether the possession of the disputed land belongs to Ignacio Wong.

HELD: It is clear that possession passed from vendor William Giger to private
respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of the first sale a retro, and accordingly, the later
sale a retro in favor of petitioner failed to pass the possession of the property because
there is an impediment — the possession exercised by private respondent. Possession
as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in
the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession,
the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessions, the one longer in
possession, if the dates of possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if
these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending
determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.

DOCTRINE: Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the

exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the
proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right - and that the execution of a
sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, unless there
is stipulation to the contrary. If, however, notwithstanding the execution of the
instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing
and make use of it herself, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by
another, then delivery has not been effected.

Somodio v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 82680

August 15, 1994, 235 SCRA 307

FACTS: Wilfredo Mabugat and Nicanor Somodio bought a residential lot situated at
Rajah Muda, Bula, General Santos. Petitioner and Mabugat partitioned the property into
two portions, with petitioner taking the western part. Immediately after the partition,
petitioner took possession of his portion and planted thereon ipil-ipil trees, coconut trees
and other fruit-bearing trees. In 1976, petitioner began construction of a structure with a
dimension of 22-by-18 feet on his lot. His employment, however, took him to
Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and he left the unfinished structure to the case of his uncle.
He would visit the property every three months or on weekened when he had time.
Sometime in October 1977, petitioner allowed respondent Felomino Ayco, to transfer
his hut to petitioner's lot. About six years later, petitioner demanded that Ayco vacate
the premises but such demand proved futile. Hence, on August 23, 1983, petitioner filed
an action for unlawful detainer with damages against respondent Ayco. Meanwhile, on
June 26, 1983, respondent Ebenecer Purisima entered the land and constructed a
house thereon. Four days later, petitioner filed against respondent Purisima a complaint
for forcible entry before the same court docketed as Civil Case No. 2013-I. Said case
was later consolidated with Civil Case No. 2032-II.

ISSUE: Whether Somodio has actual possession of the property.

HELD: Yes. Article 531 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that possession is
acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact
that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right. Petitioner took possession of the property
sometime in 1974 when he planted the property to coconut trees, ipil- ipil trees and fruit
trees. In 1976, he started the construction of a building on the property. It is immaterial
that the building was unfinished and that he left for Kidapawan for employment reasons
and visited the property only intermittently.

DOCTRINE: Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have
his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession
(Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175 [1918]). It is sufficient that petitioner was able
to subject the property to the action of his will.
 Maglucot – Aw v. Maglucot
G.R. No. 132518
March 28, 2000, 329 SCRA 78

FACTS: Sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral agreement to tentatively partition Lot
No. 1639. By virtue of this agreement, the original co-owners occupied specific portions
of Lot No. 1639. It was only in 1952 when the petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639 was
filed because two of the co-owners, namely Hermogenes Olis and heirs of Pascual Olis,
refused to have said lot subdivided and have separate certificates of title. Significantly,
after the 1952 proceedings, the parties in this case by themselves and/or through their
predecessors-in-interest occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with
the sketch plan. Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of the subject
lot. Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of
subject lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying rentals therefor. Said
respondents built houses on their corresponding leased lots. They paid the rental
amount of P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs of
Roberto Maglucot, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. In December 1992, however,
said respondents stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot
alleging they had a right over the land because such was not partitioned and they were
co-owners. Manglucot-Aw thus filed a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages against Manglucot.

ISSUE: Whether Manglucot-Aw may recover possession by virtue of a valid partition.

HELD: Yes. An order for partition is final and not interlocutory and, hence, appealable
because it decides the rights of the parties upon the issue submitted. In this case, both
the order of partition and the unconfirmed sketch plan are, thus, interlocutory.
Nevertheless, where parties do not object to the interlocutory decree, but show by their
conduct that they have assented thereto, they cannot thereafter question the decree,
especially, where, by reason of their conduct, considerable expense has been incurred
in the execution of the commission. Respondents in this case have occupied their
respective lots in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. They cannot after
acquiescing to the order for more than forty (40) years be allowed to question the
binding effect thereof. Under the present rule, the proceedings of the commissioners
without being confirmed by the court are not binding upon the parties. However, this rule
does not apply in case where the parties themselves actualized the supposedly
unconfirmed sketch/subdivision plan. The purpose of court approval is to give effect to
the sketch/subdivision plan. In this case, the parties themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest implemented the sketch plan made pursuant to a court order
for partition by actually occupying specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in 1952 and continue
to do so until the present until this case was filed, clearly, the purpose of the court
approval has been met. This statement is not to be taken to mean that confirmation of
the commissioners may be dispensed with but only that the parties herein are estopped
from raising this question by their own acts of ratification of the supposedly non-binding
sketch/subdivision plan.
 Cequeña v. Bolante

G.R. No. 137944

April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 216

FACTS: The petitioners Fernanda Mendoza Cequeña and Eduarda Apiado sought for
the ownership and possession of the land occupied by the respondent Honorata
Bolante. Prior to 1954, the land in Binangonan, Rizal was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, the father of respondent. Sinforoso died in
1930. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza
of the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito
Mendoza, the father of the petitioners. Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. During the
cadastral survey, respondent Honorata is the present occupant of the land together with
Miguel Mendoza, another brother of the petitioners. The trial court rendered the
petitioners as the lawful owner and possessors of the land. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision because the genuineness and the due execution of the
affidavit. It was said to be insufficient to overcome the denial of respondent and her
mother. Moreover, the probative value of petitioners’ tax receipts and declarations paled
in comparison with respondent’s proof of ownership of the disputed parcel. The actual,
physical, exclusive and continuous possession by respondent since 1985 gave her a
better title under Article 538 of the Civil Code. The petitioners contended otherwise that
she came into possession through force and violence, contrary to Article 536 of the Civil
Code.

ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not the respondent has the actual, physical, exclusive and
continuous possession of the land.

2.) Whether or not tax declarations and receipts are conclusive evidence
of ownership or possession.

HELD: 1.) Yes. Possession by the petitioner before 1985 was not exclusive, as the
respondent also acquired it before 1985. The records show that the petitioners’ father
and brother, as well as the respondent and her mother were simultaneously in adverse
possession of the land. Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the
preferred possessor because, benefitting from her father’s tax declaration of the subject
lot since 1926, she has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other
hand, petitioners’ father acquired joint possession only in 1952.

2.) No. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession
of the property for which taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual public and
adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove
ownership. The petitioners’ claim of ownership of the whole parcel has no legal basis.